Sextus, Against the Schoolmasters vii 65-87.
Gorgias of Leontini began from the same position
as those who have abolished the criterion,
but did not follow the same line of attack
as the school of Protagoras. In what is entitled
On the Nonexistent or On Nature he proposes
three successive headings: first and foremost,
that nothing exists; second, that even if
it exists it is inapprehensible to man; third,
that even if it is apprehensible; still it
is without a doubt incapable of being expressed
or explained to the next man.
66 Now he concludes in the following way
that nothing exists: If <anything exists,
either the existent exists or the nonexistent
or both the existent exists and the nonexistent.
But, as he will establish, neither does the
existent exist nor the nonexistent, as he
will make clear, nor the existent and <the
nonexistent, as he will also teach. It is
not the case then that anything exists.
67 More specifically, the nonexistent does
not exist; for if the nonexistent exists,
it will both exist and not exist at the same
time, for insofar as it is understood as
nonexistent, it will not exist, but insofar
as it is nonexistent it will, on the other
hand, exist. It would, however, be entirely
absurd for something to exist and at the
same time not to exist. The nonexistent,
therefore, does not exist. And to state another
argument, if the nonexistent exists, the
existent will not exist, for these are opposites
to each other, and if existence is an attribute
of the nonexistent, nonexistence will be
an attribute of the existent. But it is not,
in fact, true that the existent does not
exist. Accordingly, neither will the nonexistent
exist.
68 Moreover, the existent does not exist
either. For if the existent exists, it is
either eternal or generated, or at the same
time eternal and generated. But it is neither
eternal nor generated nor both, as we shall
show. The existent therefore does not exist.
For if the existent is eternal (one must
begin with this point) it does not have any
beginning.
69 For everything which is generated has
some beginning, but the eternal, being ungenerated,
did not have a beginning. And not having
a beginning it is without limit. And if it
is without limit it is nowhere. For if it
is somewhere, that in which it is, is something
other than it, and thus if the existent is
contained in something it will no longer
be without limit. For the container is greater
than the contained, but nothing is greater
than the unlimited, so that the unlimited
cannot exist anywhere.
70 Moreover, it is not contained in itself.
For in that case container and contained
will be the same, and the existent will become
two things, place and body (place is the
container, body the contained). But this
is absurd. Accordingly, existence is not
contained in itself. So that if the existent
is eternal it is unlimited, and if it is
unlimited it is nowhere, and if it is nowhere
it does not exist. Accordingly, if the existent
is eternal, it is not existent at all.
71 Moreover, neither can the existent be
generated. For if it has come into being,
it has come either from the existent or the
nonexistent. But it has not come from the
existent. For if it is existent, it has not
come to be, but already exists. Nor from
the nonexistent. For the nonexistent cannot
generate anything, because what is generative
of something of necessity ought to partake
of positive existence. It is not true either,
therefore, that the existent is generated.
72 In the same way it is not jointly at the
same time eternal and generated. For these
qualities are mutually exclusive of each
other, and if the existent is eternal it
has not been generated, and if it has been
generated it is not eternal. Accordingly,
if the existent is neither eternal nor generated
nor both at once, the existent should not
exist.
73 And to use another argument, if it exists,
it is either one or many. But it is neither
one nor many, as will be set forth. Therefore,
the existent does not exist. For if it is
one, it is an existent or a continuum or
a magnitude or a body. But whatever of these
it is, it is not one, since whatever has
extent will be divided, and what is a continuum
will be cut. And similarly, what is conceived
as a magnitude will not be indivisible. And
if it is by chance a body it will be three?
dimensional, for it will have length, and
breadth and depth. But it is absurd to say
that the existent is none of these things.
Therefore, the existent is not one.
74 And moreover it is not many. For if it
is not one, it is not many either, since
the many is a composite of separate entities
and thus, when the possibility that it is
one was refuted, the possibility that it
is many was refuted as well. Now it is clear
from this that neither does the existent
exist nor does the nonexistent exist.
75 It is easy to conclude that both the existent
and the nonexistent do not exist either.
For if the nonexistent exists and the existent
exists, the nonexistent will be the same
thing as the existent as far as existence
is concerned. And for this reason neither
of them exists. For it is agreed that the
nonexistent does not exist, and the existent
has been shown to be the same as the nonexistent
and it accordingly will not exist.
76 Of course, if the existent is the same
as the nonexistent, it is not possible for
both to exist. For if both exist, they are
not the same, and if the same, both do not
exist. To which the conclusion follows that
nothing exists. For if neither the existent
exists nor the nonexistent nor both, and
if no additional possibility is conceivable,
nothing exists.
77 Next it must be shown that even if anything
exists, it is unknowable and incomprehensible
to man. For, says Gorgias, if things considered
in the mind are not existent, the existent
is not considered. And that is logical. For
if "white" were a possible attribute
of what is considered, "being considered"
would also have been a possible attribute
of what is white; similarly, if "not
to be existent" were a possible attribute
of what is being considered, necessarily
"not to be considered" will be
a possible attribute of what is existent
78 As result, the statement "if things
considered are not existent, the existent
is not considered" is sound and logically
follows. But things considered (for this
must be our starting point) are not existent,
as we shall show. The existent is not therefore
considered. And more over, it is clear that
things considered are not existent.
79 For if things considered are existent,
all things considered exist, and in what]
ever way anyone considers them. Which is
absurd. For if one considers a man flying
or chariots racing in the sea, a man does
not straightway fly nor a chariot race in
the sea. So that things considered are not
existent.
80 In addition, if things considered in the
mind are existent, nonexistent things will
not be considered. For opposites are attributes
of opposites, and the nonexistent is opposed
to the existent. For this reason it is quite
evident that if "being considered in
the mind" is an attribute of the existent,
"not being considered in the mind"
will be an attribute of the nonexistent.
But this is absurd. For Scylla and Chimaera
and many other nonexistent things are considered
in the mind. Therefore, the existent is not
considered in the mind.
81 Just as objects of sight are said to be
visible for the reason that they are seen,
and objects of hearing are said to be audible
for the reason that they are heard, and we
do not reject visible things on the grounds
that they are not heard, nor dismiss audible
things because they are not seen (since each
object ought to be judged by its own sense,
but not by another), so, too, things considered
in the mind will exist even if they should
not be seen by the sight nor heard by the
hearing, because they are perceived by their
own criterion.
82 If, therefore, someone considered in the
mind that chariots race in the sea, even
if he does not see them, he should believe
that there are chariots racing in the sea.
But this is absurd. Therefore, the existent
is not an object of consideration and is
not apprehended.
83 But even if it should be apprehended,
it would be incapable of being conveyed to
another. For if existent things are visible
and audible and generally perceptible, which
means that they are external substances,
and of these the things which are visible
are perceived by the sight, those that are
audible by the hearing, and not contrariwise,
how can these things be revealed to another
person?
84 For that by which we reveal is logos,
but logos is not substances and existing
things. Therefore we do not reveal existing
things to our neighbors, but logos, which
is something other than substances. Thus,
just as the visible would not become audible,
and vice versa, similarly, when external
reality is involved, it would not become
our logos,
85 and not being logos, it would not have
been revealed to another. It is clear, he
says, that logos arises from external things
impinging upon us, that is, from perceptible
things. From encounter with a flavor, logos
is expressed by us about that quality, and
from encounter with a color, an expression
of color. But if this is the case, logos
is not evocative of the external, but the
external becomes the revealer of logos.
86 And surely it is not possible to say that
logos has substance in the way visible and
audible things have, so that substantial
and existent things can be revealed from
its substance and existence. For, he says,
even if logos has substance, still it differs
from all the other substances, and visible
bodies are to the greatest degree different
from words. What is visible is comprehended
by one organ, logos by another. Logos does
not, therefore, manifest the multiplicity
of substances, just as they do not manifest
the nature of each other.
87 Such being, in Gorgias' view, the problems,
insofar as they are valid, the criterion
is destroyed. For there would be no criterion
if nature neither exists nor can be understood
nor conveyed to another.