INTRODUCTION
THEN
THE PROEMIUM
FOLLOWED BY
ANCIENT AUTHORS' COMMENTARIES ON PARMENIDES
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Parmenides, the son of Pyres (or Pyrrhes),
of Elea Parmenides, the son of Pyres (or
Pyrrhes), was a younger contemporary of Heraclitus,
but he lived at the other end of the Greek
world: in Italy. Both men were intrigued
by the immense variety of phenomena, but
where Heraclitus discerned order in the chaos,
Parmenides pointed out that the endless variety
and eternal changes were just an illusion.
In a long poem, which partially survives,
he opposed 'being' to 'not being', and pointed
out that change was impossible, because it
would mean that something that was 'not being'
changed into 'being', which is absurd. In
other words, we had to distrust our senses
and rely solely on our intellect. The result
was a distinction between two worlds: the
unreal world which we experience every day,
and the reality, which we can reach by thinking.
This idea was to prove one of the most influential
in western culture.
INTRODUCTION
PARMENIDES OF ELEA
The Encyclopædia Britannica Eleventh Edition
(1910-1911)
PARMENIDES OF ELEA (Velia) in Italy.
Parmenides, the son of Pyres (or Pyrrhes),
was a younger contemporary of Heraclitus,
but he lived at the other end of the Greek
world: in Italy. Both men were intrigued
by the immense variety of phenomena, but
where Heraclitus discerned order in the chaos,
Parmenides pointed out that the endless variety
and eternal changes were just an illusion.
In a long poem, which partially survives,
he opposed 'being' to 'not being', and pointed
out that change was impossible, because it
would mean that something that was 'not being'
changed into 'being', which is absurd. In
other words, we had to distrust our senses
and rely solely on our intellect. The result
was a distinction between two worlds: the
unreal world which we experience every day,
and the reality, which we can reach by thinking.
This idea was to prove one of the most influential
in western culture.
The Encyclopædia Britannica Eleventh Edition
(1910-1911) :
PARMENIDES OF ELEA (Velia) in Italy.
According to Diogenes Laertius he was "in
his prime" 504-500 B. C., and would
thus seem to have been born about 539. Plato
indeed (Parmenides, 127 B) makes Socrates
see and hear Parmenides when the latter was
about sixty-five years of age, in which case
he cannot have been born before 519; but
in the absence of evidence that any such
meeting took place this may be regarded as
one of Plato's anachronisms.
However this may be, Parmenides was a contemporary,
probably a younger contemporary, of Heraclitus,
with whom the first succession of physicists
ended, while Empedocles and Anaxagoras, with
whom the second succession of physicists
began, were very much his juniors.
Belonging, it is said, to a rich and distinguished
family, Parmenides attached himself, at any
rate for a time, to the aristocratic society
or brotherhood which Pythagoras had established
at Croton; and accordingly one part of his
system, the physical part, is apparently
Pythagorean. To Xenophanes, the founder of
Eleaticism-whom he must have known, even
if he was never in any strict sense of the
word his disciple-Parmenides was, perhaps,
more deeply indebted, as the theological
speculations of that thinker unquestionably
suggested to him the theory of Being and
Not-Being, of the One and the Many, by which
he sought to reconcile Ionian "monism,"
or rather "henism," with Italiote
dualism. Tradition relates that Parmenides
Lamed laws for the Eleates, who each year
took an oath to observe them. Parmenides
embodied his tenets in a short poem, called
Nature, of which fragments, amounting in
all to about 160 lines, have been preserved
in the writings of Sextus Empiricus, Simplicius
and others.
It is traditionally divided into three parts-the
"Proem," "Truth" and
" Opinion."
In "Truth," starting from the formula
" the Ent (or existent) is, the Nonent
(or non-existent) is not," Parmenides
attempted to distinguish between the unity
or universal element of nature and its variety
or particularity, insisting upon the reality
of its unity, which is therefore the object
of knowledge, and upon the unreality of its
variety, which is therefore the object, not
of knowledge, but of opinion. In "Opinion
" he propounded a theory of the world
of seeming and its development, pointing
out however that, in accordance with the
principles already laid down, these cosmological
speculations do not pretend to anything more
than probability. In spite of the contemptuous
remarks of Cicero and Plutarch about Parmenides's
versification,
Nature is not without literary merit. The
introduction, though rugged, is forcible
and picturesque; and the rest of the poem
is written in a simple and effective style
suitable to the subject. Proem.-In the "Proem"
the poet describes his journey from darkness
to light. Borne in a whirling chariot, and
attended by the daughters of the sun, he
reaches a temple sacred to an unnamed goddess
(variously identified by the commentators
with Nature, Wisdom or Themis), by whom the
rest of the poem is spoken. He must learn
all things, she tells him, both truth, which
is certain, and human opinions; for, though
in human opinions there can be no "true
faith," they must be studied notwithstanding
for what they are worth. Truth.-"Truth"
begins with the declaration of Parmenides's
principle in opposition to the principles
of his predecessors.
There are three ways of research, and three
ways only. Of these, one asserts the non-existence
of the existent and the existence of the
non-existent [i. e. Thales, Anaximander and
Anaximenes suppose the single element which
they respectively postulate to be transformed
into the various sorts of matter which they
discover in the world around them, thus assuming
the non-existence of that which is elemental
and the existence of that which is non-elemental];
another, pursued by " restless "
persons, whose " road returns upon itself,"
assumes that a thing "is and is not,"
"is the same and not the same "
[an obvious reference, as Bernays points
out in the Rheinisches Museum, vii. 114 seq.,
to Heraclitus, the philosopher of flux].
These are ways of error, because they confound
existence and non-existence. In contrast
to them the way of truth starts from the
proposition that " the Ent is, the Nonent
is not." On the strength of the fundamental
distinction between the Ent and the Nonent,
the goddess next announces certain characteristics
of the former.
The Ent is uncreated, for it cannot be derived
either from the Ent or from the Nonent; it
is imperishable, for it cannot pass into
the Nonent; it is whole, indivisible, continuous,
for nothing exists to break its continuity
in space; it is unchangeable [for nothing
exists to break its continuity in time];
it is perfect, for there is nothing which
it can want; it never was, nor will be, but
only is; it is evenly extended in every direction,
and therefore a sphere, exactly balanced;
it is identical with thought [i. e. it is
the object, and the sole object, of thought
as opposed to sensation, sensation being
concerned with variety and change]. As then
the Ent is one, invariable and immutable,
all plurality, variety and mutation belong
to the Nonent. Whence it follows that all
things to which men attribute reality, generation
and destruction, being and not-being, change
of place, alteration of colour are no more
than empty words.
Opinion.-The investigation of the Ent [i.
e. the existent unity, extended throughout
space and enduring throughout time, which
reason discovers beneath the variety and
the mutability of things] being now complete,
it remains in "Opinion" to describe
the plurality of things, not as they are,
for they are not, but as they seem to be.
In the phenomenal world then, there are,
it has been Thought [and Parmenides accepts
the theory, which appears to be of Pythagorean
origin], two primary elements-namely, fire,
which is gentle, thin, homogeneous, and night,
which is dark, thick, heavy.
Of these elements [which, according to Aristotle,
were, or rather were analogous to, the Ent
and the Nonent respectively] all things consist,
and from them they derive their several characteristics.
The foundation for a cosmology having thus
been laid in dualism, the poem went on to
describe the generation of "earth and
sun, and moon and air that is common to all,
and the milky way, and furthest Olympus,
and the glowing stars"; but the scanty
fragments which have survived suffice only
to show that Parmenides regarded the universe
as a series of concentric rings or spheres
composed of the two primary elements and
of combinations of them, the whole system
being directed by an unnamed goddess established
at its centre. Next came a theory of animal
development.
This again was followed by a psychology,
which made thought [as well as sensation,
which was conceived to differ from thought
only in respect of its object] depend upon
the excess of the one or the other of the
two constituent elements, fire and night.
" Such, opinion tells us, was the generation,
such is the present existence, such will
be the end, of those things to which men
have given distinguishing names."
Thus, while their question meant, or ought
to have meant, What is the single element
which underlies the apparent plurality of
the material world? their answers, Parmenides
conceived, by attributing to the selected
element various and varying qualities, reintroduced
the plurality which the question sought to
eliminate. If we would discover that which
is common to all things at all times, we
must, he submitted, exclude the differences
of things, whether simultaneous or successive.
Hence, whereas his predecessors had confounded
that which is universally existent with that
which is not universally existent, he proposed
to distinguish carefully between that which
is universally existent and that which is
not universally existent, between The fundamental
truism is the epigrammatic assertion of this
distinction.
The universality of the Ent, he conceived,
necessarily carries with it certain characteristics.
It is one; it is eternal; it is whole and
continuous, both in time and in space; it
is immovable and immutable; it is limited,
but limited only by itself; it is evenly
extended in every direction, and therefore
spherical. These propositions having been
reached, apart from particular experience,
by reflection upon the fundamental principle,
we have in them, Parmenides conceived, a
body of information resting upon a firm basis
and entitled to be called " truth."
Further, the information thus obtained is
the sum total of "truth"; for,
as "existence" in the strict sense
of the word cannot be attributed to anything
besides the universal element, so nothing
besides the universal element can properly
be said to be "known."
If Parmenides's poem had had "Being"
for its subject it would doubtless have ended
at this point. Its subject is, however, "Nature";
and nature, besides its unity, has also the
semblance, if no more than the semblance,
of plurality. Hence the theory of the unity
of nature is necessarily followed by a theory
of its seeming plurality, that is to say,
of the variety and mutation of things. The
theory of plurality cannot indeed pretend
to the certainty of the theory of unity,
being of necessity untrustworthy, because
it is the partial and inconstant representation
of that which is partial and inconstant in
nature.
But, as the material world includes, together
with a real unity, the semblance of plurality,
so the theory of the material world includes,
together with the certain theory of the former,
a probable theory of the latter. "Opinion"
is then no mere excrescence; it is the necessary
sequel to "Truth." Thus, whereas
the Ionians, confounding the unity and the
plurality of the universe, had neglected
plurality, and the Pythagoreans, contenting
themselves with the reduction of the variety
of nature to a duality or a series of dualities,
had neglected unity, Parmenides, taking a
hint from Xenophanes, made the antagonistic
doctrines supply one another's deficiencies;
for, as Xenophanes in his theological system
had recognized at once the unity of God and
the plurality of things, so Parmenides in
his system of nature recognized at once the
rational unity of the Ent and the phenomenal
plurality of the Nonent.
The foregoing statement of Parmenides's position
differs from Zeller's account of it in two
important particulars.
First, whereas it has been assumed above
that Xenophanes was theologian rather than
philosopher, whence it would seem to follow
that the philosophical doctrine of unity
originated, not with him, but with Parmenides,
Zeller, supposing Xenophanes to have taught,
not merely the unity of God, but also the
unity of Being, assigns to Parmenides no
more than an exacter conception of the doctrine
of the unity of Being, the justification
of that doctrine, and the denial of the plurality
and the mutability of things. This view of
the relations of Xenophanes and Parmenides
is not borne out by their writings; and,
though ancient authorities may be quoted
in its favour, it would seem that in this
case as in others, they have fallen into
the easy mistake of confounding successive
phases of doctrine, " construing the
utterances of the master in accordance with
the principles of his scholar-the vague by
the more definite, the simpler by the mere
finished and elaborate theory " (W.
H. Thompson).
Secondly, whereas it has been argued above
that "Opinion" is necessarily included
in the system, Zeller, supposing Parmenides
to deny the Nonent even as a matter of opinion,
regards that part of the poem which has opinion
for its subject as no more than a revised
and improved statement of the views of opponents,
introduced in order that the reader, having
before him the false doctrine as well as
the true one, may be led the more certainly
to embrace the latter. In the judgment of
the present writer, Parmenides, while he
denied the real existence of plurality, recognized
its apparent existence, and consequently,
however little value he might attach to opinion,
was bound to take account of it : "pour
celui même qui nie l'existence réelle de
la nature," says Renouvier, " il
reste encore à faire une histoire naturelle
de l'apparence et de l'illusion."
The teaching of Parmenides variously influenced
both his immediate successors and subsequent
thinkers. By his recognition of an apparent
plurality supplementary to the real unity,
he effected the transition from the "
monism " or " henism " of
the first physical succession to the "pluralism"
of the second.
While Empedocles and Democritus are careful
to emphasize their dissent from "Truth,"
it is obvious that "Opinion" is
the basis of their cosmologies. The doctrine
of the deceitfulness of "the undiscerning
eye and the echoing ear" soon established
itself, though the grounds upon which Empedocles,
Anaxagoras and Democritus maintained it were
not those which were alleged by Parmenides.
Indirectly, through the dialectic of his
pupil and friend Zeno and otherwise, the
doctrine of the inadequacy of sensation led
to the humanist movement, which for a time
threatened to put an end to philosophical
and scientific speculation. But the positive
influence of Parmenides's teaching was not
yet exhausted.
To say that the Platonism of Plato's later
years, the Platonism of the Parmenides, the
Philebus and the Timaeus, is the philosophy
of Parmenides enlarged and reconstituted,
may perhaps seem paradoxical in the face
of the severe criticism to which Eleaticism
is subjected, not only in the Parmenides,
but also in the Sophist. The criticism was,
however, preparatory to a reconstruction.
Thus may be explained the selection of an
Eleatic stranger to be the chief speaker
in the latter, and of Parmenides himself
to take the lead in the former. In the Sophist
criticism predominates over reconstruction,
the Zenonian logic being turned against the
Parmenides metaphysic in such a way as to
show that both the one and the other need
revision: see 241 D, 244 B seq., 257 B seq.,
258 D. In particular, Plato taxes Parmenides
with his inconsistency in attributing (as
he certainly did) to the fundamental unity
extension and sphericity, so that "the
worshipped is after all a pitiful (W. H.
Thompson).
In the Parmenides reconstruction predominates
over criticism-the letter of Eleaticism being
here represented by Zeno, its spirit, as
Plato conceived it, by Parmenides.
Not the least important of the results obtained
in this dialogue is the discovery that, whereas
the doctrine of the "one" and the
"many" is suicidal and barren so
long as the "solitary one" and
the "indefinitely many" are absolutely
separated (137 C seq. and 163 B seq.), it
becomes consistent and fruitful as soon as
a "definite plurality " is interpolated
between them (142 B seq., 157 B seq., 160
B seq.). In short, Parmenides was no idealist,
but Plato recognized in him, and rightly,
the precursor of idealism.
BIBLIOGRAPHY.- The fragments have been skilfully
edited by H. Diels, in Parmenides Lehrgedicht,
griechisch u. deutsch (Berlin, 1897), with
commentary; in Poetarum philosophorum fragmenta.
with brief Latin notes, critical and interpretative
(Berlin, 1901); and in Die Fragmente d. Vorsokratiker
(Berlin, 2nd ed., 1906), with German translation);
and Diels' text is reproduced with a helpful
Latin commentary in Ritter and Preller's
Historia philosophiae graecae (8th ed., revised
by E. Wellmann, Gotha, 1898). The philosophical
system is expounded and discussed by E. Zeller,
D. Philosophie d. Griechen (5th ed., Leipzig,
1892; Eng. trans., London,
1881); by T. Gomperz, Griechische Denker
(Leipzig, 1896; Eng. trans., London, 1901);
and by J. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy
(London, 1908). For the cosmology, see A.
B. Krische, D. theologischen Lehren d. griechischen
Denker (Gottingen, 1840). On the relations
of Eleaticism and Platonism, see W. H. Thompson,
"On Plato's Sophist" in the Journal
of Philology viii. 303 seq. For other texts,
translations, commentaries and monographs
see the excellent bibliography contained
in the Grundriss d. Geschichte d. Philosophie
of Überweg and Heinze 10th ed., Berlin, 1909;
Eng. Trans., London, 1880). (H. JA.)
PARMENIDES' PROEM
(FRAGMENTS)
trans by John Burnet
FOLLOWED BY ANCIENT AUTHORS' COMMENTARIES
ON PARMENIDES
John Burnet (9 December 1863 - 26 May 1928)
was a Scottish classicist. Burnet was educated
at the Royal High School, Edinburgh, the
University of Edinburgh, and Balliol College,
Oxford, receiving his M. A. degree in 1887.
From 1890 to 1915, he was a Fellow at Merton
College, Oxford; he was a professor of Latin
at Edinburgh; from 1892 to 1926, he was Professor
of Greek at the University of St. Andrews.
He became a Fellow of the British Academy
in 1916. In 1909, Burnet was offered, but
did not accept, the Chair of Greek at Harvard
University. In 1894, he married Mary Farmer,
the daughter of John Farmer, who wrote the
Preface for a collection of essays published
after his death, Essays and Addresses. Burnet
is best known for his work on Plato, particularly
his argument that  the depiction of Socrates in all of Plato's
dialogues is historically accurate, and that
the philosophical views peculiar to Plato
himself are to be found only in the so-called
late dialogues. Burnet also maintained that
Socrates was closely connected to the early
Greek philosophical tradition, now generally
known as Pre-Socratic philosophy; Burnet
believed that Socrates had been in his youth
the disciple of Archelaus, a member of the
Anaxagorean tradition (Burnet 1924, vi).
Burnet's philological work on Plato is still
widely read, and his editions have been considered
authoritative for 100 years. His commentaries
on Plato's Euthyphro, Apology, and Crito
and on the Phaedo also remain widely used
and respected by scholars. Myles Burnyeat,
for example, calls Burnet's Plato: Euthyphro,
Apology of Socrates, Crito "the still
unsurpassed edition".
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POEM OF PARMENIDES: ON NATURE
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English translation
by John Burnet (1892)
 he steeds that bear me carried me as far
as ever my heart
Desired, since they brought me and set me
on the renowned
Way of the goddess, who with her own hands
conducts the man
who knows through all things. On what way
was I borne
along; for on it did the wise steeds carry
me, drawing my car,
and maidens showed the way. And the axle,
glowing in the socket -
for it was urged round by the whirling wheels
at each
end - gave forth a sound as of a pipe, when
the daughters of the
Sun, hasting to convey me into the light,
threw back their veils
from off their faces and left the abode of
Night.
There are the gates of the ways of Night
and Day, fitted
above with a lintel and below with a threshold
of stone. They
themselves, high in the air, are closed by
mighty doors, and
Avenging Justice keeps the keys that open
them. Her did
the maidens entreat with gentle words and
skilfully persuade
to unfasten without demur the bolted bars
from the gates.
Then, when the doors were thrown back,
they disclosed a widepening, when their brazen
hinges swung backwards in the
sockets fastened with rivets and nails. Straight
through them,
on the broad way, did the maidens guide the
horses and the car,
and the goddess greeted me kindly, and took
my right hand
in hers, and spake to me these words: -
Welcome, noble youth, that comest to my abode
on the car
that bears thee tended by immortal charioteers
! It is no ill
chance, but justice and right that has sent
thee forth to travel
on this way. Far, indeed, does it lie from
the beaten track of
men ! Meet it is that thou shouldst learn
all things, as well
the unshaken heart of persuasive truth, as
the opinions of
mortals in which is no true belief at all.
Yet none the less
shalt thou learn of these things also, since
thou must judge
approvedly of the things that seem to men
as thou goest
through all things in thy journey."
Come now, I will tell thee - and do thou
hearken to my
saying and carry it away - the only two ways
of search that
can be thought of. The first, namely, that
It is, and that it is
impossible for anything not to be, is the
way of. conviction,
for truth is its companion.. The other, namely,
that It is not,
and that something must needs not be, - that,
I tell thee, is a
wholly untrustworthy path. For you cannot
know what is
not - that is impossible - nor utter it;
For it is the same thing that can be thought
and that can be.
It needs must be that what can be thought
and spoken of is;
for it is possible for it to be, and it is
not possible for, what is
nothing to be. This is what I bid thee ponder.
I hold thee
back from this first way of inquiry, and
from this other also,
upon which mortals knowing naught wander
in two minds; for
hesitation guides the wandering thought in
their breasts, so that
they are borne along stupefied like men deaf
and blind.
Undiscerning crowds, in whose eyes the same
thing and not the
same is and is not, and all things travel
in opposite directions !
For this shall never be proved, that the
things that are not
are; and do thou restrain thy thought from
this way of inquiry.
Nor let habit force thee to cast a wandering
eye upon this
devious track, or to turn thither thy resounding
ear or thy
tongue; but do thou judge the subtle refutation
of their
discourse uttered by me.
One path only is left for us to
speak of, namely, that It is. In it are very
many tokens that
what is, is uncreated and indestructible,
alone, complete,
immovable and without end. Nor was it ever,
nor will it be; for
now it is, all at once, a continuous one.
For what kind of origin
for it. will you look for ? In what way and
from what source
could it have drawn its increase ? I shall
not let thee say nor
think that it came from what is not; for
it can neither be
thought nor uttered that what is not is.
And, if it came from
nothing, what need could have made it arise
later rather than
sooner ? Therefore must it either be altogether
or be not at
all. Nor will the force of truth suffer aught
to arise besides
itself from that which in any way is. Wherefore,
Justice does
not loose her fetters and let anything come
into being or pass
away, but holds it fast.
" Is it or is it not ? " Surely
it is adjudged, as it needs must
be, that we are to set aside the one way
as unthinkable and
nameless (for it is no true way), and that
the other path is real
and true. How, then, can what is be going
to be in thefuture ?
Or how could it come into being ? If it came
into
being, it is not; nor is it if it is going
to be in the future. Thus is
becoming extinguished and passing away not
to be heard of.
Nor is it divisible, since it is all alike,
and there is no more
of it in one place than in another, to hinder
it from holding
together, nor less of it, but everything
is full of what is.
Wherefore all holds together; for what is;
is in contact with what is.
Moreover, it is immovable in the bonds of
mighty chains, without
beginning and without end; since coming into
being
and passing away have been driven afar, and
true belief has cast them away.
It is the same, and it rests in the self-same
place, abiding in itself.
And thus it remaineth constant in its place;
for hard necessity
keeps it in the bonds of the limit that holds
it fast on every side.
Wherefore it is not permitted to what is
to be infinite; for it is in need of nothing;
while, if it were infinite, it would stand
in need of everything. It is the
same thing that can be thought and for the
sake of which the thought exists ;
for you cannot find thought without something
that is, to which it is
betrothed. And there is not, and never shall
be, any time other, than that which
is present, since fate has chained it so
as to be whole and immovable.
Wherefore all these things are but the names
which mortals
have given, believing them, to be true –
coming into being and passing away, being
and not being,
change of place and alteration of bright
colour.
Where, then, it has its farthest boundary,
it is complete on
every side, equally poised from the centre
in every direction,
like the mass of a rounded sphere; for it
cannot be greater or
smaller in one place than in another. For
there is nothing
which is not that could keep it from reaching
out equally, nor
is it possible that there should be more
of what is in this place
and less in that, since it is all inviolable.
For, since it is equal
in all directions, it is equally confined
within limits.
Here shall I close my trustworthy speech
and thought about the truth.
Henceforward learn the opinions of mortals,
giving ear to the deceptive ordering of my
words.
Mortals have settled in their minds to speak
of two forms, one of which
they should have left out, and that is where
they go astray from the truth.
They have assigned an opposite
substance to each, and marks distinct from
one another. To the
one they allot the fire of heaven, light,
thin, in every direction
the same as itself, but not the same as the
other. The other is
opposite to it, dark night, a compact and
heavy body. Of these
I tell thee the whole arrangement as it seems
to men,
in order that no mortal may surpass thee
in knowledge.
Now that all things have been named light
and night; and the things
which belong to the power of each have been
assigned to these
things and to those, everything is full at
once of light and dark night,
both equal, since neither has aught to do
with the other.
And thou shalt know the origin of all the
things on high,
and all the signs in the sky, and the resplendent
works of the
glowing sun’s clear torch, and whence they
arose. And thou
shalt learn likewise of the wandering deeds
of the round-faced
moon, and of her origin. Thou shalt know,
too, the heavens
that surround us, whence they arose, and
how Necessity took
them and bound them to keep the limits of
the stars . . .
How the earth, and the sun, and the moon,
and the sky that is
common to all, and the Milky Way, and the
outermost Olympos,
and the burning might of the stars
arose.
The narrower circles are filled with unmixed
fire, and those
surrounding them with night, and in the midst
of these rushes
their portion of fire. In the midst of these
circles is the divinity that directs
the course of all things; for she rules over
all painful birth and all begetting,
driving the female to the embrace of the
male, and the male to that of the female.
First of all the gods she contrived Eros.
Shining by night with borrowed light, wandering
round the earth.
Always straining her eyes to the beams of
the sun.
On the right boys; on the left girls.
Thus, according to men’s opinions, did things
comp into
being, and thus they are now. In time (they
think) they will
grow up and pass away. To each of these things
men have
assigned a fixed name.
|
Ancient
Authors' Commentaries on Parmenides
Fairbanks's Introduction.
Page 86] Parmenides, the son of Pyres (or
Pyrrhes), of Elea, was born about 515 B.
C.; his family was of noble rank and rich,
but Parmenides devoted himself to philosophy.
He was associated with members of the Pythagorean
society, and is himself called a Pythagorean
by later writers. In the formation of his
philosophic system however he was most influenced
by his aged fellow-townsman, Xenophanes;
the doctrines of Xenophanes he developed
into a system which was embodied in a poetic
work "On Nature." The statement
that he made laws for the citizens may have
reference to some connection with the Pythagorean
society.
Proemium by Parmenides
(fragments)
The horses which bear me conducted me as
far as desire may go, when they had brought
me speeding along to the far-famed road of
a divinity who herself bears onward through
all things the man of understanding. Along
this road I was borne, along this the horses,
wise indeed, bore me hastening the chariot
on, and maidens guided my course. The axle
in its box, enkindled by the heat, uttered
the sound of a pipe (for it was driven on
by the rolling wheels on either side), when
the maiden daughters of Helios hastened to
conduct me [Page 89] to the light, leaving
the realms of night, pushing aside with the
hand the veils from their heads. There is
the gate between the ways of day and night
lintel above it, and stone threshold beneath,
hold it in place, and high in air it is fitted
with great doors; retributive Justice holds
the keys that open and shut them. 1 However,
the maidens addressed her with mild words,
and found means to persuade her to thrust
back speedily for them the fastened bolt
from the doors; and the gate swinging free
made the opening wide, turning in their sockets
the bronze hinges, well fastened with bolts
and nails; then through this the maidens
kept horses and chariot straight on the high-road.
The goddess received me with kindness, and,
taking my right hand in hers, she addressed
me with these words:--Youth joined with drivers
immortal, who hast come with the horses that
bear thee, to our dwelling, hail! since no
evil fate has bid thee come on this road
(for it lies far outside the beaten track
of men), but right and justice. 'Tis necessary
for thee to learn all things, both the abiding
essence of persuasive truth, and men's opinions
in which rests no true belief. But nevertheless
these things also thou shalt learn, since
it is necessary to judge accurately the things
that rest on opinion, passing all things
carefully in review.
CONCERNING TRUTH. Come now I will tell
thee-and do thou hear my word and heed it-what
are the only ways of enquiry that lead to
knowledge. The one way, [Page 91] assuming
that being is and that it is impossible for
it not to be, is the trustworthy path, for
truth attends it. The other, that not-being
is and that it necessarily is, I call a wholly
incredible course, since thou canst not recognise
not-being (for this is impossible), nor couldst
thou speak of it, for thought and being are
the same thing. It makes no difference to
me at what point I begin, for I shall always
come back again to this.
It is necessary both to say and to think
that being is; for it is possible that being
is, and it is impossible that not-being is
; this is what I bid thee ponder. I restrain
thee from this first course of investigation;
and from that course also along which mortals
knowing nothing wander aimlessly, since helplessness
directs the roaming thought in their bosoms,
and they are borne on deaf and like-wise
blind, amazed, headstrong races, they who
consider being and not-being as the same
and not the same; and that all things follow
a back-turning course.
That things which are not are, shall never
prevail, she said, but do thou restrain thy
mind from this course of investigation.
[Page 93] And let not long-practised habit
compel thee along this path, thine eye careless,
thine ear and thy tongue overpowered by noise;
but do thou weigh the much contested refutation
of their words, which I have uttered.
There is left but this single path to tell
thee of: namely, that being is. And on this
path there are many proofs that being is
without beginning and indestructible; it
is universal, existing alone, immovable and
without end; nor ever was it nor will it
be, since it now is, all together, one, and
continuous. For what generating of it wilt
thou seek out? From what did it grow, and
how? I will not permit thee to say or to
think that it came from not- being; for it
is impossible to think or to say that not-being
is. What thine would then have stirred it
into activity that it should arise from not-being
later rather than earlier? So it is necessary
that being either is absolutely or is not.
Nor will the force of the argument permit
that anything spring from being except being
itself. Therefore justice does not slacken
her fetters to permit generation or destruction,
but holds being firm.
(The decision as to these things comes in
at this point.)
[Page 95] Either being exists or it does
not exist. It has been decided in accordance
with necessity to leave the unthinkable,
unspeakable path, as this is not the true
path, but that the other path exists and
is true. How then should being suffer destruction?
How come into existence? If it came into
existence, it is not being, nor will it be
if it ever is to come into existence. . .
. So its generation is extinguished, and
its destruction is proved incredible.
Nor is it subject to division, for it is
all alike; nor is anything more in it, so
as to prevent its cohesion, nor anything
less, but all is full of being; therefore
the all is continuous, for being is contiguous
to being.
Farther it is unmoved, in the hold of great
chains, without beginning or end, since generation
and destruction have completely disappeared
and true belief has rejected them. It lies
the same, abiding in the same state and by
itself accordingly it abides fixed in the
same spot. For powerful necessity holds it
in confining bonds, which restrain it on
all sides. Therefore divine right does not
permit being to have any end; but it is lacking
in nothing, for if it lacked anything it
would lack everything.
Nevertheless, behold steadfastly all absent
things as present to thy mind; for thou canst
not separate [Page 97] being in one place
from contact with being in another place;
it is not scattered here and there through
the universe, nor is it compounded of parts.
Therefore thinking and that by reason of
which thought exists are one and the same
thing, for thou wilt not find thinking without
the being from which it receives its name.
Nor is there nor will there be anything apart
from being; for fate has linked it together,
so that it is a whole and immovable. Wherefore
all these things will be but a name, all
these things which mortals determined in
the belief that they were true, viz. that
things arise and perish, that they are and
are not, that they change their position
and vary in colour.
But since there is a final limit, it is perfected
on every side, like the mass of a rounded
sphere, equally distant from the centre at
every point. For it is necessary that it
should neither be greater at all nor less
anywhere, since there is no not-being which
can prevent it from arriving at equality,
nor is being such that there may ever be
more than what is in one part and less in
another, since the whole is inviolate. For
if it is equal on all sides, it abides in
equality within its limits.
At this point I cease trustworthy discourse
and the thought about truth; from here on,
learn the opinions of mortals, hearing of
the illusive order of my verses.
Men have determined in their minds to name
two principles [lit. forms]; but one of these
they ought not to name, and in so doing they
have erred. They distinguish them as antithetic
in character, and give them each character
and attributes distinct from those of the
other. On the one hand there is the aethereal
flame of fire, fine, rarefied, everywhere
identical with itself and not identical with
its opposite; and on the other hand, opposed
to the first, is the second principle, flameless
darkness, dense and heavy in character. Of
these two principles I declare to thee every
arrangement as it appears to men, so that
no knowledge among mortals may surpass thine.
But since all things are called light and
darkness, and the peculiar properties of
these are predicated of one thing and another,
everything is at the same time full of light
and of obscure darkness, of both equally,
since neither has anything in common with
the other.
And the smaller circles are filled with unmixed
fire, and those next them with darkness into
which their portion of light penetrates;
in the midst of these is the divinity who
directs the course of all.
[Page 101] For she controls dreaded birth
and coition in every part of the universe,
sending female to join with male, and again
male to female.
First of all the gods she devised love.
Thou shalt know the nature of the heavens
and all signs that are in the sky, the destructive
deeds of the pure bright torch of the sun
and whence they arose, and thou shalt learn
the wandering deeds of the round-eyed moon
and its nature. Thou shalt know also the
sky surrounding all, whence it arose, and
how necessity took it and chained it so as
to serve as a limit to the courses of the
stars. How earth and sun and moon and common
sky and the milky way of the heavens and
highest Olympos and the burning
(might of the) stars began to be.
It (the moon) wanders about the earth, shining
at night with borrowed light. She is always
gazing earnestly toward the rays of the sun.
For as at any time is the blending of very
complex members in a man, so is the mind
in men constituted; for that which thinks
is the same in all men and in every man,
viz. the essence of the members of the body;
and the element that is in excess is thought.
On the right hand boys, on the left hand
girls.
So, according to men's opinions, did things
arise, and so they are now, and from this
state when they shall have reached maturity
shall they perish. For each of these men
has determined a name as a distinguishing
mark.
When male and female mingle seed of Venus
in the form [the body] of one, the excellence
from the two different bloods, if it preserves
harmony, fashions a well-formed body; but
if when the seed is mingled the excellencies
fight against each other
[Page 102] Femina virque simul Veneris cum
germina miscent unius in formam diverso ex
sanguine virtus temperiem servans bene condita
corpora fingit. at si virtutes permixto semine
pugnent nec faciant unam permixto in corpore
dirae nascentem gemino vexabiint semine sexum.
and do not unite into one, they will distress
the sex that is coming into existence, as
the twofold seed is mingled in the body of
the unfortunate woman.
With this there are fineness and heat and
light and softness and brightness; and with
the dense are classed cold and darkness and
hardness and weight, for these are separated
the ones on one side, the others on the other.
Ancient Authors' Commentaries on Parmenides
Literature: The fragments of Parmenides have
been collected by Peyron, Leipzig 1810 ;
Karsten, Amsterdam 1830; Brandis, Comm. Eleat.
Altona 1813; Vatke, Berlin 1864; Stein, Symb.
philol. Bonn. Leipzig 1867; V. Revue Phil.
1883, 5: 1884, 9. Berger, Die Zonenlehre
d. Parm. Munchen, 1895.
Plato, Theaet. 180 D. I almost forgot, Theodoros,
that there were others who asserted opinions
the very opposite of these: 'the all is alone,
unmoved; to this all names apply,' and the
other emphatic statements in opposition to
those referred to, which the school of Melissos
and Parmenides make, to the effect that all
things are one, and that the all stands itself
in itself, not having space in which it is
moved. Ibid. 183 E. Feeling ashamed before
Melissos and the rest who assert that the
all is one being, for fear we should examine
the matter somewhat crudely, I am even more
ashamed in view of the fact that Parmenides
is one of them. Parmenides seems to me, in
the words of Homer, a man to be reverenced
and at the same time feared. For when I was
a mere youth and he a very old man, I conversed
with him, and he seemed to me to have an
exceedingly wonderful depth of mind. I fear
lest we may not understand what he said,
and that we may fail still more to understand
his thoughts in saying it; and, what is most
important, I fear lest the question before
us should fail to receive due consideration.
. . .
Soph. 238 c (concluding a discussion of Parmenides).
You understand then that it is really impossible
to speak of not-being or to say anything
about it or to conceive it by itself, but
it is inconceivable, not to be spoken of
or mentioned, and irrational.
Parm. 150 B. Accordingly the unity itself
in relation to itself is as follows : Having
in itself neither greatness nor littleness,
-it could not be exceeded by itself nor could
it exceed itself, but being equal it would
be equal to itself.
[Page 104] Ibid. 163 c. This statement: It
does not exist, means absolutely that it
does not exist anywhere in any way, nor does
not-being have any share at all in being.
Accordingly not-being could not exist, nor
in any other way could it have a share in
being.
(Symp. 178 iB, 195 c : Reference to the stories
which Hesiod and Parmenides told about the
gods. Line 132 is quoted.)
Arist. Phys. i. 2; 184 b 16. The first principle
must be one, unmoved, as Parmenides and Melissos
say, . . .
Ibid. i. 3 ; 186 a 4. To those proceeding
after this impossible manner things seem
to be one, and it is not difficult to refute
them from their own statements. For both
of them reason in a fallacious manner, both
Parmenides and Melissos; for they make false
assumptions, and at the same time their course
of reasoning is not logical. . . . And the
same sort of arguments are used by Parmenides,
although he has some others of his own, and
the refutation consists in showing both that
he makes mistakes of fact and that he does
not draw his conclusions correctly. He makes
a mistake in assuming that being is to be
spoken of absolutely, speaking of it thus
many times; and he draws the false conclusion
that, in case only whites are considered,
white meaning one thing, none the less there
are many whites and not one; since neither
in the succession of things nor, in the argument
will whiteness be one. For what is predicated
of white will not be the same as what is
predicated of the object which is white,
and nothing except white will be separated
from the object; since there is no other
ground of separation except the fact that
the white is different from the object in
which the white exists. But Parmenides had
not yet arrived at the knowledge of this.
Ibid. i. 5 ; 188 a 20. Parmenides also makes
heat [Page 105] and cold first principles;
and he calls them fire and earth.
Ibid. iii. 6 ; 207 a 15. Wherefore we must
regard Parmenides as a more acute thinker
than Melissos, for the latter says that the
infinite is the all, but the former asserts
that the all is limited, equally distant
from the centre [on every side].
Gen. Corr. i. 3 ; 318 b 6. Parmenides says
that the two exist, both being and not being-i.
e. earth and water.
Metaph. i. 3 ; 984 b 1. None of those who
have affirmed that the all is one have, it
happens, seen the nature of such a cause
clearly, except, perhaps, Parmenides, and
he in so far as he sometimes asserts that
there is not one cause alone, but two causes.
Metaph. i. 5; 986 b l8. For Parmenides seemed
to lay hold of a unity according to reason,
and Melissos according to matter; wherefore
the former says it is limited, the latter
that it is unlimited. - Xenophanes first
taught the unity of things (Parmenides is
said to have been his pupil), but he did
not make anything clear, nor did he seem
to get at the nature of either finiteness
or infinity, but, looking up into the broad
heavens, he said, the unity is god. These,
as we said, are to be dismissed from the
present investigation, two of them entirely
as being somewhat more crude, Xenophanes
and Melissos; but Parmenides seems to speak
in some places with greater care. For believing
that not-being does not exist in addition
to being, of necessity he thinks that being
is one and that there is nothing else. .
. . and being compelled to account for phenomena,
and assuming that things are one from the
standpoint of reason, plural from the standpoint
of sense, he again asserts that there are
two causes and two first principles, heat
and [Page 106] cold, or, as he calls them,
fire and earth ; of these he regards heat
as being, its opposite as not-being.
Metaph. ii. 4; 1001 a 32. There is nothing
different from being, so that it is necessary
to agree with the reasoning of Parmenides
that all things are one, and that this is
being.
PASSAGES RELATING TO PARMENIDES IN THE DOXOGRAPHISTS
Theophrastos, Fr. 6 ; Alexander Metaph. p.
24, 5 Bon.; Dox. 482. And succeeding him
Parmenides, son of Pyres, the Eleatic-Theophrastos
adds the name of Xenophanes-followed both
ways. For in declaring that the all is eternal,
and in attempting to explain the genesis
of things, he expresses different opinions
according to the two standpoints:-from the
standpoint of truth he supposes the all to
be one and not generated and spheroidal in
form, while from the standpoint of popular
opinion, in order to explain generation of
phenomena, he uses two first principles,
fire and earth, the one as matter, the other
as cause and agent. Theophrastos, Fr. 6a;
Laer. Diog. ix. 21, 22; Dox. 482. Parmenides,
son of Pyres, the Eleatic, was a pupil of
Xenophanes, yet he did not accept his doctrines.
. . . He was the first to declare that the
earth is spheroidal and situated in the middle
of the universe. He said that there are two
elements, fire and earth; the one has the
office of demiurge, the other that of matter.
Men first arose from mud ; heat and cold
are the elements of which all things are
composed. He holds that intelligence and
life are the same, as Theophrastos records
in his book on physics, where he put down
the opinions of almost everybody. He said
that philosophy has a twofold office, to
understand both the truth and also what [Page
107] men believe. Accordingly- he says: (Vv.
28-30)) 'Tis necessary for thee to learn
all things, both the abiding essence of persuasive
truth and men's opinions in which rests no
true belief.'
Theoph, Fr. 17 ; Diog. Laer. viii. 48 ; Dox.
492. Theophrastos says that Parmenides was
the first to call the heavens a universe
and the earth spheroidal.
Theoph. de Sens. 3 ; Dox. 499. Parmenides
does not make any definite statements as
to sensation, except that knowledge is in
proportion to the excess of one of the two
elements. Intelligence varies as the heat
or the cold is in excess, and it is better
and purer by reason of heat; but nevertheless
it has need of a certain symmetry. (Vv.
146-149) 'For,' he says, 'as at any time
is the blending of very complex members in
a man, so is the mind in men constituted;
for that which thinks is the same in all
men and in every man, viz., the essence of
the members of the body; and the element
that is in excess is thought.' He says that
perceiving and thinking are the same thing,
and that remembering and forgetting come
from these6 as the result of mixture, but
he does not say definitely whether, if they
enter into the mixture in equal quantities,
thought will arise or not, nor what the disposition
should be. But it is evident that he believes
sensation to take place by the presence of
some quality in contrast with its opposite,
where he says that a corpse does not perceive
light and heat and sound by reason of the
absence of fire, but that it perceives cold
and silence and the similar contrasted qualities,
and in general that being as a whole has
a certain knowledge. So in his statements
he seems to do away with what is difficult
by leaving it out.
Theophr. Fr. 7 ; Simpl. Phys. 25 r 11 5 ;
Dox. 483. In [Page 108] the first book of
his physics Theophrastos gives as the opinion
of Parmenides: That which is outside of being
is not-being, not-being is nothing, accordingly
being is one.
Hipp. Phil. 11 ; Dox. 564. Parmenides supposes
that the all is one and eternal, and without
beginning and spheroidal in form; but even
he does not escape the opinion of the many,
for he speaks of fire and earth as first
principles of the all, of earth as matter,
and of fire as agent and cause, and he says
that the earth will come to an end, but in
what way he does not say. He says that the
all is eternal, and not generated, and spherical,
and homogeneous, not having place in itself,
and unmoved, and limited.
Plut. Strom. 5; Dox. 580. Parmenides the
Eleatic, the companion of Xenophanes, both
laid claim to his opinions, and at the same
time took the opposite standpoint. For he
declared the all to be eternal and immovable
according to the real state of the case;
for it is alone, existing alone, immovable
and without beginning (v. 60) ; but there
is a generation of the things that seem to
be according to false opinion, and he excepts
sense perceptions from the truth. He says
that if anything exists besides being, this
is not-being, but not-being does not exist
at all. So there is left the being that has
no beginning; and he says that the earth
was formed by the precipitation of dense
air.
Epiph. adv. Haer. iii. 10; Dox. 590. Parmenides,
the son of Pyres, himself also of the Eleatic
school, said that the first principle of
all things is the infinite.
Cie. de Nat. Deor. i. 11 ; Dox. 534. For
Parmenides devised a sort of contrivance
like a crown (he applied to it the word GREEK),
an orb of light with continuous heat, which
arched the sky, and this he called [Page
109] god, but in it no one could suspect
a divine form or a divine sentiment, and
he made many monstrosities of this sort;
moreover, he raised to the rank of gods War,
Discord, Desire, and many other things which
disease or sleep or forgetfulness or old
age destroys; and Similarly with reference
to the stars he expresses opinions which
have been criticized elsewhere and are omitted
here.
Aet. i. 3; Dox. 284. Parmenides, the Eleatic,
son of Pyrrhes, was a companion of Xenophanes,
and in his first book the doctrines agree
with those of his master; for here that verse
occurs: (V. 60), Universal, existing alone,
immovable and without beginning. He said
that the cause of all things is not earth
alone, as his master said, but also fire.
7;
303. The world is immovable and limited,
and spheroidal in form. 24; 320. Parmenides
and Melissos did away with generation and
destruction, because they thought that the
all is unmoved. 25; 321. All things are controlled
by necessity; this is fated, it is justice
and forethought, and the producer of the
world.
Aet. ii. 1 ; Dox. 827. The world is one.
4; 332. It is without beginning and eternal
and indestructible. 7; 335. Parmenides taught
that there were crowns encircling one another
in close succession, 8 one of rarefied matter,
another of dense, and between these other
mixed crowns of light and darkness; and that
which surrounded all was solid like a wall,
and under this was a crown of fire; and the
centre of all the crowns was solid, and around
it was a circle of fire; and of the mixed
crowns the one nearest the centre was the
source of motion and generation for all,
and this 'the goddess who directs the helm
and holds the keys,'9 he calls 'justice and
necessity.' The air is that which is separated
from the earth, being evaporated by the [Page
110] forcible pressure of the earth; the
sun and the circle of the milky way are the
exhalation of fire, and the moon is the mixture
of both, namely of air and fire. The aether
stands highest of all and surrounding all,
and beneath this is ranged the fiery element
which we call the heavens, and beneath this
are the things of earth. 11 ; 339. The revolving
vault highest above the earth is the heavens.
340. The heavens are of a fiery nature. 13
; 342. The stars are masses of fire. 15 ;
345. He ranks the morning star, which he
considers the same as the evening star, first
in the aether; and after this the sun, and
beneath this the stars in the fiery vault
which he calls the heavens. 17; 346. Stars
are fed from the exhalations of the earth.
20 ; 349. The sun is of a fiery nature. The
sun and the moon are separated from the milky
way, the one from the thinner mixture, which
is hot, the other from the denser, which
is cold. 25; 356. The moon is of a fiery
nature. 26; 357. The moon is of the same
size as the sun, and derives its light, from
it. 30; 361. (The moon appears dark) because
darkness is mingled with its fiery nature,
whence he calls it the star that shines with
a false light.
Aet. iii. 1 ; 365. The mixture of dense and
thin gives its milk-like appearance to the
milky way. 11; 377.. Parmenides first defined
the inhabited parts of the earth by the two
tropical zones. - 15 ; 380. Because the earth
is equally distant on all sides from other
bodies, and so, rests in an equilibrium,
not having any reason for swaying one way
rather than another; on this account it only
shakes and does not move from its place.
Aet. iv. 3; 388. The soul is of a fiery nature..
5 ; 391. The reason is in the whole breast.
392. Life and intelligence are the same thing,
nor could there be any living being entirely
without reason. 9; 397. Sensations arise
part by part according to the symmetry of
[Page 111] the pores, each particular object
of sense being adapted to each sense (organ).
398. Desire is produced by lack of nourishment.
Aet. v. 7; 419. Parmenides holds the opposite
opinion; males are produced in the northern
part, for this shares the greater density;
and females in the southern part by reason
of its rarefied state. 420. Some descend
from the right side to the right parts of
the womb, others from the left to the left
parts of the womb; but if they cross in the
descent females are born. 11; 422. When the
child comes from the right side of the womb,
it resembles the father ; when it comes from
the left side, the mother. 30 ; 443. Old
age attends the failure of heat.
Hanover Historical Texts Project Hanover
College Department of History Please send
comments to: luttmer@hanover.edu
An Alternative Translation
On Nature (Peri Physeos)
by Parmenides of Elea (c. 475 B. C.) Edited
by Allan F. Randall from translations by
David Gallop, Richard D. McKirahan, Jr.,
Jonathan Barnes, John Mansley Robinson and
others.
1The mares, which carry me as far as my heart
desires, were escorting me. They brought
and placed me upon the well-spoken path of
the Goddess, which carries everywhere unscathed
the mortal who knows. Thereon was I carried,
for thereon the wise mares did carry me,
straining to pull the chariot, with maidens
guiding the way. The axle, glowing in its
naves, gave forth the shrill sound of a musical
pipe, urged on by two rounded wheels on either
end, even whilst maidens, Daughters of the
Sun, were hastening to escort me, after leaving
the House of Night for the light, having
pushed back the veils from their heads with
their hands.
Ahead are the gates of the paths of Night
and Day. A lintel and stone threshold surround
them. The aetherial gates themselves are
filled with great doors, for which much-avenging
Justice holds the keys of retribution. Coaxing
her with gentle words, the maidens did cunningly
persuade her to push back the bolted bar
for them swiftly from the gates. These made
of the doors a yawning gap as they were opened
wide, swinging in turn the bronze posts in
their sockets, fastened with rivets and pins.
Straight through them at that point did the
maidens drive the chariot and mares along
the broad way.
The Goddess received me kindly, took my right
hand in Hers, uttered speech and thus addressed
me: "Youth, attended by immortal charioteers,
who come to our House by these mares that
carry you, welcome. For it was no ill fortune
that sent you forth to travel this road (lying
far indeed from the beaten path of humans),
but Right and Justice. And it is right that
you should learn all things, both the persuasive,
unshaken heart of Objective Truth, and the
subjective beliefs of mortals, in which there
is no true trust. But you shall learn these
too: how, for the mortals passing through
them, the things-that-seem must 'really exist',
being, for them, all there is.
The Way of Objectivity (Aletheia)
2"Come now, listen, and convey my story.
I shall tell you what paths of inquiry alone
there are for thinking:
#1. The one: that it is and it is impossible
for it not to be.
This is the path of Persuasion, for it accompanies
Objective Truth.
#2. The other: that it is not and it necessarily
must not be.
That, I point out to you, is a path wholly
unthinkable, for neither could you know what-is-not
(for that is impossible), nor could you point
it out.
6"Whatever can be spoken or thought
of necessarily is, since it is possible for
it to be, but it is not possible for nothing
to be. I urge you to consider this last point,
for I restrain you firstly from that path
of inquiry (#2), and secondly from:
. The one on which mortals, knowing nothing,
wander, two-headed, for helplessness in their
breasts guides their wandering minds and
they are carried, deaf and blind alike, dazed,
uncritical tribes, for whom being and not-being
are thought the same and yet not the same,
and the path of all runs in opposite directions.
7For never shall this be proved: that things
that are not are. But do restrain your thought
from this path of inquiry, and do not let
habit, born from much experience, compel
you along this path, to guide your sightless
eye and ringing ear and tongue. But judge
by reason the highly contentious disproof
that I have spoken.
8a"
One path only is left for us to speak of:
that it is.
On this path there are a multitude of indications
that what-is, being ungenerated, is also
imperishable, whole, of a single kind, immovable
and complete. Nor was it once, nor will it
be, since it is, now, all together, one and
continuous. For what coming-to-be of it will
you seek? How and from where did it grow?
I shall not permit you to say or to think
that it grew from what-is-not, for it is
not to be said or thought that it is not.
What necessity could have impelled it to
grow later rather than sooner, if it began
from nothing? Thus it must either fully be,
or be not at all. Nor will the force of conviction
ever allow anything, from what-is, to come-to-be
something apart from itself; wherefore Justice
does not loosen her shackles so as to allow
it to come-to-be or to perish, but holds
it fast.
"The decision on these matters depends
on this: either it is or it is not. But it
has been decided, as is necessary, to let
go the one as unthinkable and unnameable
(for it is no true path), but to allow the
other, so that it is, and is true. How could
what-is be in the future? How could it come-to-be?
For if it came-to-be, it is not, nor is it
if at some time it is going to be. Thus,
coming-to-be is extinguished and perishing
unheard of.
"Nor is it divisible, since it all alike
is. Nor is there any more of it here than
there, to hinder it from holding together,
nor any less of it, but it is all a plenum,
full of what-is. Therefore, it is all continuous,
for what-is touches what-is.
"Moreover, unchanging in the limits
of great bonds, it is without beginning or
end, since coming-to-be and perishing were
banished far away, and true conviction drove
them out. Remaining the same, in the same
place, it lies in itself, and thus firmly
remains there. For mighty Necessity holds
it fast in the bonds of a limit, which fences
it about, since it is not right for what-is
to be incomplete. For it lacks nothing. If
it lacked anything, it would lack everything.
8c
"Since, then, there is an ultimate limit,
it is completed from every direction like
the bulk of a perfect sphere, evenly balanced
in every way from the centre, as it must
not be any greater or smaller here than there.
For neither is there what-is-not, which could
stop it from reaching its like, nor is there
a way in which what-is could be more here
and less there, since it all inviolably is.
For equal to itself in every direction, it
reaches its limits uniformly.
3
"The same thing is there for thinking
of and for being. 4Look upon things which,
though absent, are yet firmly present in
thought (for you shall not cut off what-is
from holding fast to what-is, since it neither
disperses itself in all directions throughout
the order of the Cosmos, nor does it gather
itself together). 8bIt is the same thing,
to think of something and to think that it
is, since you will never find thought without
what-is, to which it refers, and on which
it depends. For nothing is nor will be except
what-is, since it was just this that Fate
did shackle to be whole and unchanging; wherefore
it has been named all things that mortals
have established, persuaded that they are
true: 'to come-to-be and to perish', 'to
be and not to be' and 'to shift place and
exchange bright colour'.
The Way of Subjectivity (Doxa)
5"Wherever I begin, it is all one to
me, for there I shall return again.
8d
"Here I stop my trustworthy speech to
you and thought about Objective Truth. From
here on, learn the subjective beliefs of
mortals; listen to the deceptive ordering
of my words. For they made up their minds
to name two forms, one of which it is not
right to name at all (here is where they
have gone astray) and have distinguished
them as opposite in bodily form and have
assigned to them marks distinguishing them
from one another:
#1. Here, on the one hand, aetherial flame
of fire, gentle, very light, everywhere the
same as itself... #2. But not the same as
this other, which in itself is opposite:
dark night, a dense and heavy body.
"All this order I present to you as
probable, so that no mortal belief shall
ever outdo you. 9
But since all things have been named light
and night, and their powers have been assigned
to each, all is a plenum of light and obscure
night together, both equal, since nothingness
partakes in neither.
10
"You shall know the nature of the aether
and all the signs in the aether, the destructive
works of the splendid Sun's pure torch, and
whence they came-to-be. And you shall learn
the wandering works of the round-faced Moon,
and its nature, and you shall know also the
surrounding heaven, whence it grew and how
Necessity did guide and shackle it to hold
the limits of the stars. 14The Moon: night-shiner,
wandering around the Earth, an alien light,
15always looking towards the rays of the
Sun. 15aThe Earth: rooted-in-water. 11
And you shall learn how Earth and Sun and
Moon and the aether common to all, the Milky
Way and the outermost heaven, and the hot
force of the stars did surge forth to come-to-be.
12
"For the narrower rings are filled with
unmingled fire, the ones next to them with
night, but a due amount of fire is inserted
amongst it. In the midst of these is the
goddess who governs everything. For she rules
over hateful birth and union of all things,
sending female to unite with male, and again
conversely male with female.
13
"She devised Love first of all the gods.
18
When man and woman mingle the seeds of love
that spring from their veins, a formative
power, maintaining proper proportions, moulds
well-formed bodies from this diverse blood
(for if, when the seed is mingled, the forces
therein clash and do not fuse into one, then
cruelly will they plague the offspring with
a double-gender). 17She placed young males
on the right side of the womb, young females
on the left.
16
"According to the union within each
person of disparate body parts, thus does
mind emerge in humans. For it is the composition
of body parts which does the thinking, and
Thought (since it defines the plenum) is
the same in each and every human.
19
"Thus, according to belief, these things
were born and now are, and hereafter, having
grown from this, they will come to an end.
And for each of these did humans establish
a distinctive name. 20One and unchanging
is that for which as a whole the name is:
'to be'."
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