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EUTHYPHRO
In One Part
by Plato
PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: SOCRATES; EUTHYPHRO
Scene: The Porch of the King Archon
Euthyphro. Why have you left the Lyceum,
Socrates? and what are you doing in the Porch
of the King Archon? Surely you cannot be
concerned in a suit before the King, like
myself?
Socrates. Not in a suit, Euthyphro; impeachment
is the word which the Athenians use.
Euthyphro:
What! I suppose that some one has been prosecuting
you, for I cannot believe that you are the
prosecutor of another.
Socrates:
Certainly not.
Euthyphro:
Then some one else has been prosecuting you?
Socrates:
Yes.
Euthyphro:
And who is he?
Socrates:
A young man who is little known, Euthyphro;
and I hardly know him: his name is Meletus,
and he is of the deme of Pitthis. Perhaps
you may remember his appearance; he has a
beak, and long straight hair, and a beard
which is ill grown.
Euthyphro:
No, I do not remember him, Socrates. But
what is the charge which he brings against
you?
Socrates:
What is the charge? Well, a very serious
charge, which shows a good deal of character
in the young man, and for which he is certainly
not to be despised. He says he knows how
the youth are corrupted and who are their
corruptors. I fancy that he must be a wise
man, and seeing that I am the reverse of
a wise man, he has found me out, and is going
to accuse me of corrupting his young friends.
And of this our mother the state is to be
the judge. Of all our political men he is
the only one who seems to me to begin in
the right way, with the cultivation of virtue
in youth; like a good husbandman, he makes
the young shoots his first care, and clears
away us who are the destroyers of them. This
is only the first step; he will afterwards
attend to the elder branches; and if he goes
on as he has begun, he will be a very great
public benefactor.
Euthyphro:
I hope that he may; but I rather fear, Socrates,
that the opposite will turn out to be the
truth. My opinion is that in attacking you
he is simply aiming a blow at the foundation
of the state. But in what way does he say
that you corrupt the young?
Socrates:
He brings a wonderful accusation against
me, which at first hearing excites surprise:
he says that I am a poet or maker of gods,
and that I invent new gods and deny the existence
of old ones; this is the ground of his indictment.
Euthyphro:
I understand, Socrates; he means to attack
you about the familiar sign which occasionally,
as you say, comes to you. He thinks that
you are a neologian, and he is going to have
you up before the court for this. He knows
that such a charge is readily received by
the world, as I myself know too well; for
when I speak in the assembly about divine
things, and foretell the future to them,
they laugh at me and think me a madman. Yet
every word that I say is true. But they are
jealous of us all; and we must be brave and
go at them.
Socrates:
Their laughter, friend Euthyphro, is not
a matter of much consequence. For a man may
be thought wise; but the Athenians, I suspect,
do not much trouble themselves about him
until he begins to impart his wisdom to others,
and then for some reason or other, perhaps,
as you say, from jealousy, they are angry.
Euthyphro:
I am never likely to try their temper in
this way.
Socrates:
I dare say not, for you are reserved in your
behaviour, and seldom impart your wisdom.
But I have a benevolent habit of pouring
out myself to everybody, and would even pay
for a listener, and I am afraid that the
Athenians may think me too talkative. Now
if, as I was saying, they would only laugh
at me, as you say that they laugh at you,
the time might pass gaily enough in the court;
but perhaps they may be in earnest, and then
what the end will be you soothsayers only
can predict.
Euthyphro:
I dare say that the affair will end in nothing,
Socrates, and that you will win your cause;
and I think that I shall win my own.
Socrates:
And what is your suit, Euthyphro? are you
the pursuer or the defendant?
Euthyphro:
I am the pursuer.
Socrates:
Of whom?
Euthyphro:
You will think me mad when I tell you.
Socrates:
Why, has the fugitive wings?
Euthyphro:
Nay, he is not very volatile at his time
of life.
Socrates:
Who is he?
Euthyphro:
My father.
Socrates:
Your father! my good man?
Euthyphro:
Yes.
Socrates:
And of what is he accused?
Euthyphro:
Of murder, Socrates.
Socrates:
By the powers, Euthyphro! how little does
the common herd know of the nature of right
and truth. A man must be an extraordinary
man, and have made great strides in wisdom,
before he could have seen his way to bring
such an action.
Euthyphro:
Indeed, Socrates, he must.
Socrates:
I suppose that the man whom your father murdered
was one of your relatives-clearly he was;
for if he had been a stranger you would never
have thought of prosecuting him.
Euthyphro:
I am amused, Socrates, at your making a distinction
between one who is a relation and one who
is not a relation; for surely the pollution
is the same in either case, if you knowingly
associate with the murderer when you ought
to clear yourself and him by proceeding against
him. The real question is whether the murdered
man has been justly slain. If justly, then
your duty is to let the matter alone; but
if unjustly, then even if the murderer lives
under the same roof with you and eats at
the same table, proceed against him. Now
the man who is dead was a poor dependent
of mine who worked for us as a field labourer
on our farm in Naxos, and one day in a fit
of drunken passion he got into a quarrel
with one of our domestic servants and slew
him. My father bound him hand and foot and
threw him into a ditch, and then sent to
Athens to ask of a diviner what he should
do with him. Meanwhile he never attended
to him and took no care about him, for he
regarded him as a murderer; and thought that
no great harm would be done even if he did
die. Now this was just what happened. For
such was the effect of cold and hunger and
chains upon him, that before the messenger
returned from the diviner, he was dead. And
my father and family are angry with me for
taking the part of the murderer and prosecuting
my father. They say that he did not kill
him, and that if he did, dead man was but
a murderer, and I ought not to take any notice,
for that a son is impious who prosecutes
a father. Which shows, Socrates, how little
they know what the gods think about piety
and impiety.
Socrates:
Good heavens, Euthyphro! and is your knowledge
of religion and of things pious and impious
so very exact, that, supposing the circumstances
to be as you state them, you are not afraid
lest you too may be doing an impious thing
in bringing an action against your father?
Euthyphro:
The best of Euthyphro, and that which distinguishes
him, Socrates, from other men, is his exact
knowledge of all such matters. What should
I be good for without it?
Socrates:
Rare friend! I think that I cannot do better
than be your disciple. Then before the trial
with Meletus comes on I shall challenge him,
and say that I have always had a great interest
in religious questions, and now, as he charges
me with rash imaginations and innovations
in religion, I have become your disciple.
You, Meletus, as I shall say to him, acknowledge
Euthyphro to be a great theologian, and sound
in his opinions; and if you approve of him
you ought to approve of me, and not have
me into court; but if you disapprove, you
should begin by indicting him who is my teacher,
and who will be the ruin, not of the young,
but of the old; that is to say, of myself
whom he instructs, and of his old father
whom he admonishes and chastises. And if
Meletus refuses to listen to me, but will
go on, and will not shift the indictment
from me to you, I cannot do better than repeat
this challenge in the court.
Euthyphro:
Yes, indeed, Socrates; and if he attempts
to indict me I am mistaken if I do not find
a flaw in him; the court shall have a great
deal more to say to him than to me.
Socrates:
And I, my dear friend, knowing this, am desirous
of becoming your disciple. For I observe
that no one appears to notice you- not even
this Meletus; but his sharp eyes have found
me out at once, and he has indicted me for
impiety. And therefore, I adjure you to tell
me the nature of piety and impiety, which
you said that you knew so well, and of murder,
and of other offences against the gods. What
are they? Is not piety in every action always
the same? and impiety, again- is it not always
the opposite of piety, and also the same
with itself, having, as impiety, one notion
which includes whatever is impious?
Euthyphro:
To be sure, Socrates.
Socrates:
And what is piety, and what is impiety?
Euthyphro:
Piety is doing as I am doing; that is to
say, prosecuting any one who is guilty of
murder, sacrilege, or of any similar crime-whether
he be your father or mother, or whoever he
may be-that makes no difference; and not
to prosecute them is impiety. And please
to consider, Socrates, what a notable proof
I will give you of the truth of my words,
a proof which I have already given to others:-of
the principle, I mean, that the impious,
whoever he may be, ought not to go unpunished.
For do not men regard Zeus as the best and
most righteous of the gods?-and yet they
admit that he bound his father (Cronos) because
he wickedly devoured his sons, and that he
too had punished his own father (Uranus)
for a similar reason, in a nameless manner.
And yet when I proceed against my father,
they are angry with me. So inconsistent are
they in their way of talking when the gods
are concerned, and when I am concerned.
Socrates:
May not this be the reason, Euthyphro, why
I am charged with impiety-that I cannot away
with these stories about the gods? and therefore
I suppose that people think me wrong. But,
as you who are well informed about them approve
of them, I cannot do better than assent to
your superior wisdom. What else can I say,
confessing as I do, that I know nothing about
them? Tell me, for the love of Zeus, whether
you really believe that they are true.
Euthyphro:
Yes, Socrates; and things more wonderful
still, of which the world is in ignorance.
Socrates:
And do you really believe that the gods,
fought with one another, and had dire quarrels,
battles, and the like, as the poets say,
and as you may see represented in the works
of great artists? The temples are full of
them; and notably the robe of Athene, which
is carried up to the Acropolis at the great
Panathenaea, is embroidered with them. Are
all these tales of the gods true, Euthyphro?
Euthyphro:
Yes, Socrates; and, as I was saying, I can
tell you, if you would like to hear them,
many other things about the gods which would
quite amaze you.
Socrates:
I dare say; and you shall tell me them at
some other time when I have leisure. But
just at present I would rather hear from
you a more precise answer, which you have
not as yet given, my friend, to the question,
What is "piety"? When asked, you
only replied, Doing as you do, charging your
father with murder.
Euthyphro:
And what I said was true, Socrates.
Socrates:
No doubt, Euthyphro; but you would admit
that there are many other pious acts?
Euthyphro:
There are.
Socrates:
Remember that I did not ask you to give me
two or three examples of piety, but to explain
the general idea which makes all pious things
to be pious. Do you not recollect that there
was one idea which made the impious impious,
and the pious pious?
Euthyphro:
I remember.
Socrates:
Tell me what is the nature of this idea,
and then I shall have a standard to which
I may look, and by which I may measure actions,
whether yours or those of any one else, and
then I shall be able to say that such and
such an action is pious, such another impious.
Euthyphro:
I will tell you, if you like.
Socrates:
I should very much like.
Euthyphro:
Piety, then, is that which is dear to the
gods, and impiety is that which is not dear
to them.
Socrates:
Very good, Euthyphro; you have now given
me the sort of answer which I wanted. But
whether what you say is true or not I cannot
as yet tell, although I make no doubt that
you will prove the truth of your words.
Euthyphro:
Of course.
Socrates:
Come, then, and let us examine what we are
saying. That thing or person which is dear
to the gods is pious, and that thing or person
which is hateful to the gods is impious,
these two being the extreme opposites of
one another. Was not that said?
Euthyphro:
It was.
Socrates:
And well said?
Euthyphro:
Yes, Socrates, I thought so; it was certainly
said.
Socrates:
And further, Euthyphro, the gods were admitted
to have enmities and hatreds and differences?
Euthyphro:
Yes, that was also said.
Socrates:
And what sort of difference creates enmity
and anger? Suppose for example that you and
I, my good friend, differ about a number;
do differences of this sort make us enemies
and set us at variance with one another?
Do we not go at once to arithmetic, and put
an end to them by a sum?
Euthyphro:
True.
Socrates:
Or suppose that we differ about magnitudes,
do we not quickly end the differences by
measuring?
Euthyphro:
Very true.
Socrates:
And we end a controversy about heavy and
light by resorting to a weighing machine?
Euthyphro:
To be sure.
Socrates:
But what differences are there which cannot
be thus decided, and which therefore make
us angry and set us at enmity with one another?
I dare say the answer does not occur to you
at the moment, and therefore I will suggest
that these enmities arise when the matters
of difference are the just and unjust, good
and evil, honourable and dishonourable. Are
not these the points about which men differ,
and about which when we are unable satisfactorily
to decide our differences, you and I and
all of us quarrel, when we do quarrel?
Euthyphro:
Yes, Socrates, the nature of the differences
about which we quarrel is such as you describe.
Socrates:
And the quarrels of the gods, noble Euthyphro,
when they occur, are of a like nature?
Euthyphro:
Certainly they are.
Socrates:
They have differences of opinion, as you
say, about good and evil, just and unjust,
honourable and dishonourable: there would
have been no quarrels among them, if there
had been no such differences-would there
now?
Euthyphro:
You are quite right.
Socrates:
Does not every man love that which he deems
noble and just and good, and hate the opposite
of them?
Euthyphro:
Very true.
Socrates:
But, as you say, people regard the same things,
some as just and others as unjust,-about
these they dispute; and so there arise wars
and fightings among them.
Euthyphro:
Very true.
Socrates:
Then the same things are hated by the gods
and loved by the gods, and are both hateful
and dear to them?
Euthyphro:
True.
Socrates:
And upon this view the same things, Euthyphro,
will be pious and also impious?
Euthyphro:
So I should suppose.
Socrates:
Then, my friend, I remark with surprise that
you have not answered the question which
I asked. For I certainly did not ask you
to tell me what action is both pious and
impious: but now it would seem that what
is loved by the gods is also hated by them.
And therefore, Euthyphro, in thus chastising
your father you may very likely be doing
what is agreeable to Zeus but disagreeable
to Cronos or Uranus, and what is acceptable
to Hephaestus but unacceptable to Here, and
there may be other gods who have similar
differences of opinion.
Euthyphro:
But I believe, Socrates, that all the gods
would be agreed as to the propriety of punishing
a murderer: there would be no difference
of opinion about that.
Socrates:
Well, but speaking of men, Euthyphro, did
you ever hear any one arguing that a murderer
or any sort of evil-doer ought to be let
off?
Euthyphro:
I should rather say that these are the questions
which they are always arguing, especially
in courts of law: they commit all sorts of
crimes, and there is nothing which they will
not do or say in their own defence.
Socrates:
But do they admit their guilt, Euthyphro,
and yet say that they ought not to be punished?
Euthyphro:
No; they do not.
Socrates:
Then there are some things which they do
not venture to say and do: for they do not
venture to argue that the guilty are to be
unpunished, but they deny their guilt, do
they not?
Euthyphro:
Yes.
Socrates:
Then they do not argue that the evil-doer
should not be punished, but they argue about
the fact of who the evil-doer is, and what
he did and when?
Euthyphro:
True.
Socrates:
And the gods are in the same case, if as
you assert they quarrel about just and unjust,
and some of them say while others deny that
injustice is done among them. For surely
neither God nor man will ever venture to
say that the doer of injustice is not to
be punished?
Euthyphro:
That is true, Socrates, in the main.
Socrates:
But they join issue about the particulars-gods
and men alike; and, if they dispute at all,
they dispute about some act which is called
in question, and which by some is affirmed
to be just, by others to be unjust. Is not
that true?
Euthyphro:
Quite true.
Socrates:
Well then, my dear friend Euthyphro, do tell
me, for my better instruction and information,
what proof have you that in the opinion of
all the gods a servant who is guilty of murder,
and is put in chains by the master of the
dead man, and dies because he is put in chains
before he who bound him can learn from the
interpreters of the gods what he ought to
do with him, dies unjustly; and that on behalf
of such an one a son ought to proceed against
his father and accuse him of murder. How
would you show that all the gods absolutely
agree in approving of his act? Prove to me
that they do, and I will applaud your wisdom
as long as I live.
Euthyphro:
It will be a difficult task; but I could
make the matter very dear indeed to you.
Socrates:
I understand; you mean to say that I am not
so quick of apprehension as the judges: for
to them you will be sure to prove that the
act is unjust, and hateful to the gods.
Euthyphro:
Yes indeed, Socrates; at least if they will
listen to me.
Socrates:
But they will be sure to listen if they find
that you are a good speaker. There was a
notion that came into my mind while you were
speaking; I said to myself: "Well, and
what if Euthyphro does prove to me that all
the gods regarded the death of the serf as
unjust, how do I know anything more of the
nature of piety and impiety? for granting
that this action may be hateful to the gods,
still piety and impiety are not adequately
defined by these distinctions, for that which
is hateful to the gods has been shown to
be also pleasing and dear to them."
And therefore, Euthyphro, I do not ask you
to prove this; I will suppose, if you like,
that all the gods condemn and abominate such
an action. But I will amend the definition
so far as to say that what all the gods hate
is impious, and what they love pious or holy;
and what some of them love and others hate
is both or neither. Shall this be our definition
of piety and impiety?
Euthyphro:
Why not, Socrates?
Socrates:
Why not! certainly, as far as I am concerned,
Euthyphro, there is no reason why not. But
whether this admission will greatly assist
you in the task of instructing me as you
promised, is a matter for you to consider.
Euthyphro:
Yes, I should say that what all the gods
love is pious and holy, and the opposite
which they all hate, impious.
Socrates:
Ought we to enquire into the truth of this,
Euthyphro, or simply to accept the mere statement
on our own authority and that of others?
What do you say?
Euthyphro:
We should enquire; and I believe that the
statement will stand the test of enquiry.
Socrates:
We shall know better, my good friend, in
a little while. The point which I should
first wish to understand is whether the pious
or holy is beloved by the gods because it
is holy, or holy because it is beloved of
the gods.
Euthyphro:
I do not understand your meaning, Socrates.
Socrates:
I will endeavour to explain: we, speak of
carrying and we speak of being carried, of
leading and being led, seeing and being seen.
You know that in all such cases there is
a difference, and you know also in what the
difference lies?
Euthyphro:
I think that I understand.
Socrates:
And is not that which is beloved distinct
from that which loves?
Euthyphro:
Certainly.
Socrates:
Well; and now tell me, is that which is carried
in this state of carrying because it is carried,
or for some other reason?
Euthyphro:
No; that is the reason.
Socrates:
And the same is true of what is led and of
what is seen?
Euthyphro:
True.
Socrates:
And a thing is not seen because it is visible,
but conversely, visible because it is seen;
nor is a thing led because it is in the state
of being led, or carried because it is in
the state of being carried, but the converse
of this. And now I think, Euthyphro, that
my meaning will be intelligible; and my meaning
is, that any state of action or passion implies
previous action or passion. It does not become
because it is becoming, but it is in a state
of becoming because it becomes; neither does
it suffer because it is in a state of suffering,
but it is in a state of suffering because
it suffers. Do you not agree?
Euthyphro:
Yes.
Socrates:
Is not that which is loved in some state
either of becoming or suffering?
Euthyphro:
Yes.
Socrates:
And the same holds as in the previous instances;
the state of being loved follows the act
of being loved, and not the act the state.
Euthyphro:
Certainly.
Socrates:
And what do you say of piety, Euthyphro:
is not piety, according to your definition,
loved by all the gods?
Euthyphro:
Yes.
Socrates:
Because it is pious or holy, or for some
other reason?
Euthyphro:
No, that is the reason.
Socrates:
It is loved because it is holy, not holy
because it is loved?
Euthyphro:
Yes.
Socrates:
And that which is dear to the gods is loved
by them, and is in a state to be loved of
them because it is loved of them?
Euthyphro:
Certainly.
Socrates:
Then that which is dear to the gods, Euthyphro,
is not holy, nor is that which is holy loved
of God, as you affirm; but they are two different
things.
Euthyphro:
How do you mean, Socrates?
Socrates:
I mean to say that the holy has been acknowledge
by us to be loved of God because it is holy,
not to be holy because it is loved.
Euthyphro:
Yes.
Socrates:
But that which is dear to the gods is dear
to them because it is loved by them, not
loved by them because it is dear to them.
Euthyphro:
True.
Socrates:
But, friend Euthyphro, if that which is holy
is the same with that which is dear to God,
and is loved because it is holy, then that
which is dear to God would have been loved
as being dear to God; but if that which dear
to God is dear to him because loved by him,
then that which is holy would have been holy
because loved by him. But now you see that
the reverse is the case, and that they are
quite different from one another. For one
(theophiles) is of a kind to be loved cause
it is loved, and the other
(osion) is loved because it is of a kind
to be loved. Thus you appear to me, Euthyphro,
when I ask you what is the essence of holiness,
to offer an attribute only, and not the essence-the
attribute of being loved by all the gods.
But you still refuse to explain to me the
nature of holiness. And therefore, if you
please, I will ask you not to hide your treasure,
but to tell me once more what holiness or
piety really is, whether dear to the gods
or not (for that is a matter about which
we will not quarrel) and what is impiety?
Euthyphro:
I really do not know, Socrates, how to express
what I mean. For somehow or other our arguments,
on whatever ground we rest them, seem to
turn round and walk away from us.
Socrates:
Your words, Euthyphro, are like the handiwork
of my ancestor Daedalus; and if I were the
sayer or propounder of them, you might say
that my arguments walk away and will not
remain fixed where they are placed because
I am a descendant of his. But now, since
these notions are your own, you must find
some other gibe, for they certainly, as you
yourself allow, show an inclination to be
on the move.
Euthyphro:
Nay, Socrates, I shall still say that you
are the Daedalus who sets arguments in motion;
not I, certainly, but you make them move
or go round, for they would never have stirred,
as far as I am concerned.
Socrates:
Then I must be a greater than Daedalus: for
whereas he only made his own inventions to
move, I move those of other people as well.
And the beauty of it is, that I would rather
not. For I would give the wisdom of Daedalus,
and the wealth of Tantalus, to be able to
detain them and keep them fixed. But enough
of this. As I perceive that you are lazy,
I will myself endeavor to show you how you
might instruct me in the nature of piety;
and I hope that you will not grudge your
labour. Tell me, then-Is not that which is
pious necessarily just?
Euthyphro:
Yes.
Socrates:
And is, then, all which is just pious? or,
is that which is pious all just, but that
which is just, only in part and not all,
pious?
Euthyphro:
I do not understand you, Socrates.
Socrates:
And yet I know that you are as much wiser
than I am, as you are younger. But, as I
was saying, revered friend, the abundance
of your wisdom makes you lazy. Please to
exert yourself, for there is no real difficulty
in understanding me. What I mean I may explain
by an illustration of what I do not mean.
The poet (Stasinus) sings-
Of Zeus, the author and creator of all these
things,
You will not tell: for where there is fear
there is also
reverence.
Now I disagree with this poet. Shall I tell
you in what respect?
Euthyphro:
By all means.
Socrates:
I should not say that where there is fear
there is also reverence; for I am sure that
many persons fear poverty and disease, and
the like evils, but I do not perceive that
they reverence the objects of their fear.
Euthyphro:
Very true.
Socrates:
But where reverence is, there is fear; for
he who has a feeling of reverence and shame
about the commission of any action, fears
and is afraid of an ill reputation.
Euthyphro:
No doubt.
Socrates:
Then we are wrong in saying that where there
is fear there is also reverence; and we should
say, where there is reverence there is also
fear. But there is not always reverence where
there is fear; for fear is a more extended
notion, and reverence is a part of fear,
just as the odd is a part of number, and
number is a more extended notion than the
odd. I suppose that you follow me now?
Euthyphro:
Quite well.
Socrates:
That was the sort of question which I meant
to raise when I asked whether the just is
always the pious, or the pious always the
just; and whether there may not be justice
where there is not piety; for justice is
the more extended notion of which piety is
only a part. Do you dissent?
Euthyphro:
No, I think that you are quite right.
Socrates:
Then, if piety is a part of justice, I suppose
that we should enquire what part? If you
had pursued the enquiry in the previous cases;
for instance, if you had asked me what is
an even number, and what part of number the
even is, I should have had no difficulty
in replying, a number which represents a
figure having two equal sides. Do you not
agree?
Euthyphro:
Yes, I quite agree.
Socrates:
In like manner, I want you to tell me what
part of justice is piety or holiness, that
I may be able to tell Meletus not to do me
injustice, or indict me for impiety, as I
am now adequately instructed by you in the
nature of piety or holiness, and their opposites.
Euthyphro:
Piety or holiness, Socrates, appears to me
to be that part of justice which attends
to the gods, as there is the other part of
justice which attends to men.
Socrates:
That is good, Euthyphro; yet still there
is a little point about which I should like
to have further information, What is the
meaning of "attention"? For attention
can hardly be used in the same sense when
applied to the gods as when applied to other
things. For instance, horses are said to
require attention, and not every person is
able to attend to them, but only a person
skilled in horsemanship. Is it not so?
Euthyphro:
Certainly.
Socrates:
I should suppose that the art of horsemanship
is the art of attending to horses?
Euthyphro:
Yes.
Socrates:
Nor is every one qualified to attend to dogs,
but only the huntsman?
Euthyphro:
True.
Socrates:
And I should also conceive that the art of
the huntsman is the art of attending to dogs?
Euthyphro:
Yes.
Socrates:
As the art of the ox herd is the art of attending
to oxen?
Euthyphro:
Very true.
Socrates:
In like manner holiness or piety is the art
of attending to the gods?-that would be your
meaning, Euthyphro?
Euthyphro:
Yes.
Socrates:
And is not attention always designed for
the good or benefit of that to which the
attention is given? As in the case of horses,
you may observe that when attended to by
the horseman's art they are benefited and
improved, are they not?
Euthyphro:
True.
Socrates:
As the dogs are benefited by the huntsman's
art, and the oxen by the art of the ox herd,
and all other things are tended or attended
for their good and not for their hurt?
Euthyphro:
Certainly, not for their hurt.
Socrates:
But for their good?
Euthyphro:
Of course.
Socrates:
And does piety or holiness, which has been
defined to be the art of attending to the
gods, benefit or improve them? Would you
say that when you do a holy act you make
any of the gods better?
Euthyphro:
No, no; that was certainly not what I meant.
Socrates:
And I, Euthyphro, never supposed that you
did. I asked you the question about the nature
of the attention, because I thought that
you did not.
Euthyphro:
You do me justice, Socrates; that is not
the sort of attention which I mean.
Socrates:
Good: but I must still ask what is this attention
to the gods which is called piety?
Euthyphro:
It is such, Socrates, as servants show to
their masters.
Socrates:
I understand-a sort of ministration to the
gods.
Euthyphro:
Exactly.
Socrates:
Medicine is also a sort of ministration or
service, having in view the attainment of
some object-would you not say of health?
Euthyphro:
I should.
Socrates:
Again, there is an art which ministers to
the ship-builder with a view to the attainment
of some result?
Euthyphro:
Yes, Socrates, with a view to the building
of a ship.
Socrates:
As there is an art which ministers to the
housebuilder with a view to the building
of a house?
Euthyphro:
Yes.
Socrates:
And now tell me, my good friend, about the
art which ministers to the gods: what work
does that help to accomplish? For you must
surely know if, as you say, you are of all
men living the one who is best instructed
in religion.
Euthyphro:
And I speak the truth, Socrates.
Socrates:
Tell me then, oh tell me-what is that fair
work which the gods do by the help of our
ministrations?
Euthyphro:
Many and fair, Socrates, are the works which
they do.
Socrates:
Why, my friend, and so are those of a general.
But the chief of them is easily told. Would
you not say that victory in war is the chief
of them?
Euthyphro:
Certainly.
Socrates:
Many and fair, too, are the works of the
husbandman, if I am not mistaken; but his
chief work is the production of food from
the earth?
Euthyphro:
Exactly.
Socrates:
And of the many and fair things done by the
gods, which is the chief or principal one?
Euthyphro:
I have told you already, Socrates, that to
learn all these things accurately will be
very tiresome. Let me simply say that piety
or holiness is learning, how to please the
gods in word and deed, by prayers and sacrifices.
Such piety, is the salvation of families
and states, just as the impious, which is
unpleasing to the gods, is their ruin and
destruction.
Socrates:
I think that you could have answered in much
fewer words the chief question which I asked,
Euthyphro, if you had chosen. But I see plainly
that you are not disposed to instruct me-dearly
not: else why, when we reached the point,
did you turn, aside? Had you only answered
me I should have truly learned of you by
this time the-nature of piety. Now, as the
asker of a question is necessarily dependent
on the answerer, whither he leads-I must
follow; and can only ask again, what is the
pious, and what is piety? Do you mean that
they are a, sort of science of praying and
sacrificing?
Euthyphro:
Yes, I do.
Socrates:
And sacrificing is giving to the gods, and
prayer is asking of the gods?
Euthyphro:
Yes, Socrates.
Socrates:
Upon this view, then piety is a science of
asking and giving?
Euthyphro:
You understand me capitally, Socrates.
Socrates:
Yes, my friend; the. reason is that I am
a votary of your science, and give my mind
to it, and therefore nothing which you say
will be thrown away upon me. Please then
to tell me, what is the nature of this service
to the gods? Do you mean that we prefer requests
and give gifts to them?
Euthyphro:
Yes, I do.
Socrates:
Is not the right way of asking to ask of
them what we want?
Euthyphro:
Certainly.
Socrates:
And the right way of giving is to give to
them in return what they want of us. There
would be no, in an art which gives to any
one that which he does not want.
Euthyphro:
Very true, Socrates.
Socrates:
Then piety, Euthyphro, is an art which gods
and men have of doing business with one another?
Euthyphro:
That is an expression which you may use,
if you like.
Socrates:
But I have no particular liking for anything
but the truth. I wish, however, that you
would tell me what benefit accrues to the
gods from our gifts. There is no doubt about
what they give to us; for there is no good
thing which they do not give; but how we
can give any good thing to them in return
is far from being equally clear. If they
give everything and we give nothing, that
must be an affair of business in which we
have very greatly the advantage of them.
Euthyphro:
And do you imagine, Socrates, that any benefit
accrues to the gods from our gifts?
Socrates:
But if not, Euthyphro, what is the meaning
of gifts which are conferred by us upon the
gods?
Euthyphro:
What else, but tributes of honour; and, as
I was just now saying, what pleases them?
Socrates:
Piety, then, is pleasing to the gods, but
not beneficial or dear to them?
Euthyphro:
I should say that nothing could be dearer.
Socrates:
Then once more the assertion is repeated
that piety is dear to the gods?
Euthyphro:
Certainly.
Socrates:
And when you say this, can you wonder at
your words not standing firm, but walking
away? Will you accuse me of being the Daedalus
who makes them walk away, not perceiving
that there is another and far greater artist
than Daedalus who makes them go round in
a circle, and he is yourself; for the argument,
as you will perceive, comes round to the
same point. Were we not saying that the holy
or pious was not the same with that which
is loved of the gods? Have you forgotten?
Euthyphro:
I quite remember.
Socrates:
And are you not saying that what is loved
of the gods is holy; and is not this the
same as what is dear to them-do you see?
Euthyphro:
True.
Socrates:
Then either we were wrong in former assertion;
or, if we were right then, we are wrong now.
Euthyphro:
One of the two must be true.
Socrates:
Then we must begin again and ask, What is
piety? That is an enquiry which I shall never
be weary of pursuing as far as in me lies;
and I entreat you not to scorn me, but to
apply your mind to the utmost, and tell me
the truth. For, if any man knows, you are
he; and therefore I must detain you, like
Proteus, until you tell. If you had not certainly
known the nature of piety and impiety, I
am confident that you would never, on behalf
of a serf, have charged your aged father
with murder. You would not have run such
a risk of doing wrong in the sight of the
gods, and you would have had too much respect
for the opinions of men. I am sure, therefore,
that you know the nature of piety and impiety.
Speak out then, my dear Euthyphro, and do
not hide your knowledge.
Euthyphro:
Another time, Socrates; for I am in a hurry,
and must go now.
Socrates:
Alas! my companion, and will you leave me
in despair? I was hoping that you would instruct
me in the nature of piety and impiety; and
then I might have cleared myself of Meletus
and his indictment. I would have told him
that I had been enlightened by Euthyphro,
and had given up rash innovations and speculations,
in which I indulged only through ignorance,
and that now I am about to lead a better
life.
-THE END-
|
Evans Experientialism 
