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Book II I
Now, if the effect of such discourses was,
as I imagine, to deter his hearers from the
paths of quackery and false-seeming,[1] so
I am sure that language like the following
was calculated to stimulate his followers
to practise self-control and endurance: self-control
in the matters of eating, drinking, sleeping,
and the cravings of lust; endurance of cold
and heat and toil and pain. He had noticed
the undue licence which one of his acquaintances
allowed himself in all such matters.[2] Accordingly
he thus addressed him:
Tell me, Aristippus (Socrates said), supposing
you had two children entrusted to you to
educate, one of them must be brought up with
an aptitude for government, and the other
without the faintest propensity to rule--how
would you educate them? What do you say?
Shall we begin our inquiry from the beginning,
as it were, with the bare elements of food
and nutriment?
Aristodemus. Yes, food to begin with, by
all means, being a first principle,[3] without
which there is no man living but would perish.
Socrates. Well, then, we may expect, may
we not, that a desire to grasp food at certain
seasons will exhibit itself in both the children?
Aristodemus. It is to be expected.
Socrates. Which, then, of the two must be
trained, of his own free will,[4] to prosecute
a pressing business rather than gratify the
belly?
Aristodemus. No doubt the one who is being
trained to govern, if we would not have affairs
of state neglected during[5] his government.
Socrates. And the same pupil must be furnished
with a power of holding out against thirst
also when the craving to quench it comes
upon him?
Aristodemus. Certainly he must.
Socrates. And on which of the two shall we
confer such self-control in regard to sleep
as shall enable him to rest late and rise
early, or keep vigil, if the need arise?
Aristodemus. To the same one of the two must
be given that endurance also.
Socrates. Well, and a continence in regard
to matters sexual so great that nothing of
the sort shall prevent him from doing his
duty? Which of them claims that?
Aristodemus. The same one of the pair again.
Socrates. Well, and on which of the two shall
be bestowed, as a further gift, the voluntary
resolution to face toils rather than turn
and flee from them?
Aristodemus. This, too, belongs of right
to him who is being trained for government.
Socrates. Well, and to which of them will
it better accord to be taught all knowledge
necessary towards the mastery of antagonists?
Aristodemus. To our future ruler certainly,
for without these parts of learning all his
other capacities will be merely waste.
Socrates. [6]Will not a man so educated be
less liable to be entrapped by rival powers,
and so escape a common fate of living creatures,
some of which (as we all know) are hooked
through their own greediness, and often even
in spite of a native shyness; but through
appetite for food they are drawn towards
the bait, and are caught; while others are
similarly ensnared by drink?
Aristodemus. Undoubtedly.
Socrates. And others again are victims of
amorous heat, as quails, for instance, or
partridges, which, at the cry of the hen-bird,
with lust and expectation of such joys grow
wild, and lose their power of computing dangers:
on they rush, and fall into the snare of
the hunter?
Aristippus assented.
Socrates. And would it not seem to be a base
thing for a man to be affected like the silliest
bird or beast? as when the adulterer invades
the innermost sanctum[7] of the house, though
he is well aware of the risks which his crime
involves,[8] the formidable penalties of
the law, the danger of being caught in the
toils, and then suffering the direst contumely.
Considering all the hideous penalties which
hang over the adulterer's head, considering
also the many means at hand to release him
from the thraldom of his passion, that a
man should so drive headlong on to the quicksands
of perdition[9]--what are we to say of such
frenzy? The wretch who can so behave must
surely be tormented by an evil spirit?[10]
Aristodemus. So it strikes me.
Socrates. And does it not strike you as a
sign of strange indifference that, whereas
the greater number of the indispensable affairs
of men, as for instance, those of war and
agriculture, and more than half the rest,
need to be conducted under the broad canopy
of heaven,[11] yet the majority of men are
quite untrained to wrestle with cold and
heat?
Aristippus again assented.
Socrates. And do you not agree that he who
is destined to rule must train himself to
bear these things lightly?
Aristodemus. Most certainly.
Socrates. And whilst we rank those who are
self-disciplined in all these matters among
persons fit to rule, we are bound to place
those incapable of such conduct in the category
of persons without any pretension whatsoever
to be rulers?
Aristodemus. I assent.
Socrates. Well, then, since you know the
rank peculiar to either section of mankind,
did it ever strike you to consider to which
of the two you are best entitled to belong?
Yes I have (replied Aristippus). I do not
dream for a moment of ranking myself in the
class of those who wish to rule. In fact,
considering how serious a business it is
to cater for one's own private needs, I look
upon it as the mark of a fool not to be content
with that, but to further saddle oneself
with the duty of providing the rest of the
community with whatever they may be pleased
to want. That, at the cost of much personal
enjoyment, a man should put himself at the
head of a state, and then, if he fail to
carry through every jot and tittle of that
state's desire, be held to criminal account,
does seem to me the very extravagance of
folly. Why, bless me! states claim to treat
their rulers precisely as I treat my domestic
slaves. I expect my attendants to furnish
me with an abundance of necessaries, but
not to lay a finger on one of them themselves.
So these states regard it as the duty of
a ruler to provide them with all the good
things imaginable, but to keep his own hands
off them all the while.[12] So then, for
my part, if anybody desires to have a heap
of pother himself,[13] and be a nuisance
to the rest of the world, I will educate
him in the manner suggested, and he shall
take his place among those who are fit to
rule; but for myself, I beg to be enrolled
amongst those who wish to spend their days
as easily and pleasantly as possible.
Socrates. Shall we then at this point turn
and inquire which of the two are likely to
lead the pleasanter life, the rulers or the
ruled?
Aristodemus. By all means let us do so.
Socrates. To begin then with the nations
and races known to ourselves.[14] In Asia
the Persians are the rulers, while the Syrians,
Phrygians, Lydians are ruled; and in Europe
we find the Scythians ruling, and the Maeotians
being ruled. In Africa[15] the Carthaginians
are rulers, the Libyans ruled. Which of these
two sets respectively leads the happier life,
in your opinion? Or, to come nearer home--you
are yourself a Hellene--which among Hellenes
enjoy the happier existence, think you, the
dominant or the subject states?
Nay,[16] I would have you to understand (exclaimed
Aristippus) that I am just as far from placing
myself in the ranks of slavery; there is,
I take it, a middle path between the two
which it is my ambition to tread, avoiding
rule and slavery alike; it lies through freedom--the
high road which leads to happiness.
Socrates. True, if only your path could avoid
human beings, as it avoids rule and slavery,
there would be something in what you say.
But being placed as you are amidst human
beings, if you purpose neither to rule nor
to be ruled, and do not mean to dance attendance,
if you can help it, on those who rule, you
must surely see that the stronger have an
art to seat the weaker on the stool of repentance[17]
both in public and in private, and to treat
them as slaves. I daresay you have not failed
to note this common case: a set of people
has sown and planted, whereupon in comes
another set and cuts their corn and fells
their fruit-trees, and in every way lays
siege to them because, though weaker, they
refuse to pay them proper court, till at
length they are persuaded to accept slavery
rather than war against their betters. And
in private life also, you will bear me out,
the brave and powerful are known to reduce
the helpless and cowardly to bondage, and
to make no small profit out of their victims.
Aristodemus. Yes, but I must tell you I have
a simple remedy against all such misadventures.
I do not confine myself to any single civil
community. I roam the wide world a foreigner.
Socrates. Well, now, that is a masterly stroke,
upon my word![18] Of course, ever since the
decease of Sinis, and Sciron, and Procrustes,[19]
foreign travellers have had an easy time
of it. But still, if I bethink me, even in
these modern days the members of free communities
do pass laws in their respective countries
for self- protection against wrong-doing.
Over and above their personal connections,
they provide themselves with a host of friends;
they gird their cities about with walls and
battlements; they collect armaments to ward
off evil-doers; and to make security doubly
sure, they furnish themselves with allies
from foreign states. In spite of all which
defensive machinery these same free citizens
do occasionally fall victims to injustice.
But you, who are without any of these aids;
you, who pass half your days on the high
roads where iniquity is rife;[20] you, who,
into whatever city you enter, are less than
the least of its free members, and moreover
are just the sort of person whom any one
bent on mischief would single out for attack--yet
you, with your foreigner's passport, are
to be exempt from injury? So you flatter
yourself. And why? Will the state authorities
cause proclamation to be made on your behalf:
"The person of this man Aristippus is
secure; let his going out and his coming
in be free from danger"? Is that the
ground of your confidence? or do you rather
rest secure in the consciousness that you
would prove such a slave as no master would
care to keep? For who would care to have
in his house a fellow with so slight a disposition
to work and so strong a propensity to extravagance?
Suppose we stop and consider that very point:
how do masters deal with that sort of domestic?
If I am not mistaken, they chastise his wantonness
by starvation; they balk his thieving tendencies
by bars and bolts where there is anything
to steal; they hinder him from running away
by bonds and imprisonment; they drive the
sluggishness out of him with the lash. Is
it not so? Or how do you proceed when you
discover the like tendency in one of your
domestics?
Aristodemus. I correct them with all the
plagues, till I force them to serve me properly.
But, Socrates, to return to your pupil educated
in the royal art,[21] which, if I mistake
not, you hold to be happiness: how, may I
ask, will he be better off than others who
lie in evil case, in spite of themselves,
simply because they suffer perforce, but
in his case the hunger and the thirst, the
cold shivers and the lying awake at nights,
with all the changes he will ring on pain,
are of his own choosing? For my part I cannot
see what difference it makes, provided it
is one and the same bare back which receives
the stripes, whether the whipping be self-appointed
or unasked for; nor indeed does it concern
my body in general, provided it be my body,
whether I am beleaguered by a whole armament
of such evils[22] of my own will or against
my will--except only for the folly which
attaches to self- appointed suffering.
Socrates. What, Aristippus, does it not seem
to you that, as regards such matters, there
is all the difference between voluntary and
involuntary suffering, in that he who starves
of his own accord can eat when he chooses,
and he who thirsts of his own free will can
drink, and so for the rest; but he who suffers
in these ways perforce cannot desist from
the suffering when the humour takes him?
Again, he who suffers hardship voluntarily,
gaily confronts his troubles, being buoyed
on hope[23]--just as a hunter in pursuit
of wild beasts, through hope of capturing
his quarry, finds toil a pleasure--and these
are but prizes of little worth in return
for their labours; but what shall we say
of their reward who toil to obtain to themselves
good friends, or to subdue their enemies,
or that through strength of body and soul
they may administer their households well,
befriend their friends, and benefit the land
which gave them birth? Must we not suppose
that these too will take their sorrows lightly,
looking to these high ends? Must we not suppose
that they too will gaily confront existence,
who have to support them not only their conscious
virtue, but the praise and admiration of
the world?[24] And once more, habits of indolence,
along with the fleeting pleasures of the
moment, are incapable, as gymnastic trainers
say, of setting up[25] a good habit of body,
or of implanting in the soul any knowledge
worthy of account; whereas by painstaking
endeavour in the pursuit of high and noble
deeds, as good men tell us, through endurance
we shall in the end attain the goal. So Hesiod
somewhere says:[26]
Wickedness may a man take wholesale with
ease, smooth is the way and her dwelling-place
is very nigh; but in front of virtue the
immortal gods have placed toil and sweat,
long is the path and steep that leads to
her, and rugged at the first, but when the
summit of the pass is reached, then for all
its roughness the path grows easy.
And Ephicharmus[27] bears his testimony when
he says:
The gods sell us all good things in return
for our labours.
And again in another passage he exclaims:
Set not thine heart on soft things, thou
knave, lest thou light upon the hard.
And that wise man Prodicus[28] delivers himself
in a like strain concerning virtue in that
composition of his about Heracles, which
crowds have listened to.[29] This, as far
as I can recollect it, is the substance at
least of what he says:
"When Heracles was emerging from boyhood
into the bloom of youth, having reached that
season in which the young man, now standing
upon the verge of independence, shows plainly
whether he will enter upon the path of virtue
or of vice, he went forth into a quiet place,
and sat debating with himself which of those
two paths he should pursue; and as he there
sat musing, there appeared to him two women
of great stature which drew nigh to him.
The one was fair to look upon, frank and
free by gift of nature,[30] her limbs adorned
with purity and her eyes with bashfulness;
sobriety set the rhythm of her gait, and
she was clad in white apparel. The other
was of a different type; the fleshy softness
of her limbs betrayed her nurture, while
the complexion of her skin was embellished
that she might appear whiter and rosier than
she really was, and her figure that she might
seem taller than nature made her; she stared
with wide-open eyes, and the raiment wherewith
she was clad served but to reveal the ripeness
of her bloom. With frequent glances she surveyed
her person, or looked to see if others noticed
her; while ever and anon she fixed her gaze
upon the shadow of herself intently.
"Now when these two had drawn near to
Heracles, she who was first named advanced
at an even pace[31] towards him, but the
other, in her eagerness to outstrip her,
ran forward to the youth, exclaiming, 'I
see you, Heracles, in doubt and difficulty
what path of life to choose; make me your
friend, and I will lead you to the pleasantest
road and easiest. This I promise you: you
shall taste all of life's sweets and escape
all bitters. In the first place, you shall
not trouble your brain with war or business;
other topics shall engage your mind;[32]
your only speculation, what meat or drink
you shall find agreeable to your palate;
what delight[33] of ear or eye; what pleasure
of smell or touch; what darling lover's intercourse
shall most enrapture you; how you shall pillow
your limbs in softest slumber; how cull each
individual pleasure without alloy of pain;
and if ever the suspicion steal upon you
that the stream of joys will one day dwindle,
trust me I will not lead you where you shall
replenish the store by toil of body and trouble
of soul. No! others shall labour, but you
shall reap the fruit of their labours; you
shall withhold your hand from nought which
shall bring you gain. For to all my followers
I give authority and power to help themselves
freely from every side.'
"Heracles hearing these words made answer:
'What, O lady, is the name you bear?' To
which she: 'Know that my friends call be
Happiness, but they that hate me have their
own nicknames[34] for me, Vice and Naughtiness.'
"But just then the other of those fair
women approached and spoke: 'Heracles, I
too am come to you, seeing that your parents
are well known to me, and in your nurture
I have gauged your nature; wherefore I entertain
good hope that if you choose the path which
leads to me, you shall greatly bestir yourself
to be the doer of many a doughty deed of
noble emprise; and that I too shall be held
in even higher honour for your sake, lit
with the lustre shed by valorous deeds.[35]
I will not cheat you with preludings of pleasure,[36]
but I will relate to you the things that
are according to the ordinances of God in
very truth. Know then that among things that
are lovely and of good report, not one have
the gods bestowed upon mortal men apart from
toil and pains. Would you obtain the favour
of the gods, then must you pay these same
gods service; would you be loved by your
friends, you must benefit these friends;
do you desire to be honoured by the state,
you must give the state your aid; do you
claim admiration for your virtue from all
Hellas, you must strive to do some good to
Hellas; do you wish earth to yield her fruits
to you abundantly, to earth must you pay
your court; do you seek to amass riches from
your flocks and herds, on them must you bestow
your labour; or is it your ambition to be
potent as a warrior, able to save your friends
and to subdue your foes, then must you learn
the arts of war from those who have the knowledge,
and practise their application in the field
when learned; or would you e'en be powerful
of limb and body, then must you habituate
limbs and body to obey the mind, and exercise
yourself with toil and sweat.'
"At this point, (as Prodicus relates)
Vice broke in exclaiming: 'See you, Heracles,
how hard and long the road is by which yonder
woman would escort you to her festal joys.[37]
But I will guide you by a short and easy
road to happiness.'
"Then spoke Virtue: 'Nay, wretched one,
what good thing hast thou? or what sweet
thing art thou acquainted with--that wilt
stir neither hand nor foot to gain it? Thou,
that mayest not even await the desire of
pleasure, but, or ever that desire springs
up, art already satiated; eating before thou
hungerest, and drinking before thou thirsteth;
who to eke out an appetite must invent an
army of cooks and confectioners; and to whet
thy thirst must lay down costliest wines,
and run up and down in search of ice in summer-time;
to help thy slumbers soft coverlets suffice
not, but couches and feather-beds must be
prepared thee and rockers to rock thee to
rest; since desire for sleep in thy case
springs not from toil but from vacuity and
nothing in the world to do. Even the natural
appetite of love thou forcest prematurely
by every means thou mayest devise, confounding
the sexes in thy service. Thus thou educatest
thy friends: with insult in the night season
and drowse of slumber during the precious
hours of the day. Immortal, thou art cast
forth from the company of gods, and by good
men art dishonoured: that sweetest sound
of all, the voice of praise, has never thrilled
thine ears; and the fairest of all fair visions
is hidden from thine eyes that have never
beheld one bounteous deed wrought by thine
own hand. If thou openest thy lips in speech,
who will believe thy word? If thou hast need
of aught, none shall satisfy thee. What sane
man will venture to join thy rablle rout?
Ill indeed are thy revellers to look upon,
young men impotent of body, and old men witless
in mind: in the heyday of life they batten
in sleek idleness, and wearily do they drag
through an age of wrinkled wretchedness:
and why? they blush with shame at the thought
of deeds done in the past, and groan for
weariness at what is left to do. During their
youth they ran riot through their sweet things,
and laid up for themselves large store of
bitterness against the time of eld. But my
companionship is with the gods; and with
the good among men my conversation; no bounteous
deed, divine or human, is wrought without
my aid. Therefore am I honoured in Heaven
pre-eminently, and upon earth among men whose
right it is to honour me;[38] as a beloved
fellow-worker of all craftsmen; a faithful
guardian of house and lands, whom the owners
bless; a kindly helpmeet of servants;[39]
a brave assistant in the labours of peace;
an unflinching ally in the deeds of war;
a sharer in all friendships indispensable.
To my friends is given an enjoyment of meats
and drinks, which is sweet in itself and
devoid of trouble, in that they can endure
until desire ripens, and sleep more delicious
visits them than those who toil not. Yet
they are not pained to part with it; nor
for the sake of slumber do they let slip
the performance of their duties. Among my
followers the youth delights in the praises
of his elders, and the old man glories in
the honour of the young; with joy they call
to memory their deeds of old, and in to-day's
well-doing are well pleased. For my sake
they are dear in the sight of God, beloved
of their friends and honoured by the country
of their birth. When the appointed goal is
reached they lie not down in oblivion with
dishonour, but bloom afresh--their praise
resounded on the lips of men for ever.[40]
Toils like these, O son of noble parents,
Heracles, it is yours to meet with, and having
endured, to enter into the heritage assured
you of transcendant happiness.'"
This, Aristippus, in rough sketch is the
theme which Prodicus pursues[41] in his "Education
of Heracles by Virtue," only he decked
out his sentiments, I admit, in far more
magnificant phrases than I have ventured
on. Were it not well, Aristippus, to lay
to heart these sayings, and to strive to
bethink you somewhat of that which touches
the future of our life?
[1] This sentence in the Greek concludes
Bk. I. There is something wrong or very awkward
in the text here.
[2] Cf. Grote, "Plato," III. xxxviii.
p. 530.
[3] Aristippus plays upon the word {arkhe}.
[4] {proairesis}.
[5] Lit. "along of."
[6] [SS. 4, 5, L. Dind. ed Lips.]
[7] {eis as eirktas}. The penetralia.
[8] Or, "he knows the risks he runs
of suffering those penalties with which the
law threatens his crime should he fall into
the snare, and being caught, be mutilated."
[9] Or, "leap headlong into the jaws
of danger."
[10] {kakodaimonontos}.
[11] Or, "in the open air."
[12] Or, "but he must have no finger
in the pie himself."
[13] See Kuhner ad loc.
[14] Or, "the outer world, the non-Hellenic
races and nationalities of which we have
any knowledge."
[15] Lit. "Libya."
[16] Or, "Pardon me interrupting you,
Socrates; but I have not the slightest intention
of placing myself." See W. L. Newman,
op. cit. i. 306.
[17] See "Symp." iii. 11; "Cyrop."
II. ii. 14; Plat. "Ion," 535 E;
L. Dindorf ad loc.
[18] Or, "Well foiled!" "A
masterly fall! my prince of wrestlers."
[19] For these mythical highway robbers,
see Diod. iv. 59; and for Sciron in particular,
Plut. "Theseus," 10.
[20] Or, "where so many suffer wrong."
[21] Cf. below, IV. ii. 11; Plat. "Statesm."
259 B; "Euthyd." 291 C; K. Joel,
op. cit. p. 387 foll. "Aristippus anticipates
Adeimantus" ("Rep." 419),
W. L. Newman, op. cit. i. 395.
[22] Cf. "suffers the slings and arrows
of outrageous fortune."
[23] Cf. above, I. vi. 8.
[24] Or, "in admiration of themselves,
the praise and envy of the world at large."
[25] See Hippocrates, "V. Med."
18.
[26] Hesiod, "Works and Days,"
285. See Plat. "Prot." 340 C; "Rep."
ii. 364 D; "Laws," iv. 718 E.
[27] Epicharmus of Cos, the chief comic poet
among the Dorians, fl. 500 B. C. Cf. Plat.
"Theaet." 152 E, "the prince
of comedy"; "Gorg." 505 D.
[28] Prodicus of Ceos. See Plat. "Men."
24; "Cratyl." 1; Philostr. "Vit.
Soph." i. 12.
[29] Or, "which he is fond of reciting
as a specimen of style." The title of
the {epideixis} was {'Orai} according to
Suidas, {Prodikos}.
[30] Reading {eleutherion phusei, . . .}
or if {eleutherion, phusei . . .} translate
"nature had adorned her limbs . . ."
[31] Or, "without change in her demeanour."
[32] Reading {diese}, or {dioisei}, "you
shall continue speculating solely."
[33] It will be recollected that Prodicus
prided himself on {orthotes onomaton}. Possibly
Xenophon is imitating (caricaturing?) his
style. {terphtheies, estheies, euphrantheies}.
[34] So the vulg. {upokorizomenoi} is interpreted.
Cobet ("Pros. Xen." p. 36) suggests
{upoknizomenoi} = "quippe qui desiderio
pungantur."
[35] Or, "bathed in the splendour of
thy virtues."
[36] Or, "honeyed overtures of pleasure."
[37] Hesiod, "Theog." 909; Milton,
"L'Allegro," 12.
[38] Reading {ois prosekei}, or if {proseko},
translate "to whom I am attached."
[39] Cf. "Econ." v. 8.
[40] Or, "so true is it, a branch is
left them; undying honour to their name!"
[41] Reading {diokei}, al. {diokei} = "so
Prodicus arranged the parts of his discourse."
Book II II
At another time, he had noticed the angry
temper shown by Lamprocles, the elder of
his sons, towards their mother, and thus
addressed himself to the lad.
Socrates. Pray, my son, did you ever hear
of certain people being called ungrateful?
That I have (replied the young man).
Socrates. And have you understood what it
is they do to get that bad name?
Lamprocles. Yes, I have: when any one has
been kindly treated, and has it in his power
to requite the kindness but neglects to do
so, men call him ungrateful.
Socrates. And you admit that people reckon
the ungrateful among wrongdoers?
Lamprocles. I do.
Socrates. And has it ever struck you to inquire
whether, as regards the right or wrong of
it, ingratitude may not perhaps resemble
some such conduct as the enslavement, say,
of prisoners, which is accounted wrong towards
friends but justifiable towards enemies?
Lamprocles. Yes, I have put that question
to myself. In my opinion, no matter who confers
the kindness, friend or foe, the recipient
should endeavour to requite it, failing which
he is a wrongdoer.
Socrates. Then if that is how the matter
stands, ingratitude would be an instance
of pure unadulterate wrongdoing?
Lamprocles assented to the proposition.
Socrates. It follows, then, that in proportion
to the greatness of the benefit conferred,
the greater his misdoing who fails to requite
the kindness?
Lamprocles again assented.
Socrates continued: And where can we hope
to find greater benefits than those which
children derive from their parents--their
father and mother who brought them out of
nothingness into being, who granted them
to look upon all these fair sights, and to
partake of all those blessings which the
gods bestow on man, things so priceless in
our eyes that one and all we shudder at the
thought of leaving them, and states have
made death the penalty for the greatest crimes,
because there is no greater evil through
fear of which to stay iniquity.
You do not suppose that human beings produce
children for the sake of carnal pleasure[1]
merely; were this the motive, street and
bordell are full of means to quit them of
that thrall; whereas nothing is plainer than
the pains we take to seek out wives who shall
bear us the finest children.[2] With these
we wed, and carry on the race. The man has
a twofold duty to perform: partly in cherishing
her who is to raise up children along with
him, and partly towards the children yet
unborn in providing them with things that
he thinks will contribute to their well-being--and
of these as large a store as possible. The
woman, conceiving, bears her precious burthen
with travail and pain, and at the risk of
life itself--sharing with that within her
womb the food on which she herself is fed.
And when with much labour she has borne to
the end and brought forth her offspring,
she feeds it and watches over it with tender
care--not in return for any good thing previously
received, for indeed the babe itself is little
conscious of its benefactor and cannot even
signify its wants; only she, the mother,
making conjecture of what is good for it,
and what will please it, essays to satisfy
it;[3] and for many months she feeds it night
and day, enduring the toil nor recking what
return she shall receive for all her trouble.
Nor does the care and kindness of parents
end with nurture; but when the children seem
of an age to learn, they teach them themselves
whatever cunning they possess, as a guide
to life, or where they feel that another
is more competent, to him they send them
to be taught at their expense. Thus they
watch over their children, doing all in their
power to enable them to grow up to be as
good as possible.
So be it (the youth answered); but even if
she have done all that, and twenty times
as much, no soul on earth could endure my
mother's cross- grained temper.
Then Socrates: Which, think you, would be
harder to bear--a wild beast's savagery or
a mother's?
Lamprocles. To my mind, a mother's--at least
if she be such as mine.
Socrates. Dear me! And has this mother ever
done you any injury--such as people frequently
receive from beasts, by bite or kick?
Lamprocles. If she has not done quite that,
she uses words which any one would sooner
sell his life than listen to.
Socrates. And how many annoyances have you
caused your mother, do you suppose, by fretfulness
and peevishness in word and deed, night and
day, since you were a little boy? How much
sorrow and pain, when you were ill?
Lamprocles. Well, I never said or did anything
to bring a blush to her cheeks.
Socrates. No, come now! Do you suppose it
is harder for you to listen to your mother's
speeches than for actor to listen to actor
on the tragic stage,[4] when the floodgates
of abuse are opened?
Lamprocles. Yes; for the simple reason that
they know it is all talk on their parts.
The inquisitor may cross-question, but he
will not inflict a fine; the threatener may
hurl his menaces, but he will do no mischief--that
is why they take it all so easily.
Socrates. Then ought you to fly into a passion,
who know well enough that, whatever your
mother says, she is so far from meaning you
mischief that she is actually wishing blessings
to descend upon you beyond all others? Or
do you believe that your mother is really
ill disposed towards you?
Lamprocles. No, I do not think that.
Socrates. Then this mother, who is kindly
disposed to you, and takes such tender care
of you when you are ill to make you well
again, and to see that you want for nothing
which may help you; and, more than all, who
is perpetually pleading for blessings in
your behalf and offering her vows to Heaven[5]--can
you say of her that she is cross-grained
and harsh? For my part, I think, if you cannot
away with such a mother, you cannot away
with such blessings either.
But tell me (he proceeded), do you owe service
to any living being, think you? or are you
prepared to stand alone? Prepared not to
please or try to please a single soul? to
follow none? To obey neither general nor
ruler of any sort? Is that your attitude,
or do you admit that you owe allegience to
somebody?
Lamprocles. Yes; certainly I owe allegiance.
Socrates. May I take it that you are willing
to please at any rate your neighbour, so
that he may kindle a fire for you in your
need, may prove himself a ready helpmate
in good fortune, or if you chance on evil
and are stumbling, may friendlily stand by
your side to aid?
Lamprocles. I am willing.
Socrates. Well, and what of that other chance
companion--your fellow- traveller by land
or sea? what of any others, you may light
upon? is it indifferent to you whether these
be friends or not, or do you admit that the
goodwill of these is worth securing by some
pains on your part?
Lamprocles. I do.
Socrates. It stands thus then: you are prepared
to pay attention to this, that, and the other
stranger, but to your mother who loves you
more than all else, you are bound to render
no service, no allegiance? Do you not know
that whilst the state does not concern itself
with ordinary ingratitude or pass judicial
sentence on it; whilst it overlooks the thanklessness
of those who fail to make return for kindly
treatment, it reserves its pains and penalties
for the special case? If a man render not
the service and allegiance due to his parents,
on him the finger of the law is laid; his
name is struck off the roll; he is forbidden
to hold the archonship--which is as much
as to say, "Sacrifices in behalf of
the state offered by such a man would be
no offerings, being tainted with impiety;
nor could aught else be 'well and justly'
performed of which he is the doer."
Heaven help us! If a man fail to adorn the
sepulchre of his dead parents the state takes
cognisance of the matter, and inquisition
is made in the scrutiny of the magistrates.[6]
And as for you, my son, if you are in your
sober senses, you will earnestly entreat
your mother, lest the very gods take you
to be an ungrateful being, and on their side
also refuse to do you good; and you will
beware of men also, lest they should perceive
your neglect of your parents, and with one
consent hold you in dishonour;[7] and so
you find yourself in a desert devoid of friends.
For if once the notion be entertained that
here is a man ungrateful to his parents,
no one will believe that any kindness shown
you would be other than thrown away.
[1] Lit. "the joys of Aphrodite."
[2] "For the procreation of children."
See below, IV. iv. 22; "Pol. Lac."
i.
[3] Lit. "to leave nought lacking."
[4] See Grote, "H. G." viii. 457;
Plut. "Solon," xxix.
[5] Or, "paying vows."
[6] Lit. "the docimasia." See Gow,
"Companion," xiv.
[7] "Visiti with atimia."
Book II III
At another time the differences between two
brothers named Chaerephon and Chaerecrates,
both well known to him, had drawn his attention;
and on seeing the younger of the two he thus
addresed him.
Socrates. Tell me, Chaerecrates, you are
not, I take it, one of those strange people
who believe that goods are better and more
precious than a brother;[1] and that too
although the former are but senseless chattels
which need protection, the latter a sensitive
and sensible being who can afford it; and
what is more, he is himself alone, whilst
as for them their name is legion. And here
again is a marvellous thing: that a man should
count his brother a loss, because the goods
of his brother are not his; but he does not
count his fellow-citizens loss, and yet their
possessions are not his; only it seems in
their case he has wits to see that to dwell
securely with many and have enough is better
than to own the whole wealth of a community
and to live in dangerous isolation; but this
same doctrine as applied to brothers they
ignore. Again, if a man have the means, he
will purchase domestic slaves, because he
wants assistants in his work; he will acquire
friends, because he needs their support;
but this brother of his--who cares about
brothers? It seems a friend may be discovered
in an ordinary citizen, but not in a blood
relation who is also a brother. And yet it
is a great vantage-ground towards friendship
to have sprung from the same loins and to
have been suckled at the same breasts, since
even among beasts a certain natural craving,
and sympathy springs up between creatures
reared together.[2] Added to which, a man
who has brothers commands more respect from
the rest of the world than the man who has
none, and who must fight his own battles.[3]
Chaerephon. I daresay, Socrates, where the
differences are not profound, reason would
a man should bear with his brother, and not
avoid him for some mere trifle's sake, for
a brother of the right sort is, as you say,
a blessing; but if he be the very antithesis
of that, why should a man lay his hand to
achieve the impossible?
Socrates. Well now, tell me, is there nobody
whom Chaerephon can please any more than
he can please yourself; or do some people
find him agreeable enough?
Chaerephon. Nay, there you hit it. That is
just why I have a right to detest him. He
can be pleasing enough to others, but to
me, whenever he appears on the scene, he
is not a blessing--no! but by every manner
of means the reverse.
Socrates. May it not happen that just as
a horse is no gain to the inexpert rider
who essays to handle him, so in like manner,
if a man tries to deal with his brother after
an ignorant fashion, this same brother will
kick?
Chaerephon. But is it likely now? How should
I be ignorant of the art of dealing with
my brother if I know the art of repaying
kind words and good deeds in kind? But a
man who tries all he can to annoy me by word
and deed, I can neither bless nor benefit,
and, what is more, I will not try.
Socrates. Well now, that is a marvellous
statement, Chaerecrates. Your dog, the serviceable
guardian of your flocks, who will fawn and
lick the hand of your shepherd, when you
come near him can only growl and show his
teeth. Well; you take no notice of the dog's
ill-temper, you try to propitiate him by
kindness; but your brother? If your brother
were what he ought to be, he would be a great
blessing to you--that you admit; and, as
you further confess, you know the secret
of kind acts and words, yet you will not
set yourself to apply means to make him your
best of friends.
Chaerephon. I am afraid, Socrates, that I
have no wisdom or cunning to make Chaerephon
bear himself towards me as he should.
Socrates. Yet there is no need to apply any
recondite or novel machinery. Only bait your
hook in the way best known to yourself, and
you will capture him; whereupon he will become
your devoted friend.
Chaerephon. If you are aware that I know
some love-charm, Socrates, of which I am
the happy but unconscious possessor, pray
make haste and enlighten me.
Socrates. Answer me then. Suppose you wanted
to get some acquaintance to invite you to
dinner when he next keeps holy day,[4] what
steps would you take?
Chaerephon. No doubt I should set him a good
example by inviting him myself on a like
occasion.
Socrates. And if you wanted to induce some
friend to look after your affairs during
your absence abroad, how would you achieve
your purpose?
Chaerephon. No doubt I should present a precedent
in undertaking to look after his in like
circumstances.
Socrates. And if you wished to get some foreign
friend to take you under his roof while visiting
his country, what would you do?
Chaerephon. No doubt I should begin by offering
him the shelter of my own roof when he came
to Athens, in order to enlist his zeal in
furthering the objects of my visit; it is
plain I should first show my readiness to
do as much for him in a like case.
Socrates. Why, it seems you are an adept
after all in all the philtres known to man,
only you chose to conceal your knowledge
all the while; or is it that you shrink from
taking the first step because of the scandal
you will cause by kindly advances to your
brother? And yet it is commonly held to redound
to a man's praise to have outstripped an
enemy in mischief or a friend in kindness.
Now if it seemed to me that Chaerephon were
better fitted to lead the way towards this
friendship,[5] I should have tried to persuade
him to take the first step in winning your
affection, but now I am persuaded the first
move belongs to you, and to you the final
victory.
Chaerephon. A startling announcement, Socrates,
from your lips, and most unlike you, to bid
me the younger take precedence of my elder
brother. Why, it is contrary to the universal
custom of mankind, who look to the elder
to take the lead in everything, whether as
a speaker or an actor.
Socrates. How so? Is it not the custom everywhere
for the younger to step aside when he meets
his elder in the street and to give him place?
Is he not expected to get up and offer him
his seat, to pay him the honour of a soft
couch,[6] to yield him precedence in argument?
My good fellow, do not stand shilly-shallying,[7]
but put out your hand caressingly, and you
will see the worthy soul will respond at
once with alacrity. Do you not note your
brother's character, proud and frank and
sensitive to honour? He is not a mean and
sorry rascal to be caught by a bribe--no
better way indeed for such riff-raff. No!
gentle natures need a finer treatment. You
can best hope to work on them by affection.
Chaerephon. But suppose I do, and suppose
that, for all my attempts, he shows no change
for the better?
Socrates. At the worst you will have shown
yourself to be a good, honest, brotherly
man, and he will appear as a sorry creature
on whom kindness is wasted. But nothing of
the sort is going to happen, as I conjecture.
My belief is that as soon as he hears your
challenge, he will embrace the contest; pricked
on by emulous pride, he will insist upon
getting the better of you in kindness of
word and deed.
At present you two are in the condition of
two hands formed by God to help each other,
but which have let go their business and
have turned to hindering one another all
they can. You are a pair of feet fashioned
on the Divine plan to work together, but
which have neglected this in order to trammel
each other's gait. Now is it not insensate
stupidity[8] to use for injury what was meant
for advantage? And yet in fashioning two
brothers God intends them, methinks, to be
of more benefit to one another than either
two hands, or two feet, or two eyes, or any
other of those pairs which belong to man
from his birth.[9] Consider how powerless
these hands of ours if called upon to combine
their action at two points more than a single
fathom's length apart;[10] and these feet
could not stretch asunder[11] even a bare
fathom; and these eyes, for all the wide-reaching
range we claim for them, are incapable of
seeing simultaneously the back and front
of an object at even closer quarters. But
a pair of brothers, linked in bonds of amity,
can work each for the other's good, though
seas divide them.[12]
[1] Cf. "Merchant of Venice," II.
viii. 17: "Justice! the law! my ducats,
and my daughter!"
[2] Or, "a yearning after their foster-brothers
manifests itself in animals." See "Cyrop."
VIII. vii. 14 foll. for a parallel to this
discussion.
[3] Lit. "and is less liable to hostility."
[4] "When he next does sacrifice";
see "Hiero," viii. 3. Cf. Theophr.
"Char." xv. 2, and Prof. Jebb's
note ad loc.
[5] Reading {pros ten philian}, or if {phusin},
transl. "natural disposition."
[6] Lit. "with a soft bed," or,
as we say, "the best bedroom."
[7] Or, "have no fears, essay a soothing
treatment."
[8] "Boorishness verging upon monomania."
[9] "With which man is endowed at birth."
[10] "More than an 'arms'-stretch' asunder."
[11] Lit. "reach at one stretch two
objects, even over that small distance."
[12] "Though leagues separate them."
Book II IV
I have at another time heard him discourse
on the kindred theme of friendship in language
well calculated, as it seemed to me, to help
a man to choose and also to use his friends
aright.
He (Socrates) had often heard the remark
made that of all possessions there is none
equal to that of a good and sincere friend;
but, in spite of this assertion, the mass
of people, as far as he could see, concerned
themselves about nothing so little as the
acquisition of friends. Houses, and fields,
and slaves, and cattle, and furniture of
all sorts (he said) they were at pains to
acquire, and they strove hard to keep what
they had got; but to procure for themselves
this greatest of all blessings, as they admitted
a friend to be, or to keep the friends whom
they already possessed, not one man in a
hundred ever gave himself a thought. It was
noticeable, in the case of a sickness befalling
a man's friend and one of his own household
simultaneously, the promptness with which
the master would fetch the doctor to his
domestic, and take every precaution necessary
for his recovery, with much expenditure of
pains; but meanwhile little account would
be taken of the friend in like condition,
and if both should die, he will show signs
of deep annoyance at the death of his domestic,
which, as he reflects, is a positive loss
to him; but as regards his friend his position
is in no wise materially affected, and thus,
though he would never dream of leaving his
other possessions disregarded and ill cared
for, friendship's mute appeal is met with
flat indifference.[1]
Or to take (said he) a crowning instance:[2]
with regard to ordinary possessions, however
multifarious these may be, most people are
at least acquainted with their number, but
if you ask a man to enumerate his friends,
who are not so very many after all perhaps,
he cannot; or if, to oblige the inquirer,
he essays to make a list, he will presently
retract the names of some whom he had previously
included.[3] Such is the amount of thought
which people bestow upon their friends.
And yet what thing else may a man call his
own is comparable to this one best possession!
what rather will not serve by contrast to
enhance the value of an honest friend! Think
of a horse or a yoke of oxen; they have their
worth; but who shall gauge the worth of a
worthy friend? Kindlier and more constant
than the faithfullest of slaves-- this is
that possession best named all-serviceable.[4]
Consider what the post is that he assigns
himself! to meet and supplement what is lacking
to the welfare of his friends, to promote
their private and their public interests,
is his concern. Is there need of kindly action
in any quarter? he will throw in the full
weight of his support. Does some terror confound?
he is at hand to help and defend by expenditure
of money and of energy,[5] by appeals to
reason or resort to force. His the privilege
alike to gladden the prosperous in the hour
of success and to sustain their footing who
have well-nigh slipped. All that the hands
of a man may minister, all that the eyes
of each are swift to see, the ears to hear,
and the feet to compass, he with his helpful
arts will not fall short of. Nay, not seldom
that which a man has failed to accomplish
for himself, has missed seeing or hearing
or attaining, a friend acting in behalf of
friend will achieve vicariously. And yet,
albeit to try and tend a tree for the sake
of its fruit is not uncommon, this copious
mine of wealth--this friend-- attracts only
a lazy and listless attention on the part
of more than half the world.
[1] Or, "the cry of a friend for careful
tending falls on deaf ears."
[2] Or, "Nor had he failed to observe
another striking contrast." Cf. Cic.
"Lael." 17; Diog. Laert. ii. 30.
[3] i. e. "like a chess-player recalling
a move."
[4] "A vessel fit for all work indeed
is this friend." Cf. Ar. "Ach."
936, {pagkhreston aggos estai}, like the
"leather bottel."
[5] Or, "by dint of his diplomacy."
Book II V
I remember listening to another argument
of his, the effect of which would be to promote
self-examination. The listener must needs
be brought to ask himself, "Of what
worth am I to my friends?" It happened
thus. One of those who were with him was
neglectful, as he noted, of a friend who
was at the pinch of poverty (Antisthenes).[1]
Accordingly, in the presence of the negligent
person and of several others, he proceeded
to question the sufferer.
Socrates. What say you, Antisthenes?--have
friends their values like domestic slaves?
One of these latter may be worth perhaps
two minae,[2] another only half a mina, a
third five, and a fourth as much as ten;
while they do say that Nicias,[3] the son
of Niceratus, paid a whole talent for a superintendent
of his silver mines. And so I propound the
question to myself as follows: "Have
friends, like slaves, their market values?"
Not a doubt of it (replied Antisthenes).
At any rate, I know that I would rather have
such a one as my friend than be paid two
minae, and there is such another whose worth
I would not estimate at half a mina, and
a third with whom I would not part for ten,
and then again a fourth whose friendship
would be cheap if it cost me all the wealth
and pains in the world to purchase it.
Well then (continued Socrates), if that be
so, would it not be well if every one were
to examine himself: "What after all
may I chance to be worth to my friends?"
Should he not try to become as dear as possible,
so that his friends will not care to give
him up? How often do I hear the complaint:
"My friend So-and-so has given me up";
or "Such an one, whom I looked upon
as a friend, has sacrificed me for a mina."
And every time I hear these remarks, the
question arises in my mind: If the vendor
of a worthless slave is ready to part with
him to a purchaser for what he will fetch--is
there not at least a strong temptation to
part with a base friend when you have a chance
of making something on the exchange? Good
slaves, as far as I can see, are not so knocked
down to the hammer; no, nor good friends
so lightly parted with.
[1] Antisthenes, "cynicorum et stoicorum
parens." Cic. "de Or." iii.
17; "ad Att." xii. 38. See below,
III. iii. 17; "Symp." passim; Diog.
Laert. II. v.; VI. i.
[2] A mina = L4 circ.
[3] For Nicias see Thuc. vii. 77 foll.; "Revenues,"
iv. 14; Plut. "Nic." IV. v.; Lys.
"de bon. Aristoph." 648.
Book II VI
Again, in reference to the test to be applied,
if we would gauge the qualifications of a
friend worth the winning, the following remarks
of Socrates could not fail, I think, to prove
instructive.[1]
Tell me (said Socrates, addressing Critobulus),
supposing we stood in need of a good friend,
how should we set about his discovery? We
must, in the first place, I suppose, seek
out one who is master of his appetites, not
under the dominion, that is, of his belly,
not addicted to the wine-cup or to lechery
or sleep or idleness, since no one enslaved
to such tyrants could hope to do his duty
either by himself or by his friends, could
he?
Certainly not (Critobulus answered).
Socrates. Do you agree, then, that we must
hold aloof from every one so dominated?
Critobulus. Most assuredly.
Well then (proceeded Socrates), what shall
we say of the spendthrift who has lost his
independence and is for ever begging of his
neighbours; if he gets anything out of them
he cannot repay, but if he fails to get anything,
he hates you for not giving--do you not think
that this man too would prove but a disagreeable
friend?
Critobulus. Certainly.
Socrates. Then we must keep away from him
too?
Critobulus. That we must.
Socrates. Well! and what of the man whose
strength lies in monetary transactions?[2]
His one craving is to amass money; and for
that reason he is an adept at driving a hard
bargain[3]--glad enough to take in, but loath
to pay out.
Critobulus. In my opinion he will prove even
a worse fellow than the last.
Socrates. Well! and what of that other whose
passion for money-making is so absorbing
that he has no leisure for anything else,
save how he may add to his gains?
Critobulus. Hold aloof from him, say I, since
there is no good to be got out of him or
his society.
Socrates. Well! what of the quarrelsome and
factious person[4] whose main object is to
saddle his friends with a host of enemies?
Critobulus. For God's sake let us avoid him
also.
Socrates. But now we will imagine a man exempt
indeed from all the above defects--a man
who has no objection to receive kindnesses,
but it never enters into his head to do a
kindness in return.
Critobulus. There will be no good in him
either. But, Socrates, what kind of man shall
we endeavour to make our friend? what is
he like?
Socrates. I should say he must be just the
converse of the above: he has control over
the pleasures of the body, he is kindly disposed,[5]
upright in all his dealings,[6] very zealous
is he not to be outdone in kindness by his
benefactors, if only his friends may derive
some profit from his acquaintance.
Critobulus. But how are we to test these
qualities, Socrates, before acquaintance?
Socrates. How do we test the merits of a
sculptor?--not by inferences drawn from the
talk of the artist merely. No, we look to
what he has already achieved. These former
statues of his were nobly executed, and we
trust he will do equally well with the rest.
Critobulus. You mean that if we find a man
whose kindness to older friends is established,
we may take it as proved that he will treat
his newer friends as amiably?
Socrates. Why, certainly, if I see a man
who has shown skill in the handling of horses
previously, I argue that he will handle others
no less skilfully again.
Critobulus. Good! and when we have discovered
a man whose friendship is worth having, how
ought we to make him our friend?
Socrates. First we ought to ascertain the
will of Heaven whether it be advisable to
make him our friend.
Critobulus. Well! and how are we to effect
the capture of this friend of our choice,
whom the gods approve? will you tell me that?
Not, in good sooth (replied Socrates), by
running him down like a hare, nor by decoying
him like a bird, or by force like a wild
boar.[7] To capture a friend against his
will is a toilsome business, and to bind
him in fetters like a slave by no means easy.
Those who are so treated are apt to become
foes instead of friends.[8]
Critobulus. But how convert them into friends?
Socrates. There are certain incantations,
we are told, which those who know them have
only to utter, and they can make friends
of whom they list; and there are certain
philtres also which those who have the secret
of them may administer to whom they like
and win their love.
Critobulus. From what source shall we learn
them?
Socrates. You need not go farther than Homer
to learn that which the Sirens sang to Odysseus,[9]
the first words of which run, I think, as
follows:
Hither, come hither, thou famous man, Odysseus,
great glory of the Achaeans!
Critobulus. And did the magic words of this
spell serve for all men alike? Had the Sirens
only to utter this one incantation, and was
every listener constrained to stay?
Socrates. No; this was the incantation reserved
for souls athirst for fame, of virtue emulous.
Critobulus. Which is as much as to say, we
must suit the incantation to the listener,
so that when he hears the words he shall
not think that the enchanter is laughing
at him in his sleeve. I cannot certainly
conceive a method better calculated to excite
hatred and repulsion than to go to some one
who knows that he is small and ugly and a
weakling, and to breathe in his ears the
flattering tale that he is beautiful and
tall and stalwart. But do you know any other
love- charms, Socrates?
Socrates. I cannot say that I do; but I have
heard that Pericles[10] was skilled in not
a few, which he poured into the ear of our
city and won her love.
Critobulus. And how did Themistocles[11]
win our city's love?
Socrates. Ah, that was not by incantation
at all. What he did was to encircle our city
with an amulet of saving virtue.[12]
Critobulus. You would imply, Socrates, would
you not, that if we want to win the love
of any good man we need to be good ourselves
in speech and action?
And did you imagine (replied Socrates) that
it was possible for a bad man to make good
friends?
Critobulus. Why, I could fancy I had seen
some sorry speech-monger who was fast friends
with a great and noble statesman; or again,
some born commander and general who was boon
companion with fellows quite incapable of
generalship.[13]
Socrates. But in reference to the point we
were discussing, may I ask whether you know
of any one who can attach a useful friend
to himself without being of use in return?[14]
Can service ally in friendship with disservice?
Critobulus. In good sooth no. But now, granted
it is impossible for a base man to be friends
with the beautiful and noble,[15] I am concerned
at once to discover if one who is himself
of a beautiful and noble character can, with
a wave of the hand, as it were, attach himself
in friendship to every other beautiful and
noble nature.
Socrates. What perplexes and confounds you,
Critobulus, is the fact that so often men
of noble conduct, with souls aloof from baseness,
are not friends but rather at strife and
discord with one another, and deal more harshly
by one another than they would by the most
good-for- nothing of mankind.
Critobulus. Yes, and this holds true not
of private persons only, but states, the
most eager to pursue a noble policy and to
repudiate a base one, are frequently in hostile
relation to one another. As I reason on these
things my heart fails me, and the question,
how friends are to be acquired, fills me
with despondency. The bad, as I see, cannot
be friends with one another. For how can
such people, the ungrateful, or reckless,
or covetous, or faithless, or incontinent,
adhere together as friends? Without hesitation
I set down the bad as born to be foes not
friends, and as bearing the birthmark of
internecine hate. But then again, as you
suggest, no more can these same people harmonise
in friendship with the good. For how should
they who do evil be friends with those who
hate all evil-doing? And if, last of all,
they that cultivate virtue are torn by party
strife in their struggle for the headship
of the states, envying one another, hating
one another, who are left to be friends?
where shall goodwill and faithfulness be
found among men?
Socrates. The fact is there is some subtlety
in the texture of these things.[15] Seeds
of love are implanted in man by nature. Men
have need of one another, feel pity, help
each other by united efforts, and in recognition
of the fact show mutual gratitude. But there
are seeds of war implanted also. The same
objects being regarded as beautiful or agreeable
by all alike, they do battle for their possession;
a spirit of disunion[16] enters, and the
parties range themselves in adverse camps.
Discord and anger sound a note of war: the
passion of more- having, staunchless avarice,
threatens hostility; and envy is a hateful
fiend.[17]
But nevertheless, through all opposing barriers
friendship steals her way and binds together
the beautiful and good among mankind.[18]
Such is their virtue that they would rather
possess scant means painlessly than wield
an empire won by war. In spite of hunger
and thirst they will share their meat and
drink without a pang. Not bloom of lusty
youth, nor love's delights can warp their
self-control; nor will they be tempted to
cause pain where pain should be unknown.
It is theirs not merely to eschew all greed
of riches, not merely to make a just and
lawful distribution of wealth, but to supply
what is lacking to the needs of one another.
Theirs it is to compose strife and discord
not in painless oblivion simply, but to the
general advantage. Theirs also to hinder
such extravagance of anger as shall entail
remorse hereafter. And as to envy they will
make a clean sweep and clearance of it: the
good things which a man possesses shall be
also the property of his friends, and the
goods which they possess are to be looked
upon as his. Where then is the improbability
that the beautiful and noble should be sharers
in the honours[19] of the state not only
without injury, but even to their mutual
advantage?
They indeed who covet and desire the honours
and offices in a state for the sake of the
liberty thereby given them to embezzle the
public moneys, to deal violently by their
fellow-creatures, and to batten in luxury
themselves, may well be regarded as unjust
and villainous persons incapable of harmony
with one another. But if a man desire to
obtain these selfsame honours in order that,
being himself secure against wrong-doing,
he may be able to assist his friends in what
is right, and, raised to a high position,[20]
may essay to confer some blessing on the
land of his fathers, what is there to hinder
him from working in harmony with some other
of a like spirit? Will he, with the "beautiful
and noble" at his side, be less able
to aid his friends? or will his power to
benfit the community be shortened because
the flower of that community are fellow-workers
in that work? Why, even in the contests of
the games it is obvious that if it were possible
for the stoutest combatants to combine against
the weakest, the chosen band would come off
victors in every bout, and would carry off
all the prizes. This indeed is against the
rules of the actual arena; but in the field
of politics, where the beautiful and good
hold empery, and there is nought to hinder
any from combining with whomsoever a man
may choose to benefit the state, it will
be a clear gain, will it not, for any one
engaged in state affairs to make the best
men his friends, whereby he will find partners
and co-operators in his aims instead of rivals
and antagonists? And this at least is obvious:
in case of foreign war a man will need allies,
but all the more if in the ranks opposed
to him should stand the flower of the enemy.[21]
Moreover, those who are willing to fight
your battles must be kindly dealt with, that
goodwill may quicken to enthusiasm; and one
good man[22] is better worth your benefiting
that a dozen knaves, since a little kindness
goes a long way with the good, but with the
base the more you give them the more they
ask for.
So keep a good heart, Critobulus; only try
to become good yourself, and when you have
attained, set to your hand to capture the
beautiful and good. Perhaps I may be able
to give you some help in this quest, being
myself an adept in Love's lore.[23] No matter
who it is for whom my heart is aflame; in
an instant my whole soul is eager to leap
forth. With vehemence I speed to the mark.
I, who love, demand to be loved again; this
desire in me must be met by counter desire
in him; this thirst for his society by thirst
reciprocal for mine. And these will be your
needs also, I foresee, whenever you are seized
with longing to contract a friendship. Do
not hide from me, therefore, whom you would
choose as a friend, since, owing to the pains
I take to please him who pleases me, I am
not altogether unversed, I fancy, in the
art of catching men.[24]
Critobulus replied: Why, these are the very
lessons of instruction, Socrates, for which
I have been long athirst, and the more particularly
if this same love's lore will enable me to
capture those who are good of soul and those
who are beautiful of person.
Socrates. Nay, now I warn you, Critobulus,
it is not within the province of my science
to make the beautiful endure him who would
lay hands upon them. And that is why men
fled from Scylla, I am persuaded, because
she laid hands upon them; but the Sirens
were different--they laid hands on nobody,
but sat afar off and chanted their spells
in the ears of all; and therefore, it is
said, all men endured to listen, and were
charmed.
Critobulus. I promise I will not lay violent
hands on any; therefore, if you have any
good device for winning friends, instruct
your pupil.
Socrates. And if there is to be no laying
on of the hands, there must be no application
either of the lips; is it agreed?
Critobulus. No, nor application of the lips
to any one--not beautiful.
Socrates. See now! you cannot open your mouth
without some luckless utterence. Beauty suffers
no such liberty, however eagerly the ugly
may invite it, making believe some quality
of soul must rank them with the beautiful.
Critobulus. Be of good cheer then; let the
compact stand thus: "Kisses for the
beautiful, and for the good a rain of kisses."
So now teach us the art of catching friends.
Socrates. Well then, when you wish to win
some one's affection, you will allow me to
lodge information against you to the effect
that you admire him and desire to be his
friend?
Critobulus. Lodge the indictment, with all
my heart. I never heard of any one who hated
his admirers.
Socrates. And if I add to the indictment
the further charge that through your admiration
you are kindly disposed towards him, you
will not feel I am taking away your character?
Critobulus. Why, no; for myself I know a
kindly feeling springs up in my heart towards
any one whom I conceive to be kindly disposed
to me.
Socrates. All this I shall feel empowered
to say about you to those whose friendship
you seek, and I can promise further help;
only there is a comprehensive "if"
to be considered: if you will further authorise
me to say that you are devoted to your friends;
that nothing gives you so much joy as a good
friend; that you pride yourself no less on
the fine deeds of those you love than on
your own; and on their good things equally
with your own; that you never weary of plotting
and planning to procure them a rich harvest
of the same; and lastly, that you have discovered
a man's virtue is to excel his friends in
kindness and his foes in hostility. If I
am authorised thus to report of you, I think
you will find me a serviceable fellow-hunter
in the quest of friends, which is the conquest
of the good.
Critobulus. Why this appeal to me?--as if
you had not free permission to say exactly
what you like about me.
Socrates. No; that I deny, on the authority
of Aspasia.[25] I have it from her own lips.
"Good matchmakers," she said tome,
"were clever hands at cementing alliances
between people, provided the good qualities
they vouched for were truthfully reported;
but when it came to their telling lies, for
her part she could not compliment them.[26]
Their poor deluded dupes ended by hating
each other and the go-betweens as well."
Now I myself am so fully persuaded of the
truth of this that I feel it is not in my
power to say aught in your praise which I
cannot say with truth.
Critobulus. Really, Socrates, you are a wonderfully
good friend to me--in so far as I have any
merit which will entitle me to win a friend,
you will lend me a helping hand, it seems;
otherwise you would rather not forge any
petty fiction for my benefit.
Socrates. But tell me, how shall I assist
you best, think you? By praising you falsely
or by persuading you to try to be a good
man? Or if it is not plain to you thus, look
at the matter by the light of some examples.
I wish to introduce you to a shipowner, or
to make him your friend: I begin by singing
your praises to him falsely thus, "You
will find him a good pilot"; he catches
at the phrase, and entrusts his ship to you,
who have no notion of guiding a vessel. What
can you expect but to make shipwreck of the
craft and yourself together? or suppose by
similar false assertions I can persuade the
state at large to entrust her destinies to
you--"a man with a fine genius for command,"
I say, "a practised lawyer," "a
politician born," and so forth. The
odds are, the state and you may come to grief
through you. Or to take an instance from
everyday life. By my falsehoods I persuade
some private person to entrust his affairs
to you as "a really careful and business-like
person with a head for economy." When
put to the test would not your administration
prove ruinous, and the figure you cut ridiculous?
No, my dear friend, there is but one road,
the shortest, safest, best, and it is simply
this: In whatsoever you desire to be deemed
good, endeavour to be good. For of all the
virtues namable among men, consider, and
you will find there is not one but may be
increased by learning and practice. For my
part then, Critobulus, these are the principles
on which we ought to go a- hunting; but if
you take a different view, I am all attention,
please instruct me.
Then Critobulus: Nay, Socrates, I should
be ashamed to gainsay what you have said;
if I did, it would neither be a noble statement
nor a true.[27]
[1] Or, "Again, as to establishing a
test of character, since a friend worth having
must be of a particular type, I cannot but
think that the following remarks would prove
instructive."
[2] Or, "the money-lender? He has a
passion for big money-bags."
[3] Or, "hard in all his dealings."
[4] "The partisan."
[5] Reading {eunous}, or if {euorkos}, transl.
"a man of his word."
[6] Or, "easy to deal with."
[7] Reading {kaproi}, al. {ekhthroi}, "an
enemy."
[8] Or, "Hate rather than friendship
is the outcome of these methods."
[9] "Od." xii. 184.
[10] See above, I. ii. 40; "Symp."
viii. 39.
[11] See below, III. vi. 2; IV. ii. 2.
[12] See Herod. vii. 143, "the wooden
wall"; Thuc. i. 93, "'the walls'
of Athens."
[13] Or, "Why, yes, when I see some
base orator fast friends with a great leader
of the people; or, again, some fellow incapable
of generalship a comrade to the greatest
captains of his age."
[14] Add, "Can service ally in friendship
with disservice? Must there not be a reciprocity
of service to make friendship lasting?"
[15] {kalous kagathous}.
[15] i. e. a cunning intertwining of the
threads of warp and woof.
[16] Cf. Shelley, "The devil of disunion
in their souls."
[17] The diction is poetical.
[18] Or, as we say, "the elite of human
kind."
[19] "And the offices."
[20] "As archon," or "raised
to rule."
[21] Lit. "the beautiful and good."
[22] Or, "the best, though few, are
better worth your benefiting than the many
base."
[23] "An authority in matters of love."
Cf. Plat. "Symp." 177 D; Xen. "Symp."
viii. 2.
[24] See below, III. xi. 7; cf. Plat. "Soph."
222; N. T. Matt. iv. 19, {alieis anthropon}.
[25] Aspasia, daughter of Axiochus, of Miletus.
See "Econ." iii. 14; Plat. "Menex."
235 E; Aesch. Socrat. ap. Cic. "de Invent."
I. xxxi. 51. See Grote, "H. G."
vi. 132 foll.; Cobet, "Pros. Xen."
[26] Reading {ouk ethelein epainein}, or
if {ouk ophelein epainousas} with Kuhner
transl. "Good matchmakers, she told
me, have to consult truth when reporting
favourably of any one: then indeed they are
terribly clever at bringing people together:
whereas false flatterers do no good; their
dupes," etc.
[27] {kala . . . alethe}.
Book II VII
He had two ways of dealing with the difficulties
of his friends: where ignorance was the cause,
he tried to meet the trouble by a dose of
common sense; or where want and poverty were
to blame, by lessoning them that they should
assist one another according to their ability;
and here I may mention certain incidents
which occurred within my own knowledge. How,
for instance, he chanced upon Aristarchus
wearing the look of one who suffered from
a fit of the "sullens," and thus
accosted him.
Socrates. You seem to have some trouble on
your mind, Aristarchus; if so, you should
share it with your friends. Perhaps together
we might lighten the weight of it a little.
Aristarchus answered: Yes, Socrates, I am
in sore straits indeed. Ever since the party
strife declared itself in the city,[1] what
with the rush of people to Piraeus, and the
wholesale banishments, I have been fairly
at the mercy of my poor deserted female relatives.
Sisters, nieces, cousins, they have all come
flocking to me for protection. I have fourteen
free-born souls, I tell you, under my single
roof, and how are we to live? We can get
nothing out of the soil--that is in the hands
of the enemy; nothing from my house property,
for there is scarcely a living soul left
in the city; my furniture? no one will buy
it; money? there is none to be borrowed--you
would have a better chance to find it by
looking for it on the road than to borrow
it from a banker. Yes, Socrates, to stand
by and see one's relatives die of hunger
is hard indeed, and yet to feed so many at
such a pinch impossible.
After he listened to the story, Socrates
asked: How comes it that Ceramon,[2] with
so many mouths to feed, not only contrives
to furnish himself and them with the necessaries
of life, but to realise a handsome surplus,
whilst you being in like plight[3] are afraid
you will one and all perish of starvation
for want of the necessaries of life?
Aristodemus. Why, bless your soul, do you
not see he has only slaves and I have free-born
souls to feed?
Socrates. And which should you say were the
better human beings, the free- born members
of your household or Ceramon's slaves?
Aristodemus. The free souls under my roof
without a doubt.
Socrates. Is it not a shame, then, that he
with his baser folk to back him should be
in easy circumstances, while you and your
far superior household are in difficulties?
Aristodemus. To be sure it is, when he has
only a set of handicraftsmen to feed, and
I my liberally-educated household.
Socrates. What is a handicraftsman? Does
not the term apply to all who can make any
sort of useful product or commodity?
Aristodemus. Certainly.
Socrates. Barley meal is a useful product,
is it not?
Aristodemus. Pre-eminently so.
Socrates. And loaves of bread?
Aristodemus. No less.
Socrates. Well, and what do you say to cloaks
for men and for women-- tunics, mantles,
vests?[4]
Aristodemus. Yes, they are all highly useful
commodities.
Socrates. Then your household do not know
how to make any of these?
Aristodemus. On the contrary, I believe they
can make them all.
Socrates. Then you are not aware that by
means of the manufacture of one of these
alone--his barley meal store--Nausicydes[5]
not only maintains himself and his domestics,
but many pigs and cattle besides, and realises
such large profits that he frequently contributes
to the state benevolences;[6] while there
is Cyrebus, again, who, out of a bread factory,
more than maintains the whole of his establishment,
and lives in the lap of luxury; and Demeas
of Collytus gets a livelihood out of a cloak
business, and Menon as a mantua-maker, and
so, again, more than half the Megarians[7]
by the making of vests.
Aristodemus. Bless me, yes! They have got
a set of barbarian fellows, whom they purchase
and keep, to manufacture by forced labour
whatever takes their fancy. My kinswomen,
I need not tell you, are free-born ladies.
Socrates. Then, on the ground that they are
free-born and your kinswomen, you think that
they ought to do nothing but eat and sleep?
Or is it your opinion that people who live
in this way--I speak of free-born people
in general--lead happier lives, and are more
to be congratulated, than those who give
their time and attention to such useful arts
of life as they are skilled in? Is this what
you see in the world, that for the purpose
of learning what it is well to know, and
of recollecting the lessons taught, or with
a view to health and strength of body, or
for the sake of acquiring and preserving
all that gives life its charm, idleness and
inattention are found to be helpful, whilst
work and study are simply a dead loss? Pray,
when those relatives of yours were taught
what you tell me they know, did they learn
it as barren information which they would
never turn to practical account, or, on the
contrary, as something with which they were
to be seriously concerned some day, and from
which they were to reap advantage? Do human
beings in general attain to well-tempered
manhood by a course of idling, or by carefully
attending to what will be of use? Which will
help a man the more to grow in justice and
uprightness, to be up and doing, or to sit
with folded hands revolving the ways and
means of existence? As things now stand,
if I am not mistaken, there is no love lost
between you. You cannot help feeling that
they are costly to you, and they must see
that you find them a burthen? This is a perilous
state of affairs, in which hatred and bitterness
have every prospect of increasing, whilst
the pre-existing bond of affection[8] is
likely to be snapped.
But now, if only you allow them free scope
for their energies, when you come to see
how useful they can be, you will grow quite
fond of them, and they, when they perceive
that they can please you, will cling to their
benefactor warmly. Thus, with the memory
of former kindnesses made sweeter, you will
increase the grace which flows from kindnesses
tenfold; you will in consequence be knit
in closer bonds of love and domesticity.
If, indeed, they were called upon to do any
shameful work, let them choose death rather
than that; but now they know, it would seem,
the very arts and accomplishments which are
regarded as the loveliest and the most suitable
for women; and the things which we know,
any of us, are just those which we can best
perform, that is to say, with ease and expedition;
it is a joy to do them, and the result is
beautiful.[9] Do not hesitate, then, to initiate
your friends in what will bring advantage
to them and you alike; probably they will
gladly respond to your summons.
Well, upon my word (Aristarchus answered),
I like so well what you say, Socrates, that
though hitherto I have not been disposed
to borrow, knowing that when I had spent
what I got I should not be in a condition
to repay, I think I can now bring myself
to do so in order to raise a fund for these
works.
Thereupon a capital was provided; wools were
purchased; the good man's relatives set to
work, and even whilst they breakfasted they
worked, and on and on till work was ended
and they supped. Smiles took the place of
frowns; they no longer looked askance with
suspicion, but full into each other's eyes
with happiness. They loved their kinsman
for his kindness to them. He became attached
to them as helpmates; and the end of it all
was, he came to Socrates and told him with
delight how matters fared; "and now,"
he added, "they tax me with being the
only drone in the house, who sit and eat
the bread of idleness."
To which Socrates: Why do not you tell them
the fable of the dog?[10] Once on a time,
so goes the story, when beasts could speak,
the sheep said to her master, "What
a marvel is this, master, that to us, your
own sheep, who provide you with fleeces and
lambs and cheese, you give nothing, save
only what we may nibble off earth's bosom;
but with this dog of yours, who provides
you with nothing of the sort, you share the
very meat out of your mouth." When the
dog heard these words, he answered promptly,
"Ay, in good sooth, for is it not I
who keep you safe and sound, you sheep, so
that you are not stolen by man nor harried
by wolves; since, if I did not keep watch
over you, you would not be able so much as
to graze afield, fearing to be destroyed."
And so, says the tale, the sheep had to admit
that the dog was rightly preferred to themselves
in honour. And so do you tell your flock
yonder that like the dog in the fable you
are their guardian and overseer, and it is
thanks to you that they are protected from
evil and evildoers, so that they work their
work and live their lives in blissful security.
Book II VIII
At another time chancing upon an old friend
whom he had not seen for a long while, he
greeted him thus.
Socrates. What quarter of the world do you
hail from, Eutherus?
The other answered: From abroad, just before
the close of the war; but at present from
the city itself.[1] You see, since we have
been denuded of our possessions across the
frontier,[2] and my father left me nothing
in Attica, I must needs bide at home, and
provide myself with the necessaries of life
by means of bodily toil, which seems preferable
to begging from another, especially as I
have no security on which to raise a loan.
Socrates. And how long do you expect your
body to be equal to providing the necessaries
of life for hire?
Euthydemus. Goodness knows, Socrates--not
for long.
Socrates. And when you find yourself an old
man, expenses will not diminish, and yet
no one will care to pay you for the labour
of your hands.
Euthydemus. That is true.
Socrates. Would it not be better then to
apply yourself at once to such work as will
stand you in good stead when you are old--that
is, address yourself to some large proprietor
who needs an assistant in managing his estate?[3]
By superintending his works, helping to get
in his crops, and guarding his property in
general, you will be a benefit to the estate
and be benefited in return.
I could not endure the yoke of slavery, Socrates!
(he exclaimed).
Socrates. And yet the heads of departments
in a state are not regarded as adopting the
badge of slavery because they manage the
public property, but as having attained a
higher degree of freedom rather.
Euthydemus. In a word, Socrates, the idea
of being held to account to another is not
at all to my taste.
Socrates. And yet, Eutherus, it would be
hard to find a work which did not involve
some liability to account; in fact it is
difficult to do anything without some mistake
or other, and no less difficult, if you should
succeed in doing it immaculately, to escape
all unfriendly criticism. I wonder now whether
you find it easy to get through your present
occupations entirely without reproach. No?
Let me tell you what you should do. You should
avoid censorious persons and attach yourself
to the considerate and kind-hearted, and
in all your affairs accept with a good grace
what you can and decline what you feel you
cannot do. Whatever it be, do it heart and
soul, and make it your finest work.[4] There
lies the method at once to silence fault-finders
and to minister help to your own difficulties.
Life will flow smoothly, risks will be diminished,
provision against old age secured.
[1] Lit. "from here." The conversation
perhaps takes place in Piraeus 404 B. C.
[2] Or, "colonial possession."
Cf. "Symp." iv. 31.
[3] Cf. "Cyrop." VIII. iii. 48.
[4] Or, "study to make it your finest
work, the expression of a real enthusiasm."
Book II IX
At another time, as I am aware, he had heard
a remark made by Crito[1] that life at Athens
was no easy matter for a man who wished to
mind his own affairs.
As, for instance, at this moment (Crito proceeded)
there are a set of fellows threatening me
with lawsuits, not because they have any
misdemeanour to allege against me, but simply
under the conviction that I will sooner pay
a sum of money than be troubled further.
To which Socrates replied: Tell me, Crito,
you keep dogs, do you not, to ward off wolves
from your flocks?
Crito. Certainly; it pays to do so.
Socrates. Then why do you not keep a watchman
willing and competent to ward off this pack
of people who seek to injure you?
I should not at all mind (he answered), if
I were not afraid he might turn again and
rend his keeper.
What! (rejoined Socrates), do you not see
that to gratify a man like yourself is far
pleasanter as a matter of self-interest than
to quarrel with you? You may be sure there
are plenty of people here who will take the
greatest pride in making you their friend.
Accordingly, they sought out Archedemus,[2]
a practical man with a clever tongue in his
head[3] but poor; the fact being, he was
not the sort to make gain by hook or by crook,
but a lover of honesty and of too good a
nature himself to make his living as a pettifogger.[4]
Crito would then take the opportunity of
times of harvesting and put aside small presents
for Achedemus of corn and oil, or wine, or
wool, or any other of the farm produce forming
the staple commodities of life, or he would
invite him to a sacrificial feast, and otherwise
pay him marked attention. Archedemus, feeling
that he had in Crito's house a harbour of
refuge, could not make too much of his patron,
and ere long he had hunted up a long list
of iniquities which could be lodged against
Crito's pettifogging persecutors themselves,
and not only their numerous crimes but their
numerous enemies; and presently he prosecuted
one of them in a public suit, where sentence
would be given against him "what to
suffer or what to pay."[5] The accused,
conscious as he was of many rascally deeds,
did all he could to be quit of Archedemus,
but Archedemus was not to be got rid of.
He held on until he had made the informer
not only loose his hold of Crito but pay
himself a sum of money; and now that Archedemus
had achieved this and other similar victories,
it is easy to guess what followed.[6] It
was just as when some shepherd has got a
very good dog, all the other shepherds wish
to lodge their flocks in his neighbourhood
that they too may reap the benefit of him.
So a number of Crito's friends came begging
him to allow Archedemus to be their guardian
also, and Archedemus was overjoyed to do
something to gratify Crito, and so it came
about that not only Crito abode in peace,
but his friends likewise. If any of those
people with whom Archedemus was not on the
best of terms were disposed to throw it in
his teeth that he accepted his patron's benefits
and paid in flatteries, he had a ready retort:
"Answer me this question--which is the
more scandalous, to accept kindnesses from
honest folk and to repay them, with the result
that I make such people my friends but quarrel
with knaves, or to make enemies of honourable
gentlemen[7] by attempts to do them wrong,
with the off-chance indeed of winning the
friendship of some scamps in return for my
co-operation, but the certainty of losing
in the tone of my acquaintances?"[8]
The net result of the whole proceedings was
that Archedemus was now Crito's right hand,[9]
and by the rest of Crito's friends he was
held in honour.
[1] Crito. See above, I. ii. 48; Cobet, "P.
X."; cf. Plat. "Rep." viii.
549 C.
[2] Archedemus, possibly the demagogue, "Hell."
I. vii. 2. So Cobet, "P. X.," but
see Grote, "H. G." viii. 245.
[3] Lit. "very capable of speech and
action"--the writer's favourite formula
for the well-trained Athenian who can speak
fluently and reason clearly, and act energetically
and opportunely.
[4] Reading {kai euphuesteros on} [or {e
os}] . . . {apo sukophanton} [or {sukophantion}],
after Cobet, "P. X." s. v. Archedemus.
The MSS. give {kai ephe raston einai}--"nothing
is easier," he said, "than recovering
from sycophants."
[5] For this formula cf. "Econ."
vi. 24. Cf. Plat. "Statesm." 299
A.
[6] {ede tote}. Cf. Plat. "Laws,"
vi. 778 C.
[7] Lit. the {kaloi kagathoi}, which like
{khrestous} and {ponerous} has a political
as well as an ethical meaning.
[8] Lit. "must associate with these
(the {ponerois}) instead of those (the {kalois
te kagathois}).
[9] He was No. 1--{eis}.
Book II X
Again I may cite, as known to myself,[1]
the following discussion; the arguments were
addressed to Diodorus, one of his companions.
The master said:
Tell me, Diodorus, if one of your slaves
runs away, are you at pains to recover him?
More than that (Diodorus answered), I summon
others to my aid and I have a reward cried
for his recovery.
Socrates. Well, if one of your domestics
is sick, do you tend him and call in the
doctors to save his life?
Diodorus. Decidedly I do.
Socrates. And if an intimate acquaintance
who is far more precious to you than any
of your household slaves is about to perish
of want, you would think it incumbent on
you to take pains to save his life? Well!
now you know without my telling you that
Hermogenes[2] is not made of wood or stone.
If you helped him he would be ashamed not
to pay you in kind. And yet--the opportunity
of possessing a willing, kindly, and trusty
assistant well fitted to do your bidding,
and not merely that, but capable of originating
useful ideas himself, with a certain forecast
of mind and judgment--I say such a man is
worth dozens of slaves. Good economists tell
us that when a precious article may be got
at a low price we ought to buy. And nowadays
when times are so bad it is possible to get
good friends exceedingly cheap.
Diodorus answered: You are quite right, Socrates;
bid Hermogenes come to me.
Socrates. Bid Hermogenes come to you!--not
I indeed! since for aught I can understand
you are no better entitled to summon him
that to go to him yourself, nor is the advantage
more on his side than your own.
Thus Diodorus went off in a trice to seek
Hermogenes, and at no great outlay won to
himself a friend--a friend whose one concern
it now was to discover how, by word or deed,
he might help and gladden Diodorus.
[1] Or, "for which I can personally
vouch."
[2] Hermogenes, presumably the son of Hipponicus.
See I. ii. 48. |