THE ESSAYS OF FRANCIS BACON
OF EMPIRE
(1607) Francis Bacon
1561 - 1626
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Francis Bacon was the son of Nicolas Bacon,
the Lord Keeper of the Seal of Elisabeth
I. He entered Trinity College Cambridge at
age 12. Bacon later described his tutors
as "Men of sharp wits, shut up in their
cells of a few authors, chiefly Aristotle,
their Dictator." This is likely the
beginning of Bacon's rejection of Aristotelianism
and Scholasticism and the new Renaissance
Humanism." His father died when he was
18, and being the youngest son this left
him virtually penniless. He turned to the
law and at 23 he was already in the House
of Commons. His rich relatives did little
to advance his career and Elisabeth apparently
distrusted him. It was not until James I
became King that Bacon's career advanced.
He rose to become Baron Verulam, Viscount
St. Albans and Lord Chancellor of England.
His fall came about in the course of a struggle
between King and Parliament. He was accused
of having taken a bribe while a judge, tried
and found guilty. He thus lost his personal
honour, his fortune and his place at court.
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Of EMPIRE
(1607)
Francis Bacon
1561 - 1626
IT IS a miserable state of mind, to have
few things to desire, and many things to
fear; and yet that commonly is the case of
kings; who, being at the highest, want matter
of desire, which makes their minds more languishing;
and have many representations of perils and
shadows, which makes their minds the less
clear. And this is one reason also, of that
effect which the Scripture speaketh of, That
the king's heart is inscrutable. For multitude
of jealousies, and lack of some predominant
desire, that should marshal and put in order
all the rest, maketh any man's heart, hard
to find or sound. Hence it comes likewise,
that princes many times make themselves desires,
and set their hearts upon toys; sometimes
upon a building; sometimes upon erecting
of an order; sometimes upon the advancing
of a person; sometimes upon obtaining excellency
in some art, or feat of the hand; as Nero
for playing on the harp, Domitian for certainty
of the hand with the arrow, Commodus for
playing at fence, Caracalla for driving chariots,
and the like. This seemeth incredible, unto
those that know not the principle, that the
mind of man, is more cheered and refreshed
by profiting in small things, than by standing
at a stay, in great. We see also that kings
that have been fortunate conquerors, in their
first years, it being not possible for them
to go forward infinitely, but that they must
have some check, or arrest in their fortunes,
turn in their latter years to be superstitious,
and melancholy; as did Alexander the Great;
Diocletian; and in our memory, Charles the
Fifth; and others: for he that is used to
go forward, and findeth a stop, falleth out
of his own favor, and is not the thing he
was.
To speak now of the true temper of empire,
it is a thing rare and hard to keep; for
both temper, and distemper, consist of contraries.
But it is one thing, to mingle contraries,
another to interchange them. The answer of
Apollonius to Vespasian, is full of excellent
instruction. Vespasian asked him, What was
Nero's overthrow? He answered, Nero could
touch and tune the harp well; but in government,
sometimes he used to wind the pins too high,
sometimes to let them down too low. And certain
it is, that nothing destroyeth authority
so much, as the unequal and untimely interchange
of power pressed too far, and relaxed too
much.
This is true, that the wisdom of all these
latter times, in princes' affairs, is rather
fine deliveries, and shiftings of dangers
and mischiefs, when they are near, than solid
and grounded courses to keep them aloof.
But this is but to try masteries with fortune.
And let men beware, how they neglect and
suffer matter of trouble to be prepared;
for no man can forbid the spark, nor tell
whence it may come. The difficulties in princes'
business are many and great; but the greatest
difficulty, is often in their own mind. For
it is common with princes (saith Tacitus)
to will contradictories, Sunt plerumque regum
voluntates vehementes, et inter se contrariae.
For it is the solecism of power, to think
to command the end, and yet not to endure
the mean.
Kings have to deal with their neighbors,
their wives, their children, their prelates
or clergy, their nobles, their second-nobles
or gentlemen, their merchants, their commons,
and their men of war; and from all these
arise dangers, if care and circumspection
be not used.
First for their neighbors; there can no general
rule be given (for occasions are so variable),
save one, which ever holdeth, which is, that
princes do keep due sentinel, that none of
their neighbors do ever grow so (by increase
of territory, by embracing of trade, by approaches,
or the like), as they become more able to
annoy them, than they were. And this is generally
the work of standing counsels, to foresee
and to hinder it. During that triumvirate
of kings, King Henry the Eighth of England,
Francis the First King of France, and Charles
the Fifth Emperor, there was such a watch
kept, that none of the three could win a
palm of ground, but the other two would straightways
balance it, either by confederation, or,
if need were, by a war; and would not in
any wise take up peace at interest. And the
like was done by that league (which Guicciardini
saith was the security of Italy) made between
Ferdinando King of Naples, Lorenzius Medici,
and Ludovicus Sforza, potentates, the one
of Florence, the other of Milan. Neither
is the opinion of some of the Schoolmen,
to be received, that a war cannot justly
be made, but upon a precedent injury or provocation.
For there is no question, but a just fear
of an imminent danger, though there be no
blow given, is a lawful cause of a war.
For their wives; there are cruel examples
of them. Livia is infamed, for the poisoning
of her husband; Roxalana, Solyman's wife,
was the destruction of that renowned prince,
Sultan Mustapha, and otherwise troubled his
house and succession; Edward the Second of
England, his queen, had the principal hand
in the deposing and murder of her husband.
This kind of danger, is then to be feared
chiefly, when the wives have plots, for the
raising of their own children; or else that
they be advoutresses.
For their children; the tragedies likewise
of dangers from them, have been many. And
generally, the entering of fathers into suspicion
of their children, hath been ever unfortunate.
The destruction of Mustapha (that we named
before) was so fatal to Solyman's line, as
the succession of the Turks, from Solyman
until this day, is suspected to be untrue,
and of strange blood; for that Selymus the
Second, was thought to be suppositious. The
destruction of Crispus, a young prince of
rare towardness, by Constantinus the Great,
his father, was in like manner fatal to his
house; for both Constantinus and Constance,
his sons, died violent deaths; and Constantius,
his other son, did little better; who died
indeed of sickness, but after that Julianus
had taken arms against him. The destruction
of Demetrius, son to Philip the Second of
Macedon, turned upon the father, who died
of repentance. And many like examples there
are; but few or none, where the fathers had
good by such distrust; except it were, where
the sons were up in open arms against them;
as was Selymus the First against Bajazet;
and the three sons of Henry the Second, King
of England.
For their prelates; when they are proud and
great, there is also danger from them; as
it was in the times of Anselmus, and Thomas
Becket, Archbishops of Canterbury; who, with
their croziers, did almost try it with the
king's sword; and yet they had to deal with
stout and haughty kings, William Rufus, Henry
the First, and Henry the Second. The danger
is not from that state, but where it hath
a dependence of foreign authority; or where
the churchmen come in and are elected, not
by the collation of the king, or particular
patrons, but by the people.
For their nobles; to keep them at a distance,
it is not amiss; but to depress them, may
make a king more absolute, but less safe;
and less able to perform, any thing that
he desires. I have noted it, in my History
of King Henry the Seventh of England, who
depressed bis nobility; whereupon it came
to pass, that his times were full of difficulties
and troubles; for the nobility, though they
continued loyal unto him, yet did they not
co-operate with him in his business. So that
in effect, he was fain to do all things himself.
For their second-nobles; there is not much
danger from them, being a body dispersed.
They may sometimes discourse high, but that
doth little hurt; besides, they are a counterpoise
to the higher nobility, that they grow not
too potent; and, lastly, being the most immediate
in authority, with the common people, they
do best temper popular commotions.
For their merchants; they are vena porta;
and if they flourish not, a kingdom may have
good limbs, but will have empty veins, and
nourish little. Taxes and imposts upon them,
do seldom good to the king's revenue; for
that that he wins in the hundred, he leeseth
in the shire; the particular rates being
increased, but the total bulk of trading,
rather decreased.
For their commons; there is little danger
from them, except it be, where they have
great and potent heads; or where you meddle
with the point of religion, or their customs,
or means of life.
For their men of war; it is a dangerous state,
where they live and remain in a body, and
are used to donatives; whereof we see examples
in the janizaries, and pretorian bands of
Rome; but trainings of men, and arming them
in several places, and under several commanders,
and without donatives, are things of defence,
and no danger.
Princes are like to heavenly bodies, which
cause good or evil times; and which have
much veneration, but no rest. All precepts
concerning kings, are in effect comprehended
in those two remembrances: memento quod es
homo; and memento quod es Deus, or vice Dei;
the one bridleth their power, and the other
their will.
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