From: Rene de Bakker To: heidegger@lists.village.virginia.edu
September 5, 2000
PART 1
I. In the Beginning
See also letters: Renne de Bakker 28 Aug
Gary Moore 3 Sept Renne de Bakker 5 Sept
Renne de Bakker 25 Sept
Gary C. Moore wrote: It is strange that Heidegger,
in his book THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF METAPHYSICS:
World, Finitude, Solitude does not actually
discuss "solitude" [Einsamkeit]
but rather "individuation" [Vereinzelung]
which, instead of being a withdrawal or detachment
or being cut off, is a process of interaction
with the world -- which would really make
it more consistent with "world"
and "finitude" than "solitude"
which is a withdrawal or detachment from
interaction into silence or disdain for communication.
Does Heidegger actually discusses "solitude"
as such, the real thing, anywhere? If so,
I have missed it. For after all, he says
he has "loneliness", not that he
is "alone".
RENNE DE BAKKER: Heidegger in 1930 presents
Einsamkeit and Vereinzelung as 2 words for
the same thing. See German p. 8, bottom,
of the "Metaphysical Concepts":
"Endlichkeit IST nur in der wahren Verendlichung.
In dieser aber vollzieht sich letzlich eine
VEREINZELUNG des Menschen auf sein Dasein.
[...] Diese Vereinzelung ist vielmehr jene
VEREINSAMUNG, in der jeder Mensch allererst
in die Naehe zum Wesentlichen aller Dinge
gelangt, zur Welt. Was ist diese EINSAMKEIT,
wo der Mensch je wie ein Einziger sein wird?"
"Finiteness IS only in the true Verendlichung
(finitude as defined by death?). In this
'finitude', however, a individuation of man
carries itself out in the long run in his
existence . . . This sort of individuation
is rather that solitariness in which each
human being arrives first of all into the
proximity at the substantial one of all things,
to the world. What is this ISOLATION (solitariness),
where the human ever will be like an only
(one)? "
RE: GARY C MOORE: The above is a revised
Altavista translation of your quote. I think
the corresponding passage in my McNeil &
Walker translation is,
"Finitude only is in truly becoming
finite. In becoming finite, however, there
ultimately occurs an INDIVIDUATION of man
with respect to his Dasein . . . This individuation
is rather that SOLITARINESS in which each
human being first of all enters into a nearness
to what is essential in all things, a nearness
to world. What is this solitude, where each
human being will be as though unique?"
(pg. 6)
There is a great deal to think about here,
but is still both unclear, insufficient,
and superficially contradictory, i. e., combining
things that ordinarily do not go together.
Yet we know they must go together according
to the premises of Heidegger's philosophy.
". . . That solitariness in which each
human being first of all enters into a nearness
to what is essential in all things, a nearness
to world" implies a gathering out of
dispersion. "Into the proximity at the
substantial one of all things" from
my faltering translation, however, seems
to say the world is the meeting place (as
a substantial oneness?) of the dispersion
gathered together by individuation. "That
solitariness in which . . . first of all"
implies an "In the beginning . . ."
as if a creation or a primal birth which
is exactly what birth, or an answer to the
call of conscience, would be for "each
human being" in some authentic sense.
"First of all enters into a nearness
to what is ESSENTIAL to all things"
implies it is the "nearness" itself
that is "essential in all things"
which "each human being enters into",
but this would equate "solitariness"
and "a nearness to world" which
"is essential in all things". Unless
this is solipsist in the sense that Sartre
defines it below (a refusal to leave the
solid ground of experience) this would seem
to be a contradiction.
However, "substantial oneness"
would seem nearer to the meaning of solitariness
here. This 'solitude' would be quite crowded.
"Solitude" is defined as "where
each human being will be AS THOUGH unique",
or as an "only one" which has less
of a sense of particularity [i. e., "unique'
as opposed to "common"] and something
much more fundamental. As though implies,
however, the necessary throwness into the
inauthenticity of the They self. This implies
a duplicity (or doubleness?) in solitude
"in which each human being enters"
so that there are two different 'things'
here, "solitude" and "human
being" as absorbed into the They, and
it is "in" the solitude that the
human being "enters into a nearness
to world". "Solitude" is being
used in a strange way here.
But, acknowledging my lack of understanding
and therefore labeling it a sort of 'X',
then as an 'X' it begins to fit into the
first part of the quote where "finitude
IS becoming finite" where "in becoming
finite" there "occurs an individuation
of man WITH RESPECT TO HIS Dasein" which
implies a passiveness in "Dasein"
as a possession of man and not the other
way around. This passiveness is also indicated
both in the nature of the call of conscience
which has nothing specific about it, and
the call is only heard within the frustration
of inauthenticity to find its ownmost project.
This would mean a fundamental disagreement
with the implications of the usual studies
of Heidegger that seem to establish a hierarchy
of Dasein which is on a 'higher' level than
man, and in turn 'Sein' being on a 'higher'
level than "Dasein" which would
also be in perfect accord with their usual
motivation to equate "Being" with
"God". In Michael Haar's book HEIDEGGER
AND THE ESSENCE OF MAN (as far as I have
gone) he also seems to be making a point
of the diminution of man as well as being-there
under the overlordship of the neutrality
of 'being', and this actually does seem to
be what Heidegger 'implies' EXCEPT, 1) especially
in translation, the equation is ludicrously
made than since "Being" is capitalized
and "God' is capitalized then they are
supposedly equated by Heidegger -- which
he has always denied; 2) that Heidegger has
also said all his efforts in "Turn II"
are dependent on his work in "Turn I"
and vice versa which is what got me started
reading Michael Haar's book in the first
place where in the introduction he makes
clear that there is a failure and need in
Turn I for Turn II, but in the body of the
book seems to be saying Turn II there is
a failure there also because it seems to
turn its back on Turn I as absolutely necessary,
both primarily and fundamentally. And an
accord seems to have been the intent of what
Heidegger said in his prefatory letter to
William J. Richardson's book HEIDEGGER: Through
Phenomenology to Thought. 3) In the "Letter
on Humanism" Heidegger does NOT say
'Being is the shepherd of mankind' as Jesus
is the shepherd of his human flock, but says,
"Man is the shepherd of being"
which would not only utterly destroy any
analogy with 'God', but be in accord with
what I said above and agrees with the statement
in "What is Metaphysics" that "Being
and the nothing belong together . . . because
Being itself is essentially finite and reveals
itself only in the transcendence of Dasein
which is held out into the nothing"
(from BASIC WRITINGS, ed. & trans. Krell,
Harper Collins, 1993, pg. 108).
"In becoming finite . . . occurs the
individuation of man" implies 1) a gathering
together of 'man' out of a primal dispersion,
but also 2) a differentiation of "individuation"
from "solitude" since solitude
is that "IN which FIRST OF ALL enters
into a nearness to world" so that the
gathering of "in becoming finite",
individuation - if it is a gathering - occurs
WITHIN solitude so that this solitude would
both be the first and accordingly the first
experience forgotten as irretrievable. Therefore
"solitude" would be a primary necessity
for "individuation" and, in SOME
sense come before it. But would this not
accord with authenticity's "always already"
being beforehand so that being-there there
becomes what it "always already"
was?
The only dispersion I can easily think of
is being-in-the-world itself as being oneself
merely one of the objects, the 'object' "I"
specifically as a scatter within the 'They'
self. But the above implies an AUTHENTIC
GATHERING FROM DISPERSION prior in some sense
to that. Being-in-the-world is indeed where
the "call of conscience" uncovers
the first glimmer of authenticity - which
has been there all the time - within inauthentic
being-there. Individuation as finitude would
then be essentially an unacknowledged but
sophisticated solipsism "presented more
modestly as a refusal to leave the solid
ground of experience" (BEING & NOTHINGNESS,
trans. Barnes, Pt. 3 "Being-for-Others",
Chap. 1 "The Existence of Others",
II. "The Reef of Solipsism", Phil.
Lib. Pg. 229, Wash. Sq. pg. 311) that Sartre
talks about where we face both the fact that
the 'They' self as the "Other"
which completely dominates, forms, and literally
IS what is 'me' as though unique, yet it
exists only through my individuation, being-there
as ownmost, that there is an 'Other' or 'They'
self at all to dominate what I am. That would
imply then one "always already"
has been finite, individuated, alone, authentic,
has 'known' it somehow from the beginning
in solitude, and has known it is connected
to death somehow as the ultimate solitude,
and therefore in the "thrown" natural
and necessary course of life ALSO has "always
already", in the beginning within the
past, run away from it. Instead of any kind
of act of cowardice, then, running away and
forgetting solitude, finitude and death are
actually the necessary structuring, individuation
of being-there as thrown. It is a hermeneutical
circle as, somehow, to even 'become' INAUTHENTIC
BEING, IT MUST IN A WAY FIRST BE 'AUTHENTIC'
IN SOME SENSE! And THEN 'inauthenticity'
would be an 'authentic' evolution of being-there!
II: The Field of Equally Indifferent Possibilities
Discovered in Authentic 'Conscience' Through
Existential Anxiety and Fundamental Boredom
Heidegger's refuses to evaluate authenticity
and inauthenticity as one preferable to the
other, or as Joan Stambaugh expressed it:
"Bearing in mind Heidegger's fundamental
distaste for questions of value and for value
judgements in general - a distaste that expressed
itself very early and in no uncertain terms
in BEING AND TIME with the refusal to deem
inauthenticity inferior to, or less desirable
than, authenticity . . . " (THE FINITUDE
OF BEING, SUNY, 1992, pg. 5). And as Michael
Haar said after his analysis of the fundamental
importance of originary time that overrides
any determination by Dasein, "Thus from
the summer of 1927 onward, the importance
of the distinction between authentic and
inauthentic, originary and derivative, becomes
attenuated; DASEIN moves toward NEUTRALITY"
(HEIDEGGER AND THE ESSENCE OF MAN, trans.
McNeil, SUNY, 1993, pg. 40). Then evaluative
concepts or "maxims" that are considered
absolutely necessary to ordinary, 'inauthentic'
human choice, as sociability, action as in
"life or death importance", "good
and evil", "self-esteem",
"the Ideal of Man", or "the
forgiveness and condemnation of God"
become mere objects of analysis, like the
universal "I" identical to the
****** 'They' self, Heidegger's analysis
of the "call of conscience" and
"primordial guilt" demonstrates
have absolutely nothing to do with moral
implication. The notion of "neutrality"
is implicit in 'authenticity' since from
that point being-there views all possibilities
as equal. This 'neutral' point, however,
is compromised by "throwness" where
choices have "always already" been
made for authentic being-there which can
then 'authentically' reappropriate its understanding
and practical world through its opposition,
destruction, and reassembly in repetition
by making the past one's ownmost. But this
involves the choice of the possibilities
of life as defined by the choice of running
ahead towards death which opens up the infinite
field of possibilities. Hence 'authenticity'
which you "always already" had,
you clarify and hold to in resolve out of
the desire for authenticity that grows out
of inauthenticity's incompleteness as if
remembered from the forgetting implicit in
throwness. In other words, you have the hermeneutic
circle of assuming authenticity in the midst
of inauthenticity. It is a seed that both
'grows' into inauthenticity and yet being
within inautheticity, it 'yearns' to grow
out of it, and is therefore a necessary structure
within inauthenticity that makes it possible
to turn towards authenticity.
From the point of view of 'authentic' understanding,
Heidegger says, "With its unequivocally
calculable maxims that one is led to expect,
(the ordinary definition of) conscience would
deny to existence nothing less than the possibility
of acting. Because conscience evidently cannot
be 'positive' in this way, neither does it
function in the same way 'only negatively'.
The call discloses nothing that could be
positive or negative as something to be taken
care of, because it has to do with an ontologically
completely different being, namely, existence.
On the contrary, the correctly understood
call gives the 'most positive thing of all'
in the existential sense - the ownmost possibility
that Da-sein can give itself as a calling
back that calls it forth to its factical
potentiality-of-being-a-self. To hear the
call authentically means to bring oneself
to factical action" (BEING & TIME,
trans. Stambaugh, SUNY, 1996, 271, M&R
340-1, SuZ 294).We must always keep in mind
even the ‘authentic’ self is factically,
in the real, always just a “potentiality”,
not an “in-itself” of any sort.
It is not that "maxims" or rules
would deny action per se, but denies action
with intention and deliberate choice as blindly
following rules like a pin ball in a game
machine rolling randomly down an incline,
hitting random posts that determine its 'choices'
for it. And yet one both claims and is accused
of responsibility for those acts. And yet
those acts were formed as much by the situation
(Lage) that one could neither escape nor
accept responsibility for. In that situation,
one is as acted upon as acting. And even
when accepting blaim, one knows that many
factors contributed to its design that one
knows clearly only retrospectively that one
might have controlled. This would also be
in accord with Michael Haar's quote from
Heidegger, "Essential thought is also
an acting" (pg. 54, BASIC WRITINGS 1977
ed. pg. 308?). What holds you ‘responsible’
is that somehow you should have thought out
the whole situation before acting. And yet
thinking it out beforehand deliberately is
a near impossibility – unless one has a fund
of experience immediately accessible so that,
“Essential thought is also an acting!” So
once again you have a pre-ontological understanding
of how one should be and operate within a
hermeneutical circle. The inheritance of
ethical rules, that Aristotle says a child
must become habituated to before it can begin
to understand them with the judgement of
equity, i. e., "EPIEKEIA", would
imply that, as simply inherited, they are
basically meaningless by not being reappropriated
into the context of the gathering of ‘authentic’
individuation which one achieves with equitous
judgement in actual situations.
III: Dreyfus: “Could Anything Be More Intelligible
Than Everyday Intelligibility?”
'Authentic' action is based on equitable
assessment of the situation, not fixed 'maxims'
of what bounds one absolutely to do this
and not that regardless of situation. Hubert
Dreyfus' paper (accessible at his web site)
"Could anything be more Intelligible
than Everyday Intelligibility?: Reinterpreting
Division I of Being and Time in light of
Division II" gives an interesting summary
of this situation. He holds there is a form
of understanding superior to everyday understanding
called "primordial understanding"
(B&T, Stambaugh 157/M&R 212/SuZ 168),
but " . . . This higher intelligibility
must somehow be based on and grow out of
the average intelligibility into which everyone
is socialized" (pg. 3). "As the
competent performer becomes more and more
emotionally involved in his task, it becomes
increasingly difficult to draw back and to
adopt the detached rule-following stance
of the beginner. While it might seem that
this involvement would interfere with rule-testing
and so would lead to irrational decisions
and inhibit further skill development, in
fact just the opposite seems to be the case"
(pg. 7).
From here Dreyfus' comes to describe what
he calls "the PHRONEMOS as a socially
recognized virtuoso" (pg. 9). "This
is obviously Aristotle's PHRONEMOS. Of course,
there may be several wise responses. Indeed,
on my account, the idea of a SINGLE correct
response makes no sense since other virtuosi
with different funds of experiences would
see the matter differently, and even the
same PHRONEMOS would presumably respond differently
once he had more experience and therefore
would discriminate a richer repertoire of
situations" (Ibid.). " . . . Heidegger's
resolute individual deviates from the banal,
average, public standards, to respond spontaneously
to the particular situation. In Heidegger's
terms, irresolute Dasein responds to the
general situation (Lage), whereas resolute
Dasein responds to the concrete situation
(Situation) . . . (Irresolute Dasein) "knows
only the 'general situation'" (B&T,
Stambaugh 276/M&R 346/SuZ 300), while
"resolute Dasein" is in touch with
the "concrete Situation of taking action"
(B&T, Stambaugh 279/M&R 349/SuZ 302,
(GCM)which also asks, "What can death
and the 'concrete Situation' of taking action
have in common?"). The distinction between
these two kinds of situation seem to come
out of nowhere in Being and Time but they
clearly have their origin in Heidegger's
detailed discussion of PHRONESIS in his 1925
Sophist Lectures" (Ibid.).
|
