PHILOSOPHY AND THE REIFICATION OF THE UNREAL
(Towards a General Theory of Reification in Two Thematic Parts)
PAGE FOUR OF FIVE PAGES
Jud Evans - University of Central Lancashire,
England. May 2007
Copyright © 2007 Jud Evans. Permission granted
to distribute in any medium, commercial
or non-commercial, provided author
attribution and copyright
notices remain intact.
THEME TWO
REIFICATION - A BIOGENETICAL EVOLUTIONARY
ACCOUNT
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TABLE OF CONTENTS FOR THEME TWO
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4. 1 |
The Reificatory
Two - Way -Traffic |
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4. 2 |
The Impulsion Towards
Reification |
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4. 3 |
Tweaking Our Verbs
and Gerunds |
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4. 4 |
Paying Nature's Biogenetical
Piper |
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4. 5 |
Thinking Meat and the Energy
Myth |
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4. 6 |
Resisting Philo-Reificative Vulgarity |
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4. 7 |
Method and Motivation Synchronised |
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Reifications (like biological entozoic
infections of the gut) are
proto-socio-neurological enculturations
and as useful fictions
are not necessarily symbiotic
with, nor necessarily benignly
adjuvant to the welfare of their unwitting
and often naive hosts.
Jud Evans. "Philosophy and the Reification
of the Unreal"
Freedom in humans consists of the ability
to liberate oneself
from the tyranny of reificationalist
imprinting.
Antonio Rossin. "Democracy, Religion, Drugs".
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This dissertation proposes that there is
a bio-evolutionary element in the selection
of reification as an innovative, linguistic
device for eliminating periphrastic verbiage
in accordance with the survival of the fittest.
Our Sensory motors map and 25 support a neurological link between manual
dexterity and speech. My analysis in this
paper points to the importance of linguistico-manual
dexterity as a survivalist necessity which
forced the adoption of a communicative compaction
of speech via reification
in opposition to periphrastic verbiage as
an synergistic elaboration of speech as a
survival strategy.
Reification deals with every aspect of human
representation and communication, but it
only works if there is a match between the
intending reifier and the semantic (unquestioning)
understanding, education, faith, belief or
acceptance of the addressee of the reification.
One of the ironies concerning the word
reification is that it is itself a reification, though
in contrast to most abstraction, reification
can be accurately defined, (to regard something abstract as
a material thing.)
This historical account and theory of reification
endeavours to explain reification as an experiential
feature of our human domain of world-experience
that arises as a biological response to the
praxis of our lives characterised as a biological
phenomenon. For some people it is only with
a profound meta-experiential effort of the
imagination that they are able to conceive
that a reificatory statement, or a sentence
containing hypostatised elements, is ontologically
suspect. The psychological profundity of
the habituation to abstraction and the ability
to distinguish its dangers varies from person
to person. On the basis of reification itself
being biogenetically instilled in humankind,
this discrepancy in the ability to discern
its presence as both a communicative advantage
and ontological hazard is hardly surprising.
Levy-Bruh writing of the languages of the
primitive:
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This wealth of vocabulary is directly dependent
on the concrete and precise nature of primitive
man's language.. He does not know who to
express himself abstractly and conditionally,
as the cultural man does. [41] (Levy-Bruh. 1930. 110-111)
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Reification is a useful fallacy selected
by nature and reinforced by gradual genetic
changes achieved through a series of chance
mutations and the well known processes of
natural selection. In early man those with
the ability to act quickly, to distinguish,
to categorise, and above all to reificationally
generalise were provided with a distinct
advantage for survival.
Those who could manipulate images, hypotheses
or possible action were able to enter an
originative or figurative realm beyond that
of their more neurologically challenged associates.
The fact that we seem to be unaware of the
reasons why we reify philosophical concepts
so profusely may be intended by nature. We
are reminded of Ruse's well known question/suggestion
that the origin of morality could be biological.
| Morality is no more. than a collective illusion
fobbed off on us by our genes for reproductive
ends [42] (Ruse. 1991. p. 506) |
The General Theory of Reification claims that the thingification of transcendental
ideas is selected and biologically transmitted
as an involuntary, heritable neuro-linguistic
process integrative with the central nervous
system and imposed on us on us by our DNA
for reproductive ends? 26
With Ruse's words ringing in our ears, it
might be fruitful in order to understand
our apparent unawareness of the useful fiction
that we call reification if we slightly modify
and paraphrase Ruse's comment as: The thingification of states of affairs and
universals is no more than an unconscious
collective illusion fobbed off on us by our
genes for reproductive ends.
For prestige reasons, the soft sciences try
to take on the mantle of the hard sciences
by using scientific sounding terminology,
which consists almost totally of reification
of one sort or another. So we see softer
domains of study attempting to shift from
the terminologically-reified center to the
terminologically-stricter and harder scientific
right.
Theoretical explanations can sometimes be
made more evident by showing how they belong
to our daily life. So that it may be made
apparent how we human beings are all involved
in the biogenetic accounts that I provide,
I must mention some support for my supposition
of soft <--> hard shift in certain
sections of science and the fact that it
is not a one-way street.
As far as the members of a hard science softening
their discipline is concerned, Catt can only
mean being less objective. Being to greater
extent influenced by emotion or personal
bias entails being less explicit or willing
to challenge existing paradigms. It also
necessitates employing fuzzy, abstract, reificative
language, which is less specific and less
open to criticism. It suggests a slackening
of rigour fuelled by fears of a lack of success,
or the inclusion of abstraction or reificational
descriptive language in findings and reports
in order to conceal areas of uncertainty.
In this manner the scientist makes his status,
career and research grants more secure by
tempering the uncompromising resolution of
his approach and confining himself to more
traditional or establishment expectations.
The effect of such a softening of the scientific
discipline is a movement by elements of the
hard scientific right to the abstractive
and reificatory comfort zone of the soft
concretist center. 27 Inductive sociology, philosophy, psychology
and the other soft sciences rely on ideational
models as real things for simulating situations
where Popperian-style falsifiable deductive
checks are impossible to apply. Unfortunately
a secondary and usually adverse effect of
this reliance upon concretised states of
affairs is that it is often built on data
that has no relation to the real world. Such
reified models are not formed by the coalescence
of material particles but of a coalescence
of disparate conceptualisation.
There is a paradoxical paradigm of a shift
on the part of one fact-finding discipline
which perceives it to be in its interest
to tone down or modify the amount of reification
in its discourse for purposes of credibility,
whereas another investigatory body may perceive
a need to do precisely the opposite and increase
the amount of reificatory language for the
same reason.
It may well be that this behaviour is a response
to the need to submit annual progress reports
to the sources of funding in order to obviate
uncomfortable scrutiny from the expectant
providers of research grants impatient for
results. Whatever be the case, it provides
a good example of the dual nature of reification
as a persuasive or disingenuous tool.
| 4. 2 The Compulsion to Reify |
Before we begin to explore the historical,
biological background of WHY we reify, perhaps
we should briefly remind ourselves of HOW
we reify. Whilst we know that to reify is
to consider an abstract concept to be real,
it might be useful at this point before we
turn to other things, to attempt a more accurate
definition of the actual process of reification
itself?
What is going on in our brains when we reify?
Here are three possible accounts of the neurological
processes that generate reification:
1. Dissimilar or analogous generalisations
are conflated into an exteriorised linguistic
particular.
2. A multiplicity of complex states of affairs
is instantiated as an individual concretised
universal.
3. Conceptual elements of varying complexity
are thingified into a singular useful abstraction. |
Thus are human ideas and actions linguistically
liquefied then crystallised 28 into more manageable singular concepts.
Soon such terms take on concretised lives
of their own. The heterogeneous elements
of far-flung men and whirring machines, the
rustling of papers at board-meetings, the
wild gesticulations of brokers on the floor
of the money exchanges and runs on the dollar
or the yen are treated grammatically and
sententially as if it were some huge, single,
global object.
The financial phenomenon becomes a thing,
which can't be bucked, an object that responds
to a reified world of commercial activity,
where goods and services are bought and sold,
driven by the paramount reification known
as capitalist competition. So it is that
abstract nouns transmogrify into things and
words such as education take on a solidity
comparable with the bricks and mortar of
the educational establishments wherein the
educators and the educable (or uneducable)
gather to educate or be educated.
Why shouldn't neuro-biological driven reification
be considered as the original: One small
step for man, one giant leap for mankind?
In an evolutionary sense man's earth-bound
quantum jump of neuro-linguistic compaction
via reification was even more awe-inspiring
than Neil Armstrong's famous step down upon
the moon's surface. Without man's awesome
abstractive giant step forward that set him
apart from all other animals and which enabled
our species to make that long journey from
the caves to Cape Kennedy, the flight to
the moon could never have taken place.
Here in theme two I advance my theory that
the reification of abstraction has a biological
basis, which not only sits comfortably with
notions of interactive advantages for the
individual human in his competition with
the other members of his or her social group,
but also provides support for evolutionary
ethical explanations which are dependent
upon group-selection accounts of social behaviour.
Many people are under the impression that the reification
intentionality exists, when in fact flora and fauna react
to stimuli in accordance with a genetical
script which has developed over periods of
millions of years as the most appropriate
survivalist sequence of DNA proved pragmatically
suitable for survival and reproduction. Plants
turn their leaves to the light because they
are deterministically programmed to do so.
They do so in a reflex manner, much as a
computer programme executes its script in
accordance with the composition of its arranged,
patterned electronic entitic components.
The elements involved are electro-chemical
and matergic respectively in the case
of both organisms (including humans) and
inorganic entities like computers and the
thermostat which controls a central-heating
system. Our brains are self-registering survivency
organs, evolved to provide continuous feedback
of its own indications at the maxima and
minima of experiential variations. Our brains
provide a ceaseless biologic systems-analysis
backed up by an informative biographic arcanum
of stored stratagems for survival and response
to stimuli.
What is often mistaken for intentionality in humans is simply the compliant
brain calculating the most efficient method
of executing the genetically created deterministic
programme given its present internal state
in relation to the extraneous circumstances
of the current environment.
The cerebral calculative scripted pattern
that specifies and initiates how a certain
input sequence (usually a cascade of sensorial
matergic entities) affecting the neurological
network) should be mapped to a behavioural
output sequence judged to be the best manner
to carry out its electro-chemical instructional
script, but only the calculating human brain-tissue
- the datergic (energised-data) processor
exists. The DNA scripted embodied brain and
the matergic electronic objects which cause
a PC to operate in certain predetermined
ways are both materialistic, matergic, objective
force-fields (call them what you wish) and
in spite of the transcendentalist claims
to the contrary, there is nothing metaphysical
involved - at least during the last two and
a half millennia no evidence has ever been
produced to back up such emphatic declarations
or non-evidential assumptions.
One has no option but to conclude that such
bizarre claims concerning the fictional "objects" - the stripped beings- the pure existents - that some realists believe exist bereft
of them existing in a particular fashion,
way, form, or combination of existential
states or modalities are no more than an internalised
reality-disconnect.
Effective communication entails the ability
to abstract and reify perceptions of socially
situational complexity into more easily grasped
conceptual concretisations and objectified
universals whilst remaining aware of the
semantic distortion that may be engendered
if the addressee interprets the thingification
involved differently from that of the addressor.
| 4. 3 Tweaking Verbs and Gerunds |
This treatise is an attempt at a bio-evolutionary
account of the human tendency to hypostasise
generality, to entify change, to objectify
time and motion in spite of the favourable or unfavourable
paradoxes that sometimes result, (see Zeno's
Achilles and the Tortoise). Communicatively it is very convenient
and timesaving to tweak and thingify verbs
and to magic gerunds and adjectival nouns
and phrases into mental objects or real things.
There is nothing more that nature responds
to better than time saving stratagems.
Saving time saves lives. Saving biologically-deemed
suitable lives means the likelihood of more
opportunities for the selfish gene to sow
its wild oats, or deposit its ethically controlled
futurity in the security of a morally stabilised
matrimonial monandry. It is the conatus inherent
in the human entity, which prompts it to
develop complexity-free communication in
order to transmit information quickly.
Descriptive competence and clarity in communication
help an individual and the group of which
it is a member to compete and obtain individual
and societal advantage and to transfer its
hereditary script via DNA. The limited abstractive and language abilities
of the higher apes appear to be purely functional
rather than communicative (using a stick
to dislodge objects, etc), and it would appear
that whilst many animals display ingenious
behaviour, much of the seemingly intelligent
behaviour of non-human creatures (the construction
of spider's webs, beavers' dams, etc) is
characterised by zoologists as instinctually
imprinted, hard-wired conduct.
Instinct is the inherent disposition of a
living organism toward a particular behaviour.
Instincts are unlearned, inherited fixed
action patterns of responses or reactions
to certain kinds of stimuli. Innate emotions,
which can be expressed in more flexible ways
and learned patterns of responses, not instincts,
form a basis for the majority of responses
to external stimuli in evolutionary higher
species, while in the case of highest evolved
species both of them are overridden by actions
based on cognitive processes with more or
less intelligence and creativity or even
trans-intellectual intuition. [43] (Nationmaster Encyclopedia. 2008).
Examples of instinctual fixed action patterns
can be observed in the behaviour of animals,
which perform various activities (sometimes
complex) that are not based upon prior experience
and do not depend on emotion or learning,
such as reproduction, and feeding among insects.
Other examples include animal fighting over
territory, animal courtship behaviour, internal
escape functions, and building of nests.
Surely reification, which I believe has also
been selected by nature for parallel generative
reasons, is not an instance of our genes
being morally or ethically concerned - but
simply that the less linguistically advantaged
or individuals less ethically committed to
enjoying the superior or more favourable
position that familial stability usually
provided were gradually eliminated from the
gene-pool?
Surely reification, which I believe has also
been selected by nature for parallel generative
reasons, is not an instance of our genes
being morally or ethically concerned, but is
simply that the less linguistically advantaged
or individuals less ethically committed to
enjoying the superior or more favourable
position that familial stability usually
provided were gradually eliminated from the
gene-pool?
If we identify reification as a communicational
ploy or linguistic tool intended to convey
a message quickly, or to rhetorically or
grandiloquently obfuscate, to manipulatively
minimize, to persuasively maximise or employ
any other of the reificational ploys in order
to secure an advantage or an understanding
in response to individual, social and group
incompatibilities and conflicts, we can see
immediately why such terminology was valuable
for natural selection.
Even so, reification had another huge benefit
or advantage to offer society in times of
warfare. In the hand-to-hand engagements
experienced by our forefathers, non-complex,
clear commands and warnings were essential.
Where voiced reificatory commands could not
be heard above the din of battle, single
cries, trumpets or drums were used. A certain
blast on a bugle signalling a defensive retreat
is actually a musical reification that carries
a complex message in a compressed audible
form.
| 4. 4 Paying Evolution's Biogenetical
Piper |
Reification has two aspects - it can both
confuse and clarify human communication.
The obfuscational form of reification can
now be seen as an out-of-control linguistic
phenomenon that is developing and rapidly
reproducing in a viral or a meme-like manner.
Faced as we are with a culture totally accepting
of an extreme and antithetical form of reification
to which they appear totally committed, we
in the West are experiencing a juncture in
history when absolute clarity of meaning
and purpose is essential, particularly in
the way that we refer to and speak about
other cultures where reificational meanings
can convey something entirely different.
So why have certain forms of reification
become counterproductive to global society
in general and philosophy, the humanities
and the sciences in particular? The answer
for philosophy is simple. Clarity is at a premium. In an age of specialisation, non-specificity
and obfuscation have become a liability -
not a benefit. A deluge of meaningless verbiage
has overwhelmed philosophy.
Clarity is now the exception rather than
the norm. It is now reification itself which
is rapidly replicating, rather than the reifying
humankind it came about to help rapidly reproduce.
Current philosophy consists of a questioning
of givens - not of their very givenness.
Obfuscation blurs this distinction. In most
universities it is no longer a philosophical
question of whether being, movement or change
(insert your own reification here) actually
exist, i. e., whether there actually ARE such phenomena, but rather function as agencies
for the investigation, study and discussion
of the historical nature of such ancient
ontological views and givens and how they
relate to modern thinking. Already in the
most embryonic stages of evolution there
is an opposition between two coincident but
mutually antagonistic feelings of inflexibility
and malleability.
The more complex the organism develops, the
stronger the tendency towards persistence
and interiorised attitudes and modes of thinking.
Instinctual and automatic patterns of behaviour
in reaction to specific situations give way
to a strictly comfortable functional intelligence
characterised by rigid patterns of perception
and meanings as the process of adaptation
to changed environments goes on. In my opinion
there is a definite reciprocal relation between
the amount of abstraction and reification
employed in human communication and the entropic
communication principle. 29 As reificatory entropic nonsensicality increases
and semantic specificity decreases, meaningful
communication will degrade pro rata.
The plasticity of language is biologically
programmed to respond to historical survivalist
paradigms and will take a long genetical
period to exhaust itself and for nature to
'get the message' and start selecting for
ontological accuracy rather than speed.
Like reificational action replays, these
perceptual blueprints and meanings are vital
requirements for the human organism that
endures within a given systemic environmental
paradigm. Thus the very mechanisms of the
evolutionary process of higher animals are
those that cause and determine the inclination
towards semantic rigidification and the objectification
of events that is the predominant property
of reification. Eventually intellectual ossification
sets in. Internalised habit patterns are
no longer recognised for what they are. New
versions are ignored or repressed. Lateral
thinking or conscious semantical management
shuts down and a new reifications is born.
The unique powers of perceiving, learning,
reasoning and knowing in human animals are
the most important adaptive enables of their
physical continuance. Not only is the work
of the human imagination rule-governed, it
is itself the system of all rule-governed
activity - a reified schematism of patterned
behaviour. Reification was a vital component
of the mechanisms of shamanist ritual and
prediction and a necessary actuator in the
adoption of the mythic stories necessary
to achieve social or military goals and ultimately
- survival and proliferation.
Reification as developed by the Greeks has
served the West well. The Greek genius for
abstraction and reification released an explosion
of human enquiry and ingenuity into every
aspect of human culture and science.
| 4. 5 Thinking Meat and the Energy
Myth |
My own view is that to include any abstraction
into scientific, philosophical, psychological
political, or theological models (and to
a large extent in natural language) is in
order to achieve two quite separate objectives.
One use is acceptable - the other unacceptable
and that only by understanding reification
can we make valid judgements.
THE VERIFICATIVE CONCRICITY OF TRUTH
Please note that I am not claiming that truth
exists, – I reject any notion of the idea
– it does not. What I claim is that ontologically
and nominally the words: object, entity,
matergy, force-field can equally be referred
to as embodied truth or adjectivalised as:
a true object, a true entity, a true matergy,
a true force-field, for material objects
always exist as they truly are as the objects
they are as physically lawful entities. It
is impossible for an object not to exist
in the apodeictic manner, mode of style in
which it exists.
Therefore the only true science, is the science
that speaks of objects, addresses objects
relation, truth, etc as objects, or, if that
find that grammatically or descriptively
onerous or impossible then employ abstraction
which is previously acknowledged to be no
more than useful fiction employed solely
for the purposes of explication.
To paraphrase Karl Marx whereby he said that:
value is crystalised labour, I claim that
in the same way that the hidden social relationship
beneath capitalism's distorted economic surface
a material, physical object can be described
as concretised truth. It goes without saying
that if you take a hammer and break open
a stone, or split an atom into its constituent
parts you will not find truth (like the confused
Heidegger looked for the is in a leaf )–
for neither truth (in its abstractive sense)
and is in its existentialising sense) do
not exist. Material truth can only exist
as a material object. [44] (Heidegger. 1993)
1. THE ACCEPTABLE USE. The acceptable use
of abstraction is one which is welcome, commendable
and useful in the interests of brevity, concision
and is helpful in order to cut out needless
circumlocution, ambage and paraphrastic rewording
for the purpose. of clarification. There
is one stipulation attached to its use. The
addressor and the addressee must be partners
to a mutual understanding that it is only
employed as useful fiction. If either of
the communicant users of abstraction believe
or are under the impression that the abstracta
or reificata actually exists, then its use
is to be considered invalid for any statement
of ontological import.
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The use of primitive abstractives like *energy* and *force* and *movement* etc. is ontologically unscientific. My
concern is wholly centred upon *what exists and what does not exist* and less with the stratagems of scientists
who invent useful fictions like momentum
operators, and energy operators in order
to put on hold a more stringent, more professionally committed
ontological approach and analysis of the
cosmos and the causal objects with which
it is populated.
| 'It is important to realize that in physics
today, we have no knowledge of what energy
is. We do not have a picture that energy
comes in little blobs of a definite amount. [45] (Feynman. 1987) |
Surely energy like all abstraction is merely a reification
of the activity of a perceived process into
a thing? Similar to the way that ’love’
is reified into a quasi-object, when plainly
it is only the human objects we characterise
as lovers who exist?
And yes, someone else believes that to be
true.
|
Energy is an abstract concept invented by
physical scientists in the nineteenth century
to describe quantitatively a wide variety
of natural phenomena. [46] (Faires & Simmang. 2002)
|
For the eliminative determinist there is
no need for this definitional confusion and
difficulty – nominatively
‘energy IS matter and vice-versa!’ All talk concerning the existence and transfer
of ‘energy’ in the sense that it is usually used is mystical nonsense. And, as if to cap
it all, speaking on the subject of energy, Abbott and Van Ness continue in the second
paragraph of their book:
| Thus it [energy] represents a primitive statement
about a primitive concept. [47] (Abbott, & Van Ness 1988) |
Now you know from whence I got the term *primitivisms* in relation to science - I got it from
scientists themselves.
Physicists have invented fictional operators
in order to continue to existentialise the
*let's pretend* descriptive terms used to describe the behaviour
of matergic objects which are magically transformed
into existential pseudo-objecthood with a
flourish of the transcendental twizzle-stick.
Movement and energy no more exist than *dancing* does. When you visit the ballet you see
human dancers moving the bodies to music
- such behaviour is described as *dancing* but it is the behaving, dancing humans
who exist - not the dancing. As for *time* - there is no such thing - only timed objects exist - like our clocks are timed in relation
to the moving, spinning earth as it circles
the sun.
Only objects that are measured, counted,
divided, etc. actually exist. Only objects
which are timed exist. Only objects which
impinge upon other objects or are impinged
upon themselves exist, and only physicists
and the paraphernalia of their profession
exist - the rest is merely a compendium of
useful fiction employed because of a lack
of knowledge of the actual ontological state
of affairs. But that is not to say that an
actual ontological state of affairs exists either - *what exists exists in the manner in which
it exists* - a tautology I know - but some tautologies
are acceptable if they throw light on areas
of interest to inquisitive humans.
The way I see it, the idea inventing and
of attributing some *mysterious process* which is not understood is unacceptable,
and all the fictive *operators* in the imaginative head-meat of their inventors
do not magic them into existence. Energy, force, drive, pressure, thrust, cause,
influence and all the rest of the elements of the
lexically synonymous merry-go-round that
characterises science as being the work of
some ‘secondary’ even more ‘mysterious’ force that is not understood, is hardly
different from that of our primitive ancestors,
who, ignorant of the nature of thunder and
lightening, attributed the flashing and banging
phenomenon to an unknown, invisible spirit
who lived in a tree or sat upon the clouds
above dangling his human marionettes like
some heavenly side-show huckster.
From the eliminativist position many thinkers
of 20th century: from Gödel, Heisenberg,
Schroedinger, Einstein, and so forth many
areontologically flawed - some more than
others. *Relativity* does not exist - only objects which humans
class as being related can be found in the
world or in space. *Waves* do not exist - only waving micro-objects
that move in a cloud exist when the physics
of spatial relocation (the material imperium)
deem it expedient to travel that way - if
not they move independantly. There are no
such things as the *let's pretend variables* of Gödel's incompleteness theorem and self-consistent recursive axiomatic systems don't exist either (they are but meaty templates
in the heads of mathematicians and cannot
be found in the world) and neither do abstract
numbers - though we have symbolic plastic
shapes called *numbers* on our front door which we map to useful abtractive categorial
identicative notions.
What exists as far as mathematics is concerned
- is meat - human meat - fibrous, chewable
flesh (as any cannibal will confirm) of the
human animal that thinks. The thinking human
meat we call the brain simply thinks - there
is no *mind* or consciousness that suspires from the spongy soma like
metaphysical laughing-gas from a fleshy swamp.
We are the unfortunate inheritors of a religiously
inspired neural representation of man as
sarcoidal-transcendentalist partnership with
what they call *a mind* which somehow exists (though it is never
explained how) lodger-like within the meaty
property our physical body.
These fleshy brains which exist atop these
mobile bodies of ours (which also taxi around
that the philo-religious tradition calls
our "souls") are comprised of cognising human
meat coiled like a sentient sesquipedalian
sausages within the thin protective carapace
of our skulls. This provides the opportunity
to the dualists to make another putative
distinction between our neurologising flesh
and the *other* world outside* which they label with the reification *reality* as if we had just landed a space vehicle
on a strange planet upon which we could not
venture outside without first donning osseo-dermatological
space-suits. In fact our cognising brains
are as much out there in the world as any of the other real objects that surround
us
If one ceases to believe in spirits or Gods
that once satisfied our forefathers as being
responsible for a so-called creation of the universe – then what else is there other than
material to be held responsible? By eliminating
one of only two dualistic alternatives, a
person is left with just one remaining available
explanation – an explanation which
I am forced to cast into metaphorical language
as that of:
Matter itself as being both legislator and
legislatee.
The scientist Georges Metanomski has briefly
summarized Einstein's view, not to
argue for it - but simply to inform
|
WE |
MAY DISTINGUISH THREE DOMAINS |
| 1. |
W |
An objective world out there |
| 2. |
S |
Our subjective sensory inputs |
| 3. |
A |
Abstract concepts and structures. |
With no diminution of respect for either
Metanomski or Einstein - I beg to differ.
Einstein:1. W - An objective World Out There.
Response: Yes, here I agree. The world undoubtably
exists. Those that doubt it (Berkeley et
al are lunatics and should be totally ignored
.)
Einstein:2. S - Our subjective sensory Inputs:
Response: Sensory Inputs do not exist –
a complete myth. Only the human sensor with
(material) sensors (organic structures,)
eyes that register incoming (material) tachyonic
quanta, nose that registers material pheromones,
ears that register vibrating (material) air,
taste receptors which analyse chemical matter,
and the epidermal skin envelope with registers and sends (material) electro-chemical
signals to the thinking meat (the material
sensorium) above.
Einstein:3. A - Abstract concepts and structures.
Response: Absolutely wrong. Concepts, ideas, and the
new fancy replacement name memes do not exist
– only the human conceptualisor, ideator
with the neurological memetic storage area
called grey matter exists.
Einstein: Science - maps S to A representations (AR),
Response: Wrong (or more precisely unclear.
) Representations only exist when they are
material representations. Graphite or dried
ink particles on paper, pixilations on screens,
carvings on wood, plastic or stone etc. Only
that which is represented exists. Neurological
representations do not exist. Only the representing
brain meat exists.
Einstein: Science endeavors to structure ARs as deductively
consistent models,
Response:Only the neurologically active modeller
(the scientist) and his material models exist.
The model that the scientist ideates actually
exists as a mode of the way his brain exists.
if the modeller imparts knowledge of the
modular way he exists to an addressee, the
addressee immediately changes the way he
exists to that of a similar existential modality
as the informant modeller or rejects the
mode of the modeller and stays the way he
exists in a modality of rejection.
Einstein: Science verifies or falsifies models by regression
to S.
Response: For the modeller to verify or falsify
models by regression to S. simply means that
he adjusts the way he exists in a similar
way to the way he might adjust the way he
is sitting upon a chair. His neuronal and
physiological state changes – he exists
in a different way to before he verified
or falsified his model or arranged his gluteous
maximus in a different or more comfortable
manner.
As can be seen I agree with Einstein and with his student
Georges Metanomski, but with certain important
reservations. For me the reification: physical
reality is only exclusively reducible to
sense impressions for those people who accept
that real objects are legitimately indicated
with such terms as: reality and human observers
accurately characterised as being the originators
and curators of a metaphysical museum of
qualia-like sense impressions. Thus the problem
with Einstein's writing in the above form
of words, is that they do not sufficiently
clarify the ontological commitment of the
author. Thus, as a genius and as the most
brilliant scientist of the twentieth century
he is perfectly correct in what he believes
- but (because even geniuses can't be expert
polymath jack-of-all-trades in everything)
lacks the absolute exactitude necessary for
an ontologically crystal-clear account of
his position. For me only that which is physical
exists and the term real is merely a synonym
for exists.
Physical reality (which is all things to all men) is not a
sufficiently scientific term to describe
the ontological ramifications of the astounding
(but in many ways imperfect) human sensorium
(our neurological meaty-bits) and should
be scrapped by the cognoscenti in philo-scientific
discussion and Einstein's wording modified
to read:
|
Our perceptions of the existential modalities
of that which is adequately sensed as being
physically real (or matergic if you wish)
are exclusively reliant on the existential
modalities of the sensing human preceptors.
|
In other words, no matter what the nature
of any future instrumentation or technology
devised to add to our sensing of matergy
which surrounds us, we will never be able
to perceive of it as it actually exists -
never - ever. We need to come to terms with
our successful, well proven (environmentally
and evolutionary) acquired knowledge of the
objects we encounter and withdraw the silly
reification nominal from our scientific vocabulary.
Kant postulated that man’s speculative reason
(intelligent guesswork) can only know phenomena
and can never penetrate to the noumenon (or
the thing-in-itself - das Ding an sich) as opposed to what Kant called the phenomenon - the thing as it appears to an observer.
What we observe as we view a banana is what
the object we call a banana looks like, feels like, smells like, and
tastes like (and if you count the thunk! – it makes when you hit someone on the head
with it) what it sounds like to humans. Why?
Because we cannot sense (what humans call
a banana) in any other way, the manner for example
how a banana is sensed by a cat, or a pongo pygmaeus or house-fly.
Now Kant claimed that man’s speculative reason
can only know phenomena and can never penetrate
to the noumenon. He also added that man is not altogether
excluded from the noumenal because of a reification
he calls practical reason (i. e. opinion) provides the capacity for
acting as a moral agent (which can presumably
include the desire to blow yourself and other
people to pieces, or burn people alive (
a la the Inquisition), or drop bombs on babies, (a la Iraq, etc.)
and that such wicked activity makes no sense
unless a noumenal world is postulated in
which freedom, access to markets, God, and immortality (and any other reification one cares to add)
abides amongst the recognisably noumenal
charred bodies of the innocents.
But it all depends upon the cognitive depth
of that penetration. There is no need to penetrate to the molecular
levels of a banana in order to understand
why in 2008 Britons perceived, named, bought
and consumed an unprecedented 3.5 billion
pieces of the tropical fruit, forcing our
native apple into a poor second place. the
fact that the banana took over as Britain's
most favourite fruit is because it is phenomenologically
sufficient to be able to perceive a banana
as a tasty, nutritious food-source (other
than to those humans to whom the protein
found in banana called chitinase, causes the immune system in some individuals
to overreact and treat the protein as harmful
to your body.
All organisms, sense a banana differently.
Every human being on the planet senses a
banana SLIGHTLY differently (differentials
of ocular and sensorial paraphernalia and
the various ambient lighting and other conditions
prevailing during the viewing.) and no banana
is exactly the same as another (otherwise
it would BE that banana) but in spite of
that the human sensorium is sufficiently
similar to allow practically all humans (other
than those handicapped in some way, etc.)
to recognise and name the object that humans
call a banana - as - a banana.
All perception of objects in immanent, but
there are varying degrees of both perception
and neurological immanency (presence of mind
or Vernunft or bon sens) in which humans
can come to an acceptable appreciation and
interfacial understanding of the existential
manner of the matergy they confront. Humans
have a sufficient-enough-for-purpose (assez
suffisant ŕ l'usage prévu) immanentist perception
in relation to bananas and most of the other
matergic objects with which we share the
world (for example - we are immanently enough
equipped to flee from a rapidly approaching
5-ton truck, or a tiger on the loose, and
to navigate a spacecraft to Mars by proxy.)
For the most part our level of immanency
is developed enough and has served us well
enough throughout our long journey from
the African savannah via the Lascaux Caves to Cape Kennedy - for the rather brusque term noumena to be scrapped in relation to the matergic
objects with which we are (species specifically)
familiar.
As to the matergies which remain (for the
moment ) still outside our understanding
(we can use our sufficiently immanent understanding of a banana as a cognitive rule of thumb
if we wish) such as electrons and other as yet not completely categorised
quanta, which pro tem are obfuscationally referred to as being
energy, force, movement, time, or being reposited in number, sets and other useful fictions – they can (if
people MUST have some term to refer to as
yet imperfectly understood entities) remain
for the time being referred to as noumena
or the slightly more farcical qualia.
| 4. 6 Resisting Philo-Reificative Vulgarity |
This last section of chapter four is in the
form of a warning. The Western world of today
is faced with a threatening form of vulgar,
systematised reification commensurate with
fascism and communism. The useful but much
misused Greek gift of reification has become
a malefic handicap that could result in the
complete annihilation of the species, which
it biogenetically developed to nurture. Putting
it bluntly, one cannot fight one unified,
agenda-driven, systematised reification with
the sort of reificational mish-mash characteristic
of the Western hemisphere's metaphysical
omnium-gatherum.
Western philosophers need to develop
a universally understood, semantically detailed
method of clear-thinking. The semantic non-specificity
and corrosively systemic disarray caused
by the traditional abstraction of historical philosophy
no longer serves us well. The indiscriminate
reification of socio-cultural and socio-political
phenomena displays a crude inclination towards
representing the globe through the lens of
occicentric prejudice. Our representation
of Islamo-centric semantic and theological
categories ignores the subtleties of intra-cultural
specificities. Vulgar Western commentators
wielding hurtful reifications or xenonyms 30 confront large sections of our fellow man
as: freeloading Hispanics, aggressive Muslims,
robot-like Japanese and lazy Africans, etc., whilst an increasing outpouring of
anti-Western vituperation floods back in
the other direction. Below, in my conclusion,
I suggest that the age-old biological bonus
of reification may have run its course as
a species-specific selective tool. and that
it is only the partial abandonment or curtailment
of reification, rather than its continued
copiousness, that will save humanity now.
|
|
Footnotes - Chapter Four |
| [25] |
|
Examining areas of the brain and observing
the corporeal reaction proves that the brain
was the engine of manual dexterity, or it
worked the other way around is a matter of
conjecture. |
| [26] |
|
A suggestion that The General Theory of Reification be regarded in a similar way to that of
the concepts of Evolutionary Ethics in the
sense of Ruse's quote: Morality may be no
more than a collective illusion fobbed off
on us by our genes for reproductive ends? |
| [27] |
|
Excuse the political metaphors. |
| [28] |
|
Marx. Cf. the well known Marxian reification:
Value as crystallised labour. Capital. 1930.
vol. 1, p. 32. |
| [29] |
|
Entropic communication principle. In communication
theory - a numerical measure of the uncertainty
of an outcome. |
| [30] |
|
Xenonym. A name for a people or a language
which is not used by the people themselves.
For example, German is a xenonym for people
who call themselves Deutsche. |
|
|
References For This Page |
|
|
|
| [41 |
|
Levy-Bruh. 1930. 110-111 Lev Semonivch Vygotsky
and Psychological Behavior of Primitive Peoples.From the Introduction to Studies on the History of
Behavior: Ape, Primitive and Child. L. S. Vygotsky and A.R. Luria 1930.
(trans. V.Golod and J. Knox, New York.. USA |
| [42] |
|
Ruse. Michael. “The Significance of Evolution.” p. 506. In. P. Singer, ed., A Companion to Ethics.
Oxford:. Blackwell Publishing. 9600 Garsington
Road. Oxford. UK. |
| [43] |
|
Nationmaster Encyclopedia. Instinct. 2008. http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/Instinct |
| [44] |
|
Heidegger.M Basic Concepts..1993 Trans. Gary E. Aylesworth. Indiana
University Press |
| [45] |
|
Feynman. Richard. ‘The Definition of Energy Explained.’ 1987. Accessed 01.04.2007.
http://www.ftexploring.com/energy/definition.htm |
| [46] |
|
Faires. Virgil Moring and Simmang. Clifford
Max. Thermodynamics, MacMillan Publishing Co., Inc. (a college
text book) http://www.ftexploring.com/energy/definition.htm
(acc. 01.04.2007 |
| [47] |
|
Abbott. M. M. & Van Ness. H. C. ‘Theory and Problems of Thermodynamics.’ McGraw-Hill Book Company |
| [48] |
|
Metanomski. Georges. Epistomology List Yahoo
28. Sept. 2008. |
| [49] |
|
Heidegger. Being and Time. 1933. Chap 1. trans. Joan Stambaugh. SUNY
Series in Contemporary Continental Philosophy.
State University of new York Press. New York.
USA. |
| [50] |
|
Heidegger. Martin. Basic Concepts. 1998. trans. Garry E. Aylesworth. Indiana
University Press. 60 North Morton St, Bloomington,
Indiana. USA. |
| [51] |
|
Sansom. Richard. Analylytical Indicant Theory. 12.09.2008. Yahoo groups. |
| [52] |
|
Ibid. |
| [53] |
|
Fromm. Erich. Humanism and the Stranger – Dealing with the Alien.' Münster: LIT-Verlag
1994, pp. 31-44. |
|