Beyond Mechanism:
The Universe in Recent Physics and Catholic Thought

INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF MECHANISM David L. Schindler

The aim of the conference from which the papers in this collection are drawn was to inquire into and elucidate the fundamental concepts In terms of which the universe is understood. Such a statement of the aim of the conference carries a range of meanings, especially in view of the title of the conference, "Beyond Mechanism: The Universe in Recent Physics and Catholic Thought." This title indicates that the inquiry to be engaged was both focussed in terms of mechanism seen as a problem and carried on jointly from within the perspectives of physics, philosophy, and theology. But engaging an inquiry of this sort with it a number of presuppositions, and it is therefore my purpose in this introduction to try to bring some of those presuppositions into relief.

I

(1) The central meaning of mechanism on the present context I think can best be reached by looking briefly at two fundamentally different ways in which the terms physis

(nature) and physics have been understood in the history of Western thought. The first of these is represented in Aristotle, in what may be called the classical Greek view. The second is represented In Descartes, in what may be called the classical modern view. I will consider each of these views in turn.

The term physics, comes from the Greek physis and thus in turn from the verb phyo, which means "to bring forth, produce, put forth; to beget, engender, generate" and so on

(Lidell and Scott Lexicon). And physis is rendered into English as "nature," which comes from the Latin "natura," and thus in turn from the verb "nascor" which, like "phyo," is also associated with giving birth. We can see developed in Aristotle the full meaning of these initial etymological considerations. I will focus that development in terms of a concept which figures centrally in any understanding of physics, namely, the concept of matter. How does Aristotle conceive nature (physis) relative to matter (hule)?

The answer I believe is essentially this: In one sense nature is matter: "Nature means the primary material—"ex ou protou"—of which any natural object consists or out of which it is made...." (Metaphysics 5.4. 1014b 27-28; cf. also Physics, 2.). Nonetheless, in a second and indeed more proper sense, nature for Aristotle is not matter: for nature in the full and proper sense for Aristotle is something actual and matter in its basic meaning is not actual—it is what has the capacity for becoming actual. It follows that nature in its full and proper sense must be—not matter—but that—the act or activity—in virtue of which nature, and hence matter, are said to be actual. What I wish to suggest here, then, Is this: that the meaning of physis (nature), is for Aristotle disclosed in the first instance by the meaning of act (that in virtue of which something is said to be actual). I thereby wish to suggest that the meaning of matter, in the sense of matter as it is a part of nature in its proper—actual—sense, is likewise disclosed in the first instance by the meaning of act. Thus it becomes crucial to get clear about what Aristotle means by act, and what he considers the main features of actuality.

There can be no question here of following Aristotle in all the nuances of his understanding as it bears on this Issue. It will suffice to call attention to several of the terms which Aristotle employs as he unfolds the meaning of physis in his Physics and Metaphysics. The terms are these: ousia (being; beingness; what most fundamentally is: Ross translates this in the most relevant passages under concern here as essence. In any case, however, one translates the word, it seems to be crucial always to keep in mind that the words is a derivative form of the verb "to be" (eimi)- arxe, enuparxo (source; immanent source—Boss's translation); sumphyo as distinct from aphes (that is, growing together—what Ross translates as organic unity,—as distinct from contact or merely touching); morphe and eidos (shape and form); telos (end or finality—from finis, the Latin translation of telos); entelexeia (actuality, that is, that which, in contrast to dynamis, has completeness and perfection (per-facio: done all the way through, hence whole); energeia (actuality or activity).

A vast array of issues is of course introduced here by these terms and the translations I have offered. My purpose in introducing them is simply to suggest the range of what is involved for Aristotle in understanding physis (nature) in its full and primary sense, which is to say, in its actuality. It is thereby to suggest what is involved in understanding that from or in relation to which matter takes its meaning—its meaning as actual. Thus my suggestion is that for Aristotle, proper understanding of nature, of matter as an actual part of nature, requires an understanding of what it means to be in the most fundamental sense (ousia), and this in turn is seen to require understanding of such features as immanence (immanent source of the activity in terms of which something is said to be actual, to grow, to change, to move), form (act of forming), end (act of finalizing), actuality or activity, and completeness or wholeness. Further, proper understanding of nature requires an understanding of the distinction between growing together as a unit and relating merely by contact.

Again, the complexity of the issues introduced here is enormous. Nonetheless, these brief remarks will suffice to Indicate, relative to the theme of the conference, what I wish to propose is central to Aristotle's understanding of physis: namely, (a) that matter is a relative concept; it is something which can properly be understood in its actuality, only and always in relation—to nature in a fuller, proper sense; secondly, (b) nature, that in relation to which matter takes its full meaning, is characterized by act or activity which is immanent, formal, final, unifying, and complete or whole. This understanding of physis has often been called organic or organismic. These terms seem to me apt, since they are commonly taken to; be characteristic of organisms i. e., the immanent activity of form and finality, internality of relation among the distinct "parts" of the organism, and consequently a wholeness of the organism which is distinct from the sum of its "parts. I thereby offer them as a summary of the features required, on an Aristotelian reading, for understanding matter properly, in any of its actual instances.

(2) When we turn to consider Descartes, the essential difference of his understanding of physis from that of Aristotle seems to me readily apparent. To put that difference simply, the matter which for Aristotle is a relative concept becomes for Descartes an absolute concept. In other words, the matter which (in any of its actual instances) is understood by Aristotle only (always and already) in relation to a nature whose primary act is formal and final becomes in Descartes precisely identical to a nature from which mind (anything like forming and finalizing activity) has—always and already—been removed.

The heart of Descartes's understanding of matter, then, unfolds like this: matter is something which can be clearly distinguished from mind. But what can be clearly distinguished for Descartes is what can be clearly set off- from everything else (cf. Principles of Philosophy, Part I,; 45), and the best way to accomplish such a setting off of one thing from another is to "picture them in the form of lines" (Discourse, Part 2). Thus, matter and mind (that is, anything like the immanent activity of forming and finalizing) are understood by Descartes as distinct in the way in which two things laying on opposite sides of the line from each other are distinct: that is, as both separate and simply different from each other, and thus as completely apart from each other. The content of the difference between matter and mind for Descartes consists in the fact that matter is what is extended.

The upshot of this reasoning by Descartes, then, is this: that the meaning of physis (nature) is now absorbed into a matter understood as that from which everything but extension has already and in principle been removed. There are at least two crucial transformations in the understanding of physis which occur here. First of all, nature

(matter in its actual instances) seen by Aristotle to be internally active (e. g., formal and final) now becomes a nature (matter) without such internal activity, hence a nature

(matter) which is essentially inert (or as Descartes says, in repose). To put another way, any activity to be ascribed to nature (matter) must now be of an external sort. 1

Secondly, Descartes's understanding of physis (nature) entails a profound transformation in terms of how one might now characterize natures in any of its actual instances as a whole. For nature, now become a matter from which anything "more" like mind—forming and finalizing activity—has already been excluded, and thereby, can be a whole only after the manner in which what is exhaustively extension is whole, that is, precisely as quantity—a quantified bit or the sum of quantified bits. In other words, the wholeness of (in any of its actual instances) which for Aristotle is characterized as an internally active hence as a wholeness which is always, in more than the sum of its "parts") becomes in Descartes a wholeness best characterized as an fly interactive collectivity (and hence as a wholeness which is always, in principle, exactly the sum of its parts).

To summarize, then: before we called Aristotle's understanding of physic organic or organismic, and suggested that the heart of that understanding consisted in a twofold claim: (a) that matter is a relative concept, something whose meaning (in any of its actual instances) is disclosed only in relation to nature in its fuller, more proper sense; and (b) that nature, that in relation to which matter takes its meaning (as actual) is (in each of Its instances) whole (a unity which is more than the sum of its "parts") and is internally active. I now propose that we call mechanical or mechanistic Descartes's understanding of physis. I suggest that the heart of that understanding consists in a twofold claim: (a) that matter is an absolute concept, something apart from, not-relative to, anything "more" like Internal—formal and final—activity; (b) that nature, now absorbed into matter in this way, is whole (in any of its instances) only in the sense of being a collection which is exactly the sum of externally interactive parts. 2

Now it is important to note that the positions of Aristotle and Descartes as briefly described here are offered only as examples—albeit classical ones—of what it means to understand physis respectively as organic or mechanical. There are, of course, countless variations of each of these understandings. Thus, for example, with respect to the organic view of physis, one might argue, in the context of the Christian tradition, that Aquinas's understanding of act in its primary sense as ease, and Indeed in its ultimacy as the Esse he calls God, entails some corresponding revision of the Aristotelian understanding of actuality—and hence some corresponding revision in the meaning of the whole range of terms which Aristotle Involves in his understanding of nature: ousia; arxe; sumphyo; eidos; telos; entetexeia; energeia, and so on. And a revision in the meaning of these terms, and thus in the terms relative to which matter takes its meaning (in any of its actual instances), would seem further thereby to entail Just so far a revision in what one ultimately means by matter.

But the point I should like to make here apropos of the organic understanding of physis which I have illustrated with reference to Aristotle is simply this: that it is the concept of matter as relative to a distinct (but internal) act (activity) for its meaning (as actual) which establishes one's understanding of physis as organic. Thus it follows that what some would argue is a distinct understanding of act in Aquinas (from that of Aristotle) leaves intact the view of nature which would thereby qualify Aquinas's view as organic, all the while that it changes (proportionately to the difference in the understanding of act) the fuller meaning of that nature as organically conceived.

On the other hand, then, one might call attention to the numerous variations in what we have exemplified in Descartes as a mechanical or mechanistic understanding of physis. First of all, there has of course been an enormous refinement in the mechanistic understanding of nature (matter) as extension or quantity: Descartes's matter as inert substance undergoing change of place has become an enormous variety of micro-substances, as it were (elementary particles), undergoing change of place. More importantly, whereas Descartes's mechanism made the explicitly metaphysical claim that material entities really were (in themselves) simply mechanical in their activity, a more methodological mechanism would abstract from the question about what material entities really are (in themselves), and restrict itself rather to treating those entitles as if they were mechanical in their activity—treating them, that is, just so far as they manifest in mechanical ways. Finally, then, this more methodological mechanism is now of a statistical sort: it treats material entities in so far as they manifest in terms of mechanical order—particles, aggregates of particles—and this is seen to be an occurrence of statistical frequency.

In short, what I have described in relation to Descartes as the mechanistic understanding of physis can be and indeed has been conceived in ways quite different from that of Descartes. Nonetheless, the point I would want to make here is that that understanding remains mechanistic in the crucial respect Just so far as it continues to treat matter only to the extent that matter manifests as discrete quantity (even if infinitesimally small and accessible as such only in terms of statistical frequency). One's understanding of physics remains mechanistic just so far as one thus continues to treat matter as absolute, in the precise sense of "something" which is taken to be properly understood in abstraction from (non-relatively to) anything "more" such as internal activity (e. g., form and finality).

II Now one of the most obvious things to be said about the mechanistic understanding of physis as I have described it is that it has been enormously successful. One of the hallmarks of modern Western culture is surely the remarkable achievements in medicine and technology which have their historical roots in the mechanistic understanding of physics dating from the seventeenth century. Nonetheless, the title of the conference suggests, in the face of these achievements, that mechanism is a problem, and that there is need to get beyond it. What does this mean?

The sense in which mechanism is understood to be a problem, and accordingly the sense in which there is seen to be a need to get beyond mechanism, is suggested by noting what seems to me to be a second obvious fact about the mechanistic understanding of physics: namely, that it has been indissolubly linked with what one might call the fragmentation in modern Western patterns of thought and life. Use of the term fragmentation of course carries a presupposition. For the root meaning of the word

(frangere, to break) denotes what is broken. And what is broken is incomplete: it is something which is detached in some inappropriate way. Or, to put it in other terms, a fragment might be called a part which is detached from the whole when and in ways that it ought not to be. A fragment is a part which is treated as separate from exclusive of relation to the whole when its very nature as part is properly understood rather to be Inclusive of relation to the whole. To get at the senses in which what I have called the fragmentation of modern Western culture was a concern of the conference, I turn now to consider how the mechanistic understanding of physis has served to shape, not only—of course—the content and method of physics itself, but also the content and method of philosophy and theology. I will focus was what seems to me to be three important problem areas: the nature of immateriality (non-material reality; spirit), the nature of value, and the nature of metaphysics and theology as matters of knowledge.

But first a general comment. The general comment consists in calling attention at the outset to the difference in the contexts in which Aristotle and Descartes work out what I have offered as classical understanding of nature is developed by him in what is, at least as a matter of explicit concern, an anthropological context. In other words, the meaning of nature (matter) is reached by him in the first instance in the context of (albeit by contrast with) what he takes to be specifically human activity, namely thinking. For Aristotle on the other hand, nature can be properly understood only by considering the meaning of activity in the first Instance, not in term of specifically human being, but rather, more basically, in terms of being (ousia). The proper context for understanding nature thus for Aristotle is not in the first instance anthropological (as for Descartes), but metaphysical and indeed theological (the nature of the activity of being qua ultimate).

This is of course a profoundly difficult issue, and reasons can be offered for Descartes's shifting (by way of restriction) of context. My purpose here is simply to record that difference in context and to underscore its significance for the subsequent modern understanding and discussion of the problems of nature/ matter: quite simply, in an Aristotelian context one would consider the problem of nature in terms of the meaning of matter relative to activity—act, actuality—in its most fundamental sense (ousia); in a post-Cartesian context one tends on the contrary to consider the problem of nature—in the first instance—in terms of the meaning of matter relative to activity in its peculiarly human sense. I believe the significance of this shift in context is felt in each of the three problem areas I now wish to focus.

(1) First of all, then, the mechanistic view of physis has affected our understanding and discussion of anything—any agent or agency—we might take to be immaterial

(non-material or indeed spiritual): form, finality, mind, God. The heart of the difference in the understanding of immateriality carried in mechanism suggest lies in the loss of Immanence as the central feature of immateriality, a loss which can be seen in least three ways. The fundamental sense of the loss of immanence is indicated simply in recalling the way Descartes first reaches his understanding of mind (and consequently immaterial agency): that is, by his distinguishing mind after the manner of what can be set from something else after the fashion of what is on I opposing side of the line from that something, this means is that mind (immaterial agency) is so far conceived in the first instance in the spatial terms of what is outside or external. The point is crucial: for Descartes's understanding of physis thus does not only result in the elimination of immanence as a feature of immaterial agency; it is the elimination of immanence.

Of course it is possible still to conceive the mind, as, Descartes in fact does, in some sense inside matter. But note how—and this is my second point relative to the loss of immanence—the meaning of "inside" (inner, internal) now gets transformed. The mind immaterial agency is (can be) inside matter (the body) only after the manner of what is disjoined or separate (somewhat after the manner in which we might picture something like a gremlin lurking at the center of a machine: not in—immanent within—the machine; but rather remaining external to the machine albeit now from somewhere imagined to be Its center). It is not hard to see how, subsequently, the activity of the mind (and indeed that of any agent taken to be immaterial: e. g., God) comes to be understood as something private: that is, as something hidden by rather than disclosed in the matter (bodies) taken to be public. And further it is not difficult to see how the activity of the mind (and indeed that of any agent taken to be immaterial: e. g., God) subsequently comes to be understood as little more than an arbitrary intrusion on matter (bodies).

Thirdly, and In connection with these two statements, it follows that, in so far as one does continue to affirm anything like a distinct activity on the part of any immaterial agent

(mind, God) on nature (matter), that activity can Just so far be conceived only in terms of what comes simply from outside: hence in terms of the sort of activity from without which we commonly call forceful. 3

In these three senses, then, I suggest that the mechanistic understanding of physis profoundly changes our understanding of immateriality. It seems to me unnecessary to rehearse all the ways in which such an understanding of immateriality (of anything taken to be immaterial—or spiritual) has in recent centuries in the West been operative in discussions regarding the meaning of mind (mind acting relative to body) and of God (God acting relative to the world).

(2) I turn next to a consideration of how the mechanistic understanding of physis has affected our understanding of the nature of value—and hence of moral, esthetic, and religious values. I begin by assuming that the nature of value is indissolubly linked with something like the immanent activity we have called form and finality. Taking this to be the case, then, it follows that the mechanistic view which consists in removing such activity from nature, and in so far as it does, just so far entails removing value from nature. Values are thus just so far seen to be no longer rooted in nature, hence just so far to be non-natural. In such a context, it is inevitable—and Western history bears this out—that values come to be seen—that is, because non-natural—just so far as arbitrary. Further, because they are no longer disclosed in nature and hence are not accessible in the public way that nature (matter) might be said to be accessible, it is likewise inevitable that values come to be seen as essentially private matters. Once again I do not think it is necessary to rehearse all the profound ways in which this separation of nature and value (commonly called a dualism of fact and value) has figured prominently in modern Western patterns of culture.

(3) Finally, let us note briefly how the mechanistic understanding of physis (nature) has In recent centuries affected the meaning of metaphysics and theology as matters of knowledge. The point can be made simply. The mechanistic understanding of nature, which entails a disjunction between nature (matter) and what is not nature, entails in turn a disjunction between the sort of knowledge proper to the study of nature (e. g., physics) and the sort of knowledge proper to the study of what it would take to be non-nature (e. g., what one might call metaphysics and theology). But once one conceives these studies (and their methods) In this disjointed fashion, two Important consequences are likely to follow. On the one hand, metaphysics and theology come to be viewed as knowledge of a simply derivative sort (simply derived from physics), that is, in so far they continue to be seen as concerning knowledge of nature at all. On the other hand, in so far as metaphysics and theology are not; seen any longer to concern knowledge of nature, they come to be viewed as not properly matters of knowledge at all (i. e., because not knowledge in its natural form). Again, I do not think I need rehearse here all the significant ways in which modern patterns of thought have reflected this view of metaphysics and. theology. 4

I focus all these problem areas, not of course with the intention of suggesting that the Issues raised therein are susceptible of any easy resolution. There are countless variations and more subtle forms of the positions which I have only sketched, and there are reasons which might be marshalled in defense of each of these positions. My purpose in outlining the positions is only to suggest important ways in which it seems to me that mechanism has manifested itself as a problem. I have offered three such ways, bearing respectively on the meaning of immateriality (hence spirit), value, and metaphysics and theology. My intention has been to show, by means of these examples, not only how the mechanistic understanding of nature transforms the meaning of physis—and hence bears on the work of physicists; but also to show how, in so doing, that mechanistic understanding simultaneously and profoundly affects a whole range of other concerns: one's conception of mind, of God of moral and esthetic and religious values, of metaphysics and theology. My purpose has thus been to show that the mechanistic understanding of nature is also a matter of profound relevance to the work of philosophers and theologians. 5

NOTES

1 This activity is of course often called effective or efficient. I would only note that the elimination of internality —form and finality—entails a profound change from the Aristotelian understanding of efficient cause or activity: the latter is now reduced to only one of its possible meanings as found in Aristotle. And again, movement for Descartes becomes local movement or the displacement of bodies: "the transference of one part of matter or one body from the vicinity of those bodies that are in immediate contact with it, and which we regard as in repose, into the vicinity of others." It is extremely interesting and important in this context to note the difference in meaning between Aristotle's kinesis, usually translated as change or movement, and what Descartes means here by movement.

2 Note the aptness here of the term mechanical/mechanistic. The term comes from the Greek verb mexanaomai, which means to contrive or make a device of some sort. The key then is the notion of something which comes together arbitrarily in the sense that its "parts" are already complete apart from such coming together—hence the relation between them in the device/contrivance can only be external.

3 Cf. my earlier comment on p. 7 above regarding the meaning of efficient or effective activity in its differences as found in Aristotle and Descartes.

4 It is interesting of course in this context to note how physics—in its mechanistic understanding—came to be called science (that is, scientia, knowledge): physics and its method—of observation/quantification—become the only way to acquire positive knowledge in the proper sense, all other endeavors—such as philosophy and theology—becoming at best second order/derivative enterprises .

5 For further exploration of this theme, cf. my "Beyond Mechanism: Physics and Catholic Theology," Communio: International Catholic Review, Vol. XI, No. 2 (Summer, 1984) pp. 186-1

Transcriber's Notes The original text as published is rife with typos. We have made an effort to correct at least the most obvious of these.

Posted by The Augustine Club at Columbia University, 2002

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