Book II I
Now, if the effect of such discourses
was,
as I imagine, to deter his hearers
from the
paths of quackery and false-seeming,[1]
so
I am sure that language like the following
was calculated to stimulate his followers
to practise self-control and endurance:
self-control
in the matters of eating, drinking,
sleeping,
and the cravings of lust; endurance
of cold
and heat and toil and pain. He had
noticed
the undue licence which one of his
acquaintances
allowed himself in all such matters.[2]
Accordingly
he thus addressed him:
Tell me, Aristippus (Socrates said),
supposing
you had two children entrusted to you
to
educate, one of them must be brought
up with
an aptitude for government, and the
other
without the faintest propensity to
rule--how
would you educate them? What do you
say?
Shall we begin our inquiry from the
beginning,
as it were, with the bare elements
of food
and nutriment?
Aristodemus. Yes, food to begin with,
by
all means, being a first principle,[3]
without
which there is no man living but would
perish.
Socrates. Well, then, we may expect,
may
we not, that a desire to grasp food
at certain
seasons will exhibit itself in both
the children?
Aristodemus. It is to be expected.
Socrates. Which, then, of the two must
be
trained, of his own free will,[4] to
prosecute
a pressing business rather than gratify
the
belly?
Aristodemus. No doubt the one who is
being
trained to govern, if we would not
have affairs
of state neglected during[5] his government.
Socrates. And the same pupil must be
furnished
with a power of holding out against
thirst
also when the craving to quench it
comes
upon him?
Aristodemus. Certainly he must.
Socrates. And on which of the two shall
we
confer such self-control in regard
to sleep
as shall enable him to rest late and
rise
early, or keep vigil, if the need arise?
Aristodemus. To the same one of the
two must
be given that endurance also.
Socrates. Well, and a continence in
regard
to matters sexual so great that nothing
of
the sort shall prevent him from doing
his
duty? Which of them claims that?
Aristodemus. The same one of the pair
again.
Socrates. Well, and on which of the
two shall
be bestowed, as a further gift, the
voluntary
resolution to face toils rather than
turn
and flee from them?
Aristodemus. This, too, belongs of
right
to him who is being trained for government.
Socrates. Well, and to which of them
will
it better accord to be taught all knowledge
necessary towards the mastery of antagonists?
Aristodemus. To our future ruler certainly,
for without these parts of learning
all his
other capacities will be merely waste.
Socrates. [6]Will not a man so educated
be
less liable to be entrapped by rival
powers,
and so escape a common fate of living
creatures,
some of which (as we all know) are
hooked
through their own greediness, and often
even
in spite of a native shyness; but through
appetite for food they are drawn towards
the bait, and are caught; while others
are
similarly ensnared by drink?
Aristodemus. Undoubtedly.
Socrates. And others again are victims
of
amorous heat, as quails, for instance,
or
partridges, which, at the cry of the
hen-bird,
with lust and expectation of such joys
grow
wild, and lose their power of computing
dangers:
on they rush, and fall into the snare
of
the hunter?
Aristippus assented.
Socrates. And would it not seem to
be a base
thing for a man to be affected like
the silliest
bird or beast? as when the adulterer
invades
the innermost sanctum[7] of the house,
though
he is well aware of the risks which
his crime
involves,[8] the formidable penalties
of
the law, the danger of being caught
in the
toils, and then suffering the direst
contumely.
Considering all the hideous penalties
which
hang over the adulterer's head, considering
also the many means at hand to release
him
from the thraldom of his passion, that
a
man should so drive headlong on to
the quicksands
of perdition[9]--what are we to say
of such
frenzy? The wretch who can so behave
must
surely be tormented by an evil spirit?[10]
Aristodemus. So it strikes me.
Socrates. And does it not strike you
as a
sign of strange indifference that,
whereas
the greater number of the indispensable
affairs
of men, as for instance, those of war
and
agriculture, and more than half the
rest,
need to be conducted under the broad
canopy
of heaven,[11] yet the majority of
men are
quite untrained to wrestle with cold
and
heat?
Aristippus again assented.
Socrates. And do you not agree that
he who
is destined to rule must train himself
to
bear these things lightly?
Aristodemus. Most certainly.
Socrates. And whilst we rank those
who are
self-disciplined in all these matters
among
persons fit to rule, we are bound to
place
those incapable of such conduct in
the category
of persons without any pretension whatsoever
to be rulers?
Aristodemus. I assent.
Socrates. Well, then, since you know
the
rank peculiar to either section of
mankind,
did it ever strike you to consider
to which
of the two you are best entitled to
belong?
Yes I have (replied Aristippus). I
do not
dream for a moment of ranking myself
in the
class of those who wish to rule. In
fact,
considering how serious a business
it is
to cater for one's own private needs,
I look
upon it as the mark of a fool not to
be content
with that, but to further saddle oneself
with the duty of providing the rest
of the
community with whatever they may be
pleased
to want. That, at the cost of much
personal
enjoyment, a man should put himself
at the
head of a state, and then, if he fail
to
carry through every jot and tittle
of that
state's desire, be held to criminal
account,
does seem to me the very extravagance
of
folly. Why, bless me! states claim
to treat
their rulers precisely as I treat my
domestic
slaves. I expect my attendants to furnish
me with an abundance of necessaries,
but
not to lay a finger on one of them
themselves.
So these states regard it as the duty
of
a ruler to provide them with all the
good
things imaginable, but to keep his
own hands
off them all the while.[12] So then,
for
my part, if anybody desires to have
a heap
of pother himself,[13] and be a nuisance
to the rest of the world, I will educate
him in the manner suggested, and he
shall
take his place among those who are
fit to
rule; but for myself, I beg to be enrolled
amongst those who wish to spend their
days
as easily and pleasantly as possible.
Socrates. Shall we then at this point
turn
and inquire which of the two are likely
to
lead the pleasanter life, the rulers
or the
ruled?
Aristodemus. By all means let us do
so.
Socrates. To begin then with the nations
and races known to ourselves.[14] In
Asia
the Persians are the rulers, while
the Syrians,
Phrygians, Lydians are ruled; and in
Europe
we find the Scythians ruling, and the
Maeotians
being ruled. In Africa[15] the Carthaginians
are rulers, the Libyans ruled. Which
of these
two sets respectively leads the happier
life,
in your opinion? Or, to come nearer
home--you
are yourself a Hellene--which among
Hellenes
enjoy the happier existence, think
you, the
dominant or the subject states?
Nay,[16] I would have you to understand
(exclaimed
Aristippus) that I am just as far from
placing
myself in the ranks of slavery; there
is,
I take it, a middle path between the
two
which it is my ambition to tread, avoiding
rule and slavery alike; it lies through
freedom--the
high road which leads to happiness.
Socrates. True, if only your path could
avoid
human beings, as it avoids rule and
slavery,
there would be something in what you
say.
But being placed as you are amidst
human
beings, if you purpose neither to rule
nor
to be ruled, and do not mean to dance
attendance,
if you can help it, on those who rule,
you
must surely see that the stronger have
an
art to seat the weaker on the stool
of repentance[17]
both in public and in private, and
to treat
them as slaves. I daresay you have
not failed
to note this common case: a set of
people
has sown and planted, whereupon in
comes
another set and cuts their corn and
fells
their fruit-trees, and in every way
lays
siege to them because, though weaker,
they
refuse to pay them proper court, till
at
length they are persuaded to accept
slavery
rather than war against their betters.
And
in private life also, you will bear
me out,
the brave and powerful are known to
reduce
the helpless and cowardly to bondage,
and
to make no small profit out of their
victims.
Aristodemus. Yes, but I must tell you
I have
a simple remedy against all such misadventures.
I do not confine myself to any single
civil
community. I roam the wide world a
foreigner.
Socrates. Well, now, that is a masterly
stroke,
upon my word![18] Of course, ever since
the
decease of Sinis, and Sciron, and Procrustes,[19]
foreign travellers have had an easy
time
of it. But still, if I bethink me,
even in
these modern days the members of free
communities
do pass laws in their respective countries
for self- protection against wrong-doing.
Over and above their personal connections,
they provide themselves with a host
of friends;
they gird their cities about with walls
and
battlements; they collect armaments
to ward
off evil-doers; and to make security
doubly
sure, they furnish themselves with
allies
from foreign states. In spite of all
which
defensive machinery these same free
citizens
do occasionally fall victims to injustice.
But you, who are without any of these
aids;
you, who pass half your days on the
high
roads where iniquity is rife;[20] you,
who,
into whatever city you enter, are less
than
the least of its free members, and
moreover
are just the sort of person whom any
one
bent on mischief would single out for
attack--yet
you, with your foreigner's passport,
are
to be exempt from injury? So you flatter
yourself. And why? Will the state authorities
cause proclamation to be made on your
behalf:
"The person of this man Aristippus
is
secure; let his going out and his coming
in be free from danger"? Is that
the
ground of your confidence? or do you
rather
rest secure in the consciousness that
you
would prove such a slave as no master
would
care to keep? For who would care to
have
in his house a fellow with so slight
a disposition
to work and so strong a propensity
to extravagance?
Suppose we stop and consider that very
point:
how do masters deal with that sort
of domestic?
If I am not mistaken, they chastise
his wantonness
by starvation; they balk his thieving
tendencies
by bars and bolts where there is anything
to steal; they hinder him from running
away
by bonds and imprisonment; they drive
the
sluggishness out of him with the lash.
Is
it not so? Or how do you proceed when
you
discover the like tendency in one of
your
domestics?
Aristodemus. I correct them with all
the
plagues, till I force them to serve
me properly.
But, Socrates, to return to your pupil
educated
in the royal art,[21] which, if I mistake
not, you hold to be happiness: how,
may I
ask, will he be better off than others
who
lie in evil case, in spite of themselves,
simply because they suffer perforce,
but
in his case the hunger and the thirst,
the
cold shivers and the lying awake at
nights,
with all the changes he will ring on
pain,
are of his own choosing? For my part
I cannot
see what difference it makes, provided
it
is one and the same bare back which
receives
the stripes, whether the whipping be
self-appointed
or unasked for; nor indeed does it
concern
my body in general, provided it be
my body,
whether I am beleaguered by a whole
armament
of such evils[22] of my own will or
against
my will--except only for the folly
which
attaches to self- appointed suffering.
Socrates. What, Aristippus, does it
not seem
to you that, as regards such matters,
there
is all the difference between voluntary
and
involuntary suffering, in that he who
starves
of his own accord can eat when he chooses,
and he who thirsts of his own free
will can
drink, and so for the rest; but he
who suffers
in these ways perforce cannot desist
from
the suffering when the humour takes
him?
Again, he who suffers hardship voluntarily,
gaily confronts his troubles, being
buoyed
on hope[23]--just as a hunter in pursuit
of wild beasts, through hope of capturing
his quarry, finds toil a pleasure--and
these
are but prizes of little worth in return
for their labours; but what shall we
say
of their reward who toil to obtain
to themselves
good friends, or to subdue their enemies,
or that through strength of body and
soul
they may administer their households
well,
befriend their friends, and benefit
the land
which gave them birth? Must we not
suppose
that these too will take their sorrows
lightly,
looking to these high ends? Must we
not suppose
that they too will gaily confront existence,
who have to support them not only their
conscious
virtue, but the praise and admiration
of
the world?[24] And once more, habits
of indolence,
along with the fleeting pleasures of
the
moment, are incapable, as gymnastic
trainers
say, of setting up[25] a good habit
of body,
or of implanting in the soul any knowledge
worthy of account; whereas by painstaking
endeavour in the pursuit of high and
noble
deeds, as good men tell us, through
endurance
we shall in the end attain the goal.
So Hesiod
somewhere says:[26]
Wickedness may a man take wholesale
with
ease, smooth is the way and her dwelling-place
is very nigh; but in front of virtue
the
immortal gods have placed toil and
sweat,
long is the path and steep that leads
to
her, and rugged at the first, but when
the
summit of the pass is reached, then
for all
its roughness the path grows easy.
And Ephicharmus[27] bears his testimony
when
he says:
The gods sell us all good things in
return
for our labours.
And again in another passage he exclaims:
Set not thine heart on soft things,
thou
knave, lest thou light upon the hard.
And that wise man Prodicus[28] delivers
himself
in a like strain concerning virtue
in that
composition of his about Heracles,
which
crowds have listened to.[29] This,
as far
as I can recollect it, is the substance
at
least of what he says:
"When Heracles was emerging from
boyhood
into the bloom of youth, having reached
that
season in which the young man, now
standing
upon the verge of independence, shows
plainly
whether he will enter upon the path
of virtue
or of vice, he went forth into a quiet
place,
and sat debating with himself which
of those
two paths he should pursue; and as
he there
sat musing, there appeared to him two
women
of great stature which drew nigh to
him.
The one was fair to look upon, frank
and
free by gift of nature,[30] her limbs
adorned
with purity and her eyes with bashfulness;
sobriety set the rhythm of her gait,
and
she was clad in white apparel. The
other
was of a different type; the fleshy
softness
of her limbs betrayed her nurture,
while
the complexion of her skin was embellished
that she might appear whiter and rosier
than
she really was, and her figure that
she might
seem taller than nature made her; she
stared
with wide-open eyes, and the raiment
wherewith
she was clad served but to reveal the
ripeness
of her bloom. With frequent glances
she surveyed
her person, or looked to see if others
noticed
her; while ever and anon she fixed
her gaze
upon the shadow of herself intently.
"Now when these two had drawn
near to
Heracles, she who was first named advanced
at an even pace[31] towards him, but
the
other, in her eagerness to outstrip
her,
ran forward to the youth, exclaiming,
'I
see you, Heracles, in doubt and difficulty
what path of life to choose; make me
your
friend, and I will lead you to the
pleasantest
road and easiest. This I promise you:
you
shall taste all of life's sweets and
escape
all bitters. In the first place, you
shall
not trouble your brain with war or
business;
other topics shall engage your mind;[32]
your only speculation, what meat or
drink
you shall find agreeable to your palate;
what delight[33] of ear or eye; what
pleasure
of smell or touch; what darling lover's
intercourse
shall most enrapture you; how you shall
pillow
your limbs in softest slumber; how
cull each
individual pleasure without alloy of
pain;
and if ever the suspicion steal upon
you
that the stream of joys will one day
dwindle,
trust me I will not lead you where
you shall
replenish the store by toil of body
and trouble
of soul. No! others shall labour, but
you
shall reap the fruit of their labours;
you
shall withhold your hand from nought
which
shall bring you gain. For to all my
followers
I give authority and power to help
themselves
freely from every side.'
"Heracles hearing these words
made answer:
'What, O lady, is the name you bear?'
To
which she: 'Know that my friends call
be
Happiness, but they that hate me have
their
own nicknames[34] for me, Vice and
Naughtiness.'
"But just then the other of those
fair
women approached and spoke: 'Heracles,
I
too am come to you, seeing that your
parents
are well known to me, and in your nurture
I have gauged your nature; wherefore
I entertain
good hope that if you choose the path
which
leads to me, you shall greatly bestir
yourself
to be the doer of many a doughty deed
of
noble emprise; and that I too shall
be held
in even higher honour for your sake,
lit
with the lustre shed by valorous deeds.[35]
I will not cheat you with preludings
of pleasure,[36]
but I will relate to you the things
that
are according to the ordinances of
God in
very truth. Know then that among things
that
are lovely and of good report, not
one have
the gods bestowed upon mortal men apart
from
toil and pains. Would you obtain the
favour
of the gods, then must you pay these
same
gods service; would you be loved by
your
friends, you must benefit these friends;
do you desire to be honoured by the
state,
you must give the state your aid; do
you
claim admiration for your virtue from
all
Hellas, you must strive to do some
good to
Hellas; do you wish earth to yield
her fruits
to you abundantly, to earth must you
pay
your court; do you seek to amass riches
from
your flocks and herds, on them must
you bestow
your labour; or is it your ambition
to be
potent as a warrior, able to save your
friends
and to subdue your foes, then must
you learn
the arts of war from those who have
the knowledge,
and practise their application in the
field
when learned; or would you e'en be
powerful
of limb and body, then must you habituate
limbs and body to obey the mind, and
exercise
yourself with toil and sweat.'
"At this point, (as Prodicus relates)
Vice broke in exclaiming: 'See you,
Heracles,
how hard and long the road is by which
yonder
woman would escort you to her festal
joys.[37]
But I will guide you by a short and
easy
road to happiness.'
"Then spoke Virtue: 'Nay, wretched
one,
what good thing hast thou? or what
sweet
thing art thou acquainted with--that
wilt
stir neither hand nor foot to gain
it? Thou,
that mayest not even await the desire
of
pleasure, but, or ever that desire
springs
up, art already satiated; eating before
thou
hungerest, and drinking before thou
thirsteth;
who to eke out an appetite must invent
an
army of cooks and confectioners; and
to whet
thy thirst must lay down costliest
wines,
and run up and down in search of ice
in summer-time;
to help thy slumbers soft coverlets
suffice
not, but couches and feather-beds must
be
prepared thee and rockers to rock thee
to
rest; since desire for sleep in thy
case
springs not from toil but from vacuity
and
nothing in the world to do. Even the
natural
appetite of love thou forcest prematurely
by every means thou mayest devise,
confounding
the sexes in thy service. Thus thou
educatest
thy friends: with insult in the night
season
and drowse of slumber during the precious
hours of the day. Immortal, thou art
cast
forth from the company of gods, and
by good
men art dishonoured: that sweetest
sound
of all, the voice of praise, has never
thrilled
thine ears; and the fairest of all
fair visions
is hidden from thine eyes that have
never
beheld one bounteous deed wrought by
thine
own hand. If thou openest thy lips
in speech,
who will believe thy word? If thou
hast need
of aught, none shall satisfy thee.
What sane
man will venture to join thy rablle
rout?
Ill indeed are thy revellers to look
upon,
young men impotent of body, and old
men witless
in mind: in the heyday of life they
batten
in sleek idleness, and wearily do they
drag
through an age of wrinkled wretchedness:
and why? they blush with shame at the
thought
of deeds done in the past, and groan
for
weariness at what is left to do. During
their
youth they ran riot through their sweet
things,
and laid up for themselves large store
of
bitterness against the time of eld.
But my
companionship is with the gods; and
with
the good among men my conversation;
no bounteous
deed, divine or human, is wrought without
my aid. Therefore am I honoured in
Heaven
pre-eminently, and upon earth among
men whose
right it is to honour me;[38] as a
beloved
fellow-worker of all craftsmen; a faithful
guardian of house and lands, whom the
owners
bless; a kindly helpmeet of servants;[39]
a brave assistant in the labours of
peace;
an unflinching ally in the deeds of
war;
a sharer in all friendships indispensable.
To my friends is given an enjoyment
of meats
and drinks, which is sweet in itself
and
devoid of trouble, in that they can
endure
until desire ripens, and sleep more
delicious
visits them than those who toil not.
Yet
they are not pained to part with it;
nor
for the sake of slumber do they let
slip
the performance of their duties. Among
my
followers the youth delights in the
praises
of his elders, and the old man glories
in
the honour of the young; with joy they
call
to memory their deeds of old, and in
to-day's
well-doing are well pleased. For my
sake
they are dear in the sight of God,
beloved
of their friends and honoured by the
country
of their birth. When the appointed
goal is
reached they lie not down in oblivion
with
dishonour, but bloom afresh--their
praise
resounded on the lips of men for ever.[40]
Toils like these, O son of noble parents,
Heracles, it is yours to meet with,
and having
endured, to enter into the heritage
assured
you of transcendant happiness.'"
This, Aristippus, in rough sketch is
the
theme which Prodicus pursues[41] in
his "Education
of Heracles by Virtue," only he
decked
out his sentiments, I admit, in far
more
magnificant phrases than I have ventured
on. Were it not well, Aristippus, to
lay
to heart these sayings, and to strive
to
bethink you somewhat of that which
touches
the future of our life?
[1] This sentence in the Greek concludes
Bk. I. There is something wrong or
very awkward
in the text here.
[2] Cf. Grote, "Plato," III.
xxxviii.
p. 530.
[3] Aristippus plays upon the word
{arkhe}.
[4] {proairesis}.
[5] Lit. "along of."
[6] [SS. 4, 5, L. Dind. ed Lips.]
[7] {eis as eirktas}. The penetralia.
[8] Or, "he knows the risks he
runs
of suffering those penalties with which
the
law threatens his crime should he fall
into
the snare, and being caught, be mutilated."
[9] Or, "leap headlong into the
jaws
of danger."
[10] {kakodaimonontos}.
[11] Or, "in the open air."
[12] Or, "but he must have no
finger
in the pie himself."
[13] See Kuhner ad loc.
[14] Or, "the outer world, the
non-Hellenic
races and nationalities of which we
have
any knowledge."
[15] Lit. "Libya."
[16] Or, "Pardon me interrupting
you,
Socrates; but I have not the slightest
intention
of placing myself." See W. L.
Newman,
op. cit. i. 306.
[17] See "Symp." iii. 11;
"Cyrop."
II. ii. 14; Plat. "Ion,"
535 E;
L. Dindorf ad loc.
[18] Or, "Well foiled!" "A
masterly fall! my prince of wrestlers."
[19] For these mythical highway robbers,
see Diod. iv. 59; and for Sciron in
particular,
Plut. "Theseus," 10.
[20] Or, "where so many suffer
wrong."
[21] Cf. below, IV. ii. 11; Plat. "Statesm."
259 B; "Euthyd." 291 C; K.
Joel,
op. cit. p. 387 foll. "Aristippus
anticipates
Adeimantus" ("Rep."
419),
W. L. Newman, op. cit. i. 395.
[22] Cf. "suffers the slings and
arrows
of outrageous fortune."
[23] Cf. above, I. vi. 8.
[24] Or, "in admiration of themselves,
the praise and envy of the world at
large."
[25] See Hippocrates, "V. Med."
18.
[26] Hesiod, "Works and Days,"
285. See Plat. "Prot." 340
C; "Rep."
ii. 364 D; "Laws," iv. 718
E.
[27] Epicharmus of Cos, the chief comic
poet
among the Dorians, fl. 500 B. C. Cf.
Plat.
"Theaet." 152 E, "the
prince
of comedy"; "Gorg."
505 D.
[28] Prodicus of Ceos. See Plat. "Men."
24; "Cratyl." 1; Philostr.
"Vit.
Soph." i. 12.
[29] Or, "which he is fond of
reciting
as a specimen of style." The title
of
the {epideixis} was {'Orai} according
to
Suidas, {Prodikos}.
[30] Reading {eleutherion phusei, .
. .}
or if {eleutherion, phusei . . .} translate
"nature had adorned her limbs
. . ."
[31] Or, "without change in her
demeanour."
[32] Reading {diese}, or {dioisei},
"you
shall continue speculating solely."
[33] It will be recollected that Prodicus
prided himself on {orthotes onomaton}.
Possibly
Xenophon is imitating (caricaturing?)
his
style. {terphtheies, estheies, euphrantheies}.
[34] So the vulg. {upokorizomenoi}
is interpreted.
Cobet ("Pros. Xen." p. 36)
suggests
{upoknizomenoi} = "quippe qui
desiderio
pungantur."
[35] Or, "bathed in the splendour
of
thy virtues."
[36] Or, "honeyed overtures of
pleasure."
[37] Hesiod, "Theog." 909;
Milton,
"L'Allegro," 12.
[38] Reading {ois prosekei}, or if
{proseko},
translate "to whom I am attached."
[39] Cf. "Econ." v. 8.
[40] Or, "so true is it, a branch
is
left them; undying honour to their
name!"
[41] Reading {diokei}, al. {diokei}
= "so
Prodicus arranged the parts of his
discourse."
Book II II
At another time, he had noticed the
angry
temper shown by Lamprocles, the elder
of
his sons, towards their mother, and
thus
addressed himself to the lad.
Socrates. Pray, my son, did you ever
hear
of certain people being called ungrateful?
That I have (replied the young man).
Socrates. And have you understood what
it
is they do to get that bad name?
Lamprocles. Yes, I have: when any one
has
been kindly treated, and has it in
his power
to requite the kindness but neglects
to do
so, men call him ungrateful.
Socrates. And you admit that people
reckon
the ungrateful among wrongdoers?
Lamprocles. I do.
Socrates. And has it ever struck you
to inquire
whether, as regards the right or wrong
of
it, ingratitude may not perhaps resemble
some such conduct as the enslavement,
say,
of prisoners, which is accounted wrong
towards
friends but justifiable towards enemies?
Lamprocles. Yes, I have put that question
to myself. In my opinion, no matter
who confers
the kindness, friend or foe, the recipient
should endeavour to requite it, failing
which
he is a wrongdoer.
Socrates. Then if that is how the matter
stands, ingratitude would be an instance
of pure unadulterate wrongdoing?
Lamprocles assented to the proposition.
Socrates. It follows, then, that in
proportion
to the greatness of the benefit conferred,
the greater his misdoing who fails
to requite
the kindness?
Lamprocles again assented.
Socrates continued: And where can we
hope
to find greater benefits than those
which
children derive from their parents--their
father and mother who brought them
out of
nothingness into being, who granted
them
to look upon all these fair sights,
and to
partake of all those blessings which
the
gods bestow on man, things so priceless
in
our eyes that one and all we shudder
at the
thought of leaving them, and states
have
made death the penalty for the greatest
crimes,
because there is no greater evil through
fear of which to stay iniquity.
You do not suppose that human beings
produce
children for the sake of carnal pleasure[1]
merely; were this the motive, street
and
bordell are full of means to quit them
of
that thrall; whereas nothing is plainer
than
the pains we take to seek out wives
who shall
bear us the finest children.[2] With
these
we wed, and carry on the race. The
man has
a twofold duty to perform: partly in
cherishing
her who is to raise up children along
with
him, and partly towards the children
yet
unborn in providing them with things
that
he thinks will contribute to their
well-being--and
of these as large a store as possible.
The
woman, conceiving, bears her precious
burthen
with travail and pain, and at the risk
of
life itself--sharing with that within
her
womb the food on which she herself
is fed.
And when with much labour she has borne
to
the end and brought forth her offspring,
she feeds it and watches over it with
tender
care--not in return for any good thing
previously
received, for indeed the babe itself
is little
conscious of its benefactor and cannot
even
signify its wants; only she, the mother,
making conjecture of what is good for
it,
and what will please it, essays to
satisfy
it;[3] and for many months she feeds
it night
and day, enduring the toil nor recking
what
return she shall receive for all her
trouble.
Nor does the care and kindness of parents
end with nurture; but when the children
seem
of an age to learn, they teach them
themselves
whatever cunning they possess, as a
guide
to life, or where they feel that another
is more competent, to him they send
them
to be taught at their expense. Thus
they
watch over their children, doing all
in their
power to enable them to grow up to
be as
good as possible.
So be it (the youth answered); but
even if
she have done all that, and twenty
times
as much, no soul on earth could endure
my
mother's cross- grained temper.
Then Socrates: Which, think you, would
be
harder to bear--a wild beast's savagery
or
a mother's?
Lamprocles. To my mind, a mother's--at
least
if she be such as mine.
Socrates. Dear me! And has this mother
ever
done you any injury--such as people
frequently
receive from beasts, by bite or kick?
Lamprocles. If she has not done quite
that,
she uses words which any one would
sooner
sell his life than listen to.
Socrates. And how many annoyances have
you
caused your mother, do you suppose,
by fretfulness
and peevishness in word and deed, night
and
day, since you were a little boy? How
much
sorrow and pain, when you were ill?
Lamprocles. Well, I never said or did
anything
to bring a blush to her cheeks.
Socrates. No, come now! Do you suppose
it
is harder for you to listen to your
mother's
speeches than for actor to listen to
actor
on the tragic stage,[4] when the floodgates
of abuse are opened?
Lamprocles. Yes; for the simple reason
that
they know it is all talk on their parts.
The inquisitor may cross-question,
but he
will not inflict a fine; the threatener
may
hurl his menaces, but he will do no
mischief--that
is why they take it all so easily.
Socrates. Then ought you to fly into
a passion,
who know well enough that, whatever
your
mother says, she is so far from meaning
you
mischief that she is actually wishing
blessings
to descend upon you beyond all others?
Or
do you believe that your mother is
really
ill disposed towards you?
Lamprocles. No, I do not think that.
Socrates. Then this mother, who is
kindly
disposed to you, and takes such tender
care
of you when you are ill to make you
well
again, and to see that you want for
nothing
which may help you; and, more than
all, who
is perpetually pleading for blessings
in
your behalf and offering her vows to
Heaven[5]--can
you say of her that she is cross-grained
and harsh? For my part, I think, if
you cannot
away with such a mother, you cannot
away
with such blessings either.
But tell me (he proceeded), do you
owe service
to any living being, think you? or
are you
prepared to stand alone? Prepared not
to
please or try to please a single soul?
to
follow none? To obey neither general
nor
ruler of any sort? Is that your attitude,
or do you admit that you owe allegience
to
somebody?
Lamprocles. Yes; certainly I owe allegiance.
Socrates. May I take it that you are
willing
to please at any rate your neighbour,
so
that he may kindle a fire for you in
your
need, may prove himself a ready helpmate
in good fortune, or if you chance on
evil
and are stumbling, may friendlily stand
by
your side to aid?
Lamprocles. I am willing.
Socrates. Well, and what of that other
chance
companion--your fellow- traveller by
land
or sea? what of any others, you may
light
upon? is it indifferent to you whether
these
be friends or not, or do you admit
that the
goodwill of these is worth securing
by some
pains on your part?
Lamprocles. I do.
Socrates. It stands thus then: you
are prepared
to pay attention to this, that, and
the other
stranger, but to your mother who loves
you
more than all else, you are bound to
render
no service, no allegiance? Do you not
know
that whilst the state does not concern
itself
with ordinary ingratitude or pass judicial
sentence on it; whilst it overlooks
the thanklessness
of those who fail to make return for
kindly
treatment, it reserves its pains and
penalties
for the special case? If a man render
not
the service and allegiance due to his
parents,
on him the finger of the law is laid;
his
name is struck off the roll; he is
forbidden
to hold the archonship--which is as
much
as to say, "Sacrifices in behalf
of
the state offered by such a man would
be
no offerings, being tainted with impiety;
nor could aught else be 'well and justly'
performed of which he is the doer."
Heaven help us! If a man fail to adorn
the
sepulchre of his dead parents the state
takes
cognisance of the matter, and inquisition
is made in the scrutiny of the magistrates.[6]
And as for you, my son, if you are
in your
sober senses, you will earnestly entreat
your mother, lest the very gods take
you
to be an ungrateful being, and on their
side
also refuse to do you good; and you
will
beware of men also, lest they should
perceive
your neglect of your parents, and with
one
consent hold you in dishonour;[7] and
so
you find yourself in a desert devoid
of friends.
For if once the notion be entertained
that
here is a man ungrateful to his parents,
no one will believe that any kindness
shown
you would be other than thrown away.
[1] Lit. "the joys of Aphrodite."
[2] "For the procreation of children."
See below, IV. iv. 22; "Pol. Lac."
i.
[3] Lit. "to leave nought lacking."
[4] See Grote, "H. G." viii.
457;
Plut. "Solon," xxix.
[5] Or, "paying vows."
[6] Lit. "the docimasia."
See Gow,
"Companion," xiv.
[7] "Visiti with atimia."
Book II III
At another time the differences between
two
brothers named Chaerephon and Chaerecrates,
both well known to him, had drawn his
attention;
and on seeing the younger of the two
he thus
addresed him.
Socrates. Tell me, Chaerecrates, you
are
not, I take it, one of those strange
people
who believe that goods are better and
more
precious than a brother;[1] and that
too
although the former are but senseless
chattels
which need protection, the latter a
sensitive
and sensible being who can afford it;
and
what is more, he is himself alone,
whilst
as for them their name is legion. And
here
again is a marvellous thing: that a
man should
count his brother a loss, because the
goods
of his brother are not his; but he
does not
count his fellow-citizens loss, and
yet their
possessions are not his; only it seems
in
their case he has wits to see that
to dwell
securely with many and have enough
is better
than to own the whole wealth of a community
and to live in dangerous isolation;
but this
same doctrine as applied to brothers
they
ignore. Again, if a man have the means,
he
will purchase domestic slaves, because
he
wants assistants in his work; he will
acquire
friends, because he needs their support;
but this brother of his--who cares
about
brothers? It seems a friend may be
discovered
in an ordinary citizen, but not in
a blood
relation who is also a brother. And
yet it
is a great vantage-ground towards friendship
to have sprung from the same loins
and to
have been suckled at the same breasts,
since
even among beasts a certain natural
craving,
and sympathy springs up between creatures
reared together.[2] Added to which,
a man
who has brothers commands more respect
from
the rest of the world than the man
who has
none, and who must fight his own battles.[3]
Chaerephon. I daresay, Socrates, where
the
differences are not profound, reason
would
a man should bear with his brother,
and not
avoid him for some mere trifle's sake,
for
a brother of the right sort is, as
you say,
a blessing; but if he be the very antithesis
of that, why should a man lay his hand
to
achieve the impossible?
Socrates. Well now, tell me, is there
nobody
whom Chaerephon can please any more
than
he can please yourself; or do some
people
find him agreeable enough?
Chaerephon. Nay, there you hit it.
That is
just why I have a right to detest him.
He
can be pleasing enough to others, but
to
me, whenever he appears on the scene,
he
is not a blessing--no! but by every
manner
of means the reverse.
Socrates. May it not happen that just
as
a horse is no gain to the inexpert
rider
who essays to handle him, so in like
manner,
if a man tries to deal with his brother
after
an ignorant fashion, this same brother
will
kick?
Chaerephon. But is it likely now? How
should
I be ignorant of the art of dealing
with
my brother if I know the art of repaying
kind words and good deeds in kind?
But a
man who tries all he can to annoy me
by word
and deed, I can neither bless nor benefit,
and, what is more, I will not try.
Socrates. Well now, that is a marvellous
statement, Chaerecrates. Your dog,
the serviceable
guardian of your flocks, who will fawn
and
lick the hand of your shepherd, when
you
come near him can only growl and show
his
teeth. Well; you take no notice of
the dog's
ill-temper, you try to propitiate him
by
kindness; but your brother? If your
brother
were what he ought to be, he would
be a great
blessing to you--that you admit; and,
as
you further confess, you know the secret
of kind acts and words, yet you will
not
set yourself to apply means to make
him your
best of friends.
Chaerephon. I am afraid, Socrates,
that I
have no wisdom or cunning to make Chaerephon
bear himself towards me as he should.
Socrates. Yet there is no need to apply
any
recondite or novel machinery. Only
bait your
hook in the way best known to yourself,
and
you will capture him; whereupon he
will become
your devoted friend.
Chaerephon. If you are aware that I
know
some love-charm, Socrates, of which
I am
the happy but unconscious possessor,
pray
make haste and enlighten me.
Socrates. Answer me then. Suppose you
wanted
to get some acquaintance to invite
you to
dinner when he next keeps holy day,[4]
what
steps would you take?
Chaerephon. No doubt I should set him
a good
example by inviting him myself on a
like
occasion.
Socrates. And if you wanted to induce
some
friend to look after your affairs during
your absence abroad, how would you
achieve
your purpose?
Chaerephon. No doubt I should present
a precedent
in undertaking to look after his in
like
circumstances.
Socrates. And if you wished to get
some foreign
friend to take you under his roof while
visiting
his country, what would you do?
Chaerephon. No doubt I should begin
by offering
him the shelter of my own roof when
he came
to Athens, in order to enlist his zeal
in
furthering the objects of my visit;
it is
plain I should first show my readiness
to
do as much for him in a like case.
Socrates. Why, it seems you are an
adept
after all in all the philtres known
to man,
only you chose to conceal your knowledge
all the while; or is it that you shrink
from
taking the first step because of the
scandal
you will cause by kindly advances to
your
brother? And yet it is commonly held
to redound
to a man's praise to have outstripped
an
enemy in mischief or a friend in kindness.
Now if it seemed to me that Chaerephon
were
better fitted to lead the way towards
this
friendship,[5] I should have tried
to persuade
him to take the first step in winning
your
affection, but now I am persuaded the
first
move belongs to you, and to you the
final
victory.
Chaerephon. A startling announcement,
Socrates,
from your lips, and most unlike you,
to bid
me the younger take precedence of my
elder
brother. Why, it is contrary to the
universal
custom of mankind, who look to the
elder
to take the lead in everything, whether
as
a speaker or an actor.
Socrates. How so? Is it not the custom
everywhere
for the younger to step aside when
he meets
his elder in the street and to give
him place?
Is he not expected to get up and offer
him
his seat, to pay him the honour of
a soft
couch,[6] to yield him precedence in
argument?
My good fellow, do not stand shilly-shallying,[7]
but put out your hand caressingly,
and you
will see the worthy soul will respond
at
once with alacrity. Do you not note
your
brother's character, proud and frank
and
sensitive to honour? He is not a mean
and
sorry rascal to be caught by a bribe--no
better way indeed for such riff-raff.
No!
gentle natures need a finer treatment.
You
can best hope to work on them by affection.
Chaerephon. But suppose I do, and suppose
that, for all my attempts, he shows
no change
for the better?
Socrates. At the worst you will have
shown
yourself to be a good, honest, brotherly
man, and he will appear as a sorry
creature
on whom kindness is wasted. But nothing
of
the sort is going to happen, as I conjecture.
My belief is that as soon as he hears
your
challenge, he will embrace the contest;
pricked
on by emulous pride, he will insist
upon
getting the better of you in kindness
of
word and deed.
At present you two are in the condition
of
two hands formed by God to help each
other,
but which have let go their business
and
have turned to hindering one another
all
they can. You are a pair of feet fashioned
on the Divine plan to work together,
but
which have neglected this in order
to trammel
each other's gait. Now is it not insensate
stupidity[8] to use for injury what
was meant
for advantage? And yet in fashioning
two
brothers God intends them, methinks,
to be
of more benefit to one another than
either
two hands, or two feet, or two eyes,
or any
other of those pairs which belong to
man
from his birth.[9] Consider how powerless
these hands of ours if called upon
to combine
their action at two points more than
a single
fathom's length apart;[10] and these
feet
could not stretch asunder[11] even
a bare
fathom; and these eyes, for all the
wide-reaching
range we claim for them, are incapable
of
seeing simultaneously the back and
front
of an object at even closer quarters.
But
a pair of brothers, linked in bonds
of amity,
can work each for the other's good,
though
seas divide them.[12]
[1] Cf. "Merchant of Venice,"
II.
viii. 17: "Justice! the law! my
ducats,
and my daughter!"
[2] Or, "a yearning after their
foster-brothers
manifests itself in animals."
See "Cyrop."
VIII. vii. 14 foll. for a parallel
to this
discussion.
[3] Lit. "and is less liable to
hostility."
[4] "When he next does sacrifice";
see "Hiero," viii. 3. Cf.
Theophr.
"Char." xv. 2, and Prof.
Jebb's
note ad loc.
[5] Reading {pros ten philian}, or
if {phusin},
transl. "natural disposition."
[6] Lit. "with a soft bed,"
or,
as we say, "the best bedroom."
[7] Or, "have no fears, essay
a soothing
treatment."
[8] "Boorishness verging upon
monomania."
[9] "With which man is endowed
at birth."
[10] "More than an 'arms'-stretch'
asunder."
[11] Lit. "reach at one stretch
two
objects, even over that small distance."
[12] "Though leagues separate
them."
Book II IV
I have at another time heard him discourse
on the kindred theme of friendship
in language
well calculated, as it seemed to me,
to help
a man to choose and also to use his
friends
aright.
He (Socrates) had often heard the remark
made that of all possessions there
is none
equal to that of a good and sincere
friend;
but, in spite of this assertion, the
mass
of people, as far as he could see,
concerned
themselves about nothing so little
as the
acquisition of friends. Houses, and
fields,
and slaves, and cattle, and furniture
of
all sorts (he said) they were at pains
to
acquire, and they strove hard to keep
what
they had got; but to procure for themselves
this greatest of all blessings, as
they admitted
a friend to be, or to keep the friends
whom
they already possessed, not one man
in a
hundred ever gave himself a thought.
It was
noticeable, in the case of a sickness
befalling
a man's friend and one of his own household
simultaneously, the promptness with
which
the master would fetch the doctor to
his
domestic, and take every precaution
necessary
for his recovery, with much expenditure
of
pains; but meanwhile little account
would
be taken of the friend in like condition,
and if both should die, he will show
signs
of deep annoyance at the death of his
domestic,
which, as he reflects, is a positive
loss
to him; but as regards his friend his
position
is in no wise materially affected,
and thus,
though he would never dream of leaving
his
other possessions disregarded and ill
cared
for, friendship's mute appeal is met
with
flat indifference.[1]
Or to take (said he) a crowning instance:[2]
with regard to ordinary possessions,
however
multifarious these may be, most people
are
at least acquainted with their number,
but
if you ask a man to enumerate his friends,
who are not so very many after all
perhaps,
he cannot; or if, to oblige the inquirer,
he essays to make a list, he will presently
retract the names of some whom he had
previously
included.[3] Such is the amount of
thought
which people bestow upon their friends.
And yet what thing else may a man call
his
own is comparable to this one best
possession!
what rather will not serve by contrast
to
enhance the value of an honest friend!
Think
of a horse or a yoke of oxen; they
have their
worth; but who shall gauge the worth
of a
worthy friend? Kindlier and more constant
than the faithfullest of slaves-- this
is
that possession best named all-serviceable.[4]
Consider what the post is that he assigns
himself! to meet and supplement what
is lacking
to the welfare of his friends, to promote
their private and their public interests,
is his concern. Is there need of kindly
action
in any quarter? he will throw in the
full
weight of his support. Does some terror
confound?
he is at hand to help and defend by
expenditure
of money and of energy,[5] by appeals
to
reason or resort to force. His the
privilege
alike to gladden the prosperous in
the hour
of success and to sustain their footing
who
have well-nigh slipped. All that the
hands
of a man may minister, all that the
eyes
of each are swift to see, the ears
to hear,
and the feet to compass, he with his
helpful
arts will not fall short of. Nay, not
seldom
that which a man has failed to accomplish
for himself, has missed seeing or hearing
or attaining, a friend acting in behalf
of
friend will achieve vicariously. And
yet,
albeit to try and tend a tree for the
sake
of its fruit is not uncommon, this
copious
mine of wealth--this friend-- attracts
only
a lazy and listless attention on the
part
of more than half the world.
[1] Or, "the cry of a friend for
careful
tending falls on deaf ears."
[2] Or, "Nor had he failed to
observe
another striking contrast." Cf.
Cic.
"Lael." 17; Diog. Laert.
ii. 30.
[3] i. e. "like a chess-player
recalling
a move."
[4] "A vessel fit for all work
indeed
is this friend." Cf. Ar. "Ach."
936, {pagkhreston aggos estai}, like
the
"leather bottel."
[5] Or, "by dint of his diplomacy."
Book II V
I remember listening to another argument
of his, the effect of which would be
to promote
self-examination. The listener must
needs
be brought to ask himself, "Of
what
worth am I to my friends?" It
happened
thus. One of those who were with him
was
neglectful, as he noted, of a friend
who
was at the pinch of poverty (Antisthenes).[1]
Accordingly, in the presence of the
negligent
person and of several others, he proceeded
to question the sufferer.
Socrates. What say you, Antisthenes?--have
friends their values like domestic
slaves?
One of these latter may be worth perhaps
two minae,[2] another only half a mina,
a
third five, and a fourth as much as
ten;
while they do say that Nicias,[3] the
son
of Niceratus, paid a whole talent for
a superintendent
of his silver mines. And so I propound
the
question to myself as follows: "Have
friends, like slaves, their market
values?"
Not a doubt of it (replied Antisthenes).
At any rate, I know that I would rather
have
such a one as my friend than be paid
two
minae, and there is such another whose
worth
I would not estimate at half a mina,
and
a third with whom I would not part
for ten,
and then again a fourth whose friendship
would be cheap if it cost me all the
wealth
and pains in the world to purchase
it.
Well then (continued Socrates), if
that be
so, would it not be well if every one
were
to examine himself: "What after
all
may I chance to be worth to my friends?"
Should he not try to become as dear
as possible,
so that his friends will not care to
give
him up? How often do I hear the complaint:
"My friend So-and-so has given
me up";
or "Such an one, whom I looked
upon
as a friend, has sacrificed me for
a mina."
And every time I hear these remarks,
the
question arises in my mind: If the
vendor
of a worthless slave is ready to part
with
him to a purchaser for what he will
fetch--is
there not at least a strong temptation
to
part with a base friend when you have
a chance
of making something on the exchange?
Good
slaves, as far as I can see, are not
so knocked
down to the hammer; no, nor good friends
so lightly parted with.
[1] Antisthenes, "cynicorum et
stoicorum
parens." Cic. "de Or."
iii.
17; "ad Att." xii. 38. See
below,
III. iii. 17; "Symp." passim;
Diog.
Laert. II. v.; VI. i.
[2] A mina = L4 circ.
[3] For Nicias see Thuc. vii. 77 foll.;
"Revenues,"
iv. 14; Plut. "Nic." IV.
v.; Lys.
"de bon. Aristoph." 648.
Book II VI
Again, in reference to the test to
be applied,
if we would gauge the qualifications
of a
friend worth the winning, the following
remarks
of Socrates could not fail, I think,
to prove
instructive.[1]
Tell me (said Socrates, addressing
Critobulus),
supposing we stood in need of a good
friend,
how should we set about his discovery?
We
must, in the first place, I suppose,
seek
out one who is master of his appetites,
not
under the dominion, that is, of his
belly,
not addicted to the wine-cup or to
lechery
or sleep or idleness, since no one
enslaved
to such tyrants could hope to do his
duty
either by himself or by his friends,
could
he?
Certainly not (Critobulus answered).
Socrates. Do you agree, then, that
we must
hold aloof from every one so dominated?
Critobulus. Most assuredly.
Well then (proceeded Socrates), what
shall
we say of the spendthrift who has lost
his
independence and is for ever begging
of his
neighbours; if he gets anything out
of them
he cannot repay, but if he fails to
get anything,
he hates you for not giving--do you
not think
that this man too would prove but a
disagreeable
friend?
Critobulus. Certainly.
Socrates. Then we must keep away from
him
too?
Critobulus. That we must.
Socrates. Well! and what of the man
whose
strength lies in monetary transactions?[2]
His one craving is to amass money;
and for
that reason he is an adept at driving
a hard
bargain[3]--glad enough to take in,
but loath
to pay out.
Critobulus. In my opinion he will prove
even
a worse fellow than the last.
Socrates. Well! and what of that other
whose
passion for money-making is so absorbing
that he has no leisure for anything
else,
save how he may add to his gains?
Critobulus. Hold aloof from him, say
I, since
there is no good to be got out of him
or
his society.
Socrates. Well! what of the quarrelsome
and
factious person[4] whose main object
is to
saddle his friends with a host of enemies?
Critobulus. For God's sake let us avoid
him
also.
Socrates. But now we will imagine a
man exempt
indeed from all the above defects--a
man
who has no objection to receive kindnesses,
but it never enters into his head to
do a
kindness in return.
Critobulus. There will be no good in
him
either. But, Socrates, what kind of
man shall
we endeavour to make our friend? what
is
he like?
Socrates. I should say he must be just
the
converse of the above: he has control
over
the pleasures of the body, he is kindly
disposed,[5]
upright in all his dealings,[6] very
zealous
is he not to be outdone in kindness
by his
benefactors, if only his friends may
derive
some profit from his acquaintance.
Critobulus. But how are we to test
these
qualities, Socrates, before acquaintance?
Socrates. How do we test the merits
of a
sculptor?--not by inferences drawn
from the
talk of the artist merely. No, we look
to
what he has already achieved. These
former
statues of his were nobly executed,
and we
trust he will do equally well with
the rest.
Critobulus. You mean that if we find
a man
whose kindness to older friends is
established,
we may take it as proved that he will
treat
his newer friends as amiably?
Socrates. Why, certainly, if I see
a man
who has shown skill in the handling
of horses
previously, I argue that he will handle
others
no less skilfully again.
Critobulus. Good! and when we have
discovered
a man whose friendship is worth having,
how
ought we to make him our friend?
Socrates. First we ought to ascertain
the
will of Heaven whether it be advisable
to
make him our friend.
Critobulus. Well! and how are we to
effect
the capture of this friend of our choice,
whom the gods approve? will you tell
me that?
Not, in good sooth (replied Socrates),
by
running him down like a hare, nor by
decoying
him like a bird, or by force like a
wild
boar.[7] To capture a friend against
his
will is a toilsome business, and to
bind
him in fetters like a slave by no means
easy.
Those who are so treated are apt to
become
foes instead of friends.[8]
Critobulus. But how convert them into
friends?
Socrates. There are certain incantations,
we are told, which those who know them
have
only to utter, and they can make friends
of whom they list; and there are certain
philtres also which those who have
the secret
of them may administer to whom they
like
and win their love.
Critobulus. From what source shall
we learn
them?
Socrates. You need not go farther than
Homer
to learn that which the Sirens sang
to Odysseus,[9]
the first words of which run, I think,
as
follows:
Hither, come hither, thou famous man,
Odysseus,
great glory of the Achaeans!
Critobulus. And did the magic words
of this
spell serve for all men alike? Had
the Sirens
only to utter this one incantation,
and was
every listener constrained to stay?
Socrates. No; this was the incantation
reserved
for souls athirst for fame, of virtue
emulous.
Critobulus. Which is as much as to
say, we
must suit the incantation to the listener,
so that when he hears the words he
shall
not think that the enchanter is laughing
at him in his sleeve. I cannot certainly
conceive a method better calculated
to excite
hatred and repulsion than to go to
some one
who knows that he is small and ugly
and a
weakling, and to breathe in his ears
the
flattering tale that he is beautiful
and
tall and stalwart. But do you know
any other
love- charms, Socrates?
Socrates. I cannot say that I do; but
I have
heard that Pericles[10] was skilled
in not
a few, which he poured into the ear
of our
city and won her love.
Critobulus. And how did Themistocles[11]
win our city's love?
Socrates. Ah, that was not by incantation
at all. What he did was to encircle
our city
with an amulet of saving virtue.[12]
Critobulus. You would imply, Socrates,
would
you not, that if we want to win the
love
of any good man we need to be good
ourselves
in speech and action?
And did you imagine (replied Socrates)
that
it was possible for a bad man to make
good
friends?
Critobulus. Why, I could fancy I had
seen
some sorry speech-monger who was fast
friends
with a great and noble statesman; or
again,
some born commander and general who
was boon
companion with fellows quite incapable
of
generalship.[13]
Socrates. But in reference to the point
we
were discussing, may I ask whether
you know
of any one who can attach a useful
friend
to himself without being of use in
return?[14]
Can service ally in friendship with
disservice?
Critobulus. In good sooth no. But now,
granted
it is impossible for a base man to
be friends
with the beautiful and noble,[15] I
am concerned
at once to discover if one who is himself
of a beautiful and noble character
can, with
a wave of the hand, as it were, attach
himself
in friendship to every other beautiful
and
noble nature.
Socrates. What perplexes and confounds
you,
Critobulus, is the fact that so often
men
of noble conduct, with souls aloof
from baseness,
are not friends but rather at strife
and
discord with one another, and deal
more harshly
by one another than they would by the
most
good-for- nothing of mankind.
Critobulus. Yes, and this holds true
not
of private persons only, but states,
the
most eager to pursue a noble policy
and to
repudiate a base one, are frequently
in hostile
relation to one another. As I reason
on these
things my heart fails me, and the question,
how friends are to be acquired, fills
me
with despondency. The bad, as I see,
cannot
be friends with one another. For how
can
such people, the ungrateful, or reckless,
or covetous, or faithless, or incontinent,
adhere together as friends? Without
hesitation
I set down the bad as born to be foes
not
friends, and as bearing the birthmark
of
internecine hate. But then again, as
you
suggest, no more can these same people
harmonise
in friendship with the good. For how
should
they who do evil be friends with those
who
hate all evil-doing? And if, last of
all,
they that cultivate virtue are torn
by party
strife in their struggle for the headship
of the states, envying one another,
hating
one another, who are left to be friends?
where shall goodwill and faithfulness
be
found among men?
Socrates. The fact is there is some
subtlety
in the texture of these things.[15]
Seeds
of love are implanted in man by nature.
Men
have need of one another, feel pity,
help
each other by united efforts, and in
recognition
of the fact show mutual gratitude.
But there
are seeds of war implanted also. The
same
objects being regarded as beautiful
or agreeable
by all alike, they do battle for their
possession;
a spirit of disunion[16] enters, and
the
parties range themselves in adverse
camps.
Discord and anger sound a note of war:
the
passion of more- having, staunchless
avarice,
threatens hostility; and envy is a
hateful
fiend.[17]
But nevertheless, through all opposing
barriers
friendship steals her way and binds
together
the beautiful and good among mankind.[18]
Such is their virtue that they would
rather
possess scant means painlessly than
wield
an empire won by war. In spite of hunger
and thirst they will share their meat
and
drink without a pang. Not bloom of
lusty
youth, nor love's delights can warp
their
self-control; nor will they be tempted
to
cause pain where pain should be unknown.
It is theirs not merely to eschew all
greed
of riches, not merely to make a just
and
lawful distribution of wealth, but
to supply
what is lacking to the needs of one
another.
Theirs it is to compose strife and
discord
not in painless oblivion simply, but
to the
general advantage. Theirs also to hinder
such extravagance of anger as shall
entail
remorse hereafter. And as to envy they
will
make a clean sweep and clearance of
it: the
good things which a man possesses shall
be
also the property of his friends, and
the
goods which they possess are to be
looked
upon as his. Where then is the improbability
that the beautiful and noble should
be sharers
in the honours[19] of the state not
only
without injury, but even to their mutual
advantage?
They indeed who covet and desire the
honours
and offices in a state for the sake
of the
liberty thereby given them to embezzle
the
public moneys, to deal violently by
their
fellow-creatures, and to batten in
luxury
themselves, may well be regarded as
unjust
and villainous persons incapable of
harmony
with one another. But if a man desire
to
obtain these selfsame honours in order
that,
being himself secure against wrong-doing,
he may be able to assist his friends
in what
is right, and, raised to a high position,[20]
may essay to confer some blessing on
the
land of his fathers, what is there
to hinder
him from working in harmony with some
other
of a like spirit? Will he, with the
"beautiful
and noble" at his side, be less
able
to aid his friends? or will his power
to
benfit the community be shortened because
the flower of that community are fellow-workers
in that work? Why, even in the contests
of
the games it is obvious that if it
were possible
for the stoutest combatants to combine
against
the weakest, the chosen band would
come off
victors in every bout, and would carry
off
all the prizes. This indeed is against
the
rules of the actual arena; but in the
field
of politics, where the beautiful and
good
hold empery, and there is nought to
hinder
any from combining with whomsoever
a man
may choose to benefit the state, it
will
be a clear gain, will it not, for any
one
engaged in state affairs to make the
best
men his friends, whereby he will find
partners
and co-operators in his aims instead
of rivals
and antagonists? And this at least
is obvious:
in case of foreign war a man will need
allies,
but all the more if in the ranks opposed
to him should stand the flower of the
enemy.[21]
Moreover, those who are willing to
fight
your battles must be kindly dealt with,
that
goodwill may quicken to enthusiasm;
and one
good man[22] is better worth your benefiting
that a dozen knaves, since a little
kindness
goes a long way with the good, but
with the
base the more you give them the more
they
ask for.
So keep a good heart, Critobulus; only
try
to become good yourself, and when you
have
attained, set to your hand to capture
the
beautiful and good. Perhaps I may be
able
to give you some help in this quest,
being
myself an adept in Love's lore.[23]
No matter
who it is for whom my heart is aflame;
in
an instant my whole soul is eager to
leap
forth. With vehemence I speed to the
mark.
I, who love, demand to be loved again;
this
desire in me must be met by counter
desire
in him; this thirst for his society
by thirst
reciprocal for mine. And these will
be your
needs also, I foresee, whenever you
are seized
with longing to contract a friendship.
Do
not hide from me, therefore, whom you
would
choose as a friend, since, owing to
the pains
I take to please him who pleases me,
I am
not altogether unversed, I fancy, in
the
art of catching men.[24]
Critobulus replied: Why, these are
the very
lessons of instruction, Socrates, for
which
I have been long athirst, and the more
particularly
if this same love's lore will enable
me to
capture those who are good of soul
and those
who are beautiful of person.
Socrates. Nay, now I warn you, Critobulus,
it is not within the province of my
science
to make the beautiful endure him who
would
lay hands upon them. And that is why
men
fled from Scylla, I am persuaded, because
she laid hands upon them; but the Sirens
were different--they laid hands on
nobody,
but sat afar off and chanted their
spells
in the ears of all; and therefore,
it is
said, all men endured to listen, and
were
charmed.
Critobulus. I promise I will not lay
violent
hands on any; therefore, if you have
any
good device for winning friends, instruct
your pupil.
Socrates. And if there is to be no
laying
on of the hands, there must be no application
either of the lips; is it agreed?
Critobulus. No, nor application of
the lips
to any one--not beautiful.
Socrates. See now! you cannot open
your mouth
without some luckless utterence. Beauty
suffers
no such liberty, however eagerly the
ugly
may invite it, making believe some
quality
of soul must rank them with the beautiful.
Critobulus. Be of good cheer then;
let the
compact stand thus: "Kisses for
the
beautiful, and for the good a rain
of kisses."
So now teach us the art of catching
friends.
Socrates. Well then, when you wish
to win
some one's affection, you will allow
me to
lodge information against you to the
effect
that you admire him and desire to be
his
friend?
Critobulus. Lodge the indictment, with
all
my heart. I never heard of any one
who hated
his admirers.
Socrates. And if I add to the indictment
the further charge that through your
admiration
you are kindly disposed towards him,
you
will not feel I am taking away your
character?
Critobulus. Why, no; for myself I know
a
kindly feeling springs up in my heart
towards
any one whom I conceive to be kindly
disposed
to me.
Socrates. All this I shall feel empowered
to say about you to those whose friendship
you seek, and I can promise further
help;
only there is a comprehensive "if"
to be considered: if you will further
authorise
me to say that you are devoted to your
friends;
that nothing gives you so much joy
as a good
friend; that you pride yourself no
less on
the fine deeds of those you love than
on
your own; and on their good things
equally
with your own; that you never weary
of plotting
and planning to procure them a rich
harvest
of the same; and lastly, that you have
discovered
a man's virtue is to excel his friends
in
kindness and his foes in hostility.
If I
am authorised thus to report of you,
I think
you will find me a serviceable fellow-hunter
in the quest of friends, which is the
conquest
of the good.
Critobulus. Why this appeal to me?--as
if
you had not free permission to say
exactly
what you like about me.
Socrates. No; that I deny, on the authority
of Aspasia.[25] I have it from her
own lips.
"Good matchmakers," she said
tome,
"were clever hands at cementing
alliances
between people, provided the good qualities
they vouched for were truthfully reported;
but when it came to their telling lies,
for
her part she could not compliment them.[26]
Their poor deluded dupes ended by hating
each other and the go-betweens as well."
Now I myself am so fully persuaded
of the
truth of this that I feel it is not
in my
power to say aught in your praise which
I
cannot say with truth.
Critobulus. Really, Socrates, you are
a wonderfully
good friend to me--in so far as I have
any
merit which will entitle me to win
a friend,
you will lend me a helping hand, it
seems;
otherwise you would rather not forge
any
petty fiction for my benefit.
Socrates. But tell me, how shall I
assist
you best, think you? By praising you
falsely
or by persuading you to try to be a
good
man? Or if it is not plain to you thus,
look
at the matter by the light of some
examples.
I wish to introduce you to a shipowner,
or
to make him your friend: I begin by
singing
your praises to him falsely thus, "You
will find him a good pilot"; he
catches
at the phrase, and entrusts his ship
to you,
who have no notion of guiding a vessel.
What
can you expect but to make shipwreck
of the
craft and yourself together? or suppose
by
similar false assertions I can persuade
the
state at large to entrust her destinies
to
you--"a man with a fine genius
for command,"
I say, "a practised lawyer,"
"a
politician born," and so forth.
The
odds are, the state and you may come
to grief
through you. Or to take an instance
from
everyday life. By my falsehoods I persuade
some private person to entrust his
affairs
to you as "a really careful and
business-like
person with a head for economy."
When
put to the test would not your administration
prove ruinous, and the figure you cut
ridiculous?
No, my dear friend, there is but one
road,
the shortest, safest, best, and it
is simply
this: In whatsoever you desire to be
deemed
good, endeavour to be good. For of
all the
virtues namable among men, consider,
and
you will find there is not one but
may be
increased by learning and practice.
For my
part then, Critobulus, these are the
principles
on which we ought to go a- hunting;
but if
you take a different view, I am all
attention,
please instruct me.
Then Critobulus: Nay, Socrates, I should
be ashamed to gainsay what you have
said;
if I did, it would neither be a noble
statement
nor a true.[27]
[1] Or, "Again, as to establishing
a
test of character, since a friend worth
having
must be of a particular type, I cannot
but
think that the following remarks would
prove
instructive."
[2] Or, "the money-lender? He
has a
passion for big money-bags."
[3] Or, "hard in all his dealings."
[4] "The partisan."
[5] Reading {eunous}, or if {euorkos},
transl.
"a man of his word."
[6] Or, "easy to deal with."
[7] Reading {kaproi}, al. {ekhthroi},
"an
enemy."
[8] Or, "Hate rather than friendship
is the outcome of these methods."
[9] "Od." xii. 184.
[10] See above, I. ii. 40; "Symp."
viii. 39.
[11] See below, III. vi. 2; IV. ii.
2.
[12] See Herod. vii. 143, "the
wooden
wall"; Thuc. i. 93, "'the
walls'
of Athens."
[13] Or, "Why, yes, when I see
some
base orator fast friends with a great
leader
of the people; or, again, some fellow
incapable
of generalship a comrade to the greatest
captains of his age."
[14] Add, "Can service ally in
friendship
with disservice? Must there not be
a reciprocity
of service to make friendship lasting?"
[15] {kalous kagathous}.
[15] i. e. a cunning intertwining of
the
threads of warp and woof.
[16] Cf. Shelley, "The devil of
disunion
in their souls."
[17] The diction is poetical.
[18] Or, as we say, "the elite
of human
kind."
[19] "And the offices."
[20] "As archon," or "raised
to rule."
[21] Lit. "the beautiful and good."
[22] Or, "the best, though few,
are
better worth your benefiting than the
many
base."
[23] "An authority in matters
of love."
Cf. Plat. "Symp." 177 D;
Xen. "Symp."
viii. 2.
[24] See below, III. xi. 7; cf. Plat.
"Soph."
222; N. T. Matt. iv. 19, {alieis anthropon}.
[25] Aspasia, daughter of Axiochus,
of Miletus.
See "Econ." iii. 14; Plat.
"Menex."
235 E; Aesch. Socrat. ap. Cic. "de
Invent."
I. xxxi. 51. See Grote, "H. G."
vi. 132 foll.; Cobet, "Pros. Xen."
[26] Reading {ouk ethelein epainein},
or
if {ouk ophelein epainousas} with Kuhner
transl. "Good matchmakers, she
told
me, have to consult truth when reporting
favourably of any one: then indeed
they are
terribly clever at bringing people
together:
whereas false flatterers do no good;
their
dupes," etc.
[27] {kala . . . alethe}.
Book II VII
He had two ways of dealing with the
difficulties
of his friends: where ignorance was
the cause,
he tried to meet the trouble by a dose
of
common sense; or where want and poverty
were
to blame, by lessoning them that they
should
assist one another according to their
ability;
and here I may mention certain incidents
which occurred within my own knowledge.
How,
for instance, he chanced upon Aristarchus
wearing the look of one who suffered
from
a fit of the "sullens," and
thus
accosted him.
Socrates. You seem to have some trouble
on
your mind, Aristarchus; if so, you
should
share it with your friends. Perhaps
together
we might lighten the weight of it a
little.
Aristarchus answered: Yes, Socrates,
I am
in sore straits indeed. Ever since
the party
strife declared itself in the city,[1]
what
with the rush of people to Piraeus,
and the
wholesale banishments, I have been
fairly
at the mercy of my poor deserted female
relatives.
Sisters, nieces, cousins, they have
all come
flocking to me for protection. I have
fourteen
free-born souls, I tell you, under
my single
roof, and how are we to live? We can
get
nothing out of the soil--that is in
the hands
of the enemy; nothing from my house
property,
for there is scarcely a living soul
left
in the city; my furniture? no one will
buy
it; money? there is none to be borrowed--you
would have a better chance to find
it by
looking for it on the road than to
borrow
it from a banker. Yes, Socrates, to
stand
by and see one's relatives die of hunger
is hard indeed, and yet to feed so
many at
such a pinch impossible.
After he listened to the story, Socrates
asked: How comes it that Ceramon,[2]
with
so many mouths to feed, not only contrives
to furnish himself and them with the
necessaries
of life, but to realise a handsome
surplus,
whilst you being in like plight[3]
are afraid
you will one and all perish of starvation
for want of the necessaries of life?
Aristodemus. Why, bless your soul,
do you
not see he has only slaves and I have
free-born
souls to feed?
Socrates. And which should you say
were the
better human beings, the free- born
members
of your household or Ceramon's slaves?
Aristodemus. The free souls under my
roof
without a doubt.
Socrates. Is it not a shame, then,
that he
with his baser folk to back him should
be
in easy circumstances, while you and
your
far superior household are in difficulties?
Aristodemus. To be sure it is, when
he has
only a set of handicraftsmen to feed,
and
I my liberally-educated household.
Socrates. What is a handicraftsman?
Does
not the term apply to all who can make
any
sort of useful product or commodity?
Aristodemus. Certainly.
Socrates. Barley meal is a useful product,
is it not?
Aristodemus. Pre-eminently so.
Socrates. And loaves of bread?
Aristodemus. No less.
Socrates. Well, and what do you say
to cloaks
for men and for women-- tunics, mantles,
vests?[4]
Aristodemus. Yes, they are all highly
useful
commodities.
Socrates. Then your household do not
know
how to make any of these?
Aristodemus. On the contrary, I believe
they
can make them all.
Socrates. Then you are not aware that
by
means of the manufacture of one of
these
alone--his barley meal store--Nausicydes[5]
not only maintains himself and his
domestics,
but many pigs and cattle besides, and
realises
such large profits that he frequently
contributes
to the state benevolences;[6] while
there
is Cyrebus, again, who, out of a bread
factory,
more than maintains the whole of his
establishment,
and lives in the lap of luxury; and
Demeas
of Collytus gets a livelihood out of
a cloak
business, and Menon as a mantua-maker,
and
so, again, more than half the Megarians[7]
by the making of vests.
Aristodemus. Bless me, yes! They have
got
a set of barbarian fellows, whom they
purchase
and keep, to manufacture by forced
labour
whatever takes their fancy. My kinswomen,
I need not tell you, are free-born
ladies.
Socrates. Then, on the ground that
they are
free-born and your kinswomen, you think
that
they ought to do nothing but eat and
sleep?
Or is it your opinion that people who
live
in this way--I speak of free-born people
in general--lead happier lives, and
are more
to be congratulated, than those who
give
their time and attention to such useful
arts
of life as they are skilled in? Is
this what
you see in the world, that for the
purpose
of learning what it is well to know,
and
of recollecting the lessons taught,
or with
a view to health and strength of body,
or
for the sake of acquiring and preserving
all that gives life its charm, idleness
and
inattention are found to be helpful,
whilst
work and study are simply a dead loss?
Pray,
when those relatives of yours were
taught
what you tell me they know, did they
learn
it as barren information which they
would
never turn to practical account, or,
on the
contrary, as something with which they
were
to be seriously concerned some day,
and from
which they were to reap advantage?
Do human
beings in general attain to well-tempered
manhood by a course of idling, or by
carefully
attending to what will be of use? Which
will
help a man the more to grow in justice
and
uprightness, to be up and doing, or
to sit
with folded hands revolving the ways
and
means of existence? As things now stand,
if I am not mistaken, there is no love
lost
between you. You cannot help feeling
that
they are costly to you, and they must
see
that you find them a burthen? This
is a perilous
state of affairs, in which hatred and
bitterness
have every prospect of increasing,
whilst
the pre-existing bond of affection[8]
is
likely to be snapped.
But now, if only you allow them free
scope
for their energies, when you come to
see
how useful they can be, you will grow
quite
fond of them, and they, when they perceive
that they can please you, will cling
to their
benefactor warmly. Thus, with the memory
of former kindnesses made sweeter,
you will
increase the grace which flows from
kindnesses
tenfold; you will in consequence be
knit
in closer bonds of love and domesticity.
If, indeed, they were called upon to
do any
shameful work, let them choose death
rather
than that; but now they know, it would
seem,
the very arts and accomplishments which
are
regarded as the loveliest and the most
suitable
for women; and the things which we
know,
any of us, are just those which we
can best
perform, that is to say, with ease
and expedition;
it is a joy to do them, and the result
is
beautiful.[9] Do not hesitate, then,
to initiate
your friends in what will bring advantage
to them and you alike; probably they
will
gladly respond to your summons.
Well, upon my word (Aristarchus answered),
I like so well what you say, Socrates,
that
though hitherto I have not been disposed
to borrow, knowing that when I had
spent
what I got I should not be in a condition
to repay, I think I can now bring myself
to do so in order to raise a fund for
these
works.
Thereupon a capital was provided; wools
were
purchased; the good man's relatives
set to
work, and even whilst they breakfasted
they
worked, and on and on till work was
ended
and they supped. Smiles took the place
of
frowns; they no longer looked askance
with
suspicion, but full into each other's
eyes
with happiness. They loved their kinsman
for his kindness to them. He became
attached
to them as helpmates; and the end of
it all
was, he came to Socrates and told him
with
delight how matters fared; "and
now,"
he added, "they tax me with being
the
only drone in the house, who sit and
eat
the bread of idleness."
To which Socrates: Why do not you tell
them
the fable of the dog?[10] Once on a
time,
so goes the story, when beasts could
speak,
the sheep said to her master, "What
a marvel is this, master, that to us,
your
own sheep, who provide you with fleeces
and
lambs and cheese, you give nothing,
save
only what we may nibble off earth's
bosom;
but with this dog of yours, who provides
you with nothing of the sort, you share
the
very meat out of your mouth."
When the
dog heard these words, he answered
promptly,
"Ay, in good sooth, for is it
not I
who keep you safe and sound, you sheep,
so
that you are not stolen by man nor
harried
by wolves; since, if I did not keep
watch
over you, you would not be able so
much as
to graze afield, fearing to be destroyed."
And so, says the tale, the sheep had
to admit
that the dog was rightly preferred
to themselves
in honour. And so do you tell your
flock
yonder that like the dog in the fable
you
are their guardian and overseer, and
it is
thanks to you that they are protected
from
evil and evildoers, so that they work
their
work and live their lives in blissful
security.
Book II VIII
At another time chancing upon an old
friend
whom he had not seen for a long while,
he
greeted him thus.
Socrates. What quarter of the world
do you
hail from, Eutherus?
The other answered: From abroad, just
before
the close of the war; but at present
from
the city itself.[1] You see, since
we have
been denuded of our possessions across
the
frontier,[2] and my father left me
nothing
in Attica, I must needs bide at home,
and
provide myself with the necessaries
of life
by means of bodily toil, which seems
preferable
to begging from another, especially
as I
have no security on which to raise
a loan.
Socrates. And how long do you expect
your
body to be equal to providing the necessaries
of life for hire?
Euthydemus. Goodness knows, Socrates--not
for long.
Socrates. And when you find yourself
an old
man, expenses will not diminish, and
yet
no one will care to pay you for the
labour
of your hands.
Euthydemus. That is true.
Socrates. Would it not be better then
to
apply yourself at once to such work
as will
stand you in good stead when you are
old--that
is, address yourself to some large
proprietor
who needs an assistant in managing
his estate?[3]
By superintending his works, helping
to get
in his crops, and guarding his property
in
general, you will be a benefit to the
estate
and be benefited in return.
I could not endure the yoke of slavery,
Socrates!
(he exclaimed).
Socrates. And yet the heads of departments
in a state are not regarded as adopting
the
badge of slavery because they manage
the
public property, but as having attained
a
higher degree of freedom rather.
Euthydemus. In a word, Socrates, the
idea
of being held to account to another
is not
at all to my taste.
Socrates. And yet, Eutherus, it would
be
hard to find a work which did not involve
some liability to account; in fact
it is
difficult to do anything without some
mistake
or other, and no less difficult, if
you should
succeed in doing it immaculately, to
escape
all unfriendly criticism. I wonder
now whether
you find it easy to get through your
present
occupations entirely without reproach.
No?
Let me tell you what you should do.
You should
avoid censorious persons and attach
yourself
to the considerate and kind-hearted,
and
in all your affairs accept with a good
grace
what you can and decline what you feel
you
cannot do. Whatever it be, do it heart
and
soul, and make it your finest work.[4]
There
lies the method at once to silence
fault-finders
and to minister help to your own difficulties.
Life will flow smoothly, risks will
be diminished,
provision against old age secured.
[1] Lit. "from here." The
conversation
perhaps takes place in Piraeus 404
B. C.
[2] Or, "colonial possession."
Cf. "Symp." iv. 31.
[3] Cf. "Cyrop." VIII. iii.
48.
[4] Or, "study to make it your
finest
work, the expression of a real enthusiasm."
Book II IX
At another time, as I am aware, he
had heard
a remark made by Crito[1] that life
at Athens
was no easy matter for a man who wished
to
mind his own affairs.
As, for instance, at this moment (Crito
proceeded)
there are a set of fellows threatening
me
with lawsuits, not because they have
any
misdemeanour to allege against me,
but simply
under the conviction that I will sooner
pay
a sum of money than be troubled further.
To which Socrates replied: Tell me,
Crito,
you keep dogs, do you not, to ward
off wolves
from your flocks?
Crito. Certainly; it pays to do so.
Socrates. Then why do you not keep
a watchman
willing and competent to ward off this
pack
of people who seek to injure you?
I should not at all mind (he answered),
if
I were not afraid he might turn again
and
rend his keeper.
What! (rejoined Socrates), do you not
see
that to gratify a man like yourself
is far
pleasanter as a matter of self-interest
than
to quarrel with you? You may be sure
there
are plenty of people here who will
take the
greatest pride in making you their
friend.
Accordingly, they sought out Archedemus,[2]
a practical man with a clever tongue
in his
head[3] but poor; the fact being, he
was
not the sort to make gain by hook or
by crook,
but a lover of honesty and of too good
a
nature himself to make his living as
a pettifogger.[4]
Crito would then take the opportunity
of
times of harvesting and put aside small
presents
for Achedemus of corn and oil, or wine,
or
wool, or any other of the farm produce
forming
the staple commodities of life, or
he would
invite him to a sacrificial feast,
and otherwise
pay him marked attention. Archedemus,
feeling
that he had in Crito's house a harbour
of
refuge, could not make too much of
his patron,
and ere long he had hunted up a long
list
of iniquities which could be lodged
against
Crito's pettifogging persecutors themselves,
and not only their numerous crimes
but their
numerous enemies; and presently he
prosecuted
one of them in a public suit, where
sentence
would be given against him "what
to
suffer or what to pay."[5] The
accused,
conscious as he was of many rascally
deeds,
did all he could to be quit of Archedemus,
but Archedemus was not to be got rid
of.
He held on until he had made the informer
not only loose his hold of Crito but
pay
himself a sum of money; and now that
Archedemus
had achieved this and other similar
victories,
it is easy to guess what followed.[6]
It
was just as when some shepherd has
got a
very good dog, all the other shepherds
wish
to lodge their flocks in his neighbourhood
that they too may reap the benefit
of him.
So a number of Crito's friends came
begging
him to allow Archedemus to be their
guardian
also, and Archedemus was overjoyed
to do
something to gratify Crito, and so
it came
about that not only Crito abode in
peace,
but his friends likewise. If any of
those
people with whom Archedemus was not
on the
best of terms were disposed to throw
it in
his teeth that he accepted his patron's
benefits
and paid in flatteries, he had a ready
retort:
"Answer me this question--which
is the
more scandalous, to accept kindnesses
from
honest folk and to repay them, with
the result
that I make such people my friends
but quarrel
with knaves, or to make enemies of
honourable
gentlemen[7] by attempts to do them
wrong,
with the off-chance indeed of winning
the
friendship of some scamps in return
for my
co-operation, but the certainty of
losing
in the tone of my acquaintances?"[8]
The net result of the whole proceedings
was
that Archedemus was now Crito's right
hand,[9]
and by the rest of Crito's friends
he was
held in honour.
[1] Crito. See above, I. ii. 48; Cobet,
"P.
X."; cf. Plat. "Rep."
viii.
549 C.
[2] Archedemus, possibly the demagogue,
"Hell."
I. vii. 2. So Cobet, "P. X.,"
but
see Grote, "H. G." viii.
245.
[3] Lit. "very capable of speech
and
action"--the writer's favourite
formula
for the well-trained Athenian who can
speak
fluently and reason clearly, and act
energetically
and opportunely.
[4] Reading {kai euphuesteros on} [or
{e
os}] . . . {apo sukophanton} [or {sukophantion}],
after Cobet, "P. X." s. v.
Archedemus.
The MSS. give {kai ephe raston einai}--"nothing
is easier," he said, "than
recovering
from sycophants."
[5] For this formula cf. "Econ."
vi. 24. Cf. Plat. "Statesm."
299
A.
[6] {ede tote}. Cf. Plat. "Laws,"
vi. 778 C.
[7] Lit. the {kaloi kagathoi}, which
like
{khrestous} and {ponerous} has a political
as well as an ethical meaning.
[8] Lit. "must associate with
these
(the {ponerois}) instead of those (the
{kalois
te kagathois}).
[9] He was No. 1--{eis}.
Book II X
Again I may cite, as known to myself,[1]
the following discussion; the arguments
were
addressed to Diodorus, one of his companions.
The master said:
Tell me, Diodorus, if one of your slaves
runs away, are you at pains to recover
him?
More than that (Diodorus answered),
I summon
others to my aid and I have a reward
cried
for his recovery.
Socrates. Well, if one of your domestics
is sick, do you tend him and call in
the
doctors to save his life?
Diodorus. Decidedly I do.
Socrates. And if an intimate acquaintance
who is far more precious to you than
any
of your household slaves is about to
perish
of want, you would think it incumbent
on
you to take pains to save his life?
Well!
now you know without my telling you
that
Hermogenes[2] is not made of wood or
stone.
If you helped him he would be ashamed
not
to pay you in kind. And yet--the opportunity
of possessing a willing, kindly, and
trusty
assistant well fitted to do your bidding,
and not merely that, but capable of
originating
useful ideas himself, with a certain
forecast
of mind and judgment--I say such a
man is
worth dozens of slaves. Good economists
tell
us that when a precious article may
be got
at a low price we ought to buy. And
nowadays
when times are so bad it is possible
to get
good friends exceedingly cheap.
Diodorus answered: You are quite right,
Socrates;
bid Hermogenes come to me.
Socrates. Bid Hermogenes come to you!--not
I indeed! since for aught I can understand
you are no better entitled to summon
him
that to go to him yourself, nor is
the advantage
more on his side than your own.
Thus Diodorus went off in a trice to
seek
Hermogenes, and at no great outlay
won to
himself a friend--a friend whose one
concern
it now was to discover how, by word
or deed,
he might help and gladden Diodorus.
[1] Or, "for which I can personally
vouch."
[2] Hermogenes, presumably the son
of Hipponicus.
See I. ii. 48. |