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When considering the work of Chomsky in terms of linguistic functions, it allows us to talk in terms of an innate capacity to understand the functions themselves.

Nevertheless, the *recognition* that takes place has to do with particular linguistic grammatical forms. The functions themselves are recognised as what animates the particular grammatical forms but, at the same time, the functions are always themselves seen in terms of the particular grammatical forms. In other words, we have a capacity to recognise these broad functions within the structural specifics of language, but which is only activated upon exposure to these elements of language in such a way that we never apprehend them in a *pure* from.

Chomsky of course has something to say about this, in terms of the capacity to distinguish *noun phrases* from *verb phrases, * but this view of the linguistic functions based upon the noun/verb distinction, is ultimately dictated by a concern with form, not function.

The *noun phrase* and *verb phrase* distinction roughly corresponds to AIT's notion of the Imbuant and the Informant, but this model imposes a number of distinct limitations that comparison with the AIT model brings out. First, when examined in AIT terms, it can be seen that Chomsky's identification of the *verb phrase* conflates the Informant function with the Processant function.

Although this is to some extent avoided within logical terminology, which speaks of a *subject* and a *predicate, * there still remains the question of the actual functions at work here, especially since once one accepts *subject* and *predicate* as the basis, the only function that is left to the Processant is that of the *copula* -- the notion of *joining* the subject to the predicate. The very basic mistake here, as shown within the word *joining* itself, is the assumption that something like a *predicate* is possible without a *copula. * But seen from an AITist perspective of linguistic functions, it becomes clear that the Processant function itself creates the predicate, by allowing it to be semantically separable from the subject.

The main point therefore is to develop a notion of these three functions that analyses them in terms of how they inter-relate, which the *copula* model has manifestly failed to do.

THE BASIC FUNCTIONS At first sight, the two main functions are similar to the conception of both the *noun phrase/verb phrase* and the *subject/predicate* distinctions.

The first function is that of EXTANTAL IMBUANCE. This roughly corresponds to both *noun phrase* and *subject, * can be seen operating within a word or phrase that, through the structure of its utterance, refers to some particular entity or occurrence. However, neither the *noun phrase* or the *subject* conception of this function adequately captures the basic relation between reference and instantiation that is at work here. That is to say, the *referent* of this type of word or phrase is instantiated in such a way that the Extantal Imbuant linguistically effects its own referent.

This can be linked to my previous discussion of words as the mark of the process of *distinguishing as* or *identifying as. * The *distinction/identification* process itself is essentially perceptual, but the word allows us to assign a regularity to it. This regularity is linked specifically to the *as* part of *distinguishing as* or *identifying as. * We use a word to bring the particular distinction we are making under other cases of having made similar distinctions.

The utterance of the word instantiates whatever falls under the particular distinction we use the word to mark, in the sense that this then becomes *psychologically extant. *

[The exact process by which this happens is obviously something upon which a lot more needs to be said.]

At the same time, this plays a role within linguistic reference, inasmuch as the distinction within which something is *distinguished or identified AS, * may or not apply to a particular entity. If someone said *cat* when confronted by a dog, then the instantiation does not match the actual entity, such that there is no semantic correspondence between the instantiation and the entity to which it is applied.

[Wittgenstein's notion of *rules of use* is useful here.]

The second function is that of MODAL INFORMANCY. This roughly corresponds to the notion of *predicate, * but only corresponds to that of the *verb phrase* when taken in combination with the third function that AIT recognises, that of the MODAL PROCESSANT.

Although these two should be properly considered as separate, it is useful to treat both of them together, because of the close interdependency of their functions. Or more accurately, the main function of the Processant can be seen as the enabling of Modal Informancy.

To reiterate, this function is missed by the usual notion of the *copula, * since the Processant function is not *to join* the subject to the predicate, but rather allows the predicate to be separable from the subject which, as such, means that the Processant literally allows predication.

The Modal Informant is where a mode or modes of the existence not already made explicitly extant within the Imbuant are introduced. The mode or modes of existence can be either of a temporary nature or some more specific permanent condition. However, although these do give whatever is stated by the Imbuant a more specific character, state, or manner etc., the mode or modes of existence of the Informant are stated in a quite specific way, such that they can be either apply or not apply to it; i. e., they can be either true or false of it.

In order to qualify as a sentence or proposition, any string of words must consist of these elements of Imbuant, Processant and Informant. Or, rather, these three functions must be at work in order that a string of words can be a sentence or a proposition.

THE PROCESSANT FUNCTION

This can be seen as having two distinct aspects, the first of which is MODAL INDICATION.

Again, this encapsulates why the Processant function cannot be described in the traditional sense as that of a "copula" for, upon closer investigation, it does not strictly perform any kind of "joining. " This can be seen if one considers the difference between "The tall man, " and "The man is tall. " To some extent one could say that in both "The man" is 'joined' to "tall" but, in fact, these elements are not so irrevocably joined in the latter as in the former. In both cases, the man has the individuated or specific mode of existence "tall, " but only in the second case is this mode of existence specifically held forth as that which the utterance points out. Thus a string of words that does not contain a specific Processant function cannot be said to contain a Modal Informant. And in any string of words where the Modal Processant appears, attention is specifically drawn to the particularity of the Modal Informant. Whether or not the mode of existence is stated as temporarily or permanently belonging to the Imbuant, it is the indication of the Modal Informant that provides the contextual point of the utterance.

The second aspect of the Processant function is that of MODAL INTERROGATION.

The Modal Processant, in its role of modal indication, functions such as to exhibit a Modal Informant. And where a mode of existence is thus exhibited, it can be examined and hence challenged. A sentence or proposition is distinguishable from other types of utterance, inasmuch as it explicitly says something (the Informant) about something (the Imbuant.) But this something that is exhibited can be detached from the Imbuant, inasmuch as it is exhibited within the possibility of not being a mode of existence of the Imbuant.

This aspect of the Processant can be seen most clearly within the role it has within question formation, within the way it allows the sentence "The man is tall" to be transformed into the question "Is the man tall? " Here it can be seen that the so-called copuletic function is inferred from the fact that where a mode of existence is displayed as a Modal Informant of a particular Extantal Imbuant, it can be effectively challenged as to its modal informancy, and disjoined from the Imbuant to which it is presented as pertaining. Thus it is assumed that the possibility of this disjunction arises out of a previous conjoining of the Imbuant to an Informant, as opposed to the indication function that AIT proposes.

But more importantly, the Processant function introduces into the structure of language the question of the veracity of utterances. The cognitive possibility of 'truth' or 'falsehood' is created out of this particular syntactic structure. A proposition must make use of the Processant function, which displays a particular mode of existence. This again can be seen if one considers the distinction between "The tall man, " and "The man is tall, " which both describe the same modes of existence. The difference is that the Processant allows these modes of existence to be displayed in terms of a possible correspondence wherein the Informant pertains the Imbuant. Obviously, we can then test this proposition, as to whether 'tall' does indeed correspond to 'the man, ' but only because this has been initiated into a separable pertaining correspondence by the Processant.

It should of course be noted that there are in fact two types of 'correspondence' simultaneously at work here. The first we can call semantic correspondence. Where someone points to a dog and says, "Cat, " there is no semantic correspondence between the referent and the standard usage of this particular word. The question of semantic correspondence does not of course arise where the referent is not physically present, which is precisely the case where the referent is made manifest through Extantal Imbuance. Nevertheless, it is the distinction between the actually perceived referent and that which is extantally imbued which allows semantic non-correspondence to be made manifest.

The second type of correspondence, which we can call propositional correspondence, is directly attributable to the Processant function. Here, the semantic reference of the Informant is separated from that of the Imbuant in order to be related back to it. This propositional correspondence itself depends upon a semantic correspondence between the Informant and a particular aspect of that to which the Imbuant refers. If both these semantic correspondences hold, then the proposition itself can be said to be true. Thus the Processant allows correspondence/non-correspondence to be introduced into the formal structure of language, in a way that goes beyond the correct/incorrect use of words upon which semantic correspondence alone depends.

NOTE and EXAMPLE It's very important to the above analysis that the notion of *propositional correspondence* is sharply distinguished from that of *identity relations. *

as an example of the difference between semantic and propositional correspondence, suppose two people are standing and talking, and in front of them is a man who is standing still. If one of them simply says: "The running man" (a phrase which consists solely of an Imbuant,) the other is likely to say: "Where? I don't see a running man. " This is an example of the *semantic correspondence* I was talking about above. The instantiation of the Imbuant has no correspondence to the particular entity that stands before the two people.

[Note that although the Imbuant might be said to be *descriptive* in this case, this purely for the purpose of accurate reference. Again, because this phrase consists entirely of an Imbuant, it does not explicitly say something (the Informant) about something (the Imbuant.)]

Anyway, returning to the above example, if one of the two people says: "The man is running, " the other is more likely to say: "No, he's not running, he's standing still. " So the second person assumes that "The man" has semantic correspondence with the man standing in front of them, and can also see whether "running" has semantic correspondence with the same man. So now we have two semantic correspondences that can be treated as separable. If BOTH of these semantic correspondences hold, then you agree with the sentence. If the first holds, and the second doesn't then the sentence is false.

[Note that *the second semantic correspondence* is the Modal Informant. Or, rather, the whole question of Modal Informancy

Note also that if the first had said: "The woman is running" the second would be likely respond in the same way as to "The running man, " i. e., "Where? I don't see a running woman. " Obviously, it might be objected that "The running man" itself could easily be answered by "No, he's not running, he's standing still. " But in this case something like "The man is running" has been assumed from "The running man, " or, at least, there has been the same separation of "The man" from "running" that the Processant explicitly performs.