MATTER.

I do not believe that the universalistic abstraction  *matter* exists, but hold that what exists is that which occupies (what we imagine is *there* -  if it were to be *unoccupied* by that which exists)  - i. e., *space.

It follows of course that *matter* cannot *not exist* either - for there is no *state of not-existing* of that which does not exist.  Therefore what I believe exists are material particularities or merologically bounded individuates existing in a *cloud* or *soup* of smaller individuates, and nothing which can be semantically universalised under the rubric *matter,* which is an ontological unspecificity, nor provide an explanation or definition of the obscure but conveniently helpful word *matter.*

Neither do I feel it necessary to employ the word *matter,* [in ontological discussion] - though it is a  *handy* useful abstraction, for there is nothing which is *non-material* to compare *it* with and differentiate *it* from that which is material. So why use the word *matter* when EVERYTHING IS MATERIAL? I recommend therefore the term: *That which is material* or even *That which exists.*



CHANGE.
There can be no *non-material intervention of space and time,* because neither the *non-material,* nor *space,* nor *time* exist, being no more that useful fictions and conceptual instantiations.
*That which is material* moves and changes because it could not exist if it didn't.

The river changes, and the constantly renewed water that caresses the hairy legs of Heraclitus flows and is replaced, because if it did not -  the water wouldn't be water, and the river wouldn't exist either.  That would mean that the philosopher Heraclitus would not have existed either -  and neither would you dear reader.

In fact there would be nothing existing anywhere - which would also be impossible, because *nothing* cannot exist nor not-exist as *nothing,* nor *something,* nor *anything.*

   Heraclitus claimed that all things are one, in some sense, and that opposites are necessary for life, but they are unified in a system of balanced exchanges. This universalism (all things are one) is useful as a *helpful fiction,* but all things are certainly not *one.*  Everything in the cosmos is individuate, but he is certainly correct in saying that they are unified in a system of balanced exchanges, though I prefer the formulation: *can be thought of*]

So the great head-scratching question of traditional philosophy which the Philosopher of Nazism  Heidegger predictably repeats: *Why is there something rather than nothing?* is actually a non-question. It is not even a *philosophical* question - it is just an admission of being aware of the obviousness of the physical imperative. The fact of the matter is that there has GOT to be something, [and ONLY something,} for it is physically and ontologically impossible for there to be nothing - for *nothing* can neither exist nor not exist.