PREFACE
This book belongs to the most rare of men.
Perhaps not one of them is yet alive. It
is possible that they may be among those
who understand my "Zarathustra":
how could I confound myself with those who
are now sprouting ears?--First the day after
tomorrow must come for me. Some men are born
posthumously.
The conditions under which any one understands
me, and necessarily understands me--I know
them only too well. Even to endure my seriousness,
my passion, he must carry intellectual integrity
to the verge of hardness. He must be accustomed
to living on mountain tops--and to looking
upon the wretched gabble of politics and
nationalism as beneath him. He must have
become indifferent; he must never ask of
the truth whether it brings profit to him
or a fatality to him... He must have an inclination,
born of strength, for questions that no one
has the courage for; the courage for the
forbidden; predestination for the labyrinth.
The experience of seven solitudes. New ears
for new music. New eyes for what is most
distant. A new conscience for truths that
have hitherto remained unheard. And the will
to economize in the grand manner--to hold
together his strength, his enthusiasm...
Reverence for self; love of self; absolute
freedom of self.....
Very well, then! of that sort only are my
readers, my true readers, my readers foreordained:
of what account are the rest?--The rest are
merely humanity.--One must make one's self
superior to humanity, in power, in loftiness
of soul,--in contempt.
FRIEDRICH W. NIETZSCHE.
1.
--Let us look each other in the face. We
are Hyperboreans--we know well enough how
remote our place is. "Neither by land
nor by water will you find the road to the
Hyperboreans": even Pindar1, in his
day, knew that much about us. Beyond the
North, beyond the ice, beyond death--our
life, our happiness... We have discovered
that happiness; we know the way; we got our
knowledge of it from thousands of years in
the labyrinth. Who else has found it?--The
man of today?--"I don't know either
the way out or the way in; I am whatever
doesn't know either the way out or the way
in"--so sighs the man of today... This
is the sort of modernity that made us ill,--we
sickened on lazy peace, cowardly compromise,
the whole virtuous dirtiness of the modern
Yea and Nay. This tolerance and largeur of
the heart that "forgives" everything
because it "understands" everything
is a sirocco to us. Rather live amid the
ice than among modern virtues and other such
south-winds! . . . We were brave enough;
we spared neither ourselves nor others; but
we were a long time finding out where to
direct our courage. We grew dismal; they
called us fatalists. Our fate--it was the
fulness, the tension, the storing up of powers.
We thirsted for the lightnings and great
deeds; we kept as far as possible from the
happiness of the weakling, from "resignation"
. . . There was thunder in our air; nature,
as we embodied it, became overcast--for we
had not yet found the way. The formula of
our happiness: a Yea, a Nay, a straight line,
a goal...
2.
What is good?--Whatever augments the feeling
of power, the will to power, power itself,
in man. What is evil?--Whatever springs from
weakness. What is happiness?--The feeling
that power increases--that resistance is
overcome. Not contentment, but more power;
not peace at any price, but war; not virtue,
but efficiency (virtue in the Renaissance
sense, virtu, virtue free of moral acid).
The weak and the botched shall perish: first
principle of our charity. And one should
help them to it. What is more harmful than
any vice?--Practical sympathy for the botched
and the weak--Christianity...
3.
The problem that I set here is not what
shall replace mankind in the order of living
creatures (--man is an end--): but what type
of man must be bred, must be willed, as being
the most valuable, the most worthy of life,
the most secure guarantee of the future.
This more valuable type has appeared often
enough in the past: but always as a happy
accident, as an exception, never as deliberately
willed. Very often it has been precisely
the most feared; hitherto it has been almost
the terror of terrors ;--and out of that
terror the contrary type has been willed,
cultivated and attained: the domestic animal,
the herd animal, the sick brute-man--the
Christian. . .
4.
Mankind surely does not represent an evolution
toward a better or stronger or higher level,
as progress is now understood. This "progress"
is merely a modern idea, which is to say,
a false idea. The European of today, in his
essential worth, falls far below the European
of the Renaissance; the process of evolution
does not necessarily mean elevation, enhancement,
strengthening.
True enough, it succeeds in isolated and
individual cases in various parts of the
earth and under the most widely different
cultures, and in these cases a higher type
certainly manifests itself; something which,
compared to mankind in the mass, appears
as a sort of superman. Such happy strokes
of high success have always been possible,
and will remain possible, perhaps, for all
time to come. Even whole races, tribes and
nations may occasionally represent such lucky
accidents.
5.
We should not deck out and embellish Christianity:
it has waged a war to the death against this
higher type of man, it has put all the deepest
instincts of this type under its ban, it
has developed its concept of evil, of the
Evil One himself, out of these instincts--the
strong man as the typical reprobate, the
"outcast among men." Christianity
has taken the part of all the weak, the low,
the botched; it has made an ideal out of
antagonism to all the self-preservative instincts
of sound life; it has corrupted even the
faculties of those natures that are intellectually
most vigorous, by representing the highest
intellectual values as sinful, as misleading,
as full of temptation. The most lamentable
example: the corruption of Pascal, who believed
that his intellect had been destroyed by
original sin, whereas it was actually destroyed
by Christianity!--
6.
It is a painful and tragic spectacle that
rises before me: I have drawn back the curtain
from the rottenness of man. This word, in
my mouth, is at least free from one suspicion:
that it involves a moral accusation against
humanity. It is used--and I wish to emphasize
the fact again--without any moral significance:
and this is so far true that the rottenness
I speak of is most apparent to me precisely
in those quarters where there has been most
aspiration, hitherto, toward "virtue"
and "godliness." As you probably
surmise, I understand rottenness in the sense
of decadence: my argument is that all the
values on which mankind now fixes its highest
aspirations are decadence-values.
I call an animal, a species, an individual
corrupt, when it loses its instincts, when
it chooses, when it prefers, what is injurious
to it. A history of the "higher feelings,"
the "ideals of humanity"--and it
is possible that I'll have to write it--would
almost explain why man is so degenerate.
Life itself appears to me as an instinct
for growth, for survival, for the accumulation
of forces, for power: whenever the will to
power fails there is disaster. My contention
is that all the highest values of humanity
have been emptied of this will--that the
values of decadence, of nihilism, now prevail
under the holiest names.
7.
Christianity is called the religion of pity.--
Pity stands in opposition to all the tonic
passions that augment the energy of the feeling
of aliveness: it is a depressant. A man loses
power when he pities. Through pity that drain
upon strength which suffering works is multiplied
a thousandfold. Suffering is made contagious
by pity; under certain circumstances it may
lead to a total sacrifice of life and living
energy--a loss out of all proportion to the
magnitude of the cause (--the case of the
death of the Nazarene). This is the first
view of it; there is, however, a still more
important one. If one measures the effects
of pity by the gravity of the reactions it
sets up, its character as a menace to life
appears in a much clearer light. Pity thwarts
the whole law of evolution, which is the
law of natural selection. It preserves whatever
is ripe for destruction; it fights on the
side of those disinherited and condemned
by life; by maintaining life in so many of
the botched of all kinds, it gives life itself
a gloomy and dubious aspect. Mankind has
ventured to call pity a virtue (--in every
superior moral system it appears as a weakness--);
going still further, it has been called the
virtue, the source and foundation of all
other virtues--but let us always bear in
mind that this was from the standpoint of
a philosophy that was nihilistic, and upon
whose shield the denial of life was inscribed.
Schopenhauer was right in this: that by means
of pity life is denied, and made worthy of
denial--pity is the technic of nihilism.
Let me repeat: this depressing and contagious
instinct stands against all those instincts
which work for the preservation and enhancement
of life: in the role of protector of the
miserable, it is a prime agent in the promotion
of decadence--pity persuades to extinction....
Of course, one doesn't say "extinction":
one says "the other world," or
"God," or "the true life,"
or Nirvana, salvation, blessedness.... This
innocent rhetoric, from the realm of religious-ethical
balderdash, appears a good deal less innocent
when one reflects upon the tendency that
it conceals beneath sublime words: the tendency
to destroy life. Schopenhauer was hostile
to life: that is why pity appeared to him
as a virtue. . . . Aristotle, as every one
knows, saw in pity a sickly and dangerous
state of mind, the remedy for which was an
occasional purgative: he regarded tragedy
as that purgative. The instinct of life should
prompt us to seek some means of puncturing
any such pathological and dangerous accumulation
of pity as that appearing in Schopenhauer's
case (and also, alack, in that of our whole
literary decadence, from St. Petersburg to
Paris, from Tolstoi to Wagner), that it may
burst and be discharged. . . Nothing is more
unhealthy, amid all our unhealthy modernism,
than Christian pity. To be the doctors here,
to be unmerciful here, to wield the knife
here--all this is our business, all this
is our sort of humanity, by this sign we
are philosophers, we Hyperboreans !--
8.
It is necessary to say just whom we regard
as our antagonists: theologians and all who
have any theological blood in their veins--this
is our whole philosophy. . . . One must have
faced that menace at close hand, better still,
one must have had experience of it directly
and almost succumbed to it, to realize that
it is not to be taken lightly (--the alleged
free-thinking of our naturalists and physiologists
seems to me to be a joke--they have no passion
about such things; they have not suffered--).
This poisoning goes a great deal further
than most people think: I find the arrogant
habit of the theologian among all who regard
themselves as "idealists"--among
all who, by virtue of a higher point of departure,
claim a right to rise above reality, and
to look upon it with suspicion. . . The idealist,
like the ecclesiastic, carries all sorts
of lofty concepts in his hand
(--and not only in his hand!); he launches
them with benevolent contempt against "understanding,"
"the senses," "honor,"
"good living," "science";
he sees such things as beneath him, as pernicious
and seductive forces, on which "the
soul" soars as a pure thing-in-itself--as
if humility, chastity, poverty, in a word,
holiness, had not already done much more
damage to life than all imaginable horrors
and vices. . . The pure soul is a pure lie.
. . So long as the priest, that professional
denier, calumniator and poisoner of life,
is accepted as a higher variety of man, there
can be no answer to the question, What is
truth? Truth has already been stood on its
head when the obvious attorney of mere emptiness
is mistaken for its representative.
9.
Upon this theological instinct I make war:
I find the tracks of it everywhere. Whoever
has theological blood in his veins is shifty
and dishonourable in all things. The pathetic
thing that grows out of this condition is
called faith: in other words, closing one's
eyes upon one's self once for all, to avoid
suffering the sight of incurable falsehood.
People erect a concept of morality, of virtue,
of holiness upon this false view of all things;
they ground good conscience upon faulty vision;
they argue that no other sort of vision has
value any more, once they have made theirs
sacrosanct with the names of "God,"
"salvation" and "eternity."
I unearth this theological instinct in all
directions: it is the most widespread and
the most subterranean form of falsehood to
be found on earth. Whatever a theologian
regards as true must be false: there you
have almost a criterion of truth. His profound
instinct of self-preservation stands against
truth ever coming into honour in any way,
or even getting stated. Wherever the influence
of theologians is felt there is a transvaluation
of values, and the concepts "true"
and "false" are forced to change
places: what ever is most damaging to life
is there called "true," and whatever
exalts it, intensifies it, approves it, justifies
it and makes it triumphant is there called
"false."... When theologians, working
through the "consciences" of princes
(or of peoples--), stretch out their hands
for power, there is never any doubt as to
the fundamental issue: the will to make an
end, the nihilistic will exerts that power...
10.
Among Germans I am immediately understood
when I say that theological blood is the
ruin of philosophy. The Protestant pastor
is the grandfather of German philosophy;
Protestantism itself is its peccatum originale.
Definition of Protestantism: hemiplegic paralysis
of Christianity--and of reason. ... One need
only utter the words "Tübingen School"
to get an understanding of what German philosophy
is at bottom--a very artful form of theology.
. . The Suabians are the best liars in Germany;
they lie innocently. . . . Why all the rejoicing
over the appearance of Kant that went through
the learned world of Germany, three-fourths
of which is made up of the sons of preachers
and teachers--why the German conviction still
echoing, that with Kant came a change for
the better? The theological instinct of German
scholars made them see clearly just what
had become possible again. . . . A backstairs
leading to the old ideal stood open; the
concept of the "true world," the
concept of morality as the essence of the
world (--the two most vicious errors that
ever existed!), were once more, thanks to
a subtle and wily scepticism, if not actually
demonstrable, then at least no longer refutable...
Reason, the prerogative of reason, does not
go so far. . . Out of reality there had been
made "appearance"; an absolutely
false world, that of being, had been turned
into reality. . . . The success of Kant is
merely a theological success; he was, like
Luther and Leibnitz, but one more impediment
to German integrity, already far from steady.--
11.
A word now against Kant as a moralist. A
virtue must be our invention; it must spring
out of our personal need and defence. In
every other case it is a source of danger.
That which does not belong to our life menaces
it; a virtue which has its roots in mere
respect for the concept of "virtue,"
as Kant would have it, is pernicious. "Virtue,"
"duty," "good for its own
sake," goodness grounded upon impersonality
or a notion of universal validity--these
are all chimeras, and in them one finds only
an expression of the decay, the last collapse
of life, the Chinese spirit of Konigsberg.
Quite the contrary is demanded by the most
profound laws of self-preservation and of
growth: to wit, that every man find hisown
virtue, his own categorical imperative. A
nation goes to pieces when it confounds its
duty with the general concept of duty. Nothing
works a more complete and penetrating disaster
than every "impersonal" duty, every
sacrifice before the Moloch of abstraction.--To
think that no one has thought of Kant's categorical
imperative as dangerous to life!... The theological
instinct alone took it under protection !--An
action prompted by the life-instinct proves
that it is a right action by the amount of
pleasure that goes with it: and yet that
Nihilist, with his bowels of Christian dogmatism,
regarded pleasure as an objection . . . What
destroys a man more quickly than to work,
think and feel without inner necessity, without
any deep personal desire, without pleasure--as
a mere automaton of duty? That is the recipe
for decadence, and no less for idiocy. .
. Kant became an idiot.--And such a man was
the contemporary of Goethe! This calamitous
spinner of cobwebs passed for the German
philosopher--still passes today! . . . I
forbid myself to say what I think of the
Germans. . . . Didn't Kant see in the French
Revolution the transformation of the state
from the inorganic form to the organic? Didn't
he ask himself if there was a single event
that could be explained save on the assumption
of a moral faculty in man, so that on the
basis of it, "the tendency of mankind
toward the good" could be explained,
once and for all time? Kant's answer: "That
is revolution." Instinct at fault in
everything and anything, instinct as a revolt
against nature, German decadence as a philosophy--that
is Kant!----
12.
I put aside a few sceptics, the types of
decency in the history of philosophy: the
rest haven't the slightest conception of
intellectual integrity. They behave like
women, all these great enthusiasts and prodigies--they
regard "beautiful feelings" as
arguments, the "heaving breast"
as the bellows of divine inspiration, conviction
as the criterion of truth. In the end, with
"German" innocence, Kant tried
to give a scientific flavour to this form
of corruption, this dearth of intellectual
conscience, by calling it "practical
reason." He deliberately invented a
variety of reasons for use on occasions when
it was desirable not to trouble with reason--that
is, when morality, when the sublime command
"thou shalt," was heard. When one
recalls the fact that, among all peoples,
the philosopher is no more than a development
from the old type of priest, this inheritance
from the priest, this fraud upon self, ceases
to be remarkable. When a man feels that he
has a divine mission, say to lift up, to
save or to liberate mankind--when a man feels
the divine spark in his heart and believes
that he is the mouthpiece of supernatural
imperatives--when such a mission in. flames
him, it is only natural that he should stand
beyond all merely reasonable standards of
judgment. He feels that he is himself sanctified
by this mission, that he is himself a type
of a higher order! . . . What has a priest
to do with philosophy! He stands far above
it!--And hitherto the priest has ruled!--He
has determined the meaning of "true"
and "not true"!
13.
Let us not under-estimate this fact: that
we ourselves, we free spirits, are already
a "transvaluation of all values,"
a visualized declaration of war and victory
against all the old concepts of "true"
and "not true." The most valuable
intuitions are the last to be attained; the
most valuable of all are those which determine
methods. All the methods, all the principles
of the scientific spirit of today, were the
targets for thousands of years of the most
profound contempt; if a man inclined to them
he was excluded from the society of "decent"
people--he passed as "an enemy of God,"
as a scoffer at the truth, as one "possessed."
As a man of science, he belonged to the Chandala
2... We have had the whole pathetic stupidity
of mankind against us--their every notion
of what the truth ought to be, of what the
service of the truth ought to be--their every
"thou shalt" was launched against
us. . . . Our objectives, our methods, our
quiet, cautious, distrustful manner--all
appeared to them as absolutely discreditable
and contemptible.--Looking back, one may
almost ask one's self with reason if it was
not actually an aesthetic sense that kept
men blind so long: what they demanded of
the truth was picturesque effectiveness,
and of the learned a strong appeal to their
senses. It was our modesty that stood out
longest against their taste... How well they
guessed that, these turkey-cocks of God!
14.
We have unlearned something. We have be
come more modest in every way. We no longer
derive man from the "spirit," from
the "god-head"; we have dropped
him back among the beasts. We regard him
as the strongest of the beasts because he
is the craftiest; one of the results thereof
is his intellectuality. On the other hand,
we guard ourselves against a conceit which
would assert itself even here: that man is
the great second thought in the process of
organic evolution. He is, in truth, anything
but the crown of creation: beside him stand
many other animals, all at similar stages
of development... And even when we say that
we say a bit too much, for man, relatively
speaking, is the most botched of all the
animals and the sickliest, and he has wandered
the most dangerously from his instincts--though
for all that, to be sure, he remains the
most interesting!--As regards the lower animals,
it was Descartes who first had the really
admirable daring to describe them as machina;
the whole of our physiology is directed toward
proving the truth of this doctrine. Moreover,
it is illogical to set man apart, as Descartes
did: what we know of man today is limited
precisely by the extent to which we have
regarded him, too, as a machine. Formerly
we accorded to man, as his inheritance from
some higher order of beings, what was called
"free will"; now we have taken
even this will from him, for the term no
longer describes anything that we can understand.
The old word "will" now connotes
only a sort of result, an individual reaction,
that follows inevitably upon a series of
partly discordant and partly harmonious stimuli--the
will no longer "acts," or "moves."
. . . Formerly it was thought that man's
consciousness, his "spirit," offered
evidence of his high origin, his divinity.
That he might be perfected, he was advised,
tortoise-like, to draw his senses in, to
have no traffic with earthly things, to shuffle
off his mortal coil--then only the important
part of him, the "pure spirit,"
would remain. Here again we have thought
out the thing better: to us consciousness,
or "the spirit," appears as a symptom
of a relative imperfection of the organism,
as an experiment, a groping, a misunderstanding,
as an affliction which uses up nervous force
unnecessarily--we deny that anything can
be done perfectly so long as it is done consciously.
The "pure spirit" is a piece of
pure stupidity: take away the nervous system
and the senses, the so-called "mortal
shell," and the rest is miscalculation--that
is all!...
15.
Under Christianity neither morality nor
religion has any point of contact with actuality.
It offers purely imaginary causes ("God"
"soul," "ego," "spirit,"
"free will"--or even "unfree"),
and purely imaginary effects ("sin"
"salvation" "grace,"
"punishment," "forgiveness
of sins"). Intercourse between imaginarybeings
("God," "spirits," "souls");
an imaginarynatural history (anthropocentric;
a total denial of the concept of natural
causes); an imaginary psychology (misunderstandings
of self, misinterpretations of agreeable
or disagreeable general feelings--for example,
of the states of the nervus sympathicus with
the help of the sign-language of religio-ethical
balderdash--, "repentance," "pangs
of conscience," "temptation by
the devil," "the presence of God");
an imaginaryteleology (the "kingdom
of God," "the last judgment,"
"eternal life").--This purely fictitious
world, greatly to its disadvantage, is to
be differentiated from the world of dreams;
the later at least reflects reality, whereas
the former falsifies it, cheapens it and
denies it. Once the concept of "nature"
had been opposed to the concept of "God,"
the word "natural" necessarily
took on the meaning of "abominable"--the
whole of that fictitious world has its sources
in hatred of the natural (--the real!--),
and is no more than evidence of a profound
uneasiness in the presence of reality. .
. . This explains everything. Who alone has
any reason for living his way out of reality?
The man who suffers under it. But to suffer
from reality one must be a botched reality.
. . . The preponderance of pains over pleasures
is the cause of this fictitious morality
and religion: but such a preponderance also
supplies the formula for decadence...
16.
A criticism of the Christian concept of
God leads inevitably to the same conclusion.--A
nation that still believes in itself holds
fast to its own god. In him it does honour
to the conditions which enable it to survive,
to its virtues--it projects its joy in itself,
its feeling of power, into a being to whom
one may offer thanks. He who is rich will
give of his riches; a proud people need a
god to whom they can make sacrifices. . .
Religion, within these limits, is a form
of gratitude. A man is grateful for his own
existence: to that end he needs a god.--Such
a god must be able to work both benefits
and injuries; he must be able to play either
friend or foe--he is wondered at for the
good he does as well as for the evil he does.
But the castration, against all nature, of
such a god, making him a god of goodness
alone, would be contrary to human inclination.
Mankind has just as much need for an evil
god as for a good god; it doesn't have to
thank mere tolerance and humanitarianism
for its own existence. . . . What would be
the value of a god who knew nothing of anger,
revenge, envy, scorn, cunning, violence?
who had perhaps never experienced the rapturous
ardeurs of victory and of destruction? No
one would understand such a god: why should
any one want him?--True enough, when a nation
is on the downward path, when it feels its
belief in its own future, its hope of freedom
slipping from it, when it begins to see submission
as a first necessity and the virtues of submission
as measures of self-preservation, then it
must overhaul its god. He then becomes a
hypocrite, timorous and demure; he counsels
"peace of soul," hate-no-more,
leniency, "love" of friend and
foe. He moralizes endlessly; he creeps into
every private virtue; he becomes the god
of every man; he becomes a private citizen,
a cosmopolitan. . . Formerly he represented
a people, the strength of a people, everything
aggressive and thirsty for power in the soul
of a people; now he is simply the good god...
The truth is that there is no other alternative
for gods: either they are the will to power--in
which case they are national gods--or incapacity
for power--in which case they have to be
good.
17.
Wherever the will to power begins to decline,
in whatever form, there is always an accompanying
decline physiologically, a decadence. The
divinity of this decadence, shorn of its
masculine virtues and passions, is converted
perforce into a god of the physiologically
degraded, of the weak. Of course, they do
not call themselves the weak; they call themselves
"the good." . . . No hint is needed
to indicate the moments in history at which
the dualistic fiction of a good and an evil
god first became possible. The same instinct
which prompts the inferior to reduce their
own god to "goodness-in-itself"
also prompts them to eliminate all good qualities
from the god of their superiors; they make
revenge on their masters by making a devil
of the latter's god.--The good god, and the
devil like him--both are abortions of decadence.--How
can we be so tolerant of the naïveté of Christian
theologians as to join in their doctrine
that the evolution of the concept of god
from "the god of Israel," the god
of a people, to the Christian god, the essence
of all goodness, is to be described as progress?--But
even Renan does this. As if Renan had a right
to be naïve! The contrary actually stares
one in the face. When everything necessary
to ascending life; when all that is strong,
courageous, masterful and proud has been
eliminated from the concept of a god; when
he has sunk step by step to the level of
a staff for the weary, a sheet-anchor for
the drowning; when he be comes the poor man's
god, the sinner's god, the invalid's god
par excellence, and the attribute of "saviour"
or "redeemer" remains as the one
essential attribute of divinity--just what
is the significance of such a metamorphosis?
what does such a reduction of the godhead
imply?--To be sure, the "kingdom of
God" has thus grown larger. Formerly
he had only his own people, his "chosen"
people. But since then he has gone wandering,
like his people themselves, into foreign
parts; he has given up settling down quietly
anywhere; finally he has come to feel at
home everywhere, and is the great cosmopolitan--until
now he has the "great majority"
on his side, and half the earth. But this
god of the "great majority," this
democrat among gods, has not become a proud
heathen god: on the contrary, he remains
a Jew, he remains a god in a corner, a god
of all the dark nooks and crevices, of all
the noisesome quarters of the world! . .
His earthly kingdom, now as always, is a
kingdom of the underworld, a souterrain kingdom,
a ghetto kingdom. . . And he himself is so
pale, so weak, so decadent . . . Even the
palest of the pale are able to master him--messieurs
the metaphysicians, those albinos of the
intellect. They spun their webs around him
for so long that finally he was hypnotized,
and began to spin himself, and became another
metaphysician. Thereafter he resumed once
more his old business of spinning the world
out of his inmost being sub specie Spinozae;
thereafter he be came ever thinner and paler--became
the "ideal," became "pure
spirit," became "the absolute,"
became "the thing-in-itself." .
. . The collapse of a god: he became a "thing-in-itself."
18.
The Christian concept of a god--the god
as the patron of the sick, the god as a spinner
of cobwebs, the god as a spirit--is one of
the most corrupt concepts that has ever been
set up in the world: it probably touches
low-water mark in the ebbing evolution of
the god-type. God degenerated into the contradiction
of life. Instead of being its transfiguration
and eternal Yea! In him war is declared on
life, on nature, on the will to live! God
becomes the formula for every slander upon
the "here and now," and for every
lie about the "beyond"! In him
nothingness is deified, and the will to nothingness
is made holy! . . .
19.
The fact that the strong races of northern
Europe did not repudiate this Christian god
does little credit to their gift for religion--and
not much more to their taste. They ought
to have been able to make an end of such
a moribund and worn-out product of the decadence.
A curse lies upon them because they were
not equal to it; they made illness, decrepitude
and contradiction a part of their instincts--and
since then they have not managed to create
any more gods. Two thousand years have come
and gone--and not a single new god! Instead,
there still exists, and as if by some intrinsic
right,--as if he were the ultimatum and maximum
of the power to create gods, of the creator
spiritus in mankind--this pitiful god of
Christian monotono-theism! This hybrid image
of decay, conjured up out of emptiness, contradiction
and vain imagining, in which all the instincts
of decadence, all the cowardices and wearinesses
of the soul find their sanction!--
20.
In my condemnation of Christianity I surely
hope I do no injustice to a related religion
with an even larger number of believers:
I allude to Buddhism. Both are to be reckoned
among the nihilistic religions--they are
both decadence religions--but they are separated
from each other in a very remarkable way.
For the fact that he is able to compare them
at all the critic of Christianity is indebted
to the scholars of India.--Buddhism is a
hundred times as realistic as Christianity--it
is part of its living heritage that it is
able to face problems objectively and coolly;
it is the product of long centuries of philosophical
speculation. The concept, "god,"
was already disposed of before it appeared.
Buddhism is the only genuinely positive religion
to be encountered in history, and this applies
even to its epistemology (which is a strict
phenomenalism) --It does not speak of a "struggle
with sin," but, yielding to reality,
of the "struggle with suffering."
Sharply differentiating itself from Christianity,
it puts the self-deception that lies in moral
concepts be hind it; it is, in my phrase,
beyond good and evil.--The two physiological
facts upon which it grounds itself and upon
which it bestows its chief attention are:
first, an excessive sensitiveness to sensation,
which manifests itself as a refined susceptibility
to pain, and secondly, an extraordinary spirituality,
a too protracted concern with concepts and
logical procedures, under the influence of
which the instinct of personality has yielded
to a notion of the "impersonal."
(--Both of these states will be familiar
to a few of my readers, the objectivists,
by experience, as they are to me). These
physiological states produced a depression,
and Buddha tried to combat it by hygienic
measures. Against it he prescribed a life
in the open, a life of travel; moderation
in eating and a careful selection of foods;
caution in the use of intoxicants; the same
caution in arousing any of the passions that
foster a bilious habit and heat the blood;
finally, no worry, either on one's own account
or on account of others. He encourages ideas
that make for either quiet contentment or
good cheer--he finds means to combat ideas
of other sorts. He understands good, the
state of goodness, as something which promotes
health. Prayer is not included, and neither
is asceticism. There is no categorical imperative
nor any disciplines, even within the walls
of a monastery (--it is always possible to
leave--). These things would have been simply
means of increasing the excessive sensitiveness
above mentioned. For the same reason he does
not advocate any conflict with unbelievers;
his teaching is antagonistic to nothing so
much as to revenge, aversion, ressentiment
(--"enmity never brings an end to enmity":
the moving refrain of all Buddhism. . .)
And in all this he was right, for it is precisely
these passions which, in view of his main
regiminal purpose, are unhealthful. The mental
fatigue that he observes, already plainly
displayed in too much "objectivity"
(that is, in the individual's loss of interest
in himself, in loss of balance and of "egoism"),
he combats by strong efforts to lead even
the spiritual interests back to the ego.
In Buddha's teaching egoism is a duty. The
"one thing needful," the question
"how can you be delivered from suffering,"
regulates and determines the whole spiritual
diet. (--Perhaps one will here recall that
Athenian who also declared war upon pure
"scientificality," to wit, Socrates,
who also elevated egoism to the estate of
a morality) .
21.
The things necessary to Buddhism are a very
mild climate, customs of great gentleness
and liberality, and no militarism; moreover,
it must get its start among the higher and
better educated classes. Cheerfulness, quiet
and the absence of desire are the chief desiderata,
and they are attained. Buddhism is not a
religion in which perfection is merely an
object of aspiration: perfection is actually
normal.--Under Christianity the instincts
of the subjugated and the oppressed come
to the fore: it is only those who are at
the bottom who seek their salvation in it.
Here the prevailing pastime, the favourite
remedy for boredom is the discussion of sin,
self-criticism, the inquisition of conscience;
here the emotion produced by power (called
"God") is pumped up (by prayer);
here the highest good is regarded as unattainable,
as a gift, as "grace." Here, too,
open dealing is lacking; concealment and
the darkened room are Christian. Here body
is despised and hygiene is denounced as sensual;
the church even ranges itself against cleanliness
(--the first Christian order after the banishment
of the Moors closed the public baths, of
which there were 270 in Cordova alone) .
Christian, too; is a certain cruelty toward
one's self and toward others; hatred of unbelievers;
the will to persecute. Sombre and disquieting
ideas are in the foreground; the most esteemed
states of mind, bearing the most respectable
names are epileptoid; the diet is so regulated
as to engender morbid symptoms and over-stimulate
the nerves. Christian, again, is all deadly
enmity to the rulers of the earth, to the
"aristocratic"--along with a sort
of secret rivalry with them (--one resigns
one's "body" to them--one wantsonly
one's "soul" . . . ). And Christian
is all hatred of the intellect, of pride,
of courage of freedom, of intellectual libertinage;
Christian is all hatred of the senses, of
joy in the senses, of joy in general . .
.
22.
When Christianity departed from its native
soil, that of the lowest orders, the underworld
of the ancient world, and began seeking power
among barbarian peoples, it no longer had
to deal with exhausted men, but with men
still inwardly savage and capable of self
torture--in brief, strong men, but bungled
men. Here, unlike in the case of the Buddhists,
the cause of discontent with self, suffering
through self, is not merely a general sensitiveness
and susceptibility to pain, but, on the contrary,
an inordinate thirst for inflicting pain
on others, a tendency to obtain subjective
satisfaction in hostile deeds and ideas.
Christianity had to embrace barbaric concepts
and valuations in order to obtain mastery
over barbarians: of such sort, for example,
are the sacrifices of the first-born, the
drinking of blood as a sacrament, the disdain
of the intellect and of culture; torture
in all its forms, whether bodily or not;
the whole pomp of the cult. Buddhism is a
religion for peoples in a further state of
development, for races that have become kind,
gentle and over-spiritualized (--Europe is
not yet ripe for it--): it is a summons 'that
takes them back to peace and cheerfulness,
to a careful rationing of the spirit, to
a certain hardening of the body. Christianity
aims at mastering beasts of prey; its modus
operandi is to make them ill--to make feeble
is the Christian recipe for taming, for "civilizing."
Buddhism is a religion for the closing, over-wearied
stages of civilization. Christianity appears
before civilization has so much as begun--under
certain circumstances it lays the very foundations
thereof.
23.
Buddhism, I repeat, is a hundred times more
austere, more honest, more objective. It
no longer has to justify its pains, its susceptibility
to suffering, by interpreting these things
in terms of sin--it simply says, as it simply
thinks, "I suffer." To the barbarian,
however, suffering in itself is scarcely
understandable: what he needs, first of all,
is an explanation as to why he suffers. (His
mere instinct prompts him to deny his suffering
altogether, or to endure it in silence.)
Here the word "devil" was a blessing:
man had to have an omnipotent and terrible
enemy--there was no need to be ashamed of
suffering at the hands of such an enemy.
--At the bottom of Christianity there are
several subtleties that belong to the Orient.
In the first place, it knows that it is of
very little consequence whether a thing be
true or not, so long as it is believed to
be true. Truth and faith: here we have two
wholly distinct worlds of ideas, almost two
diametrically opposite worlds--the road to
the one and the road to the other lie miles
apart. To understand that fact thoroughly--this
is almost enough, in the Orient, to make
one a sage. The Brahmins knew it, Plato knew
it, every student of the esoteric knows it.
When, for example, a man gets any pleasure
out of the notion that he has been saved
from sin, it is not necessary for him to
be actually sinful, but merely to feel sinful.
But when faith is thus exalted above everything
else, it necessarily follows that reason,
knowledge and patient inquiry have to be
discredited: the road to the truth becomes
a forbidden road.--Hope, in its stronger
forms, is a great deal more powerful stimulans
to life than any sort of realized joy can
ever be. Man must be sustained in suffering
by a hope so high that no conflict with actuality
can dash it--so high, indeed, that no fulfillment
can satisfy it: a hope reaching out beyond
this world. (Precisely because of this power
that hope has of making the suffering hold
out, the Greeks regarded it as the evil of
evils, as the most malign of evils; it remained
behind at the source of all evil.)3--In order
that love may be possible, God must become
a person; in order that the lower instincts
may take a hand in the matter God must be
young. To satisfy the ardor of the woman
a beautiful saint must appear on the scene,
and to satisfy that of the men there must
be a virgin. These things are necessary if
Christianity is to assume lordship over a
soil on which some aphrodisiacal or Adonis
cult has already established a notion as
to what a cult ought to be. To insist upon
chastity greatly strengthens the vehemence
and subjectivity of the religious instinct--it
makes the cult warmer, more enthusiastic,
more soulful.--Love is the state in which
man sees things most decidedly as they are
not. The force of illusion reaches its highest
here, and so does the capacity for sweetening,
for transfiguring. When a man is in love
he endures more than at any other time; he
submits to anything. The problem was to devise
a religion which would allow one to love:
by this means the worst that life has to
offer is overcome--it is scarcely even noticed.--So
much for the three Christian virtues: faith,
hope and charity: I call them the three Christian
ingenuities.--Buddhism is in too late a stage
of development, too full of positivism, to
be shrewd in any such way.--
24.
Here I barely touch upon the problem of
the origin of Christianity. The first thing
necessary to its solution is this: that Christianity
is to be understood only by examining the
soil from which it sprung--it is not a reaction
against Jewish instincts; it is their inevitable
product; it is simply one more step in the
awe-inspiring logic of the Jews. In the words
of the Saviour, "salvation is of the
Jews." 4--The second thing to remember
is this: that the psychological type of the
Galilean is still to be recognized, but it
was only in its most degenerate form (which
is at once maimed and overladen with foreign
features) that it could serve in the manner
in which it has been used: as a type of the
Saviour of mankind.
--The Jews are the most remarkable people
in the history of the world, for when they
were confronted with the question, to be
or not to be, they chose, with perfectly
unearthly deliberation, to be at any price:
this price involved a radical falsification
of all nature, of all naturalness, of all
reality, of the whole inner world, as well
as of the outer. They put themselves against
all those conditions under which, hitherto,
a people had been able to live, or had even
been permitted to live; out of themselves
they evolved an idea which stood in direct
opposition to natural conditions--one by
one they distorted religion, civilization,
morality, history and psychology until each
became a contradiction of its natural significance.
We meet with the same phenomenon later on,
in an incalculably exaggerated form, but
only as a copy: the Christian church, put
beside the "people of God," shows
a complete lack of any claim to originality.
Precisely for this reason the Jews are the
most fateful people in the history of the
world: their influence has so falsified the
reasoning of mankind in this matter that
today the Christian can cherish anti-Semitism
without realizing that it is no more than
the final consequence of Judaism.
In my "Genealogy of Morals" I
give the first psychological explanation
of the concepts underlying those two antithetical
things, a noble morality and a ressentiment
morality, the second of which is a mere product
of the denial of the former. The Judaeo-Christian
moral system belongs to the second division,
and in every detail. In order to be able
to say Nay to everything representing an
ascending evolution of life--that is, to
well-being, to power, to beauty, to self-approval--the
instincts of ressentiment, here become downright
genius, had to invent an other world in which
the acceptance of life appeared as the most
evil and abominable thing imaginable. Psychologically,
the Jews are a people gifted with the very
strongest vitality, so much so that when
they found themselves facing impossible conditions
of life they chose voluntarily, and with
a profound talent for self-preservation,
the side of all those instincts which make
for decadence--not as if mastered by them,
but as if detecting in them a power by which
"the world" could be defied. The
Jews are the very opposite of decadents:
they have simply been forced into appearing
in that guise, and with a degree of skill
approaching the non plus ultra of histrionic
genius they have managed to put themselves
at the head of all decadent movements (--for
example, the Christianity of Paul--), and
so make of them something stronger than any
party frankly saying Yes to life. To the
sort of men who reach out for power under
Judaism and Christianity,--that is to say,
to the priestly class-decadence is no more
than a means to an end. Men of this sort
have a vital interest in making mankind sick,
and in confusing the values of "good"
and "bad," "true" and
"false" in a manner that is not
only dangerous to life, but also slanders
it.
25.
The history of Israel is invaluable as a
typical history of an attempt to denaturize
all natural values: I point to five facts
which bear this out. Originally, and above
all in the time of the monarchy, Israel maintained
the right attitude of things, which is to
say, the natural attitude. Its Jahveh was
an expression of its consciousness of power,
its joy in itself, its hopes for itself:
to him the Jews looked for victory and salvation
and through him they expected nature to give
them whatever was necessary to their existence--above
all, rain. Jahveh is the god of Israel, and
consequently the god of justice: this is
the logic of every race that has power in
its hands and a good conscience in the use
of it. In the religious ceremonial of the
Jews both aspects of this self-approval stand
revealed. The nation is grateful for the
high destiny that has enabled it to obtain
dominion; it is grateful for the benign procession
of the seasons, and for the good fortune
attending its herds and its crops.--This
view of things remained an ideal for a long
while, even after it had been robbed of validity
by tragic blows: anarchy within and the Assyrian
without. But the people still retained, as
a projection of their highest yearnings,
that vision of a king who was at once a gallant
warrior and an upright judge--a vision best
visualized in the typical prophet (i. e.,
critic and satirist of the moment), Isaiah.
--But every hope remained unfulfilled. The
old god no longer could do what he used to
do. He ought to have been abandoned. But
what actually happened? simply this: the
conception of him was changed--the conception
of him was denaturized; this was the price
that had to be paid for keeping him.--Jahveh,
the god of "justice"--he is in
accord with Israel no more, he no longer
visualizes the national egoism; he is now
a god only conditionally. . . The public
notion of this god now becomes merely a weapon
in the hands of clerical agitators, who interpret
all happiness as a reward and all unhappiness
as a punishment for obedience or disobedience
to him, for "sin": that most fraudulent
of all imaginable interpretations, whereby
a "moral order of the world" is
set up, and the fundamental concepts, "cause"
and "effect," are stood on their
heads. Once natural causation has been swept
out of the world by doctrines of reward and
punishment some sort of unnatural causation
becomes necessary: and all other varieties
of the denial of nature follow it. A god
who demands--in place of a god who helps,
who gives counsel, who is at bottom merely
a name for every happy inspiration of courage
and self-reliance. . . Morality is no longer
a reflection of the conditions which make
for the sound life and development of the
people; it is no longer the primary life-instinct;
instead it has become abstract and in opposition
to life--a fundamental perversion of the
fancy, an "evil eye" on all things.
What is Jewish, what is Christian morality?
Chance robbed of its innocence; unhappiness
polluted with the idea of "sin";
well-being represented as a danger, as a
"temptation"; a physiological disorder
produced by the canker worm of conscience...
26.
The concept of god falsified; the concept
of morality falsified ;--but even here Jewish
priest craft did not stop. The whole history
of Israel ceased to be of any value: out
with it!--These priests accomplished that
miracle of falsification of which a great
part of the Bible is the documentary evidence;
with a degree of contempt unparalleled, and
in the face of all tradition and all historical
reality, they translated the past of their
people into religious terms, which is to
say, they converted it into an idiotic mechanism
of salvation, whereby all offences against
Jahveh were punished and all devotion to
him was rewarded. We would regard this act
of historical falsification as something
far more shameful if familiarity with the
ecclesiastical interpretation of history
for thousands of years had not blunted our
inclinations for uprightness in historicis.
And the philosophers support the church:
the lie about a "moral order of the
world" runs through the whole of philosophy,
even the newest. What is the meaning of a
"moral order of the world"? That
there is a thing called the will of God which,
once and for all time, determines what man
ought to do and what he ought not to do;
that the worth of a people, or of an individual
thereof, is to he measured by the extent
to which they or he obey this will of God;
that the destinies of a people or of an individual
arecontrolled by this will of God, which
rewards or punishes according to the degree
of obedience manifested.--In place of all
that pitiable lie reality has this to say:
the priest, a parasitical variety of man
who can exist only at the cost of every sound
view of life, takes the name of God in vain:
he calls that state of human society in which
he himself determines the value of all things
"the kingdom of God"; he calls
the means whereby that state of affairs is
attained "the will of God"; with
cold-blooded cynicism he estimates all peoples,
all ages and all individuals by the extent
of their subservience or opposition to the
power of the priestly order. One observes
him at work: under the hand of the Jewish
priesthood the great age of Israel became
an age of decline; the Exile, with its long
series of misfortunes, was transformed into
a punishment for that great age-during which
priests had not yet come into existence.
Out of the powerful and wholly free heroes
of Israel's history they fashioned, according
to their changing needs, either wretched
bigots and hypocrites or men entirely "godless."
They reduced every great event to the idiotic
formula: "obedient or disobedient to
God."--They went a step further: the
"will of God" (in other words some
means necessary for preserving the power
of the priests) had to be determined--and
to this end they had to have a "revelation."
In plain English, a gigantic literary fraud
had to be perpetrated, and "holy scriptures"
had to be concocted--and so, with the utmost
hierarchical pomp, and days of penance and
much lamentation over the long days of "sin"
now ended, they were duly published. The
"will of God," it appears, had
long stood like a rock; the trouble was that
mankind had neglected the "holy scriptures".
. . But the ''will of God'' had already been
revealed to Moses. . . . What happened? Simply
this: the priest had formulated, once and
for all time and with the strictest meticulousness,
what tithes were to be paid to him, from
the largest to the smallest (--not forgetting
the most appetizing cuts of meat, for the
priest is a great consumer of beefsteaks);
in brief, he let it be known just what he
wanted, what "the will of God"
was.... From this time forward things were
so arranged that the priest became indispensable
everywhere; at all the great natural events
of life, at birth, at marriage, in sickness,
at death, not to say at the "sacrifice"
(that is, at meal-times), the holy parasite
put in his appearance, and proceeded to denaturize
it--in his own phrase, to "sanctify"
it. . . . For this should be noted: that
every natural habit, every natural institution
(the state, the administration of justice,
marriage, the care of the sick and of the
poor), everything demanded by the life-instinct,
in short, everything that has any value in
itself, is reduced to absolute worthlessness
and even made the reverse of valuable by
the parasitism of priests (or, if you chose,
by the "moral order of the world").
The fact requires a sanction--a power to
grant values becomes necessary, and the only
way it can create such values is by denying
nature. . . . The priest depreciates and
desecrates nature: it is only at this price
that he can exist at all.--Disobedience to
God, which actually means to the priest,
to "the law," now gets the name
of "sin"; the means prescribed
for "reconciliation with God" are,
of course, precisely the means which bring
one most effectively under the thumb of the
priest; he alone can "save". Psychologically
considered, "sins" are indispensable
to every society organized on an ecclesiastical
basis; they are the only reliable weapons
of power; the priest lives upon sins; it
is necessary to him that there be "sinning".
. . . Prime axiom: "God forgiveth him
that repenteth"--in plain English, him
that submitteth to the priest.
27.
Christianity sprang from a soil so corrupt
that on it everything natural, every natural
value, every reality was opposed by the deepest
instincts of the ruling class--it grew up
as a sort of war to the death upon reality,
and as such it has never been surpassed.
The "holy people," who had adopted
priestly values and priestly names for all
things, and who, with a terrible logical
consistency, had rejected everything of the
earth as "unholy," "worldly,"
"sinful"--this people put its instinct
into a final formula that was logical to
the point of self-annihilation: asChristianity
it actually denied even the last form of
reality, the "holy people," the
"chosen people," Jewish reality
itself. The phenomenon is of the first order
of importance: the small insurrectionary
movement which took the name of Jesus of
Nazareth is simply the Jewish instinct redivivus--in
other words, it is the priestly instinct
come to such a pass that it can no longer
endure the priest as a fact; it is the discovery
of a state of existence even more fantastic
than any before it, of a vision of life even
more unreal than that necessary to an ecclesiastical
organization. Christianity actually denies
the church...
I am unable to determine what was the target
of the insurrection said to have been led
(whether rightly or wrongly) by Jesus, if
it was not the Jewish church--"church"
being here used in exactly the same sense
that the word has today. It was an insurrection
against the "good and just," against
the "prophets of Israel," against
the whole hierarchy of society--not against
corruption, but against caste, privilege,
order, formalism. It was unbelief in "superior
men," a Nay flung at everything that
priests and theologians stood for. But the
hierarchy that was called into question,
if only for an instant, by this movement
was the structure of piles which, above everything,
was necessary to the safety of the Jewish
people in the midst of the "waters"--it
represented theirlast possibility of survival;
it was the final residuum of their independent
political existence; an attack upon it was
an attack upon the most profound national
instinct, the most powerful national will
to live, that has ever appeared on earth.
This saintly anarchist, who aroused the people
of the abyss, the outcasts and "sinners,"
the Chandala of Judaism, to rise in revolt
against the established order of things--and
in language which, if the Gospels are to
be credited, would get him sent to Siberia
today--this man was certainly a political
criminal, at least in so far as it was possible
to be one in so absurdly unpolitical a community.
This is what brought him to the cross: the
proof thereof is to be found in the inscription
that was put upon the cross. He died for
his own sins--there is not the slightest
ground for believing, no matter how often
it is asserted, that he died for the sins
of others.--
28.
As to whether he himself was conscious of
this contradiction--whether, in fact, this
was the only contradiction he was cognizant
of--that is quite another question. Here,
for the first time, I touch upon the problem
of the psychology of the Saviour.--I confess,
to begin with, that there are very few books
which offer me harder reading than the Gospels.
My difficulties are quite different from
those which enabled the learned curiosity
of the German mind to achieve one of its
most unforgettable triumphs. It is a long
while since I, like all other young scholars,
enjoyed with all the sapient laboriousness
of a fastidious philologist the work of the
incomparable Strauss. 5At that time I was
twenty years old: now I am too serious for
that sort of thing. What do I care for the
contradictions of "tradition"?
How can any one call pious legends "traditions"?
The histories of saints present the most
dubious variety of literature in existence;
to examine them by the scientific method,
in the entire absence of corroborative documents,
seems to me to condemn the whole inquiry
from the start--it is simply learned idling.
29.
What concerns me is the psychological type
of the Saviour. This type might be depicted
in the Gospels, in however mutilated a form
and however much overladen with extraneous
characters--that is, in spite of the Gospels;
just as the figure of Francis of Assisi shows
itself in his legends in spite of his legends.
It is not a question of mere truthful evidence
as to what he did, what he said and how he
actually died; the question is, whether his
type is still conceivable, whether it has
been handed down to us.--All the attempts
that I know of to read the history of a "soul"
in the Gospels seem to me to reveal only
a lamentable psychological levity. M. Renan,
that mountebank in psychologicus, has contributed
the two most unseemly notions to this business
of explaining the type of Jesus: the notion
of the genius and that of the hero ("heros").
But if there is anything essentially unevangelical,
it is surely the concept of the hero. What
the Gospels make instinctive is precisely
the reverse of all heroic struggle, of all
taste for conflict: the very incapacity for
resistance is here converted into something
moral: ("resist not evil !"--the
most profound sentence in the Gospels, perhaps
the true key to them), to wit, the blessedness
of peace, of gentleness, the inability to
be an enemy. What is the meaning of "glad
tidings"?--The true life, the life eternal
has been found--it is not merely promised,
it is here, it is in you; it is the life
that lies in love free from all retreats
and exclusions, from all keeping of distances.
Every one is the child of God--Jesus claims
nothing for himself alone--as the child of
God each man is the equal of every other
man. . . .Imagine making Jesus a hero!--And
what a tremendous misunderstanding appears
in the word "genius"! Our whole
conception of the "spiritual,"
the whole conception of our civilization,
could have had no meaning in the world that
Jesus lived in. In the strict sense of the
physiologist, a quite different word ought
to be used here. . . . We all know that there
is a morbid sensibility of the tactile nerves
which causes those suffering from it to recoil
from every touch, and from every effort to
grasp a solid object. Brought to its logical
conclusion, such a physiological habitus
becomes an instinctive hatred of all reality,
a flight into the "intangible,"
into the "incomprehensible"; a
distaste for all formulae, for all conceptions
of time and space, for everything established--customs,
institutions, the church--; a feeling of
being at home in a world in which no sort
of reality survives, a merely "inner"
world, a "true" world, an "eternal"
world. . . . "The Kingdom of God is
withinyou". . . .
30.
The instinctive hatred of reality: the consequence
of an extreme susceptibility to pain and
irritation--so great that merely to be "touched"
becomes unendurable, for every sensation
is too profound.
The instinctive exclusion of all aversion,
all hostility, all bounds and distances in
feeling: the consequence of an extreme susceptibility
to pain and irritation--so great that it
senses all resistance, all compulsion to
resistance, as unbearable anguish (--that
is to say, as harmful, as prohibited by the
instinct of self-preservation), and regards
blessedness (joy) as possible only when it
is no longer necessary to offer resistance
to anybody or anything, however evil or dangerous--love,
as the only, as the ultimate possibility
of life. . .
These are the two physiological realities
upon and out of which the doctrine of salvation
has sprung. I call them a sublime super-development
of hedonism upon a thoroughly unsalubrious
soil. What stands most closely related to
them, though with a large admixture of Greek
vitality and nerve-force, is epicureanism,
the theory of salvation of paganism. Epicurus
was a typical decadent: I was the first to
recognize him.--The fear of pain, even of
infinitely slight pain--the end of this can
be nothing save a religion of love. . . .
31.
I have already given my answer to the problem.
The prerequisite to it is the assumption
that the type of the Saviour has reached
us only in a greatly distorted form. This
distortion is very probable: there are many
reasons why a type of that sort should not
be handed down in a pure form, complete and
free of additions. The milieu in which this
strange figure moved must have left marks
upon him, and more must have been imprinted
by the history, the destiny, of the early
Christian communities; the latter indeed,
must have embellished the type retrospectively
with characters which can be understood only
as serving the purposes of war and of propaganda.
That strange and sickly world into which
the Gospels lead us--a world apparently out
of a Russian novel, in which the scum of
society, nervous maladies and "childish"
idiocy keep a tryst--must, in any case, have
coarsened the type: the first disciples,
in particular, must have been forced to translate
an existence visible only in symbols and
incomprehensibilities into their own crudity,
in order to understand it at all--in their
sight the type could take on reality only
after it had been recast in a familiar mould....
The prophet, the messiah, the future judge,
the teacher of morals, the worker of wonders,
John the Baptist--all these merely presented
chances to misunderstand it . . . . Finally,
let us not underrate the proprium of all
great, and especially all sectarian veneration:
it tends to erase from the venerated objects
all its original traits and idiosyncrasies,
often so painfully strange--it does not even
see them. It is greatly to be regretted that
no Dostoyevsky lived in the neighbourhood
of this most interesting decadent--I mean
some one who would have felt the poignant
charm of such a compound of the sublime,
the morbid and the childish. In the last
analysis, the type, as a type of the decadence,
may actually have been peculiarly complex
and contradictory: such a possibility is
not to be lost sight of. Nevertheless, the
probabilities seem to be against it, for
in that case tradition would have been particularly
accurate and objective, whereas we have reasons
for assuming the contrary. Meanwhile, there
is a contradiction between the peaceful preacher
of the mount, the sea-shore and the fields,
who appears like a new Buddha on a soil very
unlike India's, and the aggressive fanatic,
the mortal enemy of theologians and ecclesiastics,
who stands glorified by Renan's malice as
"le grand maitre en ironie." I
myself haven't any doubt that the greater
part of this venom (and no less of esprit)
got itself into the concept of the Master
only as a result of the excited nature of
Christian propaganda: we all know the unscrupulousness
of sectarians when they set out to turn their
leader into an apologia for themselves. When
the early Christians had need of an adroit,
contentious, pugnacious and maliciously subtle
theologian to tackle other theologians, they
created a "god" that met that need,
just as they put into his mouth without hesitation
certain ideas that were necessary to them
but that were utterly at odds with the Gospels--"the
second coming," "the last judgment,"
all sorts of expectations and promises, current
at the time.--
32.
I can only repeat that I set myself against
all efforts to intrude the fanatic into the
figure of the Saviour: the very word imperieux,
used by Renan, is alone enough to annul the
type. What the "glad tidings" tell
us is simply that there are no more contradictions;
the kingdom of heaven belongs to children;
the faith that is voiced here is no more
an embattled faith--it is at hand, it has
been from the beginning, it is a sort of
recrudescent childishness of the spirit.
The physiologists, at all events, are familiar
with such a delayed and incomplete puberty
in the living organism, the result of degeneration.
A faith of this sort is not furious, it does
not denounce, it does not defend itself:
it does not come with "the sword"--it
does not realize how it will one day set
man against man. It does not manifest itself
either by miracles, or by rewards and promises,
or by "scriptures": it is itself,
first and last, its own miracle, its own
reward, its own promise, its own "kingdom
of God." This faith does not formulate
itself--it simply lives, and so guards itself
against formulae. To be sure, the accident
of environment, of educational background
gives prominence to concepts of a certain
sort: in primitive Christianity one finds
only concepts of a Judaeo--Semitic character
(--that of eating and drinking at the last
supper belongs to this category--an idea
which, like everything else Jewish, has been
badly mauled by the church). But let us be
careful not to see in all this anything more
than symbolical language, semantics6 an opportunity
to speak in parables. It is only on the theory
that no work is to be taken literally that
this anti-realist is able to speak at all.
Set down among Hindus he would have made
use of the concepts of Sankhya, 7and among
Chinese he would have employed those of Lao-tse
8--and in neither case would it have made
any difference to him.--With a little freedom
in the use of words, one might actually call
Jesus a "free spirit"9--he cares
nothing for what is established: the word
killeth, 10 a whatever is established killeth.
'The idea of "life" as an experience,
as he alone conceives it, stands opposed
to his mind to every sort of word, formula,
law, belief and dogma. He speaks only of
inner things: "life" or "truth"
or "light" is his word for the
innermost--in his sight everything else,
the whole of reality, all nature, even language,
has significance only as sign, as allegory.
--Here it is of paramount importance to be
led into no error by the temptations lying
in Christian, or rather ecclesiastical prejudices:
such a symbolism par excellence stands outside
all religion, all notions of worship, all
history, all natural science, all worldly
experience, all knowledge, all politics,
all psychology, all books, all art--his "wisdom"
is precisely a pure ignorance11 of all such
things. He has never heard of culture; he
doesn't have to make war on it--he doesn't
even deny it. . . The same thing may be said
of the state, of the whole bourgeoise social
order, of labour, of war--he has no ground
for denying" the world," for he
knows nothing of the ecclesiastical concept
of "the world" . . . Denial is
precisely the thing that is impossible to
him.--In the same way he lacks argumentative
capacity, and has no belief that an article
of faith, a "truth," may be established
by proofs (--his proofs are inner "lights,"
subjective sensations of happiness and self-approval,
simple "proofs of power"--). Such
a doctrine cannot contradict: it doesn't
know that other doctrines exist, or can exist,
and is wholly incapable of imagining anything
opposed to it. . . If anything of the sort
is ever encountered, it laments the "blindness"
with sincere sympathy--for it alone has "light"--but
it does not offer objections . . .
33.
In the whole psychology of the "Gospels"
the concepts of guilt and punishment are
lacking, and so is that of reward. "Sin,"
which means anything that puts a distance
between God and man, is abolished--this is
precisely the "glad tidings." Eternal
bliss is not merely promised, nor is it bound
up with conditions: it is conceived as the
only reality--what remains consists merely
of signs useful in speaking of it.
The results of such a point of view project
themselves into a new way of life, the special
evangelical way of life. It is not a "belief"
that marks off the Christian; he is distinguished
by a different mode of action; he acts differently.
He offers no resistance, either by word or
in his heart, to those who stand against
him. He draws no distinction between strangers
and countrymen, Jews and Gentiles ("neighbour,"
of course, means fellow-believer, Jew). He
is angry with no one, and he despises no
one. He neither appeals to the courts of
justice nor heeds their mandates ("Swear
not at all") .12 He never under any
circumstances divorces his wife, even when
he has proofs of her infidelity.--And under
all of this is one principle; all of it arises
from one instinct.--
The life of the Saviour was simply a carrying
out of this way of life--and so was his death.
. . He no longer needed any formula or ritual
in his relations with God--not even prayer.
He had rejected the whole of the Jewish doctrine
of repentance and atonement; he knew that
it was only by a way of life that one could
feel one's self "divine," "blessed,"
"evangelical," a "child of
God."Not by "repentance,"not
by "prayer and forgiveness" is
the way to God: only the Gospel way leads
to God--it is itself "God!"--What
the Gospels abolished was the Judaism in
the concepts of "sin," "forgiveness
of sin," "faith," "salvation
through faith"--the wholeecclesiastical
dogma of the Jews was denied by the "glad
tidings."
The deep instinct which prompts the Christian
how to live so that he will feel that he
is "in heaven" and is "immortal,"
despite many reasons for feeling that he
isnot "in heaven": this is the
only psychological reality in "salvation."--A
new way of life, not a new faith.
34.
If I understand anything at all about this
great symbolist, it is this: that he regarded
only subjective realities as realities, as
"truths"--hat he saw everything
else, everything natural, temporal, spatial
and historical, merely as signs, as materials
for parables. The concept of "the Son
of God" does not connote a concrete
person in history, an isolated and definite
individual, but an "eternal" fact,
a psychological symbol set free from the
concept of time. The same thing is true,
and in the highest sense, of the God of this
typical symbolist, of the "kingdom of
God," and of the "sonship of God."
Nothing could he more un-Christian than the
crude ecclesiastical notions of God as a
person, of a "kingdom of God" that
is to come, of a "kingdom of heaven"
beyond, and of a "son of God" as
the second person of the Trinity. All this--if
I may be forgiven the phrase--is like thrusting
one's fist into the eye (and what an eye!)
of the Gospels: a disrespect for symbols
amounting to world-historical cynicism. .
. .But it is nevertheless obvious enough
what is meant by the symbols "Father"
and "Son"--not, of course, to every
one--: the word "Son" expresses
entrance into the feeling that there is a
general transformation of all things (beatitude),
and "Father" expresses that feeling
itself--the sensation of eternity and of
perfection.--I am ashamed to remind you of
what the church has made of this symbolism:
has it not set an Amphitryon story13 at the
threshold of the Christian "faith"?
And a dogma of "immaculate conception"
for good measure? . .
--And thereby it has robbed conception of
its immaculateness--
The "kingdom of heaven" is a state
of the heart--not something to come "beyond
the world" or "after death."
The whole idea of natural death is absent
from the Gospels: death is not a bridge,
not a passing; it is absent because it belongs
to a quite different, a merely apparent world,
useful only as a symbol. The "hour of
death" isnot a Christian idea--"hours,"
time, the physical life and its crises have
no existence for the bearer of "glad
tidings." . . .
The "kingdom of God" is not something
that men wait for: it had no yesterday and
no day after tomorrow, it is not going to
come at a "millennium"--it is an
experience of the heart, it is everywhere
and it is nowhere. . . .
35.
This "bearer of glad tidings"
died as he lived and taught--not to "save
mankind," but to show mankind how to
live. It was a way of life that he bequeathed
to man: his demeanour before the judges,
before the officers, before his accusers--his
demeanour on the cross. He does not resist;
he does not defend his rights; he makes no
effort to ward off the most extreme penalty--more,
he invites it. . . And he prays, suffers
and loves with those, in those, who do him
evil . . . Not to defend one's self, not
to show anger, not to lay blames. . . On
the contrary, to submit even to the Evil
One--to love him. . . .
36.
--We free spirits--we are the first to have
the necessary prerequisite to understanding
what nineteen centuries have misunderstood--that
instinct and passion for integrity which
makes war upon the "holy lie" even
more than upon all other lies. . . Mankind
was unspeakably far from our benevolent and
cautious neutrality, from that discipline
of the spirit which alone makes possible
the solution of such strange and subtle things:
what men always sought, with shameless egoism,
was their own advantage therein; they created
the church out of denial of the Gospels.
. . .
Whoever sought for signs of an ironical
divinity's hand in the great drama of existence
would find no small indication thereof in
the stupendous question-mark that is called
Christianity. That mankind should be on its
knees before the very antithesis of what
was the origin, the meaning and the law of
the Gospels--that in the concept of the "church"
the very things should be pronounced holy
that the "bearer of glad tidings"
regards as beneath him and behind him--it
would be impossible to surpass this as a
grand example of world-historical irony--
37.
--Our age is proud of its historical sense:
how, then, could it delude itself into believing
that the crude fable of the wonder-worker
and Saviour constituted the beginnings of
Christianity--and that everything spiritual
and symbolical in it only came later? Quite
to the contrary, the whole history of Christianity--from
the death on the cross onward--is the history
of a progressively clumsier misunderstanding
of an original symbolism. With every extension
of Christianity among larger and ruder masses,
even less capable of grasping the principles
that gave birth to it, the need arose to
make it more and more vulgar and barbarous--it
absorbed the teachings and rites of all the
subterranean cults of the imperium Romanum,
and the absurdities engendered by all sorts
of sickly reasoning. It was the fate of Christianity
that its faith had to become as sickly, as
low and as vulgar as the needs were sickly,
low and vulgar to which it had to administer.
A sickly barbarism finally lifts itself to
power as the church--the church, that incarnation
of deadly hostility to all honesty, to all
loftiness of soul, to all discipline of the
spirit, to all spontaneous and kindly humanity.--Christian
values--noble values: it is only we, we free
spirits, who have re-established this greatest
of all antitheses in values!. . . .
38.
--I cannot, at this place, avoid a sigh.
There are days when I am visited by a feeling
blacker than the blackest melancholy--contempt
of man. Let me leave no doubt as to what
I despise, whom I despise: it is the man
of today, the man with whom I am unhappily
contemporaneous. The man of today--I am suffocated
by his foul breath! . . . Toward the past,
like all who understand, I am full of tolerance,
which is to say, generous self-control: with
gloomy caution I pass through whole millenniums
of this mad house of a world, call it "Christianity,"
"Christian faith" or the "Christian
church," as you will--I take care not
to hold mankind responsible for its lunacies.
But my feeling changes and breaks out irresistibly
the moment I enter modern times, our times.
Our age knows better. . . What was formerly
merely sickly now becomes indecent--it is
indecent to be a Christian today. And here
my disgust begins.--I look about me: not
a word survives of what was once called "truth";
we can no longer bear to hear a priest pronounce
the word. Even a man who makes the most modest
pretensions to integrity must know that a
theologian, a priest, a pope of today not
only errs when he speaks, but actually lies--and
that he no longer escapes blame for his lie
through "innocence" or "ignorance."
The priest knows, as every one knows, that
there is no longer any "God," or
any "sinner," or any "Saviour"--that
"free will" and the "moral
order of the world" are lies--: serious
reflection, the profound self-conquest of
the spirit, allow no man to pretend that
he does not know it. . . All the ideas of
the church are now recognized for what they
are--as the worst counterfeits in existence,
invented to debase nature and all natural
values; the priest himself is seen as he
actually is--as the most dangerous form of
parasite, as the venomous spider of creation.
. - - We know, our conscience now knows--just
what the real value of all those sinister
inventions of priest and church has been
and what ends they have served, with their
debasement of humanity to a state of self-pollution,
the very sight of which excites loathing,--the
concepts "the other world," "the
last judgment," "the immortality
of the soul," the "soul" itself:
they are all merely so many in instruments
of torture, systems of cruelty, whereby the
priest becomes master and remains master.
. .Every one knows this, but nevertheless
things remain as before. What has become
of the last trace of decent feeling, of self-respect,
when our statesmen, otherwise an unconventional
class of men and thoroughly anti-Christian
in their acts, now call themselves Christians
and go to the communion table? . . . A prince
at the head of his armies, magnificent as
the expression of the egoism and arrogance
of his people--and yet acknowledging, without
any shame, that he is a Christian! . . .
Whom, then, does Christianity deny? what
does it call "the world"? To be
a soldier, to be a judge, to be a patriot;
to defend one's self; to be careful of one's
honour; to desire one's own advantage; to
be proud . . . every act of everyday, every
instinct, every valuation that shows itself
in a deed, is now anti-Christian: what a
monster of falsehood the modern man must
be to call himself nevertheless, and without
shame, a Christian!--
39.
--I shall go back a bit, and tell you the
authentic history of Christianity.--The very
word "Christianity" is a misunderstanding--at
bottom there was only one Christian, and
he died on the cross. The "Gospels"
died on the cross. What, from that moment
onward, was called the "Gospels"
was the very reverse of what he had lived:
"bad tidings," a Dysangelium. 14It
is an error amounting to nonsensicality to
see in "faith," and particularly
in faith in salvation through Christ, the
distinguishing mark of the Christian: only
the Christian way of life, the life lived
by him who died on the cross, is Christian.
. . To this day such a life is still possible,
and for certain men even necessary: genuine,
primitive Christianity will remain possible
in all ages. . . . Not faith, but acts; above
all, an avoidance of acts, a different state
of being. . . . States of consciousness,
faith of a sort, the acceptance, for example,
of anything as true--as every psychologist
knows, the value of these things is perfectly
indifferent and fifth-rate compared to that
of the instincts: strictly speaking, the
whole concept of intellectual causality is
false. To reduce being a Christian, the state
of Christianity, to an acceptance of truth,
to a mere phenomenon of consciousness, is
to formulate the negation of Christianity.
In fact, there are no Christians. The "Christian"--he
who for two thousand years has passed as
a Christian--is simply a psychological self-delusion.
Closely examined, it appears that, despite
all his "faith," he has been ruled
only by his instincts--and what instincts!--In
all ages--for example, in the case of Luther--"faith"
has been no more than a cloak, a pretense,
a curtain behind which the instincts have
played their game--a shrewd blindness to
the domination of certain of the instincts
. . .I have already called "faith"
the specially Christian form of shrewdness--people
always talk of their "faith" and
act according to their instincts. . . In
the world of ideas of the Christian there
is nothing that so much as touches reality:
on the contrary, one recognizes an instinctive
hatred of reality as the motive power, the
only motive power at the bottom of Christianity.
What follows therefrom? That even here, in
psychologicis, there is a radical error,
which is to say one conditioning fundamentals,
which is to say, one in substance. Take away
one idea and put a genuine reality in its
place--and the whole of Christianity crumbles
to nothingness !--Viewed calmly, this strangest
of all phenomena, a religion not only depending
on errors, but inventive and ingenious only
in devising injurious errors, poisonous to
life and to the heart--this remains a spectacle
for the gods--for those gods who are also
philosophers, and whom I have encountered,
for example, in the celebrated dialogues
at Naxos. At the moment when their disgust
leaves them (--and us!) they will be thankful
for the spectacle afforded by the Christians:
perhaps because of this curious exhibition
alone the wretched little planet called the
earth deserves a glance from omnipotence,
a show of divine interest. . . . Therefore,
let us not underestimate the Christians:
the Christian, false to the point of innocence,
is far above the ape--in its application
to the Christians a well--known theory of
descent becomes a mere piece of politeness.
. . .
40.
--The fate of the Gospels was decided by
death--it hung on the "cross.".
. . It was only death, that unexpected and
shameful death; it was only the cross, which
was usually reserved for the canaille only--it
was only this appalling paradox which brought
the disciples face to face with the real
riddle: "Who was it? what was it?"--The
feeling of dismay, of profound affront and
injury; the suspicion that such a death might
involve a refutation of their cause; the
terrible question, "Why just in this
way?"--this state of mind is only too
easy to understand. Here everything must
be accounted for as necessary; everything
must have a meaning, a reason, the highest
sort of reason; the love of a disciple excludes
all chance. Only then did the chasm of doubt
yawn: "Who put him to death? who was
his natural enemy?"--this question flashed
like a lightning-stroke. Answer: dominant
Judaism, its ruling class. From that moment,
one found one's self in revolt against the
established order, and began to understand
Jesus as in revolt against the established
order. Until then this militant, this nay-saying,
nay-doing element in his character had been
lacking; what is more, he had appeared to
present its opposite. Obviously, the little
community had not understood what was precisely
the most important thing of all: the example
offered by this way of dying, the freedom
from and superiority to every feeling of
ressentiment--a plain indication of how little
he was understood at all! All that Jesus
could hope to accomplish by his death, in
itself, was to offer the strongest possible
proof, or example, of his teachings in the
most public manner. But his disciples were
very far from forgiving his death--though
to have done so would have accorded with
the Gospels in the highest degree; and neither
were they prepared to offer themselves, with
gentle and serene calmness of heart, for
a similar death. . . . On the contrary, it
was precisely the most unevangelical of feelings,
revenge, that now possessed them. It seemed
impossible that the cause should perish with
his death: "recompense" and "judgment"
became necessary (--yet what could be less
evangelical than "recompense,"
"punishment," and "sitting
in judgment"!) --Once more the popular
belief in the coming of a messiah appeared
in the foreground; attention was riveted
upon an historical moment: the "kingdom
of God" is to come, with judgment upon
his enemies. . . But in all this there was
a wholesale misunderstanding: imagine the
"kingdom of God" as a last act,
as a mere promise! The Gospels had been,
in fact, the incarnation, the fulfillment,
therealization of this "kingdom of God."
It was only now that all the familiar contempt
for and bitterness against Pharisees and
theologians began to appear in the character
of the Master was thereby turned into a Pharisee
and theologian himself! On the other hand,
the savage veneration of these completely
unbalanced souls could no longer endure the
Gospel doctrine, taught by Jesus, of the
equal right of all men to be children of
God: their revenge took the form of elevating
Jesus in an extravagant fashion, and thus
separating him from themselves: just as,
in earlier times, the Jews, to revenge themselves
upon their enemies, separated themselves
from their God, and placed him on a great
height. The One God and the Only Son of God:
both were products of resentment . . . .
41.
--And from that time onward an absurd problem
offered itself: "how could God allow
it!" To which the deranged reason of
the little community formulated an answer
that was terrifying in its absurdity: God
gave his son as a sacrifice for the forgiveness
of sins. At once there was an end of the
gospels! Sacrifice for sin, and in its most
obnoxious and barbarous form: sacrifice of
the innocent for the sins of the guilty!
What appalling paganism !--Jesus himself
had done away with the very concept of "guilt,"
he denied that there was any gulf fixed between
God and man; he lived this unity between
God and man, and that was precisely his "glad
tidings". . . And not as a mere privilege!--From
this time forward the type of the Saviour
was corrupted, bit by bit, by the doctrine
of judgment and of the second coming, the
doctrine of death as a sacrifice, the doctrine
of the resurrection, by means of which the
entire concept of "blessedness,"
the whole and only reality of the gospels,
is juggled away--in favour of a state of
existence after death! . . . St. Paul, with
that rabbinical impudence which shows itself
in all his doings, gave a logical quality
to that conception, that indecent conception,
in this way: "If Christ did not rise
from the dead, then all our faith is in vain!"--And
at once there sprang from the Gospels the
most contemptible of all unfulfillable promises,
the shameless doctrine of personal immortality.
. . Paul even preached it as a reward . .
.
42.
One now begins to see just what it was that
came to an end with the death on the cross:
a new and thoroughly original effort to found
a Buddhistic peace movement, and so establish
happiness on earth--real, not merely promised.
For this remains--as I have already pointed
out--the essential difference between the
two religions of decadence: Buddhism promises
nothing, but actually fulfills; Christianity
promises everything, but fulfills nothing.--Hard
upon the heels of the "glad tidings"
came the worst imaginable: those of Paul.
In Paul is incarnated the very opposite of
the "bearer of glad tidings"; he
represents the genius for hatred, the vision
of hatred, the relentless logic of hatred.
What, indeed, has not this dysangelist sacrificed
to hatred! Above all, the Saviour: he nailed
him to his own cross. The life, the example,
the teaching, the death of Christ, the meaning
and the law of the whole gospels--nothing
was left of all this after that counterfeiter
in hatred had reduced it to his uses. Surely
not reality; surely not historical truth!
. . . Once more the priestly instinct of
the Jew perpetrated the same old master crime
against history--he simply struck out the
yesterday and the day before yesterday of
Christianity, and invented his own history
of Christian beginnings. Going further, he
treated the history of Israel to another
falsification, so that it became a mere prologue
to his achievement: all the prophets, it
now appeared, had referred to his "Saviour."
. . . Later on the church even falsified
the history of man in order to make it a
prologue to Christianity . . . The figure
of the Saviour, his teaching, his way of
life, his death, the meaning of his death,
even the consequences of his death--nothing
remained untouched, nothing remained in even
remote contact with reality. Paul simply
shifted the centre of gravity of that whole
life to a place behind this existence--in
the lie of the "risen" Jesus. At
bottom, he had no use for the life of the
Saviour--what he needed was the death on
the cross, and something more. To see anything
honest in such a man as Paul, whose home
was at the centre of the Stoical enlightenment,
when he converts an hallucination into a
proof of the resurrection of the Saviour,
or even to believe his tale that he suffered
from this hallucination himself--this would
be a genuine niaiserie in a psychologist.
Paul willed the end; therefore he also willed
the means. --What he himself didn't believe
was swallowed readily enough by the idiots
among whom he spread his teaching.--What
he wanted was power; in Paul the priest once
more reached out for power--he had use only
for such concepts, teachings and symbols
as served the purpose of tyrannizing over
the masses and organizing mobs. What was
the only part of Christianity that Mohammed
borrowed later on? Paul's invention, his
device for establishing priestly tyranny
and organizing the mob: the belief in the
immortality of the soul--that is to say,
the doctrine of "judgment".
43.
When the centre of gravity of life is placed,
not in life itself, but in "the beyond"--in
nothingness--then one has taken away its
centre of gravity altogether. The vast lie
of personal immortality destroys all reason,
all natural instinct--henceforth, everything
in the instincts that is beneficial, that
fosters life and that safeguards the future
is a cause of suspicion. So to live that
life no longer has any meaning: this is now
the "meaning" of life. . . . Why
be public-spirited? Why take any pride in
descent and forefathers? Why labour together,
trust one another, or concern one's self
about the common welfare, and try to serve
it? . . . Merely so many "temptations,"
so many strayings from the "straight
path."--"One thing only is necessary".
. . That every man, because he has an "immortal
soul," is as good as every other man;
that in an infinite universe of things the
"salvation" of every individual
may lay claim to eternal importance; that
insignificant bigots and the three-fourths
insane may assume that the laws of nature
are constantly suspended in their behalf--it
is impossible to lavish too much contempt
upon such a magnification of every sort of
selfishness to infinity, to insolence. And
yet Christianity has to thank precisely this
miserable flattery of personal vanity for
its triumph--it was thus that it lured all
the botched, the dissatisfied, the fallen
upon evil days, the whole refuse and off-scouring
of humanity to its side. The "salvation
of the soul"--in plain English: "the
world revolves around me." . . . The
poisonous doctrine, "equal rights for
all," has been propagated as a Christian
principle: out of the secret nooks and crannies
of bad instinct Christianity has waged a
deadly war upon all feelings of reverence
and distance between man and man, which is
to say, upon the first prerequisite to every
step upward, to every development of civilization--out
of the ressentiment of the masses it has
forged its chief weapons against us, against
everything noble, joyous and high spirited
on earth, against our happiness on earth
. . . To allow "immortality" to
every Peter and Paul was the greatest, the
most vicious outrage upon noble humanity
ever perpetrated.--And let us not underestimate
the fatal influence that Christianity has
had, even upon politics! Nowadays no one
has courage any more for special rights,
for the right of dominion, for feelings of
honourable pride in himself and his equals--for
the pathos of distance. . . Our politics
is sick with this lack of courage!--The aristocratic
attitude of mind has been undermined by the
lie of the equality of souls; and if belief
in the "privileges of the majority"
makes and will continue to make revolution--it
is Christianity, let us not doubt, and Christian
valuations, which convert every revolution
into a carnival of blood and crime! Christianity
is a revolt of all creatures that creep on
the ground against everything that is lofty:
the gospel of the "lowly" lowers
. . .
44.
--The gospels are invaluable as evidence
of the corruption that was already persistent
within the primitive community. That which
Paul, with the cynical logic of a rabbi,
later developed to a conclusion was at bottom
merely a process of decay that had begun
with the death of the Saviour.--These gospels
cannot be read too carefully; difficulties
lurk behind every word. I confess--I hope
it will not be held against me--that it is
precisely for this reason that they offer
first-rate joy to a psychologist--as the
opposite of all merely naive corruption,
as refinement par excellence, as an artistic
triumph in psychological corruption. The
gospels, in fact, stand alone. The Bible
as a whole is not to be compared to them.
Here we are among Jews: this is the first
thing to be borne in mind if we are not to
lose the thread of the matter. This positive
genius for conjuring up a delusion of personal
"holiness" unmatched anywhere else,
either in books or by men; this elevation
of fraud in word and attitude to the level
of an art--all this is not an accident due
to the chance talents of an individual, or
to any violation of nature. The thing responsible
is race. The whole of Judaism appears in
Christianity as the art of concocting holy
lies, and there, after many centuries of
earnest Jewish training and hard practice
of Jewish technic, the business comes to
the stage of mastery. The Christian, that
ultima ratio of lying, is the Jew all over
again--he is threefold the Jew. . . The underlying
will to make use only of such concepts, symbols
and attitudes as fit into priestly practice,
the instinctive repudiation of every other
mode of thought, and every other method of
estimating values and utilities--this is
not only tradition, it is inheritance: only
as an inheritance is it able to operate with
the force of nature. The whole of mankind,
even the best minds of the best ages (with
one exception, perhaps hardly human--), have
permitted themselves to be deceived. The
gospels have been read as a book of innocence.
. . surely no small indication of the high
skill with which the trick has been done.--Of
course, if we could actually see these astounding
bigots and bogus saints, even if only for
an instant, the farce would come to an end,--and
it is precisely because I cannot read a word
of theirs without seeing their attitudinizing
that I have made am end of them. . . . I
simply cannot endure the way they have of
rolling up their eyes.--For the majority,
happily enough, books are mere literature.--Let
us not be led astray: they say "judge
not," and yet they condemn to hell whoever
stands in their way. In letting God sit in
judgment they judge themselves; in glorifying
God they glorify themselves; in demanding
that every one show the virtues which they
themselves happen to be capable of--still
more, which they must have in order to remain
on top--they assume the grand air of men
struggling for virtue, of men engaging in
a war that virtue may prevail. "We live,
we die, we sacrifice ourselves for the good"
(--"the truth," "the light,"
"the kingdom of God"): in point
of fact, they simply do what they cannot
help doing. Forced, like hypocrites, to be
sneaky, to hide in corners, to slink along
in the shadows, they convert their necessity
into aduty: it is on grounds of duty that
they account for their lives of humility,
and that humility becomes merely one more
proof of their piety. . . Ah, that humble,
chaste, charitable brand of fraud! "Virtue
itself shall bear witness for us.".
. . . One may read the gospels as books of
moral seduction: these petty folks fasten
themselves to morality--they know the uses
of morality! Morality is the best of all
devices for leading mankind by the nose!--The
fact is that the conscious conceit of the
chosen here disguises itself as modesty:
it is in this way that they, the "community,"
the "good and just," range themselves,
once and for always, on one side, the side
of "the truth"--and the rest of
mankind, "the world," on the other.
. . In that we observe the most fatal sort
of megalomania that the earth has ever seen:
little abortions of bigots and liars began
to claim exclusive rights in the concepts
of "God," "the truth,"
"the light," "the spirit,"
"love," "wisdom" and
"life," as if these things were
synonyms of themselves and thereby they sought
to fence themselves off from the "world";
little super-Jews, ripe for some sort of
madhouse, turned values upside down in order
to meet their notions, just as if the Christian
were the meaning, the salt, the standard
and even thelast judgment of all the rest.
. . . The whole disaster was only made possible
by the fact that there already existed in
the world a similar megalomania, allied to
this one in race, to wit, the Jewish: once
a chasm began to yawn between Jews and Judaeo-Christians,
the latter had no choice but to employ the
self-preservative measures that the Jewish
instinct had devised, even against the Jews
themselves, whereas the Jews had employed
them only against non-Jews. The Christian
is simply a Jew of the "reformed"
confession.--
45.
--I offer a few examples of the sort of
thing these petty people have got into their
heads--what they have put into the mouth
of the Master: the unalloyed creed of "beautiful
souls."--
"And whosoever shall not receive you,
nor hear you, when ye depart thence, shake
off the dust under your feet for a testimony
against them. Verily I say unto you, it shall
be more tolerable for Sodom and Gomorrha
in the day of judgment, than for that city"
(Mark vi, 11)--How evangelical!
"And whosoever shall offend one of
these little ones that believe in me, it
is better for him that a millstone were hanged
about his neck, and he were cast into the
sea" (Mark ix, 42) .--How evangelical!
--
"And if thine eye offend thee, pluck
it out: it is better for thee to enter into
the kingdom of God with one eye, than having
two eyes to be cast into hell fire; Where
the worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched."
(Mark ix, 47)15--It is not exactly the eye
that is meant.
"Verily I say unto you, That there
be some of them that stand here, which shall
not taste death, till they have seen the
kingdom of God come with power." (Mark
ix, 1.)--Well lied, lion! 16 . . . .
"Whosoever will come after me, let
him deny himself, and take up his cross,
and follow me. For . . ." (Note of a
psychologist. Christian morality is refuted
by its fors: its reasons are against it,--this
makes it Christian.) Mark viii, 34.--
"Judge not, that ye be not judged.
With what measure ye mete, it shall be measured
to you again." (Matthew vii, l.)17--What
a notion of justice, of a "just"
judge! . . .
"For if ye love them which love you,
what reward have ye? do not even the publicans
the same? And if ye salute your brethren
only, what do ye more than others? do not
even the publicans so?" (Matthew V,
46.)18--Principle of "Christian love":
it insists upon being well paid in the end.
. . .
"But if ye forgive not men their trespasses,
neither will your Father forgive your trespasses."
(Matthew vi, 15.)--Very compromising for
the said "father."
"But seek ye first the kingdom of God,
and his righteousness; and all these things
shall be added unto you." (Matthew vi,
33.)--All these things: namely, food, clothing,
all the necessities of life. An error, to
put it mildly. . . . A bit before this God
appears as a tailor, at least in certain
cases.
"Rejoice ye in that day, and leap for
joy: for, behold, your reward is great in
heaven: for in the like manner did their
fathers unto the prophets." (Luke vi,
23.)--Impudent rabble! It compares itself
to the prophets. . .
"Know yea not that yea are the temple
of God, and that the spirit of God dwelt
in you? If any man defile the temple of God,
him shall God destroy; for the temple of
God is holy, which temple yea are."
(Paul, 1 Corinthians iii, 16.)19--For that
sort of thing one cannot have enough contempt.
. . .
"Do yea not know that the saints shall
judge the world? and if the world shall be
judged by you, are yea unworthy to judge
the smallest matters?" (Paul, 1 Corinthians
vi,
2.)--Unfortunately, not merely the speech
of a lunatic. . .
This frightful impostor then proceeds: "Know
yea not that we shall judge angels? how much
more things that pertain to this life?".
. .
"Hat not God made foolish the wisdom
of this world? For after that in the wisdom
of God the world by wisdom knew not God,
it pleased God by the foolishness of preaching
to save them that believe. . . . Not many
wise men after the flesh, not men mighty,
not many noble are called: But God hat chosen
the foolish things of the world to confound
the wise; and God hat chosen the weak things
of the world confound the things which are
mighty; And base things of the world, and
things which are despised, hat God chosen,
yea, and things which are not, to bring to
nought things that are: That no flesh should
glory in his presence." (Paul, 1 Corinthians
i, 20ff.)20 --In order to understand this
passage, a first rate example of the psychology
underlying every Chandala-morality, one should
read the first part of my "Genealogy
of Morals": there, for the first time,
the antagonism between a noble morality and
a morality born of ressentiment and impotent
vengefulness is exhibited. Paul was the greatest
of all apostles of revenge. . . .
46.
--What follows, then? That one had better
put on gloves before reading the New Testament.
The presence of so much filth makes it very
advisable. One would as little choose "early
Christians" for companions as Polish
Jews: not that one need seek out an objection
to them . . . Neither has a pleasant smell.--I
have searched the New Testament in vain for
a single sympathetic touch; nothing is there
that is free, kindly, open-hearted or upright.
In it humanity does not even make the first
step upward--the instinct for cleanliness
is lacking. . . . Only evil instincts are
there, and there is not even the courage
of these evil instincts. It is all cowardice;
it is all a shutting of the eyes, a self-deception.
Every other book becomes clean, once one
has read the New Testament: for example,
immediately after reading Paul I took up
with delight that most charming and wanton
of scoffers, Petronius, of whom one may say
what Domenico Boccaccio wrote of Ceasar Borgia
to the Duke of Parma: "e tutto Iesto"--immortally
healthy, immortally cheerful and sound. .
. .These petty bigots make a capital miscalculation.
They attack, but everything they attack is
thereby distinguished. Whoever is attacked
by an "early Christian" is surely
not befouled . . . On the contrary, it is
an honour to have an "early Christian"
as an opponent. One cannot read the New Testament
without acquired admiration for whatever
it abuses--not to speak of the "wisdom
of this world," which an impudent wind
bag tries to dispose of "by the foolishness
of preaching." . . . Even the scribes
and pharisees are benefitted by such opposition:
they must certainly have been worth something
to have been hated in such an indecent manner.
Hypocrisy--as if this were a charge that
the "early Christians" dared to
make!--After all, they were the privileged,
and that was enough: the hatred of the Chandala
needed no other excuse. The "early Christian"--and
also, I fear, the "last Christian,"
whom I may perhaps live to see--is a rebel
against all privilege by profound instinct--he
lives and makes war for ever for "equal
rights." . . .Strictly speaking, he
has no alternative. When a man proposes to
represent, in his own person, the "chosen
of God"--or to be a "temple of
God," or a "judge of the angels"--then
every other criterion, whether based upon
honesty, upon intellect, upon manliness and
pride, or upon beauty and freedom of the
heart, becomes simply "worldly"--evil
in itself. . . Moral: every word that comes
from the lips of an "early Christian"
is a lie, and his every act is instinctively
dishonest--all his values, all his aims are
noxious, but whoever he hates, whatever he
hates, has real value . . . The Christian,
and particularly the Christian priest, is
thus a criterion of values.
--Must I add that, in the whole New Testament,
there appears but a solitary figure worthy
of honour? Pilate, the Roman viceroy. To
regard a Jewish imbroglio seriously--that
was quite beyond him. One Jew more or less--
what did it matter? . . . The noble scorn
of a Roman, before whom the word "truth"
was shamelessly mishandled, enriched the
New Testament with the only saying that has
any value--and that is at once its criticism
and its destruction: "What is truth?".
. .
47.
--The thing that sets us apart is not that
we are unable to find God, either in history,
or in nature, or behind nature--but that
we regard what has been honoured as God,
not as "divine," but as pitiable,
as absurd, as injurious; not as a mere error,
but as acrime against life. . . We deny that
God is God . . . If any one were to show
us this Christian God, we'd be still less
inclined to believe in him.--In a formula:
deus, qualem Paulus creavit, dei negatio.--Such
a religion as Christianity, which does not
touch reality at a single point and which
goes to pieces the moment reality asserts
its rights at any point, must be inevitably
the deadly enemy of the "wisdom of this
world," which is to say, of science--and
it will give the name of good to whatever
means serve to poison, calumniate and cry
down all intellectual discipline, all lucidity
and strictness in matters of intellectual
conscience, and all noble coolness and freedom
of the mind. "Faith," as an imperative,
vetoes science--in praxi, lying at any price.
. . . Paul well knew that lying--that "faith"--was
necessary; later on the church borrowed the
fact from Paul.--The God that Paul invented
for himself, a God who "reduced to absurdity"
"the wisdom of this world" (especially
the two great enemies of superstition, philology
and medicine), is in truth only an indication
of Paul's resolute determination to accomplish
that very thing himself: to give one's own
will the name of God, thora--that is essentially
Jewish. Paul wants to dispose of the "wisdom
of this world": his enemies are the
good philologians and physicians of the Alexandrine
school--on them he makes his war. As a matter
of fact no man can be a philologian or a
physician without being also Antichrist.
That is to say, as a philologian a man sees
behind the "holy books," and as
a physician he sees behind the physiological
degeneration of the typical Christian. The
physician says "incurable"; the
philologian says "fraud.". . .
48.
--Has any one ever clearly understood the
celebrated story at the beginning of the
Bible--of God's mortal terror of science?
. . . No one, in fact, has understood it.
This priest-book par excellence opens, as
is fitting, with the great inner difficulty
of the priest: he faces only one great danger;
ergo, "God" faces only one great
danger.--
The old God, wholly "spirit,"
wholly the high-priest, wholly perfect, is
promenading his garden: he is bored and trying
to kill time. Against boredom even gods struggle
in vain. 21What does he do? He creates man--man
is entertaining. . . But then he notices
that man is also bored. God's pity for the
only form of distress that invades all paradises
knows no bounds: so he forthwith creates
other animals. God's first mistake: to man
these other animals were not entertaining--he
sought dominion over them; he did not want
to be an "animal" himself.--So
God created woman. In the act he brought
boredom to an end--and also many other things!
Woman was the second mistake of God.--"Woman,
at bottom, is a serpent, Heva"--every
priest knows that; "from woman comes
every evil in the world"--every priest
knows that, too. Ergo, she is also to blame
for science. . . It was through woman that
man learned to taste of the tree of knowledge.--What
happened? The old God was seized by mortal
terror. Man himself had been his greatest
blunder; he had created a rival to himself;
science makes men godlike--it is all up with
priests and gods when man becomes scientific!--Moral:
science is the forbidden per se; it alone
is forbidden. Science is the first of sins,
the germ of all sins, the original sin. This
is all there is of morality.--"Thou
shalt not know"--the rest follows from
that.--God's mortal terror, however, did
not hinder him from being shrewd. How is
one to protect one's self against science?
For a long while this was the capital problem.
Answer: Out of paradise with man! Happiness,
leisure, foster thought--and all thoughts
are bad thoughts!--Man must not think.--And
so the priest invents distress, death, the
mortal dangers of childbirth, all sorts of
misery, old age, decrepitude, above all,
sickness--nothing but devices for making
war on science! The troubles of man don't
allow him to think. . . Nevertheless--how
terrible!--, the edifice of knowledge begins
to tower aloft, invading heaven, shadowing
the gods--what is to be done?--The old God
invents war; he separates the peoples; he
makes men destroy one another (--the priests
have always had need of war....). War--among
other things, a great disturber of science
!--Incredible! Knowledge, deliverance from
the priests, prospers in spite of war.--So
the old God comes to his final resolution:
"Man has become scientific--there is
no help for it: he must be drowned!".
. . .
49.
--I have been understood. At the opening
of the Bible there is the whole psychology
of the priest.--The priest knows of only
one great danger: that is science--the sound
comprehension of cause and effect. But science
flourishes, on the whole, only under favourable
conditions--a man must have time, he must
have an overflowing intellect, in order to
"know." . . ."Therefore, man
must be made unhappy,"--this has been,
in all ages, the logic of the priest.--It
is easy to see just what, by this logic,
was the first thing to come into the world
:--"sin." . . . The concept of
guilt and punishment, the whole "moral
order of the world," was set up against
science--against the deliverance of man from
priests. . . . Man must not look outward;
he must look inward. He must not look at
things shrewdly and cautiously, to learn
about them; he must not look at all; he must
suffer . . . And he must suffer so much that
he is always in need of the priest.--Away
with physicians! What is needed is a Saviour.--The
concept of guilt and punishment, including
the doctrines of "grace," of "salvation,"
of "forgiveness"--lies through
and through, and absolutely without psychological
reality--were devised to destroy man's sense
of causality: they are an attack upon the
concept of cause and effect !--And not an
attack with the fist, with the knife, with
honesty in hate and love! On the contrary,
one inspired by the most cowardly, the most
crafty, the most ignoble of instincts! An
attack of priests! An attack of parasites!
The vampirism of pale, subterranean leeches!
. . . When the natural consequences of an
act are no longer "natural," but
are regarded as produced by the ghostly creations
of superstition--by "God," by "spirits,"
by "souls"--and reckoned as merely
"moral" consequences, as rewards,
as punishments, as hints, as lessons, then
the whole ground-work of knowledge is destroyed--then
the greatest of crimes against humanity has
been perpetrated.--I repeat that sin, man's
self-desecration par excellence, was invented
in order to make science, culture, and every
elevation and ennobling of man impossible;
the priest rules through the invention of
sin.--
50.
--In this place I can't permit myself to
omit a psychology of "belief,"
of the "believer," for the special
benefit of 'believers." If there remain
any today who do not yet know how indecent
it is to be "believing"--or how
much a sign of decadence, of a broken will
to live--then they will know it well enough
tomorrow. My voice reaches even the deaf.--It
appears, unless I have been incorrectly informed,
that there prevails among Christians a sort
of criterion of truth that is called "proof
by power." Faith makes blessed: therefore
it is true."--It might be objected right
here that blessedness is not demonstrated,
it is merely promised: it hangs upon "faith"
as a condition--one shall be blessed because
one believes. . . . But what of the thing
that the priest promises to the believer,
the wholly transcendental "beyond"--how
is that to be demonstrated?--The "proof
by power," thus assumed, is actually
no more at bottom than a belief that the
effects which faith promises will not fail
to appear. In a formula: "I believe
that faith makes for blessedness--therefore,
it is true." . . But this is as far
as we may go. This "therefore"
would be absurdum itself as a criterion of
truth.--But let us admit, for the sake of
politeness, that blessedness by faith may
be demonstrated (--not merely hoped for,
and not merely promised by the suspicious
lips of a priest): even so, could blessedness--in
a technical term, pleasure--ever be a proof
of truth? So little is this true that it
is almost a proof against truth when sensations
of pleasure influence the answer to the question
"What is true?" or, at all events,
it is enough to make that "truth"
highly suspicious. The proof by "pleasure"
is a proof of "pleasure--nothing more;
why in the world should it be assumed that
true judgments give more pleasure than false
ones, and that, in conformity to some pre-established
harmony, they necessarily bring agreeable
feelings in their train?--The experience
of all disciplined and profound minds teaches
the contrary. Man has had to fight for every
atom of the truth, and has had to pay for
it almost everything that the heart, that
human love, that human trust cling to. Greatness
of soul is needed for this business: the
service of truth is the hardest of all services.--What,
then, is the meaning of integrityin things
intellectual? It means that a man must be
severe with his own heart, that he must scorn
"beautiful feelings," and that
he makes every Yea and Nay a matter of conscience!--Faith
makes blessed: therefore, it lies. . . .
51.
The fact that faith, under certain circumstances,
may work for blessedness, but that this blessedness
produced by an idee fixe by no means makes
the idea itself true, and the fact that faith
actually moves no mountains, but instead
raises them up where there were none before:
all this is made sufficiently clear by a
walk through a lunatic asylum. Not, of course,
to a priest: for his instincts prompt him
to the lie that sickness is not sickness
and lunatic asylums not lunatic asylums.
Christianity finds sickness necessary, just
as the Greek spirit had need of a superabundance
of health--the actual ulterior purpose of
the whole system of salvation of the church
is to make people ill. And the church itself--doesn't
it set up a Catholic lunatic asylum as the
ultimate ideal?--The whole earth as a madhouse?--The
sort of religious man that the church wants
is a typical decadent; the moment at which
a religious crisis dominates a people is
always marked by epidemics of nervous disorder;
the inner world" of the religious man
is so much like the "inner world"
of the overstrung and exhausted that it is
difficult to distinguish between them; the
"highest" states of mind, held
up be fore mankind by Christianity as of
supreme worth, are actually epileptoid in
form--the church has granted the name of
holy only to lunatics or to gigantic frauds
in majorem dei honorem. . . . Once I ventured
to designate the whole Christian system of
training22in penance and salvation (now best
studied in England) as a method of producing
a folie circulaire upon a soil already prepared
for it, which is to say, a soil thoroughly
unhealthy. Not every one may be a Christian:
one is not "converted" to Christianity--one
must first be sick enough for it. . . .We
others, who have the courage for health and
likewise for contempt,--we may well despise
a religion that teaches misunderstanding
of the body! that refuses to rid itself of
the superstition about the soul! that makes
a "virtue" of insufficient nourishment!
that combats health as a sort of enemy, devil,
temptation! that persuades itself that it
is possible to carry about a "perfect
soul" in a cadaver of a body, and that,
to this end, had to devise for itself a new
concept of "perfection," a pale,
sickly, idiotically ecstatic state of existence,
so-called "holiness"--a holiness
that is itself merely a series of symptoms
of an impoverished, enervated and incurably
disordered body! . . . The Christian movement,
as a European movement, was from the start
no more than a general uprising of all sorts
of outcast and refuse elements
(--who now, under cover of Christianity,
aspire to power)-- It does not represent
the decay of a race; it represents, on the
contrary, a conglomeration of decadence products
from all directions, crowding together and
seeking one another out. It was not, as has
been thought, the corruption of antiquity,
of noble antiquity, which made Christianity
possible; one cannot too sharply challenge
the learned imbecility which today maintains
that theory. At the time when the sick and
rotten Chandala classes in the whole imperium
were Christianized, the contrary type, the
nobility, reached its finest and ripest development.
The majority became master; democracy, with
its Christian instincts, triumphed . . .
Christianity was not "national,"
it was not based on race--it appealed to
all the varieties of men disinherited by
life, it had its allies everywhere. Christianity
has the rancour of the sick at its very core--the
instinct against the healthy, against health.
Everything that is well--constituted, proud,
gallant and, above all, beautiful gives offence
to its ears and eyes. Again I remind you
of Paul's priceless saying: "And God
hath chosen the weak things of the world,
the foolish things of the world, the base
things of the world, and things which are
despised":23 this was the formula; in
hoc signo the decadence triumphed.--God on
the cross--is man always to miss the frightful
inner significance of this symbol?--Everything
that suffers, everything that hangs on the
cross, is divine. . . . We all hang on the
cross, consequently we are divine. . . .
We alone are divine. . . . Christianity was
thus a victory: a nobler attitude of mind
was destroyed by it--Christianity remains
to this day the greatest misfortune of humanity.--
52.
Christianity also stands in opposition to
all intellectual well-being,--sick reasoning
is the only sort that it can use as Christian
reasoning; it takes the side of everything
that is idiotic; it pronounces a curse upon
"intellect," upon the superbia
of the healthy intellect. Since sickness
is inherent in Christianity, it follows that
the typically Christian state of "faith"
must be a form of sickness too, and that
all straight, straightforward and scientific
paths to knowledge must be banned by the
church as forbidden ways. Doubt is thus a
sin from the start. . . . The complete lack
of psychological cleanliness in the priest--revealed
by a glance at him--is a phenomenon resulting
from decadence,--one may observe in hysterical
women and in rachitic children how regularly
the falsification of instincts, delight in
lying for the mere sake of lying, and incapacity
for looking straight and walking straight
are symptoms of decadence. "Faith"
means the will to avoid knowing what is true.
The pietist, the priest of either sex, is
a fraud because he is sick: his instinct
demands that the truth shall never be allowed
its rights on any point. "Whatever makes
for illness is good; whatever issues from
abundance, from super-abundance, from power,
is evil": so argues the believer. The
impulse to lie--it is by this that I recognize
every foreordained theologian.--Another characteristic
of the theologian is his unfitness for philology.
What I here mean by philology is, in a general
sense, the art of reading with profit--the
capacity for absorbing facts without interpreting
them falsely, and without losing caution,
patience and subtlety in the effort to understand
them. Philology as ephexis24 in interpretation:
whether one be dealing with books, with newspaper
reports, with the most fateful events or
with weather statistics--not to mention the
"salvation of the soul." . . .
The way in which a theologian, whether in
Berlin or in Rome, is ready to explain, say,
a "passage of Scripture," or an
experience, or a victory by the national
army, by turning upon it the high illumination
of the Psalms of David, is always so daring
that it is enough to make a philologian run
up a wall. But what shall he do when pietists
and other such cows from Suabia25 use the
"finger of God" to convert their
miserably commonplace and huggermugger existence
into a miracle of "grace," a "providence"
and an "experience of salvation"?
The most modest exercise of the intellect,
not to say of decency, should certainly be
enough to convince these interpreters of
the perfect childishness and unworthiness
of such a misuse of the divine digital dexterity.
However small our piety, if we ever encountered
a god who always cured us of a cold in the
head at just the right time, or got us into
our carriage at the very instant heavy rain
began to fall, he would seem so absurd a
god that he'd have to be abolished even if
he existed. God as a domestic servant, as
a letter carrier, as an almanac--man--at
bottom, he is' a mere name for the stupidest
sort of chance. . . . "Divine Providence,"
which every third man in "educated Germany"
still believes in, is so strong an argument
against God that it would be impossible to
think of a stronger. And in any case it is
an argument against Germans! . . .
53.
--It is so little true that martyrs offer
any support to the truth of a cause that
I am inclined to deny that any martyr has
ever had anything to do with the truth at
all. In the very tone in which a martyr flings
what he fancies to be true at the head of
the world there appears so low a grade of
intellectual honesty and such insensibility
to the problem of "truth," that
it is never necessary to refute him. Truth
is not something that one man has and another
man has not: at best, only peasants, or peasant
apostles like Luther, can think of truth
in any such way. One may rest assured that
the greater the degree of a man's intellectual
conscience the greater will be his modesty,
his discretion, on this point. To know in
five cases, and to refuse, with delicacy,
to know anything further . . . "Truth,"
as the word is understood by every prophet,
every sectarian, every free-thinker, every
Socialist and every churchman, is simply
a complete proof that not even a beginning
has been made in the intellectual discipline
and self-control that are necessary to the
unearthing of even the smallest truth.--The
deaths of the martyrs, it may be said in
passing, have been misfortunes of history:
they have misled . . . The conclusion that
all idiots, women and plebeians come to,
that there must be something in a cause for
which any one goes to his death (or which,
as under primitive Christianity, sets off
epidemics of death-seeking)--this conclusion
has been an unspeakable drag upon the testing
of facts, upon the whole spirit of inquiry
and investigation. The martyrs have damaged
the truth. . . . Even to this day the crude
fact of persecution is enough to give an
honourable name to the most empty sort of
sectarianism.--But why? Is the worth of a
cause altered by the fact that some one had
laid down his life for it?--An error that
becomes honourable is simply an error that
has acquired one seductive charm the more:
do you suppose, Messrs. Theologians, that
we shall give you the chance to be martyred
for your lies?--One best disposes of a cause
by respectfully putting it on ice--that is
also the best way to dispose of theologians.
. . . This was precisely the world-historical
stupidity of all the persecutors: that they
gave the appearance of honour to the cause
they opposed--that they made it a present
of the fascination of martyrdom. . . .Women
are still on their knees before an error
because they have been told that some one
died on the cross for it. Is the cross, then,
an argument?--But about all these things
there is one, and one only, who has said
what has been needed for thousands of years--Zarathustra.
They made signs in blood along the way that
they went, and their folly taught them that
the truth is proved by blood. But blood is
the worst of all testimonies to the truth;
blood poisoneth even the purest teaching
and turneth it into madness and hatred in
the heart. And when one goeth through fire
for his teaching--what doth that prove? Verily,
it is more when one's teaching cometh out
of one's own burning! 26
54.
Do not let yourself be deceived: great intellects
are sceptical. Zarathustra is a sceptic.
The strength, the freedom which proceed from
intellectual power, from a superabundance
of intellectual power, manifest themselves
as scepticism. Men of fixed convictions do
not count when it comes to determining what
is fundamental in values and lack of values.
Men of convictions are prisoners. They do
not see far enough, they do not see what
is below them: whereas a man who would talk
to any purpose about value and non-value
must be able to see five hundred convictions
beneath him--and behind him. . . . A mind
that aspires to great things, and that wills
the means thereto, is necessarily sceptical.
Freedom from any sort of conviction belongs
to strength, and to an independent point
of view. . . That grand passion which is
at once the foundation and the power of a
sceptic's existence, and is both more enlightened
and more despotic than he is himself, drafts
the whole of his intellect into its service;
it makes him unscrupulous; it gives him courage
to employ unholy means; under certain circumstances
it does not begrudge him even convictions.
Conviction as a means: one may achieve a
good deal by means of a conviction. A grand
passion makes use of and uses up convictions;
it does not yield to them--it knows itself
to be sovereign.--On the contrary, the need
of faith, of some thing unconditioned by
yea or nay, of Carlylism, if I may be allowed
the word, is a need of weakness. The man
of faith, the "believer" of any
sort, is necessarily a dependent man--such
a man cannot posit himself as a goal, nor
can he find goals within himself. The "believer"
does not belong to himself; he can only be
a means to an end; he must be used up; he
needs some one to use him up. His instinct
gives the highest honours to an ethic of
self-effacement; he is prompted to embrace
it by everything: his prudence, his experience,
his vanity. Every sort of faith is in itself
an evidence of self-effacement, of self-estrangement.
. . When one reflects how necessary it is
to the great majority that there be regulations
to restrain them from without and hold them
fast, and to what extent control, or, in
a higher sense, slavery, is the one and only
condition which makes for the well-being
of the weak-willed man, and especially woman,
then one at once understands conviction and
"faith." To the man with convictions
they are his backbone. To avoid seeing many
things, to be impartial about nothing, to
be a party man through and through, to estimate
all values strictly and infallibly--these
are conditions necessary to the existence
of such a man. But by the same token they
are antagonists of the truthful man--of the
truth. . . . The believer is not free to
answer the question, "true" or
"not true," according to the dictates
of his own conscience: integrity on this
point would work his instant downfall. The
pathological limitations of his vision turn
the man of convictions into a fanatic--Savonarola,
Luther, Rousseau, Robespierre, Saint-Simon--these
types stand in opposition to the strong,
emancipated spirit. But the grandiose attitudes
of these sick intellects, these intellectual
epileptics, are of influence upon the great
masses--fanatics are picturesque, and mankind
prefers observing poses to listening to reasons.
. . .
55.
--One step further in the psychology of
conviction, of "faith." It is now
a good while since I first proposed for consideration
the question whether convictions are not
even more dangerous enemies to truth than
lies. ("Human, All-Too-Human,"
I, aphorism 483.)27 This time I desire to
put the question definitely: is there any
actual difference between a lie and a conviction?--All
the world believes that there is; but what
is not believed by all the world!--Every
conviction has its history, its primitive
forms, its stage of tentativeness and error:
it becomes a conviction only after having
been, for a long time, not one, and then,
for an even longer time, hardly one. What
if falsehood be also one of these embryonic
forms of conviction?--Sometimes all that
is needed is a change in persons: what was
a lie in the father becomes a conviction
in the son.--I call it lying to refuse to
see what one sees, or to refuse to see it
as it is: whether the lie be uttered before
witnesses or not before witnesses is of no
consequence. The most common sort of lie
is that by which a man deceives himself:
the deception of others is a relatively rare
offence.--Now, this will not to see what
one sees, this will not to see it as it is,
is almost the first requisite for all who
belong to a party of whatever sort: the party
man becomes inevitably a liar. For example,
the German historians are convinced that
Rome was synonymous with despotism and that
the Germanic peoples brought the spirit of
liberty into the world: what is the difference
between this conviction and a lie? Is it
to be wondered at that all partisans, including
the German historians, instinctively roll
the fine phrases of morality upon their tongues--that
morality almost owes its very survival to
the fact that the party man of every sort
has need of it every moment?--"This
is our conviction: we publish it to the whole
world; we live and die for it--let us respect
all who have convictions!"--I have actually
heard such sentiments from the mouths of
anti-Semites. On the contrary, gentlemen!
An anti-Semite surely does not become more
respectable because he lies on principle.
. . The priests, who have more finesse in
such matters, and who well understand the
objection that lies against the notion of
a conviction, which is to say, of a falsehood
that becomes a matter of principle because
it serves a purpose, have borrowed from the
Jews the shrewd device of sneaking in the
concepts, "God," "the will
of God" and "the revelation of
God" at this place. Kant, too, with
his categorical imperative, was on the same
road: this was hispractical reason. 28 There
are questions regarding the truth or untruth
of which it is not for man to decide; all
the capital questions, all the capital problems
of valuation, are beyond human reason. .
. . To know the limits of reason--that alone
is genuine. philosophy. Why did God make
a revelation to man? Would God have done
anything superfluous? Man could not find
out for himself what was good and what was
evil, so God taught him His will. Moral:
the priest does not lie--the question, "true"
or "untrue," has nothing to do
with such things as the priest discusses;
it is impossible to lie about these things.
In order to lie here it would be necessary
to knowwhat is true. But this is more than
man can know; therefore, the priest is simply
the mouth-piece of God.--Such a priestly
syllogism is by no means merely Jewish and
Christian; the right to lie and the shrewd
dodge of "revelation" belong to
the general priestly type--to the priest
of the decadence as well as to the priest
of pagan times (--Pagans are all those who
say yes to life, and to whom "God"
is a word signifying acquiescence in all
things) --The "law," the "will
of God," the "holy book,"
and "inspiration"--all these things
are merely words for the conditionsunder
which the priest comes to power and with
which he maintains his power,--these concepts
are to be found at the bottom of all priestly
organizations, and of all priestly or priestly-philosophical
schemes of governments. The "holy lie"--common
alike to Confucius, to the Code of Manu,
to Mohammed and to the Christian church--is
not even wanting in Plato. "Truth is
here": this means, no matter where it
is heard, the priest lies. . . .
56.
--In the last analysis it comes to this:
what is the end of lying? The fact that,
in Christianity, "holy" ends are
not visible is my objection to the means
it employs. Only bad ends appear: the poisoning,
the calumniation, the denial of life, the
despising of the body, the degradation and
self-contamination of man by the concept
of sin--therefore, its means are also bad.--I
have a contrary feeling when I read the Code
of Manu, an incomparably more intellectual
and superior work, which it would be a sin
against the intelligence to so much as name
in the same breath with the Bible. It is
easy to see why: there is a genuine philosophy
behind it, in it, not merely an evil-smelling
mess of Jewish rabbinism and superstition,--it
gives even the most fastidious psychologist
something to sink his teeth into. And, not
to forget what is most important, it differs
fundamentally from every kind of Bible: by
means of it the nobles, the philosophers
and the warriors keep the whip-hand over
the majority; it is full of noble valuations,
it shows a feeling of perfection, an acceptance
of life, and triumphant feeling toward self
and life--the sun shines upon the whole book.--All
the things on which Christianity vents its
fathomless vulgarity--for example, procreation,
women and marriage--are here handled earnestly,
with reverence and with love and confidence.
How can any one really put into the hands
of children and ladies a book which contains
such vile things as this: "to avoid
fornication, let every man have his own wife,
and let every woman have her own husband;
. . . it is better to marry than to burn"?29
And is it possible to be a Christian so long
as the origin of man is Christianized, which
is to say, befouled, by the doctrine of the
immaculata conceptio? . . . I know of no
book in which so many delicate and kindly
things are said of women as in the Code of
Manu; these old grey-beards and saints have
a way of being gallant to women that it would
be impossible, perhaps, to surpass. "The
mouth of a woman," it says in one place,
"the breasts of a maiden, the prayer
of a child and the smoke of sacrifice are
always pure." In another place: "there
is nothing purer than the light of the sun,
the shadow cast by a cow, air, water, fire
and the breath of a maiden." Finally,
in still another place--perhaps this is also
a holy lie--: "all the orifices of the
body above the navel are pure, and all below
are impure. Only in the maiden is the whole
body pure."
57.
One catches the unholiness of Christian
means in flagranti by the simple process
of putting the ends sought by Christianity
beside the ends sought by the Code of Manu--by
putting these enormously antithetical ends
under a strong light. The critic of Christianity
cannot evade the necessity of making Christianity
contemptible.--A book of laws such as the
Code of Manu has the same origin as every
other good law-book: it epitomizes the experience,
the sagacity and the ethical experimentation
of long centuries; it brings things to a
conclusion; it no longer creates. The prerequisite
to a codification of this sort is recognition
of the fact that the means which establish
the authority of a slowly and painfully attained
truth are fundamentally different from those
which one would make use of to prove it.
A law-book never recites the utility, the
grounds, the casuistical antecedents of a
law: for if it did so it would lose the imperative
tone, the "thou shalt," on which
obedience is based. The problem lies exactly
here.--At a certain point in the evolution
of a people, the class within it of the greatest
insight, which is to say, the greatest hindsight
and foresight, declares that the series of
experiences determining how all shall live--or
can live--has come to an end. The object
now is to reap as rich and as complete a
harvest as possible from the days of experiment
and hard experience. In consequence, the
thing that is to be avoided above everything
is further experimentation--the continuation
of the state in which values are fluent,
and are tested, chosen and criticized ad
infnitum. Against this a double wall is set
up: on the one hand, revelation, which is
the assumption that the reasons lying behind
the laws are not of human origin, that they
were not sought out and found by a slow process
and after many errors, but that they are
of divine ancestry, and came into being complete,
perfect, without a history, as a free gift,
a miracle . . . ; and on the other hand,
tradition, which is the assumption that the
law has stood unchanged from time immemorial,
and that it is impious and a crime against
one's forefathers to bring it into question.
The authority of the law is thus grounded
on the thesis: God gave it, and the fathers
lived it.--The higher motive of such procedure
lies in the design to distract consciousness,
step by step, from its concern with notions
of right living (that is to say, those that
have been proved to be right by wide and
carefully considered experience), so that
instinct attains to a perfect automatism--a
primary necessity to every sort of mastery,
to every sort of perfection in the art of
life. To draw up such a law-book as Manu's
means to lay before a people the possibility
of future mastery, of attainable perfection--it
permits them to aspire to the highest reaches
of the art of life. To that end the thing
must be made unconscious: that is the aim
of every holy lie.--The order of castes,
the highest, the dominating law, is merely
the ratification of an order of nature, of
a natural law of the first rank, over which
no arbitrary fiat, no "modern idea,"
can exert any influence. In every healthy
society there are three physiological types,
gravitating toward differentiation but mutually
conditioning one another, and each of these
has its own hygiene, its own sphere of work,
its own special mastery and feeling of perfection.
It isnot Manu but nature that sets off in
one class those who are chiefly intellectual,
in another those who are marked by muscular
strength and temperament, and in a third
those who are distinguished in neither one
way or the other, but show only mediocrity--the
last-named represents the great majority,
and the first two the select. The superior
caste--I call it the fewest--has, as the
most perfect, the privileges of the few:
it stands for happiness, for beauty, for
everything good upon earth. Only the most
intellectual of men have any right to beauty,
to the beautiful; only in them can goodness
escape being weakness. Pulchrum est paucorum
hominum: 30 goodness is a privilege. Nothing
could be more unbecoming to them than uncouth
manners or a pessimistic look, or an eye
that sees ugliness--or indignation against
the general aspect of things. Indignation
is the privilege of the Chandala; so is pessimism.
"The world is perfect"--so prompts
the instinct of the intellectual, the instinct
of the man who says yes to life. "Imperfection,
what ever is inferior to us, distance, the
pathos of distance, even the Chandala themselves
are parts of this perfection. "The most
intelligent men, like the strongest, find
their happiness where others would find only
disaster: in the labyrinth, in being hard
with themselves and with others, in effort;
their delight is in self-mastery; in them
asceticism becomes second nature, a necessity,
an instinct. They regard a difficult task
as a privilege; it is to them a recreation
to play with burdens that would crush all
others. . . . Knowledge--a form of asceticism.--They
are the most honourable kind of men: but
that does not prevent them being the most
cheerful and most amiable. They rule, not
because they want to, but because they are;
they are not at liberty to play second.--The
second caste: to this belong the guardians
of the law, the keepers of order and security,
the more noble warriors, above all, the king
as the highest form of warrior, judge and
preserver of the law. The second in rank
constitute the executive arm of the intellectuals,
the next to them in rank, taking from them
all that is rough in the business of ruling-their
followers, their right hand, their most apt
disciples.--In all this, I repeat, there
is nothing arbitrary, nothing "made
up"; whatever is to the contrary is
made up--by it nature is brought to shame.
. . The order of castes, the order of rank,
simply formulates the supreme law of life
itself; the separation of the three types
is necessary to the maintenance of society,
and to the evolution of higher types, and
the highest types--the inequality of rights
is essential to the existence of any rights
at all.--A right is a privilege. Every one
enjoys the privileges that accord with his
state of existence. Let us not underestimate
the privileges of the mediocre. Life is always
harder as one mounts the heights--the cold
increases, responsibility increases. A high
civilization is a pyramid: it can stand only
on a broad base; its primary prerequisite
is a strong and soundly consolidated mediocrity.
The handicrafts, commerce, agriculture, science,
the greater part of art, in brief, the whole
range of occupational activities, are compatible
only with mediocre ability and aspiration;
such callings would be out of place for exceptional
men; the instincts which belong to them stand
as much opposed to aristocracy as to anarchism.
The fact that a man is publicly useful, that
he is a wheel, a function, is evidence of
a natural predisposition; it is not society,
but the only sort of happiness that the majority
are capable of, that makes them intelligent
machines. To the mediocre mediocrity is a
form of happiness; they have a natural instinct
for mastering one thing, for specialization.
It would be altogether unworthy of a profound
intellect to see anything objectionable in
mediocrity in itself. It is, in fact, the
first prerequisite to the appearance of the
exceptional: it is a necessary condition
to a high degree of civilization. When the
exceptional man handles the mediocre man
with more delicate fingers than he applies
to himself or to his equals, this is not
merely kindness of heart--it is simply his
duty. . . . Whom do I hate most heartily
among the rabbles of today? The rabble of
Socialists, the apostles to the Chandala,
who undermine the workingman's instincts,
his pleasure, his feeling of contentment
with his petty existence--who make him envious
and teach him revenge. . . . Wrong never
lies in unequal rights; it lies in the assertion
of "equal" rights. . . . What is
bad? But I have already answered: all that
proceeds from weakness, from envy, from revenge.--The
anarchist and the Christian have the same
ancestry. . . .
58.
In point of fact, the end for which one
lies makes a great difference: whether one
preserves thereby or destroys. There is a
perfect likeness between Christian and anarchist:
their object, their instinct, points only
toward destruction. One need only turn to
history for a proof of this: there it appears
with appalling distinctness. We have just
studied a code of religious legislation whose
object it was to convert the conditions which
cause life to flourish into an "eternal"
social organization,--Christianity found
its mission in putting an end to such an
organization, because life flourished under
it. There the benefits that reason had produced
during long ages of experiment and insecurity
were applied to the most remote uses, and
an effort was made to bring in a harvest
that should be as large, as rich and as complete
as possible; here, on the contrary, the harvest
is blighted overnight. . . .That which stood
there aere perennis, the imperium Romanum,
the most magnificent form of organization
under difficult conditions that has ever
been achieved, and compared to which everything
before it and after it appears as patchwork,
bungling, dilletantism--those holy anarchists
made it a matter of "piety" to
destroy "the world,"which is to
say, the imperium Romanum, so that in the
end not a stone stood upon another--and even
Germans and other such louts were able to
become its masters. . . . The Christian and
the anarchist: both are decadents; both are
incapable of any act that is not disintegrating,
poisonous, degenerating, blood-sucking; both
have an instinct of mortal hatred of everything
that stands up, and is great, and has durability,
and promises life a future. . . . Christianity
was the vampire of the imperium Romanum,--
overnight it destroyed the vast achievement
of the Romans: the conquest of the soil for
a great culture that could await its time.
Can it be that this fact is not yet understood?
The imperium Romanum that we know, and that
the history of the Roman provinces teaches
us to know better and better,--this most
admirable of all works of art in the grand
manner was merely the beginning, and the
structure to follow was not to prove its
worth for thousands of years. To this day,
nothing on a like scale sub specie aeterni
has been brought into being, or even dreamed
of!--This organization was strong enough
to withstand bad emperors: the accident of
personality has nothing to do with such things--the
first principle of all genuinely great architecture.
But it was not strong enough to stand up
against the corruptest of all forms of corruption--against
Christians. . . . These stealthy worms, which
under the cover of night, mist and duplicity,
crept upon every individual, sucking him
dry of all earnest interest in real things,
of all instinct for reality--this cowardly,
effeminate and sugar-coated gang gradually
alienated all "souls," step by
step, from that colossal edifice, turning
against it all the meritorious, manly and
noble natures that had found in the cause
of Rome their own cause, their own serious
purpose, their own pride. The sneakishness
of hypocrisy, the secrecy of the conventicle,
concepts as black as hell, such as the sacrifice
of the innocent, the unio mystica in the
drinking of blood, above all, the slowly
rekindled fire of revenge, of Chandala revenge--all
that sort of thing became master of Rome:
the same kind of religion which, in a pre-existent
form, Epicurus had combatted. One has but
to read Lucretius to know what Epicurus made
war upon--not paganism, but "Christianity,"
which is to say, the corruption of souls
by means of the concepts of guilt, punishment
and immortality.--He combatted the subterranean
cults, the whole of latent Christianity--to
deny immortality was already a form of genuine
salvation.--Epicurus had triumphed, and every
respectable intellect in Rome was Epicurean--when
Paul appeared. . . Paul, the Chandala hatred
of Rome, of "the world," in the
flesh and inspired by genius--the Jew, the
eternal Jew par excellence. . . . What he
saw was how, with the aid of the small sectarian
Christian movement that stood apart from
Judaism, a "world conflagration"
might be kindled; how, with the symbol of
"God on the cross," all secret
seditions, all the fruits of anarchistic
intrigues in the empire, might be amalgamated
into one immense power. "Salvation is
of the Jews."--Christianity is the formula
for exceeding and summing up the subterranean
cults of all varieties, that of Osiris, that
of the Great Mother, that of Mithras, for
instance: in his discernment of this fact
the genius of Paul showed itself. His instinct
was here so sure that, with reckless violence
to the truth, he put the ideas which lent
fascination to every sort of Chandala religion
into the mouth of the "Saviour"
as his own inventions, and not only into
the mouth--he made out of him something that
even a priest of Mithras could understand.
. . This was his revelation at Damascus:
he grasped the fact that he needed the belief
in immortality in order to rob "the
world" of its value, that the concept
of "hell" would master Rome--that
the notion of a "beyond" is the
death of life. Nihilist and Christian: they
rhyme in German, and they do more than rhyme.
59.
The whole labour of the ancient world gone
for naught: I have no word to describe the
feelings that such an enormity arouses in
me.--And, considering the fact that its labour
was merely preparatory, that with adamantine
self-consciousness it laid only the foundations
for a work to go on for thousands of years,
the whole meaning of antiquity disappears!
. . To what end the Greeks? to what end the
Romans?--All the prerequisites to a learned
culture, all the methods of science, were
already there; man had already perfected
the great and incomparable art of reading
profitably--that first necessity to the tradition
of culture, the unity of the sciences; the
natural sciences, in alliance with mathematics
and mechanics, were on the right road,--the
sense of fact, the last and more valuable
of all the senses, had its schools, and its
traditions were already centuries old! Is
all this properly understood? Every essential
to the beginning of the work was ready;--and
the most essential, it cannot be said too
often, are methods, and also the most difficult
to develop, and the longest opposed by habit
and laziness. What we have to day reconquered,
with unspeakable self-discipline, for ourselves--for
certain bad instincts, certain Christian
instincts, still lurk in our bodies--that
is to say, the keen eye for reality, the
cautious hand, patience and seriousness in
the smallest things, the whole integrity
of knowledge--all these things were already
there, and had been there for two thousand
years! More, there was also a refined and
excellent tact and taste! Not as mere brain-drilling!
Not as "German" culture, with its
loutish manners! But as body, as bearing,
as instinct--in short, as reality. . . All
gone for naught! Overnight it became merely
a memory !--The Greeks! The Romans! Instinctive
nobility, taste, methodical inquiry, genius
for organization and administration, faith
in and the will to secure the future of man,
a great yes to everything entering into the
imperium Romanum and palpable to all the
senses, a grand style that was beyond mere
art, but had become reality, truth, life
. . --All overwhelmed in a night, but not
by a convulsion of nature! Not trampled to
death by Teutons and others of heavy hoof!
But brought to shame by crafty, sneaking,
invisible, anemic vampires! Not conquered,--only
sucked dry! . . . Hidden vengefulness, petty
envy, became master! Everything wretched,
intrinsically ailing, and invaded by bad
feelings, the whole ghetto-world of the soul,
was at once on top!--One needs but read any
of the Christian agitators, for example,
St. Augustine, in order to realize, in order
to smell, what filthy fellows came to the
top. It would be an error, however, to assume
that there was any lack of understanding
in the leaders of the Christian movement:--ah,
but they were clever, clever to the point
of holiness, these fathers of the church!
What they lacked was something quite different.
Nature neglected--perhaps forgot--to give
them even the most modest endowment of respectable,
of upright, of cleanly instincts. . . Between
ourselves, they are not even men. . . . If
Islam despises Christianity, it has a thousandfold
right to do so: Islam at least assumes that
it is dealing with men. . . .
60.
Christianity destroyed for us the whole
harvest of ancient civilization, and later
it also destroyed for us the whole harvest
of Mohammedan civilization. The wonderful
culture of the Moors in Spain, which was
fundamentally nearer to us and appealed more
to our senses and tastes than that of Rome
and Greece, was trampled down (--I do not
say by what sort of feet--) Why? Because
it had to thank noble and manly instincts
for its origin--because it said yes to life,
even to the rare and refined luxuriousness
of Moorish life! . . . The crusaders later
made war on something before which it would
have been more fitting for them to have grovelled
in the dust--a civilization beside which
even that of our nineteenth century seems
very poor and very "senile."--What
they wanted, of course, was booty: the orient
was rich. . . . Let us put aside our prejudices!
The crusades were a higher form of piracy,
nothing more! The German nobility, which
is fundamentally a Viking nobility, was in
its element there: the church knew only too
well how the German nobility was to be won
. . . The German noble, always the "Swiss
guard" of the church, always in the
service of every bad instinct of the church--but
well paid. . . Consider the fact that it
is precisely the aid of German swords and
German blood and valour that has enabled
the church to carry through its war to the
death upon everything noble on earth! At
this point a host of painful questions suggest
themselves. The German nobility stands outside
the history of the higher civilization: the
reason is obvious. . . Christianity, alcohol--the
two great means of corruption. . . . Intrinsically
there should be no more choice between Islam
and Christianity than there is between an
Arab and a Jew. The decision is already reached;
nobody remains at liberty to choose here.
Either a man is a Chandala or he is not.
. . . "War to the knife with Rome! Peace
and friendship with Islam!": this was
the feeling, this was the act, of that great
free spirit, that genius among German emperors,
Frederick II. What! must a German first be
a genius, a free spirit, before he can feel
decently? I can't make out how a German could
ever feel Christian. . . .
61.
Here it becomes necessary to call up a memory
that must be a hundred times more painful
to Germans. The Germans have destroyed for
Europe the last great harvest of civilization
that Europe was ever to reap--the Renaissance.
Is it understood at last, will it ever be
understood, what the Renaissance was? The
transvaluation of Christian values,--an attempt
with all available means, all instincts and
all the resources of genius to bring about
a triumph of the opposite values, the more
noble values. . . . This has been the one
great war of the past; there has never been
a more critical question than that of the
Renaissance--it is my question too--; there
has never been a form of attack more fundamental,
more direct, or more violently delivered
by a whole front upon the center of the enemy!
To attack at the critical place, at the very
seat of Christianity, and there enthrone
the more noble values--that is to say, to
insinuate them into the instincts, into the
most fundamental needs and appetites of those
sitting there . . . I see before me the possibility
of a perfectly heavenly enchantment and spectacle
:--it seems to me to scintillate with all
the vibrations of a fine and delicate beauty,
and within it there is an art so divine,
so infernally divine, that one might search
in vain for thousands of years for another
such possibility; I see a spectacle so rich
in significance and at the same time so wonderfully
full of paradox that it should arouse all
the gods on Olympus to immortal laughter--Caesar
Borgia as pope! . . . Am I understood? .
. . Well then, that would have been the sort
of triumph that I alone am longing for today--:
by it Christianity would have been swept
away!--What happened? A German monk, Luther,
came to Rome. This monk, with all the vengeful
instincts of an unsuccessful priest in him,
raised a rebellion against the Renaissance
in Rome. . . . Instead of grasping, with
profound thanksgiving, the miracle that had
taken place: the conquest of Christianity
at its capital--instead of this, his hatred
was stimulated by the spectacle. A religious
man thinks only of himself.--Luther saw only
the depravity of the papacy at the very moment
when the opposite was becoming apparent:
the old corruption, the peccatum originale,
Christianity itself, no longer occupied the
papal chair! Instead there was life! Instead
there was the triumph of life! Instead there
was a great yea to all lofty, beautiful and
daring things! . . . And Luther restored
the church: he attacked it. . . . The Renaissance--an
event without meaning, a great futility !--Ah,
these Germans, what they have not cost us!
Futility--that has always been the work of
the Germans.--The Reformation; Liebnitz;
Kant and so-called German philosophy; the
war of "liberation"; the empire-every
time a futile substitute for something that
once existed, for something irrecoverable
. . . These Germans, I confess, are my enemies:
I despise all their uncleanliness in concept
and valuation, their cowardice before every
honest yea and nay. For nearly a thousand
years they have tangled and confused everything
their fingers have touched; they have on
their conscience all the half-way measures,
all the three-eighths-way measures, that
Europe is sick of,--they also have on their
conscience the uncleanest variety of Christianity
that exists, and the most incurable and indestructible--Protestantism.
. . . If mankind never manages to get rid
of Christianity the Germans will be to blame.
. . .
62.
--With this I come to a conclusion and pronounce
my judgment. I condemn Christianity; I bring
against the Christian church the most terrible
of all the accusations that an accuser has
ever had in his mouth. It is, to me, the
greatest of all imaginable corruptions; it
seeks to work the ultimate corruption, the
worst possible corruption. The Christian
church has left nothing untouched by its
depravity; it has turned every value into
worthlessness, and every truth into a lie,
and every integrity into baseness of soul.
Let any one dare to speak to me of its "humanitarian"
blessings! Its deepest necessities range
it against any effort to abolish distress;
it lives by distress; it creates distress
to make itself immortal. . . . For example,
the worm of sin: it was the church that first
enriched mankind with this misery!--The "equality
of souls before God"--this fraud, this
pretext for the rancunes of all the base-minded--this
explosive concept, ending in revolution,
the modern idea, and the notion of overthrowing
the whole social order--this is Christian
dynamite. . . . The "humanitarian"
blessings of Christianity forsooth! To breed
out of humanitas a self-contradiction, an
art of self-pollution, a will to lie at any
price, an aversion and contempt for all good
and honest instincts! All this, to me, is
the "humanitarianism" of Christianity!--Parasitism
as the only practice of the church; with
its anaemic and "holy" ideals,
sucking all the blood, all the love, all
the hope out of life; the beyond as the will
to deny all reality; the cross as the distinguishing
mark of the most subterranean conspiracy
ever heard of,--against health, beauty, well-being,
intellect, kindness of soul--against life
itself. . . .
This eternal accusation against Christianity
I shall write upon all walls, wherever walls
are to be found--I have letters that even
the blind will be able to see. . . . I call
Christianity the one great curse, the one
great intrinsic depravity, the one great
instinct of revenge, for which no means are
venomous enough, or secret, subterranean
and small enough,--I call it the one immortal
blemish upon the human race. . . .
And mankind reckons time from the dies nefastus
when this fatality befell--from the first
day of Christianity!--Why not rather from
its last?--From today?--The transvaluation
of all values! . . .
THE END
FOOTNOTES created and inserted by H. L.
Mencken:
1. Cf. the tenth Pythian ode. See also the
fourth hook of Herodotus. The Hyperboreans
were a mythical people beyond the Rhipaean
mountains, in the far North. They enjoyed
unbroken happiness and perpetual youth.
2. The lowest of the Hindu castes.
3. That is, in Pandora's box.
4. John iv, 22.
5. David Friedrich Strauss (1808-74), author
of "Das Leben Jesu" (1835-6), a
very famous work in its day. Nietzsche here
refers to it.
6. The word Semiotik is in the text, but
it is probable that Semantik is what Nietzsche
had in mind.
7. One of the six great systems of Hindu
philosophy.
8. The reputed founder of Taoism.
9. Nietzsche's name for one accepting his
own philosophy.
10. That is, the strict letter of the law--the
chief target of Jesus's early preaching.
11. A reference to the "pure ignorance"
(reine Thorheit) of Parsifal.
12. Matthew v, 34.
13. Amphytrion was the son of Alcaeus, King
of Tiryns. His wife was Alcmene. During his
absence she was visited by Zeus, and bore
Heracles.
14. So in the text. One of Nietzsche's numerous
coinages, obviously suggested by Evangelium,
the German for gospel.
15. To which, without mentioning it, Nietzsche
adds verse 48.
16. A paraphrase of Demetrius' "Well
roar'd, Lion!" in act v, scene 1 of
"A Midsummer Night's Dream." The
lion, of course, is the familiar Christian
symbol for Mark.
17. Nietzsche also quotes part of verse
2.
18. The quotation also includes verse 47.
19. And 17.
20. Verses 20, 21, 26, 27, 28, 29.
21. A paraphrase of Schiller's "Against
stupidity even gods struggle in vain."
22. The word training is in English in the
text.
23. I Corinthians i, 27, 28.
24. That is, to say, scepticism. Among the
Greeks scepticism was also occasionally called
ephecticism.
25. A reference to the University of Tübingen
and its famous school of Biblical criticism.
The leader of this school was F. C. Baur,
and one of the men greatly influenced by
it was Nietzsche's pet abomination, David
F. Strauss, himself a Suabian. Vide § 10
and § 28.
26. The quotations are from "Also sprach
Zarathustra" ii, 24: "Of Priests."
27. The aphorism, which is headed "The
Enemies of Truth," makes the direct
statement: "Convictions are more dangerous
enemies of truth than lies."
28. A reference, of course, to Kant's "Kritik
der praktischen Vernunft" (Critique
of Practical Reason).
29. I Corinthians vii, 2, 9.
30. Few men are noble.