Xenophon
Memorabilia Book Four- part 1
Book IV I
Such was Socrates; so helpful under
all circumstances
and in every way that no observer,
gifted
with ordinary sensibility, could fail
to
appreciate the fact, that to be with
Socrates,
and to spend long time in his society
(no
matter where or what the circumstances),
was indeed a priceless gain. Even the
recollection
of him, when he was no longer present,
was
felt as no small benefit by those who
had
grown accustomed to be with him, and
who
accepted him. Nor indeed was he less
helpful
to his acquaintance in his lighter
than in
his graver moods.
Let us take as an example that saying
of
his, so often on his lips: "I
am in
love with so and so"; and all
the while
it was obvious the going-forth of his
soul
was not towards excellence of body
in the
bloom of beauty, but rather towards
faculties
of the soul unfolding in virtue.[1]
And these
"good natures" he detected
by certain
tokens: a readiness to learn that to
which
the attention was directed; a power
of retaining
in the memory the lessons learnt; and
a passionate
predilection for those studies in particular
which serve to good administration
of a house
or of a state,[2] and in general to
the proper
handling of man and human affairs.
Such beings,
he maintained, needed only to be educated[3]
to become not only happy themselves
and happy
administrators of their private households,
but to be capable of rendering other
human
beings as states or individuals happy
also.
He had indeed a different way of dealing
with different kinds of people.[4]
Those
who thought they had good natural ability
and despised learning he instructed
that
the most highly-gifted nature stands
most
in need of training and education;[5]
and
he would point out how in the case
of horses
it is just the spirited and fiery thoroughbred
which, if properly broken in as a colt,
will
develop into a serviceable and superb
animal,
but if left unbroken will turn out
utterly
intractable and good for nothing. Or
take
the case of dogs: a puppy exhibiting
that
zest for toil and eagerness to attack
wild
creatures which are the marks of high
breeding,[6]
will, if well brought up, prove excellent
for the chase or for any other useful
purpose;
but neglect his education and he will
turn
out a stupid, crazy brute, incapable
of obeying
the simplest command. It is just the
same
with human beings; here also the youth
of
best natural endowments --that is to
say,
possessing the most robust qualities
of spirit
and a fixed determination to carry
out whatever
he has laid his hand to-- will, if
trained
and taught what it is right to do,
prove
a superlatively good and useful man.
He achieves,
in fact, what is best upon the grandest
scale.
But leave him in boorish ignorance
untrained,
and he will prove not only very bad
but very
mischievous,[7] and for this reason,
that
lacking the knowledge to discern what
is
right to do, he will frequently lay
his hand
to villainous practices; whilst the
very
magnificence and vehemence of his character
render it impossible either to rein
him in
or to turn him aside from his evil
courses.
Hence in his case also his achievements
are
on the grandest scale but of the worst.[8]
Or to take the type of person so eaten
up
with the pride of riches that he conceives
himself dispensed from any further
need of
education --since it is "money
makes
the man," and his wealth will
amply
suffice him to carry out his desires
and
to win honours from admiring humanity.[9]
Socrates would bring such people to
their
senses by pointing out the folly of
supposing
that without instruction it was possible
to draw the line of demarcation[10]
between
what is gainful and what is hurtful
in conduct;
and the further folly of supposing
that,
apart from such discrimination, a man
could
help himself by means of wealth alone
to
whatever he liked or find the path
of expediency
plain before him; and was it not the
veriest
simplicity to suppose that, without
the power
of labouring profitably, a man can
either
be doing well or be in any sort of
way sufficiently
equipped for the battle of life? and
again,
the veriest simplicity to suppose that
by
mere wealth without true knowledge
it was
possible either to purchase a reputation
for some excellence, or without such
reputation
to gain distinction and celebrity?
[1] Or, "not excellence of body
in respect
of beauty, but of the soul as regards
virtue;
and this good natural disposition might
be
detected by the readiness of its possessor
to learn," etc. Cf. Plat. "Rep."
535 B.
[2] Cf. above, I. i. 7.
[3] Or, "A person of this type
would,
if educated, not only prove a fortune-favoured
invididual himself and," etc.
Al. Kuhner,
"Eos, qui ita instituti sunt,
ut tales
sint."
[4] Or, "His method of attack
was not
indeed uniformly the same. It varied
with
the individual."
[5] Or, "If any one was disposed
to
look down upon learning and study in
reliance
upon his own natural ability, he tried
to
lesson him that it is just the highly-gifted
nature which stands," etc. See
Newman,
op. cit. i. 397.
[6] Cf. Aristot. "H. A."
ix. 1;
and "Hunting," iii. 11.
[7] Or, "and the same man may
easily
become a master villain of the most
dangerous
sort."
[8] Kuhner ad loc. after Fr. Hermann
cf.
Plato. "Crito," 44 E; "Hipp.
min." 375 E; "Rep."
vi. 491
E; "Gorg." 526 A; "Polit."
303 A.
[9] Or, "and to be honoured by
mankind."
[10] Or, "that without learning
the
distinction it was possible to distinguish
between," etc.
Book IV II
Or to come to a third kind--the class
of
people who are persuaded that they
have received
the best education, and are proud of
their
wisdom: his manner of dealing with
these
I will now describe.
Euthydemus[1] "the beautiful"
had
(Socrates was given to understand)
collected
a large library, consisting of the
most celebrated
poets and philosophers,[2] by help
of which
he already believed himself to be more
than
a match for his fellows in wisdom,
and indeed
might presently expect to out-top them
all
in capacity of speech and action.[3]
At first,
as Socrates noted, the young man by
reason
of his youth had not as yet set foot
in the
agora,[4] but if he had anything to
transact,
his habit was to seat himself in a
saddler's
shop hard by. Accordingly to this same
saddler's
shop Socrates betook himself with some
of
those who were with him. And first
the question
was started by some one: "Was
it through
consorting with the wise,[5] or by
his own
unaided talent, that Themistocles came
so
to surpass his fellow-citizens that
when
the services of a capable man were
needed
the eyes of the whole community instinctively
turned to him?" Socrates, with
a view
to stirring[6] Euthydemus, answered:
There
was certainly an ingenuous simplicity
in
the belief that superiority in arts
of comparatively
little worth could only be attained
by aid
of qualified teachers, but that the
leadership
of the state, the most important concern
of all, was destined to drop into the
lap
of anybody, no matter whom, like an
accidental
windfall.[7]
On a subsequent occasion, Euthydemus
being
present, though, as was plain to see,
somewhat
disposed to withdraw from the friendly
concourse,[8]
as if he would choose anything rather
than
appear to admire Socrates on the score
of
wisdom, the latter made the following
remarks.
Socrates. It is clear from his customary
pursuits, is it not, sirs, that when
our
friend Euthydemus here is of full age,
and
the state propounds some question for
solution,
he will not abstain from offering the
benefit
of his advice? One can imagine the
pretty
exordium to his parliamentary speeches
which,
in his anxiety not to be thought to
have
learnt anything from anybody, he has
ready
for the occasion.[9] Clearly at the
outset
he will deliver himself thus: "Men
of
Athens, I have never at any time learnt
anything
from anybody; nor, if I have ever heard
of
any one as being an able statesman,
well
versed in speech and capable of action,
have
I sought to come across him individually.
I have not so much as been at pains
to provide
muself with a teacher from amongst
those
who have knowledge;[10] on the contrary,
I have persistently avoided, I will
not say
learning from others, but the very
faintest
suspicion of so doing. However, anything
that occurs to me by the light of nature
I shall be glad to place at your disposal."
. . . How appropriate[11] would such
a preface
sound on the lips of any one seeking,
say,
the office of state physician,[12]
would
it not? How advantageously he might
begin
an address on this wise: "Men
of Athens,
I have never learnt the art of healing
by
help of anybody, nor have I sought
to provide
myself with any teacher among medical
men.
Indeed, to put it briefly, I have been
ever
on my guard not only against learning
anything
from the profession, but against the
very
notion of having studied medicine at
all.
If, however, you will be so good as
to confer
on me this post, I promise I will do
my best
to acquire skill by experimenting on
your
persons." Every one present laughed
at the exordium (and there the matter
dropped).
Presently, when it became apparent
that Euthydemus
had got so far that he was disposed
to pay
attention to what was said, though
he was
still at pains not to utter a sound
himself,
as if he hoped by silence to attach
to himself
some reputation for sagacity, Socrates,
wishing
to cure him of that defect, proceeded.
Socrates. Is it not surprising that
people
anxious to learn to play the harp or
the
flute, or to ride, or to become proficient
in any like accomplishment, are not
content
to work unremittingly in private by
themselves
at whatever it is in which they desire
to
excel, but they must sit at the feet
of the
best-esteemed teachers, doing all things
and enduring all things for the sake
of following
the judgment of those teachers in everything,
as though they themselves could not
otherwise
become famous; whereas, among those
who aspire
to become eminent politically as orators
and statesmen,[13] there are some who
cannot
see why they should not be able to
do all
that politics demand, at a moment's
notice,
by inspiration as it were, without
any preliminary
pains or preparations whatever? And
yet it
would appear that the latter concerns
must
be more difficult of achievement than
the
former, in proportion as there are
more competitors
in the field but fewer who reach the
goal
of their ambition, which is as much
as to
say that a more sustained effort of
attention
is needed on the part of those who
embark
upon the sea of politics than is elsewhere
called for.
Such were the topics on which Socrates
was
wont in the early days of their association
to dilate in the hearing of Euthydemus;
but
when the philosopher perceived that
the youth
not only could tolerate the turns of
the
discussion more readily but was now
become
a somewhat eager listener, he went
to the
saddler's shop alone,[14] and when
Euthydemus
was seated by his side the following
conversation
took place.
Socrates. Pray tell me, Euthydemus,
is it
really true what people tell me, that
you
have made a large collection of the
writings
of "the wise," as they are
called?[15]
Euthydemus answered: Quite true, Socrates,
and I mean to go on collecting until
I possess
all the books I can possibly lay hold
of.
Socrates. By Hera! I admire you for
wishing
to possess treasures of wisdom rather
than
of gold and silver, which shows that
you
do not believe gold and silver to be
the
means of making men better, but that
the
thoughts[16] of the wise alone enrich
with
virtue their possessions.
And Euthydemus was glad when he heard
that
saying, for, thought he to himself,
"In
the eyes of Socrates I am on the high
road
to the acquisition of wisdom."
But the
latter, perceiving him to be pleased
with
the praise, continued.
Socrates. And what is it in which you
desire
to excel, Euthydemus, that you collect
books?
And when Euthydemus was silent, considering
what answer he should make, Socrates
added:
Possibly you want to be a great doctor?
Why,
the prescriptions[17] of the Pharmacopoeia
would form a pretty large library by
themselves.
No, indeed, not I! (answered Euthydemus).
Socrates. Then do you wish to be an
architect?
That too implies a man of well-stored
wit
and judgment.[18]
I have no such ambition (he replied).
Socrates. Well, do you wish to be a
mathematician,
like Theodorus?[19]
Euthydemus. No, nor yet a mathematician.
Socrates. Then do you wish to be an
astronomer?[20]
or (as the youth signified dissent)
possibly
a rhapsodist?[21] (he asked), for I
am told
you have the entire works of Homer
in your
possession.[22]
Nay, God forbid! not I! (ejaculated
the youth).
Rhapsodists have a very exact acquaintance
with epic poetry, I know, of course;
but
they are empty-pated creatures enough
themselves.[23]
At last Socrates said: Can it be, Euthydemus,
that you are an aspirant to that excellence
through which men become statesmen
and administrators
fit to rule and apt to benefit[24]
the rest
of the world and themselves?
Yes (replied he), that is the excellence
I desire--beyond measure.
Upon my word (said Socrates), then
you have
indeed selected as the object of your
ambition
the noblest of virtues and the greatest
of
the arts, for this is the property
of kings,
and is entitled "royal";
but (he
continued) have you considered whether
it
is possible to excel in these matters
without
being just and upright?[25]
Euthydemus. Certainly I have, and I
say that
without justice and uprightness it
is impossible
to be a good citizen.
No doubt (replied Socrates) you have
accomplished
that initial step?
Euthydemus. Well, Socrates, I think
I could
hold my own against all comers as an
upright
man.
And have upright men (continued Socrates)
their distinctive and appropriate works
like
those of carpenters or shoe-makers?
Euthydemus. To be sure they have.
Socrates. And just as the carpenter
is able
to exhibit his works and products,
the righteous
man should be able to expound and set
forth
his, should he not?
I see (replied Euthydemus) you are
afraid
I cannot expound the works of righteousness!
Why, bless me! of course I can, and
the works
of unrighteousness into the bargain,
since
there are not a few of that sort within
reach
of eye and ear every day.
Shall we then (proceeded Socrates)
write
the letter R on this side,[26] and
on that
side the letter W; and then anything
that
appears to us to be the product of
righteousness
we will place to the R account, and
anything
which appears to be the product of
wrong-doing
and iniquity to the account of W?
By all means do so (he answered), if
you
think that it assists matters.
Accordingly Socrates drew the letters,
as
he had suggested, and continued.
Socrates. Lying exists among men, does
it
not?
Euthydemus. Certainly.
To which side of the account then shall
we
place it? (he asked).
Euthydemus. Clearly on the side of
wrong
and injustice.
Socrates. Deceit too is not uncommon?
Euthydemus. By no means.
Socrates. To which side shall we place
deceit?
Euthydemus. Deceit clearly on the side
of
wrong.
Socrates. Well, and chicanery[27] or
mischief
of any sort?
Euthydemus. That too.
Socrates. And the enslavement of free-born
men?[28]
Euthydemus. That too.
Socrates. And we cannot allow any of
these
to lie on the R side of the account,
to the
side of right and justice, can we,
Euthydemus?
It would be monstrous (he replied).
Socrates. Very good. But supposing
a man
to be elected general, and he succeeds
in
enslaving an unjust, wicked, and hostile
state, are we to say that he is doing
wrong?
Euthydemus. By no means.
Socrates. Shall we not admit that he
is doing
what is right?
Euthydemus. Certainly.
Socrates. Again, suppose he deceives
the
foe while at war with them?
Euthydemus. That would be all fair
and right
also.
Socrates. Or steals and pillages their
property?
would he not be doing what is right?
Euthydemus. Certainly; when you began
I thought
you were limiting the question to the
case
of friends.
Socrates. So then everything which
we set
down on the side of Wrong will now
have to
be placed to the credit of Right?
Euthydemus. Apparently.
Socrates. Very well then, let us so
place
them; and please, let us make a new
definition--that
while it is right to do such things
to a
foe, it is wrong to do them to a friend,
but in dealing with the latter it behoves
us to be as straightforward as possible.[29]
I quite assent (replied Euthydemus).
So far so good (remarked Socrates);
but if
a general, seeing his troops demoralised,
were to invent a tale to the effect
that
reinforcements were coming, and by
means
of this false statement should revive
the
courage of his men, to which of the
two accounts
shall we place that act of fraud?[30]
On the side of right, to my notion
(he replied).
Socrates. Or again, if a man chanced
to have
a son ill and in need of medicine,
which
the child refused to take, and supposing
the father by an act of deceit to administer
it under the guise of something nice
to eat,
and by service of that lie to restore
the
boy to health, to which account shall
we
set down this fraud?
Euthydemus. In my judgment it too should
be placed to the same account.
Socrates. Well, supposing you have
a friend
in deplorably low spirits, and you
are afraid
he will make away with himself--accordingly
you rob him of his knife or other such
instrument:
to which side ought we to set the theft?
Euthydemus. That too must surely be
placed
to the score of right behaviour.
Socrates. I understand you to say that
a
straightforward course is not in every
case
to be pursued even in dealing with
friends?
Heaven forbid! (the youth exclaimed).
If
you will allow me, I rescind my former
statement.[31]
Socrates. Allow you! Of course you
may--anything
rather than make a false entry on our
lists.
. . . But there is just another point
we
ought not to leave uninvestigated.
Let us
take the case of deceiving a friend
to his
detriment: which is the more wrongful--to
do so voluntarily or unintentionally?
Euthydemus. Really, Socrates, I have
ceased
to believe in my own answers, for all
my
former admissions and conceptions seem
to
me other than I first supposed them.[32]
Still, if I may hazard one more opinion,
the intentional deceiver, I should
say, is
worse than the involuntary.
Socrates. And is it your opinion that
there
is a lore and science of Right and
Justice
just as there is of letters and grammar?[33]
Euthydemus. That is my opinion.
Socrates. And which should you say
was more
a man of letters[34]--he who intentionally
misspells or misreads, or he who does
so
unconsciously?
Euthydemus. He who does so intentionally,
I should say, because he can spell
or read
correctly whenever he chooses.
Socrates. Then the voluntary misspeller
may
be a lettered person, but the involuntary
offender is an illiterate?[35]
Euthydemus. True, he must be. I do
not see
how to escape from that conclusion.
Socrates. And which of the two knows
what
is right--he who intentionally lies
and deceives,
or he who lies and deceives unconsciously?[36]
Euthydemus. The intentional and conscious
liar clearly.
Socrates. Well then, your statement
is this:
on the one hand, the man who has the
knowledge
of letters is more lettered than he
who has
no such knowledge?[37]
Euthydemus. Yes.
Socrates. And, on the other, he who
has the
knowledge of what is right is more
righteous
than he who lacks that knowledge?
Euthydemus. I suppose it is, but for
the
life of me I cannot make head or tail
of
my own admission.[38]
Socrates. Well (look at it like this).
Suppose
a man to be anxious to speak the truth,
but
he is never able to hold the same language
about a thing for two minutes together.
First
he says: "The road is towards
the east,"
and then he says, "No, it's towards
the west"; or, running up a column
of
figures, now he makes the product this,
and
again he makes it that, now more, now
less--what
do you think of such a man?
Euthydemus. Heaven help us! clearly
he does
not know what he thought he knew.
Socrates. And you know the appellation
given
to certain people-- "slavish,"[39]
or, "little better than a slave?"
Euthydemus. I do.
Socrates. Is it a term suggestive of
the
wisdom or the ignorance of those to
whom
it is applied?
Euthydemus. Clearly of their ignorance.
Socrates. Ignorance, for instance,
of smithying?
Euthydemus. No, certainly not.
Socrates. Then possibly ignorance of
carpentering?
Euthydemus. No, nor yet ignorance of
carpentering.
Socrates. Well, ignorance of shoemaking?
Euthydemus. No, nor ignorance of any
of these:
rather the reverse, for the majority
of those
who do know just these matters are
"little
better than slaves."
Socrates. You mean it is a title particularly
to those who are ignorant of the beautiful,
the good, the just?[40]
It is, in my opinion (he replied).
Socrates. Then we must in every way
strain
every nerve to avoid the imputation
of being
slaves?
Euthydemus. Nay, Socrates, by all that
is
holy, I did flatter myself that at
any rate
I was a student of philosophy, and
on the
right road to be taught everything
essential
to one who would fain make beauty and
goodness
his pursuit.[41] So that now you may
well
imagine my despair when, for all my
pains
expended, I cannot even answer the
questions
put to me about what most of all a
man should
know; and there is no path of progress
open
to me, no avenue of improvement left.
Thereupon Socrates: Tell me, Euthydemus,
have you ever been to Delphi?
Yes, certainly; twice (said he).
Socrates. And did you notice an inscription
somewhere on the temple: {GNOMI SEAUTON}--KNOW
THYSELF?
Euthydemus. I did.
Socrates. Did you, possibly, pay no
regard
to the inscription? or did you give
it heed
and try to discover who and what you
were?
I can safely say I did not (he answered).
That much I made quite sure I knew,
at any
rate; since if I did not know even
myself,
what in the world did I know?
Socrates. Can a man be said, do you
think,
to know himself who knows his own name
and
nothing more? or must he not rather
set to
work precisely like the would-be purchaser
of a horse, who certainly does not
think
that he has got the knowledge he requires
until he has discovered whether the
beast
is tractable or stubborn, strong or
weak,
quick or slow, and how it stands with
the
other points, serviceable or the reverse,
in reference to the use and purpose
of a
horse? So, I say, must a man in like
manner
interrogate his own nature in reference
to
a man's requirements, and learn to
know his
own capacities, must he not?
Euthydemus. Yes, so it strikes me:
he who
knows not his own ability knows not
himself.
Socrates. And this too is plain, is
it not:
that through self-knowledge men meet
with
countless blessings, and through ignorance
of themselves with many evils? Because,
the
man who knows himself knows what is
advantageous
to himself; he discerns the limits
of his
powers, and by doing what he knows,
he provides
himself with what he needs and so does
well;
or, conversely, by holding aloof from
what
he knows not, he avoids mistakes and
thereby
mishaps. And having now a test to gauge
other
human beings he uses their need as
a stepping-stone
to provide himself with good and to
avoid
evil. Whereas he who does not know
himself,
but is mistaken as to his own capacity,
is
in like predicament to the rest of
mankind
and all human matters else; he neither
knows
what he wants, nor what he is doing,
nor
the people whom he deals with; and
being
all abroad in these respects, he misses
what
is good and becomes involved in what
is ill.
Again, he that knows what he is doing
through
the success of his performance attains
to
fame and honour; his peers and co-mates
are
glad to make use of him, whilst his
less
successful neighbours, failing in their
affairs,
are anxious to secure his advice, his
guidance,
his protection;[42] they place their
hopes
of happiness in him, and for all these
causes[43]
single him out as the chief object
of their
affection. He, on the contrary, who
knows
not what he does, who chooses amiss
and fails
in what he puts his hands to, not only
incurs
loss and suffers chastisement through
his
blunders, but step by step loses reputation
and becomes a laughing-stock, and in
the
end is doomed to a life of dishonour
and
contempt.
What is true of individuals is true
also
of communities.[44] That state which
in ignorance
of its power goes to war with a stronger
than itself ends by being uprooted
or else
reduced to slavery.
Thereupon Euthydemus: Be assured I
fully
concur in your opinion; the precept
KNOW
THYSELF cannot be too highly valued;
but
what is the application? What the starting-point
of self-examination? I look to you
for an
explanation, if you would kindly give
one.[45]
Well (replied Socrates), I presume
you know
quite well the distinction between
good and
bad things: your knowledge may be relied
upon so far?
Why, yes, to be sure (replied the youth);
for without that much discernment I
should
indeed be worse than any slave.[46]
Come then (said he), do you give me
an explanation
of the things so termed.
That is fortunately not hard (replied
the
youth). First of all, health in itself
I
hold to be a good, and disease in itself
an evil; and in the next place the
sources
of either of those aforenamed, meats
and
drinks, and habits of life,[47] I regard
as good or evil according as they contribute
either to health or to disease.
Socrates. Then health and disease themselves
when they prove to be soruces of any
good
are good, but when of any evil, evil?
And when (asked he), can health be
a source
of evil, or disease a source of good?
Why, bless me! often enough (replied
Socrates).
In the event, for instance, of some
ill-starred
expedition or of some disastrous voyage
or
other incident of the sort, of which
veritably
there are enough to spare--when those
who
owing to their health and strength
take a
part in the affair are lost; whilst
those
who were left behind--as hors de combat,
on account of ill-health of other feebleness--are
saved.
Euthydemus. Yes, you are right; but
you will
admit that there are advantages to
be got
from strength and lost through weakness.
Socrates. Even so; but ought we to
regard
those things which at one moment benefit
and at another moment injure us in
any strict
sense good rather than evil?
Euthydemus. No, certainly not, according
to that line of argument. But wisdom,[48]
Socrates, you must on your side admit,
is
irrefragably a good; since there is
nothing
which or in which a wise man would
not do
better than a fool.
Socrates. What say you? Have you never
heard
of Daedalus,[49] how he was seized
by Minos
on account of his wisdom, and forced
to be
his slave, and robbed of fatherland
and freedom
at one swoop? and how, while endeavouring
to make his escape with his son, he
caused
the boy's death without effecting his
own
salvation, but was carried off among
barbarians
and again enslaved?
Yes, I know the old story (he answered).[50]
Socrates. Or have you not heard of
the "woes
of Palamedes,"[51] that commonest
theme
of song, how for his wisdom's sake
Odysseus
envied him and slew him?
Euthydemus. That tale also is current.
Socrates. And how many others, pray,
do you
suppose have been seized on account
of their
wisdom, and despatched to the great
king
and at his court enslaved?[52]
Well, prosperity, well-being[53] (he
exclaimed),
must surely be a blessing, and that
the most
indisputable, Socrates?
It might be so (replied the philosopher)
if it chanced not to be in itself a
compound
of other questionable blessings.
Euthydemus. And which among the components
of happiness and well-being can possibly
be questionable?
None (he retorted), unless of course
we are
to include among these components beauty,
or strength, or wealth, or reputation,
or
anything else of that kind?
Euthydemus. By heaven! of course we
are to
include these, for what would happiness
be
without these?
Socrates. By heaven! yes; only then
we shall
be including the commonest sources
of mischief
which befall mankind. How many are
ruined
by their fair faces at the hand of
admireres
driven to distraction[54] by the sight
of
beauty in its bloom! how many, tempted
by
their strength to essay deeds beyond
their
power, are involved in no small evils!
how
many, rendered effeminate by reason
of their
wealth, have been plotted against and
destroyed![55]
how many through fame and political
power
have suffered a world of woe!
Well (the youth replied) if I am not
even
right in praising happiness, I must
confess
I know not for what one ought to supplicate
the gods in prayer.[56]
Nay, these are matters (proceeded Socrates)
which perhaps, through excessive confidence
in your knowledge of them, you have
failed
to examine into; but since the state,
which
you are preparing yourself to direct,
is
democratically constituted,[57] of
course
you know what a democracy is.
Euthydemus. I presume I do, decidedly.
Socrates. Well, now, is it possible
to know
what a popular state is without knowing
who
the people are?
Euthydemus. Certainly not.
Socrates. And whom do you consider
to be
the people?
Euthydemus. The poor citizens, I should
say.
Socrates. Then you know who the poor
are,
of course?
Euthydemus. Of course I do.
Socrates. I presume you also know who
the
rich are?
Euthydemus. As certainly as I know
who are
the poor.
Socrates. Whom do you understand by
poor
and rich?
Euthydemus. By poor I mean those who
have
not enough to pay for their necessaries,[58]
and by rich those who have more means
than
sufficient for all their needs.
Socrates. Have you noticed that some
who
possess a mere pittance not only find
this
sufficient, but actually succeed in
getting
a surplus out of it; while others do
not
find a large fortune large enough?
I have, most certainly; and I thank
you for
the reminder (replied Euthydemus).
One has
heard of crowned heads and despotic
rulers
being driven by want to commit misdeeds
like
the veriest paupers.
Then, if that is how matters stand
(continued
Socrates), we must class these same
crowned
heads with the commonalty; and some
possessors
of scant fortunes, provided they are
good
economists, with the wealthy?
Then Euthydemus: It is the poverty
of my
own wit which forces me to this admission.
I bethink me it is high time to keep
silence
altogether; a little more, and I shall
be
proved to know absolutely nothing.
And so
he went away crestfallen, in an agony
of
self- contempt, persuaded that he was
verily
and indeed no better than a slave.
Amongst those who were reduced to a
like
condition by Socrates, many refused
to come
near him again, whom he for his part
looked
upon as dolts and dullards.[59] But
Euthydemus
had the wit to understand that, in
order
to become worthy of account, his best
plan
was to associate as much as possible
with
Socrates; and from that moment, save
for
some necessity, he never left him--in
some
points even imitating him in his habits
and
pursuits. Socrates, on his side, seeing
that
this was the young man's disposition,
disturbed
him as little as possible, but in the
simplest
and plainest manner initiated him into
everything
which he held to be needful to know
or important
to practise.
[1] Euthydemus, the son of Diocles
perhaps.
See Plat. "Symp." 222 B,
and Jowet
ad loc.; Cobet, "Prosop. Xen."
s. n.; K. Joel, op. cit. p. 372 foll.
For
{ton kalon} cf. "Phaedr."
278 E, "Isocrates the fair."
For
the whole chapter cf. Plat. "Alc."
i.; "Lys." 210 E. See above,
"Mem."
I. ii. 29; Grote, "Plato,"
i. ch.
x. passim.
[2] Lit. "sophists." See
Grote,
"H. G." viii. p. 480, note.
For
private libraries see Becker, "Char."
p. 272 foll. (Eng. tr.)
[3] See "Hipparch," i. 24;
"Cyrop."
V. v. 46.
[4] See above, III. vi. 1; Schneid.
cf. Isocr.
"Areop." 149 C.
[5] Cf. Soph. fr. 12, {sophoi turannoi
ton
sophon xunousia}.
[6] L. and S. cf. Plat. "Lys."
223 A; "Rep." 329 B: "Wishing
to draw him out."
[7] Cf. Plat. "Alc." i. 118
C:
"And Pericles is said not to have
got
his wisdom by the light of nature,
but to
have associated with several of the
philosophers"
(Jowett).
[8] {sunedrias}, "the council."
[9] Or, "the pretty exordium .
. . now
in course of conposition. He must at
all
hazards avoid the suspicion of having
picked
up any crumb of learning from anybody;
how
can he help therefore beginning his
speech
thus?"
[10] Or, "scientific experts."
[11] Al. "Just as if one seeking
the
office of state physician were to begin
with
a like exordium." {armoseie} =
"it
would be consistent (with what has
gone before)."
[12] Schneider cf. Plat. "Laws,"
iv. 720 A; "Gorg." 456 A;
and for
"the parish doctor," "Polit."
259 A; Arist. "Acharn." 1030.
[13] Or, more lit. "powerful in
speech
and action within the sphere of politics."
[14] The question arises: how far is
the
conversation historical or imaginary?
[15] Or, "have collected several
works
of our classical authors and philosophers."
[16] Lit. "gnomes," maxims,
sententiae.
Cf. Aristot. "Rhet." ii.
21.
[17] {suggrammata}, "medical treatises."
See Aristot. "Eth." x. 9,
21.
[18] Or, "To be that implies a
considerable
store of well-packed wisdom."
[19] Of Cyrene (cf. Plat. "Theaet.")
taught Plato. Diog. Laert. ii. 8, 19.
[20] Cf. below, IV. vii. 4.
[21] See "Symp." iii. 6;
Plat.
"Ion."
[22] See Jowett, "Plato,"
i. 229;
Grote, "Plato," i. 455.
[23] Or, "are simply perfect in
the
art of reciting epic poetry, but are
apt
to be the veriest simpletons themselves."
[24] Or, "statesmen, and economists,
and rules, and benefactors of the rest
of
the world and themselves."
[25] Just, {dikaios} = upright, righteous.
Justice, {dikaiosune} = social uprightness
= righteousness, N. T. To quote a friend:
"The Greek {dikaios} combines
the active
dealing out of justice with the self-reflective
idea of preserving justice in our conduct,
which is what we mean by 'upright.'"
[26] The letter R (to stand for Right,
Righteous,
Upright, Just). The letter W (to stand
for
Wrong, Unrighteous, Unjust).
[27] Reading {to kakourgein} (= furari,
Sturz);
al. {kleptein}, Stob.
[28] Or, "the kidnapping of men
into
slavery." {to andrapodizesthai}
= the
reduction of a free-born man to a state
of
slavery. Slavery itself ({douleia})
being
regarded as the normal condition of
a certain
portion of the human race and not in
itself
immoral.
[29] Or, "an absolutely straightforward
course is necessary."
[30] Cf. "Hell." IV. iii.
10; "Cyrop."
I. vi. 31.
[31] See above, I. ii. 44 ({anatithemai}).
[32] Or, "all my original positions
seem to me now other than I first conceived
them"; or, "everything I
first
asserted seems now to be twisted topsy-turvy."
[33] {mathesis kai episteme tou dikaiou}--a
doctrine and a knowledge of the Just.
[34] Or, "more grammatical";
"the
better grammarian."
[35] Or, "In fact, he who sins
against
the lore of grammer intentionally may
be
a good grammarian and a man of letters,
but
he who does so involuntarily is illiterate
and a bad grammarian?"
[36] Or, Soc. And does he who lies
and deceives
with intent know what is right rather
than
he who does either or both unconsciously?
Euth. Clearly he does.
[37] Or, Soc. It is a fair inference,
is
it not, that he who has the {episteme}
of
grammar is more grammatical than he
who has
no such {episteme}?
Euth. Yes.
Soc. And he who has the {episteme}
of things
rightful is more righteous than he
who lacks
the {episteme}? See Plat. "Hipp.
min.";
Arist. "Eth. Eud." VI. v.
7.
[38] Lit. "Apparently; but I appear
to myself to be saying this also, heaven
knows how." See Jowett, "Plato,"
ii. p. 416 (ed. 2).
[39] {andropododeis}, which has the
connotation
of mental dulness, and a low order
of intellect,
cf. "boorish,' "rustic,"
"loutish,"
("pariah," conceivably).
"Slavish,"
"servile," with us connote
moral
rather than intellectual deficiency,
I suppose.
Hence it is impossible to preserve
the humour
of the Socratic argument. See Newman,
op.
cit. i. 107.
[40] Cf. Goethe's "Im Ganzen Guten
Schonen
resolut zu leben."
[41] {tes kalokagathias}, the virtue
of the
{kalos te kagathos}-- nobility of soul.
Cf.
above, I. vi. 14.
[42] Cf. Dante, "Tu duca, tu maestro,
tu signore."
[43] Reading, {dia panta tauta}, or
if {dia
tauta}, translate "and therefore."
[44] Or, more lit. "A law which
applies,
you will observe, to bodies politic."
[45] Or, "at what point to commence
the process of self-inspection?-- there
is
the mystery. I look to you, if you
are willing,
to interpret it."
[46] Lit. "if I did not know even
that."
[47] Or, "pursuits and occupations";
"manners and customs."
[48] See above, III. ix. 5. Here {sophia}
is not = {sophrosune}.
[49] See Ovid. "Met." viii.
159
foll., 261 foll.; Hygin. "Fab."
39, 40; Diod. Sic. iv. 79; Paus. vii.
4.
6.
[50] Or, "Ah yes, of course; the
tale
is current."
[51] See Virg. "Aen." ii.
90; Hygin.
105; Philostr. "Her." x.
[52] Cf. Herod. iii. 129.
[53] {to eudaimonein}, "happiness."
Cf. Herod. i. 86.
[54] Cf. Plat. "Rep." vii.
517
D; "Phaedr." 249 D.
[55] e. g. Alcibiades.
[56] See above for Socrates' own form
of
supplication.
[57] Or, "popularly governed."
[58] Al. "who cannot contribute
their
necessary quota to the taxes (according
to
the census)."
[59] Or, "as people of dull intelligence
and sluggish temperament." Cf.
Plat.
"Gorg." 488 A.
Book IV III
It may be inferred that Socrates was
in no
hurry for those who were with him to
discover
capacities for speech and action or
as inventive
geniuses,[1] without at any rate a
well-laid
foundation of self- control.[2] For
those
who possessed such abilities without
these
same saving virtues would, he believed,
only
become worse men with greater power
for mischief.
His first object was to instil into
those
who were with him a wise spirit in
their
relation to the gods.[3] That such
was the
tenor of his conversation in dealing
with
men may be seen from the narratives
of others
who were present on some particular
occasion.[4]
I confine myself to a particular discussion
with Euthydemus at which I was present.
Socrates said:[5] Tell me, Euthydemus,
has
it ever struck you to observe what
tender
pains the gods have taken to furnish
man
with all his needs?
Euthydemus. No indeed, I cannot say
that
it has ever struck me.
Well (Socrates cotinued), you do not
need
to be reminded that, in the first place,
we need light, and with light the gods
supply
us.
Euthydemus. Most true, and if we had
not
got it we should, as far as our own
eyes
could help us, be like men born blind.
Socrates. And then, again, seeing that
we
stand in need of rest and relaxation,
they
bestow upon us "the blessed balm
of
silent night."[6]
Yes (he answered), we are much beholden
for
that boon.
Socrates. Then, forasmuch as the sun
in his
splendour makes manifest to us the
hours
of the day and bathes all things in
brightness,
but anon night in her darkness obliterates
distinctions, have they not displayed
aloft
the starry orbs, which inform us of
the watches
of the night, whereby we can accomplish
many
of our needs?[7]
It is so (he answered).
Socrates. And let us not forget that
the
moon herself not only makes clear to
us the
quarters of the night, but of the month
also?
Certainly (he answered).
Socrates. And what of this: that whereas
we need nutriment, this too the heavenly
powers yield us? Out of earth's bosom
they
cause good to spring up[8] for our
benefit;
and for our benefit provide appropriate
seasons
to furnish us in turn not only with
the many
and diverse objects of need, but with
the
sources also of our joy and gladness?[9]
Yes (he answered earerly), these things
bear
token truly to a love for man.[10]
Socrates. Well, and what of another
priceless
gift, that of water, which conspires
with
earth and the seasons to give both
birth
and increase to all things useful to
us;
nay, which helps to nurture our very
selves,
and commingling with all that feeds
us, renders
it more digestible, more wholesome,
and more
pleasant to the taste; and mark you
in proportion
to the abundance of our need the superabundance
of its supply. What say you concerning
such
a boon?
Euthydemus. In this again I see a sign
of
providential care.
Socrates. And then the fact that the
same
heavenly power has provided us with
fire[11]--our
assistant against cold, our auxiliary
in
darkness, our fellow-workman in every
art
and every instrument which for the
sake of
its utility mortal man may invent or
furnish
himself withal. What of this, since,
to put
it compendiously, there is nothing
serviceable
to the life of man worth speaking of
but
owes its fabrication to fire?[12]
Euthydemus. Yes, a transcendent instance
of benevolent design.[13]
Socrates. Again, consider the motions
of
the Sun,[14] how when he has turned
him about
in winter[15] he again draws nigh to
us,
ripening some fruits, and causing others
whose time is past to dry up; how when
he
has fulfilled his work he comes no
closer,
but turns away as if in fear to scorch
us
to our hurt unduly; and again, when
he has
reached a point where if he should
prolong
his reatreat we should plainly be frozen
to death with cold, note how he turns
him
about and resumes his approach, traversing
that region of the heavens where he
may shed
his genial influence best upon us.
Yes, upon my word (he answered), these
occurrences
bear the impress of being so ordered
for
the sake of man.
Socrates. And then, again, it being
manifest
that we could not endure either scorching
heat or freezing cold if they came
suddenly
upon us, note how gradually the sun
approaches,
and how gradually recedes, so that
we fail
to notice how we come at last to either
extreme.[16]
For my part (he replied), the question
forces
itself upon my mind, whether the gods
have
any other occupation save only to minister
to man; and I am only hindered from
saying
so, because the rest of animals would
seem
to share these benefits along with
man.
Socrates. Why, to be sure; and is it
not
plain that these animals themselves
are born
and bred for the sake of man? At any
rate,
no living creature save man derives
so many
of his enjoyments from sheep and goats,
horses
and cattle and asses, and other animals.
He is more dependent, I should suppose,
on
these than even on plants and vegetables.
At any rate, equally with these latter
they
serve him as means of subsistence or
articles
of commerce; indeed, a large portion
of the
human family do not use the products
of the
soil as food at all, but live on the
milk
and cheese and flesh of their flocks
and
herds, whilst all men everywhere tame
and
domesticate the more useful kinds of
animals,
and turn them to account as fellow-workers
in war and for other purposes.
Yes, I cannot but agree with what you
say
(he answered), when I see that animals
so
much stronger than man become so subservient
to his hand that he can use them as
he lists.
Socrates. And as we reflect on the
infinite
beauty and utility and the variety
of nature,
what are we to say of the fact that
man has
been endowed with sensibilities which
correspond
with this diversity, whereby we take
our
fill of every blessing;[17] or, again,
this
implanted faculty of reasoning, which
enables
us to draw inferences concerning the
things
which we perceive, and by aid of memory
to
understand how each set of things may
be
turned to our good, and to devise countless
contrivances with a view to enjoying
the
good and repelling the evil; or lastly,
when
we consider the faculty bestowed upon
us
of interpretative speech, by which
we are
enabled to instruct one another, and
to participate
in all the blessings fore-named: to
form
societies, to establish laws, and to
enter
upon a civilised existence[18]--what
are
we to think?
Euthydemus. Yes, Socrates, decidely
it would
appear that the gods do manifest a
great
regard, nay, a tender care, towards
mankind.
Socrates. Well, and what do you make
of the
fact that where we are powerless to
take
advantageous forethought for our future,
at this stage they themselves lend
us their
co-operation, imparting to the inquirer
through
divination knowledge of events about
to happen,
and instructing him by what means they
may
best be turned to good account?
Euthydemus. Ay, and you, Socrates,
they would
seem to treat in a more friendly manner
still
than the rest of men, if, without waiting
even to be inquired of by you, they
show
you by signs beforehand what you must,
and
what you must not do.[19]
Socrates. Yes, and you will discover
for
youself the truth of what I say, if,
without
waiting to behold the outward and visible
forms[20] of the gods themselves, you
will
be content to behold their works; and
with
these before you, to worship and honour
the
Divine authors of them.[21] I would
have
you reflect that the very gods themselves
suggest this teaching.[22] Not one
of these
but gives us freely of his blessings;
yet
they do not step from behind their
veil in
order to grant one single boon.[23]
And pre-eminently
He who orders and holds together the
universe,[24]
in which are all things beautiful and
good;[25]
who fashions and refashions it to never-ending
use unworn, keeping it free from sickness
or decay,[26] so that swifter than
thought
it ministers to his will unerringly--this
God is seen to perform the mightiest
operations,
but in the actual administration of
the same
abides himself invisible to mortal
ken. Reflect
further, this Sun above our heads,
so visible
to all--as we suppose--will not suffer
man
to regard him too narrowly, but should
any
essay to watch him with a shameless
stare
he will snatch away their power of
vision.
And if the gods themselves are thus
unseen,
so too shall you find their ministers
to
be hidden also; from the height of
heaven
above the thunderbolt is plainly hurled,
and triumphs over all that it encounters,
yet it is all-invisible, no eye may
detect
its coming or its going at the moment
of
its swoop. The winds also are themselves
unseen, though their works are manifest,
and through their approach we are aware
of
them. And let us not forget, the soul
of
man himself, which if aught else human
shares
in the divine--however manifestly enthroned
within our bosom, is as wholly as the
rest
hidden from our gaze. These things
you should
lay to mind, and not despise the invisible
ones, but learn to recognise their
power,
as revealed in outward things, and
to know
the divine influence.[27]
Nay, Socrates (replied Euthydemus),
there
is no danger I shall turn a deaf ear
to the
divine influence even a little; of
that I
am not afraid, but I am out of heart
to think
that no soul of man may ever requite
the
kindness of the gods with fitting gratitude.
Be not out of heart because of that
(he said);
you know what answer the god at Delphi
makes
to each one who comes asking "how
shall
I return thanks to heaven?"--"According
to the law and custom of your city";
and this, I presume, is law and custom
everywhere
that a man should please the gods with
offerings
according to the ability which is in
him.[28]
How then should a man honour the gods
with
more beautiful or holier honour than
by doing
what they bid him? but he must in no
wise
slacken or fall short of his ability,
for
when a man so does, it is manifest,
I presume,
that at the moment he is not honouring
the
gods. You must then honour the gods,
not
with shortcoming but according to your
ability;
and having so done, be of good cheer
and
hope to receive the greatest blessings.
For
where else should a man of sober sense
look
to receive great blessings if not from
those
who are able to help him most, and
how else
should he hope to obtain them save
by seeking
to please his helper, and how may he
hope
to please his helper better than by
yielding
him the amplest obedience?
By such words--and conduct corresponding
to his words--did Socrates mould and
fashion
the hearts of his companions, making
them
at once more devout and more virtuous.[29]
[1] Or, "as speakers" (see
ch.
vi. below), "and men of action"
(see ch. v. below), "or as masters
of
invention" (see ch. vii. below).
[2] Or, "but as prior to those
excellences
must be engrafted in them {sophrosune}
(the
virtues of temperance and sanity of
soul)."
[3] Lit. "His first object and
endeavour
was to make those who were with him
{sophronas}
(sound of soul) as regards the gods."
[4] Reading after Herbst, Cobet, etc.,
{diegountai},
or if vulg. {diegounto}, translate,
"from
the current accounts penned during
his lifetime
by the other witnesses." For {alloi}
see K. Joel, op. cit. pp. 15, 23; above,
"Mem." I. iv. 1.
[5] For the subject matter of this
"teleological"
chapter, see above, I. iv.; K. Joel,
op.
cit. Appendix, p. 547 foll. in ref.
to Dummler's
views.
[6] {kalliston anapauterion}. The diction
throughout is "poetical."
[7] e. g. for temple orientation see
Dr.
Penrose quoted by Norman Lockyer, "Nature,"
August 31. 1893.
[8] Cf. Plat. "Laws," 747
D.
[9] Or, "pleasure."
[10] Cf. Plat. "Laws," 713
D; "Symp."
189 D. "These things are signs
of a
beneficient regard for man."
[11] Lit. "and then the fact that
they
made provision for us of even fire";
the credit of this boon, according
to Hesiod,
being due to Prometheus.
[12] Or, "no life-aiding appliance
worthy
of the name."
[13] Or, "Yes, that may be called
an
extreme instance of the divine 'philanthropy.'"
Cf. Cic. "de N. D." ii. 62.
[14] A single MS. inserts a passage
{to de
kai era . . . 'Anekphraston}.
[15] i. e. as we say, "after the
winter
solstice."
[16] Or, "note the gradual approach
and gradual recession of the sun- god,
so
gradual that we reach either extreme
in a
manner imperceptibly, and before we
are aware
of its severity."
[17] Or, "Again, when we consider
how
many beautiful objects there are serviceable
to man, and yet how unlike they are
to one
another, the fact that man has been
endowed
with senses adapted to each class of
things,
and so has access to a world of happiness."
[18] Cf. Aristot. "Pol."
III. ix.
5.
[19] See above, I. iv. 14, for a parallel
to the train of thought on the part
of Aristodemus
"the little," and of Euthydemus;
and for Socrates' {daimonion}, see
above;
Grote, "Plato," i. 400.
[20] Cf. Cic. "de N. D."
I. xii.
31; Lactantius, "de Ira,"
xi. 13.
[21] See L. Dindorf ad loc. (ed. Ox.
1862),
{theous}; G. Sauppe, vol. iii. "An.
crit." p. xxix; R. Kuhner; C.
Schenkl.
[22] i. e. "that man must walk
by faith."
For {upodeiknunai} cf. "Econ."
xii. 18.
[23] Schneid. cf. Plat. "Crat."
396.
[24] Or, "the co-ordinator and
container
of the universe."
[25] Or, "in whom all beauty and
goodness
is."
[26] Cf. "Cyrop." VIII. vii.
22;
above, I. iv. 13.
[27] {to daimonion}, the divinity.
[28] Or, "and that law, I presume,
is
universal which says, Let a man,"
etc.;
and for the maxim see above; "Anab."
III. ii. 9.
[29] Or, "sounder of soul and
more temperate
as well as more pious."
Book IV IV
But indeed[1] with respect to justice
and
uprightness he not only made no secret
of
the opinion he held, but gave practical
demonstration
of it, both in private by his law-abiding
and helpful behaviour to all,[2] and
in public
by obeying the magistrates in all that
the
laws enjoined, whether in the life
of the
city or in military service, so that
he was
a pattern of loyalty to the rest of
the world,
and on three several occasions in particular:
first, when as president (Epistates)
of the
assembly he would not suffer the sovereign
people to take an unconstitutional
vote,[3]
but ventured, on the side of the laws,
to
resist a current of popular feeling
strong
enough, I think, to have daunted any
other
man. Again, when the Thirty tried to
lay
some injunction on him contrary to
the laws,
he refused to obey, as for instance
when
they forbade his conversing with the
young;[4]
or again, when they ordered him and
certain
other citizens to arrest a man to be
put
to death,[5] he stood out single-handed
on
the ground that the injunctions laid
upon
him were contrary to the laws. And
lastly,
when he appeared as defendant in the
suit
instituted by Meletus,[6] notwithstanding
that it was customary for litigants
in the
law courts to humour the judges in
the conduct
of their arguments by flattery and
supplications
contrary to the laws,[7] notwithstanding
also that defendants owed their acquittal
by the court to the employment of such
methods,
he refused to do a single thing however
habitual
in a court of law which was not strictly
legal; and though by only a slight
deflection
from the strict path he might easily
have
been acquitted by his judges,[8] he
preferred
to abide by the laws and die rather
than
transgress them and live.
These views he frequently maintained
in conversation,
now with one and now with another,
and one
particular discussion with Hippias
of Elis[9]
on the topic of justice and uprightness
has
come to my knowledge.[10]
Hippias had just arrived at Athens
after
a long absence, and chanced to be present
when Socrates was telling some listeners
how astonishing it was that if a man
wanted
to get another taught to be a shoemaker
or
carpenter or coppersmith or horseman,
he
would have no doubt where to send him
for
the purpose: "People say,"[11]
he added, "that if a man wants
to get
his horse or his ox taught in the right
way,[12]
the world is full of instructors; but
if
he would learn himself, or have his
son or
his slave taught in the way of right,
he
cannot tell where to find such instruction."
Hippias, catching the words, exclaimed
in
a bantering tone: What! still repeating
the
same old talk,[13] Socrates, which
I used
to hear from you long ago?
Yes (answered Socrates), and what is
still
more strange, Hippias, it is not only
the
same old talk but about the same old
subjects.
Now you, I daresay, through versatility
of
knowledge,[14] never say the same thing
twice
over on the same subject?
To be sure (he answered), my endeavour
is
to say something new on all occasions.
What (he asked) about things which
you know,
as for instance in a case of spelling,
if
any one asks you, "How many letters
in Socrates, and what is their order?"[15]
I suppose you try to run off one string
of
letters to-day and to-morrow another?
or
to a question of arithmetic, "Does
twice
five make ten?" your answer to-day
will
differ from that of yesterday?
Hipparch. No; on these topics, Socrates,
I do as you do and repeat myself. However,
to revert to justice (and uprightness),[16]
I flatter myself I can at present furnish
you with some remarks which neither
you nor
any one else will be able to controvert.
By Hera![17] (he exclaimed), what a
blessing
to have discovered![18] Now we shall
have
no more divisions of opinion on points
of
right and wrong; judges will vote unanimously;
citizens will cease wrangling; there
will
be no more litigation, no more party
faction,
states will reconcile their differences,
and wars are ended. For my part I do
not
know how I can tear myself away from
you,
until I have heard from your own lips
all
about the grand discovery you have
made.
You shall hear all in good time (Hippias
answered), but not until you make a
plain
statement of your own belief. What
is justice?
We have had enough of your ridiculing
all
the rest of the world, questioning
and cross-examining
first one and then the other, but never
a
bit will you render an account to any
one
yourself or state a plain opinion upon
a
single topic.[19]
What, Hippias (Socrates retorted),
have you
not observed that I am in a chronic
condition
of proclaiming what I regard as just
and
upright?
Hipparch. And pray what is this theory[20]
of yours on the subject? Let us have
it in
words.
Socrates. If I fail to proclaim it
in words,
at any rate I do so in deed and in
fact.
Or do you not think that a fact is
worth
more as evidence than a word?[21]
Worth far more, I should say (Hippias
answered),
for many a man with justice and right
on
his lips commits injustice and wrong,
but
no doer of right ever was a misdoer
or could
possibly be.
Socrates. I ask then, have you ever
heard
or seen or otherwise perceived me bearing
false witness or lodging malicious
information,
or stirring up strife among friends
or political
dissension in the city, or committing
any
other unjust and wrongful act?
No, I cannot say that I have (he answered).
Socrates. And do you not regard it
as right
and just to abstain from wrong?[22]
Hipparch. Now you are caught, Socrates,
plainly
trying to escape from a plain statement.
When asked what you believe justice
to be,
you keep telling us not what the just
man
does, but what he does not do.
Why, I thought for my part (answered
Socrates)
that the refusal to do wrong and injustice
was a sufficient warrent in itself
of righteousness
and justice, but if you do not agree,
see
if this pleases you better: I assert
that
what is "lawful" is "just
and righteous."
Do you mean to assert (he asked) that
lawful
and just are synonymous terms?
Socrates. I do.
I ask (Hippias added), for I do not
perceive
what you mean by lawful, nor what you
mean
by just.[23]
Socrates. You understand what is meant
by
laws of a city or state?
Yes (he answered).
Socrates. What do you take them to
be?
Hipparch. The several enactments drawn
up
by the citizens or members of a state
in
agreement as to what things should
be done
or left undone.
Then I presume (Socrates continued)
that
a member of a state who regulates his
life
in accordance with these enactments
will
be law- abiding, while the transgressor
of
the same will be law-less?
Certainly (he answered).
Socrates. And I presume the law-loving
citizen
will do what is just and right, while
the
lawless man will do what is unjust
and wrong?
Hipparch. Certainly.
Socrates. And I presume that he who
does
what is just is just, and he who does
what
is unjust is unjust?
Hipparch. Of course.
Socrates. It would appear, then, that
the
law-loving man is just, and the lawless
unjust?
Then Hippias: Well, but laws, Socrates,
how
should any one regard as a serious
matter
either the laws themselves, or obedience
to them, which laws the very people
who made
them are perpetually rejecting and
altering?
Which is also true of war (Socrates
replied);
cities are perpetually undertaking
war and
then making peace again.
Most true (he answered).
Socrates. If so, what is the difference
between
depreciating obedience to law because
laws
will be repealed, and depreciating
good discipline
in war because peace will one day be
made?
But perhaps you object to enthusiasm
displayed
in defence of one's home and fatherland
in
war?
No, indeed I do not! I heartily approve
of
it (he answered).
Socrates. Then have you laid to heart
the
lesson taught by Lycurgus to the Lacedaemonians,[24]
and do you understand that if he succeeded
in giving Sparta a distinction above
other
states, it was only by instilling into
her,
beyond all else, a spirit of obedience
to
the laws? And among magistrates and
rulers
in the different states, you would
scarcely
refuse the palm of superiority to those
who
best contribute to make their fellow-citizens
obedient to the laws? And you would
admit
that any particular state in which
obedience
to the laws is the paramount distinction
of the citizens flourishes most in
peace
time, and in time of war is irresistible?
But, indeed, of all the blessings which
a
state may enjoy, none stands higher
than
the blessing of unanimity. "Concord
among citizens"--that is the constant
theme of exhortation emphasised by
the councils
of elders[25] and by the choice spirits
of
the community;[26] at all times and
everywhere
through the length and breadth of all
Hellas
it is an established law that the citizens
be bound together by an oath of concord;[27]
everywhere they do actually swear this
oath;
not of course as implying that citizens
shall
all vote for the same choruses, or
give their
plaudits to the same flute-players,
or choose
the same poets, or limit themselves
to the
same pleasures, but simply that they
shall
pay obedience to the laws, since in
the end
that state will prove most powerful
and most
prosperous in which the citizens abide
by
these; but without concord neither
can a
state be well administered nor a household
well organised.
And if we turn to private life, what
better
protection can a man have than obedience
to the laws? This shall be his safeguard
against penalties, his guarantee of
honours
at the hands of the community; it shall
be
a clue to thread his way through the
mazes
of the law courts unbewildered, secure
against
defeat, assured of victory.[28] It
is to
him, the law-loving citizen, that men
will
turn in confidence when seeking a guardian
of the most sacred deposits, be it
of money
or be it their sons or daughters. He,
in
the eyes of the state collectively,
is trustworthy--he
and no other; who alone may be depended
on
to render to all alike their dues--to
parents
and kinsmen and servants, to friends
and
fellow-citizens and foreigners. This
is he
whom the enemy will soonest trust to
arrange
an armistice, or a truce, or a treaty
of
peace. They would like to become the
allies
of this man, and to fight on his side.
This
is he to whom the allies[29] of his
country
will most confidently entrust the command
of their forces, or of a garrison,
or their
states themselves. This, again, is
he who
may be counted on to recompense kindness
with gratitude, and who, therefore,
is more
sure of kindly treatment than another
whose
sense of gratitude is fuller.[30] The
most
desirable among friends, the enemy
of all
others to be avoided, clearly he is
not the
person whom a foreign state would choose
to go to war with; encompassed by a
host
of friends and exempt from foes, his
very
character has a charm to compel friendship
and alliance, and before him hatred
and hostility
melt away.
And now, Hippias, I have done my part;
that
is my proof and demonstration that
the "lawful"
and "law-observant" are synonymous
with the "upright" and the
"just";
do you, if you hold a contrary view,
instruct
us.[31]
Then Hippias: Nay, upon my soul, Socrates,
I am not aware of holding any contrary
opinion
to what you have uttered on the theme
of
justice.[32]
Socrates. But now, are you aware, Hippias,
of certain unwritten laws?[33]
Yes (he answered), those held in every
part
of the world, and in the same sense.
Can you then assert (asked Socrates)
of these
unwritten laws that men made them?
Nay, how (he answered) should that
be, for
how could they all have come together
from
the ends of the earth? and even if
they had
so done, men are not all of one speech?[34]
Socrates. Whom then do you believe
to have
been the makers of these laws.
Hipparch. For my part, I think that
the gods
must have made these laws for men,
and I
take it as proof that first and foremost
it is a law and custom everywhere to
worship
and reverence the gods.
Socrates. And, I presume, to honour
parents
is also customary everywhere?
Yes, that too (he answered).
Socrates. And, I presume, also the
prohibition
of intermarriage between parents and
children?
Hipparch. No; at that point I stop,
Socrates.
That does not seem to me to be a law
of God.
Now, why? (he asked).
Because I perceive it is not infrequently
transgressed (he answered).[35]
Socrates. Well, but there are a good
many
other things which people do contrary
to
law; only the penalty, I take it, affixed
to the transgression of the divine
code is
certain; there is no escape for the
offender
after the manner in which a man may
transgress
the laws of man with impunity, slipping
through
the fingers of justice by stealth,
or avoiding
it by violence.
Hipparch. And what is the inevitable
penalty
paid by those who, being related as
parents
and children, intermingle in marriage?
Socrates. The greatest of all penalties;
for what worse calamity can human beings
suffer in the production of offspring
than
to misbeget?[36]
Hipparch. But how or why should they
breed
them ill where nothing hinders them,
being
of a good stock themselves and producing
from stock as good?
Socrates. Because, forsooth, in order
to
produce good children, it is not simply
necessary
that the parents should be good and
of a
good stock, but that both should be
equally
in the prime and vigour of their bodies.[37]
Do you suppose that the seed of those
who
are at their prime is like theirs who
either
have not yet reached their prime, or
whose
prime has passed?
Hipparch. No, it is reasonable to expect
that the seed will differ.
Socrates. And for the better--which?
Hipparch. Theirs clearly who are at
their
prime.
Socrates. It would seem that the seed
of
those who are not yet in their prime
or have
passed their prime is not good?
Hipparch. It seems most improbable
it should
be.
Socrates. Then the right way to produce
children
is not that way?
Hipparch. No, that is not the right
way.
Socrates. Then children who are so
produced
are produced not as they ought to be?
Hipparch. So it appears to me.
What offspring then (he asked) will
be ill
produced, ill begotten, and ill born,
if
not these?
I subscribe to that opinion also (replied
Hippias).
Socrates. Well, it is a custom universally
respected, is it not, to return good
for
good, and kindness with kindness?
Hipparch. Yes, a custom, but one which
again
is apt to be transgressed.
Socrates. Then he that so transgresses
it
pays penalty in finding himself isolated;
bereft of friends who are good, and
driven
to seek after those who love him not.
Or
is it not so that he who does me kindness
in my intercourse with him is my good
friend,
but if I requite not this kindness
to my
benefactor, I am hated by him for my
ingratitude,
and yet I must needs pursue after him
and
cling to him because of the great gain
to
me of his society?
Hipparch. Yes, Socrates. In all these
cases,
I admit, there is an implication of
divine
authority;[38] that a law should in
itself
be loaded with the penalty of its transgression
does suggest to my mind a higher than
human
type of legistlator.
Socrates. And in your opinion, Hippias,
is
the legislation of the gods just and
righteous,
or the reverse of what is just and
righteous?
Hipparch. Not the reverse of what is
just
and righteous, Socrates, God forbid!
for
scarcely could any other legislate
aright,
of not God himself.
Socrates. It would seem then, Hippias,
the
gods themselves are well pleased that
"the
lawful" and "the just"
should
be synonymous?[39]
By such language and by such conduct,
through
example and precept alike, he helped
to make
those who approached him more upright
and
more just.
[1] L. Dindorf suspects [SS. 1-6, {'Alla
men . . . pollakis}], ed. Lips. 1872.
See
also Praef. to Ox. ed. p. viii.
[2] Or, "by his conduct to all,
which
was not merely innocent in the eye
of law
and custom but positively helpful."
[3] See above, I. i. 18; "Hell."
I. vii. 14, 15; Grote, "H. G."
viii. 272.
[4] See above, I. ii. 35.
[5] Leon of Salamis. See "Hell."
II. iii. 39; Plat. "Apol."
32 C;
Andoc. "de Myst." 46.
[6] See above, I. i. 1; Plat. "Apol."
19 C.
[7] Kuhner cf. Quintil. VI. i. 7: "Athenis
affectus movere etiam per praeconem
prohibatur
orator"; "Apol." 4;
Plat.
"Apol." 38 D, E.
[8] See Grote, "H. G." viii.
p.
663 foll.
[9] For this famous person see Cob.
"Pros.
Xen." s. n.; Plat. "Hipp.
maj."
148; Quint. xii. 11, 21; Grote, "H.
G." viii. 524.
[10] Or, "I can personally vouch
for."
[11] L. Dindorf, after Ruhnken and
Valckenar,
omits this sentence {phasi de tines
. . .
didaxonton}. See Kuhner ad loc. For
the sentiment
see Plat. "Apol." 20 A.
[12] Cf. "Cyrop." II. ii.
26; VIII.
iii. 38; also "Horsem." iii.
5;
"Hunting," vii. 4.
[13] This tale is repeated by Dio Chrys.
"Or." III. i. 109. Cf. Plat.
"Gorg."
490 E.
[14] Or, "such is the breadth
of your
learning," {polumathes}. Cf. Plat.
"Hipp.
maj."
[15] Cf. "Econ." viii. 14;
Plat.
"Alc." i. 113 A.
[16] Or, "on the topic of the
just I
have something to say at present which,"
etc.
[17] See above, I. v. 5.
[18] Or, "what a panacea are you
the
inventor of"; lit. "By Hera,
you
have indeed discovered a mighty blessing,
if juries are to cease recording their
verdicts
'aye' and 'no'; if citizens are to
cease
their wranglings on points of justice,
their
litigations, and their party strifes;
if
states are to cease differing on matters
of right and wrong and appealing to
the arbitrament
of war."
[19] See Plat. "Gorg." 465
A.
[20] {o logos}.
[21] Or, "is of greater evidential
value,"
"ubi res adsunt, quid opus est
verbis?"
[22] Or, "is not abstinence from
wrongdoing
synonymous with righteous behaviour?"
[23] Lit. "what sort of lawful
or what
sort of just is spoken of."
[24] Cf. "Pol. Lac." viii.
See
Newman, op. cit. i. 396.
[25] Lit. "the Gerousiai."
{S}
or {X S} uses the Spartan phraseology.
[26] Lit. "the best men."
{S} or
{X S} speaks as an "aristocrat."
[27] Cf. "Hell." II. iv.
43; Lys.
xxv. 21 foll.; Schneid. cf. Lycurg.
"u
Leocr." 189.
[28] Or, "ignorant of hostile,
assured
of favourable verdict."
[29] Lit. "the Allies," e.
g. of
Sparta or of Athens, etc.
[30] Lit. "From whom may the doer
of
a deed of kindness more confidently
expect
the recompense of gratitude than from
your
lover of the law? and whom would one
select
as the recipient of kindness rather
than
a man susceptible of gratitude?"
[31] For the style of this enconium
(of the
{nomimos}) cf. "Ages." i.
36; and
for the "Socratic" reverence
for
law cf. Plat. "Crito."
[32] Lit. "the just and upright,"
{tou dikaiou}.
[33] See Soph. "Antig." "Oed.
T." 865, and Prof. Jebb ad loc.;
Dem.
"de Cor." 317, 23; Aristot.
"Rhet."
I. xiii.
[34] Or, "there would be difficulty
of understanding each other, and a
babel
of tongues."
[35] Or, "as I perceive, it is
not of
universal application, some transgress
it."
[36] Or, "in the propagation of
the
species than to produce misbegotten
children."
[37] Cf. Plat. "Laws," viii.
839
A; Herbst, etc., cf. Grotius, "de
Jure,"
ii. 5, xii. 4.
[38] Lit. "Yes, upon my word,
Socrates,
all these cases look very like (would
seem
to point to) the gods."
[39] Or, "it is well pleasing
also to
the gods that what is lawful is just
and
what is just is lawful."
Book IV V
And now I propose to show in what way
he
made those who were with him more vigorous
in action.[1] In the first place, as
befitted
one whose creed was that a basis of
self-command
is indispensable to any noble performance,
he manifested himself to his companions
as
one who had pre-eminently disciplined
himself;[2]
and in the next place by conversation
and
discussion he encouraged them to a
like self-
restraint beyond all others.[3] Thus
it was
that he continued ever mindful himself,
and
was continually reminding all whom
he encountered,
of matters conducive to virtue; as
the following
discussion with Euthydemus, which has
come
to my knowledge,[4] will serve to illustrate--the
topic of the discussion being self-command.
Tell me, Euthydemus (he began), do
you believe
freedom to be a noble and magnificent
acquisition,
whether for a man or for a state?
I cannot conceive a nobler or more
magnificent
(he answered).
Socrates. Then do you believe him to
be a
free man who is ruled by the pleasures
of
the body, and thereby cannot perform
what
is best?
Certainly not (he answered).
Socrates. No! for possibly to perform
what
is best appears to you to savour of
freedom?
And, again, to have some one over you
who
will prevent you doing the like seems
a loss
of freedom?
Most decidedly (he answered).
Socrates. It would seem you are decidedly
of opinion that the incontinent are
the reverse
of free?[5]
Euthydemus. Upon my word, I much suspect
so.
Socrates. And does it appear to you
that
the incontinent man is merely hindered
from
doing what is noblest, or that further
he
is impelled to do what is most shameful?
Euthydemus. I think he is as much driven
to the one as he is hindered from the
other.
Socrates. And what sort of lords and
masters
are those, think you, who at once put
a stop
to what is best and enforce what is
worst?
Euthydemus. Goodness knows, they must
be
the very worst of masters.
Socrates. And what sort of slavery
do you
take to be the worst?
I should say (he answered) slavery
to the
worst masters.
It would seem then (pursued Socrates)
that
the incontinent man is bound over to
the
worst sort of slavery, would it not?
So it appears to be (the other answered).
Socrates. And does it not appear to
you that
this same beldame incontinence shuts
out
wisdom, which is the best of all things,[6]
from mankind, and plunges them into
the opposite?
Does it not appear to you that she
hinders
men from attending to things which
will be
of use and benefit, and from learning
to
understand them; that she does so by
dragging
them away to things which are pleasant;
and
often though they are well aware of
the good
and of the evil, she amazes and confounds[7]
their wits and makes them choose the
worse
in place of the better?
Yes, so it comes to pass (he answered).
Socrates. And[8] soundness of soul,
the spirit
of temperate modesty? Who has less
claim
to this than the incontinent man? The
works
of the temperate spirit and the works
of
incontinency are, I take it, diametrically
opposed?
That too, I admit (he answered).
Socrates. If this then be so concerning
these
virtues,[9] what with regard to carefulness
and devotion to all that ought to occupy
us? Can anything more seriously militate
against these than this same incontinence?
Nothing that I can think of (he replied).
Socrates. And can worse befall a man,
think
you? Can he be subjected to a more
baleful
influence than that which induces him
to
choose what is hurtful in place of
what is
helpful; which cajoles him to devote
himself
to the evil and to neglect the good;
which
forces him, will he nill he, to do
what every
man in his sober senses would shrink
from
and avoid?
I can imagine nothing worse (he replied).
Socrates. Self-control, it is reasonable
to suppose, will be the cause of opposite
effects upon mankind to those of its
own
opposite, the want of self-control?
Euthydemus. It is to be supposed so.
Socrates. And this, which is the source
of
opposite effects to the very worst,
will
be the very best of things?
Euthydemus. That is the natural inference.
Socrates. It looks, does it not, Euthydemus,
as if self-control were the best thing
a
man could have?
It does indeed, Socrates (he answered).
Socrates. But now, Euthydemus, has
it ever
occurred to you to note one fact?
What fact? (he asked).
Socrates. That, after all, incontinency
is
powerless to bring us to that realm
of sweetness
which some look upon[10] as her peculiar
province; it is not incontinency but
self-control
alone which has the passport to highest
pleasures.
In what way? (he asked). How so?
Why, this way (Socrates answered):
since
incontinency will not suffer us to
resist
hunger and thirst, or to hold out against
sexual appetite, or want of sleep (which
abstinences are the only channels to
true
pleasure in eating and drinking, to
the joys
of love, to sweet repose and blissful
slumber
won by those who will patiently abide
and
endure till each particular happiness
is
at the flood)[11]--it comes to this:
by incontinency
we are cut off from the full fruition
of
the more obvious and constantly recurring
pleasures.[12] To self-control, which
alone
enables us to endure the pains aforesaid,
alone belongs the power to give us
any pleasure
worth remembering in these common cases.
You speak the words of truth[13] (he
answered).
Socrates. Furthermore,[14] if there
be any
joy in learning aught "beautiful
and
good," or in patient application
to
such rules as may enable a man to manage
his body aright, or to administer his
household
well, or to prove himself useful to
his friends
and to the state, or to dominate his
enemies--which
things are the sources not only of
advantage
but of deepest satisifaction[15]--to
the
continent and self-controlled it is
given
to reap the fruits of them in their
performance.
It is the incontinent who have neither
part
nor lot in any one of them. Since we
must
be right in asserting that he is least
concerned
with such things who has least ability
to
do them, being tied down to take an
interest
in the pleasure which is nearest to
hand.
Euthydemus replied: Socrates, you would
say,
it seems to me, that a man who is mastered
by the pleasures of the body has no
concern
at all with virtue.
And what is the distinction, Euthydemus
(he
asked), between a man devoid of self-control
and the dullest of brute beasts? A
man who
foregoes all height of aim, who gives
up
searching for the best and strives
only to
gratify his sense of pleasure,[16]
is he
better than the silliest of cattle?[17]
.
. . But to the self-controlled alone
is it
given to discover the hid treasures.
These,
by word and by deed, they will pick
out and
make selection of them according to
their
kinds, choosing deliberately the good
and
holding aloof from the evil.[18] Thus
(he
added) it is that a man reaches the
zenith,
as it were, of goodness and happiness,
thus
it is that he becomes most capable
of reasoning
and discussion.[19] The very name discussion
({dialegesthai}) is got from people
coming
together and deliberating in common
by picking
out and selecting things
({dialegein}) according to their kinds.[20]
A man then is bound to prepare himself
as
much as possible for this business,
and to
pursue it beyond all else with earnest
resolution;
for this is the right road to excellence,
this will make a man fittest to lead
his
fellows and be a master in debate.[21]
[1] Lit. "more practical,"
i. e.
more energetic and effective.
[2] "If any one might claim to
be a
prince of ascetics, it was Socrates;
such
was the ineffaceable impression left
on the
minds of his associates."
[3] Or, "he stimulated in these
same
companions a spirit of self- restraint
beyond
all else."
[4] Or, "which I can vouch for."
[5] Or, "incontinency is illiberal."
[6] "Wisdom, the greatest good
which
men can possess."
[7] Schneid. cf. Plat. "Protag."
355 A; and "Symp." iv. 23.
[8] "And if this be so concerning
wisdom,
{sophia}, what of {sophrasune}, soundness
of soul--sobriety?"
[9] Or add, "If this be so concerning
not wisdom only, but concerning temperance
and soundness of soul, what,"
etc.
[10] Or, "which we are apt to
think
of as."
[11] Or, "at its season."
Lit.
"is as sweet as possible."
[12] Or, "from tasting to any
extent
worth speaking of the most necessary
and
all-pervading sources of happiness."
[13] Lit. "What you say is absolutely
and entirely true" (the "vraie
verite" of the matter).
[14] Or, "But indeed, if there
be joy
in the pursuit of any noble study or
of such
accomplishments as shall enable,"
etc.
[15] Or, "of the highest pleasures."
[16] Or, "and seeks by hook and
by crook
to do what is pleasantest."
[17] i. e. he becomes an animal "feeding
a blind life within the brain."
[18] Or, "selecting the ore and
repudiating
the dross." Kuhner cf. Plat. "Laws,"
v. 735 B.
[19] Or, "draws nearer to happiness
and perfection, and is most capable
of truth-disclosing
conversation." Cf. Plat. "Apol."
41: "What would not a man give,
O judges,
to be able to examine the leaders of
the
great Trojan expedition, or Odysseus,
or
Sisyphus, or numberless others, men
and women
too! What infinite delight would there
be
in conversing with them and asking
them questions!"
(Jowett).
[20] For {dialegein kata gene} = {dialegesthai},
cf. Grote, "H. G." viii.
590.
[21] Cf. Plat. "Rep." 534
D; "Phaedr."
252 E; "Crat." 390 C; "Statesm."
286 D foll.
Book IV VII
The frankness and simplicity with which
Socrates
endeavoured to declare his own opinions,
in dealing with those who conversed
with
him,[1] is, I think, conclusively proved
by the above instances; at the same
time,
as I hope now to show, he was no less
eager
to cultivate a spirit of independence
in
others, which would enable them to
stand
alone in all transactions suited to
their
powers.
Of all the men I have ever known, he
was
most anxious to ascertain in what any
of
those about him was really versed;
and within
the range of his own knowledge he showed
the greatest zeal in teaching everything
which it befits the true gentleman[2]
to
know; or where he was deficient in
knowledge
himself,[3] he would introduce his
friends
to those who knew.[4] He did not fail
to
teach them also up to what point it
was proper
for an educated man to acquire empiric
knowledge
of any particular matter.[5]
To take geometry as an instance: Every
one
(he would say) ought to be taught geometry
so far, at any rate, as to be able,
if necessary,
to take over or part with a piece of
land,
or to divide it up or assign a portion
of
it for cultivation,[6] and in every
case
by geometric rule.[7] That amount of
geometry
was so simple indeed, and easy to learn,
that it only needed ordinary application
of the mind to the method of mensuration,
and the student could at once ascertain
the
size of the piece of land, and, with
the
satisfaction of knowing its measurement,
depart in peace. But he was unable
to approve
of the pursuit of geometry up to the
point
at which it became a study of unintelligible
diagrams.[8] What the use of these
might
be, he failed, he said, to see; and
yet he
was not unversed in these recondite
matters
himself.[9] These things, he would
say, were
enough to wear out a man's life, and
to hinder
him from many other more useful studies.[10]
Again, a certain practical knowledge
of astronomy,
a certain skill in the study of the
stars,
he strongly insisted on. Every one
should
know enough of the science to be able
to
discover the hour of the night or the
season
of the month or year, for the purposes
of
travel by land or sea--the march, the
voyage,
and the regulations of the watch;[11]
and
in general, with regard to all matters
connected
with the night season, or with the
month,
or the year,[12] it was well to have
such
reliable data to go upon as would serve
to
distinguish the various times and seasons.
But these, again, were pieces of knowledge
easily learnt from night sportsmen,[13]
pilots
of vessels, and many others who make
it their
business to know such things. As to
pushing
the study of astronomy so far as to
include
a knowledge of the movements of bodies
outside
our own orbit, whether planets or stars
of
eccentric movement,[14] or wearing
oneself
out endeavouring to discover their
distances
from the earth, their periods, and
their
causes,[15] all this he strongly discountenanced;
for he saw (he said) no advantage in
these
any more than in the former studies.
And
yet he was not unversed[16] in the
subtleties
of astronomy any more than in those
of geometry;
only these, again, he insisted, were
sufficient
to wear out a man's lifetime, and to
keep
him away from many more useful pursuits.
And to speak generally, in regard of
things
celestial he set his face against attempts
to excogitate the machinery by which
the
divine power formed its several operations.[17]
Not only were these matters beyond
man's
faculties to discover, as he believed,
but
the attempt to search out what the
gods had
not chosen to reveal could hardly (he
supposed)
be well pleasing in their sight. Indeed,
the man who tortured his brains about
such
subjects stood a fair chance of losing
his
wits entirely, just as Anaxagoras,[18]
the
headiest speculator of them all, in
his attempt
to explain the divine mechanism, had
somewhat
lost his head. Anaxagoras took on himself
to assert that sun and fire are identical,[19]
ignoring the fact that human beings
can easily
look at fire, but to gaze steadily
into the
face of the sun is given to no man;
or that
under the influence of his rays the
colour
of the skin changes, but under the
rays of
fire not.[20] He forgot that no plant
or
vegetation springs from earth's bosom
with
healthy growth without the help of
sunlight,
whilst the influence of fire is to
parch
up everything, and to destroy life;
and when
he came to speak of the sun as being
a "red-hot
stone" he ignored another fact,
that
a stone in fire neither lights up nor
lasts,
whereas the sun-god abides for ever
with
intensest brilliancy undimmed.
Socrates inculcated the study of reasoning
processes,[21] but in these, equally
with
the rest, he bade the student beware
of vain
and idle over-occupation. Up to the
limit
set by utility, he was ready to join
in any
investigation, and to follow out an
argument
with those who were with him; but there
he
stopped. He particularly urged those
who
were with him to pay the utmost attention
to health. They would learn all it
was possible
to learn from adepts, and not only
so, but
each one individually should take pains
to
discover, by a lifelong observation
of his
own case, what particular regimen,
what meat
or drink, or what kind of work, best
suited
him; these he should turn to account
with
a view to leading the healthiest possible
life. It would be no easy matter for
any
one who would follow this advice, and
study
his own idiosyncrasy, to find a doctor
to
improve either on the diagnosis or
the treatment
requisite.[22]
Where any one came seeking for help
which
no human wisdom could supply, he would
counsel
him to give heed to "divination."
He who has the secret of the means
whereby
the gods give signs to men touching
their
affairs can never surely find himself
bereft
of heavenly guidance.
[1] Or, "who frequented his society,
is, I hope, clear from what has been
said."
[2] Lit. "a beautiful and good
man."
[3] Or, "where he lacked acquaintance
with the matter himself." See,
for an
instance, "Econ." iii. 14.
[4] "To those who had the special
knowledge";
"a connoisseur in the matter."
[5] Or, "of any particular branch
of
learning"; "in each department
of things."
[6] {e ergon apodeixasthai}, or "and
to explain the process." Cf. Plat.
"Rep."
vii. 528 D. See R. Kuhner ad loc. for
other
interpretations of the phrase. Cf.
Max. Tyr.
xxxvii. 7.
[7] Or, "by correct measurement";
lit. "by measurement of the earth."
[8] Cf. Aristot. "Pol." v.
(viii.)
2; Cic. "Acad. Post." I.
iv. 15.
For the attitude compare the attitude
of
a philosopher in other respects most
unlike
Socrates--August Comte, e. g. as to
the futility
of sidereal astronomy, "Pos. Pol."
i. 412 (Bridges).
[9] Cf. Isocr. "On the Antidosis,"
258-269, as to the true place of "Eristic"
in education. See above, IV. ii. 10.
[10] Cf. A. Comte as to "perte
intellectuelle"
in the pursuit of barren studies.
[11] Schneid. cf. Plat. "Rep."
vii. 527 D.
[12] "Occurrences connected with
the
night, the month, or year." e.
g. the
festival of the Karneia, the {tekmerion}
(point de repere) of which is the full
moon
of August. Cf. Eur. "Alc."
449.
[13] See Plat. "Soph." 220
D; above,
III. xi. 8; "Cyrop." I. vi.
40;
"Hunting," xii. 6; Hippocr.
"Aer."
28.
[14] See Lewis, "Astron. of the
Ancients";
cf. Diog. Laert. vii. 1. 144.
[15] Or, "the causes of these."
[16] {oude touton ge anekoos en}. He
had
"heard," it is said, Archelaus,
a pupil of Anaxagoras. Cf. Cic. "Tusc."
V. iv. 10.
[17] Or, "he tried to divert one
from
becoming overly-wise in heavenly matters
and the 'mecanique celeste' of the
Godhead
in His several operations." See
above,
I. i. 11. See Grote, "Plato,"
i.
438.
[18] Of Clazomenae. Cf. Plat. "Apol."
14; Diog. Laert. II. vi; Cic. "Tusc."
V. iv. 10; Cobet, "Prosop. Xen."
s. n.; Grote, "H. G." i.
501.
[19] Or, "that the sun was simply
a
fire, forgetting so simple a f |
Evans Experientialism 
