Transition Period, A Idealism & Scepticism
2. HUME.
We must add to what has preceded an account
of the Scepticism of Hume, which has been
given a more important place in history than
it deserves from its intrinsic nature; its
historic importance is due to the fact that
Kant really derives the starting point of
his philosophy from Hume.
David Hume was born in 1711 at Edinburgh
and died there in 1776. He held a librarian's
post in that town for some time, then he
became secretary to the Embassy in Paris;
for quite a long period, indeed, he moved
in diplomatic circles. In Paris he came to
know Jean Jacques Rousseau and invited him
to England, but Rousseau's terribly distrustful
and suspicious nature very soon estranged
the two. (1) Hume is more celebrated as a
writer of history than through his philosophic
works. He wrote: “A Treatise of human nature,”
3 vols., 1739, translated into German by
Jacob, Halle, 1790, 8vo; likewise “Essays
and Treatises on several subjects,” 2 vols.
(Vol. 1. containing “Essays moral, political
and literary,” printed for the first time
in Edinburgh, 1742; Vol. II. containing an
“Inquiry concerning human understanding”
a further development of the Treatise, and
first printed separately in London, 1748,
8vo). In his “Essays,” which contributed
most to his fame as far as the philosophic
side is concerned, he treated philosophic
subjects as an educated, thoughtful man of
the world would do — not in a systematic
connection, nor showing the wide range which
his thoughts should properly have been able
to attain; in fact in some of his treatises
he merely dealt with particular points of
view.
We must shortly deal with the main aspects
of Hume's philosophy. He starts directly
from the philosophic standpoint of Locke
and Bacon, which derives our conceptions
from experience, and his scepticism has the
idealism of Berkeley as its object. The sequence
of thought is this: Berkeley allows all ideas
to hold good as they are; in Hume the antithesis
of the sensuous and universal has cleared
and more sharply defined itself, sense being
pronounced by him to be devoid of universality.
Berkeley does not make any distinction as
to whether in his sensations there is a necessary
connection or not. Formerly experience was
a mixture of the two elements. Hume tells
us that all perceptions of the mind may be
divided into two classes or species, that
of impressions, i. e. sensuous perceptions,
and thoughts or ideas; the latter are similar
in content to the former, but less forcible
and lively. All objects of reason are consequently
either relations of thoughts such as mathematical
axioms, or facts of experience. (2) Since
Hume makes these into the content he naturally
rejects innate ideas. (3)
Now when Hume goes on to consider more closely
what is subsumed under experience, he finds
categories of the understanding present there,
and more especially the determination of
the universal and of universal necessity;
he took under his consideration more particularly
the category of cause and effect, and in
it set forth the rational element, inasmuch
as in this causal relationship necessity
is especially contained. Here Hume really
completed the system of Locke, since he consistently
drew attention to the fact that if this point
of view be adhered to, experience is indeed
the principle of whatever one knows, or perception
itself contains everything that happens,
but nevertheless the determination of universality
and necessity are not contained in, nor were
they given us by experience. Hume has thus
destroyed the objectivity or absolute nature
of thought-determinations. “Our conviction
of the truth of a fact rests on feeling,
memory, and the reasonings founded on the
causal connection, i. e. on the relation
of cause and effect. The knowledge of this
relation is not attained by reasonings a
priori, but arises entirely from experience;
and we draw inferences, since we expect similar
results to follow from similar causes, by
reason of the principle of the custom or
habit of conjoining different manifestations,
i. e. by reason of the principle of the association
of ideas. Hence there is no knowledge and
no metaphysics beyond experience.” (4)
The simple thought we have here is exactly
what Locke says, that we must receive the
conception of cause and effect, and thus
of a necessary connection, from experience;
but experience, as sensuous perception, contains
no necessity, has no causal connection. For
in what we term such, that which we properly
speaking perceive is merely the fact that
something first of all happens and that then
something else follows. Immediate perception
relates only to a content of conditions or
things which are present alongside of and
in succession to one another, but not to
what we call cause and effect; in time-succession
there is thus no relation of cause and effect,
and consequently no necessity either. (5)
When we say the pressure of the water is
the cause of the destruction of this house,
that is no pure experience. We have merely
seen the water pressing or moving along in
this direction, and subsequently the house
falling down; and so with other examples.
Necessity is thus not justified by experience,
but we carry it into experience; it is accidentally
arrived at by us and is subjective merely.
This kind of universality which we connect
with necessity, Hume calls custom. Because
we have often seen results to follow we are
accustomed to regard the connection as a
necessary one; the necessity to him is thus
a quite contingent association of ideas,
which is custom.
It is the same thing in respect of the universal.
What we perceive are individual phenomena
and sensations in which we see that this
is now one thing and now another. It may
likewise be that we perceive the same determination
frequently repeated and in manifold ways.
But this is still far removed from universality;
universality is a determination which is
not given to us through experience. It may
be said that this is quite a correct remark
on Hume's part, if by experience we understand
outward experience. Experience is sensible
that something exists, but nevertheless the
universal is not as yet present in it. Indeed,
sensuous existence as such is something which
is set forth as indifferent, not differentiated
from anything else; but sensuous existence
is likewise universal in itself, or the indifference
of its determinateness is not its only determinateness.
But since Hume regards necessity, the unity
of opposites, as resting quite subjectively
on custom, we cannot get any deeper in thought.
Custom is indeed so far a necessity in consciousness,
and to this extent we really see the principle
of this idealism in it; but in the second
place this necessity is represented as something
quite devoid of thought or Notion.
This custom obtains both in our perception
which relates to sensuous nature, and in
relation to law and morality. The ideas of
justice and morality rest upon an instinct,
on a subjective, but very often deceptive
moral feeling. (6) From a sceptical point
of view the opposite may likewise be demonstrated.
From this side Hume considers justice, morality,
religious determinations, and disputes their
absolute validity. That is to say when it
is assumed that our knowledge arises from
experience, and that we must consider only
what we obtain thereby to be the truth, we
find indeed in our feeling, the sentiment
e. g. that the murderer, the thief, &c.,
must be punished; and because this is likewise
felt by others it is universally allowed.
But Hume, like the sceptics of former days,
appeals to the various opinions of various
nations: amongst different nations and in
different times various standards of right
have been held. (7) There are those who in
this case do not have the feeling of wrongdoing
in respect of stealing, e. g. the Lacedæmonians
or the so-called innocent inhabitants of
the South Sea Islands. What is by one nation
called immoral, shameful and irreligious,
is by another not considered so at all. Thus
because such matters rest upon experience,
one subject has such and such an experience,
finds, for instance, in his religious feelings
this determination which inclines him to
God, while another subject has different
experiences altogether. We are in the habit
of allowing one thing to be just and moral,
others have another mode of regarding it.
Hence if the truth depends upon experience,
the element of universality, of objectivity,
&c., comes from elsewhere, or is not
justified by experience. Hume thus declared
this sort of universality, as he declared
necessity, to be rather subjectively than
objectively existent; for custom is just
a subjective universality of this kind. This
is an important and acute observation in
relation to experience looked at as the source
of knowledge; and it is from this point that
the Kantian reflection now begins.
Hume (Essays and Treatises on several subjects,
Vol. 111. Sect. 8, 11) then extended his
scepticism to the conceptions and doctrines
of freedom and necessity, and to the proofs
of the existence of God; and in fact scepticism
here possesses a wide field. To such a system
of reasoning from thoughts and possibilities
another method of reasoning may again be
opposed, and this reasoning is no better
than the other. What is said to be metaphysically
established regarding immortality, God, nature,
&c., lacks a real ground for resting
upon, such as is professed to be given; for
the inferences on which men ground their
proofs are subjectively formed conceptions.
But where a universality is found, it does
not rest in the matter in itself, but is
simply a subjective necessity which is really
mere custom. Hence the result which Hume
arrives at is necessarily astonishment regarding
the condition of human knowledge, a general
state of mistrust, and a sceptical indecision
— which indeed does not amount to much. The
condition of human knowledge regarding which
Hume so much wonders, he further describes
as containing an antagonism between reason
and instinct; this instinct, it is said,
which embraces many sorts of powers, inclinations,
&c., deceives us in many different ways,
and reason demonstrates this. But on the
other side it is empty, without content or
principles of its own; and if a content is
in question at all, it must keep to those
inclinations. In itself reason thus has no
criterion whereby the antagonism between
individual desires, and between itself and
the desires, may be settled. (8) Thus everything
appears in the form of an irrational existence
devoid of thought; the implicitly true and
right is not in thought, but in the form
of an instinct, a desire.
Notes:
1. Buhle: Geschichte der neuern Philosophie,
Vol. V. Sect. 1, pp. 193-200.
2. Tennemann's Grundriss der Geschichte
der
Philosophie von Wendt (Leipzig, 1829),
§
370, pp. 439, 440; Hume: Essays and
Treatises
on several subjects, Vol. III. containing
an Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding
(London, 1770), Sect. 2. pp. 21, 22;
Sect.
4, P. I. p. 42; Tennemann, Vol. XI.
pp. 433,
434.
3. Hume: op. cit., Vol. III. Not. A.
pp.
283, 284.
4. Tennemann op. cit., § 370, p. 440;
Hume:
op. cit., Vol. III. Sect. 4, Pt. I.
pp. 43-45;
Sect. 5, pp. 66, 67; Buhle: Geschichte
der
neuern Philosophie, Vol. V. Sect. 1,
pp.
204, 205; Tennemann, Vol. XI. pp. 435,
436.
5. Hume: op. cit., Vol. III. Sect.
vii. Pt.
1, pp. 102, 103; Pt. 2, pp. 108, 109;
Sect.
viii. pp. 118, 119.
6. Hume: op. cit., Vol. IV. containing
an
Inquiry concerning the principles of
morals,
Sect. 1, p. 4; Appendix I. p. 170.
7. Buhle: op. cit., Vol. V. Sect. 1,
pp.
230, 231; cf. Hume, ibidem, Vol. III.
Sect.
12, P. II. p. 221; Vol. IV.; An Inquiry,
&c., Sect. 4, pp. 62-65; A dialogue,
pp. 235, 236, &c., &c.
8. Hume: op. cit.. Vol. III. Sect. 12, Pt.
I. pp. 217, 218; Not. N. pp. 296, 297; Buhle:
Geschichte der neuern Philosophie, Vol. V.
Sect. 1, p. 210.
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