ON THE SUBLIME
CHAPTERS 33- 36
LONGINUS
c. 213-273
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ON THE SUBLIME - PART EIGHT
Chapters XXXIII - XXXVI
XXXIII
COME, now, let us take some writer who is
really immaculate and beyond reproach. Is
it not worth while, on this very point, to
raise the general question whether we ought
to give the preference, in poems and prose
writings, to grandeur with some attendant
faults, or to success which is moderate but
altogether sound and free from error? Aye,
and further, whether a greater number of
excellences, or excellences higher in quality,
would in literature rightly bear away the
palm? For these are inquiries appropriate
to a treatise on the sublime, and they imperatively
demand a settlement. 2. For my part, I am
well aware that lofty genius is far removed
from flawlessness; for invariable accuracy
incurs the risk of pettiness, and in the
sublime, as in great fortunes, there must
be something which is overlooked. It may
be necessarily the case that low and average
natures remain as a rule free from failing
and in greater safety because they never
run a risk or seek to scale the heights,
while great endowments prove insecure because
of their very greatness. 3. In the second
place, I am not ignorant that it naturally
happens that the worse side of human character
is always the more easily recognised, and
that the memory of errors remains indelible,
while that of excellences quickly dies away.
4. I have myself noted not a few errors on
the part of Homer and other writers of the
greatest distinction, and the slips they
have made afford me anything but pleasure.
Still I do not term them wilful errors, but
rather oversights of a random and casual
kind, due to neglect and introduced with
all the heedlessness of genius. Consequently
I do not waver in my view that excellences
higher in quality, even if not sustained
throughout, should always on a comparison
be voted the first place, because of their
sheer elevation of spirit if for no other
reason. Granted that Apollonius in his Argonautica
shows himself a poet who does not trip, and
that in his pastorals Theocritus is, except
in a few externals, most happy, would you
not, for all that, choose to be Homer rather
than Apollonius? 5. Again: does Eratosthenes
in the Erigone (a little poem which is altogether
free from flaw) show himself a greater poet
than Archilochus with the rich and disorderly
abundance which follows in his train and
with that outburst of the divine spirit within
him which it is difficult to bring under
the rules of law? Once more: in lyric poetry
would you prefer to be Bacchylides rather
than Pindar? And in tragedy to be Ion of
Chios rather than--Sophocles? It is true
that Bacchylides and Ion are faultless and
entirely elegant writers of the polished
school, while Pindar and Sophocles, although
at times they burn everything before them
as it were in their swift career, are often
extinguished unaccountably and fail most
lamentably. But would anyone in his senses
regard all the compositions of Ion put together
as an equivalent for the single play of the
Oedipus?
XXXIV
If successful writing were to be estimated
by number of merits and not by the true criterion,
thus judged Hyperides would be altogether
superior to Demosthenes. For he has a greater
variety of accents than Demosthenes and a
greater number of excellences, and like the
pentathlete he falls just below the top in
every branch. In all the contests he has
to resign the first place to his rivals,
while he maintains that place as against
all ordinary persons. 2. Now Hyperides not
only imitates all the strong points of Demosthenes
with the exception of his composition, but
he has embraced in a singular degree the
excellences and graces of Lysias as well.
For he talks with simplicity, where it is
required, and does not adopt like Demosthenes
one unvarying tone in all his utterances.
He possesses the gift of characterisation
in a sweet and pleasant form and with a touch
of piquancy. There are innumerable signs
of wit in him--the most polished raillery,
high-bred ease, supple skill in the contests
of irony, jests not tasteless or rude after
the well-known Attic manner but naturally
suggested by the subject, clever ridicule,
much comic power, biting satire with well-directed
fun, and what may be termed an inimitable
charm investing the whole. He is excellently
fitted by nature to excite pity; in narrating
a fable he is facile, and with his pliant
spirit he is also most easily turned towards
a digression (as for instance in his rather
poetical presentation of the story of Leto),
while he has treated his Funeral Oration
in the epideictic vein with probably unequalled
success. 3. Demosthenes, on the other hand,
is not an apt delineator of character, he
is not facile, he is anything but pliant
or epideictic, he is comparatively lacking
in the entire list of excellences just given.
Where he forces himself to be jocular and
pleasant, he does not excite laughter but
rather becomes the subject of it, and when
he wishes to approach the region of charm,
he is all the farther removed from it. If
he had attempted to write the short speech
about Phryne or about Athenogenes, he would
have all the more commended Hyperides to
our regard. 4. The good points of the latter,
however, many though they be, are wanting
in elevation; they are the staid utterances
of a sober-hearted man and leave the hearer
unmoved, no one feeling terror when he reads
Hyperides. But Demosthenes draws--as from
a store-- excellences allied to the highest
sublimity and perfected to the utmost, the
tone of lofty speech, living passions, copiousness,
readiness, speed (where it is legitimate),
and that power and vehemence of his which
forbid approach. Having, I say, absorbed
bodily within himself these mighty gifts
which we may deem heaven-sent (for it would
not be right to term them human), he thus
with the noble qualities which are his own
routs all comers even where the qualities
he does not possess are concerned, and overpowers
with thunder and with lightning the orators
of every age. One could sooner face with
unflinching eyes a descending thunderbolt
than meet with steady gaze his bursts of
passion in their swift succession.
XXXV
But in the case of Plato and Lysias there
is, as I said, a further point of difference.
For not only in the degree of his excellences,
but also in their number, Lysias is much
inferior to Plato; and at the same time he
surpasses him in his faults still more than
he falls below him in his excellences. 2.
What fact, then, was before the eyes of those
superhuman writers who, aiming at everything
that was highest in composition, contemned
an all-pervading accuracy? This besides many
other things, that Nature has appointed us
men to be no base nor ignoble animals; but
when she ushers us into life and into the
vast universe as into some great assembly,
to be as it were spectators of the mighty
whole and the keenest aspirants for honour,
forthwith she implants in our souls the unconquerable
love of whatever is elevated and more divine
than we. 3. Wherefore not even the entire
universe suffices for the thought and contemplation
within the reach of the human mind, but our
imaginations often pass beyond the bounds
of space, and if we survey our life on every
side and see how much more it everywhere
abounds in what is striking, and great, and
beautiful, we shall soon discern the purpose
of our birth. 4. This is why, by a sort of
natural impulse, we admire not the small
streams, useful and pellucid though they
be, but the Nile, the Danube or the Rhine,
and still more the Ocean. Nor do we view
the tiny flame of our own kindling (guarded
in lasting purity as its light ever is) with
greater awe than the celestial fires though
they are often shrouded in darkness; nor
do we deem it a greater marvel than the craters
of Etna, whose eruptions throw up stones
from its depths and great masses of rock,
and at times pour forth rivers of that pure
and unmixed subterranean fire. 5. In all
such matters we may say that what is useful
or necessary men regard as commonplace, while
they reserve their admiration for that which
is astounding.
XXXVI
Now as regards the manifestations of the
sublime in literature, in which grandeur
is never, as it sometimes is in nature, found
apart from utility and advantage, it is fitting
to observe at once that, though writers of
this magnitude are far removed from faultlessness,
they none the less all rise above what is
mortal; that all other qualities prove their
possessors to be men, but sublimity raises
them near the majesty of God; and that while
immunity from errors relieves from censure,
it is grandeur that excites admiration. 2.
What need to add thereto that each of these
supreme authors often redeems all his failures
by a single sublime and happy touch, and
(most important of all) that if one were
to pick out and mass together the blunders
of Homer, Demosthenes, Plato, and all the
rest of the greatest writers, they would
be found to be a very small part, nay an
infinitesimal fraction, of the triumphs which
those heroes achieve on every hand? This
is the reason why the judgment of all posterity
--a verdict which envy itself cannot convict
of perversity-- has brought and offered those
meeds of victory which up to this day it
guards intact and seems likely still to preserve,
Long as earth's waters shall flow, and her
tall trees burgeon and bloom.
3. In reply, however, to the writer who maintains
that the faulty Colossus is not superior
to the Spearman of Polycleitus, it is obvious
to remark among many other things that in
art the utmost exactitude is admired, grandeur
in the works of nature; and that it is by
nature that man is a being gifted with speech.
In statues likeness to man is the quality
required; in discourse we demand, as I said,
that which transcends the human. 4. Nevertheless--and
the counsel about to be given reverts to
the beginning of our memoir--since freedom
from failings is for the most part the successful
result of art, and excellence (though it
may be unevenly sustained) the result of
sublimity, the employment of art is in every
way a fitting aid to nature; for it is the
conjunction of the two which tends to ensure
perfection.
Such are the decisions to which we have felt
bound to come with regard to the questions
proposed; but let every man cherish the view
which pleases him best.
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