PARMENIDES' ARGUMENT*


BY PROF. EMERITUS JAMES DYE


FOLLOWED
PARMENIDES' PROEM
translated  by John Burnet



PARMENIDES
The School of Athens (detail) Raffaello Sanzio


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PARMENIDES' ARGUMENT*

BY PROF. EMERITUS JAMES DYE

FOLLOWED BY
PARMENIDES' PROEM
translated by John Burnet


PARMENIDES' ARGUMENT* James Dye Professor Emeritus Ph. D., Tulane University. Areas of interest: ancient Greek philosophy, 18th-century philosophy, philosophy of religion. Current research on: Aristotle's Physics, Hume's Dialogues. Representative publications: "Demea's Departure," Hume Studies (1993) "A Word on Behalf of Demea," Hume Studies (1989) "Superhuman Speech and Biological books,"History of Philosophy Quarterly (1988) "Hume on Curing Superstition," Hume Studies (1987) "The Poetization of Science," Studies in Science and Culture (1986) "The Sensibility of Intelligible Matter," International Studies in Philosophy (1982) "Aristotle's Matter as a Sensible Principle," International Studies in Philosophy (1978) Copyright © 1995, James Dye

* For the full original text on which this outline is based see Kirk, Raven, and Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers, 2nd Ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1983), Chap. VIII.

PARMENIDES' ARGUMENT*

P1. Whatever is knowable is.

P2. Whatever is not is not knowable.

P3. Whatever exists exists. (What is is.)

P4. What exists is [called] the existent. (What is is [what] is.)

C1. Therefore, the existent exists. ([What] is is.)

P5. Whatever is non-existence does not exist. (Whatever is not what is is not.)

P6. Coming-to-be is not existing (Becoming is not being.)

C2. Therefore, whatever comes to be is not [that which exists].

C3. Therefore, (by P2, C2) whatever comes to be is not knowable.

(The argument form of P5-C3 may be repeated indefinitely, substituting whatever you please for 'Coming-to-be' in P6 and 'Whatever comes to be' in C2 and C3. For example:

P6´. Blue is not existing.

C2´. Therefore, blue is not.

C3´. Therefore, blue is not knowable.)

P7. What comes to be either comes from what is or from what is not.

C4. What is could not come from what is, for it would already exist.

P8. Nothing can come into being from what does not exist.

C5. Therefore, what is could not come to be from what is not.

C6. Therefore, what is does not come to be.

P9. Ceasing-to-be is not existing.

C7. Therefore, what is does not cease to be.

P10. What does not come-to-be or cease to be is eternal.

C8. Therefore, what is is eternal.

P11. Distinct things are not identical.

P12. What is not identical with what is is what is not. (Whatever is not being is non-being.)

C9. Therefore, (by P5) there is nothing distinct from what is [being].

P13. A plurality is composed of distinct, countable parts.

C10. Therefore, what is is not plural.

C11. Therefore, what is is one.

P14. Whatever is discontinuous has its parts separated.

P15. Whatever is separated is separated by something distinct.

C12. Therefore, (by C6) what is is continuous.

P16. The things perceived by the senses are many, discontinuous, and they come into being and cease to exist.

C13. Therefore, perceptible things are not what is.

C14. Therefore, (by P5) perceptible things do not exist.

C15. Therefore, (by P2) perceptible things are not knowable.

* For the full original text on which this outline is based see Kirk, Raven, and Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers, 2nd Ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1983), Chap. VIII. Return to note reference *

Copyright © 1995, James Dye

Last Updated 31 December, 1995

More Wisdom from That most respected of Philosophers - Professor James Dye

Heraclitus & Parmenides

Heraclitus claims that sense perception alone cannot reveal the truth about things, for they are not really what they seem to be. Thought is required to reveal that what seems stable is really constantly changing--that what seems to be a thing is but a slice of a process. Heraclitus invents the distinction between appearance and reality.

Perceptual objects are not the real entities constituting the natural world; they are only the ways those entities appear to us. Our perceptions are the effects of causes which we do not directly perceive and which we can know only by inference. (Does the image on the movie screen or the television monitor exist? Is it a real thing in the world? Do we exist or are we more like a movie or a television program--processes seeming to be entities only because of the abstractive character of our experience of ourselves?)


Parmenides takes note of Heraclitus' observations about sense perception but disagrees that the mind could ever reconstruct the truth out of the sensory data. There is no one way our sensations can be manipulated to yield a single, coherent story about what really exists. Therefore any single way in which they are assembled will at best be an opinion, not the truth, about what is. If the truth is to be gotten, it must consist just of that information which can be acquired by the mind alone, uncontaminated by sensory information which may be understood in a variety of ways.

This additional epistemological requirement Parmenides adds to the Heraclitean analysis is, in effect, the distinction between a priori and a posteriori. A priori information is that which can be acquired by pure reasoning, "prior to" perceptual experience; a posteriori information is that which initially depends on (is "posterior to") some perceptual experience. On Parmenides' view, all genuine knowledge is a priori; any a posteriori claims are necessarily only matters of belief, not of truth. Knowledge consists of truths. A truth is a proposition to which our reasoning compels us to assent; a belief is a proposition to which we voluntarily assent, since our reasoning permits more than one opinion about the matter.

Beliefs cannot constitute knowledge because they compete with other beliefs and so any one belief may be false. Therefore reality can only be apprehended by a priori reasoning; any reasoning which begins with sensory data (a posteriori reasoning) can never get beyond mere appearance.

Copyright © 1998, James Dye




PARMENIDES' PROEM
(FRAGMENTS)
translated  by John Burnet

John Burnet (9 December 1863 - 26 May 1928) was a Scottish classicist. Burnet was educated at the Royal High School, Edinburgh, the University of Edinburgh, and Balliol College, Oxford, receiving his M. A. degree in 1887. From 1890 to 1915, he was a Fellow at Merton College, Oxford; he was a professor of Latin at Edinburgh; from 1892 to 1926, he was Professor of Greek at the University of St. Andrews. He became a Fellow of the British Academy in 1916. In 1909, Burnet was offered, but did not accept, the Chair of Greek at Harvard University. In 1894, he married Mary Farmer, the daughter of John Farmer, who wrote the Preface for a collection of essays published after his death, Essays and Addresses. Burnet is best known for his work on Plato, particularly his argument that the depiction of Socrates in all of Plato's dialogues is historically accurate, and that the philosophical views peculiar to Plato himself are to be found only in the so-called late dialogues. Burnet also maintained that Socrates was closely connected to the early Greek philosophical tradition, now generally known as Pre-Socratic philosophy; Burnet believed that Socrates had been in his youth the disciple of Archelaus, a member of the Anaxagorean tradition (Burnet 1924, vi). Burnet's philological work on Plato is still widely read, and his editions have been considered authoritative for 100 years. His commentaries on Plato's Euthyphro, Apology, and Crito and on the Phaedo also remain widely used and respected by scholars. Myles Burnyeat, for example, calls Burnet's Plato: Euthyphro, Apology of Socrates, Crito "the still unsurpassed edition".


POEM OF PARMENIDES: ON NATURE

      English translation by John Burnet (1892)

he steeds that bear me carried me as far as ever my heart
Desired, since they brought me and set me on the renowned
Way of the goddess, who with her own hands conducts the man
who knows through all things. On what way was I borne

along; for on it did the wise steeds carry me, drawing my car,
and maidens showed the way. And the axle, glowing in the socket -
for it was urged round by the whirling wheels at each
end - gave forth a sound as of a pipe, when the daughters of the
Sun, hasting to convey me into the light, threw back their veils

from off their faces and left the abode of Night.
There are the gates of the ways of Night and Day, fitted
above with a lintel and below with a threshold of stone. They
themselves, high in the air, are closed by mighty doors, and
Avenging Justice keeps the keys that open them. Her did

the maidens entreat with gentle words and skilfully persuade
to unfasten without demur the bolted bars from the gates.
Then, when the doors were thrown back,
they disclosed a widepening, when their brazen
hinges swung backwards in the

sockets fastened with rivets and nails. Straight through them,
on the broad way, did the maidens guide the horses and the car,
and the goddess greeted me kindly, and took my right hand
in hers, and spake to me these words: -
Welcome, noble youth, that comest to my abode on the car

that bears thee tended by immortal charioteers ! It is no ill
chance, but justice and right that has sent thee forth to travel
on this way. Far, indeed, does it lie from the beaten track of
men ! Meet it is that thou shouldst learn all things, as well
the unshaken heart of persuasive truth, as the opinions of

mortals in which is no true belief at all. Yet none the less
shalt thou learn of these things also, since thou must judge
approvedly of the things that seem to men as thou goest
through all things in thy journey."

Come now, I will tell thee - and do thou hearken to my
saying and carry it away - the only two ways of search that
can be thought of. The first, namely, that It is, and that it is
impossible for anything not to be, is the way of. conviction,

for truth is its companion.. The other, namely, that It is not,
and that something must needs not be, - that, I tell thee, is a
wholly untrustworthy path. For you cannot know what is
not - that is impossible - nor utter it;

For it is the same thing that can be thought and that can be.

It needs must be that what can be thought and spoken of is;
for it is possible for it to be, and it is not possible for, what is
nothing to be. This is what I bid thee ponder. I hold thee
back from this first way of inquiry, and from this other also,

upon which mortals knowing naught wander in two minds; for
hesitation guides the wandering thought in their breasts, so that
they are borne along stupefied like men deaf and blind.
Undiscerning crowds, in whose eyes the same thing and not the
same is and is not, and all things travel in opposite directions !

For this shall never be proved, that the things that are not
are; and do thou restrain thy thought from this way of inquiry.
Nor let habit force thee to cast a wandering eye upon this
devious track, or to turn thither thy resounding ear or thy

tongue; but do thou judge the subtle refutation of their
discourse uttered by me.

One path only is left for us to
speak of, namely, that It is. In it are very many tokens that
what is, is uncreated and indestructible, alone, complete,
immovable and without end. Nor was it ever, nor will it be; for

now it is, all at once, a continuous one. For what kind of origin
for it. will you look for ? In what way and from what source
could it have drawn its increase ? I shall not let thee say nor
think that it came from what is not; for it can neither be
thought nor uttered that what is not is. And, if it came from

nothing, what need could have made it arise later rather than
sooner ? Therefore must it either be altogether or be not at
all. Nor will the force of truth suffer aught to arise besides
itself from that which in any way is. Wherefore, Justice does
not loose her fetters and let anything come into being or pass

away, but holds it fast.
" Is it or is it not ? " Surely it is adjudged, as it needs must
be, that we are to set aside the one way as unthinkable and
nameless (for it is no true way), and that the other path is real
and true. How, then, can what is be going to be in the

future ? Or how could it come into being ? If it came into
being, it is not; nor is it if it is going to be in the future. Thus is
becoming extinguished and passing away not to be heard of.
Nor is it divisible, since it is all alike, and there is no more
of it in one place than in another, to hinder it from holding
together, nor less of it, but everything is full of what is.

Wherefore all holds together; for what is; is in contact with what is.
Moreover, it is immovable in the bonds of mighty chains, without
beginning and without end; since coming into being
and passing away have been driven afar, and true belief has cast them away.
It is the same, and it rests in the self-same place, abiding in itself.

And thus it remaineth constant in its place; for hard necessity
keeps it in the bonds of the limit that holds it fast on every side.
Wherefore it is not permitted to what is to be infinite; for it is in need of nothing ; while, if it were infinite, it would stand in need of everything. It is the
same thing that can be thought and for the sake of which the thought exists ;

for you cannot find thought without something that is, to which it is
betrothed. And there is not, and never shall be, any time other, than that which
is present, since fate has chained it so as to be whole and immovable.
Wherefore all these things are but the names which mortals
have given, believing them, to be true –

coming into being and passing away, being and not being,
change of place and alteration of bright colour.
Where, then, it has its farthest boundary, it is complete on
every side, equally poised from the centre in every direction,
like the mass of a rounded sphere; for it cannot be greater or

smaller in one place than in another. For there is nothing
which is not that could keep it from reaching out equally, nor
is it possible that there should be more of what is in this place
and less in that, since it is all inviolable. For, since it is equal
in all directions, it is equally confined within limits.

Here shall I close my trustworthy speech and thought about the truth.
Henceforward learn the opinions of mortals,
giving ear to the deceptive ordering of my words.
Mortals have settled in their minds to speak of two forms, one of which
they should have left out, and that is where they go astray from the truth.

They have assigned an opposite
substance to each, and marks distinct from one another. To the
one they allot the fire of heaven, light, thin, in every direction
the same as itself, but not the same as the other. The other is
opposite to it, dark night, a compact and heavy body. Of these

I tell thee the whole arrangement as it seems to men,
in order that no mortal may surpass thee in knowledge.

Now that all things have been named light and night; and the things
which belong to the power of each have been assigned to these
things and to those, everything is full at once of light and dark night,
both equal, since neither has aught to do with the other.

And thou shalt know the origin of all the things on high,
and all the signs in the sky, and the resplendent works of the
glowing sun’s clear torch, and whence they arose. And thou
shalt learn likewise of the wandering deeds of the round-faced

moon, and of her origin. Thou shalt know, too, the heavens
that surround us, whence they arose, and how Necessity took
them and bound them to keep the limits of the stars . . .

How the earth, and the sun, and the moon, and the sky that is
common to all, and the Milky Way, and the outermost Olympos,
and the burning might of the stars
arose.

The narrower circles are filled with unmixed fire, and those
surrounding them with night, and in the midst of these rushes
their portion of fire. In the midst of these circles is the divinity that directs
the course of all things; for she rules over all painful birth and all begetting,

driving the female to the embrace of the male, and the male to that of the female.

First of all the gods she contrived Eros.

Shining by night with borrowed light, wandering round the earth.

Always straining her eyes to the beams of the sun.

On the right boys; on the left girls.

Thus, according to men’s opinions, did things comp into
being, and thus they are now. In time (they think) they will
grow up and pass away. To each of these things men have
assigned a fixed name.








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