A problem I have been dealing with in Heidegger is that In BEING AND TIME, Heidegger takes a very radical view of dasein's authentic appropriation of tradition which, by necessity, completely takes it apart and puts it back together again as dasein actually knows it instead of the 'everyday' passive acceptance of a vague theme of what tradition is that never examines it rationally in detail or judge even if it fits together coherently. To speak literally, it would seem from an authentic point of view -- which is not a privileged point of view: it can be just as stupid or intelligent as inauthenticity: after all in the everyday world one must keep one's practical wits sharp -- tradition is a trash pile, and stays that way with the 'They' self. 'Everyday' tradition is something one nods to with respect but otherwise ignores because, except for politicians and preachers (the distinction between them is diminishing), it is useless and cumbersome. That is why we have so many 'Christians' that will convert you by hook or crook who have never read more than five or six whole pages of the Bible and otherwise only know snippets. In other words, 'everyday' tradition can be anything you want it to be and justify any act you wish to commit (i.e., a Texas Supreme Court judge and reborn Christian elected to office because he had the same name as a famous senator who had died recently was stopped by a policeman for a traffic violation, had the trunk of the car opened, found it loaded with guns and ammunition, and after questioning, found out he was on the way to kill a political rival). Heidegger after the rector speech seems to take on this 'They' self sense of tradition to a large extent - Instead of, "It is my tradition because I essentially put it together," it becomes a vague, random, popular 'feeling' that can be moulded any which way and, again, justify any act. To me it boils down to a plain question: Why did Heidegger need his fellow Germans so much? He had formulated a philosophy of almost solipsistic uniqueness in the concept of dasein (I call it the "solipsistic aporia", i.e., it is absurd I created the world because I find myself thrown into it unwillingly but, on the other hand, as an authentic dasein, my relation to it verges on the solipsistic). In BEING AND TIME he is more like Shankara achieving illumination and dropping the whole world as a "mere illusion". Then in 1933 everything changes. Am I wrong? Of course I am. Show me.