Posterior Analytics, Book II, Chapter 19 Part 2

Sunday 18th of April 2004.

1st.: Well, if we have them, it is absurd; for it results that we have pieces of knowledge more precise than demonstration and yet this escapes notice. But if we get them without having them earlier, how might we become familiar with them and learn them from no pre-existing knowledge? For that is impossible, as we said in the case of demonstration too. It is evidently impossible, then, both for us to have them and for them to come about in us when we are ignorant and have no such state at all. Necessarily, therefore, we have some capacity, but do not have one of a type which will be more valuable than these in respect of precision.

2nd.: It is absurd that we possess such states; for then we should possess pieces of knowledge more exact than demonstration without its being noticed. But if we get them without possessing them earlier, how could we come to acquire knowledge and to learn except from pre-existing knowledge? This is impossible, as I said in connection with demonstration. It is clear, then, both that we cannot possess these states and also that they cannot come about in us when we are ignorant and possess no state at all. We must therefore possess some sort of capacity—but not one which will be more valuable than these states in respect to exactness.

GCM: Innate knowledge is rejected: (Barnes’ commentary) “Aristotle would doubtless have adopted Locke’s answer to this reaction; it reduces innatism to the uncontroversial hypothesis that human infant have certain innate cognitive capacities the exercise of which waits upon experience.” There are a variety of “states” of knowledge. Capacity is one, experience is another. Neither one “will be more valuable than these states in respect to exactness.” There is no hierarchy of knowledge, no rising from experience to Ideas. There is no special “state” of knowledge that provides more important information than another.

1st.: And this evidently belongs to all animals; for they have a connate discriminatory capacity, which is called perception. And if perception is present in them, in some animals retention of the percept comes about, but in others it does not come about. Now for those in which it does not come about, there is no knowledge outside perceiving (either none at all, or none with regard to that of which there is no retention); [100a1] but for some perceivers, it is possible to grasp it in their minds. And when many such things come about, then a difference comes about, so that some come to have an account from the retention of such things, and others do not.

2nd.: And this is clearly true of all animals: they have a connate discriminatory capacity, which is called perception. Given that perception is present in them, in some animals the percepts are retained and in others they are not. If they are not, then the animal has no knowledge when it is not perceiving (either in general or with regard to items which are not retained). But some can still hold the percepts in their soul after perceiving them. When this occurs often, there is then a further difference: some animals come to have an account based on the retention of these items, and others do not.

GCM: What becomes apparent here but is usually missed is Aristotle’s growing emphasis on perception as the fundamental “state” of knowledge and not words, not “propositions” at all. The discriminatory capacity is perception itself and we know this because Aristotle is talking about animals, all kinds of animals. (Barnes’ commentary) “Aristotle frequently says that perception krinei or is kritikos (references given). Krinein may mean either “judge” or “discriminate”, and to say that perception is kritike is to say either that perception makes judgments or that it can discriminate.” He is talking about percepts. And the ONLY fundamental distinction he will make among animals is whether they remember and compare (an “account”, i. e., “an account from the retention”, “an account based on the retention”) their percepts or not, so that his discussion of mind imperceptibly goes from animal to human being because human being is just an animal also.

1st.: So from perception there comes memory, as we call it, and from memory (when it occurs often in connection with the same thing), experience; for memories that are many in number form a single experience. And from experience, or from the whole universal that has come to rest in the soul (the one apart from the many, whatever is one and the same in all those things), there comes a principle of skill and of understanding--of skill if it deals with how things come about, of understanding if it deals with what is the case.

2nd.: Thus from perception there comes memory, as we call it, and from memory (when it occurs often in connection with the same item) experience; for memories which are many in number form a single experience. And from experience, or from all the universal which has come to rest in the soul (the one apart from the many, i. e., whatever is one and the same in all these items), there comes a principle of skill or understanding—of skill if it deals with how things come about, of understanding if it deals with how things are.

GCM: “From perception comes memory, and from memory experience.” No word, no propositions yet. Experience is a group of memories of perception. No words yet. The universal “that comes to rest in the soul” is the perception of “whatever is one and the same in all these items”. “Skill” and “understanding, then, are here purely perceptual. With skill this is easy to see. A dog can learn a skill and therefore must retain some perceptual form in its mind. (Barnes’ commentary) “What ‘remains’ is properly not a percept or sense impression but a ‘phantasm’ or mental image, which is as it were the trace or imprint of a percept, and memory requires in addition to this retention the ability to resurrect these imprints (references given).

1st.: Thus the states neither belong in us in a determinate form, nor come about from other states that are more cognitive; but they come about from perception--as in a battle when a rout occurs, if one man makes a stand another does and then another, until a position of strength is reached. And the soul is such as to be capable of undergoing this.

2nd.: Thus the states in question neither inhere in us in a determinate form nor come about from other states which are more cognitive; rather, they come about from perception—as in a battle, when a rout has occurred, first one man makes a stand, then another does, and then another, until a position of strength is reached. And the soul is such as to be capable of undergoing this.

GCM: All the ‘states” come about from perception. Remember hexis is a having, a grasping, a perceived physical act. And the perceptual universal arises from perceptions joining together in the ‘battle’ of sensation to form a universal of experience, not words.

1st.: What we have just said but not said clearly, let us say again: when one of the undifferentiated things makes a stand, there is a primitive universal in the mind (for though one perceives [100b1] the particular, perception is of the universal--e. g. of man but not of Callias the man); again a stand is made in these, until what has no parts and is universal stands-e. g. such-and-such an animal stands, until animal does, and in this a stand is made in the same way. Thus it is clear that it is necessary for us to become familiar with the primitives by induction; for perception too instils the universal in this way.

2nd.: Let us say again what we have just said but not clearly. When one of the undifferentiated items makes a stand, there is a primitive universal in the soul; for although you perceive particulars, perception is of universals,--e. g. of man, not Callias the man. Next, a stand is made among these items, until something partless and universal makes a stand, until animal does; and with animal a stand is made in the same way. Thus it is plain we must get to know the primitives by induction; for this is the way in which perception instills universals.

GCM: “When one undifferentiated thing takes a stand, there is a primitive universal in the mind.” You have one unique sense impression, but the mind automatically puts it in a frame work whereby it can be compared to other sense impressions. This is “capacity”. The actual, literal this very moment act of perceiving only sees Callias but Callias is put into the framework, an “account” that, upon accumulating like sense impressions produce the percept man. No words yet. (Barnes’ commentary) “We perceive things as AS.” his is much like Kant’s “object X”, the mere framework to individuate something, but in ‘individuating’ it, makes it a ‘type, a ‘kind’, with nothing yet to compare it to. Husserl and Heidegger would call this “projection” and thereby tie it to temporality, an act done in time for a future purpose. “Partlessness” here comes into view, and thereby the whole discussion of identity per se and the necessary “self” to support an identity in existence like God continuously supports his created creature man. But Aristotle inconveniently brings us back to being an animal again, “until animal does”, “and with animal a stand is made” just like the lonely figures in battle that decide to stand and hold the line against the enemy! God is not necessary at all here. The animal needs no support. The animal makes a decision like the soldiers to make a “stand”. “Thus it is plain we must get to know the primitives by induction; for this is the way in which perception instills universals.” No words yet.

1st.: Since of the intellectual states by which we grasp truth some are always true and some admit falsehood (e. g. opinion and reasoning--whereas understanding and comprehension are always true), and no kind other than comprehension is more precise than understanding, and the principles of demonstrations are more familiar, and all understanding involves an account--there will not be understanding of the principles; and since it is not possible for anything to be truer than understanding, except comprehension, there will be comprehension of the principles--both if we inquire from these facts and because demonstration is not a principle of demonstration so that understanding is not a principle of understanding either--so if we have no other true kind apart from understanding, comprehension will be the principle of understanding. And the principle will be of the principle, and understanding as a whole will be similarly related to the whole object.

2nd.: Of the intellectual states by which we grasp truth, some are always true and some admit falsehood (e. g. opinion and calculation do—whereas understanding and comprehension are always true); and no kind apart from comprehension is more exact than understanding. Again, the principles of demonstrations are more familiar, and all understanding involves an account. Hence there will not be understanding of the principles; and since nothing apart from comprehension can be truer than understanding, there will be comprehension of the principles. This emerges both from our present inquiry and also because, just as demonstration is not a principle of demonstration, so understanding is not a principle of understanding. Thus if we have no other true kind apart from understanding, comprehension will be the principle of understanding. And the principle will relate to the principle as understanding as a whole is related to its object as a whole.

GCM: “Understanding involves an account [therefore] there will not be understanding of the principles.” However, “there will be comprehension of the principles.” Neither “understanding” nor “comprehension” can be a principle. This means they cannot be comprehended by words but are the very acts of perception, of sensation just as in any animal. (Barnes’ commentary) “”Intuited truths are just ‘seen’ to be true.” “Principle will relate to principle” as simply relation. They are “always true” as they are from “understanding and comprehension”, not “opinion and reasoning”. They are from sense impressions and can only be changed by sense impressions. They are the axioms. They are not something that can be logically chosen or be the result of a process of reasoning because they are the reason why any process of reasoning gets started in the first place. They are the reason you reason, and it cannot be the other way around. “Understanding as a whole is related to its object as a whole. Heidegger would call this “world”, that which precedes “self” and “God” in order of cognition as explained in the Hemming letters. I can see no immediate reason Hume would object to this, and may have a corresponding concept I have missed, since this “world” is the “whole” of what is received, “given”: It is the whole sensual perception of what one has received and remembered through the senses and the sensual sounds of others linked to interpretation, i. e., pointing to a cat: “This is a cat”, etc., and linked in turn to tone, to body language, and to punishment, all “sensual” communication. No abstract words yet. Barnes questions the possibility of a “ ‘perfect’ induction” but that is already in place, perfect, “always already” all inclusive, boundry-less perception of which I have written several times before. You cannot perceive the unperceived just as you cannot know what you do not know. All that is known is contained “whole” within what you have perceived. And what you have perceived can sensually have nothing to do with what I have perceived. Therefore propositions, abstractions, words may be useful but are in themselves inherently meaningless outside the context of personal experience.