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Heidegger Moore

A QUESTION TO EVERYBODY
Copyright © 2009 Gary C. Moore. Permission granted to distribute in any medium, commercial
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A problem I have been dealing with in Heidegger is that In BEING AND TIME, Heidegger takes a very radical view of dasein's authentic appropriation of tradition which, by necessity, completely takes it apart and puts it back together again as dasein actually knows it instead of the 'everyday' passive acceptance of a vague theme of what tradition is that never examines it rationally in detail or judge even if it fits together coherently.Gary C. Moore 2001


 

This is the perfect word to start with and set the tone. I will cut it down, though, to just 'everyone' because 'everybody' is too tremendous and leaves me in fear of confronting the digestive philosophy and bowel rumblings of Levinas who, in that sphere, is a very formidable thinker. Heidegger could be flippantly quoted as saying everyone is no one, the 'They' self. This would seem to indicate superficially that Heidegger simply disparages the 'They' self, but Mr. Day grasps Heidegger perfectly when he indicates the 'They' self is the most real self. But I'm jumping ahead.

As to the question itself, there is no relevance of the "authentic self" to the "post-modern context" by definition of 'authenticity,' I would drop the 'self,' because when dealing with the 'moment of vision' of the resolve of authenticity the 'self' has become merely a 'call', a flimsy, ephemeral thing that is most momentary, fleeting, gone. First, authenticity must by definition reject such a label. Second, a living context that could be called "post-modern" either simply does not exist or is an utter abomination, the exact opposite of authenticity. The only real context is you and I. But "I" is nothing special: as Hegel said, everybody calls themselves that. There are "I"s everywhere, in truckloads, in shiploads. It is nothing special. Sartre is irritating just like a bad conscience. One of the few things I like, though, about his critique of the dialectic is that he has all human history, and since animals do not have history, that means --all language starts from basic human needs, primarily hunger.

Everyone starts from the same place. I once read a book that said we could not possibly understand the ancient Greeks because their context was so different from ours. Were they not born from women? Did they not hunger? Did they not bleed? These exactly same needs we have exactly determined their context. On that point I will grudgingly agree with Marx. Again, there is only one living context, you and I. "Ich oder du" if I remember it right: me or you. "Heidegger ceases to focus on questions of authenticity" This is on the surface true, and very irritating to me. He left far too much unsaid, as if I was suppose to think for myself. I would rather for him to do my thinking for me because he does it so much better. But the "questions of authenticity" are not only not rejected, not denied, not declared false as such, but you find authenticity/inauthenticity as well as death constantly haunting the words of his later writings, serving as its necessary ground. For how can "Sein" ever be thought about except as in and through "Dasein"? What you say about Sartre is perfectly true and also irritates me extremely. Sartre may push too much for dasein to assume moral responsibility ex nihilo where it is completely out of place (it is only 'in place' with everyday man), but his passion for this does reflect the real urgency of the call of conscience. Yet, none the less, Heidegger is absolutely right in describing the call of conscience as something outside morality, amoral if you will, sort of like a yearning for God when you know in the practical and irrevocably real world God doesn't exist as so well described in the teleology section of the Critique of Judgement. The same with ethics (why is Aristotle's ethics so totally and deliberately misunderstood in the 'modern' world searching for a ground for ethics?

Heidegger certainly understood that Aristotle had the only clear answer. But that also includes the Politics, which Heidegger is very deficient in. I would appreciate it if someone can prove me wrong.). This is constantly reflected in everyday life where the immediacy of the practical situation either overrides or completely reinterprets what one considers to be good and true (consider the graduate student or junior professor of philosophy: Which determines more fundamentally what the truth is -- the naked, bare, unrewarding desire for pure truth or the approval of superiors and the reliability of a paycheck? When one has tenure, then one might contemplate the divine fields of Ideas.) -- and, most important, leaving out the beautiful altogether. For me that clenches the fundamental worthlessness of everyday life. But I'm jumping ahead. "The vast majority of everything we do throughout our lives, no matter how we strive for authenticity, is carried out in its everydayness." Perfectly true. The 'everyday' is the real, not authenticity. "This is not a failing." Perfectly true. Without the everyday, without the real "They" self you literally couldn't function, either from the point of driving a car or eating breakfast or surviving in the workplace or home life. It is "most of our life"

(actually all because authenticity can only exist through the desire of inauthenticity and is therefore its constant ground) "much of which is extremely worthy and fulfilling". If this is true I envy you and have less than no desire to attack it. It is "carried out in the mode of everydayness that Heidegger focuses on this way of being-in- the-world." He certainly does. But he also shrives it, cuts it down in a double-handed fashion. On the one hand, dasein is cut down to the bare bones where even 'self' becomes a phantasm, the ideal creation of inauthenticity. But on the other hand, he shows that everything 'we' are, including 'our' self comes from elsewhere, from 'somebody' else: and the same applies to all other 'somebodies' to the beginning of time. In other words, 'we' really are no one, we really are 'They'. "When we do achieve authenticity": What do you mean by achieve? Possess permanently as an accomplishment? Everydayness possesses reality itself. It won't let you. "It's a mistake to see the achievement of authenticity as a drawing away from others": Here again is the double-handed on the one hand, if everydayness and the 'They' self are the real situation of things then we never draw away from them.

On the other hand, Heidegger describes in SzT dasein, even then the shepherd of being, as both totally absorbed in being- with yet, knowing it is fallen, though 'fallen' from nowhere, hearing the call of conscience that it is not where it wants to be, that it is not at home, knowing everydayness and the 'They' self, though they are reality, are still fundamentally incomplete, wants to strive for its myth of a 'true self' regardless of its absurdity, as the only thing that 'completes'. In other words, dasein goes where it finds it is always already totally alone, in a solipsistic aporia it knows is nonsense. "Dasein is always already a social being": This is absolutely true, but not the society of the textbook or political tract or the TV sob show, but the real everyday society of the work place where you must, simply to survive, maintain a firm level of hypocrisy and indifference. And is it different in the comfort of your family? Or simply a different context? Inauthenticity is predominant and that is where all the rewards of life are. It is more real. But it is still a fraud. This is all wrong, but still . .

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