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B. Scottish Philosophy
In Scotland quite another school of thought
developed, and the Scotch are the foremost
of Hume's opponents; in German philosophy,
on the other hand, we have to recognize in
Kant another opposing force to that of Hume.
To the Scottish school many philosophers
belong; English philosophy is now restricted
to Edinburgh and Glasgow, in which places
a number of professors belonging to this
school succeeded one another. To the scepticism
of Hume they oppose an inward independent
source of truth for all that pertains to
religion and morality. This coincides with
Kant, who also maintains an inward source
or spring as against external perception;
but in the case of Kant this has quite another
form than that which it possesses with the
Scottish philosophers. To them this inward
independent source is not thought or reason
as such, for the content which comes to pass
from this inwardness is concrete in its nature,
and likewise demands for itself the external
matter of experience. It consists of popular
principles, which on the one hand are opposed
to the externality of the sources of knowledge,
and, on the other, to metaphysics as such,
to abstract thought or reasoning on its own
account. This sort of reasoning understanding
applied itself to ethics and to politics
- sciences which have been much developed
by German, French, and above all by Scottish
philosophers (supra, p. 320); they regarded
morality as cultured men would, and sought
to bring moral duties under a principle.
Many of their works are translated into German;
several of these on ethics or morality are
translated by Garve, for instance, who also
translated Cicero De Officiis, and they are
written in a manner similar to that of Cicero
when he uses the expression Insitum est a
natura (Vol. I. p. 93). This moral sentiment
and the ordinary human understanding hereafter
formed the common principle to a whole succession
of Scots, such as Thomas Reid, Beattie, Oswald,
and others; in this way they frequently made
sagacious observations, but with them speculative
philosophy quite disappears. One special
characteristic of these Scottish philosophers
is that they have sought accurately to define
the principle of knowledge; but on the whole
they start from the same point as that which
was in Germany likewise accepted as the principle.
That is to say they represented the so-called
healthy reason, or common-sense (sensus communis),
as the ground of truth. The following are
the principal members of this school, each
of whom has some special feature distinguishing
him from the rest.
Chapter II. — Transition Period B. Scottish
Philosophy
1. THOMAS REID. Thomas Reid, born in 1710,
died as a professor in Glasgow in 1796.(1)
He maintained the principle of common-sense.
His endeavour was to discover the principles
of knowledge, and the following are his conclusions:
"(a) There are certain undemonstrated
and undemonstrable fundamental truths which
common-sense begets and recognizes as immediately
conclusive and absolute." This hence
constitutes an immediate knowledge; in it
an inward independent source is set forth
which is hereby opposed to religion as revealed.
"(b) These immediate truths require
no support from any elaborated science, nor
do they submit to its criticism;" they
cannot be criticized by philosophy. "(c)
Philosophy itself has no root other than
that of an immediate, self-enlightening truth;
whatever contradicts such truth is in itself
false, contradictory, and absurd." This
is true for knowledge and "(d) Morality;
the individual is moral if he acts in accordance
with the perfect principles of the perfection
of the whole and with his own duty as it
is known to him."(2)
2. JAMES BEATTIE. James Beattie, born 1735,
was a professor of moral philosophy in Edinburgh
and Aberdeen, and died in 1803. He likewise
made common-sense the source of all knowledge.
"The common-sense of the plain human
understanding is the source of all morality,
of all religion, and all certainty. The confirmation
of common-sense must be added to the testimony
of our senses. The truth is what the necessities
of my nature call upon me to believe. Belief
signifies conviction in the case of truths
which are certain, in that of those which
are probable, approbation. The truth which
is certain is known by means of intuition,
the probable truth by means of proofs."(3)
Such convictions as are quite certain form
the basis of actions.
3. JAMES OSWALD. James Oswald, a Scottish
clergyman, made use of an expression which
indicates that we have the principles just
mentioned as facts existing within us.(4)
"The existence of the Divine Being is
(according to him) a fact absolutely raised
above all reasoning and all doubt, and immediately
certain for the common-sense of morality."(5)
The same principle was likewise established
in Germany at this time - an inward revelation,
a knowledge of the conscience, and specially
of God and His Being.
4. DUGALD STEWART. To this school also belong
Dugald Stewart, Edward Search,(9) Ferguson,
and Hutcheson, most of whom have written
on morals. The political economist Adam Smith
from this point of view is likewise a philosopher,
and the best known of them all. This Scottish
philosophy is now given forth in Germany
as something new. It is a popular philosophy,
which, on the one hand, has the great merit
of seeking in man, and in his consciousness,
for the source of all that should be held
by him as true, the immanence of what should
be by him esteemed. The content is at the
same time a concrete content; in a certain
degree, it is the antithesis of metaphysics
proper, of the wandering about in abstract
determinations of the understanding. Of these
Scots, Dugald Stewart, who is living still,(10)
appears to be the last and least significant;
in them all there is the same ground-work
to be found, the same circle of reflection,
namely, an a priori philosophy, though not
one which is to be pursued in a speculative
way. The general idea which pervades their
principle is that of the healthy human understanding;
to this they have added benevolent desires,
sympathy, a moral sense, and from such grounds
composed very excellent moral writings. That
is certainly all very well in order to understand
approximately, up to a certain degree of
culture, what universal thoughts are, in
order to narrate their history, to appeal
to examples, and to explain them; but further
it does not extend.
In more recent times this Scottish philosophy
has passed to France, and Professor Royer-Collard,
now president of the Second Chamber,(11)
as also his disciple, Jouffroy, in conformity
with it, pass from the facts of consciousness
through cultured reasoning and experience,
to a further stage in development. What by
the French is called Idéologie (supra, p.
308) has also its place here; it is abstract
metaphysics, in so far as it is an enumeration
and analysis of the most simple thought-determinations.
They are not treated dialectically, but from
our reflection, from our thoughts, the material
is derived, and in this the determinations
therein contained are demonstrated.
1. Tennemann's Grundriss der Geschichte
der
Philosophie von Wendt, § 371, p. 442.
2. Rixner: Handbuch der Geschicte der
Philosophie,
Vol. III. § 119, p. 259; ct. Thomas
Reid;
An Inquiry into the human mind on the
principles
of common sense (Edinburgh,
1810), chap. i. Sect. 4, pp. 19, 20
(translated
into German, Leipzig, 1782, pp. 17,
18);
chap. vi. Sect. 20, pp. 372-375 (pp.
310,
311), &c.
3. Rixner: Handbuch der Geschichte
der Philosophie,
Vol. III. § 120, pp. 261, 262; cf.
James
Beattie: Essays on the nature and immutability
of Truth, &c. (Edinburh, 1772),
Pt. I.,
chap. i., pp. 18-31 (translated into
German,
Copenhagen and Leipzig, 1772, pp. 24-42);
chap. ii. Sect. 2, pp. 37-42 (pp. 49-55),
&c.
4. Cf. James Oswald: An Appeal of common-sense
in behalf of religion (Edinburgh, 1772),
Vol. I. Book I. Introduction, p. 12
(translated
by Wilmsen, Leipzig, 1774, p. 11).
5. Rixner, ibidem, § 121, p. 262; cf.
James
Oswald, ibidem, Vol. II. Book II. chap.
i.
pp. 50, 51 (pp. 54, 55).
6. The name assumed by Abraham Tucker.-[Translator's
note.]
7. Lectures of 1825-1826.
8. Lectures of 1829-1830.
9. The name assumed by Abraham Tucker.-[Translator's
note.]
10. Lectures of 1825-1826.
11. Lectures of 1829-1830.
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