MATTER.

I do not believe that the universalistic abstraction matter exists, but hold that what exists is that which occupies (what we imagine is there - if it were to be unoccupied by that which exists) - i. e., space.

It follows of course that matter cannot not exist either - for there is no state of not-existing of that which does not exist. Therefore what I believe exists are material particularities or merologically bounded individuates existing in a cloud or cosmic soup of smaller individuates, and nothing which can be semantically universalised under the rubric matter, which is an ontologically entitic  unspecificity, nor provide an explanation or definition of the obscure but conveniently helpful word matter. (matergy.)

Neither do I feel it necessary to employ the word matter, [in ontological discussion] - though it is a useful abstraction, for there is nothing which is non-material to compare it with and differentiate it from that which is material. So why use the word matter when EVERYTHING IS MATERIAL? I recommend therefore the term: That which is material or even That which exists.

CHANGE.

There can be no non-material intervention of space and time, because neither the non-material, nor space, nor time exist, being no more that useful fictions and conceptual instantiations. That which is material moves and changes because it could not exist if it didn't.

The river changes, and the constantly renewed water that caresses the hairy legs of Heraclitus flows and is replaced, because if it did not - the water wouldn't be water, and the river wouldn't exist either. That would mean that the philosopher Heraclitus would not have existed either - and neither would you or I dear reader.

In fact there would be nothing existing anywhere - which would also be impossible, because nothing cannot exist nor not-exist as nothing, nor something, nor anything.

Heraclitus claimed that all things are one, in some sense, and that opposites are necessary for life, but they are unified in a system of balanced exchanges. This universalism (all things are one) is useful as a helpful fiction, but all things are certainly not one. Everything in the cosmos is individuate. But he is certainly correct in saying that they are unified in a system of balanced impingements and exchanges, though I prefer the formulation: can be conceptualised]

So the great head-scratching question of traditional philosophy which the Philosopher of Nazism Heidegger predictably repeats: Why is there something rather than nothing? is actually a non-question. It is not even a philosophical question - it is just an admission of being aware of the obviousness of the physical imperative. The fact of the matter is that there has GOT to be something, for it is physically and ontologically impossible for there to be  nothing - for nothing can neither exist nor not exist.