Gary Moore To: heidegger@lists.village.virginia.edu
October 3, 2000.

PART 2

Dreyfus again quotes B&T, "Resoluteness does not first take cognizance of the situation . . ., it has put itself into the Situation already. As resolute, Dasein is already TAKING ACTION" (Stambaugh 276/M&R 347/SuZ 300). And Dreyfus continues: Or as Heidegger already put it in his 1924 lectures, "in PHRONESIS . . ., in a momentary glance [Augenblick] I survey the concrete situation of action, out of which and in favor of which I resolve [Entschliesse] myself" (English 114, German 165). Also, according to Aristotle, since there are no rules that dictate what the PHRONEMOS does is the correct thing to do in that type of situation, the PHRONEMOS, like any expert, cannot explain why he did what he did. Heidegger, of course, agrees: "The Situation cannot be calculated in advance or presented like something occurent which is waiting for someone to grasp it. It only gets disclosed in free resolving which has not been determined beforehand but which is open to the possibility of such determination" (Stambaugh 284/M&R 355/SuZ 307). So when Heidegger asks rhetorically, "But on what basis does Dasein disclose itself in resoluteness?" he answers: "ONLY the resolution itself can give the answer . . ." (Stambaugh 275/M&R 345/SuZ 298). (Dreyfus pg. 11)

We are in the world of ZEN AND THE ART OF ARCHERY here, of spontaneous action sure of itself but no longer following ANY RULES at all. And neither is this 'intent' in the ordinary use of the word that requires a point of origin as in Kant's "I think". Action has become its own intent and meaning, filled with a sense of rightness for the situation, but solely from the unique point of view of the PHRONEMOS' ownmost being-there. "The Situation IS only through resoluteness and in it" (B&T, Stambaugh 276/M&R 346/SuZ 300) as Dreyfus quotes Heidegger.

IV: The Nature of Experience

Now Dreyfus says, "Like the PHRONEMOS, the resolute individual PRESUMABLY
(my italics) does what is retroactively recognized by others as appropriate, but what he does is not the TAKEN-FOR-GRANTED, AVERAGE right thing - not what ONE does - but what his past experience leads him to do in that particular Situation. Moreover, as we have seen, since the Situation is specific and the PHRONEMOS' past experience unique, what he does cannot be THE appropriate thing. It can only be AN appropriate thing" (pp. 11-12). If the only standard is experience is the unique experience of the PHRONEMOS, then one is in an absurdity. There must be a "for-the-sake-of" of some sort. But what would apply if it is not "the TAKEN-FOR-GRANTED, AVERAGE right thing"? If a rational system of ethics is self-explanatory, there must be some fundamental axiom it is based on. Therefore, as an axiom, it must be such that to deny it would involve a contradiction. Probably the most obvious and popular suggestion would be the maintenance of life. But that also immediately has problems when confronted with authenticity. For, first, you must answer: WHOSE life? Life 'in general', as is the situation in general (Lage), is as inauthentic as the "I" of the 'They' self. Only unique individuals are alive and held responsible by the They self. Again, remember the They self is NOT an illusion or a falsity or a degradation of authenticity. It is the inescapable real world you must act in, and justify your actions to when accused. In other words, you must be able to explain rationally and publicly.

And yet it logically follows, by the definition of "individual", individuals as equivalent entities do not live 'together'. And even more: Only one individual lives at one time in one place just as A=A as identity at the same time and the same place. Even if you somehow COULD disregard logic, experience forces on you exactly the same thing. So where do you get such 'entities' as societies, nations, peoples, or, in fact, groups of any kind? For if there was any objective, physical reality to a society, then that physical reality would interconnect all individuals into one physical reality and make the individual a logical and experiential impossibility. Rather, groups are individuals that have various kinds and degrees of private relation. Relation does not designate an objective reality of any sort. The center of relation is each individual viewing every other individual of the group. Then, not only is each relational view going to be different by logical necessity, but there is no necessary reason for it to be based on logical agreement or likeness since the relational view of this is retained within the individual. In fact, as you know very well from experience, it does not have to be logical or real in any way, the view of the 'unity' of the goal of the 'group' being always individual with no effective way to generalize it even with Stalinistic terror because even that just attained outward conformity while at the same time deeply motivating even more profound individual particularity. In other words, only the threat of punishment OR EXCLUSION enforces any semblance of similarity within a group, and that similarity is purely external, while the real reasons for a group belonging 'together' is as various as the number of members of that group. This is one reason why, when Dostoyevsky has Ivan Karamazov say, "If God does not exist, then everything is permitted", it is such a perfect generalization of particulars because, once the prohibitory element is renounced, then the field of possibilities is wide open which everyone understands.

But the corollary to this I have never seen noticed is that, though everything is now permitted, now, also, there is absolutely no reason given, provided, grounded, to do ANYTHING! Everyone has fantasies about what they would do if they could. But when they can, then they are still bound down in exactly the same situation as the PHRONEMOS, i. e., considering your history, your skills, the physical reality available, and OTHER INDIVIDUALS AS INDIVIDUALS, then suddenly everything is NOT permitted, and never could be. And, realizing the real restrictions, all meaning goes out of "Everything is permitted!" completely, and all fantasies collapse in their inability to exist in such a context. Then the question turns from, "What of the infinite possibilities I have before me do I choose?" and changes into, "What is really a good reason to now do anything at all? Even of the things I can do?" And this is because you do need an absolute axiom to your existence that, to deny which, automatically involves you in contradiction. But that there is a need for such an axiom means IN NO WAY that it must, should, or possibly even COULD exist as a positive, communicable rational conception. Or, for that matter, even be known. That is why faith eschews "rational conception": it undermines itself with the greatest of ease. It always asks for the grounds for the ground. An axiom is not the statement of positive, demonstrable knowledge, but is a negative boundary delimiting how things are, i. e., Experience is, always and in every case, MY experience. It is nonsense to say I have someone elses experience as then I would be that person and not myself. Or Perception is always My perception, etc. Or, I want to live, no matter what and no matter why.

V: Why Does Authentic Dasein Act?

Now, there is a shift here in the meaning and context of the word "appropriate" that I have trouble with, considering the conclusions we have come to above. This is similar to what I said about the hermeneutic circle above, i. e., that being-there must take hold of authenticity in order to uncover authenticity. First, the use of "his past experience (that) leads him to do" is disturbing as it seems a reversion to rule oriented behavior that the resolute individual supposedly has left behind. "Appropriate" CAN mean 'appropriate' to life as the voluntary running towards death that opens up one's ownmost possibilities, but that just pushes the problem back a step. Dreyfus is saying the resolute individual compares past experience to his present situation in order to make a decision. The PHRONEMOS makes the decision and the others of the "one" catch up later and for some reason all of their own. According to their rule-bound judgement, they judge that the PHRONEMOS did the right thing. Yet first of all, those judgements of "appropriate" CANNOT BE UPON THE SAME GROUNDS! " . . . The resolute individual PRESUMABLY does what is retroactively recognized by others as appropriate, but what he does is not the taken-for-granted, average right thing . . ." In other words, the grounds for the judgements of the PHRONEMOS and the They are ontologically different, and therefore do not even BEGIN to correspond! If, as Heidegger says, "The Situation is only through resoluteness and in it," then the Situation IS only through and in the resolute individual's life, the PHRONEMOS, alone, uniquely. "Appropriate" then would seem 'appropriate' only for the PHRONEMOS in an 'authentic' sense, whereas "what is retroactively recognized by the others as appropriate" by their rules is so only CONTENGENTLY since "what (the PHRONEMOS) does is not the TAKEN-FOR-GRANTED, AVERAGE right thing".

VI: Mitdasein As Subordinate And Inauthentic Concept

Dreyfus goes on to quote Heidegger saying, "Resolution does not withdraw from 'actuality', but discovers first what is factically possible, and does so by seizing upon it in whatever way is possible for it as its ownmost ability to be in the 'one'" (both Stambaugh and M&R use, instead of "one", the "they" of the 'They' self: 275/346/299). This is to justify his statement, "Thus, in responding to the concrete Situation the resolute individual is recognized as a model, not of what GENERAL thing to do, but of HOW to respond in an especially appropriate way. In this way, "when Dasein is resolute, it can become the 'conscience' of others" (pg. 12, B&T
274/344/298). But Heidegger's "can" in "it can become" is meant literally and seriously, i. e., "In the light of the for-the-sake-of-which of the potentiality-of-being which it has chosen, resolute Da-sein frees itself for its world." It is merely one of infinite, neutral, valuable/valueless possibilities. When Heidegger says "its world", he means specifically, "Thrown into its 'there', Da-sein is always factically dependent on a definite 'world' -its 'world" which he says on SuZ 297, two paragraphs above this statement. Heidegger therefore explicitly is saying "its world" IS being-there's ownmost. Heidegger immediately continues with, "The resoluteness toward itself first brings Da-sein to the possibility of LETTING (my italics) the others who are with it 'be' (Heidegger's scare quotes) in their ownmost potentiality of being, and also discloses that POTENTIALITY (my italics) in CONCERN (my italics) which leaps ahead and frees. Resolute Da-sein CAN (my italics) become the conscience of others"
(STAMBAUGH TRANS. M&R is essentially identical). There is here a clear sense of ontological subordination of "the others", the 'They', who become a free choice of concern or not -- on being-there's part. Heidegger, again on pg. 297 immediately following the above quote says, "At the same time those nearest factical projects are guided by the LOSTNESS (Heidegger's italics) in the they taking care of things. This lostness can be SUMMONED (my italics) by one's own Da-sein, the summons can be understood in the mode of resoluteness. But AUTHENTIC disclosedness then MODIFIES (my italics) equiprimordially the discoveredness of 'world' grounded IN IT (my italics) and the disclosedness of being-with of others" (STAMBAUGH TRANS.) 'Being-with Others', then, is a voluntarily assumed INAUTHENTIC mode "guided by the LOSTNESS in the they taking care of things" into which being-there finds itself thrown, "for if the actual totality of relevance of things at hand is to be freed, this requires a pre-understanding of significance. In understanding significance, Da-sein, taking care of things, is circumspectly referred to the things at hand encountered" (274/344/297, slightly above the other quotes).

So the relation between the individuated dasein AS solitude in "nearness to world" undermines the 'value' of the existential "being-with" (which Sartre points out "is not knowledge", B & N, 3.1. III., pg. 246/332) to being on the one hand merely voluntary social accommodation, and on the other hand a tyranny of literally random tradition (you did not choose to be born, nor when, nor where, i. e., throwness) and history, grounded in originary forgetting that is NOT liable to "repetition", from which one is able to free oneself only in the open solitude of individuation as "nearness to world" or into the proximity at the substantial one of all things, a solipsism detached in the "more modest . . . refusal to leave the solid ground of experience". In other words, Heidegger, accommodating sociability, has facticaly already attained that state of detachment Hoederlin and Nietzsche refused to just accommodate, mere being-along-side the world, but engaged themselves in the world whole heartedly. And then, finding those values to be contingent, finite, and thoroughly mortal, cut all ties to the world and its domination through the only real and true 'freedom', arbitrary and meaningless action without any of the value of "importance".

(Hoelderlin did have an appropriate flash of sanity when the local authorities came to search his house for Jacobin literature and political letters. He thoroughly and cogently denounced the Jacobins and said he had nothing to do with them which, of course, was not exactly the truth . . . WHICH SHOWED HE KNEW EXACTLY WHEN AND HOW TO LIE WHEN IT WAS A MATTER OF PRISON! This is not the action of a gene-bound, chemically induced schizophrenic!)

Heidegger achieved the state of authentic detachment from all preconceived values and "maxims". Being-there-with, "mitdasein", is the ONLY mode, and only a mode, of the being of others within being-in-the-world. In the term "mitdasein", there is no hint of plurality of "dasein" or "authenticity". Therefore it does not mean, as Dr. Tom Rockmore says, "What, for lack of a better term, we can call 'plural authenticity' can come about if the group authentically shares its heritage and realizes it" (ON HEIDEGGER'S NAZISM AND PHILOSOPHY, University of California Press, 1992, pg. 48). Dr. Rockmore should have first come up with tangible evidence for the existence of this 'group mind' or 'racial unconscious' instead of using 'everyday' language of the 'They' self THAT MUST, FOR ITS OWN SELF-MAINTAINANCE, vaguely believe in such nonsense. "Plural authenticity" is one of the bedrocks for his arguments as to Heidegger's fundamental 'philosophical' Nazism. For, he goes on to say, "For Heidegger, who here makes use of a notion of plural authenticity originally mentioned in BEING AND TIME, a people only is one when it receives its unifying idea and so returns to Being (pg. 197). Dr. Rockmore has two footnote references here. The second one mentions part of the same footnote that went with my first quote. The footnote for page 48 refers to M&R's translation of SuZ, pages 436 and 159, in that order. These are supposed to support his notion of "plural authenticity". And, indeed, superficially they seem to if one doesn't pay close attention. However, what Heidegger seems to give with one hand, he undermines with the other, and even on the same page.

First, let's deal with page 159 (German 122). Heidegger says, "In contrast to this, there is also the possibility of a kind of solicitude which does not so much leap in for the Other as LEAP AHEAD of him in his EXISTENTIELL
(my italics) potentiality-for-Being, not in order to take away his 'care'
(Heidegger's scare quotes) but rather to give it back to him authentically as such for the first time. This kind of solicitude pertains essentially to authentic care - that is, to the existence of the Other, not to a 'WHAT' with which he is concerned; it helps the Other to become transparent to himself IN his care and to become FREE FOR it." At first this seems to be a paen for altruism and togetherness until we find out lower down the page that "solicitude" in Heidegger has no such simple connotation. Solicitude as EVERYDAY (my italics) Being-with-one-another maintains itself between the two extremes of POSITIVE (my italics) solicitude that which leaps in and dominates, and that which leaps forth and liberates. They are treated as equals. Even the form of "authentic" solicitude described here is a subordinate level of being-there as 'ownmost'. This quote immediately follows the above: "Solicitude proves to be a state of Dasein's Being - one which, in accordance with its different possibilities, is bound up with its Being towards the world of its CONCERN (my italics), and likewise with its AUTHENTIC (my italics) Being towards itself." Again: "Solicitude . . . is bound up with (Dasein's) Being towards the world of CONCERN (my italics)": Though Heidegger says on M&R pg. 157, ". . . Those entities towards which Dasein as Being-with comports itself do not have the kind of Being which belongs to equipment ready to hand; they are themselves Dasein", he also says IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THIS, "Concern is a character-of-Being which Being-with cannot have as its own, EVEN THOUGH BEING-WITH, LIKE CONCERN, IS A BEING TOWARDS ENTITIES ENCOUNTERED WITHIN-THE-WORLD" (my italics). The difference between concern (Besorgen) and solicitude (Fursorge) is the difference between equipment ready-to-hand and entities which are themselves Dasein. And yet Being-with, like concern, is a Being towards entities encountered within the world, thereupon if those entities are themselves Dasein (remember Dasein is only singular) then either Dasein is an entity OR a category within MY Dasein.

So here the distance between ready-to-hand equipment and other so-called Daseins becomes very narrow. However, the difference can be made VERY clear. Using the preponderance of Heidegger's examples of 'solicitous' Being-with, one can say with certainty the main aspect of that difference is THAT IT IS ABSURD TO MISTRUST EQUIPMENT whereas it does "characterize everyday, average Being-with-one-another" (Stambaugh 114/M&R 158/SuZ 121) as in The Being-with-one another of those who are hired for the same affair often thrives only on mistrust (Stambaugh 115/M&R 159/Suz 121), and that the overriding difference between solicitude and concern is that, for solicitude, it assumes that you are CONFRONTING an intentionality different from your own, whereas only through the blameful animation through personification of tools that do not work right do we assume the like for objects. Heidegger says on 158/121 that, "It seems as if only negligible variations of the same kind of Being lie before us; yet ontologically there is an essential distinction between the 'indifferent' way in which Things at random occur together and the way in which ENTITIES (my italics) who are with one another do not 'matter' to one another." This "essential distinction" merely boils down to the difference between "Things at random" without possible inimical intent versus, "A Being-with-one-another which arises from one's doing the same thing as someone else, not only keeps for the most part within the outer limits, but enters the mode of distance and reserve. The Being-with-one-another of those who are hired for the same affair often thrives only on mistrust" (B&T, 115/159/122). Yet on the other hand, the importance of that seems diminished by what follows: "On the other hand, when they devote themselves to the same affair in common . . . They thus become AUTHENTICALLY bound together, and this makes possible the right kind of objectivity, which frees the Other in his freedom for himself." But the part I left out says, " . . . their doing so is determined by the manner in which their Dasein, EACH IN THEIR OWN WAY (my italics), has been taken hold of." In other words, not only is the phrase "in common" rendered utterly meaningless and contradictory - after all, if you are hired for the same job, why is that NOT a purpose "in common"? - but the phrase "AUTHENTICALLY bound together" is also made meaningless and contradictory by the each "each in their own way" unless authentically bound together means as a subordinate pat OF MY Dasein! If each person in a group is really going their "own way", and what is "common" is that, contingently, it suits "each' person's purpose. Then the concept "AUTHENTICALLY bound together is utter and complete nonsense and is only ludicrously considered an argument for "plural authenticity" (Rockmore 48), or "a notion of plural authenticity . . .. a people only is one when it receives its unifying idea and so returns to Being" (197), or "impelling Heidegger to transform his interest in individual authenticity in BEING AND TIME to the authenticity of the VOLK in his turn toward Nazism" (219). And we have just considered the referral from Division I, which is essentially about everyday Dasein that any existential analysis has to start from and be grounded in. Both Fursorge and Besorgen originate in Division I, the analysis of the everyday inauthentic They self.