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The History of the Peloponnesian War
By Thucydides
Translated by Richard Crawley
The Sixth Book.
CHAPTER XVIII.
Seventeenth Year of the War - The Sicilian
Campaign - Affair of the Hermae - Departure
of the Expedition
THE same winter the Athenians resolved to
sail again to Sicily, with a greater armament
than that under Laches and Eurymedon, and,
if possible, to conquer the island; most
of them being ignorant of its size and of
the number of its inhabitants, Hellenic and
barbarian, and of the fact that they were
undertaking a war not much inferior to that
against the Peloponnesians. For the voyage
round Sicily in a merchantman is not far
short of eight days; and yet, large as the
island is, there are only two miles of sea
to prevent its being mainland. It was settled
originally as follows, and the peoples that
occupied it are these. The earliest inhabitants
spoken of in any part of the country are
the Cyclopes and Laestrygones; but I cannot
tell of what race they were, or whence they
came or whither they went, and must leave
my readers to what the poets have said of
them and to what may be generally known concerning
them. The Sicanians appear to have been the
next settlers, although they pretend to have
been the first of all and aborigines; but
the facts show that they were Iberians, driven
by the Ligurians from the river Sicanus in
Iberia. It was from them that the island,
before called Trinacria, took its name of
Sicania, and to the present day they inhabit
the west of Sicily. On the fall of Ilium,
some of the Trojans escaped from the Achaeans,
came in ships to Sicily, and settled next
to the Sicanians under the general name of
Elymi; their towns being called Eryx and
Egesta. With them settled some of the Phocians
carried on their way from Troy by a storm,
first to Libya, and afterwards from thence
to Sicily. The Sicels crossed over to Sicily
from their first home Italy, flying from
the Opicans, as tradition says and as seems
not unlikely, upon rafts, having watched
till the wind set down the strait to effect
the passage; although perhaps they may have
sailed over in some other way. Even at the
present day there are still Sicels in Italy;
and the country got its name of Italy from
Italus, a king of the Sicels, so called.
These went with a great host to Sicily, defeated
the Sicanians in battle and forced them to
remove to the south and west of the island,
which thus came to be called Sicily instead
of Sicania, and after they crossed over continued
to enjoy the richest parts of the country
for near three hundred years before any Hellenes
came to Sicily; indeed they still hold the
centre and north of the island. There were
also Phoenicians living all round Sicily,
who had occupied promontories upon the sea
coasts and the islets adjacent for the purpose
of trading with the Sicels. But when the
Hellenes began to arrive in considerable
numbers by sea, the Phoenicians abandoned
most of their stations, and drawing together
took up their abode in Motye, Soloeis, and
Panormus, near the Elymi, partly because
they confided in their alliance, and also
because these are the nearest points for
the voyage between Carthage and Sicily. These
were the barbarians in Sicily, settled as
I have said. Of the Hellenes, the first to
arrive were Chalcidians from Euboea with
Thucles, their founder. They founded Naxos
and built the altar to Apollo Archegetes,
which now stands outside the town, and upon
which the deputies for the games sacrifice
before sailing from Sicily. Syracuse was
founded the year afterwards by Archias, one
of the Heraclids from Corinth, who began
by driving out the Sicels from the island
upon which the inner city now stands, though
it is no longer surrounded by water: in process
of time the outer town also was taken within
the walls and became populous. Meanwhile
Thucles and the Chalcidians set out from
Naxos in the fifth year after the foundation
of Syracuse, and drove out the Sicels by
arms and founded Leontini and afterwards
Catana; the Catanians themselves choosing
Evarchus as their founder. About the same
time Lamis arrived in Sicily with a colony
from Megara, and after founding a place called
Trotilus beyond the river Pantacyas, and
afterwards leaving it and for a short while
joining the Chalcidians at Leontini, was
driven out by them and founded Thapsus. After
his death his companions were driven out
of Thapsus, and founded a place called the
Hyblaean Megara; Hyblon, a Sicel king, having
given up the place and inviting them thither.
Here they lived two hundred and forty-five
years; after which they were expelled from
the city and the country by the Syracusan
tyrant Gelo. Before their expulsion, however,
a hundred years after they had settled there,
they sent out Pamillus and founded Selinus;
he having come from their mother country
Megara to join them in its foundation. Gela
was founded by Antiphemus from Rhodes and
Entimus from Crete, who joined in leading
a colony thither, in the forty-fifth year
after the foundation of Syracuse. The town
took its name from the river Gelas, the place
where the citadel now stands, and which was
first fortified, being called Lindii. The
institutions which they adopted were Dorian.
Near one hundred and eight years after the
foundation of Gela, the Geloans founded Acragas
(Agrigentum), so called from the river of
that name, and made Aristonous and Pystilus
their founders; giving their own institutions
to the colony. Zancle was originally founded
by pirates from Cuma, the Chalcidian town
in the country of the Opicans: afterwards,
however, large numbers came from Chalcis
and the rest of Euboea, and helped to people
the place; the founders being Perieres and
Crataemenes from Cuma and Chalcis respectively.
It first had the name of Zancle given it
by the Sicels, because the place is shaped
like a sickle, which the Sicels call zanclon;
but upon the original settlers being afterwards
expelled by some Samians and other Ionians
who landed in Sicily flying from the Medes,
and the Samians in their turn not long afterwards
by Anaxilas, tyrant of Rhegium, the town
was by him colonized with a mixed population,
and its name changed to Messina, after his
old country. Himera was founded from Zancle
by Euclides, Simus, and Sacon, most of those
who went to the colony being Chalcidians;
though they were joined by some exiles from
Syracuse, defeated in a civil war, called
the Myletidae. The language was a mixture
of Chalcidian and Doric, but the institutions
which prevailed were the Chalcidian. Acrae
and Casmenae were founded by the Syracusans;
Acrae seventy years after Syracuse, Casmenae
nearly twenty after Acrae. Camarina was first
founded by the Syracusans, close upon a hundred
and thirty-five years after the building
of Syracuse; its founders being Daxon and
Menecolus. But the Camarinaeans being expelled
by arms by the Syracusans for having revolted,
Hippocrates, tyrant of Gela, some time later
receiving their land in ransom for some Syracusan
prisoners, resettled Camarina, himself acting
as its founder. Lastly, it was again depopulated
by Gelo, and settled once more for the third
time by the Geloans. Such is the list of
the peoples, Hellenic and barbarian, inhabiting
Sicily, and such the magnitude of the island
which the Athenians were now bent upon invading;
being ambitious in real truth of conquering
the whole, although they had also the specious
design of succouring their kindred and other
allies in the island. But they were especially
incited by envoys from Egesta, who had come
to Athens and invoked their aid more urgently
than ever. The Egestaeans had gone to war
with their neighbours the Selinuntines upon
questions of marriage and disputed territory,
and the Selinuntines had procured the alliance
of the Syracusans, and pressed Egesta hard
by land and sea. The Egestaeans now reminded
the Athenians of the alliance made in the
time of Laches, during the former Leontine
war, and begged them to send a fleet to their
aid, and among a number of other considerations
urged as a capital argument that if the Syracusans
were allowed to go unpunished for their depopulation
of Leontini, to ruin the allies still left
to Athens in Sicily, and to get the whole
power of the island into their hands, there
would be a danger of their one day coming
with a large force, as Dorians, to the aid
of their Dorian brethren, and as colonists,
to the aid of the Peloponnesians who had
sent them out, and joining these in pulling
down the Athenian empire. The Athenians would,
therefore, do well to unite with the allies
still left to them, and to make a stand against
the Syracusans; especially as they, the Egestaeans,
were prepared to furnish money sufficient
for the war. The Athenians, hearing these
arguments constantly repeated in their assemblies
by the Egestaeans and their supporters, voted
first to send envoys to Egesta, to see if
there was really the money that they talked
of in the treasury and temples, and at the
same time to ascertain in what posture was
the war with the Selinuntines. The envoys
of the Athenians were accordingly dispatched
to Sicily. The same winter the Lacedaemonians
and their allies, the Corinthians excepted,
marched into the Argive territory, and ravaged
a small part of the land, and took some yokes
of oxen and carried off some corn. They also
settled the Argive exiles at Orneae, and
left them a few soldiers taken from the rest
of the army; and after making a truce for
a certain while, according to which neither
Orneatae nor Argives were to injure each
other's territory, returned home with the
army. Not long afterwards the Athenians came
with thirty ships and six hundred heavy infantry,
and the Argives joining them with all their
forces, marched out and besieged the men
in Orneae for one day; but the garrison escaped
by night, the besiegers having bivouacked
some way off. The next day the Argives, discovering
it, razed Orneae to the ground, and went
back again; after which the Athenians went
home in their ships. Meanwhile the Athenians
took by sea to Methone on the Macedonian
border some cavalry of their own and the
Macedonian exiles that were at Athens, and
plundered the country of Perdiccas. Upon
this the Lacedaemonians sent to the Thracian
Chalcidians, who had a truce with Athens
from one ten days to another, urging them
to join Perdiccas in the war, which they
refused to do. And the winter ended, and
with it ended the sixteenth year of this
war of which Thucydides is the historian.
Early in the spring of the following summer
the Athenian envoys arrived from Sicily,
and the Egestaeans with them, bringing sixty
talents of uncoined silver, as a month's
pay for sixty ships, which they were to ask
to have sent them. The Athenians held an
assembly and, after hearing from the Egestaeans
and their own envoys a report, as attractive
as it was untrue, upon the state of affairs
generally, and in particular as to the money,
of which, it was said, there was abundance
in the temples and the treasury, voted to
send sixty ships to Sicily, under the command
of Alcibiades, son of Clinias, Nicias, son
of Niceratus, and Lamachus, son of Xenophanes,
who were appointed with full powers; they
were to help the Egestaeans against the Selinuntines,
to restore Leontini upon gaining any advantage
in the war, and to order all other matters
in Sicily as they should deem best for the
interests of Athens. Five days after this
a second assembly was held, to consider the
speediest means of equipping the ships, and
to vote whatever else might be required by
the generals for the expedition; and Nicias,
who had been chosen to the command against
his will, and who thought that the state
was not well advised, but upon a slight aid
specious pretext was aspiring to the conquest
of the whole of Sicily, a great matter to
achieve, came forward in the hope of diverting
the Athenians from the enterprise, and gave
them the following counsel: "Although
this assembly was convened to consider the
preparations to be made for sailing to Sicily,
I think, notwithstanding, that we have still
this question to examine, whether it be better
to send out the ships at all, and that we
ought not to give so little consideration
to a matter of such moment, or let ourselves
be persuaded by foreigners into undertaking
a war with which we have nothing to do. And
yet, individually, I gain in honour by such
a course, and fear as little as other men
for my person- not that I think a man need
be any the worse citizen for taking some
thought for his person and estate; on the
contrary, such a man would for his own sake
desire the prosperity of his country more
than others- nevertheless, as I have never
spoken against my convictions to gain honour,
I shall not begin to do so now, but shall
say what I think best. Against your character
any words of mine would be weak enough, if
I were to advise your keeping what you have
got and not risking what is actually yours
for advantages which are dubious in themselves,
and which you may or may not attain. I will,
therefore, content myself with showing that
your ardour is out of season, and your ambition
not easy of accomplishment. "I affirm,
then, that you leave many enemies behind
you here to go yonder and bring more back
with you. You imagine, perhaps, that the
treaty which you have made can be trusted;
a treaty that will continue to exist nominally,
as long as you keep quiet- for nominal it
has become, owing to the practices of certain
men here and at Sparta- but which in the
event of a serious reverse in any quarter
would not delay our enemies a moment in attacking
us; first, because the convention was forced
upon them by disaster and was less honourable
to them than to us; and secondly, because
in this very convention there are many points
that are still disputed. Again, some of the
most powerful states have never yet accepted
the arrangement at all. Some of these are
at open war with us; others (as the Lacedaemonians
do not yet move) are restrained by truces
renewed every ten days, and it is only too
probable that if they found our power divided,
as we are hurrying to divide it, they would
attack us vigorously with the Siceliots,
whose alliance they would have in the past
valued as they would that of few others.
A man ought, therefore, to consider these
points, and not to think of running risks
with a country placed so critically, or of
grasping at another empire before we have
secured the one we have already; for in fact
the Thracian Chalcidians have been all these
years in revolt from us without being yet
subdued, and others on the continents yield
us but a doubtful obedience. Meanwhile the
Egestaeans, our allies, have been wronged,
and we run to help them, while the rebels
who have so long wronged us still wait for
punishment. "And yet the latter, if
brought under, might be kept under; while
the Sicilians, even if conquered, are too
far off and too numerous to be ruled without
difficulty. Now it is folly to go against
men who could not be kept under even if conquered,
while failure would leave us in a very different
position from that which we occupied before
the enterprise. The Siceliots, again, to
take them as they are at present, in the
event of a Syracusan conquest (the favourite
bugbear of the Egestaeans), would to my thinking
be even less dangerous to us than before.
At present they might possibly come here
as separate states for love of Lacedaemon;
in the other case one empire would scarcely
attack another; for after joining the Peloponnesians
to overthrow ours, they could only expect
to see the same hands overthrow their own
in the same way. The Hellenes in Sicily would
fear us most if we never went there at all,
and next to this, if after displaying our
power we went away again as soon as possible.
We all know that that which is farthest off,
and the reputation of which can least be
tested, is the object of admiration; at the
least reverse they would at once begin to
look down upon us, and would join our enemies
here against us. You have yourselves experienced
this with regard to the Lacedaemonians and
their allies, whom your unexpected success,
as compared with what you feared at first,
has made you suddenly despise, tempting you
further to aspire to the conquest of Sicily.
Instead, however, of being puffed up by the
misfortunes of your adversaries, you ought
to think of breaking their spirit before
giving yourselves up to confidence, and to
understand that the one thought awakened
in the Lacedaemonians by their disgrace is
how they may even now, if possible, overthrow
us and repair their dishonour; inasmuch as
military reputation is their oldest and chiefest
study. Our struggle, therefore, if we are
wise, will not be for the barbarian Egestaeans
in Sicily, but how to defend ourselves most
effectually against the oligarchical machinations
of Lacedaemon. "We should also remember
that we are but now enjoying some respite
from a great pestilence and from war, to
the no small benefit of our estates and persons,
and that it is right to employ these at home
on our own behalf, instead of using them
on behalf of these exiles whose interest
it is to lie as fairly as they can, who do
nothing but talk themselves and leave the
danger to others, and who if they succeed
will show no proper gratitude, and if they
fail will drag down their friends with them.
And if there be any man here, overjoyed at
being chosen to command, who urges you to
make the expedition, merely for ends of his
own- specially if he be still too young to
command- who seeks to be admired for his
stud of horses, but on account of its heavy
expenses hopes for some profit from his appointment,
do not allow such a one to maintain his private
splendour at his country's risk, but remember
that such persons injure the public fortune
while they squander their own, and that this
is a matter of importance, and not for a
young man to decide or hastily to take in
hand. "When I see such persons now sitting
here at the side of that same individual
and summoned by him, alarm seizes me; and
I, in my turn, summon any of the older men
that may have such a person sitting next
him not to let himself be shamed down, for
fear of being thought a coward if he do not
vote for war, but, remembering how rarely
success is got by wishing and how often by
forecast, to leave to them the mad dream
of conquest, and as a true lover of his country,
now threatened by the greatest danger in
its history, to hold up his hand on the other
side; to vote that the Siceliots be left
in the limits now existing between us, limits
of which no one can complain (the Ionian
sea for the coasting voyage, and the Sicilian
across the open main), to enjoy their own
possessions and to settle their own quarrels;
that the Egestaeans, for their part, be told
to end by themselves with the Selinuntines
the war which they began without consulting
the Athenians; and that for the future we
do not enter into alliance, as we have been
used to do, with people whom we must help
in their need, and who can never help us
in ours. "And you, Prytanis, if you
think it your duty to care for the commonwealth,
and if you wish to show yourself a good citizen,
put the question to the vote, and take a
second time the opinions of the Athenians.
If you are afraid to move the question again,
consider that a violation of the law cannot
carry any prejudice with so many abettors,
that you will be the physician of your misguided
city, and that the virtue of men in office
is briefly this, to do their country as much
good as they can, or in any case no harm
that they can avoid." Such were the
words of Nicias. Most of the Athenians that
came forward spoke in favour of the expedition,
and of not annulling what had been voted,
although some spoke on the other side. By
far the warmest advocate of the expedition
was, however, Alcibiades, son of Clinias,
who wished to thwart Nicias both as his political
opponent and also because of the attack he
had made upon him in his speech, and who
was, besides, exceedingly ambitious of a
command by which he hoped to reduce Sicily
and Carthage, and personally to gain in wealth
and reputation by means of his successes.
For the position he held among the citizens
led him to indulge his tastes beyond what
his real means would bear, both in keeping
horses and in the rest of his expenditure;
and this later on had not a little to do
with the ruin of the Athenian state. Alarmed
at the greatness of his licence in his own
life and habits, and of the ambition which
he showed in all things soever that he undertook,
the mass of the people set him down as a
pretender to the tyranny, and became his
enemies; and although publicly his conduct
of the war was as good as could be desired,
individually, his habits gave offence to
every one, and caused them to commit affairs
to other hands, and thus before long to ruin
the city. Meanwhile he now came forward and
gave the following advice to the Athenians:
"Athenians, I have a better right to
command than others- I must begin with this
as Nicias has attacked me- and at the same
time I believe myself to be worthy of it.
The things for which I am abused, bring fame
to my ancestors and to myself, and to the
country profit besides. The Hellenes, after
expecting to see our city ruined by the war,
concluded it to be even greater than it really
is, by reason of the magnificence with which
I represented it at the Olympic games, when
I sent into the lists seven chariots, a number
never before entered by any private person,
and won the first prize, and was second and
fourth, and took care to have everything
else in a style worthy of my victory. Custom
regards such displays as honourable, and
they cannot be made without leaving behind
them an impression of power. Again, any splendour
that I may have exhibited at home in providing
choruses or otherwise, is naturally envied
by my fellow citizens, but in the eyes of
foreigners has an air of strength as in the
other instance. And this is no useless folly,
when a man at his own private cost benefits
not himself only, but his city: nor is it
unfair that he who prides himself on his
position should refuse to be upon an equality
with the rest. He who is badly off has his
misfortunes all to himself, and as we do
not see men courted in adversity, on the
like principle a man ought to accept the
insolence of prosperity; or else, let him
first mete out equal measure to all, and
then demand to have it meted out to him.
What I know is that persons of this kind
and all others that have attained to any
distinction, although they may be unpopular
in their lifetime in their relations with
their fellow-men and especially with their
equals, leave to posterity the desire of
claiming connection with them even without
any ground, and are vaunted by the country
to which they belonged, not as strangers
or ill-doers, but as fellow-countrymen and
heroes. Such are my aspirations, and however
I am abused for them in private, the question
is whether any one manages public affairs
better than I do. Having united the most
powerful states of Peloponnese, without great
danger or expense to you, I compelled the
Lacedaemonians to stake their all upon the
issue of a single day at Mantinea; and although
victorious in the battle, they have never
since fully recovered confidence. "Thus
did my youth and so-called monstrous folly
find fitting arguments to deal with the power
of the Peloponnesians, and by its ardour
win their confidence and prevail. And do
not be afraid of my youth now, but while
I am still in its flower, and Nicias appears
fortunate, avail yourselves to the utmost
of the services of us both. Neither rescind
your resolution to sail to Sicily, on the
ground that you would be going to attack
a great power. The cities in Sicily are peopled
by motley rabbles, and easily change their
institutions and adopt new ones in their
stead; and consequently the inhabitants,
being without any feeling of patriotism,
are not provided with arms for their persons,
and have not regularly established themselves
on the land; every man thinks that either
by fair words or by party strife he can obtain
something at the public expense, and then
in the event of a catastrophe settle in some
other country, and makes his preparations
accordingly. From a mob like this you need
not look for either unanimity in counsel
or concert in action; but they will probably
one by one come in as they get a fair offer,
especially if they are torn by civil strife
as we are told. Moreover, the Siceliots have
not so many heavy infantry as they boast;
just as the Hellenes generally did not prove
so numerous as each state reckoned itself,
but Hellas greatly over-estimated their numbers,
and has hardly had an adequate force of heavy
infantry throughout this war. The states
in Sicily, therefore, from all that I can
hear, will be found as I say, and I have
not pointed out all our advantages, for we
shall have the help of many barbarians, who
from their hatred of the Syracusans will
join us in attacking them; nor will the powers
at home prove any hindrance, if you judge
rightly. Our fathers with these very adversaries,
which it is said we shall now leave behind
us when we sail, and the Mede as their enemy
as well, were able to win the empire, depending
solely on their superiority at sea. The Peloponnesians
had never so little hope against us as at
present; and let them be ever so sanguine,
although strong enough to invade our country
even if we stay at home, they can never hurt
us with their navy, as we leave one of our
own behind us that is a match for them. "In
this state of things what reason can we give
to ourselves for holding back, or what excuse
can we offer to our allies in Sicily for
not helping them? They are our confederates,
and we are bound to assist them, without
objecting that they have not assisted us.
We did not take them into alliance to have
them to help us in Hellas, but that they
might so annoy our enemies in Sicily as to
prevent them from coming over here and attacking
us. It is thus that empire has been won,
both by us and by all others that have held
it, by a constant readiness to support all,
whether barbarians or Hellenes, that invite
assistance; since if all were to keep quiet
or to pick and choose whom they ought to
assist, we should make but few new conquests,
and should imperil those we have already
won. Men do not rest content with parrying
the attacks of a superior, but often strike
the first blow to prevent the attack being
made. And we cannot fix the exact point at
which our empire shall stop; we have reached
a position in which we must not be content
with retaining but must scheme to extend
it, for, if we cease to rule others, we are
in danger of being ruled ourselves. Nor can
you look at inaction from the same point
of view as others, unless you are prepared
to change your habits and make them like
theirs. "Be convinced, then, that we
shall augment our power at home by this adventure
abroad, and let us make the expedition, and
so humble the pride of the Peloponnesians
by sailing off to Sicily, and letting them
see how little we care for the peace that
we are now enjoying; and at the same time
we shall either become masters, as we very
easily may, of the whole of Hellas through
the accession of the Sicilian Hellenes, or
in any case ruin the Syracusans, to the no
small advantage of ourselves and our allies.
The faculty of staying if successful, or
of returning, will be secured to us by our
navy, as we shall be superior at sea to all
the Siceliots put together. And do not let
the do-nothing policy which Nicias advocates,
or his setting of the young against the old,
turn you from your purpose, but in the good
old fashion by which our fathers, old and
young together, by their united counsels
brought our affairs to their present height,
do you endeavour still to advance them; understanding
that neither youth nor old age can do anything
the one without the other, but that levity,
sobriety, and deliberate judgment are strongest
when united, and that, by sinking into inaction,
the city, like everything else, will wear
itself out, and its skill in everything decay;
while each fresh struggle will give it fresh
experience, and make it more used to defend
itself not in word but in deed. In short,
my conviction is that a city not inactive
by nature could not choose a quicker way
to ruin itself than by suddenly adopting
such a policy, and that the safest rule of
life is to take one's character and institutions
for better and for worse, and to live up
to them as closely as one can." Such
were the words of Alcibiades. After hearing
him and the Egestaeans and some Leontine
exiles, who came forward reminding them of
their oaths and imploring their assistance,
the Athenians became more eager for the expedition
than before. Nicias, perceiving that it would
be now useless to try to deter them by the
old line of argument, but thinking that he
might perhaps alter their resolution by the
extravagance of his estimates, came forward
a second time and spoke as follows: "I
see, Athenians, that you are thoroughly bent
upon the expedition, and therefore hope that
all will turn out as we wish, and proceed
to give you my opinion at the present juncture.
From all that I hear we are going against
cities that are great and not subject to
one another, or in need of change, so as
to be glad to pass from enforced servitude
to an easier condition, or in the least likely
to accept our rule in exchange for freedom;
and, to take only the Hellenic towns, they
are very numerous for one island. Besides
Naxos and Catana, which I expect to join
us from their connection with Leontini, there
are seven others armed at all points just
like our own power, particularly Selinus
and Syracuse, the chief objects of our expedition.
These are full of heavy infantry, archers,
and darters, have galleys in abundance and
crowds to man them; they have also money,
partly in the hands of private persons, partly
in the temples at Selinus, and at Syracuse
first-fruits from some of the barbarians
as well. But their chief advantage over us
lies in the number of their horses, and in
the fact that they grow their corn at home
instead of importing it. "Against a
power of this kind it will not do to have
merely a weak naval armament, but we shall
want also a large land army to sail with
us, if we are to do anything worthy of our
ambition, and are not to be shut out from
the country by a numerous cavalry; especially
if the cities should take alarm and combine,
and we should be left without friends (except
the Egestaeans) to furnish us with horse
to defend ourselves with. It would be disgraceful
to have to retire under compulsion, or to
send back for reinforcements, owing to want
of reflection at first: we must therefore
start from home with a competent force, seeing
that we are going to sail far from our country,
and upon an expedition not like any which
you may undertaken undertaken the quality
of allies, among your subject states here
in Hellas, where any additional supplies
needed were easily drawn from the friendly
territory; but we are cutting ourselves off,
and going to a land entirely strange, from
which during four months in winter it is
not even easy for a messenger get to Athens.
"I think, therefore, that we ought to
take great numbers of heavy infantry, both
from Athens and from our allies, and not
merely from our subjects, but also any we
may be able to get for love or for money
in Peloponnese, and great numbers also of
archers and slingers, to make head against
the Sicilian horse. Meanwhile we must have
an overwhelming superiority at sea, to enable
us the more easily to carry in what we want;
and we must take our own corn in merchant
vessels, that is to say, wheat and parched
barley, and bakers from the mills compelled
to serve for pay in the proper proportion;
in order that in case of our being weather-bound
the armament may not want provisions, as
it is not every city that will be able to
entertain numbers like ours. We must also
provide ourselves with everything else as
far as we can, so as not to be dependent
upon others; and above all we must take with
us from home as much money as possible, as
the sums talked of as ready at Egesta are
readier, you may be sure, in talk than in
any other way. "Indeed, even if we leave
Athens with a force not only equal to that
of the enemy except in the number of heavy
infantry in the field, but even at all points
superior to him, we shall still find it difficult
to conquer Sicily or save ourselves. We must
not disguise from ourselves that we go to
found a city among strangers and enemies,
and that he who undertakes such an enterprise
should be prepared to become master of the
country the first day he lands, or failing
in this to find everything hostile to him.
Fearing this, and knowing that we shall have
need of much good counsel and more good fortune-
a hard matter for mortal man to aspire to-
I wish as far as may be to make myself independent
of fortune before sailing, and when I do
sail, to be as safe as a strong force can
make me. This I believe to be surest for
the country at large, and safest for us who
are to go on the expedition. If any one thinks
differently I resign to him my command."
With this Nicias concluded, thinking that
he should either disgust the Athenians by
the magnitude of the undertaking, or, if
obliged to sail on the expedition, would
thus do so in the safest way possible. The
Athenians, however, far from having their
taste for the voyage taken away by the burdensomeness
of the preparations, became more eager for
it than ever; and just the contrary took
place of what Nicias had thought, as it was
held that he had given good advice, and that
the expedition would be the safest in the
world. All alike fell in love with the enterprise.
The older men thought that they would either
subdue the places against which they were
to sail, or at all events, with so large
a force, meet with no disaster; those in
the prime of life felt a longing for foreign
sights and spectacles, and had no doubt that
they should come safe home again; while the
idea of the common people and the soldiery
was to earn wages at the moment, and make
conquests that would supply a never-ending
fund of pay for the future. With this enthusiasm
of the majority, the few that liked it not,
feared to appear unpatriotic by holding up
their hands against it, and so kept quiet.
At last one of the Athenians came forward
and called upon Nicias and told him that
he ought not to make excuses or put them
off, but say at once before them all what
forces the Athenians should vote him. Upon
this he said, not without reluctance, that
he would advise upon that matter more at
leisure with his colleagues; as far however
as he could see at present, they must sail
with at least one hundred galleys- the Athenians
providing as many transports as they might
determine, and sending for others from the
allies- not less than five thousand heavy
infantry in all, Athenian and allied, and
if possible more; and the rest of the armament
in proportion; archers from home and from
Crete, and slingers, and whatever else might
seem desirable, being got ready by the generals
and taken with them. Upon hearing this the
Athenians at once voted that the generals
should have full powers in the matter of
the numbers of the army and of the expedition
generally, to do as they judged best for
the interests of Athens. After this the preparations
began; messages being sent to the allies
and the rolls drawn up at home. And as the
city had just recovered from the plague and
the long war, and a number of young men had
grown up and capital had accumulated by reason
of the truce, everything was the more easily
provided. In the midst of these preparations
all the stone Hermae in the city of Athens,
that is to say the customary square figures,
so common in the doorways of private houses
and temples, had in one night most of them
their fares mutilated. No one knew who had
done it, but large public rewards were offered
to find the authors; and it was further voted
that any one who knew of any other act of
impiety having been committed should come
and give information without fear of consequences,
whether he were citizen, alien, or slave.
The matter was taken up the more seriously,
as it was thought to be ominous for the expedition,
and part of a conspiracy to bring about a
revolution and to upset the democracy. Information
was given accordingly by some resident aliens
and body servants, not about the Hermae but
about some previous mutilations of other
images perpetrated by young men in a drunken
frolic, and of mock celebrations of the mysteries,
averred to take place in private houses.
Alcibiades being implicated in this charge,
it was taken hold of by those who could least
endure him, because he stood in the way of
their obtaining the undisturbed direction
of the people, and who thought that if he
were once removed the first place would be
theirs. These accordingly magnified the matter
and loudly proclaimed that the affair of
the mysteries and the mutilation of the Hermae
were part and parcel of a scheme to overthrow
the democracy, and that nothing of all this
had been done without Alcibiades; the proofs
alleged being the general and undemocratic
licence of his life and habits. Alcibiades
repelled on the spot the charges in question,
and also before going on the expedition,
the preparations for which were now complete,
offered to stand his trial, that it might
be seen whether he was guilty of the acts
imputed to him; desiring to be punished if
found guilty, but, if acquitted, to take
the command. Meanwhile he protested against
their receiving slanders against him in his
absence, and begged them rather to put him
to death at once if he were guilty, and pointed
out the imprudence of sending him out at
the head of so large an army, with so serious
a charge still undecided. But his enemies
feared that he would have the army for him
if he were tried immediately, and that the
people might relent in favour of the man
whom they already caressed as the cause of
the Argives and some of the Mantineans joining
in the expedition, and did their utmost to
get this proposition rejected, putting forward
other orators who said that he ought at present
to sail and not delay the departure of the
army, and be tried on his return within a
fixed number of days; their plan being to
have him sent for and brought home for trial
upon some graver charge, which they would
the more easily get up in his absence. Accordingly
it was decreed that he should sail. After
this the departure for Sicily took place,
it being now about midsummer. Most of the
allies, with the corn transports and the
smaller craft and the rest of the expedition,
had already received orders to muster at
Corcyra, to cross the Ionian Sea from thence
in a body to the Iapygian promontory. But
the Athenians themselves, and such of their
allies as happened to be with them, went
down to Piraeus upon a day appointed at daybreak,
and began to man the ships for putting out
to sea. With them also went down the whole
population, one may say, of the city, both
citizens and foreigners; the inhabitants
of the country each escorting those that
belonged to them, their friends, their relatives,
or their sons, with hope and lamentation
upon their way, as they thought of the conquests
which they hoped to make, or of the friends
whom they might never see again, considering
the long voyage which they were going to
make from their country. Indeed, at this
moment, when they were now upon the point
of parting from one another, the danger came
more home to them than when they voted for
the expedition; although the strength of
the armament, and the profuse provision which
they remarked in every department, was a
sight that could not but comfort them. As
for the foreigners and the rest of the crowd,
they simply went to see a sight worth looking
at and passing all belief. Indeed this armament
that first sailed out was by far the most
costly and splendid Hellenic force that had
ever been sent out by a single city up to
that time. In mere number of ships and heavy
infantry that against Epidaurus under Pericles,
and the same when going against Potidaea
under Hagnon, was not inferior; containing
as it did four thousand Athenian heavy infantry,
three hundred horse, and one hundred galleys
accompanied by fifty Lesbian and Chian vessels
and many allies besides. But these were sent
upon a short voyage and with a scanty equipment.
The present expedition was formed in contemplation
of a long term of service by land and sea
alike, and was furnished with ships and troops
so as to be ready for either as required.
The fleet had been elaborately equipped at
great cost to the captains and the state;
the treasury giving a drachma a day to each
seaman, and providing empty ships, sixty
men-of-war and forty transports, and manning
these with the best crews obtainable; while
the captains gave a bounty in addition to
the pay from the treasury to the thranitae
and crews generally, besides spending lavishly
upon figure-heads and equipments, and one
and all making the utmost exertions to enable
their own ships to excel in beauty and fast
sailing. Meanwhile the land forces had been
picked from the best muster-rolls, and vied
with each other in paying great attention
to their arms and personal accoutrements.
From this resulted not only a rivalry among
themselves in their different departments,
but an idea among the rest of the Hellenes
that it was more a display of power and resources
than an armament against an enemy. For if
any one had counted up the public expenditure
of the state, and the private outlay of individuals-
that is to say, the sums which the state
had already spent upon the expedition and
was sending out in the hands of the generals,
and those which individuals had expended
upon their personal outfit, or as captains
of galleys had laid out and were still to
lay out upon their vessels; and if he had
added to this the journey money which each
was likely to have provided himself with,
independently of the pay from the treasury,
for a voyage of such length, and what the
soldiers or traders took with them for the
purpose of exchange- it would have been found
that many talents in all were being taken
out of the city. Indeed the expedition became
not less famous for its wonderful boldness
and for the splendour of its appearance,
than for its overwhelming strength as compared
with the peoples against whom it was directed,
and for the fact that this was the longest
passage from home hitherto attempted, and
the most ambitious in its objects considering
the resources of those who undertook it.
The ships being now manned, and everything
put on board with which they meant to sail,
the trumpet commanded silence, and the prayers
customary before putting out to sea were
offered, not in each ship by itself, but
by all together to the voice of a herald;
and bowls of wine were mixed through all
the armament, and libations made by the soldiers
and their officers in gold and silver goblets.
In their prayers joined also the crowds on
shore, the citizens and all others that wished
them well. The hymn sung and the libations
finished, they put out to sea, and first
out in column then raced each other as far
as Aegina, and so hastened to reach Corcyra,
where the rest of the allied forces were
also assembling. CHAPTER XIX. Seventeenth
Year of the War - Parties at Syracuse - Story
of Harmodius and Aristogiton - Disgrace of
Alcibiades MEANWHILE at Syracuse news came
in from many quarters of the expedition,
but for a long while met with no credence
whatever. Indeed, an assembly was held in
which speeches, as will be seen, were delivered
by different orators, believing or contradicting
the report of the Athenian expedition; among
whom Hermocrates, son of Hermon, came forward,
being persuaded that he knew the truth of
the matter, and gave the following counsel:
"Although I shall perhaps be no better
believed than others have been when I speak
upon the reality of the expedition, and although
I know that those who either make or repeat
statements thought not worthy of belief not
only gain no converts but are thought fools
for their pains, I shall certainly not be
frightened into holding my tongue when the
state is in danger, and when I am persuaded
that I can speak with more authority on the
matter than other persons. Much as you wonder
at it, the Athenians nevertheless have set
out against us with a large force, naval
and military, professedly to help the Egestaeans
and to restore Leontini, but really to conquer
Sicily, and above all our city, which once
gained, the rest, they think, will easily
follow. Make up your minds, therefore, to
see them speedily here, and see how you can
best repel them with the means under your
hand, and do be taken off your guard through
despising the news, or neglect the common
weal through disbelieving it. Meanwhile those
who believe me need not be dismayed at the
force or daring of the enemy. They will not
be able to do us more hurt than we shall
do them; nor is the greatness of their armament
altogether without advantage to us. Indeed,
the greater it is the better, with regard
to the rest of the Siceliots, whom dismay
will make more ready to join us; and if we
defeat or drive them away, disappointed of
the objects of their ambition (for I do not
fear for a moment that they will get what
they want), it will be a most glorious exploit
for us, and in my judgment by no means an
unlikely one. Few indeed have been the large
armaments, either Hellenic or barbarian,
that have gone far from home and been successful.
They cannot be more numerous than the people
of the country and their neighbours, all
of whom fear leagues together; and if they
miscarry for want of supplies in a foreign
land, to those against whom their plans were
laid none the less they leave renown, although
they may themselves have been the main cause
of their own discomfort. Thus these very
Athenians rose by the defeat of the Mede,
in a great measure due to accidental causes,
from the mere fact that Athens had been the
object of his attack; and this may very well
be the case with us also. "Let us, therefore,
confidently begin preparations here; let
us send and confirm some of the Sicels, and
obtain the friendship and alliance of others,
and dispatch envoys to the rest of Sicily
to show that the danger is common to all,
and to Italy to get them to become our allies,
or at all events to refuse to receive the
Athenians. I also think that it would be
best to send to Carthage as well; they are
by no means there without apprehension, but
it is their constant fear that the Athenians
may one day attack their city, and they may
perhaps think that they might themselves
suffer by letting Sicily be sacrificed, and
be willing to help us secretly if not openly,
in one way if not in another. They are the
best able to do so, if they will, of any
of the present day, as they possess most
gold and silver, by which war, like everything
else, flourishes. Let us also send to Lacedaemon
and Corinth, and ask them to come here and
help us as soon as possible, and to keep
alive the war in Hellas. But the true thing
of all others, in my opinion, to do at the
present moment, is what you, with your constitutional
love of quiet, will be slow to see, and what
I must nevertheless mention. If we Siceliots,
all together, or at least as many as possible
besides ourselves, would only launch the
whole of our actual navy with two months'
provisions, and meet the Athenians at Tarentum
and the Iapygian promontory, and show them
that before fighting for Sicily they must
first fight for their passage across the
Ionian Sea, we should strike dismay into
their army, and set them on thinking that
we have a base for our defensive- for Tarentum
is ready to receive us- while they have a
wide sea to cross with all their armament,
which could with difficulty keep its order
through so long a voyage, and would be easy
for us to attack as it came on slowly and
in small detachments. On the other hand,
if they were to lighten their vessels, and
draw together their fast sailers and with
these attack us, we could either fall upon
them when they were wearied with rowing,
or if we did not choose to do so, we could
retire to Tarentum; while they, having crossed
with few provisions just to give battle,
would be hard put to it in desolate places,
and would either have to remain and be blockaded,
or to try to sail along the coast, abandoning
the rest of their armament, and being further
discouraged by not knowing for certain whether
the cities would receive them. In my opinion
this consideration alone would be sufficient
to deter them from putting out from Corcyra;
and what with deliberating and reconnoitring
our numbers and whereabouts, they would let
the season go on until winter was upon them,
or, confounded by so unexpected a circumstance,
would break up the expedition, especially
as their most experienced general has, as
I hear, taken the command against his will,
and would grasp at the first excuse offered
by any serious demonstration of ours. We
should also be reported, I am certain, as
more numerous than we really are, and men's
minds are affected by what they hear, and
besides the first to attack, or to show that
they mean to defend themselves against an
attack, inspire greater fear because men
see that they are ready for the emergency.
This would just be the case with the Athenians
at present. They are now attacking us in
the belief that we shall not resist, having
a right to judge us severely because we did
not help the Lacedaemonians in crushing them;
but if they were to see us showing a courage
for which they are not prepared, they would
be more dismayed by the surprise than they
could ever be by our actual power. I could
wish to persuade you to show this courage;
but if this cannot be, at all events lose
not a moment in preparing generally for the
war; and remember all of you that contempt
for an assailant is best shown by bravery
in action, but that for the present the best
course is to accept the preparations which
fear inspires as giving the surest promise
of safety, and to act as if the danger was
real. That the Athenians are coming to attack
us, and are already upon the voyage, and
all but here- this is what I am sure of."
Thus far spoke Hermocrates. Meanwhile the
people of Syracuse were at great strife among
themselves; some contending that the Athenians
had no idea of coming and that there was
no truth in what he said; some asking if
they did come what harm they could do that
would not be repaid them tenfold in return;
while others made light of the whole affair
and turned it into ridicule. In short, there
were few that believed Hermocrates and feared
for the future. Meanwhile Athenagoras, the
leader of the people and very powerful at
that time with the masses, came forward and
spoke as follows: "For the Athenians,
he who does not wish that they may be as
misguided as they are supposed to be, and
that they may come here to become our subjects,
is either a coward or a traitor to his country;
while as for those who carry such tidings
and fill you with so much alarm, I wonder
less at their audacity than at their folly
if they flatter themselves that we do not
see through them. The fact is that they have
their private reasons to be afraid, and wish
to throw the city into consternation to have
their own terrors cast into the shade by
the public alarm. In short, this is what
these reports are worth; they do not arise
of themselves, but are concocted by men who
are always causing agitation here in Sicily.
However, if you are well advised, you will
not be guided in your calculation of probabilities
by what these persons tell you, but by what
shrewd men and of large experience, as I
esteem the Athenians to be, would be likely
to do. Now it is not likely that they would
leave the Peloponnesians behind them, and
before they have well ended the war in Hellas
wantonly come in quest of a new war quite
as arduous in Sicily; indeed, in my judgment,
they are only too glad that we do not go
and attack them, being so many and so great
cities as we are. "However, if they
should come as is reported, I consider Sicily
better able to go through with the war than
Peloponnese, as being at all points better
prepared, and our city by itself far more
than a match for this pretended army of invasion,
even were it twice as large again. I know
that they will not have horses with them,
or get any here, except a few perhaps from
the Egestaeans; or be able to bring a force
of heavy infantry equal in number to our
own, in ships which will already have enough
to do to come all this distance, however
lightly laden, not to speak of the transport
of the other stores required against a city
of this magnitude, which will be no slight
quantity. In fact, so strong is my opinion
upon the subject, that I do not well see
how they could avoid annihilation if they
brought with them another city as large as
Syracuse, and settled down and carried on
war from our frontier; much less can they
hope to succeed with all Sicily hostile to
them, as all Sicily will be, and with only
a camp pitched from the ships, and composed
of tents and bare necessaries, from which
they would not be able to stir far for fear
of our cavalry. "But the Athenians see
this as I tell you, and as I have reason
to know are looking after their possessions
at home, while persons here invent stories
that neither are true nor ever will be. Nor
is this the first time that I see these persons,
when they cannot resort to deeds, trying
by such stories and by others even more abominable
to frighten your people and get into their
hands the government: it is what I see always.
And I cannot help fearing that trying so
often they may one day succeed, and that
we, as long as we do not feel the smart,
may prove too weak for the task of prevention,
or, when the offenders are known, of pursuit.
The result is that our city is rarely at
rest, but is subject to constant troubles
and to contests as frequent against herself
as against the enemy, not to speak of occasional
tyrannies and infamous cabals. However, I
will try, if you will support me, to let
nothing of this happen in our time, by gaining
you, the many, and by chastising the authors
of such machinations, not merely when they
are caught in the act- a difficult feat to
accomplish- but also for what they have the
wish though not the power to do; as it is
necessary to punish an enemy not only for
what he does, but also beforehand for what
he intends to do, if the first to relax precaution
would not be also the first to suffer. I
shall also reprove, watch, and on occasion
warn the few- the most effectual way, in
my opinion, of turning them from their evil
courses. And after all, as I have often asked,
what would you have, young men? Would you
hold office at once? The law forbids it,
a law enacted rather because you are not
competent than to disgrace you when competent.
Meanwhile you would not be on a legal equality
with the many! But how can it be right that
citizens of the same state should be held
unworthy of the same privileges? "It
will be said, perhaps, that democracy is
neither wise nor equitable, but that the
holders of property are also the best fitted
to rule. I say, on the contrary, first, that
the word demos, or people, includes the whole
state, oligarchy only a part; next, that
if the best guardians of property are the
rich, and the best counsellors the wise,
none can hear and decide so well as the many;
and that all these talents, severally and
collectively, have their just place in a
democracy. But an oligarchy gives the many
their share of the danger, and not content
with the largest part takes and keeps the
whole of the profit; and this is what the
powerful and young among you aspire to, but
in a great city cannot possibly obtain. "But
even now, foolish men, most senseless of
all the Hellenes that I know, if you have
no sense of the wickedness of your designs,
or most criminal if you have that sense and
still dare to pursue them- even now, if it
is not a case for repentance, you may still
learn wisdom, and thus advance the interest
of the country, the common interest of us
all. Reflect that in the country's prosperity
the men of merit in your ranks will have
a share and a larger share than the great
mass of your fellow countrymen, but that
if you have other designs you run a risk
of being deprived of all; and desist from
reports like these, as the people know your
object and will not put up with it. If the
Athenians arrive, this city will repulse
them in a manner worthy of itself; we have
moreover, generals who will see to this matter.
And if nothing of this be true, as I incline
to believe, the city will not be thrown into
a panic by your intelligence, or impose upon
itself a self-chosen servitude by choosing
you for its rulers; the city itself will
look into the matter, and will judge your
words as if they were acts, and, instead
of allowing itself to be deprived of its
liberty by listening to you, will strive
to preserve that liberty, by taking care
to have always at hand the means of making
itself respected." Such were the words
of Athenagoras. One of the generals now stood
up and stopped any other speakers coming
forward, adding these words of his own with
reference to the matter in hand: "It
is not well for speakers to utter calumnies
against one another, or for their hearers
to entertain them; we ought rather to look
to the intelligence that we have received,
and see how each man by himself and the city
as a whole may best prepare to repel the
invaders. Even if there be no need, there
is no harm in the state being furnished with
horses and arms and all other insignia of
war; and we will undertake to see to and
order this, and to send round to the cities
to reconnoitre and do all else that may appear
desirable. Part of this we have seen to already,
and whatever we discover shall be laid before
you." After these words from the general,
the Syracusans departed from the assembly.
In the meantime the Athenians with all their
allies had now arrived at Corcyra. Here the
generals began by again reviewing the armament,
and made arrangements as to the order in
which they were to anchor and encamp, and
dividing the whole fleet into three divisions,
allotted one to each of their number, to
avoid sailing all together and being thus
embarrassed for water, harbourage, or provisions
at the stations which they might touch at,
and at the same time to be generally better
ordered and easier to handle, by each squadron
having its own commander. Next they sent
on three ships to Italy and Sicily to find
out which of the cities would receive them,
with instructions to meet them on the way
and let them know before they put in to land.
After this the Athenians weighed from Corcyra,
and proceeded to cross to Sicily with an
armament now consisting of one hundred and
thirty-four galleys in all (besides two Rhodian
fifty-oars), of which one hundred were Athenian
vessels- sixty men-of-war, and forty troopships-
and the remainder from Chios and the other
allies; five thousand and one hundred heavy
infantry in all, that is to say, fifteen
hundred Athenian citizens from the rolls
at Athens and seven hundred Thetes shipped
as marines, and the rest allied troops, some
of them Athenian subjects, and besides these
five hundred Argives, and two hundred and
fifty Mantineans serving for hire; four hundred
and eighty archers in all, eighty of whom
were Cretans, seven hundred slingers from
Rhodes, one hundred and twenty light-armed
exiles from Megara, and one horse-transport
carrying thirty horses. Such was the strength
of the first armament that sailed over for
the war. The supplies for this force were
carried by thirty ships of burden laden with
corn, which conveyed the bakers, stone-masons,
and carpenters, and the tools for raising
fortifications, accompanied by one hundred
boats, like the former pressed into the service,
besides many other boats and ships of burden
which followed the armament voluntarily for
purposes of trade; all of which now left
Corcyra and struck across the Ionian Sea
together. The whole force making land at
the Iapygian promontory and Tarentum, with
more or less good fortune, coasted along
the shores of Italy, the cities shutting
their markets and gates against them, and
according them nothing but water and liberty
to anchor, and Tarentum and Locri not even
that, until they arrived at Rhegium, the
extreme point of Italy. Here at length they
reunited, and not gaining admission within
the walls pitched a camp outside the city
in the precinct of Artemis, where a market
was also provided for them, and drew their
ships on shore and kept quiet. Meanwhile
they opened negotiations with the Rhegians,
and called upon them as Chalcidians to assist
their Leontine kinsmen; to which the Rhegians
replied that they would not side with either
party, but should await the decision of the
rest of the Italiots, and do as they did.
Upon this the Athenians now began to consider
what would be the best action to take in
the affairs of Sicily, and meanwhile waited
for the ships sent on to come back from Egesta,
in order to know whether there was really
there the money mentioned by the messengers
at Athens. In the meantime came in from all
quarters to the Syracusans, as well as from
their own officers sent to reconnoitre, the
positive tidings that the fleet was at Rhegium;
upon which they laid aside their incredulity
and threw themselves heart and soul into
the work of preparation. Guards or envoys,
as the case might be, were sent round to
the Sicels, garrisons put into the posts
of the Peripoli in the country, horses and
arms reviewed in the city to see that nothing
was wanting, and all other steps taken to
prepare for a war which might be upon them
at any moment. Meanwhile the three ships
that had been sent on came from Egesta to
the Athenians at Rhegium, with the news that
so far from there being the sums promised,
all that could be produced was thirty talents.
The generals were not a little disheartened
at being thus disappointed at the outset,
and by the refusal to join in the expedition
of the Rhegians, the people they had first
tried to gain and had had had most reason
to count upon, from their relationship to
the Leontines and constant friendship for
Athens. If Nicias was prepared for the news
from Egesta, his two colleagues were taken
completely by surprise. The Egestaeans had
had recourse to the following stratagem,
when the first envoys from Athens came to
inspect their resources. They took the envoys
in question to the temple of Aphrodite at
Eryx and showed them the treasures deposited
there: bowls, wine-ladles, censers, and a
large number of other pieces of plate, which
from being in silver gave an impression of
wealth quite out of proportion to their really
small value. They also privately entertained
the ships' crews, and collected all the cups
of gold and silver that they could find in
Egesta itself or could borrow in the neighbouring
Phoenician and Hellenic towns, and each brought
them to the banquets as their own; and as
all used pretty nearly the same, and everywhere
a great quantity of plate was shown, the
effect was most dazzling upon the Athenian
sailors, and made them talk loudly of the
riches they had seen when they got back to
Athens. The dupes in question- who had in
their turn persuaded the rest- when the news
got abroad that there was not the money supposed
at Egesta, were much blamed by the soldiers.
Meanwhile the generals consulted upon what
was to be done. The opinion of Nicias was
to sail with all the armament to Selinus,
the main object of the expedition, and if
the Egestaeans could provide money for the
whole force, to advise accordingly; but if
they could not, to require them to supply
provisions for the sixty ships that they
had asked for, to stay and settle matters
between them and the Selinuntines either
by force or by agreement, and then to coast
past the other cities, and after displaying
the power of Athens and proving their zeal
for their friends and allies, to sail home
again (unless they should have some sudden
and unexpected opportunity of serving the
Leontines, or of bringing over some of the
other cities), and not to endanger the state
by wasting its home resources. Alcibiades
said that a great expedition like the present
must not disgrace itself by going away without
having done anything; heralds must be sent
to all the cities except Selinus and Syracuse,
and efforts be made to make some of the Sicels
revolt from the Syracusans, and to obtain
the friendship of others, in order to have
corn and troops; and first of all to gain
the Messinese, who lay right in the passage
and entrance to Sicily, and would afford
an excellent harbour and base for the army.
Thus, after bringing over the towns and knowing
who would be their allies in the war, they
might at length attack Syracuse and Selinus;
unless the latter came to terms with Egesta
and the former ceased to oppose the restoration
of Leontini. Lamachus, on the other hand,
said that they ought to sail straight to
Syracuse, and fight their battle at once
under the walls of the town while the people
were still unprepared, and the panic at its
height. Every armament was most terrible
at first; if it allowed time to run on without
showing itself, men's courage revived, and
they saw it appear at last almost with indifference.
By attacking suddenly, while Syracuse still
trembled at their coming, they would have
the best chance of gaining a victory for
themselves and of striking a complete panic
into the enemy by the aspect of their numbers-
which would never appear so considerable
as at present- by the anticipation of coming
disaster, and above all by the immediate
danger of the engagement. They might also
count upon surprising many in the fields
outside, incredulous of their coming; and
at the moment that the enemy was carrying
in his property the army would not want for
booty if it sat down in force before the
city. The rest of the Siceliots would thus
be immediately less disposed to enter into
alliance with the Syracusans, and would join
the Athenians, without waiting to see which
were the strongest. They must make Megara
their naval station as a place to retreat
to and a base from which to attack: it was
an uninhabited place at no great distance
from Syracuse either by land or by sea. After
speaking to this effect, Lamachus nevertheless
gave his support to the opinion of Alcibiades.
After this Alcibiades sailed in his own vessel
across to Messina with proposals of alliance,
but met with no success, the inhabitants
answering that they could not receive him
within their walls, though they would provide
him with a market outside. Upon this he sailed
back to Rhegium. Immediately upon his return
the generals manned and victualled sixty
ships out of the whole fleet and coasted
along to Naxos, leaving the rest of the armament
behind them at Rhegium with one of their
number. Received by the Naxians, they then
coasted on to Catana, and being refused admittance
by the inhabitants, there being a Syracusan
party in the town, went on to the river Terias.
Here they bivouacked, and the next day sailed
in single file to Syracuse with all their
ships except ten which they sent on in front
to sail into the great harbour and see if
there was any fleet launched, and to proclaim
by herald from shipboard that the Athenians
were come to restore the Leontines to their
country, as being their allies and kinsmen,
and that such of them, therefore, as were
in Syracuse should leave it without fear
and join their friends and benefactors the
Athenians. After making this proclamation
and reconnoitring the city and the harbours,
and the features of the country which they
would have to make their base of operations
in the war, they sailed back to Catana. An
assembly being held here, the inhabitants
refused to receive the armament, but invited
the generals to come in and say what they
desired; and while Alcibiades was speaking
and the citizens were intent on the assembly,
the soldiers broke down an ill-walled-up
postern gate without being observed, and
getting inside the town, flocked into the
marketplace. The Syracusan party in the town
no sooner saw the army inside than they became
frightened and withdrew, not being at all
numerous; while the rest voted for an alliance
with the Athenians and invited them to fetch
the rest of their forces from Rhegium. After
this the Athenians sailed to Rhegium, and
put off, this time with all the armament,
for Catana, and fell to work at their camp
immediately upon their arrival. Meanwhile
word was brought them from Camarina that
if they went there the town would go over
to them, and also that the Syracusans were
manning a fleet. The Athenians accordingly
sailed alongshore with all their armament,
first to Syracuse, where they found no fleet
manning, and so always along the coast to
Camarina, where they brought to at the beach,
and sent a herald to the people, who, however,
refused to receive them, saying that their
oaths bound them to receive the Athenians
only with a single vessel, unless they themselves
sent for more. Disappointed here, the Athenians
now sailed back again, and after landing
and plundering on Syracusan territory and
losing some stragglers from their light infantry
through the coming up of the Syracusan horse,
so got back to Catana. There they found the
Salaminia come from Athens for Alcibiades,
with orders for him to sail home to answer
the charges which the state brought against
him, and for certain others of the soldiers
who with him were accused of sacrilege in
the matter of the mysteries and of the Hermae.
For the Athenians, after the departure of
the expedition, had continued as active as
ever in investigating the facts of the mysteries
and of the Hermae, and, instead of testing
the informers, in their suspicious temper
welcomed all indifferently, arresting and
imprisoning the best citizens upon the evidence
of rascals, and preferring to sift the matter
to the bottom sooner than to let an accused
person of good character pass unquestioned,
owing to the rascality of the informer. The
commons had heard how oppressive the tyranny
of Pisistratus and his sons had become before
it ended, and further that that had been
put down at last, not by themselves and Harmodius,
but by the Lacedaemonians, and so were always
in fear and took everything suspiciously.
Indeed, the daring action of Aristogiton
and Harmodius was undertaken in consequence
of a love affair, which I shall relate at
some length, to show that the Athenians are
not more accurate than the rest of the world
in their accounts of their own tyrants and
of the facts of their own history. Pisistratus
dying at an advanced age in possession of
the tyranny, was succeeded by his eldest
son, Hippias, and not Hipparchus, as is vulgarly
believed. Harmodius was then in the flower
of youthful beauty, and Aristogiton, a citizen
in the middle rank of life, was his lover
and possessed him. Solicited without success
by Hipparchus, son of Pisistratus, Harmodius
told Aristogiton, and the enraged lover,
afraid that the powerful Hipparchus might
take Harmodius by force, immediately formed
a design, such as his condition in life permitted,
for overthrowing the tyranny. In the meantime
Hipparchus, after a second solicitation of
Harmodius, attended with no better success,
unwilling to use violence, arranged to insult
him in some covert way. Indeed, generally
their government was not grievous to the
multitude, or in any way odious in practice;
and these tyrants cultivated wisdom and virtue
as much as any, and without exacting from
the Athenians more than a twentieth of their
income, splendidly adorned their city, and
carried on their wars, and provided sacrifices
for the temples. For the rest, the city was
left in full enjoyment of its existing laws,
except that care was always taken to have
the offices in the hands of some one of the
family. Among those of them that held the
yearly archonship at Athens was Pisistratus,
son of the tyrant Hippias, and named after
his grandfather, who dedicated during his
term of office the altar to the twelve gods
in the market-place, and that of Apollo in
the Pythian precinct. The Athenian people
afterwards built on to and lengthened the
altar in the market-place, and obliterated
the inscription; but that in the Pythian
precinct can still be seen, though in faded
letters, and is to the following effect:
Pisistratus, the son of Hippias, Sent up
this record of his archonship In precinct
of Apollo Pythias. That Hippias was the eldest
son and succeeded to the government, is what
I positively assert as a fact upon which
I have had more exact accounts than others,
and may be also ascertained by the following
circumstance. He is the only one of the legitimate
brothers that appears to have had children;
as the altar shows, and the pillar placed
in the Athenian Acropolis, commemorating
the crime of the tyrants, which mentions
no child of Thessalus or of Hipparchus, but
five of Hippias, which he had by Myrrhine,
daughter of Callias, son of Hyperechides;
and naturally the eldest would have married
first. Again, his name comes first on the
pillar after that of his father; and this
too is quite natural, as he was the eldest
after him, and the reigning tyrant. Nor can
I ever believe that Hippias would have obtained
the tyranny so easily, if Hipparchus had
been in power when he was killed, and he,
Hippias, had had to establish himself upon
the same day; but he had no doubt been long
accustomed to overawe the citizens, and to
be obeyed by his mercenaries, and thus not
only conquered, but conquered with ease,
without experiencing any of the embarrassment
of a younger brother unused to the exercise
of authority. It was the sad fate which made
Hipparchus famous that got him also the credit
with posterity of having been tyrant. To
return to Harmodius; Hipparchus having been
repulsed in his solicitations insulted him
as he had resolved, by first inviting a sister
of his, a young girl, to come and bear a
basket in a certain procession, and then
rejecting her, on the plea that she had never
been invited at all owing to her unworthiness.
If Harmodius was indignant at this, Aristogiton
for his sake now became more exasperated
than ever; and having arranged everything
with those who were to join them in the enterprise,
they only waited for the great feast of the
Panathenaea, the sole day upon which the
citizens forming part of the procession could
meet together in arms without suspicion.
Aristogiton and Harmodius were to begin,
but were to be supported immediately by their
accomplices against the bodyguard. The conspirators
were not many, for better security, besides
which they hoped that those not in the plot
would be carried away by the example of a
few daring spirits, and use the arms in their
hands to recover their liberty. At last the
festival arrived; and Hippias with his bodyguard
was outside the city in the Ceramicus, arranging
how the different parts of the procession
were to proceed. Harmodius and Aristogiton
had already their daggers and were getting
ready to act, when seeing one of their accomplices
talking familiarly with Hippias, who was
easy of access to every one, they took fright,
and concluded that they were discovered and
on the point of being taken; and eager if
possible to be revenged first upon the man
who had wronged them and for whom they had
undertaken all this risk, they rushed, as
they were, within the gates, and meeting
with Hipparchus by the Leocorium recklessly
fell upon him at once, infuriated, Aristogiton
by love, and Harmodius by insult, and smote
him and slew him. Aristogiton escaped the
guards at the moment, through the crowd running
up, but was afterwards taken and dispatched
in no merciful way: Harmodius was killed
on the spot. When the news was brought to
Hippias in the Ceramicus, he at once proceeded
not to the scene of action, but to the armed
men in the procession, before they, being
some distance away, knew anything of the
matter, and composing his features for the
occasion, so as not to betray himself, pointed
to a certain spot, and bade them repair thither
without their arms. They withdrew accordingly,
fancying he had something to say; upon which
he told the mercenaries to remove the arms,
and there and then picked out the men he
thought guilty and all found with daggers,
the shield and spear being the usual weapons
for a procession. In this way offended love
first led Harmodius and Aristogiton to conspire,
and the alarm of the moment to commit the
rash action recounted. After this the tyranny
pressed harder on the Athenians, and Hippias,
now grown more fearful, put to death many
of the citizens, and at the same time began
to turn his eyes abroad for a refuge in case
of revolution. Thus, although an Athenian,
he gave his daughter, Archedice, to a Lampsacene,
Aeantides, son of the tyrant of Lampsacus,
seeing that they had great influence with
Darius. And there is her tomb in Lampsacus
with this inscription: Archedice lies buried
in this earth, Hippias her sire, and Athens
gave her birth; Unto her bosom pride was
never known, Though daughter, wife, and sister
to the throne. Hippias, after reigning three
years longer over the Athenians, was deposed
in the fourth by the Lacedaemonians and the
banished Alcmaeonidae, and went with a safe
conduct to Sigeum, and to Aeantides at Lampsacus,
and from thence to King Darius; from whose
court he set out twenty years after, in his
old age, and came with the Medes to Marathon.
With these events in their minds, and recalling
everything they knew by hearsay on the subject,
the Athenian people grow difficult of humour
and suspicious of the persons charged in
the affair of the mysteries, and persuaded
that all that had taken place was part of
an oligarchical and monarchical conspiracy.
In the state of irritation thus produced,
many persons of consideration had been already
thrown into prison, and far from showing
any signs of abating, public feeling grew
daily more savage, and more arrests were
made; until at last one of those in custody,
thought to be the most guilty of all, was
induced by a fellow prisoner to make a revelation,
whether true or not is a matter on which
there are two opinions, no one having been
able, either then or since, to say for certain
who did the deed. However this may be, the
other found arguments to persuade him, that
even if he had not done it, he ought to save
himself by gaining a promise of impunity,
and free the state of its present suspicions;
as he would be surer of safety if he confessed
after promise of impunity than if he denied
and were brought to trial. He accordingly
made a revelation, affecting himself and
others in the affair of the Hermae; and the
Athenian people, glad at last, as they supposed,
to get at the truth, and furious until then
at not being able to discover those who had
conspired against the commons, at once let
go the informer and all the rest whom he
had not denounced, and bringing the accused
to trial executed as many as were apprehended,
and condemned to death such as had fled and
set a price upon their heads. In this it
was, after all, not clear whether the sufferers
had been punished unjustly, while in any
case the rest of the city received immediate
and manifest relief. To return to Alcibiades:
public feeling was very hostile to him, being
worked on by the same enemies who had attacked
him before he went out; and now that the
Athenians fancied that they had got at the
truth of the matter of the Hermae, they believed
more firmly than ever that the affair of
the mysteries also, in which he was implicated,
had been contrived by him in the same intention
and was connected with the plot against the
democracy. Meanwhile it so happened that,
just at the time of this agitation, a small
force of Lacedaemonians had advanced as far
as the Isthmus, in pursuance of some scheme
with the Boeotians. It was now thought that
this had come by appointment, at his instigation,
and not on account of the Boeotians, and
that, if the citizens had not acted on the
information received, and forestalled them
by arresting the prisoners, the city would
have been betrayed. The citizens went so
far as to sleep one night armed in the temple
of Theseus within the walls. The friends
also of Alcibiades at Argos were just at
this time suspected of a design to attack
the commons; and the Argive hostages deposited
in the islands were given up by the Athenians
to the Argive people to be put to death upon
that account: in short, everywhere something
was found to create suspicion against Alcibiades.
It was therefore decided to bring him to
trial and execute him, and the Salaminia
was sent to Sicily for him and the others
named in the information, with instructions
to order him to come and answer the charges
against him, but not to arrest him, because
they wished to avoid causing any agitation
in the army or among the enemy in Sicily,
and above all to retain the services of the
Mantineans and Argives, who, it was thought,
had been induced to join by his influence.
Alcibiades, with his own ship and his fellow
accused, accordingly sailed off with the
Salaminia from Sicily, as though to return
to Athens, and went with her as far as Thurii,
and there they left the ship and disappeared,
being afraid to go home for trial with such
a prejudice existing against them. The crew
of the Salaminia stayed some time looking
for Alcibiades and his companions, and at
length, as they were nowhere to be found,
set sail and departed. Alcibiades, now an
outlaw, crossed in a boat not long after
from Thurii to Peloponnese; and the Athenians
passed sentence of death by default upon
him and those in his company. CHAPTER XX.
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Years of the War
- Inaction of the Athenian Army - Alcibiades
at Sparta - Investment of Syracuse THE Athenian
generals left in Sicily now divided the armament
into two parts, and, each taking one by lot,
sailed with the whole for Selinus and Egesta,
wishing to know whether the Egestaeans would
give the money, and to look into the question
of Selinus and ascertain the state of the
quarrel between her and Egesta. Coasting
along Sicily, with the shore on their left,
on the side towards the Tyrrhene Gulf they
touched at Himera, the only Hellenic city
in that part of the island, and being refused
admission resumed their voyage. On their
way they took Hyccara, a petty Sicanian seaport,
nevertheless at war with Egesta, and making
slaves of the inhabitants gave up the town
to the Egestaeans, some of whose horse had
joined them; after which the army proceeded
through the territory of the Sicels until
it reached Catana, while the fleet sailed
along the coast with the slaves on board.
Meanwhile Nicias sailed straight from Hyccara
along the coast and went to Egesta and, after
transacting his other business and receiving
thirty talents, rejoined the forces. They
now sold their slaves for the sum of one
hundred and twenty talents, and sailed round
to their Sicel allies to urge them to send
troops; and meanwhile went with half their
own force to the hostile town of Hybla in
the territory of Gela, but did not succeed
in taking it. Summer was now over. The winter
following, the Athenians at once began to
prepare for moving on Syracuse, and the Syracusans
on their side for marching against them.
From the moment when the Athenians failed
to attack them instantly as they at first
feared and expected, every day that passed
did something to revive their courage; and
when they saw them sailing far away from
them on the other side of Sicily, and going
to Hybla only to fail in their attempts to
storm it, they thought less of them than
ever, and called upon their generals, as
the multitude is apt to do in its moments
of confidence, to lead them to Catana, since
the enemy would not come to them. Parties
also of the Syracusan horse employed in reconnoitring
constantly rode up to the Athenian armament,
and among other insults asked them whether
they had not really come to settle with the
Syracusans in a foreign country rather than
to resettle the Leontines in their own. Aware
of this, the Athenian generals determined
to draw them out in mass as far as possible
from the city, and themselves in the meantime
to sail by night alongshore, and take up
at their leisure a convenient position. This
they knew they could not so well do, if they
had to disembark from their ships in front
of a force prepared for them, or to go by
land openly. The numerous cavalry of the
Syracusans (a force which they were themselves
without) would then be able to do the greatest
mischief to their light troops and the crowd
that followed them; but this plan would enable
them to take up a position in which the horse
could do them no hurt worth speaking of,
some Syracusan exiles with the army having
told them of the spot near the Olympieum,
which they afterwards occupied. In pursuance
of their idea, the generals imagined the
following stratagem. They sent to Syracuse
a man devoted to them, and by the Syracusan
generals thought to be no less in their interest;
he was a native of Catana, and said he came
from persons in that place, whose names the
Syracusan generals were acquainted with,
and whom they knew to be among the members
of their party still left in the city. He
told them that the Athenians passed the night
in the town, at some distance from their
arms, and that if the Syracusans would name
a day and come with all their people at daybreak
to attack the armament, they, their friends,
would close the gates upon the troops in
the city, and set fire to the vessels, while
the Syracusans would easily take the camp
by an attack upon the stockade. In this they
would be aided by many of the Catanians,
who were already prepared to act, and from
whom he himself came. The generals of the
Syracusans, who did not want confidence,
and who had intended even without this to
march on Catana, believed the man without
any sufficient inquiry, fixed at once a day
upon which they would be there, and dismissed
him, and the Selinuntines and others of their
allies having now arrived, gave orders for
all the Syracusans to march out in mass.
Their preparations completed, and the time
fixed for their arrival being at hand, they
set out for Catana, and passed the night
upon the river Symaethus, in the Leontine
territory. Meanwhile the Athenians no sooner
knew of their approach than they took all
their forces and such of the Sicels or others
as had joined them, put them on board their
ships and boats, and sailed by night to Syracuse.
Thus, when morning broke the Athenians were
landing opposite the Olympieum ready to seize
their camping ground, and the Syracusan horse
having ridden up first to Catana and found
that all the armament had put to sea, turned
back and told the infantry, and then all
turned back together, and went to the relief
of the city. In the meantime, as the march
before the Syracusans was a long one, the
Athenians quietly sat down their army in
a convenient position, where they could begin
an engagement when they pleased, and where
the Syracusan cavalry would have least opportunity
of annoying them, either before or during
the action, being fenced off on one side
by walls, houses, trees, and by a marsh,
and on the other by cliffs. They also felled
the neighbouring trees and carried them down
to the sea, and formed a palisade alongside
of their ships, and with stones which they
picked up and wood hastily raised a fort
at Daskon, the most vulnerable point of their
position, and broke down the bridge over
the Anapus. These preparations were allowed
to go on without any interruption from the
city, the first hostile force to appear being
the Syracusan cavalry, followed afterwards
by all the foot together. At first they came
close up to the Athenian army, and then,
finding that they did not offer to engage,
crossed the Helorine road and encamped for
the night. The next day the Athenians and
their allies prepared for battle, their dispositions
being as follows: Their right wing was occupied
by the Argives and Mantineans, the centre
by the Athenians, and the rest of the field
by the other allies. Half their army was
drawn up eight deep in advance, half close
to their tents in a hollow square, formed
also eight deep, which had orders to look
out and be ready to go to the support of
the troops hardest pressed. The camp followers
were placed inside this reserve. The Syracusans,
meanwhile, formed their heavy infantry sixteen
deep, consisting of the mass levy of their
own people, and such allies as had joined
them, the strongest contingent being that
of the Selinuntines; next to them the cavalry
of the Geloans, numbering two hundred in
all, with about twenty horse and fifty archers
from Camarina. The cavalry was posted on
their right, full twelve hundred strong,
and next to it the darters. As the Athenians
were about to begin the attack, Nicias went
along the lines, and addressed these words
of encouragement to the army and the nations
composing it: "Soldiers, a long exhortation
is little needed by men like ourselves, who
are here to fight in the same battle, the
force itself being, to my thinking, more
fit to inspire confidence than a fine speech
with a weak army. Where we have Argives,
Mantineans, Athenians, and the first of the
islanders in the ranks together, it were
strange indeed, with so many and so brave
companions in arms, if we did not feel confident
of victory; especially when we have mass
levies opposed to our picked troops, and
what is more, Siceliots, who may disdain
us but will not stand against us, their skill
not being at all commensurate to their rashness.
You may also remember that we are far from
home and have no friendly land near, except
what your own swords shall win you; and here
I put before you a motive just the reverse
of that which the enemy are appealing to;
their cry being that they shall fight for
their country, mine that we shall fight for
a country that is not ours, where we must
conquer or hardly get away, as we shall have
their horse upon us in great numbers. Remember,
therefore, your renown, and go boldly against
the enemy, thinking the present strait and
necessity more terrible than they."
After this address Nicias at once led on
the army. The Syracusans were not at that
moment expecting an immediate engagement,
and some had even gone away to the town,
which was close by; these now ran up as hard
as they could and, though behind time, took
their places here or there in the main body
as fast as they joined it. Want of zeal or
daring was certainly not the fault of the
Syracusans, either in this or the other battles,
but although not inferior in courage, so
far as their military science might carry
them, when this failed them they were compelled
to give up their resolution also. On the
present occasion, although they had not supposed
that the Athenians would begin the attack,
and although constrained to stand upon their
defence at short notice, they at once took
up their arms and advanced to meet them.
First, the stone-throwers, slingers, and
archers of either army began skirmishing,
and routed or were routed by one another,
as might be expected between light troops;
next, soothsayers brought forward the usual
victims, and trumpeters urged on the heavy
infantry to the charge; and thus they advanced,
the Syracusans to fight for their country,
and each individual for his safety that day
and liberty hereafter; in the enemy's army,
the Athenians to make another's country theirs
and to save their own from suffering by their
defeat; the Argives and independent allies
to help them in getting what they came for,
and to earn by victory another sight of the
country they had left behind; while the subject
allies owed most of their ardour to the desire
of self-preservation, which they could only
hope for if victorious; next to which, as
a secondary motive, came the chance of serving
on easier terms, after helping the Athenians
to a fresh conquest. The armies now came
to close quarters, and for a long while fought
without either giving ground. Meanwhile there
occurred some claps of thunder with lightning
and heavy rain, which did not fail to add
to the fears of the party fighting for the
first time, and very little acquainted with
war; while to their more experienced adversaries
these phenomena appeared to be produced by
the time of year, and much more alarm was
felt at the continued resistance of the enemy.
At last the Argives drove in the Syracusan
left, and after them the Athenians routed
the troops opposed to them, and the Syracusan
army was thus cut in two and betook itself
to flight. The Athenians did not pursue far,
being held in check by the numerous and undefeated
Syracusan horse, who attacked and drove back
any of their heavy infantry whom they saw
pursuing in advance of the rest; in spite
of which the victors followed so far as was
safe in a body, and then went back and set
up a trophy. Meanwhile the Syracusans rallied
at the Helorine road, where they re-formed
as well as they could under the circumstances,
and even sent a garrison of their own citizens
to the Olympieum, fearing that the Athenians
might lay hands on some of the treasures
there. The rest returned to the town. The
Athenians, however, did not go to the temple,
but collected their dead and laid them upon
a pyre, and passed the night upon the field.
The next day they gave the enemy back their
dead under truce, to the number of about
two hundred and sixty, Syracusans and allies,
and gathered together the bones of their
own, some fifty, Athenians and allies, and
taking the spoils of the enemy, sailed back
to Catana. It was now winter; and it did
not seem possible for the moment to carry
on the war before Syracuse, until horse should
have been sent for from Athens and levied
among the allies in Sicily- to do away with
their utter inferiority in cavalry- and money
should have been collected in the country
and received from Athens, and until some
of the cities, which they hoped would be
now more disposed to listen to them after
the battle, should have been brought over,
and corn and all other necessaries provided,
for a campaign in the spring against Syracuse.
With this intention they sailed off to Naxos
and Catana for the winter. Meanwhile the
Syracusans burned their dead and then held
an assembly, in which Hermocrates, son of
Hermon, a man who with a general ability
of the first order had given proofs of military
capacity and brilliant courage in the war,
came forward and encouraged them, and told
them not to let what had occurred make them
give way, since their spirit had not been
conquered, but their want of discipline had
done the mischief. Still they had not been
beaten by so much as might have been expected,
especially as they were, one might say, novices
in the art of war, an army of artisans opposed
to the most practised soldiers in Hellas.
What had also done great mischief was the
number of the generals (there were fifteen
of them) and the quantity of orders given,
combined with the disorder and insubordination
of the troops. But if they were to have a
few skilful generals, and used this winter
in preparing their heavy infantry, finding
arms for such as had not got any, so as to
make them as numerous as possible, and forcing
them to attend to their training generally,
they would have every chance of beating their
adversaries, courage being already theirs
and discipline in the field having thus been
added to it. Indeed, both these qualities
would improve, since danger would exercise
them in discipline, while their courage would
be led to surpass itself by the confidence
which skill inspires. The generals should
be few and elected with full powers, and
an oath should be taken to leave them entire
discretion in their command: if they adopted
this plan, their secrets would be better
kept, all preparations would be properly
made, and there would be no room for excuses.
The Syracusans heard him, and voted everything
as he advised, and elected three generals,
Hermocrates himself, Heraclides, son of Lysimachus,
and Sicanus, son of Execestes. They also
sent envoys to Corinth and Lacedaemon to
procure a force of allies to join them, and
to induce the Lacedaemonians for their sakes
openly to address themselves in real earnest
to the war against the Athenians, that they
might either have to leave Sicily or be less
able to send reinforcements to their army
there. The Athenian forces at Catana now
at once sailed against Messina, in the expectation
of its being betrayed to them. The intrigue,
however, after all came to nothing: Alcibiades,
who was in the secret, when he left his command
upon the summons from home, foreseeing that
he would be outlawed, gave information of
the plot to the friends of the Syracusans
in Messina, who had at once put to death
its authors, and now rose in arms against
the opposite faction with those of their
way of thinking, and succeeded in preventing
the admission of the Athenians. The latter
waited for thirteen days, and then, as they
were exposed to the weather and without provisions,
and met with no success, went back to Naxos,
where they made places for their ships to
lie in, erected a palisade round their camp,
and retired into winter quarters; meanwhile
they sent a galley to Athens for money and
cavalry to join them in the spring. During
the winter the Syracusans built a wall on
to the city, so as to take in the statue
of Apollo Temenites, all along the side looking
towards Epipolae, to make the task of circumvallation
longer and more difficult, in case of their
being defeated, and also erected a fort at
Megara and another in the Olympieum, and
stuck palisades along the sea wherever there
was a landing Place. Meanwhile, as they knew
that the Athenians were wintering at Naxos,
they marched with all their people to Catana,
and ravaged the land and set fire to the
tents and encampment of the Athenians, and
so returned home. Learning also that the
Athenians were sending an embassy to Camarina,
on the strength of the alliance concluded
in the time of Laches, to gain, if possible,
that city, they sent another from Syracuse
to oppose them. They had a shrewd suspicion
that the Camarinaeans had not sent what they
did send for the first battle very willingly;
and they now feared that they would refuse
to assist them at all in future, after seeing
the success of the Athenians in the action,
and would join the latter on the strength
of their old friendship. Hermocrates, with
some others, accordingly arrived at Camarina
from Syracuse, and Euphemus and others from
the Athenians; and an assembly of the Camarinaeans
having been convened, Hermocrates spoke as
follows, in the hope of prejudicing them
against the Athenians: "Camarinaeans,
we did not come on this embassy because we
were afraid of your being frightened by the
actual forces of the Athenians, but rather
of your being gained by what they would say
to you before you heard anything from us.
They are come to Sicily with the pretext
that you know, and the intention which we
all suspect, in my opinion less to restore
the Leontines to their homes than to oust
us from ours; as it is out of all reason
that they should restore in Sicily the cities
that they lay waste in Hellas, or should
cherish the Leontine Chalcidians because
of their Ionian blood and keep in servitude
the Euboean Chalcidians, of whom the Leontines
are a colony. No; but the same policy which
has proved so successful in Hellas is now
being tried in Sicily. After being chosen
as the leaders of the Ionians and of the
other allies of Athenian origin, to punish
the Mede, the Athenians accused some of failure
in military service, some of fighting against
each other, and others, as the case might
be, upon any colourable pretext that could
be found, until they thus subdued them all.
In fine, in the struggle against the Medes,
the Athenians did not fight for the liberty
of the Hellenes, or the Hellenes for their
own liberty, but the former to make their
countrymen serve them instead of him, the
latter to change one master for another,
wiser indeed than the first, but wiser for
evil. "But we are not now come to declare
to an audience familiar with them the misdeeds
of a state so open to accusation as is the
Athenian, but much rather to blame ourselves,
who, with the warnings we possess in the
Hellenes in those parts that have been enslaved
through not supporting each other, and seeing
the same sophisms being now tried upon ourselves-
such as restorations of Leontine kinsfolk
and support of Egestaean allies- do not stand
together and resolutely show them that here
are no Ionians, or Hellespontines, or islanders,
who change continually, but always serve
a master, sometimes the Mede and sometimes
some other, but free Dorians from independent
Peloponnese, dwelling in Sicily. Or, are
we waiting until we be taken in detail, one
city after another; knowing as we do that
in no other way can we be conquered, and
seeing that they turn to this plan, so as
to divide some of us by words, to draw some
by the bait of an alliance into open war
with each other, and to ruin others by such
flattery as different circumstances may render
acceptable? And do we fancy when destruction
first overtakes a distant fellow countryman
that the danger will not come to each of
us also, or that he who suffers before us
will suffer in himself alone? "As for
the Camarinaean who says that it is the Syracusan,
not he, that is the enemy of the Athenian,
and who thinks it hard to have to encounter
risk in behalf of my country, I would have
him bear in mind that he will fight in my
country, not more for mine than for his own,
and by so much the more safely in that he
will enter on the struggle not alone, after
the way has been cleared by my ruin, but
with me as his ally, and that the object
of the Athenian is not so much to punish
the enmity of the Syracusan as to use me
as a blind to secure the friendship of the
Camarinaean. As for him who envies or even
fears us (and envied and feared great powers
must always be), and who on this account
wishes Syracuse to be humbled to teach us
a lesson, but would still have her survive,
in the interest of his own security the wish
that he indulges is not humanly possible.
A man can control his own desires, but he
cannot likewise control circumstances; and
in the event of his calculations proving
mistaken, he may live to bewail his own misfortune,
and wish to be again envying my prosperity.
An idle wish, if he now sacrifice us and
refuse to take his share of perils which
are the same, in reality though not in name,
for him as for us; what is nominally the
preservation of our power being really his
own salvation. It was to be expected that
you, of all people in the world, Camarinaeans,
being our immediate neighbours and the next
in danger, would have foreseen this, and
instead of supporting us in the lukewarm
way that you are now doing, would rather
come to us of your own accord, and be now
offering at Syracuse the aid which you would
have asked for at Camarina, if to Camarina
the Athenians had first come, to encourage
us to resist the invader. Neither you, however,
nor the rest have as yet bestirred yourselves
in this direction. "Fear perhaps will
make you study to do right both by us and
by the invaders, and plead that you have
an alliance with the Athenians. But you made
that alliance, not against your friends,
but against the enemies that might attack
you, and to help the Athenians when they
were wronged by others, not when as now they
are wronging their neighbours. Even the Rhegians,
Chalcidians though they be, refuse to help
to restore the Chalcidian Leontines; and
it would be strange if, while they suspect
the gist of this fine pretence and are wise
without reason, you, with every reason on
your side, should yet choose to assist your
natural enemies, and should join with their
direst foes in undoing those whom nature
has made your own kinsfolk. This is not to
do right; but you should help us without
fear of their armament, which has no terrors
if we hold together, but only if we let them
succeed in their endeavours to separate us;
since even after attacking us by ourselves
and being victorious in battle, they had
to go off without effecting their purpose.
"United, therefore, we have no cause
to despair, but rather new encouragement
to league together; especially as succour
will come to us from the Peloponnesians,
in military matters the undoubted superiors
of the Athenians. And you need not think
that your prudent policy of taking sides
with neither, because allies of both, is
either safe for you or fair to us. Practically
it is not as fair as it pretends to be. If
the vanquished be defeated, and the victor
conquer, through your refusing to join, what
is the effect of your abstention but to leave
the former to perish unaided, and to allow
the latter to offend unhindered? And yet
it were more honourable to join those who
are not only the injured party, but your
own kindred, and by so doing to defend the
common interests of Sicily and save your
friends the Athenians from doing wrong. "In
conclusion, we Syracusans say that it is
useless for us to demonstrate either to you
or to the rest what you know already as well
as we do; but we entreat, and if our entreaty
fail, we protest that we are menaced by our
eternal enemies the Ionians, and are betrayed
by you our fellow Dorians. If the Athenians
reduce us, they will owe their victory to
your decision, but in their own name will
reap the honour, and will receive as the
prize of their triumph the very men who enabled
them to gain it. On the other hand, if we
are the conquerors, you will have to pay
for having been the cause of our danger.
Consider, therefore; and now make your choice
between the security which present servitude
offers and the prospect of conquering with
us and so escaping disgraceful submission
to an Athenian master and avoiding the lasting
enmity of Syracuse." Such were the words
of Hermocrates; after whom Euphemus, the
Athenian ambassador, spoke as follows: "Although
we came here only to renew the former alliance,
the attack of the Syracusans compels us to
speak of our empire and of the good right
we have to it. The best proof of this the
speaker himself furnished, when he called
the Ionians eternal enemies of the Dorians.
It is the fact; and the Peloponnesian Dorians
being our superiors in numbers and next neighbours,
we Ionians looked out for the best means
of escaping their domination. After the Median
War we had a fleet, and so got rid of the
empire and supremacy of the Lacedaemonians,
who had no right to give orders to us more
than we to them, except that of being the
strongest at that moment; and being appointed
leaders of the King's former subjects, we
continue to be so, thinking that we are least
likely to fall under the dominion of the
Peloponnesians, if we have a force to defend
ourselves with, and in strict truth having
done nothing unfair in reducing to subjection
the Ionians and islanders, the kinsfolk whom
the Syracusans say we have enslaved. They,
our kinsfolk, came against their mother country,
that is to say against us, together with
the Mede, and, instead of having the courage
to revolt and sacrifice their property as
we did when we abandoned our city, chose
to be slaves themselves, and to try to make
us so. "We, therefore, deserve to rule
because we placed the largest fleet and an
unflinching patriotism at the service of
the Hellenes, and because these, our subjects,
did us mischief by their ready subservience
to the Medes; and, desert apart, we seek
to strengthen ourselves against the Peloponnesians.
We make no fine profession of having a right
to rule because we overthrew the barbarian
single-handed, or because we risked what
we did risk for the freedom of the subjects
in question any more than for that of all,
and for our own: no one can be quarrelled
with for providing for his proper safety.
If we are now here in Sicily, it is equally
in the interest of our security, with which
we perceive that your interest also coincides.
We prove this from the conduct which the
Syracusans cast against us and which you
somewhat too timorously suspect; knowing
that those whom fear has made suspicious
may be carried away by the charm of eloquence
for the moment, but when they come to act
follow their interests. "Now, as we
have said, fear makes us hold our empire
in Hellas, and fear makes us now come, with
the help of our friends, to order safely
matters in Sicily, and not to enslave any
but rather to prevent any from being enslaved.
Meanwhile, let no one imagine that we are
interesting ourselves in you without your
having anything to do with us, seeing that,
if you are preserved and able to make head
against the Syracusans, they will be less
likely to harm us by sending troops to the
Peloponnesians. In this way you have everything
to do with us, and on this account it is
perfectly reasonable for us to restore the
Leontines, and to make them, not subjects
like their kinsmen in Euboea, but as powerful
as possible, to help us by annoying the Syracusans
from their frontier. In Hellas we are alone
a match for our enemies; and as for the assertion
that it is out of all reason that we should
free the Sicilian, while we enslave the Chalcidian,
the fact is that the latter is useful to
us by being without arms and contributing
money only; while the former, the Leontines
and our other friends, cannot be too independent.
"Besides, for tyrants and imperial cities
nothing is unreasonable if expedient, no
one a kinsman unless sure; but friendship
or enmity is everywhere an affair of time
and circumstance. Here, in Sicily, our interest
is not to weaken our friends, but by means
of their strength to cripple our enemies.
Why doubt this? In Hellas we treat our allies
as we find them useful. The Chians and Methymnians
govern themselves and furnish ships; most
of the rest have harder terms and pay tribute
in money; while others, although islanders
and easy for us to take, are free altogether,
because they occupy convenient positions
round Peloponnese. In our settlement of the
states here in Sicily, we should therefore;
naturally be guided by our interest, and
by fear, as we say, of the Syracusans. Their
ambition is to rule you, their object to
use the suspicions that we excite to unite
you, and then, when we have gone away without
effecting anything, by force or through your
isolation, to become the masters of Sicily.
And masters they must become, if you unite
with them; as a force of that magnitude would
be no longer easy for us to deal with united,
and they would be more than a match for you
as soon as we were away. "Any other
view of the case is condemned by the facts.
When you first asked us over, the fear which
you held out was that of danger to Athens
if we let you come under the dominion of
Syracuse; and it is not right now to mistrust
the very same argument by which you claimed
to convince us, or to give way to suspicion
because we are come with a larger force against
the power of that city. Those whom you should
really distrust are the Syracusans. We are
not able to stay here without you, and if
we proved perfidious enough to bring you
into subjection, we should be unable to keep
you in bondage, owing to the length of the
voyage and the difficulty of guarding large,
and in a military sense continental, towns:
they, the Syracusans, live close to you,
not in a camp, but in a city greater than
the force we have with us, plot always against
you, never let slip an opportunity once offered,
as they have shown in the case of the Leontines
and others, and now have the face, just as
if you were fools, to invite you to aid them
against the power that hinders this, and
that has thus far maintained Sicily independent.
We, as against them, invite you to a much
more real safety, when we beg you not to
betray that common safety which we each have
in the other, and to reflect that they, even
without allies, will, by their numbers, have
always the way open to you, while you will
not often have the opportunity of defending
yourselves with such numerous auxiliaries;
if, through your suspicions, you once let
these go away unsuccessful or defeated, you
will wish to see if only a handful of them
back again, when the day is past in which
their presence could do anything for you.
"But we hope, Camarinaeans, that the
calumnies of the Syracusans will not be allowed
to succeed either with you or with the rest:
we have told you the whole truth upon the
things we are suspected of, and will now
briefly recapitulate, in the hope of convincing
you. We assert that we are rulers in Hellas
in order not to be subjects; liberators in
Sicily that we may not be harmed by the Sicilians;
that we are compelled to interfere in many
things, because we have many things to guard
against; and that now, as before, we are
come as allies to those of you who suffer
wrong in this island, not without invitation
but upon invitation. Accordingly, instead
of making yourselves judges or censors of
our conduct, and trying to turn us, which
it were now difficult to do, so far as there
is anything in our interfering policy or
in our character that chimes in with your
interest, this take and make use of; and
be sure that, far from being injurious to
all alike, to most of the Hellenes that policy
is even beneficial. Thanks to it, all men
in all places, even where we are not, who
either apprehend or meditate aggression,
from the near prospect before them, in the
one case, of obtaining our intervention in
their favour, in the other, of our arrival
making the venture dangerous, find themselves
constrained, respectively, to be moderate
against their will, and to be preserved without
trouble of their own. Do not you reject this
security that is open to all who desire it,
and is now offered to you; but do like others,
and instead of being always on the defensive
against the Syracusans, unite with us, and
in your turn at last threaten them."
Such were the words of Euphemus. What the
Camarinaeans felt was this. Sympathizing
with the Athenians, except in so far as they
might be afraid of their subjugating Sicily,
they had always been at enmity with their
neighbour Syracuse. From the very fact, however,
that they were their neighbours, they feared
the Syracusans most of the two, and being
apprehensive of their conquering even without
them, both sent them in the first instance
the few horsemen mentioned, and for the future
determined to support them most in fact,
although as sparingly as possible; but for
the moment in order not to seem to slight
the Athenians, especially as they had been
successful in the engagement, to answer both
alike. Agreeably to this resolution they
answered that as both the contending parties
happened to be allies of theirs, they thought
it most consistent with their oaths at present
to side with neither; with which answer the
ambassadors of either party departed. In
the meantime, while Syracuse pursued her
preparations for war, the Athenians were
encamped at Naxos, and tried by negotiation
to gain as many of the Sicels as possible.
Those more in the low lands, and subjects
of Syracuse, mostly held aloof; but the peoples
of the interior who had never been otherwise
than independent, with few exceptions, at
once joined the Athenians, and brought down
corn to the army, and in some cases even
money. The Athenians marched against those
who refused to join, and forced some of them
to do so; in the case of others they were
stopped by the Syracusans sending garrisons
and reinforcements. Meanwhile the Athenians
moved their winter quarters from Naxos to
Catana, and reconstructed the camp burnt
by the Syracusans, and stayed there the rest
of the winter. They also sent a galley to
Carthage, with proffers of friendship, on
the chance of obtaining assistance, and another
to Tyrrhenia; some of the cities there having
spontaneously offered to join them in the
war. They also sent round to the Sicels and
to Egesta, desiring them to send them as
many horses as possible, and meanwhile prepared
bricks, iron, and all other things necessary
for the work of circumvallation, intending
by the spring to begin hostilities. In the
meantime the Syracusan envoys dispatched
to Corinth and Lacedaemon tried as they passed
along the coast to persuade the Italiots
to interfere with the proceedings of the
Athenians, which threatened Italy quite as
much as Syracuse, and having arrived at Corinth
made a speech calling on the Corinthians
to assist them on the ground of their common
origin. The Corinthians voted at once to
aid them heart and soul themselves, and then
sent on envoys with them to Lacedaemon, to
help them to persuade her also to prosecute
the war with the Athenians more openly at
home and to send succours to Sicily. The
envoys from Corinth having reached Lacedaemon
found there Alcibiades with his fellow refugees,
who had at once crossed over in a trading
vessel from Thurii, first to Cyllene in Elis,
and afterwards from thence to Lacedaemon;
upon the Lacedaemonians' own invitation,
after first obtaining a safe conduct, as
he feared them for the part he had taken
in the affair of Mantinea. The result was
that the Corinthians, Syracusans, and Alcibiades,
pressing all the same request in the assembly
of the Lacedaemonians, succeeded in persuading
them; but as the ephors and the authorities,
although resolved to send envoys to Syracuse
to prevent their surrendering to the Athenians,
showed no disposition to send them any assistance,
Alcibiades now came forward and inflamed
and stirred the Lacedaemonians by speaking
as follows: "I am forced first to speak
to you of the prejudice with which I am regarded,
in order that suspicion may not make you
disinclined to listen to me upon public matters.
The connection, with you as your proxeni,
which the ancestors of our family by reason
of some discontent renounced, I personally
tried to renew by my good offices towards
you, in particular upon the occasion of the
disaster at Pylos. But although I maintained
this friendly attitude, you yet chose to
negotiate the peace with the Athenians through
my enemies, and thus to strengthen them and
to discredit me. You had therefore no right
to complain if I turned to the Mantineans
and Argives, and seized other occasions of
thwarting and injuring you; and the time
has now come when those among you, who in
the bitterness of the moment may have been
then unfairly angry with me, should look
at the matter in its true light, and take
a different view. Those again who judged
me unfavourably, because I leaned rather
to the side of the commons, must not think
that their dislike is any better founded.
We have always been hostile to tyrants, and
all who oppose arbitrary power are called
commons; hence we continued to act as leaders
of the multitude; besides which, as democracy
was the government of the city, it was necessary
in most things to conform to established
conditions. However, we endeavoured to be
more moderate than the licentious temper
of the times; and while there were others,
formerly as now, who tried to lead the multitude
astray- the same who banished me- our party
was that of the whole people, our creed being
to do our part in preserving the form of
government under which the city enjoyed the
utmost greatness and freedom, and which we
had found existing. As for democracy, the
men of sense among us knew what it was, and
I perhaps as well as any, as I have the more
cause to complain of it; but there is nothing
new to be said of a patent absurdity; meanwhile
we did not think it safe to alter it under
the pressure of your hostility. "So
much then for the prejudices with which I
am regarded: I now can call your attention
to the questions you must consider, and upon
which superior knowledge perhaps permits
me to speak. We sailed to Sicily first to
conquer, if possible, the Siceliots, and
after them the Italiots also, and finally
to assail the empire and city of Carthage.
In the event of all or most of these schemes
succeeding, we were then to attack Peloponnese,
bringing with us the entire force of the
Hellenes lately acquired in those parts,
and taking a number of barbarians into our
pay, such as the Iberians and others in those
countries, confessedly the most warlike known,
and building numerous galleys in addition
to those which we had already, timber being
plentiful in Italy; and with this fleet blockading
Peloponnese from the sea and assailing it
with our armies by land, taking some of the
cities by storm, drawing works of circumvallation
round others, we hoped without difficulty
to effect its reduction, and after this to
rule the whole of the Hellenic name. Money
and corn meanwhile for the better execution
of these plans were to be supplied in sufficient
quantities by the newly acquired places in
those countries, independently of our revenues
here at home. "You have thus heard the
history of the present expedition from the
man who most exactly knows what our objects
were; and the remaining generals will, if
they can, carry these out just the same.
But that the states in Sicily must succumb
if you do not help them, I will now show.
Although the Siceliots, with all their inexperience,
might even now be saved if their forces were
united, the Syracusans alone, beaten already
in one battle with all their people and blockaded
from the sea, will be unable to withstand
the Athenian armament that is now there.
But if Syracuse falls, all Sicily falls also,
and Italy immediately afterwards; and the
danger which I just now spoke of from that
quarter will before long be upon you. None
need therefore fancy that Sicily only is
in question; Peloponnese will be so also,
unless you speedily do as I tell you, and
send on board ship to Syracuse troops that
shall able to row their ships themselves,
and serve as heavy infantry the moment that
they land; and what I consider even more
important than the troops, a Spartan as commanding
officer to discipline the forces already
on foot and to compel recusants to serve.
The friends that you have already will thus
become more confident, and the waverers will
be encouraged to join you. Meanwhile you
must carry on the war here more openly, that
the Syracusans, seeing that you do not forget
them, may put heart into their resistance,
and that the Athenians may be less able to
reinforce their armament. You must fortify
Decelea in Attica, the blow of which the
Athenians are always most afraid and the
only one that they think they have not experienced
in the present war; the surest method of
harming an enemy being to find out what he
most fears, and to choose this means of attacking
him, since every one naturally knows best
his own weak points and fears accordingly.
The fortification in question, while it benefits
you, will create difficulties for your adversaries,
of which I shall pass over many, and shall
only mention the chief. Whatever property
there is in the country will most of it become
yours, either by capture or surrender; and
the Athenians will at once be deprived of
their revenues from the silver mines at Laurium,
of their present gains from their land and
from the law courts, and above all of the
revenue from their allies, which will be
paid less regularly, as they lose their awe
of Athens and see you addressing yourselves
with vigour to the war. The zeal and speed
with which all this shall be done depends,
Lacedaemonians, upon yourselves; as to its
possibility, I am quite confident, and I
have little fear of being mistaken. "Meanwhile
I hope that none of you will think any the
worse of me if, after having hitherto passed
as a lover of my country, I now actively
join its worst enemies in attacking it, or
will suspect what I say as the fruit of an
outlaw's enthusiasm. I am an outlaw from
the iniquity of those who drove me forth,
not, if you will be guided by me, from your
service; my worst enemies are not you who
only harmed your foes, but they who forced
their friends to become enemies; and love
of country is what I do not feel when I am
wronged, but what I felt when secure in my
rights as a citizen. Indeed I do not consider
that I am now attacking a country that is
still mine; I am rather trying to recover
one that is mine no longer; and the true
lover of his country is not he who consents
to lose it unjustly rather than attack it,
but he who longs for it so much that he will
go all lengths to recover it. For myself,
therefore, Lacedaemonians, I beg you to use
me without scruple for danger and trouble
of every kind, and to remember the argument
in every one's mouth, that if I did you great
harm as an enemy, I could likewise do you
good service as a friend, inasmuch as I know
the plans of the Athenians, while I only
guessed yours. For yourselves I entreat you
to believe that your most capital interests
are now under deliberation; and I urge you
to send without hesitation the expeditions
to Sicily and Attica; by the presence of
a small part of your forces you will save
important cities in that island, and you
will destroy the power of Athens both present
and prospective; after this you will dwell
in security and enjoy the supremacy over
all Hellas, resting not on force but upon
consent and affection." Such were the
words of Alcibiades. The Lacedaemonians,
who had themselves before intended to march
against Athens, but were still waiting and
looking about them, at once became much more
in earnest when they received this particular
information from Alcibiades, and considered
that they had heard it from the man who best
knew the truth of the matter. Accordingly
they now turned their attention to the fortifying
of Decelea and sending immediate aid to the
Sicilians; and naming Gylippus, son of Cleandridas,
to the command of the Syracusans, bade him
consult with that people and with the Corinthians
and arrange for succours reaching the island,
in the best and speediest way possible under
the circumstances. Gylippus desired the Corinthians
to send him at once two ships to Asine, and
to prepare the rest that they intended to
send, and to have them ready to sail at the
proper time. Having settled this, the envoys
departed from Lacedaemon. In the meantime
arrived the Athenian galley from Sicily sent
by the generals for money and cavalry; and
the Athenians, after hearing what they wanted,
voted to send the supplies for the armament
and the cavalry. And the winter ended, and
with it ended the seventeenth year of the
present war of which Thucydides is the historian.
The next summer, at the very beginning of
the season, the Athenians in Sicily put out
from Catana, and sailed along shore to Megara
in Sicily, from which, as I have mentioned
above, the Syracusans expelled the inhabitants
in the time of their tyrant Gelo, themselves
occupying the territory. Here the Athenians
landed and laid waste the country, and after
an unsuccessful attack upon a fort of the
Syracusans, went on with the fleet and army
to the river Terias, and advancing inland
laid waste the plain and set fire to the
corn; and after killing some of a small Syracusan
party which they encountered, and setting
up a trophy, went back again to their ships.
They now sailed to Catana and took in provisions
there, and going with their whole force against
Centoripa, a town of the Sicels, acquired
it by capitulation, and departed, after also
burning the corn of the Inessaeans and Hybleans.
Upon their return to Catana they found the
horsemen arrived from Athens, to the number
of two hundred and fifty (with their equipments,
but without their horses which were to be
procured upon the spot), and thirty mounted
archers and three hundred talents of silver.
The same spring the Lacedaemonians marched
against Argos, and went as far as Cleonae,
when an earthquake occurred and caused them
to return. After this the Argives invaded
the Thyreatid, which is on their border,
and took much booty from the Lacedaemonians,
which was sold for no less than twenty-five
talents. The same summer, not long after,
the Thespian commons made an attack upon
the party in office, which was not successful,
but succours arrived from Thebes, and some
were caught, while others took refuge at
Athens. The same summer the Syracusans learned
that the Athenians had been joined by their
cavalry, and were on the point of marching
against them; and seeing that without becoming
masters of Epipolae, a precipitous spot situated
exactly over the town, the Athenians could
not, even if victorious in battle, easily
invest them, they determined to guard its
approaches, in order that the enemy might
not ascend unobserved by this, the sole way
by which ascent was possible, as the remainder
is lofty ground, and falls right down to
the city, and can all be seen from inside;
and as it lies above the rest the place is
called by the Syracusans Epipolae or Overtown.
They accordingly went out in mass at daybreak
into the meadow along the river Anapus, their
new generals, Hermocrates and his colleagues,
having just come into office, and held a
review of their heavy infantry, from whom
they first selected a picked body of six
hundred, under the command of Diomilus, an
exile from Andros, to guard Epipolae, and
to be ready to muster at a moment's notice
to help wherever help should be required.
Meanwhile the Athenians, the very same morning,
were holding a review, having already made
land unobserved with all the armament from
Catana, opposite a place called Leon, not
much more than half a mile from Epipolae,
where they disembarked their army, bringing
the fleet to anchor at Thapsus, a peninsula
running out into the sea, with a narrow isthmus,
and not far from the city of Syracuse either
by land or water. While the naval force of
the Athenians threw a stockade across the
isthmus and remained quiet at Thapsus, the
land army immediately went on at a run to
Epipolae, and succeeded in getting up by
Euryelus before the Syracusans perceived
them, or could come up from the meadow and
the review. Diomilus with his six hundred
and the rest advanced as quickly as they
could, but they had nearly three miles to
go from the meadow before reaching them.
Attacking in this way in considerable disorder,
the Syracusans were defeated in battle at
Epipolae and retired to the town, with a
loss of about three hundred killed, and Diomilus
among the number. After this the Athenians
set up a trophy and restored to the Syracusans
their dead under truce, and next day descended
to Syracuse itself; and no one coming out
to meet them, reascended and built a fort
at Labdalum, upon the edge of the cliffs
of Epipolae, looking towards Megara, to serve
as a magazine for their baggage and money,
whenever they advanced to battle or to work
at the lines. Not long afterwards three hundred
cavalry came to them from Egesta, and about
a hundred from the Sicels, Naxians, and others;
and thus, with the two hundred and fifty
from Athens, for whom they had got horses
from the Egestaeans and Catanians, besides
others that they bought, they now mustered
six hundred and fifty cavalry in all. After
posting a garrison in Labdalum, they advanced
to Syca, where they sat down and quickly
built the Circle or centre of their wall
of circumvallation. The Syracusans, appalled
at the rapidity with which the work advanced,
determined to go out against them and give
battle and interrupt it; and the two armies
were already in battle array, when the Syracusan
generals observed that their troops found
such difficulty in getting into line, and
were in such disorder, that they led them
back into the town, except part of the cavalry.
These remained and hindered the Athenians
from carrying stones or dispersing to any
great distance, until a tribe of the Athenian
heavy infantry, with all the cavalry, charged
and routed the Syracusan horse with some
loss; after which they set up a trophy for
the cavalry action. The next day the Athenians
began building the wall to the north of the
Circle, at the same time collecting stone
and timber, which they kept laying down towards
Trogilus along the shortest line for their
works from the great harbour to the sea;
while the Syracusans, guided by their generals,
and above all by Hermocrates, instead of
risking any more general engagements, determined
to build a counterwork in the direction in
which the Athenians were going to carry their
wall. If this could be completed in time,
the enemy's lines would be cut; and meanwhile,
if he were to attempt to interrupt them by
an attack, they would send a part of their
forces against him, and would secure the
approaches beforehand with their stockade,
while the Athenians would have to leave off
working with their whole force in order to
attend to them. They accordingly sallied
forth and began to build, starting from their
city, running a cross wall below the Athenian
Circle, cutting down the olives and erecting
wooden towers. As the Athenian fleet had
not yet sailed round into the great harbour,
the Syracusans still commanded the seacoast,
and the Athenians brought their provisions
by land from Thapsus. The Syracusans now
thought the stockades and stonework of their
counterwall sufficiently far advanced; and
as the Athenians, afraid of being divided
and so fighting at a disadvantage, and intent
upon their own wall, did not come out to
interrupt them, they left one tribe to guard
the new work and went back into the city.
Meanwhile the Athenians destroyed their pipes
of drinking-water carried underground into
the city; and watching until the rest of
the Syracusans were in their tents at midday,
and some even gone away into the city, and
those in the stockade keeping but indifferent
guard, appointed three hundred picked men
of their own, and some men picked from the
light troops and armed for the purpose, to
run suddenly as fast as they could to the
counterwork, while the rest of the army advanced
in two divisions, the one with one of the
generals to the city in case of a sortie,
the other with the other general to the stockade
by the postern gate. The three hundred attacked
and took the stockade, abandoned by its garrison,
who took refuge in the outworks round the
statue of Apollo Temenites. Here the pursuers
burst in with them, and after getting in
were beaten out by the Syracusans, and some
few of the Argives and Athenians slain; after
which the whole army retired, and having
demolished the counterwork and pulled up
the stockade, carried away the stakes to
their own lines, and set up a trophy. The
next day the Athenians from the Circle proceeded
to fortify the cliff above the marsh which
on this side of Epipolae looks towards the
great harbour; this being also the shortest
line for their work to go down across the
plain and the marsh to the harbour. Meanwhile
the Syracusans marched out and began a second
stockade, starting from the city, across
the middle of the marsh, digging a trench
alongside to make it impossible for the Athenians
to carry their wall down to the sea. As soon
as the Athenians had finished their work
at the cliff they again attacked the stockade
and ditch of the Syracusans. Ordering the
fleet to sail round from Thapsus into the
great harbour of Syracuse, they descended
at about dawn from Epipolae into the plain,
and laying doors and planks over the marsh,
where it was muddy and firmest, crossed over
on these, and by daybreak took the ditch
and the stockade, except a small portion
which they captured afterwards. A battle
now ensued, in which the Athenians were victorious,
the right wing of the Syracusans flying to
the town and the left to the river. The three
hundred picked Athenians, wishing to cut
off their passage, pressed on at a run to
the bridge, when the alarmed Syracusans,
who had with them most of their cavalry,
closed and routed them, hurling them back
upon the Athenian right wing, the first tribe
of which was thrown into a panic by the shock.
Seeing this, Lamachus came to their aid from
the Athenian left with a few archers and
with the Argives, and crossing a ditch, was
left alone with a few that had crossed with
him, and was killed with five or six of his
men. These the Syracusans managed immediately
to snatch up in haste and get across the
river into a place of security, themselves
retreating as the rest of the Athenian army
now came up. Meanwhile those who had at first
fled for refuge to the city, seeing the turn
affairs were taking, now rallied from the
town and formed against the Athenians in
front of them, sending also a part of their
number to the Circle on Epipolae, which they
hoped to take while denuded of its defenders.
These took and destroyed the Athenian outwork
of a thousand feet, the Circle itself being
saved by Nicias, who happened to have been
left in it through illness, and who now ordered
the servants to set fire to the engines and
timber thrown down before the wall; want
of men, as he was aware, rendering all other
means of escape impossible. This step was
justified by the result, the Syracusans not
coming any further on account of the fire,
but retreating. Meanwhile succours were coming
up from the Athenians below, who had put
to flight the troops opposed to them; and
the fleet also, according to orders, was
sailing from Thapsus into the great harbour.
Seeing this, the troops on the heights retired
in haste, and the whole army of the Syracusans
re-entered the city, thinking that with their
present force they would no longer be able
to hinder the wall reaching the sea. After
this the Athenians set up a trophy and restored
to the Syracusans their dead under truce,
receiving in return Lamachus and those who
had fallen with him. The whole of their forces,
naval and military, being now with them,
they began from Epipolae and the cliffs and
enclosed the Syracusans with a double wall
down to the sea. Provisions were now brought
in for the armament from all parts of Italy;
and many of the Sicels, who had hitherto
been looking to see how things went, came
as allies to the Athenians: there also arrived
three ships of fifty oars from Tyrrhenia.
Meanwhile everything else progressed favourably
for their hopes. The Syracusans began to
despair of finding safety in arms, no relief
having reached them from Peloponnese, and
were now proposing terms of capitulation
among themselves and to Nicias, who after
the death of Lamachus was left sole commander.
No decision was come to, but, as was natural
with men in difficulties and besieged more
straitly than before, there was much discussion
with Nicias and still more in the town. Their
present misfortunes had also made them suspicious
of one another; and the blame of their disasters
was thrown upon the ill-fortune or treachery
of the generals under whose command they
had happened; and these were deposed and
others, Heraclides, Eucles, and Tellias,
elected in their stead. Meanwhile the Lacedaemonian,
Gylippus, and the ships from Corinth were
now off Leucas, intent upon going with all
haste to the relief of Sicily. The reports
that reached them being of an alarming kind,
and all agreeing in the falsehood that Syracuse
was already completely invested, Gylippus
abandoned all hope of Sicily, and wishing
to save Italy, rapidly crossed the Ionian
Sea to Tarentum with the Corinthian, Pythen,
two Laconian, and two Corinthian vessels,
leaving the Corinthians to follow him after
manning, in addition to their own ten, two
Leucadian and two Ambraciot ships. From Tarentum
Gylippus first went on an embassy to Thurii,
and claimed anew the rights of citizenship
which his father had enjoyed; failing to
bring over the townspeople, he weighed anchor
and coasted along Italy. Opposite the Terinaean
Gulf he was caught by the wind which blows
violently and steadily from the north in
that quarter, and was carried out to sea;
and after experiencing very rough weather,
remade Tarentum, where he hauled ashore and
refitted such of his ships as had suffered
most from the tempest. Nicias heard of his
approach, but, like the Thurians, despised
the scanty number of his ships, and set down
piracy as the only probable object of the
voyage, and so took no precautions for the
present. About the same time in this summer,
the Lacedaemonians invaded Argos with their
allies, and laid waste most of the country.
The Athenians went with thirty ships to the
relief of the Argives, thus breaking their
treaty with the Lacedaemonians in the most
overt manner. Up to this time incursions
from Pylos, descents on the coast of the
rest of Peloponnese, instead of on the Laconian,
had been the extent of their co-operation
with the Argives and Mantineans; and although
the Argives had often begged them to land,
if only for a moment, with their heavy infantry
in Laconia, lay waste ever so little of it
with them, and depart, they had always refused
to do so. Now, however, under the command
of Phytodorus, Laespodius, and Demaratus,
they landed at Epidaurus Limera, Prasiae,
and other places, and plundered the country;
and thus furnished the Lacedaemonians with
a better pretext for hostilities against
Athens. After the Athenians had retired from
Argos with their fleet, and the Lacedaemonians
also, the Argives made an incursion into
the Phlisaid, and returned home after ravaging
their land and killing some of the inhabitants.
|
Evans Experientialism 
