THE TRUTH -- For me a true statement is a correct description of the manner in which an entity or entities exist, or a correct description of the actual way, modality or manner in which an entity exists in relation to the way another entity or entities exist, subject to and depending upon, the statement being capable of being verified as to the perceived actuality of the entity or entities under observation. It is as simple and uncomplicated as that. But hist! Wait! Sorry - it is NOT as simple as that, for our human sensorial equipment is not sophisticated enough to render a pluperfect perception of the actual manner, mode or state in which the observed object exists. So what now? Go to the beginning of the opening paragraph above and delete any instances of the word *correct* in the document, and insert the words: *best fit* in their place.*

I recognise the importance of using abstractional mathematical signification in calculations, as long as they truly correspond to the way in which some [any] entitic [base proof-object of last resort] exists. Even the notion of 'time' to my way of thinking, is tied to the way objects exist. As far as motion is concerned, it can only be measured in relation to the motion or stasis of some other entity, whether that entity be the earth in its movement around the sun, sand or water dribbling through a small hole in a piece of glass, or the regular pulsing of an atomic particle.

      Truth, reality, time, motion, causality — in fact in the case of any one of Richard Sansom's eight elements of 'The Way The World is,' (TWTWI ) or Aristotle's categorical version] and my own 'existential octet,' entities of ultimate reduction are mapped in ALL existential categorisations as 'examples of last resort' [like the golden meter rod in the Louvre.] Without entities there wouldn't even be a 'null set' of TWTWI elements. That is not to say that I believe 'sets' exist either, but that 'sets' and 'time' and 'number', etc., provide important ways for our transient little species to understand TWTWI while we are still around to do so in this relentless and ever-changing cosmos of ours.

My own view regarding the matter of truth is that the human statement: 'correctness of statement,' is an abstract concept or idea not associated with any specific instance. Furthermore, it presupposes a Platonic form of 'correctness,' that is floating around somewhere waiting for somebody to apply it or incorporate it into a suitable statement.

In other words — the information provided by definer (A) about the world described by a truth statement claimed as correct, may well be rejected as erroneous by the definer

(B). The question is, does the rejection of a truth claim by (B) as defined by (A) which is claimed as embodying: 'correctness of statement' invalidate it — or does the very fact that it is defined by the Platonist definer as being a 'correct statement' ensure that the claim is indeed truthful? I think not.

On the other hand, in the case of an actual entity, [any entity] no statement of any sort whatsoever is required — indeed any statement [truth claim or otherwise] regarding its actuality is superfluous, redundant and tautologous, for all that is required is to draw somebody's attention to it so that it may be physically apprehended.

    In my opinion there is a subconscious duality embedded in language reinforced by habit — a cognitive split twixt lingual content or the mechanism of language  - the choice and arrangement of signs, and the denotatum or what is referred to by those signs. Humans have a tendency to confuse the actuality of the message with the subject of the message [confusing map with territory as Korzybski once said.]

     Sadly, 'statemental correctness,' or 'predicational veracity' is a semantic variable, and whilst some people claim correctness as residing in some statement, others would dispute the claim and counter with the opposite — that such and such a thing is incorrect. In the absence of some heavenly enthroned Plato acting as an arbitrator in the matter, the whole thing might well descend into disputation and chaos, which is EXACTLY what the result of such obfuscational logic has led to over the course of the last two thousand years.

    If on the other hand I silently slip a pebble into your hand, it is beyond dispute that what you hold in your palm is actual, and what is actual corresponds to the human concept of truth, therefore [metaphorically speaking] you are like a god holding truth in the palm of your hand. The notion of appearing godlike and in possession of truth will no doubt appeal to many Heideggerians, and it is to hoped that they do not all immediately rush out and strip the beaches of pebbles - leaving no shelter for crabs and other shoreline fauna.

     Incorrectness regarding the actuality of the pebble would not be an issue, for if I didn't draw your attention to it, or place it in your hand, then you would not be aware of its actuality, and you would therefore have no notion of its actuality at all, and be prevented from either ascertaining the truth of it, or rejecting any putative falsity of its actuality. Even if you were under the impression that it was NOT a pebble that you held in your hand, and represented it as being something else, that would not change the entitic entelechy of the object, for it would continue to be a truthful existential actualisation of what it really was - it would simply mean that your denotatum was false.

The way I see it, any statement incorporating claims about both 'truth' and 'existence' are made possible as concepts by their respective counter concepts 'falsehood' and 'non-existence,' which are available for verificational purposes in the actuality of the 'entities of last recourse' or 'ultimate reduction', or 'exhibits of physical actuality' or some such title... take your pick.

I am not so much focussed in this particular instant with descriptions of language use, invaluable though they are in describing the world, or whether a notion works or is helpful in providing useful information for perpetuating what are [in my humble opinion only] old fashioned and faulty ontological notions of what exists and what is merely an idea about what exists. In my nominalistic world only 'material ' objects/energy exist, and only ideators - not ideas are actual. Men can be found in the world, but not their ideas - for ideas are the thoughts of men, and only men exist. In that sense for me ideas are the behaviour of ideators - the cerebral activity of human beings.

     'Correctness or incorrectness' of statement is therefore an appropriate or inappropriate claim as to the manner or mode in which some entity or entities is/are claimed to exist. Claims that posit the existence of certain perfect exemplars against which entitic types or human emotional states may be measured, in the manner of Plato and his forms, are rejected in my ontology as merely constituting the ideas of a notional perfection ideated by the ideators. One such ideational template is of course the very template against which the efficacy and fittingness of all other templates is measured - the 'correctness of statement' template.

     Unfortunately some people [transcendentalists and the religious for example] cannot be trusted to 'think on their own' when separated from the entitic evidence of their own senses. They begin to imagine another realm of abstractional [reified] entities [beings] which, in the past, if one denied their existence, meant one could end up tied to a wooden post surrounded by wooden faggots and be burned alive. Even nowadays in certain Arab lands unbelievers are executed as a matter of course. Science has its own forms of abstraction - abstractions considered as useful if correct as statements which accord with the real world of objects.

    As Pascal wrote of scientism - it is an abstraction from experience, it couldn't function without the work of the human mind on what it encounters in the world. I am focussing on right now on what is physically encountered in the world and what are reifications engendered in the minds of the ideators.

I was thinking perhaps [by way of example] of the sadness of the American people at the chaotic deaths of thousands of their innocent countrymen and woman who were murdered because certain statements claimed by eastern mystics to be 'statementally correct' and concurred with and believed as correct by countless millions of the religiously minded - were in fact hideously statementally incorrect. Does that suggest that there may in fact be competitive compendiums of forms floating around in the ether - the good old western Platonic ones  - and the alien Islamic ones vying with each other for veridical application to any statement that passes by?

If on spotting a roadsign which proclaims: 'London 20m'  I say: 'It's only
twenty miles to London,' and my passenger responds: 'That's true,' is he:

(1) referring to some 'truth' which is somehow embedded or intrinsically contained in the roadsign and/or its message?

(2) Referring to some 'truth' as somehow being embedded or characterised in the sentence:
'It's only twenty miles to London.'

(3) Agreeing that the physical mass of material London [houses, buildings, roads, cars,
people] exists in the location where the sign and I claim it does?

(4) Referring [by the use of that] to the spatial distance between us, the car and London?

(5) Referring to the topographical or physical separation between where we are now — and London?
There may be elements of all 5 covered by the phrase: 'That's true?' The brain rummages around with a concept looking for the pros and cons in favour of an acceptance or rejection.

In the case of (1) there would be a rapid realisation that in general government road signs can be expected to be accurate and that 20 miles is a truthful expression of the distance.

In the case of (2) in a similar manner, the fact that the driver is repeating the information on a government sign, or to a lesser extent, has calculated the number of miles covered on his milometer and worked out the miles to go.

Again in (3) the evidence of the [trustworthy] sign would suggest that the 20-miles is a true reference to the whereabouts of the physical mass we call London.

With (4) there would be a quick resume of what a mile actually is and what 20 of them entails timewise, comfort, need to urinate, dying for a drink, etc.

And lastly (5) — a consciousness of the actual straight motorway ahead — the three lanes — the next service station, etc.

     Maybe it's me that's nitpicking — but when someone makes a statement regarding an object — my brain says — is that true of the object mentioned? And when I answer. 'Yes, that's true,' I am saying 'Yes, that's true of the object' If you say: 'The apple is red,' and I answer, That's true,' the 'that's true' is a foreshortening of the complete [but unnecessarily explicit] expression: 'Yes, the apple is red.'

Therefore an abstract truth claim such as: 'The Americans are pulling out of Baghdad," can only be truly verified by a physical check upon the human entities mapped by the statement — the actualities that are the American personnel and their military and civilian accoutrements that are, or are not actually vacating the de facto soil of Iraq.

I doubt very much whether the Iraqi people, or the voters of the US and Britain would be willing to accept the way that Bush and Blair talk about entities — they would much prefer to make sure and have somebody physically check out the US tanks and hardware in the raw so to speak.

For me 'entity + language = truth' is not acceptable. Just think of Blair's statement about the so-called 'entities' of mass destruction, and the 'language' he used to describe their existence, in which he included the 'fact' that they could be launched within 15-minutes. All falsity, and all 'entity + language' that equalled misrepresentation. For me then only 'entity= truth is relevant, and THAT is precisely the reason for my battles with the transcendentalists, because their notion of an 'entity' is so primitive and slippery [abstract objects and so on] it obscures truth — and my small side-show of a battle is ultimately about the meaning of truth.

It is true that experience and truth and all the rest of the abstractions cannot talk. As to the point that without language we couldn't say this or think that, I do not accept that as a valid point, for patently we DO have language - we humans exist as animals with a complex of signs that we use to communicate. I realise of course that to speak about a notional absence of language is to speak  illustratively, but the notion of NO having language means that we would not be Homo Sapiens, and we would not be having this cyber-conversation.

     I am trying to address the real world rather than some language-less imagined one, bereft of communications and notions of truth. Most importantly I am not addressing linguistic efficacy, or what works and what doesn't work - but trying to pin down what actually EXISTS in the world and what are but products of the human imagination - whether those imaginings are fruitful and useful or whether they be destructive and worthless.

But of course I don't believe that 'truth' exists — in fact ANY construction that I dream up to take the place of 'truth' doesn't exist either. So if I say in place of 'truth:' ENTITIC ACTUALITY,' which is EXACTLY what I DO mean, the 'entitic actuality' doesn't exist either. What DOES exist is THE RED APPLE.