A Reply to Jon Neivens

I've included it below in case anyone else is interested.

The translation is by Jonathan Barnes, from the Clarendon Aristotle Series. Unfortunately I don't have the whole text, just a series of extracts included in _The New Aristotle Reader_, edited by JL Ackrill, a fairly good anthology though it has some odd ommissions.

Anyway, what interests you in particular about this text?

Dear Jon,

The text you have is Barnes first edition. I shall make clear my interest as I note places of importance and changes.

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Posterior Analytics, Book II, Chapter 19 Part 1

1^st. [99b15]: Now as for deduction and demonstration, it is evident both what each is and how it comes about--and at the same time this goes for demonstrative understanding too (for that is the same thing). But as for the principles--how they become familiar and what is the state that becomes familiar with them--that will be clear from what follows, when we have first set down the puzzles.

2nd ed.: As for deductions and demonstrations, it is clear what both each of them is and also how they come about--and so too (which is the same thing) for demonstrative understanding. As for the principles—how they become familiar and what is the state which gets to know them--, this will be plain from what follows, when we have first set out these puzzles.

GCM: The most significant change is “what is the state (hexis: verbal noun from echein [“have”], mental dispositions cognitive and virtuous) that becomes familiar with them” to “what is the state which gets to know them”. “Familiar” is an emotional term that fits very well with “state”. Related to that, which Barnes notes in the commentary, the change from singular to plural means there are plural states (hexeis), different kinds of states in which “to know”. And the “states” are “ ‘havings’ or graspings”. My computer says “what is the state which gets to know them” is ungrammatical thereby giving a clue that something important has happened to make an Oxford don become ungrammatical. We normally consider “state of being” as an “emotional state” but here Barnes/Aristotle has associated it with knowing. This is perfectly acceptable to Hume but sounds strange to our inherited ‘ear’ for Aristotle.

What is notable in both texts is that he does not say he resolves or is going to resolve the puzzles. It would be nice to know what the Greek word translated “puzzles” was.

1^st.: Now, we have said earlier that it is not possible to understand through demonstration if we are not aware of the primitive, immediate, principles. But as to knowledge of the immediates, one might puzzle both whether it is the same or not the same--whether there is understanding of each, or rather understanding of the one and some other kind of thing of the other--and also whether the states are not present in us but come about in us, or whether they are present in us but escape notice.

2^nd.: I have said earlier that you cannot understand anything through a demonstration unless you know the primitive immediate principles. As for knowledge of the immediates, one might wonder whether it is the same or not the same, and whether there is or is not understanding in each case, or rather understanding in the one case and some other kind of knowledge in the other; and also whether the states, not being present in us, come about in us or rather are present in us without being noticed.

GCM: The language becomes less abstract in the 2^nd edition and more directed toward “brute fact”. “Primitive, immediate principles” may or may not really be referring to axioms but they certainly are referring to “presuppositions” because Aristotle says we may not even know they are there. Again, Hume would agree. “Whether it is the same or not the same” as to “immediates” – again, it would be nice to know Aristotle’s Greek—may be very similar to the problem Hume is having in “Part 3” as to the relation of his two basic principles. Aristotle introduces the possibility of “understanding” opposite to “some other kind of knowledge”. This was translated “some other kind of thing” in the 1^st edition. And the last sentence relates to whether “innate ideas” are possible. Barnes, in his commentary, states “B 19 is Janus faced, looking in one direction towards empiricism, and in the other towards rationalism. The principles are apprehended by ‘induction’ (epagoge) in an honest empirical way; but they are also grasped by nous, or ‘intuition’ as it is normally translated, in the easy rationalist fashion.” But Barnes concludes, “Aristotle . . . is whole-heartedly empiricist.”