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The History of the Peloponnesian War
By Thucydides
Translated by Richard Crawley
The Eighth Book.
CHAPTER XXIV.
Nineteenth and Twentieth Years of the War
- Revolt of Ionia - Intervention of Persia
- The War in Ionia
WHEN the news was brought to Athens, for
a long while they disbelieved even the most
respectable of the soldiers who had themselves
escaped from the scene of action and clearly
reported the matter, a destruction so complete
not being thought credible. When the conviction
was forced upon them, they were angry with
the orators who had joined in promoting the
expedition, just as if they had not themselves
voted it, and were enraged also with the
reciters of oracles and soothsayers, and
all other omen-mongers of the time who had
encouraged them to hope that they should
conquer Sicily. Already distressed at all
points and in all quarters, after what had
now happened, they were seized by a fear
and consternation quite without example.
It was grievous enough for the state and
for every man in his proper person to lose
so many heavy infantry, cavalry, and able-bodied
troops, and to see none left to replace them;
but when they saw, also, that they had not
sufficient ships in their docks, or money
in the treasury, or crews for the ships,
they began to despair of salvation. They
thought that their enemies in Sicily would
immediately sail with their fleet against
Piraeus, inflamed by so signal a victory;
while their adversaries at home, redoubling
all their preparations, would vigorously
attack them by sea and land at once, aided
by their own revolted confederates. Nevertheless,
with such means as they had, it was determined
to resist to the last, and to provide timber
and money, and to equip a fleet as they best
could, to take steps to secure their confederates
and above all Euboea, to reform things in
the city upon a more economical footing,
and to elect a board of elders to advise
upon the state of affairs as occasion should
arise. In short, as is the way of a democracy,
in the panic of the moment they were ready
to be as prudent as possible. These resolves
were at once carried into effect. Summer
was now over. The winter ensuing saw all
Hellas stirring under the impression of the
great Athenian disaster in Sicily. Neutrals
now felt that even if uninvited they ought
no longer to stand aloof from the war, but
should volunteer to march against the Athenians,
who, as they severally reflected, would probably
have come against them if the Sicilian campaign
had succeeded. Besides, they considered that
the war would now be short, and that it would
be creditable for them to take part in it.
Meanwhile the allies of the Lacedaemonians
felt all more anxious than ever to see a
speedy end to their heavy labours. But above
all, the subjects of the Athenians showed
a readiness to revolt even beyond their ability,
judging the circumstances with passion, and
refusing even to hear of the Athenians being
able to last out the coming summer. Beyond
all this, Lacedaemon was encouraged by the
near prospect of being joined in great force
in the spring by her allies in Sicily, lately
forced by events to acquire their navy. With
these reasons for confidence in every quarter,
the Lacedaemonians now resolved to throw
themselves without reserve into the war,
considering that, once it was happily terminated,
they would be finally delivered from such
dangers as that which would have threatened
them from Athens, if she had become mistress
of Sicily, and that the overthrow of the
Athenians would leave them in quiet enjoyment
of the supremacy over all Hellas. Their king,
Agis, accordingly set out at once during
this winter with some troops from Decelea,
and levied from the allies contributions
for the fleet, and turning towards the Malian
Gulf exacted a sum of money from the Oetaeans
by carrying off most of their cattle in reprisal
for their old hostility, and, in spite of
the protests and opposition of the Thessalians,
forced the Achaeans of Phthiotis and the
other subjects of the Thessalians in those
parts to give him money and hostages, and
deposited the hostages at Corinth, and tried
to bring their countrymen into the confederacy.
The Lacedaemonians now issued a requisition
to the cities for building a hundred ships,
fixing their own quota and that of the Boeotians
at twenty-five each; that of the Phocians
and Locrians together at fifteen; that of
the Corinthians at fifteen; that of the Arcadians,
Pellenians, and Sicyonians together at ten;
and that of the Megarians, Troezenians, Epidaurians,
and Hermionians together at ten also; and
meanwhile made every other preparation for
commencing hostilities by the spring. In
the meantime the Athenians were not idle.
During this same winter, as they had determined,
they contributed timber and pushed on their
ship-building, and fortified Sunium to enable
their corn-ships to round it in safety, and
evacuated the fort in Laconia which they
had built on their way to Sicily; while they
also, for economy, cut down any other expenses
that seemed unnecessary, and above all kept
a careful look-out against the revolt of
their confederates. While both parties were
thus engaged, and were as intent upon preparing
for the war as they had been at the outset,
the Euboeans first of all sent envoys during
this winter to Agis to treat of their revolting
from Athens. Agis accepted their proposals,
and sent for Alcamenes, son of Sthenelaidas,
and Melanthus from Lacedaemon, to take the
command in Euboea. These accordingly arrived
with some three hundred Neodamodes, and Agis
began to arrange for their crossing over.
But in the meanwhile arrived some Lesbians,
who also wished to revolt; and these being
supported by the Boeotians, Agis was persuaded
to defer acting in the matter of Euboea,
and made arrangements for the revolt of the
Lesbians, giving them Alcamenes, who was
to have sailed to Euboea, as governor, and
himself promising them ten ships, and the
Boeotians the same number. All this was done
without instructions from home, as Agis while
at Decelea with the army that he commanded
had power to send troops to whatever quarter
he pleased, and to levy men and money. During
this period, one might say, the allies obeyed
him much more than they did the Lacedaemonians
in the city, as the force he had with him
made him feared at once wherever he went.
While Agis was engaged with the Lesbians,
the Chians and Erythraeans, who were also
ready to revolt, applied, not to him but
at Lacedaemon; where they arrived accompanied
by an ambassador from Tissaphernes, the commander
of King Darius, son of Artaxerxes, in the
maritime districts, who invited the Peloponnesians
to come over, and promised to maintain their
army. The King had lately called upon him
for the tribute from his government, for
which he was in arrears, being unable to
raise it from the Hellenic towns by reason
of the Athenians; and he therefore calculated
that by weakening the Athenians he should
get the tribute better paid, and should also
draw the Lacedaemonians into alliance with
the King; and by this means, as the King
had commanded him, take alive or dead Amorges,
the bastard son of Pissuthnes, who was in
rebellion on the coast of Caria. While the
Chians and Tissaphernes thus joined to effect
the same object, about the same time Calligeitus,
son of Laophon, a Megarian, and Timagoras,
son of Athenagoras, a Cyzicene, both of them
exiles from their country and living at the
court of Pharnabazus, son of Pharnaces, arrived
at Lacedaemon upon a mission from Pharnabazus,
to procure a fleet for the Hellespont; by
means of which, if possible, he might himself
effect the object of Tissaphernes' ambition
and cause the cities in his government to
revolt from the Athenians, and so get the
tribute, and by his own agency obtain for
the King the alliance of the Lacedaemonians.
The emissaries of Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes
treating apart, a keen competition now ensued
at Lacedaemon as to whether a fleet and army
should be sent first to Ionia and Chios,
or to the Hellespont. The Lacedaemonians,
however, decidedly favoured the Chians and
Tissaphernes, who were seconded by Alcibiades,
the family friend of Endius, one of the ephors
for that year. Indeed, this is how their
house got its Laconic name, Alcibiades being
the family name of Endius. Nevertheless the
Lacedaemonians first sent to Chios Phrynis,
one of the Perioeci, to see whether they
had as many ships as they said, and whether
their city generally was as great as was
reported; and upon his bringing word that
they had been told the truth, immediately
entered into alliance with the Chians and
Erythraeans, and voted to send them forty
ships, there being already, according to
the statement of the Chians, not less than
sixty in the island. At first the Lacedaemonians
meant to send ten of these forty themselves,
with Melanchridas their admiral; but afterwards,
an earthquake having occurred, they sent
Chalcideus instead of Melanchridas, and instead
of the ten ships equipped only five in Laconia.
And the winter ended, and with it ended also
the nineteenth year of this war of which
Thucydides is the historian. At the beginning
of the next summer the Chians were urging
that the fleet should be sent off, being
afraid that the Athenians, from whom all
these embassies were kept a secret, might
find out what was going on, and the Lacedaemonians
at once sent three Spartans to Corinth to
haul the ships as quickly as possible across
the Isthmus from the other sea to that on
the side of Athens, and to order them all
to sail to Chios, those which Agis was equipping
for Lesbos not excepted. The number of ships
from the allied states was thirty-nine in
all. Meanwhile Calligeitus and Timagoras
did not join on behalf of Pharnabazus in
the expedition to Chios or give the money-
twenty-five talents- which they had brought
with them to help in dispatching a force,
but determined to sail afterwards with another
force by themselves. Agis, on the other hand,
seeing the Lacedaemonians bent upon going
to Chios first, himself came in to their
views; and the allies assembled at Corinth
and held a council, in which they decided
to sail first to Chios under the command
of Chalcideus, who was equipping the five
vessels in Laconia, then to Lesbos, under
the command of Alcamenes, the same whom Agis
had fixed upon, and lastly to go to the Hellespont,
where the command was given to Clearchus,
son of Ramphias. Meanwhile they would take
only half the ships across the Isthmus first,
and let those sail off at once, in order
that the Athenians might attend less to the
departing squadron than to those to be taken
across afterwards, as no care had been taken
to keep this voyage secret through contempt
of the impotence of the Athenians, who had
as yet no fleet of any account upon the sea.
Agreeably to this determination, twenty-one
vessels were at once conveyed across the
Isthmus. They were now impatient to set sail,
but the Corinthians were not willing to accompany
them until they had celebrated the Isthmian
festival, which fell at that time. Upon this
Agis proposed to them to save their scruples
about breaking the Isthmian truce by taking
the expedition upon himself. The Corinthians
not consenting to this, a delay ensued, during
which the Athenians conceived suspicions
of what was preparing at Chios, and sent
Aristocrates, one of their generals, and
charged them with the fact, and, upon the
denial of the Chians, ordered them to send
with them a contingent of ships, as faithful
confederates. Seven were sent accordingly.
The reason of the dispatch of the ships lay
in the fact that the mass of the Chians were
not privy to the negotiations, while the
few who were in the secret did not wish to
break with the multitude until they had something
positive to lean upon, and no longer expected
the Peloponnesians to arrive by reason of
their delay. In the meantime the Isthmian
games took place, and the Athenians, who
had been also invited, went to attend them,
and now seeing more clearly into the designs
of the Chians, as soon as they returned to
Athens took measures to prevent the fleet
putting out from Cenchreae without their
knowledge. After the festival the Peloponnesians
set sail with twenty-one ships for Chios,
under the command of Alcamenes. The Athenians
first sailed against them with an equal number,
drawing off towards the open sea. The enemy,
however, turning back before he had followed
them far, the Athenians returned also, not
trusting the seven Chian ships which formed
part of their number, and afterwards manned
thirty-seven vessels in all and chased him
on his passage alongshore into Spiraeum,
a desert Corinthian port on the edge of the
Epidaurian frontier. After losing one ship
out at sea, the Peloponnesians got the rest
together and brought them to anchor. The
Athenians now attacked not only from the
sea with their fleet, but also disembarked
upon the coast; and a melee ensued of the
most confused and violent kind, in which
the Athenians disabled most of the enemy's
vessels and killed Alcamenes their commander,
losing also a few of their own men. After
this they separated, and the Athenians, detaching
a sufficient number of ships to blockade
those of the enemy, anchored with the rest
at the islet adjacent, upon whkh they proceeded
to encamp, and sent to Athens for reinforcements;
the Peloponnesians having been joined on
the day after the battle by the Corinthians,
who came to help the ships, and by the other
inhabitants in the vicinity not long afterwards.
These saw the difficulty of keeping guard
in a desert place, and in their perplexity
at first thought of burning the ships, but
finally resolved to haul them up on shore
and sit down and guard them with their land
forces until a convenient opportunity for
escaping should present itself. Agis also,
on being informed of the disaster, sent them
a Spartan of the name of Thermon. The Lacedaemonians
first received the news of the fleet having
put out from the Isthmus, Alcamenes having
been ordered by the ephors to send off a
horseman when this took place, and immediately
resolved to dispatch their own five vessels
under Chalcideus, and Alcibiades with him.
But while they were full of this resolution
came the second news of the fleet having
taken refuge in Spiraeum; and disheartened
at their first step in the Ionian war proving
a failure, they laid aside the idea of sending
the ships from their own country, and even
wished to recall some that had already sailed.
Perceiving this, Alcibiades again persuaded
Endius and the other ephors to persevere
in the expedition, saying that the voyage
would be made before the Chians heard of
the fleet's misfortune, and that as soon
as he set foot in Ionia, he should, by assuring
them of the weakness of the Athenians and
the zeal of Lacedaemon, have no difficulty
in persuading the cities to revolt, as they
would readily believe his testimony. He also
represented to Endius himself in private
that it would be glorious for him to be the
means of making Ionia revolt and the King
become the ally of Lacedaemon, instead of
that honour being left to Agis (Agis, it
must be remembered, was the enemy of Alcibiades);
and Endius and his colleagues thus persuaded,
he put to sea with the five ships and the
Lacedaemonian Chalcideus, and made all haste
upon the voyage. About this time the sixteen
Peloponnesian ships from Sicily, which had
served through the war with Gylippus, were
caught on their return off Leucadia and roughly
handled by the twenty-seven Athenian vessels
under Hippocles, son of Menippus, on the
lookout for the ships from Sicily. After
losing one of their number, the rest escaped
from the Athenians and sailed into Corinth.
Meanwhile Chalcideus and Alcibiades seized
all they met with on their voyage, to prevent
news of their coming, and let them go at
Corycus, the first point which they touched
at in the continent. Here they were visited
by some of their Chian correspondents and,
being urged by them to sail up to the town
without announcing their coming, arrived
suddenly before Chios. The many were amazed
and confounded, while the few had so arranged
that the council should be sitting at the
time; and after speeches from Chalcideus
and Alcibiades stating that many more ships
were sailing up, but saying nothing of the
fleet being blockaded in Spiraeum, the Chians
revolted from the Athenians, and the Erythraeans
immediately afterwards. After this three
vessels sailed over to Clazomenae, and made
that city revolt also; and the Clazomenians
immediately crossed over to the mainland
and began to fortify Polichna, in order to
retreat there, in case of necessity, from
the island where they dwelt. While the revolted
places were all engaged in fortifying and
preparing for the war, news of Chios speedily
reached Athens. The Athenians thought the
danger by which they were now menaced great
and unmistakable, and that the rest of their
allies would not consent to keep quiet after
the secession of the greatest of their number.
In the consternation of the moment they at
once took off the penalty attaching to whoever
proposed or put to the vote a proposal for
using the thousand talents which they had
jealously avoided touching throughout the
whole war, and voted to employ them to man
a large number of ships, and to send off
at once under Strombichides, son of Diotimus,
the eight vessels, forming part of the blockading
fleet at Spiraeum, which had left the blockade
and had returned after pursuing and failing
to overtake the vessels with Chalcideus.
These were to be followed shortly afterwards
by twelve more under Thrasycles, also taken
from the blockade. They also recalled the
seven Chian vessels, forming part of their
squadron blockading the fleet in Spiraeum,
and giving the slaves on board their liberty,
put the freemen in confinement, and speedily
manned and sent out ten fresh ships to blockade
the Peloponnesians in the place of all those
that had departed, and decided to man thirty
more. Zeal was not wanting, and no effort
was spared to send relief to Chios. In the
meantime Strombichides with his eight ships
arrived at Samos, and, taking one Samian
vessel, sailed to Teos and required them
to remain quiet. Chalcideus also set sail
with twenty-three ships for Teos from Chios,
the land forces of the Clazomenians and Erythraeans
moving alongshore to support him. Informed
of this in time, Strombichides put out from
Teos before their arrival, and while out
at sea, seeing the number of the ships from
Chios, fled towards Samos, chased by the
enemy. The Teians at first would not receive
the land forces, but upon the flight of the
Athenians took them into the town. There
they waited for some time for Chalcideus
to return from the pursuit, and as time went
on without his appearing, began themselves
to demolish the wall which the Athenians
had built on the land side of the city of
the Teians, being assisted by a few of the
barbarians who had come up under the command
of Stages, the lieutenant of Tissaphernes.
Meanwhile Chalcideus and Alcibiades, after
chasing Strombichides into Samos, armed the
crews of the ships from Peloponnese and left
them at Chios, and filling their places with
substitutes from Chios and manning twenty
others, sailed off to effect the revolt of
Miletus. The wish of Alcibiades, who had
friends among the leading men of the Milesians,
was to bring over the town before the arrival
of the ships from Peloponnese, and thus,
by causing the revolt of as many cities as
possible with the help of the Chian power
and of Chalcideus, to secure the honour for
the Chians and himself and Chalcideus, and,
as he had promised, for Endius who had sent
them out. Not discovered until their voyage
was nearly completed, they arrived a little
before Strombichides and Thrasycles (who
had just come with twelve ships from Athens,
and had joined Strombichides in pursuing
them), and occasioned the revolt of Miletus.
The Athenians sailing up close on their heels
with nineteen ships found Miletus closed
against them, and took up their station at
the adjacent island of Lade. The first alliance
between the King and the Lacedaemonians was
now concluded immediately upon the revolt
of the Milesians, by Tissaphernes and Chalcideus,
and was as follows: The Lacedaemonians and
their allies made a treaty with the King
and Tissaphernes upon the terms following:
1. Whatever country or cities the King has,
or the King's ancestors had, shall be the
king's: and whatever came in to the Athenians
from these cities, either money or any other
thing, the King and the Lacedaemonians and
their allies shall jointly hinder the Athenians
from receiving either money or any other
thing. 2. The war with the Athenians shall
be carried on jointly by the King and by
the Lacedaemonians and their allies: and
it shall not be lawful to make peace with
the Athenians except both agree, the King
on his side and the Lacedaemonians and their
allies on theirs. 3. If any revolt from the
King, they shall be the enemies of the Lacedaemonians
and their allies. And if any revolt from
the Lacedaemonians and their allies, they
shall be the enemies of the King in like
manner. This was the alliance. After this
the Chians immediately manned ten more vessels
and sailed for Anaia, in order to gain intelligence
of those in Miletus, and also to make the
cities revolt. A message, however, reaching
them from Chalcideus to tell them to go back
again, and that Amorges was at hand with
an army by land, they sailed to the temple
of Zeus, and there sighting ten more ships
sailing up with which Diomedon had started
from Athens after Thrasycles, fled, one ship
to Ephesus, the rest to Teos. The Athenians
took four of their ships empty, the men finding
time to escape ashore; the rest took refuge
in the city of the Teians; after which the
Athenians sailed off to Samos, while the
Chians put to sea with their remaining vessels,
accompanied by the land forces, and caused
Lebedos to revolt, and after it Erae. After
this they both returned home, the fleet and
the army. About the same time the twenty
ships of the Peloponnesians in Spiraeum,
which we left chased to land and blockaded
by an equal number of Athenians, suddenly
sallied out and defeated the blockading squadron,
took four of their ships, and, sailing back
to Cenchreae, prepared again for the voyage
to Chios and Ionia. Here they were joined
by Astyochus as high admiral from Lacedaemon,
henceforth invested with the supreme command
at sea. The land forces now withdrawing from
Teos, Tissaphernes repaired thither in person
with an army and completed the demolition
of anything that was left of the wall, and
so departed. Not long after his departure
Diomedon arrived with ten Athenian ships,
and, having made a convention by which the
Teians admitted him as they had the enemy,
coasted along to Erae, and, failing in an
attempt upon the town, sailed back again.
About this time took place the rising of
the commons at Samos against the upper classes,
in concert with some Athenians, who were
there in three vessels. The Samian commons
put to death some two hundred in all of the
upper classes, and banished four hundred
more, and themselves took their land and
houses; after which the Athenians decreed
their independence, being now sure of their
fidelity, and the commons henceforth governed
the city, excluding the landholders from
all share in affairs, and forbidding any
of the commons to give his daughter in marriage
to them or to take a wife from them in future.
After this, during the same summer, the Chians,
whose zeal continued as active as ever, and
who even without the Peloponnesians found
themselves in sufficient force to effect
the revolt of the cities and also wished
to have as many companions in peril as possible,
made an expedition with thirteen ships of
their own to Lesbos; the instructions from
Lacedaemon being to go to that island next,
and from thence to the Hellespont. Meanwhile
the land forces of the Peloponnesians who
were with the Chians and of the allies on
the spot, moved alongshore for Clazomenae
and Cuma, under the command of Eualas, a
Spartan; while the fleet under Diniadas,
one of the Perioeci, first sailed up to Methymna
and caused it to revolt, and, leaving four
ships there, with the rest procured the revolt
of Mitylene. In the meantime Astyochus, the
Lacedaemonian admiral, set sail from Cenchreae
with four ships, as he had intended, and
arrived at Chios. On the third day after
his arrival, the Athenian ships, twenty-five
in number, sailed to Lesbos under Diomedon
and Leon, who had lately arrived with a reinforcement
of ten ships from Athens. Late in the same
day Astyochus put to sea, and taking one
Chian vessel with him sailed to Lesbos to
render what assistance he could. Arrived
at Pyrrha, and from thence the next day at
Eresus, he there learned that Mitylene had
been taken, almost without a blow, by the
Athenians, who had sailed up and unexpectedly
put into the harbour, had beaten the Chian
ships, and landing and defeating the troops
opposed to them had become masters of the
city. Informed of this by the Eresians and
the Chian ships, which had been left with
Eubulus at Methymna, and had fled upon the
capture of Mitylene, and three of which he
now fell in with, one having been taken by
the Athenians, Astyochus did not go on to
Mitylene, but raised and armed Eresus, and,
sending the heavy infantry from his own ships
by land under Eteonicus to Antissa and Methymna,
himself proceeded alongshore thither with
the ships which he had with him and with
the three Chians, in the hope that the Methymnians
upon seeing them would be encouraged to persevere
in their revolt. As, however, everything
went against him in Lesbos, he took up his
own force and sailed back to Chios; the land
forces on board, which were to have gone
to the Hellespont, being also conveyed back
to their different cities. After this six
of the allied Peloponnesian ships at Cenchreae
joined the forces at Chios. The Athenians,
after restoring matters to their old state
in Lesbos, set sail from thence and took
Polichna, the place that the Clazomenians
were fortifying on the continent, and carried
the inhabitants back to their town upon the
island, except the authors of the revolt,
who withdrew to Daphnus; and thus Clazomenae
became once more Athenian. The same summer
the Athenians in the twenty ships at Lade,
blockading Miletus, made a descent at Panormus
in the Milesian territory, and killed Chalcideus
the Lacedaemonian commander, who had come
with a few men against them, and the third
day after sailed over and set up a trophy,
which, as they were not masters of the country,
was however pulled down by the Milesians.
Meanwhile Leon and Diomedon with the Athenian
fleet from Lesbos issuing from the Oenussae,
the isles off Chios, and from their forts
of Sidussa and Pteleum in the Erythraeid,
and from Lesbos, carried on the war against
the Chians from the ships, having on board
heavy infantry from the rolls pressed to
serve as marines. Landing in Cardamyle and
in Bolissus they defeated with heavy loss
the Chians that took the field against them
and, laying desolate the places in that neighbourhood,
defeated the Chians again in another battle
at Phanae, and in a third at Leuconium. After
this the Chians ceased to meet them in the
field, while the Athenians devastated the
country, which was beautifully stocked and
had remained uninjured ever since the Median
wars. Indeed, after the Lacedaemonians, the
Chians are the only people that I have known
who knew how to be wise in prosperity, and
who ordered their city the more securely
the greater it grew. Nor was this revolt,
in which they might seem to have erred on
the side of rashness, ventured upon until
they had numerous and gallant allies to share
the danger with them, and until they perceived
the Athenians after the Sicilian disaster
themselves no longer denying the thoroughly
desperate state of their affairs. And if
they were thrown out by one of the surprises
which upset human calculations, they found
out their mistake in company with many others
who believed, like them, in the speedy collapse
of the Athenian power. While they were thus
blockaded from the sea and plundered by land,
some of the citizens undertook to bring the
city over to the Athenians. Apprised of this
the authorities took no action themselves,
but brought Astyochus, the admiral, from
Erythrae, with four ships that he had with
him, and considered how they could most quietly,
either by taking hostages or by some other
means, put an end to the conspiracy. While
the Chians were thus engaged, a thousand
Athenian heavy infantry and fifteen hundred
Argives (five hundred of whom were light
troops furnished with armour by the Athenians),
and one thousand of the allies, towards the
close of the same summer sailed from Athens
in forty-eight ships, some of which were
transports, under the command of Phrynichus,
Onomacles, and Scironides, and putting into
Samos crossed over and encamped at Miletus.
Upon this the Milesians came out to the number
of eight hundred heavy infantry, with the
Peloponnesians who had come with Chalcideus,
and some foreign mercenaries of Tissaphernes,
Tissaphernes himself and his cavalry, and
engaged the Athenians and their allies. While
the Argives rushed forward on their own wing
with the careless disdain of men advancing
against Ionians who would never stand their
charge, and were defeated by the Milesians
with a loss little short of three hundred
men, the Athenians first defeated the Peloponnesians,
and driving before them the barbarians and
the ruck of the army, without engaging the
Milesians, who after the rout of the Argives
retreated into the town upon seeing their
comrades worsted, crowned their victory by
grounding their arms under the very walls
of Miletus. Thus, in this battle, the Ionians
on both sides overcame the Dorians, the Athenians
defeating the Peloponnesians opposed to them,
and the Milesians the Argives. After setting
up a trophy, the Athenians prepared to draw
a wall round the place, which stood upon
an isthmus; thinking that, if they could
gain Miletus, the other towns also would
easily come over to them. Meanwhile about
dusk tidings reached them that the fifty-five
ships from Peloponnese and Sicily might be
instantly expected. Of these the Siceliots,
urged principally by the Syracusan Hermocrates
to join in giving the finishing blow to the
power of Athens, furnished twenty-two- twenty
from Syracuse, and two from Silenus; and
the ships that we left preparing in Peloponnese
being now ready, both squadrons had been
entrusted to Therimenes, a Lacedaemonian,
to take to Astyochus, the admiral. They now
put in first at Leros the island off Miletus,
and from thence, discovering that the Athenians
were before the town, sailed into the Iasic
Gulf, in order to learn how matters stood
at Miletus. Meanwhile Alcibiades came on
horseback to Teichiussa in the Milesian territory,
the point of the gulf at which they had put
in for the night, and told them of the battle
in which he had fought in person by the side
of the Milesians and Tissaphernes, and advised
them, if they did not wish to sacrifice Ionia
and their cause, to fly to the relief of
Miletus and hinder its investment. Accordingly
they resolved to relieve it the next morning.
Meanwhile Phrynichus, the Athenian commander,
had received precise intelligence of the
fleet from Leros, and when his colleagues
expressed a wish to keep the sea and fight
it out, flatly refused either to stay himself
or to let them or any one else do so if he
could help it. Where they could hereafter
contend, after full and undisturbed preparation,
with an exact knowledge of the number of
the enemy's fleet and of the force which
they could oppose to him, he would never
allow the reproach of disgrace to drive him
into a risk that was unreasonable. It was
no disgrace for an Athenian fleet to retreat
when it suited them: put it as they would,
it would be more disgraceful to be beaten,
and to expose the city not only to disgrace,
but to the most serious danger. After its
late misfortunes it could hardly be justified
in voluntarily taking the offensive even
with the strongest force, except in a case
of absolute necessity: much less then without
compulsion could it rush upon peril of its
own seeking. He told them to take up their
wounded as quickly as they could and the
troops and stores which they had brought
with them, and leaving behind what they had
taken from the enemy's country, in order
to lighten the ships, to sail off to Samos,
and there concentrating all their ships to
attack as opportunity served. As he spoke
so he acted; and thus not now more than afterwards,
nor in this alone but in all that he had
to do with, did Phrynichus show himself a
man of sense. In this way that very evening
the Athenians broke up from before Miletus,
leaving their victory unfinished, and the
Argives, mortified at their disaster, promptly
sailed off home from Samos. As soon as it
was morning the Peloponnesians weighed from
Teichiussa and put into Miletus after the
departure of the Athenians; they stayed one
day, and on the next took with them the Chian
vessels originally chased into port with
Chalcideus, and resolved to sail back for
the tackle which they had put on shore at
Teichiussa. Upon their arrival Tissaphernes
came to them with his land forces and induced
them to sail to Iasus, which was held by
his enemy Amorges. Accordingly they suddenly
attacked and took Iasus, whose inhabitants
never imagined that the ships could be other
than Athenian. The Syracusans distinguished
themselves most in the action. Amorges, a
bastard of Pissuthnes and a rebel from the
King, was taken alive and handed over to
Tissaphernes, to carry to the King, if he
chose, according to his orders: Iasus was
sacked by the army, who found a very great
booty there, the place being wealthy from
ancient date. The mercenaries serving with
Amorges the Peloponnesians received and enrolled
in their army without doing them any harm,
since most of them came from Peloponnese,
and handed over the town to Tissaphernes
with all the captives, bond or free, at the
stipulated price of one Doric stater a head;
after which they returned to Miletus. Pedaritus,
son of Leon, who had been sent by the Lacedaemonians
to take the command at Chios, they dispatched
by land as far as Erythrae with the mercenaries
taken from Amorges; appointing Philip to
remain as governor of Miletus. Summer was
now over. The winter following, Tissaphernes
put Iasus in a state of defence, and passing
on to Miletus distributed a month's pay to
all the ships as he had promised at Lacedaemon,
at the rate of an Attic drachma a day for
each man. In future, however, he was resolved
not to give more than three obols, until
he had consulted the King; when if the King
should so order he would give, he said, the
full drachma. However, upon the protest of
the Syracusan general Hermocrates (for as
Therimenes was not admiral, but only accompanied
them in order to hand over the ships to Astyochus,
he made little difficulty about the pay),
it was agreed that the amount of five ships'
pay should be given over and above the three
obols a day for each man; Tissaphernes paying
thirty talents a month for fifty-five ships,
and to the rest, for as many ships as they
had beyond that number, at the same rate.
The same winter the Athenians in Samos, having
been joined by thirty-five more vessels from
home under Charminus, Strombichides, and
Euctemon, called in their squadron at Chios
and all the rest, intending to blockade Miletus
with their navy, and to send a fleet and
an army against Chios; drawing lots for the
respective services. This intention they
carried into effect; Strombichides, Onamacles,
and Euctemon sailing against Chios, which
fell to their lot, with thirty ships and
a part of the thousand heavy infantry, who
had been to Miletus, in transports; while
the rest remained masters of the sea with
seventy-four ships at Samos, and advanced
upon Miletus. Meanwhile Astyochus, whom we
left at Chios collecting the hostages required
in consequence of the conspiracy, stopped
upon learning that the fleet with Therimenes
had arrived, and that the affairs of the
league were in a more flourishing condition,
and putting out to sea with ten Peloponnesian
and as many Chian vessels, after a futile
attack upon Pteleum, coasted on to Clazomenae,
and ordered the Athenian party to remove
inland to Daphnus, and to join the Peloponnesians,
an order in which also joined Tamos the king's
lieutenant in Ionia. This order being disregarded,
Astyochus made an attack upon the town, which
was unwalled, and having failed to take it
was himself carried off by a strong gale
to Phocaea and Cuma, while the rest of the
ships put in at the islands adjacent to Clazomenae-
Marathussa, Pele, and Drymussa. Here they
were detained eight days by the winds, and,
plundering and consuming all the property
of the Clazomenians there deposited, put
the rest on shipboard and sailed off to Phocaea
and Cuma to join Astyochus. While he was
there, envoys arrived from the Lesbians who
wished to revolt again. With Astyochus they
were successful; but the Corinthians and
the other allies being averse to it by reason
of their former failure, he weighed anchor
and set sail for Chios, where they eventually
arrived from different quarters, the fleet
having been scattered by a storm. After this
Pedaritus, whom we left marching along the
coast from Miletus, arrived at Erythrae,
and thence crossed over with his army to
Chios, where he found also about five hundred
soldiers who had been left there by Chalcideus
from the five ships with their arms. Meanwhile
some Lesbians making offers to revolt, Astyochus
urged upon Pedaritus and the Chians that
they ought to go with their ships and effect
the revolt of Lesbos, and so increase the
number of their allies, or, if not successful,
at all events harm the Athenians. The Chians,
however, turned a deaf ear to this, and Pedaritus
flatly refused to give up to him the Chian
vessels. Upon this Astyochus took five Corinthian
and one Megarian vessel, with another from
Hermione, and the ships which had come with
him from Laconia, and set sail for Miletus
to assume his command as admiral; after telling
the Chians with many threats that he would
certainly not come and help them if they
should be in need. At Corycus in the Erythraeid
he brought to for the night; the Athenian
armament sailing from Samos against Chios
being only separated from him by a hill,
upon the other side of which it brought to;
so that neither perceived the other. But
a letter arriving in the night from Pedaritus
to say that some liberated Erythraean prisoners
had come from Samos to betray Erythrae, Astyochus
at once put back to Erythrae, and so just
escaped falling in with the Athenians. Here
Pedaritus sailed over to join him; and after
inquiry into the pretended treachery, finding
that the whole story had been made up to
procure the escape of the men from Samos,
they acquitted them of the charge, and sailed
away, Pedaritus to Chios and Astyochus to
Miletus as he had intended. Meanwhile the
Athenian armament sailing round Corycus fell
in with three Chian men-of-war off Arginus,
and gave immediate chase. A great storm coming
on, the Chians with difficulty took refuge
in the harbour; the three Athenian vessels
most forward in the pursuit being wrecked
and thrown up near the city of Chios, and
the crews slain or taken prisoners. The rest
of the Athenian fleet took refuge in the
harbour called Phoenicus, under Mount Mimas,
and from thence afterwards put into Lesbos
and prepared for the work of fortification.
The same winter the Lacedaemonian Hippocrates
sailed out from Peloponnese with ten Thurian
ships under the command of Dorieus, son of
Diagoras, and two colleagues, one Laconian
and one Syracusan vessel, and arrived at
Cnidus, which had already revolted at the
instigation of Tissaphernes. When their arrival
was known at Miletus, orders came to them
to leave half their squadron to guard Cnidus,
and with the rest to cruise round Triopium
and seize all the merchantmen arriving from
Egypt. Triopium is a promontory of Cnidus
and sacred to Apollo. This coming to the
knowledge of the Athenians, they sailed from
Samos and captured the six ships on the watch
at Triopium, the crews escaping out of them.
After this the Athenians sailed into Cnidus
and made an assault upon the town, which
was unfortified, and all but took it; and
the next day assaulted it again, but with
less effect, as the inhabitants had improved
their defences during the night, and had
been reinforced by the crews escaped from
the ships at Triopium. The Athenians now
withdrew, and after plundering the Cnidian
territory sailed back to Samos. About the
same time Astyochus came to the fleet at
Miletus. The Peloponnesian camp was still
plentifully supplied, being in receipt of
sufficient pay, and the soldiers having still
in hand the large booty taken at Iasus. The
Milesians also showed great ardour for the
war. Nevertheless the Peloponnesians thought
the first convention with Tissaphernes, made
with Chalcideus, defective, and more advantageous
to him than to them, and consequently while
Therimenes was still there concluded another,
which was as follows: The convention of the
Lacedaemonians and the allies with King Darius
and the sons of the King, and with Tissaphernes
for a treaty and friendship, as follows:
1. Neither the Lacedaemonians nor the allies
of the Lacedaemonians shall make war against
or otherwise injure any country or cities
that belong to King Darius or did belong
to his father or to his ancestors; neither
shall the Lacedaemonians nor the allies of
the Lacedaemonians exact tribute from such
cities. Neither shall King Darius nor any
of the subjects of the King make war against
or otherwise injure the Lacedaemonians or
their allies. 2. If the Lacedaemonians or
their allies should require any assistance
from the King, or the King from the Lacedaemonians
or their allies, whatever they both agree
upon they shall be right in doing. 3. Both
shall carry on jointly the war against the
Athenians and their allies: and if they make
peace, both shall do so jointly. 4. The expense
of all troops in the King's country, sent
for by the King, shall be borne by the King.
5. If any of the states comprised in this
convention with the King attack the King's
country, the rest shall stop them and aid
the King to the best of their power. And
if any in the King's country or in the countries
under the King's rule attack the country
of the Lacedaemonians or their allies, the
King shall stop it and help them to the best
of his power. After this convention Therimenes
handed over the fleet to Astyochus, sailed
off in a small boat, and was lost. The Athenian
armament had now crossed over from Lesbos
to Chios, and being master by sea and land
began to fortify Delphinium, a place naturally
strong on the land side, provided with more
than one harbour, and also not far from the
city of Chios. Meanwhile the Chians remained
inactive. Already defeated in so many battles,
they were now also at discord among themselves;
the execution of the party of Tydeus, son
of Ion, by Pedaritus upon the charge of Atticism,
followed by the forcible imposition of an
oligarchy upon the rest of the city, having
made them suspicious of one another; and
they therefore thought neither themselves
not the mercenaries under Pedaritus a match
for the enemy. They sent, however, to Miletus
to beg Astyochus to assist them, which he
refused to do, and was accordingly denounced
at Lacedaemon by Pedaritus as a traitor.
Such was the state of the Athenian affairs
at Chios; while their fleet at Samos kept
sailing out against the enemy in Miletus,
until they found that he would not accept
their challenge, and then retired again to
Samos and remained quiet. In the same winter
the twenty-seven ships equipped by the Lacedaemonians
for Pharnabazus through the agency of the
Megarian Calligeitus, and the Cyzicene Timagoras,
put out from Peloponnese and sailed for Ionia
about the time of the solstice, under the
command of Antisthenes, a Spartan. With them
the Lacedaemonians also sent eleven Spartans
as advisers to Astyochus; Lichas, son of
Arcesilaus, being among the number. Arrived
at Miletus, their orders were to aid in generally
superintending the good conduct of the war;
to send off the above ships or a greater
or less number to the Hellespont to Pharnabazus,
if they thought proper, appointing Clearchus,
son of Ramphias, who sailed with them, to
the command; and further, if they thought
proper, to make Antisthenes admiral, dismissing
Astyochus, whom the letters of Pedaritus
had caused to be regarded with suspicion.
Sailing accordingly from Malea across the
open sea, the squadron touched at Melos and
there fell in with ten Athenian ships, three
of which they took empty and burned. After
this, being afraid that the Athenian vessels
escaped from Melos might, as they in fact
did, give information of their approach to
the Athenians at Samos, they sailed to Crete,
and having lengthened their voyage by way
of precaution made land at Caunus in Asia,
from whence considering themselves in safety
they sent a message to the fleet at Miletus
for a convoy along the coast. Meanwhile the
Chians and Pedaritus, undeterred by the backwardness
of Astyochus, went on sending messengers
pressing him to come with all the fleet to
assist them against their besiegers, and
not to leave the greatest of the allied states
in Ionia to be shut up by sea and overrun
and pillaged by land. There were more slaves
at Chios than in any one other city except
Lacedaemon, and being also by reason of their
numbers punished more rigorously when they
offended, most of them, when they saw the
Athenian armament firmly established in the
island with a fortified position, immediately
deserted to the enemy, and through their
knowledge of the country did the greatest
mischief. The Chians therefore urged upon
Astyochus that it was his duty to assist
them, while there was still a hope and a
possibility of stopping the enemy's progress,
while Delphinium was still in process of
fortification and unfinished, and before
the completion of a higher rampart which
was being added to protect the camp and fleet
of their besiegers. Astyochus now saw that
the allies also wished it and prepared to
go, in spite of his intention to the contrary
owing to the threat already referred to.
In the meantime news came from Caunus of
the arrival of the twenty-seven ships with
the Lacedaemonian commissioners; and Astyochus,
postponing everything to the duty of convoying
a fleet of that importance, in order to be
more able to command the sea, and to the
safe conduct of the Lacedaemonians sent as
spies over his behaviour, at once gave up
going to Chios and set sail for Caunus. As
he coasted along he landed at the Meropid
Cos and sacked the city, which was unfortified
and had been lately laid in ruins by an earthquake,
by far the greatest in living memory, and,
as the inhabitants had fled to the mountains,
overran the country and made booty of all
it contained, letting go, however, the free
men. From Cos arriving in the night at Cnidus
he was constrained by the representations
of the Cnidians not to disembark the sailors,
but to sail as he was straight against the
twenty Athenian vessels, which with Charminus,
one of the commanders at Samos, were on the
watch for the very twenty-seven ships from
Peloponnese which Astyochus was himself sailing
to join; the Athenians in Samos having heard
from Melos of their approach, and Charminus
being on the look-out off Syme, Chalce, Rhodes,
and Lycia, as he now heard that they were
at Caunus. Astyochus accordingly sailed as
he was to Syme, before he was heard of, in
the hope of catching the enemy somewhere
out at sea. Rain, however, and foggy weather
encountered him, and caused his ships to
straggle and get into disorder in the dark.
In the morning his fleet had parted company
and was most of it still straggling round
the island, and the left wing only in sight
of Charminus and the Athenians, who took
it for the squadron which they were watching
for from Caunus, and hastily put out against
it with part only of their twenty vessels,
and attacking immediately sank three ships
and disabled others, and had the advantage
in the action until the main body of the
fleet unexpectedly hove in sight, when they
were surrounded on every side. Upon this
they took to flight, and after losing six
ships with the rest escaped to Teutlussa
or Beet Island, and from thence to Halicarnassus.
After this the Peloponnesians put into Cnidus
and, being joined by the twenty-seven ships
from Caunus, sailed all together and set
up a trophy in Syme, and then returned to
anchor at Cnidus. As soon as the Athenians
knew of the sea-fight, they sailed with all
the ships at Samos to Syme, and, without
attacking or being attacked by the fleet
at Cnidus, took the ships' tackle left at
Syme, and touching at Lorymi on the mainland
sailed back to Samos. Meanwhile the Peloponnesian
ships, being now all at Cnidus, underwent
such repairs as were needed; while the eleven
Lacedaemonian commissioners conferred with
Tissaphernes, who had come to meet them,
upon the points which did not satisfy them
in the past transactions, and upon the best
and mutually most advantageous manner of
conducting the war in future. The severest
critic of the present proceedings was Lichas,
who said that neither of the treaties could
stand, neither that of Chalcideus, nor that
of Therimenes; it being monstrous that the
King should at this date pretend to the possession
of all the country formerly ruled by himself
or by his ancestors- a pretension which implicitly
put back under the yoke all the islands-
Thessaly, Locris, and everything as far as
Boeotia- and made the Lacedaemonians give
to the Hellenes instead of liberty a Median
master. He therefore invited Tissaphernes
to conclude another and a better treaty,
as they certainly would not recognize those
existing and did not want any of his pay
upon such conditions. This offended Tissaphernes
so much that he went away in a rage without
settling anything. CHAPTER XXV. Twentieth
and Twenty - first Years of the War - Intrigues
of Alcibiades - Withdrawal of the Persian
Subsidies - Oligarchical Coup d'Etat at Athens
- Patriotism of the Army at Samos THE Peloponnesians
now determined to sail to Rhodes, upon the
invitation of some of the principal men there,
hoping to gain an island powerful by the
number of its seamen and by its land forces,
and also thinking that they would be able
to maintain their fleet from their own confederacy,
without having to ask for money from Tissaphernes.
They accordingly at once set sail that same
winter from Cnidus, and first put in with
ninety-four ships at Camirus in the Rhodian
country, to the great alarm of the mass of
the inhabitants, who were not privy to the
intrigue, and who consequently fled, especially
as the town was unfortified. They were afterwards,
however, assembled by the Lacedaemonians
together with the inhabitants of the two
other towns of Lindus and Ialysus; and the
Rhodians were persuaded to revolt from the
Athenians and the island went over to the
Peloponnesians. Meanwhile the Athenians had
received the alarm and set sail with the
fleet from Samos to forestall them, and came
within sight of the island, but being a little
too late sailed off for the moment to Chalce,
and from thence to Samos, and subsequently
waged war against Rhodes, issuing from Chalce,
Cos, and Samos. The Peloponnesians now levied
a contribution of thirty-two talents from
the Rhodians, after which they hauled their
ships ashore and for eighty days remained
inactive. During this time, and even earlier,
before they removed to Rhodes, the following
intrigues took place. After the death of
Chalcideus and the battle at Miletus, Alcibiades
began to be suspected by the Peloponnesians;
and Astyochus received from Lacedaemon an
order from them to put him to death, he being
the personal enemy of Agis, and in other
respects thought unworthy of confidence.
Alcibiades in his alarm first withdrew to
Tissaphernes, and immediately began to do
all he could with him to injure the Peloponnesian
cause. Henceforth becoming his adviser in
everything, he cut down the pay from an Attic
drachma to three obols a day, and even this
not paid too regularly; and told Tissaphernes
to say to the Peloponnesians that the Athenians,
whose maritime experience was of an older
date than their own, only gave their men
three obols, not so much from poverty as
to prevent their seamen being corrupted by
being too well off, and injuring their condition
by spending money upon enervating indulgences,
and also paid their crews irregularly in
order to have a security against their deserting
in the arrears which they would leave behind
them. He also told Tissaphernes to bribe
the captains and generals of the cities,
and so to obtain their connivance- an expedient
which succeeded with all except the Syracusans,
Hermocrates alone opposing him on behalf
of the whole confederacy. Meanwhile the cities
asking for money Alcibiades sent off, by
roundly telling them in the name of Tissaphernes
that it was great impudence in the Chians,
the richest people in Hellas, not content
with being defended by a foreign force, to
expect others to risk not only their lives
but their money as well in behalf of their
freedom; while the other cities, he said,
had had to pay largely to Athens before their
rebellion, and could not justly refuse to
contribute as much or even more now for their
own selves. He also pointed out that Tissaphernes
was at present carrying on the war at his
own charges, and had good cause for economy,
but that as soon as he received remittances
from the king he would give them their pay
in full and do what was reasonable for the
cities. Alcibiades further advised Tissaphernes
not to be in too great a hurry to end the
war, or to let himself be persuaded to bring
up the Phoenician fleet which he was equipping,
or to provide pay for more Hellenes, and
thus put the power by land and sea into the
same hands; but to leave each of the contending
parties in possession of one element, thus
enabling the king when he found one troublesome
to call in the other. For if the command
of the sea and land were united in one hand,
he would not know where to turn for help
to overthrow the dominant power; unless he
at last chose to stand up himself, and go
through with the struggle at great expense
and hazard. The cheapest plan was to let
the Hellenes wear each other out, at a small
share of the expense and without risk to
himself. Besides, he would find the Athenians
the most convenient partners in empire as
they did not aim at conquests on shore, and
carried on the war upon principles and with
a practice most advantageous to the King;
being prepared to combine to conquer the
sea for Athens, and for the King all the
Hellenes inhabiting his country, whom the
Peloponnesians, on the contrary, had come
to liberate. Now it was not likely that the
Lacedaemonians would free the Hellenes from
the Hellenic Athenians, without freeing them
also from the barbarian Mede, unless overthrown
by him in the meanwhile. Alcibiades therefore
urged him to wear them both out at first,
and, after docking the Athenian power as
much as he could, forthwith to rid the country
of the Peloponnesians. In the main Tissaphernes
approved of this policy, so far at least
as could be conjectured from his behaviour;
since he now gave his confidence to Alcibiades
in recognition of his good advice, and kept
the Peloponnesians short of money, and would
not let them fight at sea, but ruined their
cause by pretending that the Phoenician fleet
would arrive, and that they would thus be
enabled to contend with the odds in their
favour, and so made their navy lose its efficiency,
which had been very remarkable, and generally
betrayed a coolness in the war that was too
plain to be mistaken. Alcibiades gave this
advice to Tissaphernes and the King, with
whom he then was, not merely because he thought
it really the best, but because he was studying
means to effect his restoration to his country,
well knowing that if he did not destroy it
he might one day hope to persuade the Athenians
to recall him, and thinking that his best
chance of persuading them lay in letting
them see that he possessed the favour of
Tissaphernes. The event proved him to be
right. When the Athenians at Samos found
that he had influence with Tissaphernes,
principally of their own motion (though partly
also through Alcibiades himself sending word
to their chief men to tell the best men in
the army that, if there were only an oligarchy
in the place of the rascally democracy that
had banished him, he would be glad to return
to his country and to make Tissaphernes their
friend), the captains and chief men in the
armament at once embraced the idea of subverting
the democracy. The design was first mooted
in the camp, and afterwards from thence reached
the city. Some persons crossed over from
Samos and had an interview with Alcibiades,
who immediately offered to make first Tissaphernes,
and afterwards the King, their friend, if
they would give up the democracy and make
it possible for the King to trust them. The
higher class, who also suffered most severely
from the war, now conceived great hopes of
getting the government into their own hands,
and of triumphing over the enemy. Upon their
return to Samos the emissaries formed their
partisans into a club, and openly told the
mass of the armament that the King would
be their friend, and would provide them with
money, if Alcibiades were restored and the
democracy abolished. The multitude, if at
first irritated by these intrigues, were
nevertheless kept quiet by the advantageous
prospect of the pay from the King; and the
oligarchical conspirators, after making this
communication to the people, now re-examined
the proposals of Alcibiades among themselves,
with most of their associates. Unlike the
rest, who thought them advantageous and trustworthy,
Phrynichus, who was still general, by no
means approved of the proposals. Alcibiades,
he rightly thought, cared no more for an
oligarchy than for a democracy, and only
sought to change the institutions of his
country in order to get himself recalled
by his associates; while for themselves their
one object should be to avoid civil discord.
It was not the King's interest, when the
Peloponnesians were now their equals at sea,
and in possession of some of the chief cities
in his empire, to go out of his way to side
with the Athenians whom he did not trust,
when he might make friends of the Peloponnesians
who had never injured him. And as for the
allied states to whom oligarchy was now offered,
because the democracy was to be put down
at Athens, he well knew that this would not
make the rebels come in any the sooner, or
confirm the loyal in their allegiance; as
the allies would never prefer servitude with
an oligarchy or democracy to freedom with
the constitution which they actually enjoyed,
to whichever type it belonged. Besides, the
cities thought that the so-called better
classes would prove just as oppressive as
the commons, as being those who originated,
proposed, and for the most part benefited
from the acts of the commons injurious to
the confederates. Indeed, if it depended
on the better classes, the confederates would
be put to death without trial and with violence;
while the commons were their refuge and the
chastiser of these men. This he positively
knew that the cities had learned by experience,
and that such was their opinion. The propositions
of Alcibiades, and the intrigues now in progress,
could therefore never meet with his approval.
However, the members of the club assembled,
agreeably to their original determination,
accepted what was proposed, and prepared
to send Pisander and others on an embassy
to Athens to treat for the restoration of
Alcibiades and the abolition of the democracy
in the city, and thus to make Tissaphernes
the friend of the Athenians. Phrynichus now
saw that there would be a proposal to restore
Alcibiades, and that the Athenians would
consent to it; and fearing after what he
had said against it that Alcibiades, if restored,
would revenge himself upon him for his opposition,
had recourse to the following expedient.
He sent a secret letter to the Lacedaemonian
admiral Astyochus, who was still in the neighbourhood
of Miletus, to tell him that Alcibiades was
ruining their cause by making Tissaphernes
the friend of the Athenians, and containing
an express revelation of the rest of the
intrigue, desiring to be excused if he sought
to harm his enemy even at the expense of
the interests of his country. However, Astyochus,
instead of thinking of punishing Alcibiades,
who, besides, no longer ventured within his
reach as formerly, went up to him and Tissaphernes
at Magnesia, communicated to them the letter
from Samos, and turned informer, and, if
report may be trusted, became the paid creature
of Tissaphernes, undertaking to inform him
as to this and all other matters; which was
also the reason why he did not remonstrate
more strongly against the pay not being given
in full. Upon this Alcibiades instantly sent
to the authorities at Samos a letter against
Phrynichus, stating what he had done, and
requiring that he should be put to death.
Phrynichus distracted, and placed in the
utmost peril by the denunciation, sent again
to Astyochus, reproaching him with having
so ill kept the secret of his previous letter,
and saying that he was now prepared to give
them an opportunity of destroying the whole
Athenian armament at Samos; giving a detailed
account of the means which he should employ,
Samos being unfortified, and pleading that,
being in danger of his life on their account,
he could not now be blamed for doing this
or anything else to escape being destroyed
by his mortal enemies. This also Astyochus
revealed to Alcibiades. Meanwhile Phrynichus
having had timely notice that he was playing
him false, and that a letter on the subject
was on the point of arriving from Alcibiades,
himself anticipated the news, and told the
army that the enemy, seeing that Samos was
unfortified and the fleet not all stationed
within the harbour, meant to attack the camp,
that he could be certain of this intelligence,
and that they must fortify Samos as quickly
as possible, and generally look to their
defences. It will be remembered that he was
general, and had himself authority to carry
out these measures. Accordingly they addressed
themselves to the work of fortification,
and Samos was thus fortified sooner than
it would otherwise have been. Not long afterwards
came the letter from Alcibiades, saying that
the army was betrayed by Phrynichus, and
the enemy about to attack it. Alcibiades,
however, gained no credit, it being thought
that he was in the secret of the enemy's
designs, and had tried to fasten them upon
Phrynichus, and to make out that he was their
accomplice, out of hatred; and consequently
far from hurting him he rather bore witness
to what he had said by this intelligence.
After this Alcibiades set to work to persuade
Tissaphernes to become the friend of the
Athenians. Tissaphernes, although afraid
of the Peloponnesians because they had more
ships in Asia than the Athenians, was yet
disposed to be persuaded if he could, especially
after his quarrel with the Peloponnesians
at Cnidus about the treaty of Therimenes.
The quarrel had already taken place, as the
Peloponnesians were by this time actually
at Rhodes; and in it the original argument
of Alcibiades touching the liberation of
all the towns by the Lacedaemonians had been
verified by the declaration of Lichas that
it was impossible to submit to a convention
which made the King master of all the states
at any former time ruled by himself or by
his fathers. While Alcibiades was besieging
the favour of Tissaphernes with an earnestness
proportioned to the greatness of the issue,
the Athenian envoys who had been dispatched
from Samos with Pisander arrived at Athens,
and made a speech before the people, giving
a brief summary of their views, and particularly
insisting that, if Alcibiades were recalled
and the democratic constitution changed,
they could have the King as their ally, and
would be able to overcome the Peloponnesians.
A number of speakers opposed them on the
question of the democracy, the enemies of
Alcibiades cried out against the scandal
of a restoration to be effected by a violation
of the constitution, and the Eumolpidae and
Ceryces protested in behalf of the mysteries,
the cause of his banishment, and called upon
the gods to avert his recall; when Pisander,
in the midst of much opposition and abuse,
came forward, and taking each of his opponents
aside asked him the following question: In
the face of the fact that the Peloponnesians
had as many ships as their own confronting
them at sea, more cities in alliance with
them, and the King and Tissaphernes to supply
them with money, of which the Athenians had
none left, had he any hope of saving the
state, unless someone could induce the King
to come over to their side? Upon their replying
that they had not, he then plainly said to
them: "This we cannot have unless we
have a more moderate form of government,
and put the offices into fewer hands, and
so gain the King's confidence, and forthwith
restore Alcibiades, who is the only man living
that can bring this about. The safety of
the state, not the form of its government,
is for the moment the most pressing question,
as we can always change afterwards whatever
we do not like." The people were at
first highly irritated at the mention of
an oligarchy, but upon understanding clearly
from Pisander that this was the only resource
left, they took counsel of their fears, and
promised themselves some day to change the
government again, and gave way. They accordingly
voted that Pisander should sail with ten
others and make the best arrangement that
they could with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades.
At the same time the people, upon a false
accusation of Pisander, dismissed Phrynichus
from his post together with his colleague
Scironides, sending Diomedon and Leon to
replace them in the command of the fleet.
The accusation was that Phrynichus had betrayed
Iasus and Amorges; and Pisander brought it
because he thought him a man unfit for the
business now in hand with Alcibiades. Pisander
also went the round of all the clubs already
existing in the city for help in lawsuits
and elections, and urged them to draw together
and to unite their efforts for the overthrow
of the democracy; and after taking all other
measures required by the circumstances, so
that no time might be lost, set off with
his ten companions on his voyage to Tissaphernes.
In the same winter Leon and Diomedon, who
had by this time joined the fleet, made an
attack upon Rhodes. The ships of the Peloponnesians
they found hauled up on shore, and, after
making a descent upon the coast and defeating
the Rhodians who appeared in the field against
them, withdrew to Chalce and made that place
their base of operations instead of Cos,
as they could better observe from thence
if the Peloponnesian fleet put out to sea.
Meanwhile Xenophantes, a Laconian, came to
Rhodes from Pedaritus at Chios, with the
news that the fortification of the Athenians
was now finished, and that, unless the whole
Peloponnesian fleet came to the rescue, the
cause in Chios must be lost. Upon this they
resolved to go to his relief. In the meantime
Pedaritus, with the mercenaries that he had
with him and the whole force of the Chians,
made an assault upon the work round the Athenian
ships and took a portion of it, and got possession
of some vessels that were hauled up on shore,
when the Athenians sallied out to the rescue,
and first routing the Chians, next defeated
the remainder of the force round Pedaritus,
who was himself killed, with many of the
Chians, a great number of arms being also
taken. After this the Chians were besieged
even more straitly than before by land and
sea, and the famine in the place was great.
Meanwhile the Athenian envoys with Pisander
arrived at the court of Tissaphernes, and
conferred with him about the proposed agreement.
However, Alcibiades, not being altogether
sure of Tissaphernes (who feared the Peloponnesians
more than the Athenians, and besides wished
to wear out both parties, as Alcibiades himself
had recommended), had recourse to the following
stratagem to make the treaty between the
Athenians and Tissaphernes miscarry by reason
of the magnitude of his demands. In my opinion
Tissaphernes desired this result, fear being
his motive; while Alcibiades, who now saw
that Tissaphernes was determined not to treat
on any terms, wished the Athenians to think,
not that he was unable to persuade Tissaphernes,
but that after the latter had been persuaded
and was willing to join them, they had not
conceded enough to him. For the demands of
Alcibiades, speaking for Tissaphernes, who
was present, were so extravagant that the
Athenians, although for a long while they
agreed to whatever he asked, yet had to bear
the blame of failure: he required the cession
of the whole of Ionia, next of the islands
adjacent, besides other concessions, and
these passed without opposition; at last,
in the third interview, Alcibiades, who now
feared a complete discovery of his inability,
required them to allow the King to build
ships and sail along his own coast wherever
and with as many as he pleased. Upon this
the Athenians would yield no further, and
concluding that there was nothing to be done,
but that they had been deceived by Alcibiades,
went away in a passion and proceeded to Samos.
Tissaphernes immediately after this, in the
same winter, proceeded along shore to Caunus,
desiring to bring the Peloponnesian fleet
back to Miletus, and to supply them with
pay, making a fresh convention upon such
terms as he could get, in order not to bring
matters to an absolute breach between them.
He was afraid that if many of their ships
were left without pay they would be compelled
to engage and be defeated, or that their
vessels being left without hands the Athenians
would attain their objects without his assistance.
Still more he feared that the Peloponnesians
might ravage the continent in search of supplies.
Having calculated and considered all this,
agreeably to his plan of keeping the two
sides equal, he now sent for the Peloponnesians
and gave them pay, and concluded with them
a third treaty in words following: In the
thirteenth year of the reign of Darius, while
Alexippidas was ephor at Lacedaemon, a convention
was concluded in the plain of the Maeander
by the Lacedaemonians and their allies with
Tissaphernes, Hieramenes, and the sons of
Pharnaces, concerning the affairs of the
King and of the Lacedaemonians and their
allies. 1. The country of the King in Asia
shall be the King's, and the King shall treat
his own country as he pleases. 2. The Lacedaemonians
and their allies shall not invade or injure
the King's country: neither shall the King
invade or injure that of the Lacedaemonians
or of their allies. If any of the Lacedaemonians
or of their allies invade or injure the King's
country, the Lacedaemonians and their allies
shall prevent it: and if any from the King's
country invade or injure the country of the
Lacedaemonians or of their allies, the King
shall prevent it. 3. Tissaphernes shall provide
pay for the ships now present, according
to the agreement, until the arrival of the
King's vessels: but after the arrival of
the King's vessels the Lacedaemonians and
their allies may pay their own ships if they
wish it. If, however, they choose to receive
the pay from Tissaphernes, Tissaphernes shall
furnish it: and the Lacedaemonians and their
allies shall repay him at the end of the
war such moneys as they shall have received.
4. After the vessels have arrived, the ships
of the Lacedaemonians and of their allies
and those of the King shall carry on the
war jointly, according as Tissaphernes and
the Lacedaemonians and their allies shall
think best. If they wish to make peace with
the Athenians, they shall make peace also
jointly. This was the treaty. After this
Tissaphernes prepared to bring up the Phoenician
fleet according to agreement, and to make
good his other promises, or at all events
wished to make it appear that he was so preparing.
Winter was now drawing towards its close,
when the Boeotians took Oropus by treachery,
though held by an Athenian garrison. Their
accomplices in this were some of the Eretrians
and of the Oropians themselves, who were
plotting the revolt of Euboea, as the place
was exactly opposite Eretria, and while in
Athenian hands was necessarily a source of
great annoyance to Eretria and the rest of
Euboea. Oropus being in their hands, the
Eretrians now came to Rhodes to invite the
Peloponnesians into Euboea. The latter, however,
were rather bent on the relief of the distressed
Chians, and accordingly put out to sea and
sailed with all their ships from Rhodes.
Off Triopium they sighted the Athenian fleet
out at sea sailing from Chalce, and, neither
attacking the other, arrived, the latter
at Samos, the Peloponnesians at Miletus,
seeing that it was no longer possible to
relieve Chios without a battle. And this
winter ended, and with it ended the twentieth
year of this war of which Thucydides is the
historian. Early in the spring of the summer
following, Dercyllidas, a Spartan, was sent
with a small force by land to the Hellespont
to effect the revolt of Abydos, which is
a Milesian colony; and the Chians, while
Astyochus was at a loss how to help them,
were compelled to fight at sea by the pressure
of the siege. While Astyochus was still at
Rhodes they had received from Miletus, as
their commander after the death of Pedaritus,
a Spartan named Leon, who had come out with
Antisthenes, and twelve vessels which had
been on guard at Miletus, five of which were
Thurian, four Syracusans, one from Anaia,
one Milesian, and one Leon's own. Accordingly
the Chians marched out in mass and took up
a strong position, while thirty-six of their
ships put out and engaged thirty-two of the
Athenians; and after a tough fight, in which
the Chians and their allies had rather the
best of it, as it was now late, retired to
their city. Immediately after this Dercyllidas
arrived by land from Miletus; and Abydos
in the Hellespont revolted to him and Pharnabazus,
and Lampsacus two days later. Upon receipt
of this news Strombichides hastily sailed
from Chios with twenty-four Athenian ships,
some transports carrying heavy infantry being
of the number, and defeating the Lampsacenes
who came out against him, took Lampsacus,
which was unfortified, at the first assault,
and making prize of the slaves and goods
restored the freemen to their homes, and
went on to Abydos. The inhabitants, however,
refusing to capitulate, and his assaults
failing to take the place, he sailed over
to the coast opposite, and appointed Sestos,
the town in the Chersonese held by the Medes
at a former period in this history, as the
centre for the defence of the whole Hellespont.
In the meantime the Chians commanded the
sea more than before; and the Peloponnesians
at Miletus and Astyochus, hearing of the
sea-fight and of the departure of the squadron
with Strombichides, took fresh courage. Coasting
along with two vessels to Chios, Astyochus
took the ships from that place, and now moved
with the whole fleet upon Samos, from whence,
however, he sailed back to Miletus, as the
Athenians did not put out against him, owing
to their suspicions of one another. For it
was about this time, or even before, that
the democracy was put down at Athens. When
Pisander and the envoys returned from Tissaphernes
to Samos they at once strengthened still
further their interest in the army itself,
and instigated the upper class in Samos to
join them in establishing an oligarchy, the
very form of government which a party of
them had lately risen to avoid. At the same
time the Athenians at Samos, after a consultation
among themselves, determined to let Alcibiades
alone, since he refused to join them, and
besides was not the man for an oligarchy;
and now that they were once embarked, to
see for themselves how they could best prevent
the ruin of their cause, and meanwhile to
sustain the war, and to contribute without
stint money and all else that might be required
from their own private estates, as they would
henceforth labour for themselves alone. After
encouraging each other in these resolutions,
they now at once sent off half the envoys
and Pisander to do what was necessary at
Athens (with instructions to establish oligarchies
on their way in all the subject cities which
they might touch at), and dispatched the
other half in different directions to the
other dependencies. Diitrephes also, who
was in the neighbourhood of Chios, and had
been elected to the command of the Thracian
towns, was sent off to his government, and
arriving at Thasos abolished the democracy
there. Two months, however, had not elapsed
after his departure before the Thasians began
to fortify their town, being already tired
of an aristocracy with Athens, and in daily
expectation of freedom from Lacedaemon. Indeed
there was a party of them (whom the Athenians
had banished), with the Peloponnesians, who
with their friends in the town were already
making every exertion to bring a squadron,
and to effect the revolt of Thasos; and this
party thus saw exactly what they most wanted
done, that is to say, the reformation of
the government without risk, and the abolition
of the democracy which would have opposed
them. Things at Thasos thus turned out just
the contrary to what the oligarchical conspirators
at Athens expected; and the same in my opinion
was the case in many of the other dependencies;
as the cities no sooner got a moderate government
and liberty of action, than they went on
to absolute freedom without being at all
seduced by the show of reform offered by
the Athenians. Pisander and his colleagues
on their voyage alongshore abolished, as
had been determined, the democracies in the
cities, and also took some heavy infantry
from certain places as their allies, and
so came to Athens. Here they found most of
the work already done by their associates.
Some of the younger men had banded together,
and secretly assassinated one Androcles,
the chief leader of the commons, and mainly
responsible for the banishment of Alcibiades;
Androcles being singled out both because
he was a popular leader and because they
sought by his death to recommend themselves
to Alcibiades, who was, as they supposed,
to be recalled, and to make Tissaphernes
their friend. There were also some other
obnoxious persons whom they secretly did
away with in the same manner. Meanwhile their
cry in public was that no pay should be given
except to persons serving in the war, and
that not more than five thousand should share
in the government, and those such as were
most able to serve the state in person and
in purse. But this was a mere catchword for
the multitude, as the authors of the revolution
were really to govern. However, the Assembly
and the Council of the Bean still met notwithstanding,
although they discussed nothing that was
not approved of by the conspirators, who
both supplied the speakers and reviewed in
advance what they were to say. Fear, and
the sight of the numbers of the conspirators,
closed the mouths of the rest; or if any
ventured to rise in opposition, he was presently
put to death in some convenient way, and
there was neither search for the murderers
nor justice to be had against them if suspected;
but the people remained motionless, being
so thoroughly cowed that men thought themselves
lucky to escape violence, even when they
held their tongues. An exaggerated belief
in the numbers of the conspirators also demoralized
the people, rendered helpless by the magnitude
of the city, and by their want of intelligence
with each other, and being without means
of finding out what those numbers really
were. For the same reason it was impossible
for any one to open his grief to a neighbour
and to concert measures to defend himself,
as he would have had to speak either to one
whom he did not know, or whom he knew but
did not trust. Indeed all the popular party
approached each other with suspicion, each
thinking his neighbour concerned in what
was going on, the conspirators having in
their ranks persons whom no one could ever
have believed capable of joining an oligarchy;
and these it was who made the many so suspicious,
and so helped to procure impunity for the
few, by confirming the commons in their mistrust
of one another. At this juncture arrived
Pisander and his colleagues, who lost no
time in doing the rest. First they assembled
the people, and moved to elect ten commissioners
with full powers to frame a constitution,
and that when this was done they should on
an appointed day lay before the people their
opinion as to the best mode of governing
the city. Afterwards, when the day arrived,
the conspirators enclosed the assembly in
Colonus, a temple of Poseidon, a little more
than a mile outside the city; when the commissioners
simply brought forward this single motion,
that any Athenian might propose with impunity
whatever measure he pleased, heavy penalties
being imposed upon any who should indict
for illegality, or otherwise molest him for
so doing. The way thus cleared, it was now
plainly declared that all tenure of office
and receipt of pay under the existing institutions
were at an end, and that five men must be
elected as presidents, who should in their
turn elect one hundred, and each of the hundred
three apiece; and that this body thus made
up to four hundred should enter the council
chamber with full powers and govern as they
judged best, and should convene the five
thousand whenever they pleased. The man who
moved this resolution was Pisander, who was
throughout the chief ostensible agent in
putting down the democracy. But he who concerted
the whole affair, and prepared the way for
the catastrophe, and who had given the greatest
thought to the matter, was Antiphon, one
of the best men of his day in Athens; who,
with a head to contrive measures and a tongue
to recommend them, did not willingly come
forward in the assembly or upon any public
scene, being ill looked upon by the multitude
owing to his reputation for talent; and who
yet was the one man best able to aid in the
courts, or before the assembly, the suitors
who required his opinion. Indeed, when he
was afterwards himself tried for his life
on the charge of having been concerned in
setting up this very government, when the
Four Hundred were overthrown and hardly dealt
with by the commons, he made what would seem
to be the best defence of any known up to
my time. Phrynichus also went beyond all
others in his zeal for the oligarchy. Afraid
of Alcibiades, and assured that he was no
stranger to his intrigues with Astyochus
at Samos, he held that no oligarchy was ever
likely to restore him, and once embarked
in the enterprise, proved, where danger was
to be faced, by far the staunchest of them
all. Theramenes, son of Hagnon, was also
one of the foremost of the subverters of
the democracy- a man as able in council as
in debate. Conducted by so many and by such
sagacious heads, the enterprise, great as
it was, not unnaturally went forward; although
it was no light matter to deprive the Athenian
people of its freedom, almost a hundred years
after the deposition of the tyrants, when
it had been not only not subject to any during
the whole of that period, but accustomed
during more than half of it to rule over
subjects of its own. The assembly ratified
the proposed constitution, without a single
opposing voice, and was then dissolved; after
which the Four Hundred were brought into
the council chamber in the following way.
On account of the enemy at Decelea, all the
Athenians were constantly on the wall or
in the ranks at the various military posts.
On that day the persons not in the secret
were allowed to go home as usual, while orders
were given to the accomplices of the conspirators
to hang about, without making any demonstration,
at some little distance from the posts, and
in case of any opposition to what was being
done, to seize the arms and put it down.
There were also some Andrians and Tenians,
three hundred Carystians, and some of the
settlers in Aegina come with their own arms
for this very purpose, who had received similar
instructions. These dispositions completed,
the Four Hundred went, each with a dagger
concealed about his person, accompanied by
one hundred and twenty Hellenic youths, whom
they employed wherever violence was needed,
and appeared before the Councillors of the
Bean in the council chamber, and told them
to take their pay and be gone; themselves
bringing it for the whole of the residue
of their term of office, and giving it to
them as they went out. Upon the Council withdrawing
in this way without venturing any objection,
and the rest of the citizens making no movement,
the Four Hundred entered the council chamber,
and for the present contented themselves
with drawing lots for their Prytanes, and
making their prayers and sacrifices to the
gods upon entering office, but afterwards
departed widely from the democratic system
of government, and except that on account
of Alcibiades they did not recall the exiles,
ruled the city by force; putting to death
some men, though not many, whom they thought
it convenient to remove, and imprisoning
and banishing others. They also sent to Agis,
the Lacedaemonian king, at Decelea, to say
that they desired to make peace, and that
he might reasonably be more disposed to treat
now that he had them to deal with instead
of the inconstant commons. Agis, however,
did not believe in the tranquillity of the
city, or that the commons would thus in a
moment give up their ancient liberty, but
thought that the sight of a large Lacedaemonian
force would be sufficient to excite them
if they were not already in commotion, of
which he was by no means certain. He accordingly
gave to the envoys of the Four Hundred an
answer which held out no hopes of an accommodation,
and sending for large reinforcements from
Peloponnese, not long afterwards, with these
and his garrison from Decelea, descended
to the very walls of Athens; hoping either
that civil disturbances might help to subdue
them to his terms, or that, in the confusion
to be expected within and without the city,
they might even surrender without a blow
being struck; at all events he thought he
would succeed in seizing the Long Walls,
bared of their defenders. However, the Athenians
saw him come close up, without making the
least disturbance within the city; and sending
out their cavalry, and a number of their
heavy infantry, light troops, and archers,
shot down some of his soldiers who approached
too near, and got possession of some arms
and dead. Upon this Agis, at last convinced,
led his army back again and, remaining with
his own troops in the old position at Decelea,
sent the reinforcement back home, after a
few days' stay in Attica. After this the
Four Hundred persevering sent another embassy
to Agis, and now meeting with a better reception,
at his suggestion dispatched envoys to Lacedaemon
to negotiate a treaty, being desirous of
making peace. They also sent ten men to Samos
to reassure the army, and to explain that
the oligarchy was not established for the
hurt of the city or the citizens, but for
the salvation of the country at large; and
that there were five thousand, not four hundred
only, concerned; although, what with their
expeditions and employments abroad, the Athenians
had never yet assembled to discuss a question
important enough to bring five thousand of
them together. The emissaries were also told
what to say upon all other points, and were
so sent off immediately after the establishment
of the new government, which feared, as it
turned out justly, that the mass of seamen
would not be willing to remain under the
oligarchical constitution, and, the evil
beginning there, might be the means of their
overthrow. Indeed at Samos the question of
the oligarchy had already entered upon a
new phase, the following events having taken
place just at the time that the Four Hundred
were conspiring. That part of the Samian
population which has been mentioned as rising
against the upper class, and as being the
democratic party, had now turned round, and
yielding to the solicitations of Pisander
during his visit, and of the Athenians in
the conspiracy at Samos, had bound themselves
by oaths to the number of three hundred,
and were about to fall upon the rest of their
fellow citizens, whom they now in their turn
regarded as the democratic party. Meanwhile
they put to death one Hyperbolus, an Athenian,
a pestilent fellow that had been ostracized,
not from fear of his influence or position,
but because he was a rascal and a disgrace
to the city; being aided in this by Charminus,
one of the generals, and by some of the Athenians
with them, to whom they had sworn friendship,
and with whom they perpetrated other acts
of the kind, and now determined to attack
the people. The latter got wind of what was
coming, and told two of the generals, Leon
and Diomedon, who, on account of the credit
which they enjoyed with the commons, were
unwilling supporters of the oligarchy; and
also Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, the former
a captain of a galley, the latter serving
with the heavy infantry, besides certain
others who had ever been thought most opposed
to the conspirators, entreating them not
to look on and see them destroyed, and Samos,
the sole remaining stay of their empire,
lost to the Athenians. Upon hearing this,
the persons whom they addressed now went
round the soldiers one by one, and urged
them to resist, especially the crew of the
Paralus, which was made up entirely of Athenians
and freemen, and had from time out of mind
been enemies of oligarchy, even when there
was no such thing existing; and Leon and
Diomedon left behind some ships for their
protection in case of their sailing away
anywhere themselves. Accordingly, when the
Three Hundred attacked the people, all these
came to the rescue, and foremost of all the
crew of the Paralus; and the Samian commons
gained the victory, and putting to death
some thirty of the Three Hundred, and banishing
three others of the ringleaders, accorded
an amnesty to the rest. and lived together
under a democratic government for the future.
The ship Paralus, with Chaereas, son of Archestratus,
on board, an Athenian who had taken an active
part in the revolution, was now without loss
of time sent off by the Samians and the army
to Athens to report what had occurred; the
fact that the Four Hundred were in power
not being yet known. When they sailed into
harbour the Four Hundred immediately arrested
two or three of the Parali and, taking the
vessel from the rest, shifted them into a
troopship and set them to keep guard round
Euboea. Chaereas, however, managed to secrete
himself as soon as he saw how things stood,
and returning to Samos, drew a picture to
the soldiers of the horrors enacting at Athens,
in which everything was exaggerated; saying
that all were punished with stripes, that
no one could say a word against the holders
of power, that the soldiers' wives and children
were outraged, and that it was intended to
seize and shut up the relatives of all in
the army at Samos who were not of the government's
way of thinking, to be put to death in case
of their disobedience; besides a host of
other injurious inventions. On hearing this
the first thought of the army was to fall
upon the chief authors of the oligarchy and
upon all the rest concerned. Eventually,
however, they desisted from this idea upon
the men of moderate views opposing it and
warning them against ruining their cause,
with the enemy close at hand and ready for
battle. After this, Thrasybulus, son of Lycus,
and Thrasyllus, the chief leaders in the
revolution, now wishing in the most public
manner to change the government at Samos
to a democracy, bound all the soldiers by
the most tremendous oaths, and those of the
oligarchical party more than any, to accept
a democratic government, to be united, to
prosecute actively the war with the Peloponnesians,
and to be enemies of the Four Hundred, and
to hold no communication with them. The same
oath was also taken by all the Samians of
full age; and the soldiers associated the
Samians in all their affairs and in the fruits
of their dangers, having the conviction that
there was no way of escape for themselves
or for them, but that the success of the
Four Hundred or of the enemy at Miletus must
be their ruin. The struggle now was between
the army trying to force a democracy upon
the city, and the Four Hundred an oligarchy
upon the camp. Meanwhile the soldiers forthwith
held an assembly, in which they deposed the
former generals and any of the captains whom
they suspected, and chose new captains and
generals to replace them, besides Thrasybulus
and Thrasyllus, whom they had already. They
also stood up and encouraged one another,
and among other things urged that they ought
not to lose heart because the city had revolted
from them, as the party seceding was smaller
and in every way poorer in resources than
themselves. They had the whole fleet with
which to compel the other cities in their
empire to give them money just as if they
had their base in the capital, having a city
in Samos which, so far from wanting strength,
had when at war been within an ace of depriving
the Athenians of the command of the sea,
while as far as the enemy was concerned they
had the same base of operations as before.
Indeed, with the fleet in their hands, they
were better able to provide themselves with
supplies than the government at home. It
was their advanced position at Samos which
had throughout enabled the home authorities
to command the entrance into Piraeus; and
if they refused to give them back the constitution,
they would now find that the army was more
in a position to exclude them from the sea
than they were to exclude the army. Besides,
the city was of little or no use towards
enabling them to overcome the enemy; and
they had lost nothing in losing those who
had no longer either money to send them (the
soldiers having to find this for themselves),
or good counsel, which entitles cities to
direct armies. On the contrary, even in this
the home government had done wrong in abolishing
the institutions of their ancestors, while
the army maintained the said institutions,
and would try to force the home government
to do so likewise. So that even in point
of good counsel the camp had as good counsellors
as the city. Moreover, they had but to grant
him security for his person and his recall,
and Alcibiades would be only too glad to
procure them the alliance of the King. And
above all if they failed altogether, with
the navy which they possessed, they had numbers
of places to retire to in which they would
find cities and lands. Debating together
and comforting themselves after this manner,
they pushed on their war measures as actively
as ever; and the ten envoys sent to Samos
by the Four Hundred, learning how matters
stood while they were still at Delos, stayed
quiet there. About this time a cry arose
among the soldiers in the Peloponnesian fleet
at Miletus that Astyochus and Tissaphernes
were ruining their cause. Astyochus had not
been willing to fight at sea- either before,
while they were still in full vigour and
the fleet of the Athenians small, or now,
when the enemy was, as they were informed,
in a state of sedition and his ships not
yet united- but kept them waiting for the
Phoenician fleet from Tissaphernes, which
had only a nominal existence, at the risk
of wasting away in inactivity. While Tissaphernes
not only did not bring up the fleet in question,
but was ruining their navy by payments made
irregularly, and even then not made in full.
They must therefore, they insisted, delay
no longer, but fight a decisive naval engagement.
The Syracusans were the most urgent of any.
The confederates and Astyochus, aware of
these murmurs, had already decided in council
to fight a decisive battle; and when the
news reached them of the disturbance at Samos,
they put to sea with all their ships, one
hundred and ten in number, and, ordering
the Milesians to move by land upon Mycale,
set sail thither. The Athenians with the
eighty-two ships from Samos were at the moment
lying at Glauce in Mycale, a point where
Samos approaches near to the continent; and,
seeing the Peloponnesian fleet sailing against
them, retired into Samos, not thinking themselves
numerically strong enough to stake their
all upon a battle. Besides, they had notice
from Miletus of the wish of the enemy to
engage, and were expecting to be joined from
the Hellespont by Strombichides, to whom
a messenger had been already dispatched,
with the ships that had gone from Chios to
Abydos. The Athenians accordingly withdrew
to Samos, and the Peloponnesians put in at
Mycale, and encamped with the land forces
of the Milesians and the people of the neighbourhood.
The next day they were about to sail against
Samos, when tidings reached them of the arrival
of Strombichides with the squadron from the
Hellespont, upon which they immediately sailed
back to Miletus. The Athenians, thus reinforced,
now in their turn sailed against Miletus
with a hundred and eight ships, wishing to
fight a decisive battle, but, as no one put
out to meet them, sailed back to Samos. CHAPTER
XXVI. Twenty-first Year of the War - Recall
of Alcibiades to Samos - Revolt of Euboea
and Downfall of the Four Hundred - Battle
of Cynossema IN the same summer, immediately
after this, the Peloponnesians having refused
to fight with their fleet united, through
not thinking themselves a match for the enemy,
and being at a loss where to look for money
for such a number of ships, especially as
Tissaphernes proved so bad a paymaster, sent
off Clearchus, son of Ramphias, with forty
ships to Pharnabazus, agreeably to the original
instructions from Peloponnese; Pharnabazus
inviting them and being prepared to furnish
pay, and Byzantium besides sending offers
to revolt to them. These Peloponnesian ships
accordingly put out into the open sea, in
order to escape the observation of the Athenians,
and being overtaken by a storm, the majority
with Clearchus got into Delos, and afterwards
returned to Miletus, whence Clearchus proceeded
by land to the Hellespont to take the command:
ten, however, of their number, under the
Megarian Helixus, made good their passage
to the Hellespont, and effected the revolt
of Byzantium. After this, the commanders
at Samos were informed of it, and sent a
squadron against them to guard the Hellespont;
and an encounter took place before Byzantium
between eight vessels on either side. Meanwhile
the chiefs at Samos, and especially Thrasybulus,
who from the moment that he had changed the
government had remained firmly resolved to
recall Alcibiades, at last in an assembly
brought over the mass of the soldiery, and
upon their voting for his recall and amnesty,
sailed over to Tissaphernes and brought Alcibiades
to Samos, being convinced that their only
chance of salvation lay in his bringing over
Tissaphernes from the Peloponnesians to themselves.
An assembly was then held in which Alcibiades
complained of and deplored his private misfortune
in having been banished, and speaking at
great length upon public affairs, highly
incited their hopes for the future, and extravagantly
magnified his own influence with Tissaphernes.
His object in this was to make the oligarchical
government at Athens afraid of him, to hasten
the dissolution of the clubs, to increase
his credit with the army at Samos and heighten
their own confidence, and lastly to prejudice
the enemy as strongly as possible against
Tissaphernes, and blast the hopes which they
entertained. Alcibiades accordingly held
out to the army such extravagant promises
as the following: that Tissaphernes had solemnly
assured him that if he could only trust the
Athenians they should never want for supplies
while he had anything left, no, not even
if he should have to coin his own silver
couch, and that he would bring the Phoenician
fleet now at Aspendus to the Athenians instead
of to the Peloponnesians; but that he could
only trust the Athenians if Alcibiades were
recalled to be his security for them. Upon
hearing this and much more besides, the Athenians
at once elected him general together with
the former ones, and put all their affairs
into his hands. There was now not a man in
the army who would have exchanged his present
hopes of safety and vengeance upon the Four
Hundred for any consideration whatever; and
after what they had been told they were now
inclined to disdain the enemy before them,
and to sail at once for Piraeus. To the plan
of sailing for Piraeus, leaving their more
immediate enemies behind them, Alcibiades
opposed the most positive refusal, in spite
of the numbers that insisted upon it, saying
that now that he had been elected general
he would first sail to Tissaphernes and concert
with him measures for carrying on the war.
Accordingly, upon leaving this assembly,
he immediately took his departure in order
to have it thought that there was an entire
confidence between them, and also wishing
to increase his consideration with Tissaphernes,
and to show that he had now been elected
general and was in a position to do him good
or evil as he chose; thus managing to frighten
the Athenians with Tissaphernes and Tissaphernes
with the Athenians. Meanwhile the Peloponnesians
at Miletus heard of the recall of Alcibiades
and, already distrustful of Tissaphernes,
now became far more disgusted with him than
ever. Indeed after their refusal to go out
and give battle to the Athenians when they
appeared before Miletus, Tissaphernes had
grown slacker than ever in his payments;
and even before this, on account of Alcibiades,
his unpopularity had been on the increase.
Gathering together, just as before, the soldiers
and some persons of consideration besides
the soldiery began to reckon up how they
had never yet received their pay in full;
that what they did receive was small in quantity,
and even that paid irregularly, and that
unless they fought a decisive battle or removed
to some station where they could get supplies,
the ships' crews would desert; and that it
was all the fault of Astyochus, who humoured
Tissaphernes for his own private advantage.
The army was engaged in these reflections,
when the following disturbance took place
about the person of Astyochus. Most of the
Syracusan and Thurian sailors were freemen,
and these the freest crews in the armament
were likewise the boldest in setting upon
Astyochus and demanding their pay. The latter
answered somewhat stiffly and threatened
them, and when Dorieus spoke up for his own
sailors even went so far as to lift his baton
against him; upon seeing which the mass of
men, in sailor fashion, rushed in a fury
to strike Astyochus. He, however, saw them
in time and fled for refuge to an altar;
and they were thus parted without his being
struck. Meanwhile the fort built by Tissaphernes
in Miletus was surprised and taken by the
Milesians, and the garrison in it turned
out- an act which met with the approval of
the rest of the allies, and in particular
of the Syracusans, but which found no favour
with Lichas, who said moreover that the Milesians
and the rest in the King's country ought
to show a reasonable submission to Tissaphernes
and to pay him court, until the war should
be happily settled. The Milesians were angry
with him for this and for other things of
the kind, and upon his afterwards dying of
sickness, would not allow him to be buried
where the Lacedaemonians with the army desired.
The discontent of the army with Astyochus
and Tissaphernes had reached this pitch,
when Mindarus arrived from Lacedaemon to
succeed Astyochus as admiral, and assumed
the command. Astyochus now set sail for home;
and Tissaphernes sent with him one of his
confidants, Gaulites, a Carian, who spoke
the two languages, to complain of the Milesians
for the affair of the fort, and at the same
time to defend himself against the Milesians,
who were, as he was aware, on their way to
Sparta chiefly to denounce his conduct, and
had with them Hermocrates, who was to accuse
Tissaphernes of joining with Alcibiades to
ruin the Peloponnesian cause and of playing
a double game. Indeed Hermocrates had always
been at enmity with him about the pay not
being restored in full; and eventually when
he was banished from Syracuse, and new commanders-
Potamis, Myscon, and Demarchus- had come
out to Miletus to the ships of the Syracusans,
Tissaphernes, pressed harder than ever upon
him in his exile, and among other charges
against him accused him of having once asked
him for money, and then given himself out
as his enemy because he failed to obtain
it. While Astyochus and the Milesians and
Hermocrates made sail for Lacedaemon, Alcibiades
had now crossed back from Tissaphernes to
Samos. After his return the envoys of the
Four Hundred sent, as has been mentioned
above, to pacify and explain matters to the
forces at Samos, arrived from Delos; and
an assembly was held in which they attempted
to speak. The soldiers at first would not
hear them, and cried out to put to death
the subverters of the democracy, but at last,
after some difficulty, calmed down and gave
them a hearing. Upon this the envoys proceeded
to inform them that the recent change had
been made to save the city, and not to ruin
it or to deliver it over to the enemy, for
they had already had an opportunity of doing
this when he invaded the country during their
government; that all the Five Thousand would
have their proper share in the government;
and that their hearers' relatives had neither
outrage, as Chaereas had slanderously reported,
nor other ill treatment to complain of, but
were all in undisturbed enjoyment of their
property just as they had left them. Besides
these they made a number of other statements
which had no better success with their angry
auditors; and amid a host of different opinions
the one which found most favour was that
of sailing to Piraeus. Now it was that Alcibiades
for the first time did the state a service,
and one of the most signal kind. For when
the Athenians at Samos were bent upon sailing
against their countrymen, in which case Ionia
and the Hellespont would most certainly at
once have passed into possession of the enemy,
Alcibiades it was who prevented them. At
that moment, when no other man would have
been able to hold back the multitude, he
put a stop to the intended expedition, and
rebuked and turned aside the resentment felt,
on personal grounds, against the envoys;
he dismissed them with an answer from himself,
to the effect that he did not object to the
government of the Five Thousand, but insisted
that the Four Hundred should be deposed and
the Council of Five Hundred reinstated in
power: meanwhile any retrenchments for economy,
by which pay might be better found for the
armament, met with his entire approval. Generally,
he bade them hold out and show a bold face
to the enemy, since if the city were saved
there was good hope that the two parties
might some day be reconciled, whereas if
either were once destroyed, that at Samos,
or that at Athens, there would no longer
be any one to be reconciled to. Meanwhile
arrived envoys from the Argives, with offers
of support to the Athenian commons at Samos:
these were thanked by Alcibiades, and dismissed
with a request to come when called upon.
The Argives were accompanied by the crew
of the Paralus, whom we left placed in a
troopship by the Four Hundred with orders
to cruise round Euboea, and who being employed
to carry to Lacedaemon some Athenian envoys
sent by the Four Hundred- Laespodias, Aristophon,
and Melesias- as they sailed by Argos laid
hands upon the envoys, and delivering them
over to the Argives as the chief subverters
of the democracy, themselves, instead of
returning to Athens, took the Argive envoys
on board, and came to Samos in the galley
which had been confided to them. The same
summer at the time that the return of Alcibiades
coupled with the general conduct of Tissaphernes
had carried to its height the discontent
of the Peloponnesians, who no longer entertained
any doubt of his having joined the Athenians,
Tissaphernes wishing, it would seem, to clear
himself to them of these charges, prepared
to go after the Phoenician fleet to Aspendus,
and invited Lichas to go with him; saying
that he would appoint Tamos as his lieutenant
to provide pay for the armament during his
own absence. Accounts differ, and it is not
easy to ascertain with what intention he
went to Aspendus, and did not bring the fleet
after all. That one hundred and forty-seven
Phoenician ships came as far as Aspendus
is certain; but why they did not come on
has been variously accounted for. Some think
that he went away in pursuance of his plan
of wasting the Peloponnesian resources, since
at any rate Tamos, his lieutenant, far from
being any better, proved a worse paymaster
than himself: others that he brought the
Phoenicians to Aspendus to exact money from
them for their discharge, having never intended
to employ them: others again that it was
in view of the outcry against him at Lacedaemon,
in order that it might be said that he was
not in fault, but that the ships were really
manned and that he had certainly gone to
fetch them. To myself it seems only too evident
that he did not bring up the fleet because
he wished to wear out and paralyse the Hellenic
forces, that is, to waste their strength
by the time lost during his journey to Aspendus,
and to keep them evenly balanced by not throwing
his weight into either scale. Had he wished
to finish the war, he could have done so,
assuming of course that he made his appearance
in a way which left no room for doubt; as
by bringing up the fleet he would in all
probability have given the victory to the
Lacedaemonians, whose navy, even as it was,
faced the Athenian more as an equal than
as an inferior. But what convicts him most
clearly, is the excuse which he put forward
for not bringing the ships. He said that
the number assembled was less than the King
had ordered; but surely it would only have
enhanced his credit if he spent little of
the King's money and effected the same end
at less cost. In any case, whatever was his
intention, Tissaphernes went to Aspendus
and saw the Phoenicians; and the Peloponnesians
at his desire sent a Lacedaemonian called
Philip with two galleys to fetch the fleet.
Alcibiades finding that Tissaphernes had
gone to Aspendus, himself sailed thither
with thirteen ships, promising to do a great
and certain service to the Athenians at Samos,
as he would either bring the Phoenician fleet
to the Athenians, or at all events prevent
its joining the Peloponnesians. In all probability
he had long known that Tissaphernes never
meant to bring the fleet at all, and wished
to compromise him as much as possible in
the eyes of the Peloponnesians through his
apparent friendship for himself and the Athenians,
and thus in a manner to oblige him to join
their side. While Alcibiades weighed anchor
and sailed eastward straight for Phaselis
and Caunus, the envoys sent by the Four Hundred
to Samos arrived at Athens. Upon their delivering
the message from Alcibiades, telling them
to hold out and to show a firm front to the
enemy, and saying that he had great hopes
of reconciling them with the army and of
overcoming the Peloponnesians, the majority
of the members of the oligarchy, who were
already discontented and only too much inclined
to be quit of the business in any safe way
that they could, were at once greatly strengthened
in their resolve. These now banded together
and strongly criticized the administration,
their leaders being some of the principal
generals and men in office under the oligarchy,
such as Theramenes, son of Hagnon, Aristocrates,
son of Scellias, and others; who, although
among the most prominent members of the government
(being afraid, as they said, of the army
at Samos, and most especially of Alcibiades,
and also lest the envoys whom they had sent
to Lacedaemon might do the state some harm
without the authority of the people), without
insisting on objections to the excessive
concentration of power in a few hands, yet
urged that the Five Thousand must be shown
to exist not merely in name but in reality,
and the constitution placed upon a fairer
basis. But this was merely their political
cry; most of them being driven by private
ambition into the line of conduct so surely
fatal to oligarchies that arise out of democracies.
For all at once pretend to be not only equals
but each the chief and master of his fellows;
while under a democracy a disappointed candidate
accepts his defeat more easily, because he
has not the humiliation of being beaten by
his equals. But what most clearly encouraged
the malcontents was the power of Alcibiades
at Samos, and their own disbelief in the
stability of the oligarchy; and it was now
a race between them as to which should first
become the leader of the commons. Meanwhile
the leaders and members of the Four Hundred
most opposed to a democratic form of government-
Phrynichus who had had the quarrel with Alcibiades
during his command at Samos, Aristarchus
the bitter and inveterate enemy of the commons,
and Pisander and Antiphon and others of the
chiefs who already as soon as they entered
upon power, and again when the army at Samos
seceded from them and declared for a democracy,
had sent envoys from their own body to Lacedaemon
and made every effort for peace, and had
built the wall in Eetionia- now redoubled
their exertions when their envoys returned
from Samos, and they saw not only the people
but their own most trusted associates turning
against them. Alarmed at the state of things
at Athens as at Samos, they now sent off
in haste Antiphon and Phrynichus and ten
others with injunctions to make peace with
Lacedaemon upon any terms, no matter what,
that should be at all tolerable. Meanwhile
they pushed on more actively than ever with
the wall in Eetionia. Now the meaning of
this wall, according to Theramenes and his
supporters, was not so much to keep out the
army of Samos, in case of its trying to force
its way into Piraeus, as to be able to let
in, at pleasure, the fleet and army of the
enemy. For Eetionia is a mole of Piraeus,
close alongside of the entrance of the harbour,
and was now fortified in connection with
the wall already existing on the land side,
so that a few men placed in it might be able
to command the entrance; the old wall on
the land side and the new one now being built
within on the side of the sea, both ending
in one of the two towers standing at the
narrow mouth of the harbour. They also walled
off the largest porch in Piraeus which was
in immediate connection with this wall, and
kept it in their own hands, compelling all
to unload there the corn that came into the
harbour, and what they had in stock, and
to take it out from thence when they sold
it. These measures had long provoked the
murmurs of Theramenes, and when the envoys
returned from Lacedaemon without having effected
any general pacification, he affirmed that
this wall was like to prove the ruin of the
state. At this moment forty-two ships from
Peloponnese, including some Siceliot and
Italiot vessels from Locri and Tarentum,
had been invited over by the Euboeans and
were already riding off Las in Laconia preparing
for the voyage to Euboea, under the command
of Agesandridas, son of Agesander, a Spartan.
Theramenes now affirmed that this squadron
was destined not so much to aid Euboea as
the party fortifying Eetionia, and that unless
precautions were speedily taken the city
would be surprised and lost. This was no
mere calumny, there being really some such
plan entertained by the accused. Their first
wish was to have the oligarchy without giving
up the empire; failing this to keep their
ships and walls and be independent; while,
if this also were denied them, sooner than
be the first victims of the restored democracy,
they were resolved to call in the enemy and
make peace, give up their walls and ships,
and at all costs retain possession of the
government, if their lives were only assured
to them. For this reason they pushed forward
the construction of their work with posterns
and entrances and means of introducing the
enemy, being eager to have it finished in
time. Meanwhile the murmurs against them
were at first confined to a few persons and
went on in secret, until Phrynichus, after
his return from the embassy to Lacedaemon,
was laid wait for and stabbed in full market
by one of the Peripoli, falling down dead
before he had gone far from the council chamber.
The assassin escaped; but his accomplice,
an Argive, was taken and put to the torture
by the Four Hundred, without their being
able to extract from him the name of his
employer, or anything further than that he
knew of many men who used to assemble at
the house of the commander of the Peripoli
and at other houses. Here the matter was
allowed to drop. This so emboldened Theramenes
and Aristocrates and the rest of their partisans
in the Four Hundred and out of doors, that
they now resolved to act. For by this time
the ships had sailed round from Las, and
anchoring at Epidaurus had overrun Aegina;
and Theramenes asserted that, being bound
for Euboea, they would never have sailed
in to Aegina and come back to anchor at Epidaurus,
unless they had been invited to come to aid
in the designs of which he had always accused
the government. Further inaction had therefore
now become impossible. In the end, after
a great many seditious harangues and suspicions,
they set to work in real earnest. The heavy
infantry in Piraeus building the wall in
Eetionia, among whom was Aristocrates, a
colonel, with his own tribe, laid hands upon
Alexicles, a general under the oligarchy
and the devoted adherent of the cabal, and
took him into a house and confined him there.
In this they were assisted by one Hermon,
commander of the Peripoli in Munychia, and
others, and above all had with them the great
bulk of the heavy infantry. As soon as the
news reached the Four Hundred, who happened
to be sitting in the council chamber, all
except the disaffected wished at once to
go to the posts where the arms were, and
menaced Theramenes and his party. Theramenes
defended himself, and said that he was ready
immediately to go and help to rescue Alexicles;
and taking with him one of the generals belonging
to his party, went down to Piraeus, followed
by Aristarchus and some young men of the
cavalry. All was now panic and confusion.
Those in the city imagined that Piraeus was
already taken and the prisoner put to death,
while those in Piraeus expected every moment
to be attacked by the party in the city.
The older men, however, stopped the persons
running up and down the town and making for
the stands of arms; and Thucydides the Pharsalian,
proxenus of the city, came forward and threw
himself in the way of the rival factions,
and appealed to them not to ruin the state,
while the enemy was still at hand waiting
for his opportunity, and so at length succeeded
in quieting them and in keeping their hands
off each other. Meanwhile Theramenes came
down to Piraeus, being himself one of the
generals, and raged and stormed against the
heavy infantry, while Aristarchus and the
adversaries of the people were angry in right
earnest. Most of the heavy infantry, however,
went on with the business without faltering,
and asked Theramenes if he thought the wall
had been constructed for any good purpose,
and whether it would not be better that it
should be pulled down. To this he answered
that if they thought it best to pull it down,
he for his part agreed with them. Upon this
the heavy infantry and a number of the people
in Piraeus immediately got up on the fortification
and began to demolish it. Now their cry to
the multitude was that all should join in
the work who wished the Five Thousand to
govern instead of the Four Hundred. For instead
of saying in so many words "all who
wished the commons to govern," they
still disguised themselves under the name
of the Five Thousand; being afraid that these
might really exist, and that they might be
speaking to one of their number and get into
trouble through ignorance. Indeed this was
why the Four Hundred neither wished the Five
Thousand to exist, nor to have it known that
they did not exist; being of opinion that
to give themselves so many partners in empire
would be downright democracy, while the mystery
in question would make the people afraid
of one another. The next day the Four Hundred,
although alarmed, nevertheless assembled
in the council chamber, while the heavy infantry
in Piraeus, after having released their prisoner
Alexicles and pulled down the fortification,
went with their arms to the theatre of Dionysus,
close to Munychia, and there held an assembly
in which they decided to march into the city,
and setting forth accordingly halted in the
Anaceum. Here they were joined by some delegates
from the Four Hundred, who reasoned with
them one by one, and persuaded those whom
they saw to be the most moderate to remain
quiet themselves, and to keep in the rest;
saying that they would make known the Five
Thousand, and have the Four Hundred chosen
from them in rotation, as should be decided
by the Five Thousand, and meanwhile entreated
them not to ruin the state or drive it into
the arms of the enemy. After a great many
had spoken and had been spoken to, the whole
body of heavy infantry became calmer than
before, absorbed by their fears for the country
at large, and now agreed to hold upon an
appointed day an assembly in the theatre
of Dionysus for the restoration of concord.
When the day came for the assembly in the
theatre, and they were upon the point of
assembling, news arrived that the forty-two
ships under Agesandridas were sailing from
Megara along the coast of Salamis. The people
to a man now thought that it was just what
Theramenes and his party had so often said,
that the ships were sailing to the fortification,
and concluded that they had done well to
demolish it. But though it may possibly have
been by appointment that Agesandridas hovered
about Epidaurus and the neighbourhood, he
would also naturally be kept there by the
hope of an opportunity arising out of the
troubles in the town. In any case the Athenians,
on receipt of the news immediately ran down
in mass to Piraeus, seeing themselves threatened
by the enemy with a worse war than their
war among themselves, not at a distance,
but close to the harbour of Athens. Some
went on board the ships already afloat, while
others launched fresh vessels, or ran to
defend the walls and the mouth of the harbour.
Meanwhile the Peloponnesian vessels sailed
by, and rounding Sunium anchored between
Thoricus and Prasiae, and afterwards arrived
at Oropus. The Athenians, with revolution
in the city, and unwilling to lose a moment
in going to the relief of their most important
possession (for Euboea was everything to
them now that they were shut out from Attica),
were compelled to put to sea in haste and
with untrained crews, and sent Thymochares
with some vessels to Eretria. These upon
their arrival, with the ships already in
Euboea, made up a total of thirty-six vessels,
and were immediately forced to engage. For
Agesandridas, after his crews had dined,
put out from Oropus, which is about seven
miles from Eretria by sea; and the Athenians,
seeing him sailing up, immediately began
to man their vessels. The sailors, however,
instead of being by their ships, as they
supposed, were gone away to purchase provisions
for their dinner in the houses in the outskirts
of the town; the Eretrians having so arranged
that there should be nothing on sale in the
marketplace, in order that the Athenians
might be a long time in manning their ships,
and, the enemy's attack taking them by surprise,
might be compelled to put to sea just as
they were. A signal also was raised in Eretria
to give them notice in Oropus when to put
to sea. The Athenians, forced to put out
so poorly prepared, engaged off the harbour
of Eretria, and after holding their own for
some little while notwithstanding, were at
length put to flight and chased to the shore.
Such of their number as took refuge in Eretria,
which they presumed to be friendly to them,
found their fate in that city, being butchered
by the inhabitants; while those who fled
to the Athenian fort in the Eretrian territory,
and the vessels which got to Chalcis, were
saved. The Peloponnesians, after taking twenty-two
Athenian ships, and killing or making prisoners
of the crews, set up a trophy, and not long
afterwards effected the revolt of the whole
of Euboea (except Oreus, which was held by
the Athenians themselves), and made a general
settlement of the affairs of the island.
When the news of what had happened in Euboea
reached Athens, a panic ensued such as they
had never before known. Neither the disaster
in Sicily, great as it seemed at the time,
nor any other had ever so much alarmed them.
The camp at Samos was in revolt; they had
no more ships or men to man them; they were
at discord among themselves and might at
any moment come to blows; and a disaster
of this magnitude coming on the top of all,
by which they lost their fleet, and worst
of all Euboea, which was of more value to
them than Attica, could not occur without
throwing them into the deepest despondency.
Meanwhile their greatest and most immediate
trouble was the possibility that the enemy,
emboldened by his victory, might make straight
for them and sail against Piraeus, which
they had no longer ships to defend; and every
moment they expected him to arrive. This,
with a little more courage, he might easily
have done, in which case he would either
have increased the dissensions of the city
by his presence, or, if he had stayed to
besiege it, have compelled the fleet from
Ionia, although the enemy of the oligarchy,
to come to the rescue of their country and
of their relatives, and in the meantime would
have become master of the Hellespont, Ionia,
the islands, and of everything as far as
Euboea, or, to speak roundly, of the whole
Athenian empire. But here, as on so many
other occasions, the Lacedaemonians proved
the most convenient people in the world for
the Athenians to be at war with. The wide
difference between the two characters, the
slowness and want of energy of the Lacedaemonians
as contrasted with the dash and enterprise
of their opponents, proved of the greatest
service, especially to a maritime empire
like Athens. Indeed this was shown by the
Syracusans, who were most like the Athenians
in character, and also most successful in
combating them. Nevertheless, upon receipt
of the news, the Athenians manned twenty
ships and called immediately a first assembly
in the Pnyx, where they had been used to
meet formerly, and deposed the Four Hundred
and voted to hand over the government to
the Five Thousand, of which body all who
furnished a suit of armour were to be members,
decreeing also that no one should receive
pay for the discharge of any office, or if
he did should be held accursed. Many other
assemblies were held afterwards, in which
law-makers were elected and all other measures
taken to form a constitution. It was during
the first period of this constitution that
the Athenians appear to have enjoyed the
best government that they ever did, at least
in my time. For the fusion of the high and
the low was effected with judgment, and this
was what first enabled the state to raise
up her head after her manifold disasters.
They also voted for the recall of Alcibiades
and of other exiles, and sent to him and
to the camp at Samos, and urged them to devote
themselves vigorously to the war. Upon this
revolution taking place, the party of Pisander
and Alexicles and the chiefs of the oligarchs
immediately withdrew to Decelea, with the
single exception of Aristarchus, one of the
generals, who hastily took some of the most
barbarian of the archers and marched to Oenoe.
This was a fort of the Athenians upon the
Boeotian border, at that moment besieged
by the Corinthians, irritated by the loss
of a party returning from Decelea, who had
been cut off by the garrison. The Corinthians
had volunteered for this service, and had
called upon the Boeotians to assist them.
After communicating with them, Aristarchus
deceived the garrison in Oenoe by telling
them that their countrymen in the city had
compounded with the Lacedaemonians, and that
one of the terms of the capitulation was
that they must surrender the place to the
Boeotians. The garrison believed him as he
was general, and besides knew nothing of
what had occurred owing to the siege, and
so evacuated the fort under truce. In this
way the Boeotians gained possession of Oenoe,
and the oligarchy and the troubles at Athens
ended. To return to the Peloponnesians in
Miletus. No pay was forthcoming from any
of the agents deputed by Tissaphernes for
that purpose upon his departure for Aspendus;
neither the Phoenician fleet nor Tissaphernes
showed any signs of appearing, and Philip,
who had been sent with him, and another Spartan,
Hippocrates, who was at Phaselis, wrote word
to Mindarus, the admiral, that the ships
were not coming at all, and that they were
being grossly abused by Tissaphernes. Meanwhile
Pharnabazus was inviting them to come, and
making every effort to get the fleet and,
like Tissaphernes, to cause the revolt of
the cities in his government still subject
to Athens, founding great hopes on his success;
until at length, at about the period of the
summer which we have now reached, Mindarus
yielded to his importunities, and, with great
order and at a moment's notice, in order
to elude the enemy at Samos, weighed anchor
with seventy-three ships from Miletus and
set sail for the Hellespont. Thither sixteen
vessels had already preceded him in the same
summer, and had overrun part of the Chersonese.
Being caught in a storm, Mindarus was compelled
to run in to Icarus and, after being detained
five or six days there by stress of weather,
arrived at Chios. Meanwhile Thrasyllus had
heard of his having put out from Miletus,
and immediately set sail with fifty-five
ships from Samos, in haste to arrive before
him in the Hellespont. But learning that
he was at Chios, and expecting that he would
stay there, he posted scouts in Lesbos and
on the continent opposite to prevent the
fleet moving without his knowing it, and
himself coasted along to Methymna, and gave
orders to prepare meal and other necessaries,
in order to attack them from Lesbos in the
event of their remaining for any length of
time at Chios. Meanwhile he resolved to sail
against Eresus, a town in Lesbos which had
revolted, and, if he could, to take it. For
some of the principal Methymnian exiles had
carried over about fifty heavy infantry,
their sworn associates, from Cuma, and hiring
others from the continent, so as to make
up three hundred in all, chose Anaxander,
a Theban, to command them, on account of
the community of blood existing between the
Thebans and the Lesbians, and first attacked
Methymna. Balked in this attempt by the advance
of the Athenian guards from Mitylene, and
repulsed a second time in a battle outside
the city, they then crossed the mountain
and effected the revolt of Eresus. Thrasyllus
accordingly determined to go there with all
his ships and to attack the place. Meanwhile
Thrasybulus had preceded him thither with
five ships from Samos, as soon as he heard
that the exiles had crossed over, and coming
too late to save Eresus, went on and anchored
before the town. Here they were joined also
by two vessels on their way home from the
Hellespont, and by the ships of the Methymnians,
making a grand total of sixty-seven vessels;
and the forces on board now made ready with
engines and every other means available to
do their utmost to storm Eresus. In the meantime
Mindarus and the Peloponnesian fleet at Chios,
after taking provisions for two days and
receiving three Chian pieces of money for
each man from the Chians, on the third day
put out in haste from the island; in order
to avoid falling in with the ships at Eresus,
they did not make for the open sea, but keeping
Lesbos on their left, sailed for the continent.
After touching at the port of Carteria, in
the Phocaeid, and dining, they went on along
the Cumaean coast and supped at Arginusae,
on the continent over against Mitylene. From
thence they continued their voyage along
the coast, although it was late in the night,
and arriving at Harmatus on the continent
opposite Methymna, dined there; and swiftly
passing Lectum, Larisa, Hamaxitus, and the
neighbouring towns, arrived a little before
midnight at Rhoeteum. Here they were now
in the Hellespont. Some of the ships also
put in at Sigeum and at other places in the
neighbourhood. Meanwhile the warnings of
the fire signals and the sudden increase
in the number of fires on the enemy's shore
informed the eighteen Athenian ships at Sestos
of the approach of the Peloponnesian fleet.
That very night they set sail in haste just
as they were, and, hugging the shore of the
Chersonese, coasted along to Elaeus, in order
to sail out into the open sea away from the
fleet of the enemy. After passing unobserved
the sixteen ships at Abydos, which had nevertheless
been warned by their approaching friends
to be on the alert to prevent their sailing
out, at dawn they sighted the fleet of Mindarus,
which immediately gave chase. All had not
time to get away; the greater number however
escaped to Imbros and Lemnos, while four
of the hindmost were overtaken off Elaeus.
One of these was stranded opposite to the
temple of Protesilaus and taken with its
crew, two others without their crews; the
fourth was abandoned on the shore of Imbros
and burned by the enemy. After this the Peloponnesians
were joined by the squadron from Abydos,
which made up their fleet to a grand total
of eighty-six vessels; they spent the day
in unsuccessfully besieging Elaeus, and then
sailed back to Abydos. Meanwhile the Athenians,
deceived by their scouts, and never dreaming
of the enemy's fleet getting by undetected,
were tranquilly besieging Eresus. As soon
as they heard the news they instantly abandoned
Eresus, and made with all speed for the Hellespont,
and after taking two of the Peloponnesian
ships which had been carried out too far
into the open sea in the ardour of the pursuit
and now fell in their way, the next day dropped
anchor at Elaeus, and, bringing back the
ships that had taken refuge at Imbros, during
five days prepared for the coming engagement.
After this they engaged in the following
way. The Athenians formed in column and sailed
close alongshore to Sestos; upon perceiving
which the Peloponnesians put out from Abydos
to meet them. Realizing that a battle was
now imminent, both combatants extended their
flank; the Athenians along the Chersonese
from Idacus to Arrhiani with seventy-six
ships; the Peloponnesians from Abydos to
Dardanus with eighty-six. The Peloponnesian
right wing was occupied by the Syracusans,
their left by Mindarus in person with the
best sailers in the navy; the Athenian left
by Thrasyllus, their right by Thrasybulus,
the other commanders being in different parts
of the fleet. The Peloponnesians hastened
to engage first, and outflanking with their
left the Athenian right sought to cut them
off, if possible, from sailing out of the
straits, and to drive their centre upon the
shore, which was not far off. The Athenians
perceiving their intention extended their
own wing and outsailed them, while their
left had by this time passed the point of
Cynossema. This, however, obliged them to
thin and weaken their centre, especially
as they had fewer ships than the enemy, and
as the coast round Point Cynossema formed
a sharp angle which prevented their seeing
what was going on on the other side of it.
The Peloponnesians now attacked their centre
and drove ashore the ships of the Athenians,
and disembarked to follow up their victory.
No help could be given to the centre either
by the squadron of Thrasybulus on the right,
on account of the number of ships attacking
him, or by that of Thrasyllus on the left,
from whom the point of Cynossema hid what
was going on, and who was also hindered by
his Syracusan and other opponents, whose
numbers were fully equal to his own. At length,
however, the Peloponnesians in the confidence
of victory began to scatter in pursuit of
the ships of the enemy, and allowed a considerable
part of their fleet to get into disorder.
On seeing this the squadron of Thrasybulus
discontinued their lateral movement and,
facing about, attacked and routed the ships
opposed to them, and next fell roughly upon
the scattered vessels of the victorious Peloponnesian
division, and put most of them to flight
without a blow. The Syracusans also had by
this time given way before the squadron of
Thrasyllus, and now openly took to flight
upon seeing the flight of their comrades.
The rout was now complete. Most of the Peloponnesians
fled for refuge first to the river Midius,
and afterwards to Abydos. Only a few ships
were taken by the Athenians; as owing to
the narrowness of the Hellespont the enemy
had not far to go to be in safety. Nevertheless
nothing could have been more opportune for
them than this victory. Up to this time they
had feared the Peloponnesian fleet, owing
to a number of petty losses and to the disaster
in Sicily; but they now ceased to mistrust
themselves or any longer to think their enemies
good for anything at sea. Meanwhile they
took from the enemy eight Chian vessels,
five Corinthian, two Ambraciot, two Boeotian,
one Leucadian, Lacedaemonian, Syracusan,
and Pellenian, losing fifteen of their own.
After setting up a trophy upon Point Cynossema,
securing the wrecks, and restoring to the
enemy his dead under truce, they sent off
a galley to Athens with the news of their
victory. The arrival of this vessel with
its unhoped-for good news, after the recent
disasters of Euboea, and in the revolution
at Athens, gave fresh courage to the Athenians,
and caused them to believe that if they put
their shoulders to the wheel their cause
might yet prevail. On the fourth day after
the sea-fight the Athenians in Sestos having
hastily refitted their ships sailed against
Cyzicus, which had revolted. Off Harpagium
and Priapus they sighted at anchor the eight
vessels from Byzantium, and, sailing up and
routing the troops on shore, took the ships,
and then went on and recovered the town of
Cyzicus, which was unfortified, and levied
money from the citizens. In the meantime
the Peloponnesians sailed from Abydos to
Elaeus, and recovered such of their captured
galleys as were still uninjured, the rest
having been burned by the Elaeusians, and
sent Hippocrates and Epicles to Euboea to
fetch the squadron from that island. About
the same time Alcibiades returned with his
thirteen ships from Caunus and Phaselis to
Samos, bringing word that he had prevented
the Phoenician fleet from joining the Peloponnesians,
and had made Tissaphernes more friendly to
the Athenians than before. Alcibiades now
manned nine more ships, and levied large
sums of money from the Halicarnassians, and
fortified Cos. After doing this and placing
a governor in Cos, he sailed back to Samos,
autumn being now at hand. Meanwhile Tissaphernes,
upon hearing that the Peloponnesian fleet
had sailed from Miletus to the Hellespont,
set off again back from Aspendus, and made
all sail for Ionia. While the Peloponnesians
were in the Hellespont, the Antandrians,
a people of Aeolic extraction, conveyed by
land across Mount Ida some heavy infantry
from Abydos, and introduced them into the
town; having been ill-treated by Arsaces,
the Persian lieutenant of Tissaphernes. This
same Arsaces had, upon pretence of a secret
quarrel, invited the chief men of the Delians
to undertake military service (these were
Delians who had settled at Atramyttium after
having been driven from their homes by the
Athenians for the sake of purifying Delos);
and after drawing them out from their town
as his friends and allies, had laid wait
for them at dinner, and surrounded them and
caused them to be shot down by his soldiers.
This deed made the Antandrians fear that
he might some day do them some mischief;
and as he also laid upon them burdens too
heavy for them to bear, they expelled his
garrison from their citadel. Tissaphernes,
upon hearing of this act of the Peloponnesians
in addition to what had occurred at Miletus
and Cnidus, where his garrisons had been
also expelled, now saw that the breach between
them was serious; and fearing further injury
from them, and being also vexed to think
that Pharnabazus should receive them, and
in less time and at less cost perhaps succeed
better against Athens than he had done, determined
to rejoin them in the Hellespont, in order
to complain of the events at Antandros and
excuse himself as best he could in the matter
of the Phoenician fleet and of the other
charges against him. Accordingly he went
first to Ephesus and offered sacrifice to
Artemis.... [When the winter after this summer
is over the twenty-first year of this war
will be completed.] THE END
|
Evans Experientialism 
