REASON IN COMMON SENSE
GEORGE SANTAYANA,
(1863-1952)
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George Santayana (born Jorge Agustín Nicolás
Ruiz de Santayana y Borrás in Madrid, December
16, 1863; died September 26, 1952, in Rome)
was a Spanish American philosopher, essayist,
poet, and novelist. A lifelong Spanish citizen,
Santayana was raised and educated in the
United States, wrote in English and is generally
considered an American man of letters. Santayana
is perhaps best known today for his remark
that "Those who cannot remember the
past are condemned to repeat it", and
the line "only the dead have seen the
end of war" -the latter often falsely
attributed to Plato. The philosophical system
of Santayana is broadly considered Pragmatist
due to having similar concerns as his fellow
Harvard University associates William James
and Josiah Royce, but he did not accept this
label for his writing and eschewed any association
with a philosophical school; he declared
that he stood in philosophy "exactly
where [he stood] in daily life."
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In order to discern this healthy life, for
the soul no less than for the body, not much
learning is required; only a little experience,
a little reflection, and a little candor.
· A conception of something called human
nature arises not unnaturally on observing
the passions of men, passions which under
various disguises seem to reappear in all
ages and countries. The tendency of Greek
philosophy, with its insistence on general
concepts, was to define this idea of human
nature still further and to encourage the
belief that a single and identical essence,
present in all men, determined their powers
and ideal destiny. Christianity, while it
transposed the human ideal and dwelt on the
super-human affinities of man, did not abandon
the notion of a specific humanity. On the
contrary, such a notion was implied in the
Fall and Redemption, in the Sacraments, and
in the universal validity of Christian doctrine
and precept. For if human nature were not
one, there would be no propriety in requiring
all men to preserve unanimity in faith or
conformity in conduct. Human nature was likewise
the entity which the English psychologists
set themselves to describe; and Kant was
so entirely dominated by the notion of a
fixed and universal human nature that its
constancy, in his opinion, was the source
of all natural as well as moral laws. Had
he doubted for a moment the stability of
human nature, the foundations of his system
would have fallen out; the forms of perception
and thought would at once have lost their
boasted necessity, since tomorrow might dawn
upon new categories and a modified a priori
intuition of space or time; and the avenue
would also have been closed by which man
was led, through his unalterable moral sentiments,
to assumptions about metaphysical truths.
The force of this long tradition has been
broken, however, by two influences of great
weight in recent times, the theory of evolution
and the revival of pantheism. The first has
reintroduced flux into the conception of
existence and the second into the conception
of values. If natural species are fluid and
pass into one another, human nature is merely
a name for a group of qualities found by
chance in certain tribes of animals, a group
to which new qualities are constantly tending
to attach themselves while other faculties
become extinct, now in whole races, now in
sporadic individuals. Human nature is therefore
a variable, and its ideal cannot have a greater
constancy than the demands to which it gives
expression. Nor can the ideal of one man
or one age have any authority over another,
since the harmony existing in their nature
and interests is accidental and each is a
transitional phase in an indefinite evolution.
· The true philosopher, who is not one chiefly
by profession, must be prepared to tread
the wine-press alone. He may indeed flourish
like the bay-tree in a grateful environment,
but more often he will rather resemble a
reed shaken by the wind. Whether starved
or fed by the accidents of fortune he must
find his essential life in his own ideal.
· The living mind cannot surrender its rights
to any physical power or subordinate itself
to any figment of its own art without falling
into manifest idolatry.
· In imagination, not in perception, lies
the substance of experience, while knowledge
and reason are but its chastened and ultimate
form.
· To be nourished and employed, intelligence
must have developed such structure and habits
as will enable it to assimilate what food
comes in its way; so that the persistence
of any intellectual habit is a proof that
it has
some applicability, however partial, to the
facts of sentience. This applicability,
the prerequisite of significant thought,
is also its eventual test; and the gathering
of new experiences, the consciousness of
more and more facts crowding into the memory
and demanding co-ordination, is at once the
presentation to reason of her legitimate
problem and a proof that she is already at
work. It is a presentation of her problem,
because reason is not a faculty of dreams
but the art of living.
· The best part of wealth is to have worthy
heirs, and mind can be transmitted only to
a kindred mind.
· Progress, far from consisting in change,
depends on retentiveness. When change is
absolute there remains no being to improve
and no direction is set for possible improvement:
and when experience is not retained, as
among savages, infancy is perpetual. Those
who cannot remember the past are condemned
to repeat it. In the first stage of life
the mind is frivolous and easily distracted;
it misses progress by failing in consecutiveness
and persistence. This is the condition of
children and barbarians, in whom instinct
has learned nothing from experience. In a
second stage men are docile to events, plastic
to new habits and suggestions, yet able to
graft them on original instincts, which they
thus bring to fuller satisfaction. This is
the plane of manhood and true progress. Last
comes a stage when retentiveness is exhausted
and all that happens is at once forgotten;
a vain, because unpractical, repetition of
the past takes the place of plasticity and
fertile re-adaptation. In a moving world
re-adaptation is the price of longevity.
The hard shell, far from protecting the vital
principle, condemns it to die down slowly
and be gradually chilled; immortality in
such a case must have been secured earlier,
by giving birth to a generation plastic
to the contemporary world and able to retain
its lessons. Thus old age is as forgetful
as youth, and more incorrigible; it displays
the same inattentiveness to conditions; its
memory becomes self-repeating and degenerates
into an instinctive reaction, like a bird's
chirp.
· I am not sure that a humanity such as we
know, were it destined to exist for ever,
would offer a more exhilarating prospect
than a humanity having indefinite elasticity
together with a precarious tenure of life.
Mortality has its compensations: one is that
all evils are transitory, another that better
times may come.
· The human savage craves a freedom and many
a danger inconsistent with civilization,
because independent of reason. He does not
yet identify his interests with any persistent
and ideal harmonies created by reflection.
And when reflection is absent, length of
life is no benefit: a quick succession of
generations, with a small chance of reaching
old age, is a beautiful thing in purely animal
economy, where vigor is the greatest joy,
propagation the highest function, and decrepitude
the sorriest woe. The value of safety, accordingly,
hangs on the question whether life has become
reflective and rational.
· Many possessions, if they do not make a
man better, are at least expected to make
his children happier and this pathetic hope
is behind many exertions.
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REASON IN SOCIETY
· Parental functions in nature are limited
to nursing the extremely young. This phase
of the instinct, being the most primitive
and fundamental, is most to be relied upon
even in man. Especially in the mother, care
for the children's physical well-being is
unfailing to the end. She understands the
vegetative soul, and the first lispings of
sense and sentiment in the child have an
absorbing interest for her. In that region
her skill and delights are miracles of nature;
but her insight and keenness gradually fade
as the children grow older. Seldom is the
private and ideal life of a young son or
daughter a matter in which the mother shows
particular tact or for which she has instinctive
respect. Even rarer is any genuine community
in life and feeling between parents and their
adult children. Often the parents' influence
comes to be felt as a dead constraint, the
more cruel that it cannot be thrown off without
unkindness; and what makes the parents' claim
at once unjust and pathetic is that it is
founded on passionate love for a remembered
being, the child once wholly theirs, that
no longer exists in the man.
· It is no loss of liberty to subordinate
ourselves to a natural leader.
· There is no greater stupidity or meanness
than to take uniformity for an ideal, as
if it were not a benefit and a joy to a man,
being what he is, to know that many are,
have been, and will be better than he.
· Love is a brilliant illustration of a principle
everywhere discoverable: namely, that human
reason lives by turning the friction of material
forces into the light of ideal goods. There
can be no philosophic interest in disguising
the animal basis of love, or in denying its
spiritual sublimations, since all life is
animal in its origin and spiritual in its
possible fruits.
· The being to whom significant thoughts
come is the most widely based and synthetic
of her creatures. The mind spreads and soars
in proportion as the body feeds on the surrounding
world. Noble ideas, although rare and difficult
to attain, are not naturally fugitive.
· An individual's concern for the attitude
society takes toward him is firstly concern
for his own welfare. But imagination here
refines upon worldly interest. What others
think of us would be of little moment did
it not, when known, so deeply tinge what
we think of ourselves. Nothing could better
prove the mythical character of self-consciousness
than this extreme sensitiveness to alien
opinions; for if a man really knew himself
he would utterly despise the ignorant notions
others might form on a subject in which he
had such matchless opportunities for observation.
Indeed, those opinions would hardly seem
to him directed upon the reality at all,
and he would laugh at them as he might at
the stock fortune-telling of some itinerant
gypsy.
· The tie that in contemporary society most
nearly resembles the ancient ideal of friendship
is a well-assorted marriage. In spite of
intellectual disparity and of divergence
in occupation, man and wife are bound together
by a common dwelling, common friends, common
affection for children, and, what is of great
importance, common financial interests. These
bonds often suffice for substantial and lasting
unanimity, even when no ideal passion preceded;
so that what is called a marriage of reason,
if it is truly reasonable, may give a fair
promise of happiness, since a normal married
life can produce the sympathies it requires.
· Discipleship and hero-worship are not stable
relations. Since the meaning they embody
is ideal and radiates from within outward,
and since the image to which that meaning
is attributed is controlled by a real external
object, meaning and image - as time goes
on - will necessarily fall apart. The idol
will be discredited. An ideal, ideally conceived
and known to be an ideal, a spirit worshipped
in spirit and in truth, will take the place
of the pleasing phenomenon; and in regard
to every actual being, however noble, discipleship
will yield to emulation, and worship to an
admiration more or less selective and critical.
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REASON IN RELIGION
· Religion remains an imaginative achievement,
a symbolic representation of moral reality
which may have a most important function
in vitalizing the mind and in transmitting,
by way of parables, the lessons of experience.
But it becomes at the same time a continuous
incidental deception; and this deception,
in proportion as it is strenuously denied
to be such, can work indefinite harm in the
world and in the conscience.
· As the Middle Ages advanced, the newborn
human genius which constituted their culture
grew daily more playful, curious, and ornate.
It was naturally in the countries formerly
pagan that this new paganism principally
flourished. Religion began in certain quarters
to be taken philosophically; its relation
to life began to be understood, that it was
a poetic expression of need, hope, and ignorance.
Here prodigious vested interests and vested
illusions of every sort made dangerous the
path of sincerity. Genuine moral and religious
impulses could not be easily dissociated
from a system of thought and discipline with
which for a thousand years they had been
intimately interwoven. Skepticism, instead
of seeming, what it naturally is, a moral
force, a tendency to sincerity, economy,
and fine adjustment of life and mind to experience
- skeptcism seemed a temptation and a danger.
This situation, which still prevails in a
certain measure, strikingly shows into how
artificial a posture Christianity has thrown
the mind.
· If you have seen the world, if you have
played your game and won it, what more would
you ask for? If you have tasted the sweets
of existence, you should be satisfied; if
the experience has been bitter, you should
be glad that it comes to an end.
· Piety is the spirit's acknowledgment of
its incarnation --- happiness and utility
are possible nowhere to a man who represents
nothing and who looks out on the world without
a plot of his own to stand on, either on
earth or in heaven. He wanders from place
to place, a voluntary exile, always querulous,
always uneasy, always alone. His very criticisms
express no ideal. His experience is without
sweetness, without cumulative fruits, and
his children, if he has them, are without
morality. For reason and happiness are like
other flowers - they wither when plucked.
· What establishes superstitions is haste
to understand, rash confidence in the moral
intelligibility of things. It turns out in
the end, as we have laboriously discovered,
that understanding has to be circuitous and
cannot fulfil its function until it applies
naturalistic categories to existence. A thorough
philosophy will become aware that moral intelligibility
can only be an incidental ornament and partial
harmony in the world. For moral significance
is relative to particular interests and to
natures having a constitutional and definite
bias, and having consequently special preferences
which it is chimerical to expect the rest
of the world to be determined by. The attempt
to subsume the natural order under the moral
is like attempts to establish a government
of the parent by the child - something children
are not averse to. But such follies are the
follies of an intelligent and eager creature,
restless in a world it cannot at once master
and comprehend. They are the errors of reason,
wanderings in the by-paths of philosophy,
not due to lack of intelligence or of faith
in law, but rather to a premature vivacity
in catching at laws, a vivacity misled by
inadequate information. The hunger for facile
wisdom is the root of all false philosophy.
The mind's reactions anticipate in such cases
its sufficient nourishment; it has not yet
matured under the rays of experience, so
that both materials and guidance are lacking
for its precocious organizing force. Superstitious
minds are penetrating and narrow, deep and
ignorant. They apply the higher categories
before the lower - an inversion which in
all spheres produces the worst and most pathetic
disorganization, because the lower functions
are then deranged and the higher contaminated.
Poetry anticipates science, on which it ought
to follow, and imagination rushes in to intercept
memory, on which it ought to feed. Hence
superstition and the magical function of
religion; hence the deceptions men fall into
by cogitating on things they are ignorant
of and arrogating to themselves powers which
they have never learned to exercise.
· Mythical thinking has its roots in reality,
but, like a plant, touches the ground only
at one end. It stands unmoved and flowers
wantonly into the air, transmuting into unexpected
and richer forms the substances it sucks
from the soil. It is therefore a fruit of
experience, an ornament, a proof of organic
vitality; but it is no vehicle for knowledge;
it cannot serve the purposes of transitive
thought or action. Science, on the other
hand, is constituted by those fancies which,
arising like myths out of perception, retain
a sensuous language and point to further
perceptions of the same kind; so that the
suggestions drawn from one object perceived
are only ideas of other objects similarly
perceptible. A scientific hypothesis is
one which represents something continuous
with the observed facts and conceivably existent
in the same medium. Science is a bridge touching
experience at both ends, over which practical
thought may travel from act to act, from
perception to perception.
· Piety is the spirit's acknowledgment of
its incarnation. So, in filial and parental
affection, which is piety in an elementary
form, there is a moulding of will and emotion,
a check to irresponsible initiative, in harmony
with the facts of animal reproduction. Every
living creature has an intrinsic and ideal
worth; he is the center of actual and yet
more of potential interests. But this moral
value, which even the remotest observer must
recognize in both parent and child, is not
the ground of their specific affection for
each other, which no other mortal is called
to feel in their regard. This affection is
based on the incidental and irrational fact
that the one has this particular man for
a father, and the other that particular man
for a son. Yet, considering the animal basis
of human life, an attachment resting on that
circumstance is a necessary and rational
attachment.
· Only order can beget a world or evoke a
sensation. Chaos is something secondary,
composed of conflicting organizations interfering
with one another. It is compounded like a
common noise out of jumbled vibrations, each
of which has its period and would in itself
be musical. The problem is to arrange these
sounds, naturally so tuneful, into concerted
music.
· Prayer is a soliloquy; but being a soliloquy
expressing need, and being furthermore -
like sacrifice - a desperate expedient which
men fly to in their impotence, it looks for
an effect: to cry aloud, to make vows, to
contrast eloquently the given with the ideal
situation, is certainly as likely a way of
bringing about a change for the better as
it would be to chastise one's self severely,
or to destroy what one loves best, or to
perform acts altogether trivial and arbitrary.
Prayer also is magic, and as such it is expected
to do work. The answer looked for, or one
which may be accepted instead, very often
ensues and it is then that mythology begins
to enter in and seeks to explain by what
machinery of divine passions and purposes
that answering effect was produced.
Magic is in a certain sense the mother of
art, art being the magic that succeeds and
can establish itself. For this very reason
mere magic is never appealed to when art
has been found, and no unsophisticated man
prays to have that done for him which he
knows how to do for himself. When his art
fails, if his necessity still presses, he
appeals to magic, and he prays when he no
longer can control the event, provided this
event is momentous to him. Prayer is not
a substitute for work; it is a desperate
effort to work further and to be efficient
beyond the range of one's powers. It is not
the lazy who are most inclined to prayer;
those pray most who care most, and who, having
worked hard, find it intolerable to be defeated.
What rational religion really should pass
into is contemplation, ideality, poetry,
in the sense in which poetry includes all
imaginative moral life. That this is what
religion looks to is very clear in prayer
and in the efficacy which prayer consistently
can have. In rational prayer the soul may
be said to accomplish three things important
to its welfare: it withdraws within itself
and defines its good, it accommodates itself
to destiny, and it grows like the ideal which
it conceives.
· Not only is man's original effort aimed
at living for ever in his own person, but,
even if he could renounce that desire, the
dream of being represented perpetually by
posterity is no less doomed. Reproduction,
like nutrition, is a device not ultimately
successful. If extinction does not defeat
it, evolution will. Doubtless the fertility
of whatever substance may have produced us
will not be exhausted in this single effort;
a potentiality that has once proved efficacious
and been actualized in life, though it should
sleep, will in time revive again. In some
form and after no matter what intervals,
nature may be expected always to restore
consciousness.
· Existence is essentially temporal and life
foredoomed to be mortal, since its basis
is a process and an opposition; it floats
in the stream of time, never to return, never
to be recovered or repossessed. But ever
since substance became at some sensitive
point intelligent and reflective, ever since
time made room and pause for memory, for
history, for the consciousness of time, a
god, as it were, became incarnate in mortality
and some vision of truth, some self-forgetful
satisfaction, became a heritage that moment
could transmit to moment and man to man.
This heritage is humanity itself, the presence
of immortal reason in creatures that perish.
Apprehension, which makes man so like a god,
makes him in one respect immortal; it quickens
his numbered moments with a vision of what
never dies, the truth of those moments and
their inalienable values. To participate
in this vision is to participate at once
in humanity and in divinity, since all other
bonds are material and perishable, but the
bond between two thoughts that have grasped
the same truth, of two instants that have
caught the same beauty, is a spiritual and
imperishable bond. It is imperishable simply
because it is ideal and resident merely in
import and intent.
· If nature has added intelligence to animal
life it is because they belong together.
Intelligence is a natural emanation of vitality.
If eternity could exist otherwise than as
a vision in time, eternity would have no
meaning for men in the world, while the world,
men, and time would have no status in eternity.
By having a status in eternity is not meant
being parts of an eternal existence, petrified
or congealed into something real but motionless.
What is meant is only that whatever exists
in time, when bathed in the light of reflection,
reveals an indelible character and discloses
irreversible relations; every fact, in being
recognized, takes its place in the universe
of discourse, in that ideal sphere of truth
which is the common and unchanging standard
for all assertions. Language, science, art,
religion, and all ambitious dreams are compacted
of ideas. Life is as much a mosaic of notions
as the firmament is of stars; and these ideal
and transpersonal objects, bridging time,
fixing standards, establishing values, constituting
the true history of all living, are the very
furniture of eternity, the goals and playthings
of that reason which is an instinct in the
heart as vital and spontaneous as any other.
· The happy filling of a single hour is so
much gained for the universe at large, and
to find joy and sufficiency in the flying
moment is perhaps the only means open to
us for increasing the glory of eternity.
· He who lives in the ideal and leaves it
expressed in society or in art enjoys a double
immortality. The eternal has absorbed him
while he lived, and when he is dead his influence
brings others to the same absorption, making
them, through that ideal identity with the
best in him, reincarnations and perennial
seats of all in him which he could rationally
hope to rescue from destruction. He can say,
without any subterfuge or desire to delude
himself, that he shall not wholly die; for
he will have a better notion than the vulgar
of what constitutes his being. By becoming
the spectator and confessor of his own death
and of universal mutation, he will have identified
himself with what is spiritual in all spirits
and masterful in all apprehension; and so
conceiving himself, he may truly feel and
know that he is eternal.
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REASON IN ART
· Ideals which cannot be realized, and are
not fed at least by partial realizations,
soon grow dormant.
· Mind grows self-perpetuating only by its
extension in matter.
[Commentary by D. Runes - Matter is in flux.
Mind, conceived by Santayana as "simply
sensibility in bodies", is existentially
carried along the movement of that flux but
is
capable of arresting some datum, different
from what the stimulated sensibility can
articulate. This datum is essence in whose
language alone mind can express its experiences.]
· Arts are instincts bred and reared in the
open, creative habits acquired in the light
of reason. Consciousness accompanies their
formation; a certain uneasiness or desire
and a more or less definite conception of
what is wanted often precedes their full
organization. That the need should be felt
before the means for satisfying it have been
found has led the unreflecting to imagine
that in art the need produces the discovery
and the idea the work. Causes at best are
lightly assigned by mortals, and this particular
superstition is no worse than any other.
The data - the plan and its execution - as
conjoined empirically in the few interesting
cases which show successful achievement,
are made into a law, in oblivion of the fact
that in more numerous cases such conjunction
fails wholly or in part, and that even in
the successful cases other natural conditions
are present, and must be present, to secure
the result.
In a matter where custom is so ingrained
and supported by a constant apperceptive
illusion, there is little hope of making
thought suddenly exact, or exact language
not paradoxical. We must observe, however,
that only by virtue of a false perspective
do ideas seem to govern action, or is a felt
necessity the mother of invention. In truth
invention is the child of abundance, and
the genius or vital premonition and groping
which achieve art simultaneously achieve
the ideas which that art embodies; or, rather,
ideas are themselves products of an inner
movement which has an automatic extension
outwards; and this extension manifests the
ideas.
Mere craving has no lights of its own to
prophesy by, no prescience of what the world
may contain that would satisfy, no power
of imagining what would allay its unrest.
Images and satisfactions have to come of
themselves; then the blind craving, as it
turns into an incipient pleasure, first recognizes
its object. The pure will's impotence is
absolute, and it would writhe forever and
consume itself in darkness if perception
gave it no light, and experience no premonition.
· Lying is a privilege of poets because they
have not reached the level on which truth
and error are discernible. Veracity and significance
are not ideals for a primitive mind; we learn
to value them as we learn to live, when we
discover that the spirit cannot be wholly
free and solipsistic. To have to distinguish
fact from fancy is so great a violence to
the inner man that not only poets, but theologians
and philosophers still protest against such
a distinction.
· Truth is a jewel that should not be painted
over; but it may be set to advantage and
shown in a good light.
· Irrational hopes, irrational shames, irrational
indecencies, make man's chief desolation.
· Art springs so completely from the heart
of man that it makes everything speak to
him in his own languages; it reaches, nevertheless,
so truly to the heart of nature that it co-operates
with her, becomes a parcel of her creative
material energy, and builds by her instinctive
hand.
· A refined mind finds as little happiness
in love without friendship as in sensuality
without love; it may succumb to both, but
it accepts neither.
· To impress a meaning and a rational form
on matter is one of the most masterful of
actions.
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LIFE OF REASON: Phases Of Human Progress
· The functional good is the ideal that a
vital and energizing soul carries with it
as it moves. It is identical, as Socrates
taught, with the useful, the helpful, the
beneficent. It is the complement needed to
perfect every art and every activity after
its own kind.
· Early pagan sacrifice evolved into spiritual
sacrifice rituals - via identification of
the negative components of the self which
one wants to give back (sacrifice) to the
deity, through rituals of confession and
prayer.
· A form of immortality exists in man in
that memory, while it confirms mortality
(in recognizing the death of past relatives)
also extends our existence via the virtual
reality of past events and historical truths
- e. g. the memory of father/grandfather
can enhance/context/enrich the present moment.
The form of immortality issuing from memory
is that expression of our own individual
mortality by sharing in the species life-line,
again via learning/wisdom derived from shared
experiences and memories.
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DOMINATIONS AND POWERS
· The crowd compels us to adopt its language,
manners, morals, and religion; and it is
a rare freedom in human life when even a
slight personal originality in any of these
matters - or even in dress - is not crushed
at once by universal obloquy and persecution.
This is not because the public is wicked
but because it is the public - which is hardly
its own fault. Society suffocates liberty
merely by existing, and it must exist, and
all its members are equally its slaves.
· One of the inspirations of man is his conscience;
but if you give this inspiration free rein,
it may end by persuading you that it is murder
to boil an egg.
· There is a sort of subterranean chaos,
sometimes bursting through the crust of civilization;
and something in the individual heart rejoices
at that eruption, feels that at last the
moment has come to break through its own
crust, and build itself, as well as the
world, on some different plan. Not a better
plan, since there is no deeper organism to
pronounce on the matter or to have any stake
in it; but simply a relief from this plan,
from this routine and this morality, from
these surroundings, and these prospects.
It is what Descartes called the infinity
of the will, contrasted with the finitude
of reason. A sort of self-hatred and self-contempt:
a wild throw for something different, and
a deep, dark impulse to challenge and to
destroy everything that has the impertinence
to exist.
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DIALOGUES IN LIMBO
· The soul, too, has her virginity and must
bleed a little before bearing fruit.
· The young man who has not wept is a savage,
and the old man who will not laugh is a fool.
· All living souls welcome whatsoever they
are ready to cope with; all else they ignore,
or pronounce to be monstrous and wrong, or
deny to be possible.
So the mother of the first tailless child
- for men formerly had tails - wept bitterly
and consulted the soothsayers, elders conspicuous
for their long and honorable tails, who gave
out oracles from the hollow of ancient trees;
and she asked what unwitting impiety she
or her husband could have committed, that
the just gods should condemn their innocent
child to such eternal disgrace.
When, however, other tailless births began
to occur, at first the legislators had the
little monsters put rigorously to death;
but soon, as the parents began to offer resistance,
they suffered a scapegoat to be sacrificed
instead; and persons without a tail were
merely condemned to pass their lives in slavery,
or at least without the rights of citizenship;
because the philosophers, who all belonged
to the elder generation with ample tails,
declared that without a tail no man was really
human or could be admitted after death into
the company of the gods.
Yet later, when that hinder ornament had
become rare, opinion was reversed, until
the priests, legislators, and sages gathered
in council and decreed, by a majority vote,
that a tail in man was unnatural, and that
the tradition that such things had existed
was an invention of ignorant poets, and absurd.
When, however, by a casual reversion and
sport of nature, a child with a tail was
born here and there, not only was the infant
instantly dispatched, but the mother was
burned alive for having had commerce with
a devil.
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REASON IN SCIENCE
· A fable about matter and form.
In order to live - if such a myth may be
allowed - the Titan Matter was eager to disguise
his incorrigible vagueness and pretend to
be something. He accordingly addressed himself
to the beautiful company of Forms, sisters
whom he thought all equally beautiful, though
their number was endless, and equally fit
to satisfy his heart. He wooed them hypocritically,
with no intention of wedding them; yet he
uttered their names in such seductive accents
(called by mortals intelligence and toil)
that the virgin goddesses offered no resistance
- at least such of them as happened to be
near or of a facile disposition. They were
presently deserted by their unworthy lover;
yet they, too, in that moment's union, had
tasted the sweetness of life. The heaven
to which they returned was no longer an infinite
mathematical paradise. It was crossed by
memories of earth, and a warmer breath lingered
in some of its lanes and grottoes. Henceforth
its nymphs could not forget that they had
awakened a passion and that, unmoved themselves,
they had moved a strange indomitable giant
to art and love.
· Christianity persecuted, tortured, and
burned. Like a hound it tracked the very
scent of heresy. It kindled wars, and nursed
furious hatreds and ambitions. It sanctified,
quite like Mohammedanism, extermination and
tyranny. All this would have been impossible
if - like Buddhism - it had looked only to
peace and the liberation of souls. It looked
beyond; it dreamt of infinite blisses and
crowns it should be crowned with before an
electrified universe and an applauding God.
These were rival baits to those which the
world fishes with, and were snapped at, when
seen, with no less avidity. Man, far from
being freed from his natural passions, was
plunged into artificial ones quite as violent
and more disappointing. Buddhism had tried
to quiet a sick world with anesthetics; Christianity
sought to purge it with fire.
· That a cosmos underlies the superficial
play of sense and opinion is what all practical
reason must assume and what all comprehended
experience bears witness to. A cosmos does
not mean a disorder with which somebody happens
to be well pleased; it means a regularity
from which every one must draw his happiness.
Mechanical processes are not like mathematical
relations, because they happen. What they
express the form of is a flux, not a truth
or an ideal necessity. The situation may
therefore always be new, though produced
from the preceding situation by rules which
are invariable, since the preceding situation
was itself novel.
· If the total flux is continuous and naturally
intelligible, why is the part felt by man
so disjointed and opaque? An answer to this
question may perhaps be drawn from the fact
that consciousness apparently arises to express
the functions only of extremely complicated
organisms. The basis of thought is vastly
more elaborate than its deliverance. It takes
a wonderful brain and exquisite senses to
produce a few stupid ideas. The mind starts,
therefore, with a tremendous handicap. Its
existence is intermittent and its visions
unmeaning. It fails to conceive its own interests
or the situations that might support or defeat
those interests. If it pictures anything
clearly, it is only some fantastic image
in no way adequate to its own complex basis.
· Thus the parasitical human mind, finding
what clear knowledge it has laughably insufficient
to interpret its destiny, takes to neglecting
knowledge altogether and to hugging instead
various irrational ideas. On the one hand
it lapses into dreams which, while obviously
irrelevant to practice, express the mind's
vegetative instincts; hence poetry and mythology,
which substitute play-worlds for the real
one on correlation with which human prosperity
and dignity depend.
· On the other hand, the mind becomes wedded
to conventional objects which mark, perhaps,
the turning-points of practical life and
plot the curve of it in a schematic and disjointed
fashion, but which are themselves entirely
opaque and, as we say, material. Now as matter
is commonly a name for things not understood,
men materially minded are those whose ideas,
while practical, are meager and blind, so
that their knowledge of nature, if not invalid,
is exceedingly fragmentary. This grossness
in common sense, like irrelevance in imagination,
springs from the fact that the mind's representative
powers are out of focus with its controlling
conditions.
· We may perhaps entangle our friends in
their own words, and force them for the moment
to say what they do not mean, and what it
is not in their natures to think; but the
bent bow will spring back, perhaps somewhat
sharply, and we shall get little thanks for
our labour. There would be more profit in
taking one another frankly by the arm and
walking together along the outskirts of real
knowledge, pointing to the material facts
which we all can see - nature, the monuments,
the texts, the actual ways and institutions
of men; and in the presence of such a stimulus,
with the contagion of a common interest,
the plastic mind would respond of itself
to the situation, and we should be helping
one another to understand whatever lies within
the range of our fancy, be it in antiquity
or in the human heart.
· The circumstances, open to science, which
surround consciousness are the real attributes
of a man by which he is truly known and distinguished.
Appearances are the qualities of reality,
else realities would be without place, time,
character, or interrelation.
· Intent is one of many evidences that the
intellect's essence is practical. Intent
is action in the sphere of thought; it corresponds
to transition and derivation in the natural
world. Analytic psychology is obliged to
ignore intent, for it is obliged to regard
it merely as a feeling; but while the feeling
of intent is a fact like any other, intent
itself is an aspiration, a passage, the recognition
of an object which not only is not a part
of the feeling given but is often incapable
of being a feeling or a fact at all.
· Moral energy, so closely analogous to physical
interplay, is of course not without a material
basis. Spiritual sublimation does not consist
in not using matter but in using it up, in
making it all useful. When life becomes rational
it continues to be mechanical and to dramatize
room and energy in the natural world. In
its most intimate and supernatural functions,
intellect has natural conditions. In dreams
and madness, intent is confused and wayward,
in idiocy it is suspended altogether; nor
has discourse any other pledge that it is
addressing kindred interlocutors except that
which it receives from the disposition and
habit of bodies. People who have not yet
been born into the world have not yet begun
to think about it.
· Every theme or motive in the Life of Reason
expresses some instinct rooted in the body
and incidental to natural organization. The
intent by which memory refers to past or
reported experience, or the intent by which
perception becomes recognition, is a transcript
of relations in which events actually stand
to one another. Such intent represents modifications
of structure and action important to life,
modifications that have responded to forces
on which life is dependent.
Both desire and meaning translate into cognitive
or ideal energy, into intent, material relations
subsisting in nature. These material relations
give practical force to the thought that
expresses them, and the thought in turn gives
significance and value to the forces that
subserve it. Fulfillment is mutual, in one
direction bringing material potentialities
to the light and making them actual and conscious,
and in the other direction embodying intent
in the actual forms of things and manifesting
reason. Nothing could be more ill-considered
than the desire to disembody reason. Reason
cries aloud for reunion with the material
world which she needs not only for a basis
but, what concerns her even more, for a theme.
· Rational ethics is an embodiment of volition,
not a description of it. It is the expression
of living interest, preference, and categorical
choice. It leaves to psychology and history
a free field for the description of moral
phenomena. It has no interest in slipping
far-fetched and incredible myths beneath
the facts of nature, so as to lend a non-natural
origin to human aspirations.
· Devotion and single-mindedness, perhaps
possible in the cloister, are hard to establish
in the world; yet a rational morality requires
that all lay activities, all sweet temptations,
should have their voice in the conclave.
Morality becomes rational precisely by refusing
either to accept human nature, as it sprouts,
altogether without harmony, or to mutilate
it in the haste to make it harmonious. The
art of making a beginning in good friendships
is to find a set of people with well-knit
character and cogent traditions, so that
there may be a firm soil to cultivate and
that labour may not be wasted in ploughing
the quick-sands.
· Christianity, even in its orthodox forms,
covers various kinds of morality, and its
philosophical incoherence betrays itself
in disruptive movements, profound schisms,
and total alienation on the part of one Christian
from the inward faith of another. Trappist
or Calvinist may be practicing a heroic and
metaphysical self-surrender while the busy-bodies
of their respective creeds are fostering,
in God's name, all their hot and miscellaneous
passions.
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PERSONS AND PLACES
· Body, character and mind are formed together
by that single hereditary organizing power
which the ancients called psyche or soul;
so that however much the mind or the body
may be distorted by accident influences,
at bottom they must always correspond; and
the innocent eye often catches this profound
identity. We are arrested by a beautiful
body because the sight of it quickens in
ourselves the same vital principle that fashioned
that body.
· They say dying animals go into hiding;
and I could understand that instinct. There
are phases of distress when help is neither
possible nor desired. It is simpler, easier,
more honest to be seasick alone, and to die
alone. The trouble then seems something fated,
not to be questioned, like life itself; and
nature is built to face it and to see it
out.
· The worst symptoms of infidelity that I
saw in that family were in the women. Not
unintelligibly. It was they who had suffered
most from poverty, since there had always
been enough to eat, but not enough to appear
in the world as women like to appear. And
it was they who had suffered most from the
latent disgrace of their position, and the
dread of gossip and insults. They owed society
a grudge for making their life difficult.
They had not sinned against nature, but the
world had sinned against them by its cruel
tyranny and injustice. They were therefore
rebels, impotent rebels, against all the
powers that be, celestial and earthly.
· I was as convinced as I am now of the steady
march of cosmic forces that we may - in a
measure - enlist in our service and thereby
win the prize of life in the process of living
- without laying any claims to dominate the
universe - either physically or morally.
But this is a comparatively mature, though
very ancient, conclusion; and it is as well
to become aware in the first place of the
uncertainty and blindness of human opinion.
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LITTLE ESSAYS
440
· In imagination, not in perception, lies
the substance of experience, while science
and reason are but its chastened and ultimate
form.
· If we must speak, therefore, of causal
relations between mind and body, we should
say that matter is the pervasive cause of
the distribution of mind, and mind the pervasive
cause of the discovery and value of matter.
To ask for an efficient cause, to trace back
a force or investigate origins, is to have
already turned one's face in the direction
of matter and mechanical laws: no success
in that undertaking can fail to be a triumph
for materialism.
· All the doctrines that have flourished
in the world about immortality have hardly
affected men's natural sentiment in the face
of death, a sentiment which those doctrines,
if taken seriously, ought wholly to have
reversed.
· Faith in the supernatural is a desperate
wager made by man at the lowest ebb of his
fortunes.
· Prayer, among sane people, has never superseded
practical efforts to secure the desired end;
a proof that the sphere of expression was
never really confused with that of reality.
· The mass of mankind is divided into two
classes - the Sancho Panzas who have a sense
for reality, but no ideals; and the Don Quixotes
with a sense for ideals, but mad.
· A soul is but the last bubble of a long
fermentation in the world.
· The purpose of education is to free us
from prejudices. For the barbarian is the
man who regards his passions as their own
excuse for being; who does not domesticate
them by understanding their cause or by
conceiving their ideal goal. He is the man
who does not know his derivations nor perceive
his tendencies, but who merely feels and
acts, valuing in his life its force and its
filling, but being careless of its purpose
and its form. His delight is in abundance
and vehemence; his art, like his life, shows
an exclusive respect for quantity and splendor
of materials. His scorn for what is poorer
and weaker than himself is only surpassed
by his ignorance of what is higher.
· Materialism has its distinct aesthetic
and emotional colour, though this may be
strangely affected and even reversed by contrast
with systems of an incongruous hue, jostling
it accidentally in a confused and amphibious
mind. If you are in the habit of believing
in special providences, or of expecting to
continue your romantic adventures in a second
life, materialism will dash your hopes most
unpleasantly, and you may think for a year
or two that you have nothing left to live
for.
But a thorough materialist, one born to the
faith and not half-plunged into it by an
unexpected christening in cold water, will
be like the superb Democritus, a laughing
philosopher. His delight in a mechanism that
can fall into so many marvelous and beautiful
shapes, and can generate so many exciting
passions, should be of the same intellectual
quality as that which the visitor feels in
a museum of natural history, where he views
the myriad butterflies in their cases, the
flamingoes and shell-fish, the mammoths and
gorillas. Doubtless there were pangs in that
incalculable life, but they were soon over;
and how splendid meantime was the pageant,
how infinitely interesting the universal
interplay, and how foolish and inevitable
those absolute little passions. Somewhat
of that sort might be the sentiment that
materialism would arouse in a vigorous mind,
active, joyful, impersonal, and in respect
to private illusions not without a touch
of scorn.
· What matters is quality. The reasonable
and humane demand to make of the world is
that such creatures as exist should not be
unhappy, and that life - whatever its quantity
- should have a quality that may justify
it in its own eyes.
· There is nothing cheaper than idealism.
It can be had by merely not observing the
ineptitude of our chance prejudices, and
by declaring that the first rhymes that have
struck our ear are the eternal and necessary
harmonies of the world.
· It is war that wastes a nation's wealth,
chokes its industries, kills its flower,
narrows its sympathies, condemns it to be
governed by adventurers, and leaves the puny,
deformed, and unmanly to breed the next generation.
Internecine war, foreign and civil, brought
about the greatest setback that the life
of reason has ever suffered; it exterminated
the Greek and Italian aristocracies. Instead
of being descended from heroes, modern nations
are descended from slaves; and it is not
their bodies only that show it.
· Individualism is in one sense the only
possible ideal; for whatever social order
may be most valuable can be valuable only
for its effect on conscious individuals.
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PHILOSOPHY OF GEORGE SANTAYANA
· The true skeptic merely analyses belief,
discovering the risk and the logical uncertainty
inherent in it. He finds that alleged knowledge
is always faith.
· My skepticism remains merely the confession
that faith is faith, without any rebellion
against the physical necessity of believing.
It enables me to believe in common-sense
and in materialism and, like Landor, to warm
both hands before the fire of life; and at
the same time it gives me the key to the
realms of dialectic and fancy, which I may
enter without illusion.
· I everywhere insist that mental events
have physical grounds.
· Idolatry is also common in morals, when
certain precepts are felt to coerce the conscience
by their intrinsic authority, without any
vital or rational backing.
· We must welcome the future, remembering
that soon it will be the past; and we must
respect the past remembering that once it
was all that was humanly possible.
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SCEPTICISM AND ANIMAL MIND
· The more perfect the dogmatism, the more
insecure. A great high topsail that can never
be reefed nor furled is the first carried
away by a gale.
· It was the fear of illusion that originally
disquieted the honest mind, congenitally
dogmatic, and drove it in the direction
of skepticism.
· Thus a mind enlightened by skepticism and
cured of noisy dogma, a mind discounting
all reports, and free from all tormenting
anxiety about its own fortune or existence,
finds in the wilderness of essence a very
sweet and marvelous solitude. The ultimate
reaches of doubt and renunciation open out
for it, by an easy transition, into fields
of endless variety and peace, as if through
the gorges of death it had passed into a
paradise where all things are crystallized
into the image of themselves, and have lost
their urgency and their venom.
· Belief in experience is the beginning of
that bold instinctive art, more plastic than
the instinct of most animals, by which man
has raised himself to his earthly eminence:
it opens the gates of nature to him, both
within and without, and enables him to transmute
his apprehension - at first merely aesthetic
- into mathematical science. This is so great
a step that most minds cannot take it. They
stumble, and remain entangled in poetry and
in gnomic wisdom. Science and reasonable
virtue, which plunge their roots in the soil
of nature, are to this day only partially
welcome or understood. Although they bring
freedom in the end, the approach to them
seems sacrificial, and many prefer to live
in the glamour of intuition, not having
the courage to believe in experience.
· I myself have no passionate attachment
to existence, and value this world for the
intuitions it can suggest, rather than for
the wilderness of facts that compose it.
To turn away from it may be the deepest wisdom
in the end. What better than to blow out
the candle, and to bed! But at noon this
pleasure is premature. I can always hold
it in reserve, and perhaps nihilism is a
system - the simplest of all - on which we
shall all agree in the end.
· The universe is a novel of which the ego
is the hero. (R)
· I do not know what matter is in itself:
but what metaphysical idealists call spirit,
if it is understood to be responsible for
what goes on in the world and in myself,
and to be the "reality" of these
appearances, is, in respect to my spiritual
existence, precisely what I call matter;
and I find the description of this matter
which the natural sciences supply much more
interesting than that given by the idealists,
much more beautiful, and much more likely
to be true.
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OBITER SCRITA
· Social institutions must always remain
questionable and oppressive in varying degrees,
because they are not innate in the human
race but are imposed upon us by circumstances.
· Society exists by a conspiracy of psychological,
physiological forces; however rigid you may
make its machinery, its breath of life must
come from the willing connivance of a myriad
fleeting, inconstant, half rational human
souls.
· The playful and godlike mind of philosophers
has always been fascinated by intuition:
for philosophers - I mean the great ones
- are the infant prodigies of reflection.
· I have sometimes wondered at the value
ladies set upon jewels: as centers of light,
jewels seem rather trivial and monotonous.
And yet there is an unmistakable spell about
these pebbles; they can be taken up and turned
over; they can be kept; they are faithful
possessions; the sparkle of them, shifting
from moment to moment, is constant from age
to age. They are substances.
The same aspects of light and colour, if
they were homeless in space, or could be
spied only once and irrecoverably, like fireworks,
would have a less comfortable charm. In jewels
there is the security, the mystery, the inexhaustible
fixity proper to substance. After all, perhaps
I can understand the fascination they exercise
over the ladies; it is the same that the
eternal feminine exercises over us. Our contact
with them is unmistakable, our contemplation
of them gladly renewed, and pleasantly prolonged;
yet in one sense they are unknowable; we
cannot fathom the secret of their constancy,
of their hardness, of that perpetual but
uncertain brilliancy by which they dazzle
us and hide themselves.
These qualities of the jewel and of the eternal
feminine are also the qualities of substance
and of the world. The existence of this world
- unless we lapse for a moment into an untenable
skepticism - is certain, or at least it is
unquestioningly to be assumed. Experience
may explore it adventurously, and science
may describe it with precision; but after
you have wandered up and down in it for many
years, and have gathered all you could of
its ways by report, this same world - because
it exists substantially and is not invented
- remains a foreign thing and a marvel to
the spirit; unknowable as a drop of water
is unknowable, or unknowable like a person
loved.
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SOLILOQUIES IN ENGLAND AND LATER
· Friendship is almost always the union of
a part of one mind with a part of another;
people are friends in spots.
· Compromise is odious to passionate natures
because it seems a surrender, and to intellectual
natures because it seems a confusion; but
to the inner man, to the profound Psyche
within us, whose life is warm, nebulous and
plastic, compromise seems the path of profit
and justice.
· Protestant faith does not vanish into the
sunlight as Catholic faith does, but leaves
a shadowy ghost haunting the night of the
soul.
· And yet the Protestant can hardly go back
- as the Catholic does easily on occasion
- out of habit, or fatigue, or disappointment
in life, or metaphysical delusion, or the
emotional weakness of the death-bed. No,
the Protestant is more in earnest, he carries
his problem and his religion with him.
· Christ and Buddha are called saviors of
the world; I think it must be in irony, for
the world is just as much in need of salvation
as ever. Death and insight and salvation
are personal. The world springs up unregenerate
every morning in spite of all the Tabors
and Calvaries of yesterday.
· Since, as a matter of fact, birth and death
actually occur, and our brief career is surrounded
by vacancy, it is far better to live in the
light of the tragic fact, rather than to
forget or deny it, and build everything on
a fundamental lie.
· The dark background which death supplies
brings out the tender colours of life in
all their purity.
· Each generation breaks its egg-shell with
the same haste and assurance as the last,
pecks at the same indigestible pebbles, dreams
the same dreams, or others just as absurd,
and if it hears anything of what former men
have learned by experience, it corrects their
maxims by its first impressions, and rushes
down any un-trodden path which it finds alluring,
to die in its own way, or become wise too
late and to no purpose.
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MY HOST - THE WORLD
· The full-grown human soul should respect
all traditions and understand all passions;
at the same time it should possess and embody
a particular culture, without any unmanly
relaxation or mystical neutrality. Justice
is one thing, indecision is another, and
weak. If you allow all men to live according
to their genuine natures, you must assert
your own genuine nature and live up to it.
· Oh, no: I had never wished to teach. I
had nothing to teach. I wished only to learn,
to be always the student, never the professor.
And with being eternally a student went the
idea of being free to move, to pass from
one town and one country to another, at least
while enough youth and energy remained for
me to love exploration and to profit by it.
· People do not grow better when they grow
older; they remain the same, - but later
circumstances cause them to exhibit their
character sometimes in a minor key with the
soft pedal, so that they seem to us to have
grown sweeter, and sometimes more harshly
and disagreeably, when we think them soured
or depraved. No: we are no longer charmed
by their virtues or interested in their vices.
· I am profoundly selfish in the sense that
I resist human contagion, except provisionally,
on the surface, and in matters indifferent
to me. For pleasure, and convivially, I like
to share the life about me, and have often
done it; but never so as, at heart, to surrender
my independence. On the other hand, I am
not selfish in a competitive way. I don't
want to snatch money or position or pleasures
from other people, nor do I attempt to dominate
them, as an unselfish man would say, for
their own good. I sincerely wish them joy
in their native ways of living, as if they
were wild animals; but I decidedly refuse
to hunt with them unless the probable result
recommends itself to me independently.
To heartlessness of this kind I am ready
to plead guilty, and see clearly that it
is unhuman. Sympathy with nature, however,
is the source of it, and not any aggressive
selfishness.
· Old places and old persons in their turn,
when spirit dwells in them, have an intrinsic
vitality of which youth is incapable; precisely
the balance and wisdom that comes from long
perspectives and broad foundations.
· What is required for living rationally?
I think the conditions may be reduced to
two: First, knowledge of the world to perceive
what alternatives are open to you and secondly,
to perceive which of them are favorable to
your true interests.
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OTHER SOURCES:
· Immediate feeling, pure experience, is
the only reality, the only fact. (Winds of
Doctrine)
· The first man was a great man for this
reason: having been an ape perplexed and
corrupted by his multiplying instincts, he
suddenly found a new way of being decent,
by harnessing all those instincts together,
through memory and imagination, and giving
each in turn a measure of its due; which
is what we call being rational.
(ibid)
· No doubt the spirit or energy of the world
is what is acting in us, as the sea is what
rises in every little wave; but it passes
through us, and cry out as we may, it will
move on. Our privilege is to have perceived
it as it moves. Our dignity is not in what
we do, but in what we understand. (ibid)
· America is all one prairie, swept by a
universal tornado. Although it has always
thought itself in an eminent sense the land
of freedom, even when it was covered with
slaves, there is no country in which people
live under more overpowering compulsions.
(Character and Opinion in USA)
· The human world was so horrible to the
human mind, that it could be made to look
at all decent and interesting only by ignoring
one half the facts, and putting a false front
on the other half. Hence all that brood of
fables. (The Last Puritan)
· Better not travel, if you wished to admire
the world; if you wished to think highly
of your fellow men, better not hug them too
close.
(ibid)
· Thought is never sure of its contacts with
reality; action must intervene to render
the rhetoric of thought harmless and its
emotions sane.
(ibid)
· Every act initiates a new habit and may
implant a new instinct. We see people even
late in life carried away by political or
religious contagions or developing strange
vices; there would be no peace in old age,
but rather a greater and greater obsession
by all sorts of cares, were it not that time
- in exposing us to many adventitious influences
- weakens or discharges our primitive passions;
we are less greedy, less lusty, less hopeful,
less generous. But these weakened primitive
impulses are naturally by far the strongest
and most deeply rooted in the organism: so
that although an old man may be converted
or may take up some hobby, there is usually
something thin in his elderly zeal. (Turns
of Thought in Modern Philosophy)
· That the end of life should be death may
sound sad: yet what other end can anything
have? The end of an evening party is to go
to bed; but its use is to gather congenial
people together, that they may pass the time
pleasantly. An invitation to the dance is
not rendered ironical because the dance cannot
last for ever; the youngest of us and the
most vigorously wound up, after a few hours,
has had enough of sinuous stepping and prancing.
The transience of things is essential to
their physical being, and not at all sad
in itself; it becomes sad by virtue of a
sentimental illusion, which makes us imagine
that they wish to endure, and that their
end is always untimely; but in a healthy
nature it is not so. (ibid)
· The truth is cruel, but it can be loved,
and it makes free those who have loved it.
(The Realm of Truth)
· Conviction always abounds in its own sense,
as in theology: but what breaks at last through
such a charmed circle is wild nature, within
and without. A thousand contrary facts, a
thousand rebel emotions, drive us from our
nest. We find that there can be no peace
in delusion: and perhaps in this negative
and moral guise the idea of truth first insinuates
itself into the mind. (ibid)
· With a world so full of stuff before him,
I can hardly conceive what morbid instinct
can tempt a man to look elsewhere for wider
vistas, unless it be unwillingness to endure
the sadness and the discipline of the truth.
(Poetry and Religion)
· Men became superstitious not because they
had too much imagination, but because they
were not aware that they had any.
(ibid)
· The influences and practices that tend
to awaken inspiration are those that liberate
and stimulate the inner man: therefore images
and words that then come forward will rise
from a relatively deeper and purer level
and will reveal the native affinities of
the psyche. (Ideas of Christ in The Gospels)
· Avoiding, then, this poetical word, the
soul, laden with so many equivocations, I
will beg the reader to distinguish sharply
two levels of life in the human body, one
of which I call the spirit and the other
the psyche. By spirit I understand the actual
light of consciousness falling upon anything
- the ultimate invisible emotional fruition
of life in feeling and thought. On the other
hand by the psyche I understand a system
of tropes, inherited or acquired, displayed
by living bodies in their growth and behaviour.
This psyche is the specific form of physical
life, present and potential, asserting itself
in any plant or animal. (The Realm of Matter)
· I find that in the psychological sphere,
apart from pure feeling or intuition, everything
is physical. There is no such thing as mental
substance, mental force, mental machinery,
or mental causation. If actual feelings or
intuitions have any ground at all this ground
is physical; if they have a date, place,
or occasion they have it only in the physical
world. (ibid)
· Cultivate imagination, love it, give it
endless forms, but do not let it deceive
you (-Atlantic, Dec., 1948.)
· Doubtless nobody is quite sane; but nature,
against our reasonings and expectations,
continually redresses the balance, killing
off the worst fools; and the non-theoretical
strain in us keeps us alive, with only our
more harmless illusions. (reviewing Russell's
"Religion and Science" in Mercury
magazine)
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