AIT represents a fundamental shift in the way we should think about the relation between that syntactic and logical structure of natural language, and links this to a specifically linguistic notion of ontological commitment. Its starting point is a fundamental re-analysis of the function of ‘BE,’ which, in all of its various conjugations never functions as a ‘verb of existence.’ Moreover, AIT has identified the that syntactic function which can account for the various semantic interpretations existence, identity, predication, or generic inclusion - usually placed upon it. The priorities of AIT are directed toward one particular aspect of language - the interpretation of the function of grammatical structure in relation to the stating of the existence of an entity in terms of the modes or states of its existence.

Almost half a century after Noam Chomsky began his seminal work on syntactic structure, the debate surrounding its philosophical implications shows no sign of abating. Certainly, both Jon Neivens and Jud Evans share the conviction that humans posses an inbuilt capacity for dealing with syntax. However, they take strong issue with Chomsky’s attempt to take this as evidence for a Cartesian Rationalism. And although Chomsky’s arguments in favour of a syntactic capacity are convincing, his various attempts to outline this in terms of algorithmic expressions are less so. In particular, the question of syntactic capacity has not, in any systematic fashion, approached the question of the particular cognitive constants that grammar serves to transform into the structure of a particular language.

For much of the century just passed, another area of intellectual dispute has been that between the ‘Analytic’ and ‘Existential’ philosophy, largely centred upon the influence of Martin Heidegger. Whilst AIT concedes that aspects of Heidegger’s thinking may be of some use to questions of epistemology, the very basis of the AIT approach represents a fundamental rejection of the notion of ‘Being’ upon which his phenomenological approach is founded. Whilst other philosophers, most notably Willard Quine, have examined the question of the ontological structure of language with far greater perspicuity, the fact remains that the role of the ‘be’ conjugation remains seriously under-examined, even where it looks to be fundamental to propositional structure.

Despite the fact that, in recent years, philosophers as diverse as Lakoff & Johnson, H.P. Grice, and Ruth Millikan, have, from their own perspectives, taken seriously the question of the structure of natural language, it seems that here, as also happens in linguistics, it is assumed that far more is known about the workings of the ‘be’ conjugation and its equivalents in other languages than is actually the case. And that's where we come in...