THE WILL TO POWER
BOOK IV DISCIPLINE AND BREEDING
Excerpts
I. Order of Rank
1. The Doctrine of Order of Rank
858 (Nov. 1887-March 1888)
What determines your rank is the quantum
of power you are: the rest is cowardice.
862 (1884)
A doctrine is needed powerful enough to work
as a breeding agent: strengthening the strong,
paralyzing and destructive for the world-weary.
The annihilation of the decaying races. Decay
of Europe.-- The annihilation of slavish
evaluations.-- Dominion over the earth as
a means of producing a higher type.-- The
annihilation of the tartuffery called "morality"
(Christianity as a hysterical kind of honesty
in this: Augustine, Bunyan).-- The annihilation
of suffrage universel; i. e., the system
through which the lowest natures prescribe
themselves as laws for the higher.-- The
annihilation of mediocrity and its acceptance.
(The one-sided, individuals--peoples; to
strive for fullness of nature through the
pairing of opposites: race mixture to this
end).-- The new courage--no a priori truths
(such truths were sought by those accustomed
to faith!), but a free subordination to a
ruling idea that has its time: e. g., time
as a property of space, etc.
2. The Strong and the Weak
871 (Nov. 1887-March 1888)
The victorious and unbridled: their depressive
influence on the value of the desires. It
was the dreadful barbarism of custom that,
especially in the Middle Ages, compelled
the creation of a veritable "league
of virtue"--together with an equally
dreadful exaggeration of that which constitutes
the value of man. Struggling "civilization"
(taming) needs every kind of irons and torture
to maintain itself against terribleness and
beast-of-prey natures.
Here a confusion is quite natural, although
its influence has been fatal: that which
men of power and will are able to demand
of themselves also provides a measure of
that which they may permit themselves. Such
natures are the antithesis of the vicious
and unbridled: although they may on occasion
do things that would convict a lesser man
of vice and immoderation.
Here the concept of the "equal value
of men before God" is extraordinarily
harmful; one forbade actions and attitudes
that were in themselves among the prerogatives
of the strongly constituted--as if they were
in themselves unworthy of men. One brought
the entire tendency of the strong into disrepute
when one erected the protective measures
of the weakest (those who were weakest also
when confronting themselves) as a norm of
value.
Confusion went so far that one branded the
very virtuosi of life (whose autonomy offered
the sharpest antithesis to the vicious and
unbridled) with the most opprobrious names.
Even now one believes one must disapprove
of a Cesare Borgia; that is simply laughable.
The church has excommunicated German emperors
on account of their vices: as if a monk or
priest had any right to join in a discussion
about what a Fredric II may demand of himself.
A Don Juan is sent to hell: that is very
naive. Has it been noticed that in heaven
all interesting men are missing?-- Just a
hint to the girls as to where they can best
find their salvation.-- If one reflects with
some consistency, and moreover with a deepened
insight into what a "great man"
is, no doubt remains that the church sends
all "great men" to hell--it fights
against all "greatness of man."
877 (Spring-Fall 1887; rev. Spring-Fall 1888)
The revolution made Napoleon possible: that
is its justification. For the sake of a similar
prize one would have to desire the anarchical
collapse of our entire civilization. Napoleon
made nationalism possible: that is its excuse.
The value of a man (apart from his morality
or immorality, naturally; for with these
concepts the value of a man is not even touched)
does not reside in his utility; for it would
continue to exist even if there were no one
to whom he could be of any use. And why could
not precisely that man who produced the most
disastrous effects be the pinnacle of the
whole species of man: so high, so superior
that everything would perish from envy of
him?
893 (Spring-Fall 1887)
Hatred of mediocrity is unworthy of a philosopher:
it is almost a question mark against his
"right to philosophy." Precisely
because he is an exception he has to take
the rule under his protection, he has to
keep the mediocre in good heart.
898 (Spring-Fall 1887)
The strong of the future.-- That which partly
necessity, partly chance has achieved here
and there, the conditions for the production
of a stronger type, we are now able to comprehend
and consciously will: we are able to create
the conditions under which such an elevation
is possible.
Until now, "education" has had
in view the needs of society: not the possible
needs of the future, but the needs of the
society of the day. One desired to produce
"tools" for it. Assuming the wealth
of force were greater, one could imagine
forces being subtracted, not to serve the
needs of society but some future need.
Such a task would have to be posed the more
it was grasped to what extent the contemporary
form of society was being so powerfully transformed
that at some future time it would be unable
to exist for its own sake alone, but only
as a tool in the hands of a stronger race.
The increasing dwarfing of man is precisely
the driving force that brings to mind the
breeding of a stronger race--a race that
would be excessive precisely where the dwarfed
species was weak and growing weaker (in will,
responsibility, self-assurance, ability to
posit goals for oneself).
The means would be those history teaches:
isolation through interests in preservation
that are the reverse of those which are average
today; habituation to reverse evaluations;
distance as a pathos; a free conscience in
those things that today are most undervalued
and prohibited.
The homogenizing of European man is the great
process that cannot be obstructed: one should
even hasten it. The necessity to create a
gulf, distance, order of rank, is given eo
ipso--not the necessity to retard the process.
As soon as it is established, this homogenizing
species requires a justification: it lies
in serving a higher sovereign species that
stands upon the former and can raise itself
to its task only by doing this. Not merely
a master race whose sole task is to rule,
but a race with its own sphere of life, with
an excess of strength for beauty, bravery,
culture, manners to the highest peak of the
spirit; an affirming race that may grant
itself every great luxury--strong enough
to have no need of the tyranny of the virtue-imperative,
rich enough to have no need of thrift and
pedantry, beyond good and evil; a hothouse
for strange and choice plants.
|
new barbarians
|
cynics
{experimenters}
conquerors
|
union of spiritual superiority with well-being
and an excess of strength.
|
899 (1885)
Our psychologists, whose glance lingers involuntarily
on symptoms of decadence alone, again and
again induce us to mistrust the spirit. One
always sees only those effects of the spirit
that make men weak, delicate, and morbid;
but now there are coming
new barbarians cynics {experimenters} conquerors
union of spiritual superiority with well-being
and an excess of strength.
900 (1885)
I point to something new: certainly for such
a democratic type there exists the danger
of the barbarian, but one has looked for
it only in the depths. There exists also
another type of barbarian, who comes from
the heights: a species of conquering and
ruling natures in search of material to mold.
Prometheus was this kind of barbarian.
909 (Jan.-Fall 1888)
The typical forms of self-formation. Or:
the eight principal questions.
1. Whether one wants to be more multifarious
or simpler?
2. Whether one wants to become happier or
more indifferent to happiness and unhappiness?
3. Whether one wants to become more contented
with oneself or more exacting and inexorable?
4. Whether one wants to become softer, more
yielding, more human, or more "inhuman"?
5. Whether one wants to become more prudent
or more ruthless?
6. Whether one wants to reach a goal or to
avoid all goals (as, e. g., the philosopher
does who smells a boundary, a nook, a prison,
a stupidity in every goal)?
7. Whether one wants to become more respected
or more feared? Or more despised?
8. Whether one wants to become tyrant or
seducer or shepherd or herd animal?
910 (Spring-Fall 1887)
Types of my disciples.-- To those human beings
who are of any concern to me I wish suffering,
desolation, sickness, ill-treatment, indignities--I
wish that they should not remain unfamiliar
with profound self-contempt, the torture
of self-mistrust, the wretchedness of the
vanquished: I have no pity for them, because
I wish them the only thing that can prove
today whether one is worth anything or not--that
one endures. [The note continues in Nietzsche's
MS: "I have not yet got to know any
idealist, but many liars--—"]
916 (1884; rev. Spring-Fall 1888)
What has been ruined by the church's misuse
of it:
1. asceticism: one has hardly the courage
so far to display its natural utility, its
indispensability in the service of the education
of the will. Our absurd pedagogic world,
before which the "useful civil servant"
hovers as a model, thinks it can get by with
"instruction," with brain drill;
it has not the slightest idea that something
else is needed first--education of will power;
one devises tests for everything except for
the main thing: whether one can will, whether
one may promise; the young man finishes school
without a single question, without any curiosity
even, concerning this supreme value-problem
of his nature;
2. fasting: in every sense--even as a means
of preserving the delicacy of one's ability
to enjoy all good things (e. g., occasionally
to stop reading, listening to music, being
pleasant; one must have fast days for one's
virtues, too);
3. the "monastery": temporary isolation,
accompanied by strict refusal, e. g., of
letters; a kind of most profound self-reflection
and self-recovery that desires to avoid,
not "temptations," but "duties":
an escape from the daily round; a detachment
from they tyranny of stimuli and influences
that condemns us to spend our strength in
nothing but reactions and does not permit
the accumulation to the point of spontaneous
activity (one should observe our scholars
from close up: they think only reactively;
i. e., they have to read before they can
think);
4. feasts: One has to be very coarse in order
not to feel the presence of Christians and
Christian values as an oppression beneath
which all genuine festive feelings go to
the devil. Feasts include: pride, exuberance,
wantonness; mockery of everything serious
and Philistine; a divine affirmation of oneself
out of animal plenitude and perfection--one
and all states which the Christian cannot
honestly welcome. The feast is paganism par
excellence;
5. courage confronted with one's own nature:
dressing up in "moral costumes.-- That
one has no need of moral formulas in order
to welcome an affect; standard: how far we
can affirm what is nature in us--how much
or how little we need to have recourse to
morality;
6. death-- One must convert the stupid physiological
fact into a moral necessity. So to live that
one can also will at the right time to die!
918 (Jan.-Fall 1888)
One would make a fit little boy stare if
one asked him: "Would you like to become
virtuous?"-- but he will open his eyes
wide if asked: "Would you like to become
stronger than your friends?"--
3. The Noble Man
941 (Summer-Fall 1883)
The meaning of our gardens and palaces (and
to this extent also the meaning of all desire
for riches) is to remove disorder and vulgarity
from sight and to build a home for nobility
of soul.
The majority, to be sure, believe they will
acquire higher natures when, those beautiful,
peaceful objects have operated upon them:
hence the rush to go to Italy and on travels,
etc.; all reading and visits to theaters.
They want to have themselves formed--that
is the meaning of their cultural activity!
But the strong, the mighty want to form and
no longer to have anything foreign about
them!
Thus men also plunge into wild nature, not
to find themselves but to lose and forget
themselves in it. "To be outside oneself"
as the desire of all the weak and the self-discontented.
942 (1885)
There is only nobility of birth, only nobility
of blood. (I am not speaking here of the
little word "von" or of the Almanach
de Gotha [Genealogy reference book of the
royal families of Europe.]: parenthesis for
asses.) When one speaks of "aristocrats
of the spirit," reasons are usually
not lacking for concealing something; as
is well known, it is a favorite term among
ambitious Jews. For spirit alone does not
make noble; rather, there must be something
to ennoble the spirit.-- What then is required?
Blood.
949 (Nov. 1887-March 1888)
That one stakes one's life, one's health,
one's honor, is the consequence of high spirits
and an overflowing, prodigal will: not from
love of man but because every great danger
challenges our curiosity about the degree
of our strength and our courage.
4. The Masters of the Earth
958 (1884)
I write for a species of man that does not
yet exist: for the "masters of the earth."
Religions, as consolations and relaxations,
dangerous: man believes he has a right to
take his ease.
In Plato's Theages it is written: "Each
one of us would like to be master over all
men, if possible, and best of all God."
This attitude must exist again.
Englishmen, Americans, and Russians--—
960 (1885-1886)
From now on there will be more favorable
preconditions for more comprehensive forms
of dominion, whose like has never yet existed.
And even this is not the most important thing;
the possibility has been established for
the production of international racial unions
whose task will be to rear a master race,
the future "masters of the earth";--a
new, tremendous aristocracy, based on the
severest self-legislation, in which the will
of philosophical men of power and artist-tyrants
will be made to endure for millennia--a higher
kind of man who, thanks to their superiority
in will, knowledge, riches, and influence,
employ democratic Europe as their most pliant
and supple instrument for getting hold of
the destinies of the earth, so as to work
as artists upon "man" himself.
Enough: the time is coming when politics
will have a different meaning.
5. The Great Human Being
966 (1884)
In contrast to the animals, man has cultivated
an abundance of contrary drives and impulses
within himself: thanks to this synthesis,
he is master of the earth.-- Moralities are
the expression of locally limited orders
of rank in his multifarious world of drives,
so man should not perish through their contradictions.
Thus a drive as master, its opposite weakened,
refined, as the impulse that provides the
stimulus for the activity of the chief drive.
The highest man would have the greatest multiplicity
of drives, in the relatively greatest strength
that can be endured. Indeed, where the plant
"man" shows himself strongest one
finds instincts that conflict powerfully
(e. g., in Shakespeare), but are controlled.
6. The Highest Man as Legislator of the Future
981 (Spring-Fall 1887)
Not to make men "better," not to
preach morality to them in any form, as if
"morality in itself," or any ideal
kind of man, were given; but to create conditions
that require stronger men who for their part
need, and consequently will have, a morality
(more clearly: a physical-spiritual discipline)
that makes them strong!
Not to allow oneself to be misled by blue
eyes or heaving bosoms: greatness of soul
has nothing romantic about it. And unfortunately
nothing at all amiable.
984 (1884)
Greatness of soul is inseparable from greatness
of spirit. For it involves independence;
but in the absence of spiritual greatness,
independence ought not to be allowed, it
causes mischief, even through its desire
to do good and practice "justice."
Small spirits must obey--hence cannot possess
greatness.
II. Dionysus
1003 (Jan.-Fall 1888)
To him who has turned out well, who does
my heart good, carved from wood that is hard,
gentle, and fragrant--in whom even the nose
takes pleasure--this book is dedicated.
He enjoys the taste of what is wholesome
for him;
his pleasure in anything ceases when the
bounds of the wholesome are crossed;
he divines the remedies for partial injuries;
he has illnesses as great stimulants of his
life;
he knows how to exploit ill chances;
he grows stronger through the accidents that
threaten to destroy him;
he instinctively gathers from all that he
sees, hears, experiences, what advances his
main concern--he follows a principle of selection--he
allows much to fall through;
he reacts with the slowness bred by a long
caution and a deliberate pride--he tests
a stimulus for its origin and its intentions,
he does not submit;
he is always in his own company, whether
he deals with books, men, or landscapes;
he honors by choosing, by admitting, by trusting.
1007 (Spring-Fall 1887)
To revalue values--what would that mean?
All the spontaneous--new, future, stronger--movements
must be there; but they still appear under
false names and valuations and have not yet
become conscious of themselves.
A courageous becoming-conscious and affirmation
of what has been achieved--a liberation from
the slovenly routine of old valuations that
dishonor us in the best and strongest things
we have achieved.
1017 (Spring-Fall 1887)
In place of the "natural man" of
Rousseau, the nineteenth century has discovered
a truer image of "man"--it has
had the courage to do so.-- On the whole,
the Christian concept "man" has
thus been reinstated. What one has not had
the courage for is to call this "man
in himself" good and to see in him the
guarantee of the future. Neither has one
dared to grasp that an increase in the terribleness
of man is an accompaniment of every increase
in culture; in this, one is still subject
to the Christian ideal and takes its side
against paganism, also against the Renaissance
concept of virtù. But the key to culture
is not to be found in this way: and in praxis
one retains the falsification of history
in favor of the "good man" (as
if he alone constituted the progress of man)
and the socialist ideal (i. e., the residue
of Christianity and of Rousseau in the de-Christianized
world).
The struggle against the eighteenth century:
its supreme overcoming by Goethe and Napoleon.
Schopenhauer, too, struggles against it;
but he involuntarily steps back into the
seventeenth century--he is a modern Pascal,
with Pascalian value judgments without Christianity.
Schopenhauer was not strong enough for a
new Yes.
Napoleon: insight that the higher and the
terrible man necessarily belong together.
The "man" reinstated; the woman
again accorded her due tribute of contempt
and fear. "Totality" as health
and highest activity; the straight line,
the grand style in action rediscovered; the
most powerful instinct, that of life itself,
the lust to rule, affirmed.
1023 (March-June 1888)
Pleasure appears where there is the feeling
of power.
Happiness: in the triumphant consciousness
of power and victory.
Progress: the strengthening of the type,
the ability for great willing; everything
else is misunderstanding, danger.
1026 (Summer-Fall 1883)
Not "happiness follows virtue"--but
the more powerful man first designates his
happy state as virtue.
Evil actions belong to the powerful and virtuous:
bad, base ones to the subjected.
The most powerful man, the creator, would
have to be the most evil, in as much as he
carries his ideal against the ideals of other
men and remakes them in his own image. Evil
here means: hard, painful, enforced.
Such men as Napoleon must come again and
again and confirm the belief in the autocracy
of the individual: but he himself was corrupted
by the means he had to employ and lost noblesse
of character. If he had had to prevail among
a different kind of man he could have employed
other means; and it would thus not seem to
be a necessity for a Caesar to become bad.
1028 (Spring-Fall 1887)
Terribleness is part of greatness: let us
not deceive ourselves.
1038 (March-Fall 1888)
--And how many new gods are still possible!
As for myself, in whom the religious, that
is to say god-forming, instinct occasionally
becomes active at impossible times--how differently,
how variously the divine has revealed itself
to me each time!
So many strange things have passed before
me in those timeless moments that fall into
one's life as if from the moon, when one
no longer has any idea how old one is or
how young one will yet be--I should not doubt
that there are many kinds of gods-- There
are some one cannot imagine without a certain
halcyon and frivolous quality in their makeup--
Perhaps light feet are even an integral part
of the concept :god-- Is it necessary to
elaborate that a god prefers to stay beyond
everything bourgeois and rational? and, between
ourselves, also beyond good and evil? His
prospect of free--in Goethe's words.-- And
to call upon the inestimable authority of
Zarathustra in this instance: Zarathustra
goes so far as to confess: "I would
believe only in a God who could dance"--
To repeat: how many new gods are still possible!
Zarathustra himself, to be sure, is merely
an old atheist: he believes neither in old
nor in new gods. Zarathustra says he would;
but Zarathustra will not-- Do not misunderstand
him.
The type of God after the type of creative
spirits, of "great men."
1049 (1885-1886)
Apollo's deception: the eternity of beautiful
forms; the aristocratic legislation, "thus
shall it be for ever!"
Dionysus: sensuality and cruelty. Transitoriness
could be interpreted as enjoyment of productive
and destructive force, as continual creation.
III. The Eternal Recurrence
1053 (1884)
My philosophy brings the triumphant idea
of which all other modes of thought will
ultimately perish. It is the great cultivating
idea: the races that cannot bear it stand
condemned; those who find it the greatest
benefit are chosen to rule.
1054 (1885-1886)
The greatest of struggles: for this a new
weapon is needed.
The hammer: to provoke a fearful decision,
to confront Europe with the consequences:
whether its will "wills" destruction.
Prevention of reduction to mediocrity. Rather
destruction!
1055 (1885)
A pessimistic teaching and way of thinking,
an ecstatic nihilism, can under certain conditions
be indispensable precisely to the philosopher--as
a mighty pressure and hammer with which he
breaks and removes degenerate and decaying
races to make way for a new order of life,
or to implant into that which is degenerate
and desires to die a longing for the end.
1056 (1884)
I want to teach the idea that gives many
the right to erase themselves--the great
cultivating idea.
1057 (1883-1888)
The eternal recurrence. A prophecy. [In the
MS: "A Book of Prophecy." In the
so-called Grossoktav edition of 1911, p.
514, this section represents the plan for
a book, The Eternal Recurrence.]
1. Presentation of the doctrine and its theoretical
presuppositions and consequences.
2. Proof of the doctrine.
3. Probable consequences of its being believed
(it makes everything break open). a) Means
of enduring it; b) Means of disposing it.
4. Its place in history as a mid-point. Period
of greatest danger. Foundation of an oligarchy
above peoples and their interests: education
to a universally human politics. Counterpart
of Jesuitism.
1058 (1883-1888)
The two great philosophical points of view
(devised by Germans):
a) that of becoming, of development. b) that
according to the value of existence (but
the wretched form of German pessimism must
first be overcome!)--both brought together
by me in a decisive way.
Everything becomes and recurs eternally--escape
is impossible!-- Supposing we could judge
value, what follows? The idea of recurrence
as a selective principle, in the service
of strength (and barbarism!!).
Ripeness of man for this idea.
1059 (1884)
1. The idea [of the eternal recurrence]:
the presuppositions that would have to be
true if it were true. Its consequences.
2. As the hardest idea: its probable effect
if it were not prevented, i. e., if all values
were not revalued.
3. Means of enduring it: the revaluation
of all values. No longer joy in certainty
but uncertainty; no longer "cause and
effect" but the continually creative;
no longer will to preservation but to power;
no longer the humble expression, "everything
is merely subjective," but "it
is also our work!-- Let us be proud of it!"
1060 (1884)
To endure the idea of the recurrence one
needs: freedom from morality; new means against
the fact of pain (pain conceived as a tool,
as the father of pleasure; there is no cumulative
consciousness of displeasure); the enjoyment
of all kinds of uncertainty, experimentalism,
as a counterweight to this extreme fatalism;
abolition of the concept of necessity; abolition
of the "will"; abolition of "knowledge-in-itself."
Greatest elevation of the consciousness of
strength in man, as he creates the overman.
1061 (1887-1888)
The two most extreme modes of thought--the
mechanistic and the Platonic--are reconciled
in the eternal recurrence: both as ideals.
1062 (1885)
If the world had a goal, it must have been
reached. If there were for it some unintended
final state, this also must have been reached.
If it were in any way capable of a pausing
and becoming fixed, of "being,"
then all becoming would long since have come
to an end, along with all thinking, all "spirit."
The fact of "spirit" as a form
of becoming proves that the world has no
goal, no final state, and is incapable of
being.
The old habit, however, of associating a
goal with every event and a guiding, creative
God with the world, is so powerful that it
requires an effort for a thinker not to fall
into thinking of the very aimlessness of
the world as intended. This notion--that
the world intentionally avoids a goal and
even knows artifices for keeping itself from
entering into a circular course--must occur
to all those who would like to force on the
world the ability for eternal novelty, i.
e., on a finite, definite, unchangeable force
of constant size, such as the world is, the
miraculous power of infinite novelty in its
forms and states. The world, even if it is
no longer a god, is still supposed to be
capable of the divine power of creation,
the power of infinite transformations; it
is supposed to consciously prevent itself
from returning to any of its old forms; it
is supposed to possess not only the intention
but the means of every one of its movements
at every moment so as to escape goals, final
states, repetitions--and whatever else may
follow from such an unforgivably insane way
of thinking and desiring. It is still the
old religious way of thinking and desiring,
a kind of longing to believe that in some
way the world is after all like the old beloved,
infinite, boundlessly creative God--that
in some way "the old God still lives"--that
longing of Spinoza which was expressed in
the words "deus sive natura" [God
or nature.] (he even felt "natura sive
deus").
What, then, is the law and belief with which
the decisive change, the recently attained
preponderance of the scientific spirit over
the religious, God-inventing spirit, is most
clearly formulated? Is it not: the world,
as force, may not be thought of as unlimited,
for it cannot be so thought of; we forbid
ourselves the concept of an infinite force
as incompatible with the concept "force."
Thus--the world also lacks the capacity for
eternal novelty.
1063 (1887-1888)
The law of the conservation of energy demands
eternal recurrence.
1064 (1885)
That a state of equilibrium is never reached
proves that it is not possible. But in an
indefinite space it would have to have been
reached. Likewise in a spherical space. The
shape of space must be the cause of eternal
movement, and ultimately of all "imperfection."
That "force" and "rest,"
"remaining the same," contradict
one another. The measure of force (as magnitude)
as fixed, but its essence in flux. [The MS
continues: "in tension, compelling."]
"Timelessness" to be rejected.
At any precise moment of a force, the absolute
conditionality of a new distribution of all
its forces is given: it cannot stand still.
"Change" belongs to the essence,
therefore also temporality: with this, however,
the necessity of change has only been posited
once more conceptually.
1065 (Nov. 1887-March 1888)
A certain emperor always bore in mind the
transitoriness of all things so as not to
take them too seriously and to live at peace
among them. To me, on the contrary, everything
seems far too valuable to be so fleeting:
I seek an eternity for everything: ought
one to pour the most precious salves and
wines into the sea?-- My consolation is that
everything that has been is eternal: the
sea will cast it up again.
1066 (March-June 1888)
The new world-conception.-- The world exists;
it is not something that becomes, not something
that passes away. Or rather: it becomes,
it passes away, but it has never begun to
become and never ceased from passing away--it
maintains itself in both.-- It lives on itself:
its excrements are its food.
We need not worry for a moment about the
hypothesis of a created world. The concept
"create" is today completely indefinable
[This word is illegible.], unrealizable;
merely a word, a rudimentary survival from
the ages of superstition; one can explain
nothing with a mere word. The last attempt
to conceive a world that had a beginning
has lately been made several times with the
aid of logical procedures--generally, as
one may divine, with an ulterior theological
motive.
Lately one has sought several times to find
a contradiction in the concept "temporal
infinity of the world in the past" (regressus
in infinitum): one has even found it, although
at the cost of confusing the head with the
tail. Nothing can prevent me from reckoning
backward from this moment and saying "I
shall never reach the end"; just as
I can reckon forward from the same moment
into the infinite. Only if I made the mistake--I
shall guard against it--of equating this
correct concept of a regressus in infinitum
with an utterly unrealizable concept of a
finite progressus up to this present, only
if I suppose that the direction (forward
or backward) is logically a matter of indifference,
would I take the head--this moment--for the
tail: I shall leave that to you, my dear
Herr Dühring!--
I have come across this idea in earlier thinkers:
every time it was determined by other ulterior
considerations (--mostly theological, in
favor of the creator spiritus). If the world
could in any way become rigid, dry, dead,
nothing, or if it could reach a state of
equilibrium, or if it had any kind of goal
that involved duration, immutability, the
once-and-for-all (in short, speaking metaphysically:
if becoming could resolve itself into being
or into nothingness), then this state must
have been reached: from which it follows--
This is the sole certainty we have in our
hands to serve as a corrective to a great
host of world hypotheses possible in themselves.
If, e. g., the mechanistic theory cannot
avoid the consequence, drawn for it by William
Thomson [First Baron Kelvin (1824-1907),
British physicist and mathematician who introduced
the Kelvin or Absolute Scale of temperature.],
of leading to a final state, then the mechanistic
theory stands refuted.
If the world may be thought of as a certain
definite quantity of force and as a certain
definite number of centers of force--and
every other representation remains indefinite
and therefore useless--it follows that, in
the great dice game of existence, it must
pass through a calculable number of combinations.
In infinite time, every possible combination
would at some time or another be realized;
more: it would be realized an infinite number
of times. And since between every combination
and its next recurrence all other possible
combinations would have to take place, and
each of these combinations conditions the
entire sequence of combinations in the same
series, a circular movement of absolutely
identical series is thus demonstrated: the
world as a circular movement that has already
repeated itself infinitely often and plays
its game in infinitum.
This conception is not simply a mechanistic
conception; for if it were that, it would
not condition an infinite recurrence of identical
cases, but a final state. Because the world
has not reached this, mechanistic theory
must be considered an imperfect and merely
provisional hypothesis.
1067 (1885)
And do you know what "the world"
is to me? Shall I show it to you in my mirror?
This world: a monster of energy, without
beginning, without end; a firm, iron magnitude
of force that does not grow bigger or smaller,
that does not expend itself but only transforms
itself; as a whole, of unalterable size,
a household without expenses or losses, but
likewise without increase or income; enclosed
by "nothingness" as by a boundary;
not something blurry or wasted, not something
endlessly extended, but set in a definite
space as a definite force, and not a sphere
that might be "empty" here or there,
but rather as force throughout, as a play
of forces and waves of forces, at the same
time one and many, increasing here and at
the same time decreasing there; a sea of
forces flowing and rushing together, eternally
changing, eternally flooding back, with tremendous
years of recurrence, with an ebb and a flood
of its forms; out of the simplest forms striving
toward the most complex, out of the stillest,
most rigid, coldest forms toward the hottest,
most turbulent, most self-contradictory,
and then again returning home to the simple
out of this abundance, out of the play of
contradictions back to the joy of concord,
still affirming itself in this uniformity
of its courses and its years, blessing itself
as that which must return eternally, as a
becoming that knows no satiety, no disgust,
no weariness: this, my Dionysian world of
the eternally self-creating, the eternally
self-destroying, this mystery world of the
twofold voluptuous delight, my "beyond
good and evil," without goal, unless
the joy of the circle is itself a goal; without
will, unless a ring feels good will toward
itself--do you want a name for this world?
A solution for all its riddles? A light for
you, too, you best-concealed, strongest,
most intrepid, most midnightly men?-- This
world is the will to power--and nothing besides!
And you yourselves are also this will to
power--and nothing besides!
The End
