In his recent paper, "Nominalism and
Transference: Meditations on Goodman's Theory
of Metaphor", Jonathan Cohen concludes
that Goodman's metaphysical commitment to
nominalism prevents him from giving a plausible
account of metaphor. This conclusion is drawn
from two arguments. According to the first,
Goodman equivocates between two conceptions
of nominalism, and only one of them is compatible
with his account of metaphor. Unfortunately,
that conception of nominalism suffers from
two drawbacks: it is incompatible with Goodman's
conventionalism and it does not cogently
explain how words get their meanings. In
his second argument, Cohen points to a more
general explanatory deficiency affecting
any nominalist program. He suggests that
an aversion to non-extensional elements of
meaning deprives the nominalist of the resources
necessary for a complete 'hermeneutics' of
metaphorical meaning. I will examine these
two arguments in turn.
Section 1: Nominalism and Convention According
to Cohen, Goodman equivocates between two
conceptions of nominalism in Languages of
Art.{1} The first Cohen calls 'stipulative
nominalism' according to which rules associating
labels with objects are precepts handed down
from an unspecified source. The second he
calls 'conventional nominalism' according
to which rules of association are determined
by the practices of language users. As Cohen
persuasively demonstrates, the second form
of nominalism is baldly incompatible with
Goodman's account of metaphor. According
to Goodman, a metaphorical application of
a predicate can be right or wrong, and, more
importantly, its applicability will be a
matter of fact established independently
of and prior to its actual use. In other
words, conventional practice does not determine
a predicate's rules of association. Consequently,
Goodman is forced to adopt stipulative nominalism.
At first blush, this is not an unhappy position
for Goodman; stipulative nominalism is perfectly
compatible with his account of metaphor.
Nevertheless, Cohen tells us, there is a
deeper tension between stipulative nominalism
and Goodman's general approach to symbols.
Goodman vigorously endorses a conventionalist
line on symbolic content. Thus, he is confronted
with a dilemma: if he retains his account
of metaphor, he must adopt stipulative nominalism
and, consequently, he must abandon conventionalism;
if he retains his conventionalism, he must
abandon his views on metaphorical truth.
Cohen is correct detecting an equivocation
in Goodman's account, and he is correct in
saying it involves a blurred distinction
between precept and practice. But, I think
this equivocation does not involve two conceptions
of nominalism. For Goodman, nominalism is
an ontological position about the existential
status of abstract objects and non-individuals.
This ontological position compels a certain
conception of the relationship between words
and things, but it does not entail any position
about how words come to be related to their
extensions. In that sense, Cohen is right
in saying that a nominalist can believe either
that symbolic association comes through precept
or that association comes through practice.
But this choice is equally available to philosophers
with more lenient ontologies. The precept/practice
equivocation is not rooted in or dependent
on Goodman's ontology. Instead, the equivocation
infects his conception of convention.
Goodman recognizes that convention is a
"dangerously ambiguous" term.{2}
When we say that something is conventional
we can mean one of two things: first, we
might mean that it is ordinary, usual or
consonant with common practice; second, we
might mean that that it is artificial, arbitrary,
optional or invented. Taking some liberties,
we can call these two meanings, 'normal-convention'
and 'norm-convention' respectively. The difference
between normal- and norm-convention can be
detected in the conflicting implications
of the phrases 'very conventional' and 'highly
conventional.'. But the conflict is not absolute.
Something which is norm-conventional can
become normal-conventional. For example our
practice of going on green and stopping on
red reflects an arbitrarily stipulated rule
which we all learn at a very young age. But
our adherence to this rule has become a matter
of normal practice. It is a regrettable consequence
of this overlap that we can never get a full
grasp on what Goodman means when he calls
something conventional.{3}
Cohen's argument is helpful in this regard.
The distinction between norm-convention and
normal-convention seems to parallel the distinction
between precept and practice. A rule of association
is norm-conventional if it is stipulated
or handed down in the form of a precept,
while a rule is normal-conventional if it
is determined by practice. When Goodman espouses
his conventionalism, he seems to have both
of these things in mind. But, Cohen's argument
raises some difficulties for Goodman. If
a conventional rule of association is determined
by practice (i. e., by normal-convention)
alone, then the label governed by that rule
cannot be said to apply to an object prior
to its being used to apply to that object.
There is no matter of fact, independent of
practice, which determines applicability
for expressions whose meanings are normal-conventional.
Thus, Goodman cannot say that a novel metaphorical
application of a predicate is metaphorically
true or false if the association rule of
that predicate is normal-conventional. He
cannot say it is both novel and familiar,
surprising and correct. Consequently, Goodman
cannot concurrently claim that a predicate's
association rules are normal-convention and
that the predicate has a relationship of
fit when it is inventively applied. Cohen's
critique shows us that Goodman is committed
to norm-conventionalism --- the view that
association rules are determined by precepts
extending from an unspecified source.
However, this conclusion allows Goodman
to circumvent the dilemma implied Cohen's
argument. Goodman's account of metaphor is
perfectly compatible with (one form of) conventionalism.
But he can only circumvent the dilemma if
he disavows his remarks which are sympathetic
to normal-conventionalism and becomes a full-fledged
norm-conventionalist. It is not clear that
Goodman is willing to do this. Thus, Cohen's
argument still has considerable force.
There is one more consideration which Cohen
brings to bear against Goodman's commitment
to a stipulative account or association rules.
He suggests that such an account leaves the
origin of such rules mysterious. Goodman's
never tells us who stipulates these rules
or how they come to have normative force.
Without answering these questions, the stipulative
account seems less plausible than an account
which explains content in terms of practice.
These considerations intimate a second dilemma.
If Goodman retains his theory of metaphor,
he must adopt a norm-conventionalism; but,
if he adopts norm-conventionalism, he cannot
successfully explain the way words get their
meanings. Fortunately for Goodman, this explanatory
gap can be filled. Meaning theories which
emphasize linguistic practice are commonly
called use-theories. Use-theories offer a
cogent explanation of how expressions acquire
content, but they have recently come under
attack. Opponents of use-theories typically
admit that practice can affect meaning, but
they insist that meaning is not a statistical
measure. A word can be misapplied more often
than it is applied correctly. But if linguistic
practice is not the primary determiner of
content, what is? The most popular answer
is that many expressions are causally related
to their extensions. Two causal theories
of meaning are in vogue. On the first, the
causal link between an expression and its
extension is established in an initial baptism
in which a semantic relation is stipulated
by the person or people coining the expression.{4}
On the second, the causal link is established
by a nomological covariance between tokenings
of an expression and appearances of members
of its extension.{5}
Both of these theories of meaning are compatible
with Goodman's account in three important
ways. First, they hold that the applicability
of a predicate to an object is a fact established
independently of the day-to-day use of that
predicate. Second, both theories qualify
as conventional in one sense of that term.
Third, neither theory is incompatible with
nominalism. The availability of these two
theories of meaning bolsters Goodman's account.
They provide an answer to the questions of
origin which ostensibly jeopardize norm-conventionalism.
As Cohen points out, Goodman wants to have
it both ways. He appeals to both precept
and practice. But his appeal to practice
is at odds with his realism about rules of
association. Recent work in the theory in
causal semantics provides a way of substantially
weakening the role of practice in the determination
of meaning. With these tools, Goodman could
skirt Cohen's second dilemma.
Section 2: Nominalism and Metaphor Cohen's
second line against Goodman is more persuasive.
It questions whether any species of nominalism
has the resources to provide a complete account
of metaphor. Cohen's complaint builds on
an incisive observation about metaphor. The
meaning of a metaphorical application of
a predicate seems to be parasitic on the
meaning of literal applications of that predicate.
There is an asymmetry between the metaphorical
and the literal. In order to understand a
metaphorical application, we must first understand
a literal application. This distinguishes
metaphor from ambiguity; in the latter, the
meanings of an expression are independent.
Nominalists, Cohen insists, are not equipped
to explain the asymmetric dependence of metaphorical
applications. The reason seems to be this.
In order to explain the asymmetric dependence,
we will have to appeal to abstract objects.
In particular, we can only explain successful
metaphor in terms of the properties which
members of a predicate's literal extension
have in common with its metaphorical extension.
This line of explanation is unavailable to
the nominalist, because nominalists repudiate
abstract objects including properties. Without
an appeal to properties, they cannot offer
a complete account of how metaphors work.
Of course, nominalists can give a partial
explanation of asymmetric dependence. As
Cohen points out, Goodman offers a detailed
account of how metaphors work. He conceives
metaphor as a way of transferring one schema
of labels to a foreign realm of objects.
This transference imposes certain structural
relations within the schema onto its new
realm. Goodman acknowledges parallels between
his view and the account of metaphor defended
by Max Black.{6} According to that account,
metaphor involves an interaction between
a predicate and an object of predication.
The properties associated with the object
are reorganized in terms of the properties
associated with the predicate (and vice versa).
Of course, Goodman cannot talk of properties.
But he can talk about the ordering or structure
of a schema.{7} For example, in the schema
containing temperature words, there is a
polarity between 'hot' and 'cold'. When we
transfer the temperature schema to a foreign
realm, we must preserve this structure. Applying
the expressions 'hot' and 'cold' to two objects
in that realm will imply a polar relationship
between those two objects. In this way metaphor
imposes and is constrained by structural
features of schemata and realms. If a metaphor
cannot establish a structural isomorphism
between a schema and a realm, that metaphor
will be infelicitous. Thus, Goodman can describe
metaphors as successful and unsuccessful
without appealing to a comparison of properties.
He can say that a painting is sad without
saying it has any properties in common with
a sad person. He only commits to a structural
relationship between sad and happy paintings
which parallels the relationship between
happy and sad people. Ostensibly, this account
answers Cohen's objection. But, I think the
answer is insufficient.
Metaphors do not merely reorganize alien
realms. If this was all they did, then structurally
similar schemata would have the same metaphorical
force. For example, the temperature schema
(hot/cold), the size schema (big/small),
and the height schema (tall/short) seem to
be organized in similar ways. But metaphorical
applications of labels within these schemata
(e. g., 'a hot idea', 'a big idea', and 'a
tall idea') convey very different information.
It is not clear how the nominalist can explain
this fact without appealing to properties.
I am not sure whether this is the point that
Cohen wants to make, but I think the moral
is similar. In order to explain the meaning
of a metaphor, it is advantageous to have
a relatively rich ontology. Goodman gives
us a method of identifying metaphors and
some insight into how metaphors work, but
he does not tell us why metaphors are useful
in language or what particular metaphors
mean. He explains how the mechanisms of transference
allow us to call a picture sad, and he gives
us a rough idea of what kinds of structural
constraints that metaphor places on further
applications of emotive labels to the realm
of pictures. But he does not explain what
makes a sad picture sad, or what a sad picture
has in common with a sad person, or what
the act calling a picture 'sad' conveys.
It seems that all Goodman can tell us is
that sad pictures and sad people both exemplify
a label coextensive with 'sad' and that they
can be contrasted with happy pictures and
happy people respectively. Clearly, this
is an impoverished account. Consequently,
I am inclined to share Cohen's suspicion
that nominalists forsake the most promising
avenues towards an full account of metaphorical
meaning. |
Evans Experientialism 
Can the Nominalist Explain Metaphor?
