NIETZSCHE'S CRITIQUE OF RELIGION - G. J.
MATTEY'S LECTURE NOTES - ATHENAEUM LIBRARY
OF PHILOSOPHY
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NIETZSCHE'S CRITIQUE OF RELIGION
FRIEDRICH WILHELM NIETZSCHE
(1844-1900)
NIETZSCHE'S CRITIQUE OF RELIGION
G. J. MATTEY'S LECTURE NOTES, PHILOSOPHY
151
Human beings who do not want to belong to
the mass need only to stop, and not be comfortable;
follow their conscience, which cries out:
"Be yourself! All you are now doing,
thinking, desiring, is not you yourself."...your
educators can be only your liberators...
—Schopenhauer as Educator, §1 - From Untimely Meditationsm
Nietzsche's Critique of Religion G. J. Mattey's
Lecture Notes, Philosophy 151
font Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844-1900) Human
beings who do not want to belong to the mass
need only to stop, and not be comfortable;
follow their conscience, which cries out:
"Be yourself! All you are now doing,
thinking, desiring, is not you yourself."...
your educators can be only your liberators...
—Schopenhauer as Educator, §1 - From Untimely
Meditationsm November 21, 1995
Modern Christian civilization, Nietzsche
declared, is sick and must be overcome. Much
of On the Genealogy of Morals is devoted
to an etiology of the modern sickness, and
the cause is said to be two-fold. There has
always been the seething resentment of the
"herd," the base, the powerless
mass. By itself this resentment is not sickness;
it becomes so through the ministrations of
the priests, who manage the resentment by
turning it inward.
Civilization itself sets the stage for the
disease. In civil society, individual humans
are confined and their the exercise of their
wills repressed. Like a wild beast in a cage,
a civilized human hurls himself at the walls
in a frenzy of self-destruction. Thus arises
bad conscience in its natural form. In its
religious form, bad conscience becomes much
more: it becomes guilt.
Society as a whole finds itself indebted
for what it has to its ancestors. As civilization
becomes more powerful, the ancestors are
made into powerful gods, to whom the debt
is even greater. The Christian God is the
most powerful of all, and the debt owed that
God is the greatest. It is so great that
it cannot be discharged by any action, any
sacrifice. Redemption comes only through
grace, which is granted only through God's
will, which might be turned by the intercession
of the priest. Thus the human being is a
sinner and the priest is his greatest hope.
The values of the priest are ascetic values.
The priestly virtues of poverty, chastity,
obedience are all forms of self-denial. Shortly
we shall see how they are said by Nietzsche
to give meaning to the life of the masses.
But first we will turn our attention to the
meaning of ascetic values for the philosopher.
It was Socrates who invented the type of
the philosopher: "theoretical man,"
one whose entire being is devoted to thought.
The activity of the philosopher is the discharge
of his power, and it is to be enhanced in
any way possible. Asceticism, self-denial,
is the effective means to philosophical thinking.
All philosophers up to his time that Nietzsche
marked as great -- Heraclitus, Plato, Descartes,
Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, Schopenhauer -- were
unmarried. One could not even imagine them
married. "A married philosopher belongs
in comedy, that is my proposition -- and
as for that exception, Socrates -- the malicious
Socrates, it would seem, married ironically,
just to demonstrate this proposition"
(On the Genealogy of Morals, Third Essay,
section 7). A philosopher gives up the possibility
of fame, fortune, sensuality for the prize
of enhancing the fundamental activity which
makes him what he is.
The ascetic priest generalizes self-denial
to a repudiation of the natural world as
a whole. He begins with a general disgust
with life, which holds nothing but pain and
suffering. Moreover, this miserable condition
is meaningless. One response to this situation
(that of Buddhism and Schopenhauer) is to
attempt to give up willing altogether. But
the ascetic priest repudiates this way out,
instead giving life a purpose.
Suffering has a meaning after all: it is
the sufferer who brings it upon himself!
The response is for the sufferer to turn
against himself, to deny himself, to adopt
ascetic ideals. "'I suffer: someone
must be to blame for it' -- thus thinks every
sickly sheep. But his shepherd, the ascetic
priest, tells him: 'Quite so, my sheep! someone
must be to blame for it: but you youself
are this someone, you alone are to blame
for it -- you alone are to blame for yourself!'"
(On the Genealogy of Morals, Third Essay,
Section 15). In this way, resentment is turned
inward and the herd is rendered harmless.
Self-punishment for one's own guilt is the
most effective regulator at all, and at the
same time, it gives a meaning to life.
Thus Nietzsche condemned Christianity as
a movement led by sick men whose aim was
to infect everyone else. It is a religion
of resentment, at its very beginning blaming
the Jews for the death of its founder. Its
stance toward life, toward everything sensual,
is one of hostility. It must tame every natural
instinct, just as it tamed the barbarian
tribes of the north (thus accomplishing what
the Roman Empire could not). Hegel had stated
that this taming process was necessary to
bring forth the genius of the German people,
but to Nietzsche all that resulted was the
loss of all that was noble in them.
In this respect, Christianity is far different
from the older religion of the East, Buddhism,
which grew out of an already-mature culture.
Far from needing to be tamed, the ancient
Indians were overly civilized, with the result
that they were hyper-sensitive to pain. They
sought release from pain by slipping gently
into nothingness, by giving up the will.
Nietzsche also distinguished Christianity
from the teachings of Jesus Christ. The message
of the Christ was one of glad tidings, that
heaven is to be found in how one lives. It
is not by following the law, not through
redemption from sin, but only through a benevolent
disposition, which might best be summarized
in the commandment to love one's neighbor
as one's self. "The 'kingdom of Heaven'
is a condition of the heart -- not sometihng
that comes 'upon the earth' or 'after death'"
(The Anti-Christ, section 34).
Christian doctrine, however, is little concerned
with the glad tidings, Nietzsche went on.
After the death of Jesus, it turned in the
opposite direction, to become a religion
of hatred. This began by Jesus's followers
blaming the Jews for putting their leader
to death. But it could not be the whole story,
for God had to have permitted the event to
occur. "And now an absurd problem came
up: 'How could God have permitted that?'
For this question the deranged reason of
the little community found a downright terrifingly
absurd anser: God gave his Son for the forgiveness
of sins, as a sacrifice" (The Anti-Christ,
section 41). Guilt, which played no part
in the glad tidings of Jesus, took center
stage once again. Nietzsche accused the disciples,
Paul in particular, of having gone on to
falsify the history of Christianity, for
example by putting words of vengeance in
the mouth of Jesus.
Christianity had its battles with secular
civilizations of Greece and Rome, with the
northern barbarians, and it emerged victorious.
The last battle was fought by Luther against
the re-emergence of noble values in the Renaissance.
Thus Nietzsche was uncompromisingly anti-Christian,
for Christianity was the most potent force
against those values which he prized most
highly. It is a life-and-death struggle that
may someday be won, but in the present day
is more difficult than ever. "I call
Christianity the one great curse, the one
great intrinsic depravity, the one great
instinct for revenge for which no expedient
is sufficiently poisonous, secret, subterranean,
petty -- I call it the one immortal blemish
of mankind"
(The Anti-Christ, section 62).