Introduction

I. The Power of God. II Universals. Plato Aristotle Ockham. III Epistemology The Age of Reform Ockham Luther. Conclusion. Bibliography. Notes.

Introduction


William of Ockham, one of the most notable thinkers of his day (and a century afterward), was in on the ground level of what has become, to many Modern thinkers, quite an upsetting occurrence. He probably never anticipated his dream coming true: the death of universals. The fact that they are dead is no surprise to modern scholars who have tended not to trust these structures anymore, whatever they may look like, and even shy away from using the word "universal." Contemporary Postmodern philosopher Jean-François Lyotard equates universals with "metanarratives": overarching and universally applicable maxims (equally applicable through time and space), i. e. truth, knowledge, ethics, or God. In fact, Lyotard defines postmodernity as "incredulity towards metanarratives," and has been working hard within a band of intrepid thinkers to make sure they never return.(1) Below is a discussion of the framework of this occurrence, focusing on the theology, metaphysics and epistemology of William of Ockham. I hope to briefly describe his understanding of the power of God, place his view of universals in a wider philosophical context, and explore his empirical epistemology and rejection of realism. Finally, I want to connect his beliefs with their repercussions, as formulated by the Protestant Reformer Martin Luther.

Born in 1285, probably in the village of Ockham, outside of London, William of Ockham was the brightest thinker of the Late Middle Ages. He worked as a Franciscan theologian and scholar, teaching at Oxford until his views came under question by the papal court of Avignon in 1324. There, he met Michael of Cesena, who was also under papal charges, and together they began to review the papal constitutions on apostolic poverty. Through that study, they finally agreed that Pope John XXII (r.1316-1334) had fallen into heresy. In 1328, Ockham and Cesena fled to the protection of Emperor Louis IV of Bavaria, the political opponent of the pope in Italy and Germany. In the Franciscan convent in Munich, Ockham wrote mostly political treatises for the last two decades of his life, mainly aimed at John XXII and his successors. Ockham died in April 1347.

Ockham was first and foremost a Franciscan theologian. While much of his work seems plainly philosophical, logical, and scientific, it was out of religious motivation and faithful conviction that he worked. While extremely innovative and creative in his thinking, often daring to reject previous thinkers because of their basic presuppositions, Ockham incorporated much of the work of some previous theologians, especially John Duns Scotus. From Scotus, Ockham derived his view of divine omnipotence, his view of grace and justification, much of his epistemology and ethical convictions. However, he also reacted to and against Scotus in the areas of predestination, penance, his understanding of universals, his distinction ex parte rei (that is, 'as applied to created things'), and his view of parsimony. Some of these points need explanation:

To begin to understand Ockham's thought, there are a number of principles and presuppositions adopted from his predecessors which he used repeatedly.( 2) The first was a belief in the total transcendence of God, and utter contingency of all aspects of creation. That is, there is nothing other than God which is absolutely necessary, including the physical and moral laws of our world. The second, closely related to the first, is the distinction between potentia absoluta and potentia ordinata. That is, the difference between the power of God as considered by itself, and that power considered from a standpoint of the decrees God has made. God is free to do whatever God chooses to do, so long as it does not contradict the nature of God. This notion was derived from Scotus and other thirteenth-century thinkers. The third principle is that individual substances and qualities are the fundamental physical realities in human experience. The world is made up of individually existing things, not universalities; this was taught by Abélard in the twelfth century.(3) Thus, the task of theology and philosophy is to explain the similarity and universality exhibited in the world around us, not its individuation. Fourth and finally, Ockham adhered to the principle of parsimony, or economy of "sufficient reason": plurality ought not to be posited without necessity. This became commonly known as Ockham's razor, or in lay terms, "the simplest answer is usually the correct one."

I would now like to explore in more detail three principles raised above. Section I deals with the power of God (omnipotence and absolute/ordained powers); II covers the issue of Universals and Ockham's metaphysics; III describes his epistemology.

I - The Power of God

Divine power and the ground of possibility were two areas of questioning common to the Medieval period. They asked questions relevant to their situation about the ability of God: "Are things possible because God has the power to make them, or does God have the power to make them because they are possible?" or "Are things impossible because God lacks the power to make them, or does [God] lack the power to make them because they are impossible?"(4) The center of their questions revolved around finding the 'source' or 'ultimate ground' of possibility and impossibility. Some found the answer in God's power, and others in God's lack of it. Throughout his writings, Ockham constantly reiterated his belief in the total transcendence of God. God is not reliant upon any person nor power for existence, the power to create, or the power not to create. In other words, God is not coerced by any outside principle or power to be God or to do the work of God. The Creator may choose not to create, or to create however God sees fit. The definition of creature is utter dependence and contingency on the will of the Creator.

His second distinction is that between potentia absoluta and potentia ordinata. In order to underscore the contingent relationship between the creation and the Creator, Ockham stressed the difference "between what God might have done and still theoretically can do and what he [sic] in fact has done and promises to do."(5) Potentia absoluta is the first, relating to God's omnipotence, and means that God is free to do whatever God chooses to do, so far as it is without contradiction to God's nature. This would include coming to earth in the messiah as a piece of wood, or a goat, or droplets of water. While sounding almost farcical to us, this line of argument was quite insulting to his opponents. Then, because God is free to act freely, sole reliance on reason, Ockham insists, in matters of faith is to be rejected. When we discover categories of how we expect God will act or work, we are then limiting God to behave in a particular way, and hence being unfaithful as Christians. Ockham might say "when we base our faiths on reason and 'figure out' what God will do or say, we are putting God in a box," and limiting the scope of what God is capable and incapable of doing.

The second power of God, potentia ordinata is the way God has acted in history, decrees, and revelation. It is the concrete and actual ways we have come to experience God in the world. God has chosen to be bound to the creation and to uphold natural and spiritual orders. While God has the freedom to move in any direction, the Creator has made choices which we experience as our universe. Potentia ordinata refers to those things which God does according to the laws God alone has ordained and instituted.(6) God's created order thus represents the willed and realized possibilities out of numerous others. In this line of reasoning, however, Ockham does not mean that there are really two powers in God.

II - Universals

Ockham's metaphysics embraces one of the most extreme forms of Nominalism for the Middle Ages, as he entirely rejected the real existence of Universals. This is the third presupposition mentioned above, and to which we now return. It is this belief which is the core of Nominalist philosophy: that only particulars exist and universals are mere categories, contrived simply for our understanding. This, of course has serious philosophical and theological consequences, which we will explore later. Classical philosophy had generally fallen (and perhaps still does) into two camps: Platonic philosophy [the way from above], which includes the great Socrates; and Aristotelian philosophy [the way from below]. In this section I hope to lay out William of Ockham's Nominalist thinking in comparison to earlier Platonism and Aristotelian metaphysics; this will hopefully provide the background for his tendencies away from the via antiqua, the realists, and the established academy.

Plato

Platonic philosophy centers around the existence of two worlds: the world of ideas & forms, and the world of objects & things. Both make up the whole of reality. Forms are what we normally identify with the term 'properties': beauty, or being beautiful, largeness, or being large. They are distinguished from things that have properties: chairs, books, persons. Objects are the concrete articles in our own world which we use to cook, drive, or flush. They are made up of matter, but have attributed to them qualities of forms. Therefore, the matter which makes up the chair is defined or ruled by the form of a chair. 'Chair-ness' (or any design which holds up a sitting individual, is portable, normally seats one, etc.) is what sets this matter off to be recognizable as a chair. The wood or metal that it is made of could also be fashioned into a hat, a boat, or a lamp. What distinguishes Plato's theory is that while we use, enjoy, and appreciate the concrete objects in our world, it is truly the world of ideas which is greater still; it allows us to create useful and beautiful and elaborate objects. Each single Form is always distinguished from the many things which 'participate' in it. There are many beautiful things, but they all share in the one Form, Beauty. Properties are what we also call universals, as opposed to particulars.(7) Plato developed this understanding through a long process, best encapsulated in his allegory of the cave, which spoke of enchained prisoners in a dark cave, only allowed to see 'shadows' of the 'real' and bright world outside. Once freed through their intellects, they see reality in full color, depth, and clarity. To Plato, the more 'perfect' something is, the more 'real' it also is; most of the world we see around us breaks, deteriorates, and is flawed. It is the universal categories which never break or deteriorate, and they are, by definition, never flawed. Plato's epistemology then, is rooted not in the observance of this dark and broken world, but in contemplating the realm which is unaffected by accident, tragedy, or selfishness. The perfect world of ideas is where we should begin our truth, knowledge, ethics, and theology. This belief is often associated with a priori knowledge: it does not begin with observance of the world around us, but may be found independently in the mind which is freed enough of its earthly fetters.

Aristotle

Aristotelian philosophy basically begins at the other pole in this discussion: only through observance and comparison of the world around us can we begin to understand it. Aristotle affirmed his teacher's two ultimate categories: Forms and Objects [universals and particulars], but found a different way for moving between the two. Our use of the senses is not to be discounted as a way of knowing, since the primary kind of being is substance. By observing, categorizing, and determining causality in this substance, we are on well on our way to understanding concrete reality and the reality of forms; we are also on the way to the beginnings of modern science.(8) This a posteriori approach employed by science brings together many different objects whose definitions are different but are related focally to one thing. We correlate the concrete similarities between those different objects, and thus arrive at the common Form or 'essence' which defines them. And it is in the study of human beings that we find their essence is a soul -- which is not simply matter -- and which also exhibits the Form that makes them up. Universals are unforgiving and immovable; therefore, the study of immovable substance (theology) counts as first philosophy. To Aristotle, universals still remain the only perfect and worthy goals of knowledge; we must simply arrive there by different means. It was Thomas Aquinas who was the strongest Medieval proponent of Aristotelian thought and logic, and alone tremendously influenced the increase of scientific investigation and observation.

Ockham

Ockham's view of universals does not grant as much confidence in the world of ungraspable, unseeable forms and ideas. Basically, universals do not even exist as external realities in apposition to concrete realities. They are simply useful terms which we can employ to sort the world we see and feel around us. Therefore species, category, or archetypes are not valid properties which exist "out there" somewhere; they are ways of describing similarities we notice among objects. Plato holds that there is an inherent, common nature among similar things: the properties of being a flower are present in roses, geraniums, and daisies. This nature also exists outside of the flower itself. Ockham insists that this is completely invalid; there are no common natures. Thus in answer to the ontological question of universals, Ockham does not allow both the view of a common nature existing apart from things and the view of a universal or common nature existing in things.(9) We arrive at general concepts (universals) by beginning with our experience of individuals and slowly build up our idea of similarity
(a posteriori knowledge).(10) Platonic and even Aristotelian thinkers would contend that the more 'real' realities in the cosmos are the timeless, immutable Forms, of which we recognize individual examples
(particulars) in our external reality and time. To that, Ockham answers: "without existing things, time, in our sense, would not exist."(11) He believed that Aristotle's categories of quantity and relation are not things in themselves, but are descriptions for the ways in which substances and qualities act or interact.(12) Originally holding that a universal concept was a mental object, a fictum, or image created by the mind but possessing no reality other than logical being, Ockham later maintained that the concept was a psychic entity identical with the act of knowing: the act of abstractive cognition.(13) This raises the issue of knowing.

III - Epistemology

A final theoretical area to explore before moving to Luther's Reformation is Ockham's epistemology, or his answer to the question "how do we know?" This point is crucial in defining theologians and philosophers, as upon its shoulders rides their understandings of truth, metaphysics, human nature, and ethics. Ockham's epistemological revolution came through his insistence that individual things could be known as individual things, that direct, unmediated knowledge of particulars was possible.(14) He reduced all of human knowledge into two fundamental categories: intuitive and abstract. Intuitive knowledge is based upon "existential judgments," which means judging an object by direct experience when it is present to our senses; to intuit means to behold and gaze on something attentively.(15) There is no need to depend upon assumed universals or common nature to mediate our sensations and experiences. "For Ockham, the mind naturally had a proper, simple, unconfused, and fully dependable cognition of singular things. No more need be said; nothing else need be postulated; no further terms need be assumed."(16)

Unlike intuitive knowledge, abstract knowledge is not concerned with existential judgments; it is knowledge people have regardless of whether or not what they know presently exists outside the mind.(17) Still, it is based upon intuitive knowledge; all abstractions come from actual experience of a world outside the mind. One's memory of something that was once verified is a form of simple abstractive knowledge. These memories are filed away and retrieved for later reference, to make life quicker and easier. However, humans also have the ability to create new mental objects which never have or ever will exist literally outside the mind. This is called complex abstractive knowledge.(18) This knowledge contains all the imaginative fictions and formulas of abstract thought, along with universal concepts:

By the same process by which the mind created a unicorn by imaginatively grafting a spirelike horn onto the forehead of a horse, it legislated universals. From its intuitive and simple abstractive knowledge of many individuals of the same species, the mind generalized a universal concept and term that stood for all members of that species.(19)

Ockham arrives, therefore, at a complex scheme of intellectual cognition and remembering which work together to provide data and attempt to fill in unknown holes. Suppose that I have before me now a white object x:(20) [1] I have an intuitive intellectual cognition of x and [2] of the white which inheres in it (w). (1) and (2) partially cause and are accompanied simultaneously by [3] an abstractive cognition of x and [4] its whiteness. (3) and (4) each create dispositions (3*) and (4*) to similar acts. [5] If I form the proposition p, 'x is white', then (1) and (2) allow me immediately to [6] judge that p is true. Then tomorrow: [7] I have an imperfect intuitive cognition of x by virtue of (3*) and [8] of w by virtue of (4*). [9] If I form the proposition q, 'x was white yesterday', then (7) and (8) allow me immediately to [10] judge that q is true.

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The Age of Reform

I present this in such detail for a reason. To discuss William of Ockham's views on the power of God; his incredulity towards universals despite the academy's dependence upon them; and his epistemology helps us to place the next generations of thinkers within the right context; it allows us to identify common threads we may see later in history. While seemingly abstract, these foundational beliefs of Ockham do in fact have concrete effects, which is the focus of this section. Below I will look to the questions of how this directly affected Ockham's practice of faith, and, more specifically, how they affected the theology and reforming perspective of Martin Luther.

Ockham

Primary in Ockham's Franciscan theology is the idea that the physical universe and the theological order of salvation are completely dependent and contingent upon the will of God. This again emphasizes God's omnipotence, an idea borrowed from Scotus, and God's freedom to act outside the bounds of human reason, but within the bounds of non-contradiction. God, therefore, is free to give grace to whomever God chooses, independent of human qualification; however, Ockham did believe that this gift was normally granted to those who did their best to fulfill the commandments of God.(21) At the heart of Scotus' and Ockham's teaching on grace and justification lies the concept that the meritorious quality of a good act is not inherent in the act but is ascribed to it by God.(22) This obviously parallels the previous discussion of Ockham's view on universals, since the definition of what is good lies in the will of God and because merit is based on acceptation, not acceptation on merit. The two thinkers also applied this to the sacraments. Whereas in nature God has implanted certain forces that cause their effects through their own agency as well as the sustaining power of God, the sacraments, de facto, do not operate by inherent virtue but by an ascribed virtue or power.(23) There is no inherent power in the water, words of institution, or oil of ordination that has a sacramental effect. Only when the sacrament is properly performed may God choose to make it efficacious. Ockham stopped short in this reasoning when it came to the Eucharist. Only in that sacrament, he said, is an inherent value given after consecration, where the body and blood of Christ are really present.

Consistent with Ockham's understanding of dependence upon God, where faith therefore becomes a covenant with God, are his ethical norms. He holds that there are no absolute ethical norms but ones freely chosen by God from a much larger number of possibilities.(24) Murder, adultery, and theft could have been arranged by God to be acceptable acts, but through the unified reason and will of God, which is expressed in scripture and natural law, God did not choose to do make these acceptable. However, this system is not to be seen as arbitrary. It seems contradictory to Ockham's rejection of universals to depend here upon any idea of "natural law" which is "written in our hearts."(25) Still, he insists that those ethical laws are good because God has chosen them; God did not choose them because they were good.

Luther

The via antiqua had the advantage of clearly designated authorities: Aquinas and Duns Scotus. The via moderna, on the other hand, never found such commitment. While Ockham and other thinkers preached the modern way around Europe, specifically Gregory of Rimini in Italy, Pierre d'Ailly in France, and Germans Gabriel Biel and Marsilius von Inghen, they all clung so tightly to academic and intellectual freedom that a "school" of thought as such could never be consolidated or formulated.(26) However, when Luther was only fourteen, four years before he would matriculate to the University of Erfurt, two professors there did manage to gather the core of Nominalism into a cohesive program and curriculum. Jodokus Trutfetter and Bartholomaeus Arnoldi were the first to bring nominalistic trends into one academic school and employ them directly in their teaching. "They wrote handbooks to introduce their students to the application of nominalistic criteria. Arnoldi published his introduction to natural philosophy (1499), and Trutfetter [his] handbook of logic (1501)."(27) Over and over again they referred to one central principle as characteristic of the via moderna: all philosophical speculation about the world must be tested by means of experience and reality-based reason, regardless of what even the most respected authorities might say to the contrary. Theology is no exception either: all theological speculation is to be tested by the authority of the Scriptures as interpreted by the Church.(28) Thus, the epistemology of Ockham played itself out not only in theoretical ways, but ecclesial-political ways as well. Trutfetter and Arnoldi taught that experience and scripture were therefore the only valid norms for philosophy and theology. This brought about attacks of "relativizing" truth, since it was always appealing to scientific method and solid proof; and certainly it meant the demise of scholasticism. But instead the two philosophy professors at Erfurt had equipped Luther with concepts that were to become essential to the Reformation. Heiko Oberman writes:

So here we see two distinct points of Ockham's thought reflected in the principle teachings of Luther's Reformation. Both thinkers generally defied and opposed tradition, within the Church and the Academy. A final line of similarity between Luther and Ockham is found in their attacks on Aristotle. The work of Aristotle was foundational for Trutfetter and most European scholars in this period. Luther wrote to his professor in 1517, warning "should Aristotle not have been a man of flesh and blood, I would not hesitate to assert that he was the Devil himself."(30) His concern was that neither the via antiqua nor the via moderna truly allowed their doctrines to be determined by the Word of God. But it was the via moderna that had insisted on distinguishing the realms of God's Word and human reason; Arnoldi and Trutfetter had themselves provided Luther with the means of opposing the via moderna's violations of this boundary.(31)

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Conclusion It often seems difficult to justify great claims concerning connections we make in history that have not been validated in a book, course or at least an article. And the claim I so hesitantly make is that Ockham's thought is alive and well in Western philosophy today. This is taking place in several ways: first, there is the theological connection with Luther and later Nominalist thinkers who upset the status quo of the Church and set a new agenda for inquiry and discussion. The rejection of the rule of reason and tradition, together with the emergence of experience in the life of faith were vital to the Reformation. The second way is found in the (now) long history of scientific inquiry, of which Ockham was only a link in the chain, that grew into empiricism, then the Enlightenment, and finally into the Post-industrial, Postmodern era in which we now live. Science has 'ruled the roost' for centuries now, taking the place of theology and speculation, and is only beginning to show signs of weakening. This is because of the third way Ockham still lingers: in the reemergence of a systematic rejection of universals. It is this operation that helps define much of Postmodern philosophy, ethics, and theology today. My hesitation, however, is in making this connection too boldly and without outside encouragement. I certainly cannot make the claim that Ockham is the 'Grandfather of Postmodernism', or that it is to him that we may directly attribute much or most of it. I do, however, see an importance in finding Ockham's place, among others, which I believe he has been deprived and ignored. Now, at a time when these disciplines are being upset and transformed, at such an exciting time, I think it is important to look back and ask where we have moved from and why. Freedom from tradition is never attained once and for all. It is always tempting to accept the convictions of great scholars. However, in full Ockhamist tradition, I too believe that "the discovery of the uncertainty of knowledge must be made ever anew."(32)

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Marilyn McCord Adams. William Ockham. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987.

Robert Audi, ed. The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

Norman Cantor. The Civilization of the Middle Ages. New York: Harper Collins, 1994.

Euan Cameron. The European Reformation. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991.

William J. Courtenay. "Nominalism," from Dictionary of the Middle Ages: (Vol. 9) Mystery Religions - Poland. Joseph R. Strayer, ed. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,1987. pp. 155-158.. "Ockham, William of," from Dictionary of the Middle Ages: (Vol. 9) Mystery Religions - Poland. Joseph R. Strayer, ed. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1987. pp. 209-214.

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Will Durant. The Reformation: A History of European Civilization from Wyclif to Calvin: 1300-1564. The Story of Civilization, part VI. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1957.

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Jean-François Lyotard. The Condition of Postmodernity: A Report on Knowledge. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984.

Gordon Leff. William of Ockham: The Metamorphosis of Scholastic Discourse. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1975.

John Marenbon. Later Medieval Philosophy (1150-1350). London: Routledge, 1987.

Heiko A. Oberman. Luther: Man Between God and the Devil. Trans. by Eileen Walliser-Schwarzbart. New York: Image Books, 1992.

William of Ockham. Philosophical Writings: A Selection. Translated & edited by Philotheus Boehner, O. F. M. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1990.

Steven Ozment. The Age of Reform 1250-1550: An Intellectual and Religious History of Late Medieval and Reformation Europe. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980.

Richard Rorty, et al. Philosophy in History: Essays on the Historiography of Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.

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Notes

Lyotard, xxiv.

Courtenay, "Ockham", 210.

Durant, 246.

Adams, 1065.

Courtenay, "Nominalism", 156.

Ozment, 38.

It should be mentioned that not all properties are precisely universals to Plato. Some Forms are what we call relations -- Equality, Likeness, Doubleness -- but still categorized as universals. Also to be noted is that Plato himself never uses the terms 'property', 'universal' or 'particular'. See the essay §2.4.5 in Grayling, 378.

Audi, 43. Aristotle breaks all of our observation of universals exhibited in particulars down in his Categories: a substance, a quantity, a quality, a relative, a place, a time, a position, a having, a doing, or a being affected (39).

Courtenay, "Ockham", 211.

Though it should be noted that Ockham tended to reject a priori knowledge for a posteriori, but not all, as in the case of accepting the statement "Everything that is in motion is moved by something." Audi, 544.

Courtenay, "Ockham", 211.

Courtenay, "Nominalism", 156. According to Ockham, quantity, relation, place, motion, and time are not res extrae animam (things existing outside the soul or mind).

Courtenay, "Ockham", 211.

Leff, 76-77.

Ozment, 57.

Ibid.

Ockham, 23-24.

Ozment, 58.

Ibid.

Taken from Marenbon, 186.

Courtenay, "Ockham", 213.

Ibid., 213-214.

Courtenay, "Ockham", 213.

Ibid., 214.

Ibid., 214.

Oberman, 118.

Ibid.

Ibid., 119.

Oberman, 120. See also Cameron, chapter 12, "The Conversions of the Reformers," 168-185, especially 168-174 (Martin Luther: Development and Influences).

Oberman, 121. Luther had no problem opposing significant figures in the academy or church, as he even turned on Scotus' and Ockham's teachings on justification in his treatise on the Seven Penitential Psalms, 4 September, 1517. See Cameron, 100.

Ibid. Oberman, 119.