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 Chapter 13
Maturidism
Maturidism by A. K. M Ayyub Ali, M. A, Ph.
D,
Principle Government Rajshahi Madrasah, Rajshahi
(Pakistan)
A detailed discussion of the fundamental
principles of Islam led Muslim scholars
in
the second and thir/eighth and ninth
centuries
of Hijrah to philosophical reasonings
on
the nature and attributes of God and
His
relation to man and the universe. As
a result,
a new science of Muslim scholasticism
called
'Ilm al-Kalam came into being.
As a matter of fact, it was the Mu'tazilites
who laid the foundation of this new
science
and made lasting contributions for
its development.
They started their movement by adopting
a
rational attitude in respect of some
theological
questions, but when they reached the
height
of their power, they adopted an aggressive
attitude towards their opponents. The
orthodox
Muslims opposed the Mu'tazilite movement
from the very beginning and tried to
refute
their doctrines by the traditional
method.
A section of the orthodox people took
recourse
even to violent methods.
Conflicting ideas and antagonistic
attitudes
created chaos and confusion in Muslim
thought
and shook the foundation of old ideas
and
traditional beliefs. The need for reconciliation
and solving the crisis by adopting
a middle
course and a tolerant attitude was
keenly
felt. At this critical period of the
history
of Muslim theology there appeared,
in three
parts of the Muslim world, three eminent
scholars: al-Maturidi in Central Asia,
al-Ash'ari
in Iraq, and al-Tahawi in Egypt. They
all
endeavoured to reconcile conflicting
ideas
and settle the theological problems
of the
time by adopting a system that would
satisfy
reason and conform to the general tenets
of the Qur'an and the Sunnah. They
exercised
profound and lasting influence on the
subsequent
development of Muslim philosophy and
theology
and were considered to be the fathers
of
the three schools of thoughts named
after
them.
Ash'arism and Tahawism have been dealt
with
in separate chapters; here we are concerned
with Maturidism.
A
LIFE AND WORKS OF MATURIDI
Abu Mansur Muhammad b. Muhammad b.
Mahmud,
al-Maturidi, al-Ansari, al-Hanafi,
was born
at Maturid, [1] a village or quarter
in the
neighbourhood of Samarqand, one of
the great
cities of Central Asia. According to
some
writers, he came of the renowned family
of
abu Ayyub al-Ansari of Madinah. [2]
This statement is also corroborated
by the
fact that some other Arab families
of Madinah
also settled in Samarqand [3] and that
al-Maturidi's
daughter was married to al-Hasan al-Ash'ari,
the father of Imam abu al-Hasan `Ali
al
Ash'ari and a descendant of abu Ayyub
al
Ansari of Madinah. [4]
Almost all the biographers who give
only
short sketches of al-Maturidi's life
in their
worksb agree that he died in the year
333/944,
but none of them mentions the date
of his
birth. One of the teachers of al-Maturidi,
namely, Muhammad b. Muqatil al-Razi
is stated
to have died in 248/862, which proves
that
al-Maturidi was born before that year
and
possibly about the year 238/853. According
to this assumption, al-Maturidi was
born
during the reign of the 'Abbasid Caliph
al-Mutawakkil
(r. 232-247/847-861) who combated the
Mu'tazilite
doctrines and supported the traditional
faith.
Al-Maturidi flourished under the powerful
rule of the Samanids, who ruled practically
the whole of Persia from 261/874 to
389/999
actively patronized science and literature,
and gathered around their Court as
number
of renowned scholars. [6] He was brought
up in the peaceful academic atmosphere
and
cultural environment of his native
land and
received good education in different
Islamic
sciences under four eminent scholars
of his
time: Shaikh abu Bakr Ahmad b. Ishaq,
abu
Nasr Ahmad b. al-`Abbas known as al-Faqih
al-Samarqandi, Nusair b. Yahya al-Balkhi
(d. 268/881), and Muhammad b. Muqatil
al-Razi
(d. 248,/862), Qadi of Rayy. All of
them
were students of Imam abu Hanifah (d.
150/767)
[7]
In recognition of his scholarship and
profound
knowledge in theology (and his invaluable
services to the cause of ahl al-sunnah
w-al-jama'ah)
people conferred on him the title of
Imam
al-Huda and Imam al-Mutakallimin. Mahmud
al-Kufawi mentioned him as "leader
of
guidance, the model of the Sunnite
and the
guided, the bearer of the standard
of ahl
al-sunnah w-al jama'ah, the uprooter
of
misguidance arising from disorder and
heresies,
leader of the scholastics, and rectifier
of the faith of the Muslims. [8]
Works - Al-Maturidi wrote a number
of important
books on Tafsir, Kalam, and Usul, a
list
of which is given below:
1. Kitab Tawilat al-Qur'an or Tawilat
Ahl
al-Sunnah.
2. Kitab Ma'khadh al-Shari'ah.
3. Kitab al-Jadal.
4. Kitab al-Usul (Usul al-Din).
5. Kitab al-Maqalat.
6. Kitab al- Tauhid.
7. Kitab Bayan Wahm al-Mu'tazilah.
8. Kitab Radd Awa'il al-Adillah li
al-Ka'bi.
9. Kitab Radd Tahdhib al-Jadal li al-Ka'bi.
10. Kitab Radd Wa'id al-Fussaq li al-Ka'bi.
11. Radd al Usul al-Khamsah li abi
Muhammad
al- Bahili.
12. Radd Kitab al-Imamah li ba'd al-Rawafid.
13. Kitab al-Radd `ala al-Qaramitah
[9]
Unfortunately, not a single work of
al-Maturidi
has so far been published. His Tawilat
al-Qur'an,
Kitab al-Tauhid, and Kitab al-Maqalat
which
are by far the most important and valuable
of all his works, exist only in manuscripts.
The Tawil al-Qur'an is a commentary
on the
Qur'an in the scholastic method in
which
he endeavoured to establish the liberal
orthodox
theology, both traditionally and rationally,
and to provide for it a sound basis.
[10]
Commenting on this momentous work,
Sheikh
`Abd al-Qadir al-Qarashi says, "A
unique
book with which no book of the earlier
authors
on this subject can have any comparison."
[11]
In his Kitab al-Tauhid, al-Maturidi
gave
an elaborate exposition of his system
and
sought to harmonize the extreme views
of
both the traditionists and the rationalists.
The book bears testimony to his broad
outlook,
deep insight, and intimate acquaintance
with
the philosophical systems of his time.
The
evidence at our disposal at present
shows
that al-Maturidi was the first Mutakalim
to introduce the doctrine of the sources
of human knowledge in a book on theology
such as Kitab al-Tauhid and thereby
made
a thorough attempt to build up his
system
on a sound philosophical basis. This
method
was followed by other theologians and
the
subject was later on elaborately treated
by the Ash'arite scholars, al-Baqillani
(d.
403/1013), and al-Baghdadi (d. 429/1037).
Al-Maturidi is one of the pioneers
amongst
the Hanafite scholars who wrote on
the principles
of jurisprudence and his two works
Ma'khadh
al-Shari'ah and Kitab al-Jadal are
considered
to be authoritative on the subject.
[12]
It is evident from the list of works
written
by al-Maturidi that he took great care
to
refute the views and ideas of the Qarmatians,
the Shiites, and especially those of
the
Mu'tazilites. His contemporary abu
al-Qasim
`Abd Allah al-Ka'bi (d. 317/929) was
the
leader of the Mu'tazilite school of
Baghdad.
[13] Al-Maturidi combated the doctrines
of
al-Ka'bi in his Kitab al-Tauhid and
wrote
three books on criticism of al-Ka'bi's
three
books. It may be observed here that
while
al-Maturidi in the East engaged himself
in
fighting the Mu'tazilites in general
and
particularly the Baghdad group, his
contemporary
al-Ash'ari in Iraq took a prominent
part
in resisting the Mu'tazilites of Basrah.
But it appears to us that al-Maturidi
began
his movement long before al-Ash'ari
appeared
on the scene and most probably while
the
latter was still in the Mu'tazilite
camp.
[14]
B
METHOD
Al-Maturidi in his Kitab al-Tauhid
gave a
short critical account of the different
views
regarding the matter and sources of
human
knowledge and the best method to be
followed
in order to acquire knowledge. Means
of acquiring
knowledge, according to him, are three:
(1)
Sense-organs (al-a'yan); (2) Reports
(al-akhbar)
; (3) Reason
(al-nazr).
He severely criticized the conflicting
views
of different groups who thought that
knowledge
is not attainable at all, or that senses
cannot supply true knowledge, or that
reason
alone is sufficient to give us all
knowledge.
Refuting the views of those who deny
or doubt
the possibility of knowledge altogether
or
the possibility of acquiring knowledge
through
sense-organs, al-Maturidi says that
even
animals perceive by their senses what
may
preserve or destroy them and what may
be
useful or harmful to them. So theoretical
arguments with those who pretend to
deny
the objective reality of things is
useless.
Yet he says, they may be humorously
asked:
"Do you know what you deny?"
If
they say "No," their denial
stands
cancelled, but if they answer affirmatively,
they admit the reality of their denial
and
thereby become opposers of their opposing.
A more effective way than this is to
make
them subject to physical torture so
that
they may be compelled to admit what
they
deny of the reality of sensuous knowledge.
Reports are the means of acquiring
knowledge
concerning genealogy, past occurrences,
remote
countries, useful and harmful things,
foodstuffs,
medicine, etc. These are of two kinds,
historical
reports (khabr al-mutawatir) and reports
of the prophets (khabr al-rusul), possessing
sure signs to prove their honesty.
Though
both kinds of reports are proved to
be sources
of knowledge, we should be very critical
in accepting reports of the prophets,
because
they are handed down through chains
of narrators
who are not infallible and who may
commit
mistakes in reporting. Those who reject
report
as a source of knowledge are, al-Maturidi
asserts, like those who reject sensuous
knowledge.
In order to convince them, they should
be
physically tortured and if they complain
of pain, they should be told: Your
words
of complaint are nothing but reports
which
cannot give us any real knowledge.
[15]
Reason, according to al-Maturidi, is
the
most important of all other sources
of knowledge,
because without its assistance sense
and
report can give no real knowledge.
Knowledge
of metaphysical realities and moral
principles
is derived through this source. It
is reason
which distinguishes men from animals.
Al-Maturidi
has pointed out many cases where nothing
but reason can reveal the truth. This
is
why the Qur'an repeatedly enjoins man
to
think, to ponder, and to judge by reason
in order to find out the truth. Refuting
the ideas of those who think that reason
cannot give true knowledge, he says
that
they cannot prove their doctrine without
employing reason. [16]
Reason, no doubt, occupies a very eminent
place in the system of al-Maturidi,
but
it cannot give, he holds, true knowledge
concerning everything that we require
to
know. Like senses, it has a limit beyond
which it cannot go. Sometimes the true
nature
of the human intellect is obscured
and influenced
by internal and external factors such
as
desire, motive, habit, environment,
and association,
and, as a result, it even fails to
give us
true knowledge of things that are within
its own sphere. Divergent views and
conflicting
ideas of the learned concerning many
a problem
are mentioned by al-Maturidi as one
of the
proofs in support of his statement.
Hence,
reason often requires, he asserts,
the service
of a guide and helper who will protect
it
from straying, lead it to the right
path,
help it understand delicate and mysterious
affairs, and know the truth. This guide,
according to him, is the divine revelation
received by a prophet. If anyone will
deny
the necessity of this divine guidance
through
revelation and claim that reason alone
is
capable of giving us all the knowledge
we
need, then he will certainly overburden
his
reason and oppress it quite unreasonably.
[17]
The necessity of the divine revelation
is
not restricted, according to al-Maturidi,
to religious affairs only, but its
guidance
is required in many worldly affairs
too.
The discovery of the different kinds
of foodstuffs,
medicine, invention of arts and crafts,
etc., are the results of this divine
guidance.
Human intellect cannot give any knowledge
in respect of many of these matters,
and
if man had to rely solely on individual
experience
for the knowledge of all these things,
then
human civilization could not have made
such
rapid progress. [18]
Al-Maturidi refutes the idea of those
who
think that the individual mind is the
basis
of knowledge and criterion of truth.
He also
does not regard inspiration (ilham)
as a
source of knowledge. Inspiration, he
argues,
creates chaos and conflicts in the
domain
of knowledge, makes true knowledge
impossible,
and is ultimately liable to lead humanity
to disintegration and destruction for
want
of a common standard of judgment and
universal
basis for agreement. [19]
It is evident from this brief account
that
reason and revelation both occupy a
prominent
place in the system of al-Maturidi.
The articles
of religious belief are derived, according
to him, from revelation, and the function
of reason is to understand them correctly.
There can be no conflict between reason
and
revelation if the real purport of the
latter
be correctly understood. His method
of interpreting
the Scriptures may be outlined in the
following
words: The passages of the Holy Qur'an
which
appear to be ambiguous or the meanings
of
which are obscure or uncertain (mubham
and
mushtabah) must be taken in the light
of
the verses that are self-explaining
and precise
(muhkam). Where the apparent sense
of a verse
contradicts what has been established
by
the "precise" (muhkam) verses,
it must then be believed that the apparent
sense was never intended, because there
cannot
be contradiction in the verses of the
Holy
Qur'an, as God has repeatedly declared.
In
such cases, it is permissible to interpret
the particular verse in the light of
the
established truth (tawil) or to leave
its
true meaning to the knowledge of God
(tafwid).
[20]
The difference between the attitude
of al-Maturidi
and that of the Mu'tazilites in this
respect
is quite fundamental. The latter formulated
certain doctrines on rational grounds
and
then tried to support their views by
the
verses of the Holy Qur'an, interpreting
them
in the light of their doctrines. As
regards
the traditions of the Prophet, their
attitude
was to accept those which supported
their
views and to reject those which opposed
them.
[21]
C
CRITICISM OF THE MU'TAZILITES
Al-Maturidi always tried to adopt a
middle
course between the extreme Rationalists
and
the Traditionists. He would agree with
the
Mu'tazilites on many points, but would
never
accept the Aristotelian philosophy
as a basis
of religious doctrines. Similarly,
he is
in accord with the Traditionists on
fundamentals,
but is not ready to take the Qur'an
and the
Hadith always in their literal sense
and
thereby to fall into gross anthropomorphism.
He agrees with the Mu'tazilites that
it is
obligatory on the part of every rational
being to acquire knowledge of the existence
of God through his reason even if no
messenger
were sent by Aim for this purpose;
that things
are intrinsically good or bad and the
Shari'
(God) takes into consideration these
values
in His amr (command) and nahi (prohibition);
that God has endowed man with reason
through
which he can often distinguish right
from
wrong. But, contrary to the Mu'tazilites,
he maintains that reason cannot be
the final
authority for human obligation and
religious
law. The basis of religious obligation,
according
to him, is revelation, not reason.
[22] It
seems that al-Maturidi's view on this
question
and on the authorship of human action,
as
will be seen, is mainly guided by the
Qur'anic
verses such as "To Him belong
creation
and command." [23]
Al-Maturidi bitterly criticized the
Mu'tazilite
doctrine of divine justice and unity.
Their
interpretation of divine justice led
them
to deny the all-pervading will and
power
of God, His authorship of human action,
and
made Him quite helpless and subject
to external
compulsion. Divine grace and mercy
find no
place in their system as is evident
from
their view on grave sins. Their doctrine
of al-aslah (salutary) cannot explain
satisfactorily
the existence of evil, natural calamities,
and sufferings of innocent children
and animals.
According to their doctrine, man enjoys
more
power and freedom than the Creator
of the
universe. They did not follow, al-Maturidi
tried to prove, the explicit decisions
of
the Qur'an and the Sunnah, nor the
dictates
of sound reason. [24] Their interpretation
of tauhid reduced God to an unknown
and unknowable
non-entity (ta'til). [25]
Their view that Non-Being is a thing
(al-ma'dumu
shai'un) only supports the atheists'
doctrine
of the eternity of the world, makes
an eternal
partner with God, and thereby contradicts
the Qur'anic doctrines of creation
and tauhid.
They made God quite imperfect and subject
to changes by denying His eternally
creative
funetion. [26]
D.
MATURIDI'S SYSTEM
Al-Maturidi built up his own system
mainly
on two principles: freedom from similitude
(tanzih) and divine wisdom (hikmah).
On the
principle of freedom from similitude
he opposes
similitude (tashbih) and anthropomorphism
(tajsim) in all their forms, without
denying
divine attributes. The anthropomorphic
expressions
used in the Qur'an like the hands,
the face,
the eyes of God, and His sitting on
the Throne
should not be taken in their apparent
sense,
because the literal interpretation
of these
expressions contradicts the explicit
verses
of the Qur'an. These passages, therefore,
should be interpreted in the light
of the
clear passages of tanzih in a manner
consistent
with, the doctrine of tauhid, and permissible
according to the usage and idiom of
the Arabic
language, or their true meanings should
be
left to the knowledge of God. [27]
On the principle of divine widom (hikmah)
al-Maturidi tried to reconcile the
conflicting
views of the Determinists (Jabrites)
and
the Mu'tazilites and prove for man
certain
amount of freedom, without denying
the all-pervading
divine will, power, and decree. Wisdom
means
placing a thing in its own place; so
divine
wisdom comprises both justice ('adl)
and
grace and kindness (fadl). God possesses
absolute power and His absoluteness
is not
subject to any external laws but His
own
wisdom. [28] Al-Maturidi applied this
principle
also to combat the Mu'tazilites' doctrine
of al-aslah (best) on the one hand,
and the
orthodox view that God may overburden
his
servants (taklif ma la yutaq) on the
other.
It is inconsistent with divine wisdom,
which
includes both justice and kindness,
to demand
from man performance of an act which
is beyond
his power, such as to command a blind
man:
"See," or to command one
who has
no hands: "Stretch your hands.”
[29]
Similarly, it would be an act of injustice
if God would punish the believers in
hell
for ever or reward the infidels in
paradise
for ever. [30] He agreed with the Mu'tazilites
on these questions in opposition to
the orthodox,
[31] but he strongly opposed the former's
doctrine that God must do what is best
for
man. This Mu'tazilite doctrine, he
argues,
places God under compulsion to do a
particular
act at a fixed time for the benefit
of an
individual and denies His freedom of
action.
It only proves the right of a man on
Him
and not the intrinsic value and merit
of
an action which the divine wisdom keeps
in
view. Moreover, this doctrine cannot
solve
the problem of evil. Al-Maturidi, therefore,
maintains that divine justice consists
not
in doing what is salutary to an individual,
but in doing an action on its own merit
and
in giving a thing its own place. [32]
After this brief outline, we give below
a
somewhat detailed account of al-Maturidi’s
view on the most important theological
problems
of his time, viz., the relation between
God
and human action, divine attributes,
and
beatific vision.
Relation between God and Man - Al-Maturidi
in his Kitab al-Tauhid and Tawilat
al-Qur'an
has dealt at length with different
aspects
of this broad problem, the will, the
power,
the eternal decree, and the creative
function
of God; His wisdom and existence of
evil
in this world; freedom of man; and
the basis
of religious obligation and responsibility,
etc.
Al-Maturidi combated the views of the
Jabrites
and the Mu'tazilites on the above questions
and he also disagreed with al-Ash'ari
on
certain points. Refuting the absolute
determinism
of the Jabrites, he says that the relation
between God and man should not be considered
to be the same as that between God
and the
physical world. God has endowed man
with
reason, with the power of distinguishing
between right and wrong, and with the
faculties
of thinking, feeling, willing, and
judging,
and has sent messengers and revealed
books
for his guidance. Man inclines and
directs
his mind towards something which he
thinks
may benefit him, restrains himself
from what
he thinks will harm him, chooses one
of the
alternative courses of action by the
exercise
of his own reason, and thinks himself
responsible
for the merits or demerits of his actions.
Now, while he thinks, desires, inclines,
chooses, and acts, he always considers
himself
quite free, and never thinks or feels
that
any outside agency compels him to do
any
of his actions. This consciousness
of freedom,
al-Maturidi asserts, is a reality,
the denial
of which will lead to the denial of
all human
knowledge and sciences. Quoting passages
from the Qur'an [33] he also shows
that the
actions enjoined or prohibited by God
are
ascribed to men, and that they will
be accountable
for their "own" actions.
All this
clearly proves that God has granted
men freedom
of choice and necessary power to perform
an action. The denial of this freedom
will
mean that God is wholly responsible
for all
human actions and is liable to blame
or punishment
for sins committed by men, yet on the
Day
of Judgment He will punish them for
His own
actions. This is quite absurd, as God
has
described Himself in the Qur'an as
the most
wise, just, and compassionate. [34]
But how can human freedom be reconciled
with
the Qur'anic conception of the all-embracing
divine will, power, eternal decree,
and God's
authorship of all human actions? Al-Maturidi's
explanations may be summed up as follows.
Creation belongs to God alone and all
human
actions, good or bad, are willed, decreed,
and created by Him. Creation means
bringing
forth of an action from non-existence
into
existence by one who possesses absolute
power
and complete knowledge in respect of
that
action. As man does not know all the
circumstances,
causes, conditions, or the results
of his
action, and does not possess within
himself
the requisite power for producing an
action,
he cannot be regarded as the creator
(khaliq) of his action. Now, when it
is proved
that God is the creator of all human
actions,
it will necessarily follow that He
also wills
these actions, because divine action
must
be preceded by divine will. So nothing
can
happen in the world against or without
the
will of God. But, though God wills
and creates
human actions, He is not liable to
blame
or accountable for their actions, because
divine will is determined by divine
knowledge
and He creates the action when a man
in the
free exercise of his reason chooses
and intends
to perform an action. Thus, God wills
an
action good or evil, which He knows
a man
will choose, and when ultimately he
chooses
and intends to acquire it God creates
that
act as a good or evil act for him.
From this,
it will be clear that God's willing
or creating
an evil action is not inconsistent
with His
wisdom and goodness. Because, God wills
the
happening of the evil because He desires
the individual to exercise free choice,
but
being wise and just He always prohibits
the
choice of evil. So, though sins are
in accordance
with His will, they are never in accordance
with His command, pleasure, desire,
or guidance.
Sin, then, according to al-Maturidi,
consists
not in going against the divine will,
but
in violating the divine law, command,
guidance,
pleasure, or desire.
The basis of man's obligation and responsibility
(taklif), al-Maturidi maintains, does
not
consist in his possessing the power
to create
an action, but it is the freedom to
choose
(ikhtiyar) and the freedom to acquire
an
action (iktisab), conferred on man
as a rational
being, which make him responsible and
accountable.
[35]
As regards eternal divine decree (qada'
and
qadar) al-Maturidi holds that it is
not inconsistent
with human freedom, nor does it imply
any
compulsion on the part of man, because
it
is an eternal record based on foreknowledge.
God decrees the act He knows from eternity
that a man will choose and acquire
freely.
Man cannot deny his own responsibilities
on the ground of the divine decree,
al-Maturidi
adds; he cannot do so on account of
time
and space within which actions must
be done.
So, though man is not absolutely free,
God
has granted him necessary freedom consistent
with his obligation and, therefore,
the divine
decree relating to human actions should
not
be regarded the same as in relation
to the
physical world. [36]
It may not be out of place to note
here the
points of difference between al-Maturidi
and al-Ash'ari on this question. In
order
to make a man responsible for his action
al-Maturidi laid great stress, as we
have
just noticed, on the freedom of choice
(ikhtiyar)
and freedom of acquisition (iktisab).
Divine
will, decree, and foreknowledge do
not deprive
a man of this freedom. An action is
a man's
own action, though created by God,
because
it is the result of his own choice
and it
has been acquired by him without any
compulsion.
God provided for him all the means
and facilities
for acquiring an action, endowed him
with
the power of judgment and self-control,
and
granted him freedom to choose whatever
means
and course he prefers to adopt. Al-Ash'ari
also used the term acquisition (kasb)
[37]
but interpreted it differently. It
seems
that he did not favour the idea of
the freedom
of choice. According to him, God being
omnipotent,
all objects of power fall under His
power,
as God being omniscient all objects
of knowledge
fall under His knowledge. So a man's
will
has no effect or influence at all on
his
action; it is always determined by
the divine
will. Even the desire and power of
acquisition
fall under divine power and are the
creation
of God. [38] Acquisition then; according
to al-Ash'ari, means only a general
coincidence
of the divine power anal human actions.
It
is God who in reality creates as well
as
acquires the action through man. This
view,
as is evident, does not differ in essence
from that of the Determinists and hence
he
was regarded by some writers as being
one
of them. [39] Even most of the prominent
Ash'arites like Qadi abu Bakr al-Baqillani
(d. 403/1013), Saikh abu Ishaq al-Isfara'ini,
and Imam al-Haramain al-Juwaini (d.
478/
1085) could not agree with him on this
question
and gave different interpretations
of the
term kasb. [40]
Divine Attributes - Human languages
do not
possess any term, al-Maturidi says,
to explain
the nature and attributes of God in
a way
that will not imply any idea of resemblance
or comparison. Yet it is a necessity
for
human understanding to ascribe some
names
and attributes to the Creator of the
world.
Giving a critical account of the views
of
the philosophers, the pluralists, the
dualists,
and the atheists, al-Maturidi asserts
that
the belief in one Supreme Power and
Ultimate
Reality is universal, but the people
differ
greatly from one another in giving
names
and attributing qualities to this Supreme
Being. Among the people of tauhid,
it is
only the Mu'tazilites, he says, who
by denying
the divine attributes and their eternity
endangered this universal belief in
the existence
of one God. Refuting the views of the
Mu'tazilites
on this question, he says that it is
agreed
that God has beautiful names and it
will
be quite futile to apply these names
to Him
divested of the meanings and contents
which
they imply; for otherwise it will not
be
unreasonable to ascribe to Him any
name whatsoever.
So, when, for example, it is said that
God
is wise, it must mean that He possesses
the
quality of wisdom. The denial of the
divine
attributes (ta'til) only creates confusions,
makes the knowledge of God impossible,
and
ultimately reduces Him to an unknown
and
unknowable Non Being. The denial of
the
eternity of the attributes makes God
imperfect
in the beginning and subject to changes,
and, thus, it shakes the very basis
of tauhid.
The idea of pluralism or anthropomorphism
that may arise due to affirmation of
the
eternal attributes can easily be eradicated
by firm belief in the absolute unity
of God
together with the idea of tanzih (denial
of likeness and similitude) and mukhlafah
(difference from the created being).
Thus
when we say that "God is knowing,"
we also add to this (as a safeguard
against
any blasphemous idea concerning Him),
"but
not like the learned, and His knowledge
is
not like our knowledge." The consequences
of the denial of the divine attributes
or
their eternity are far more dangerous
than
those of their affirmation.
As regards the relation between divine
essence
and attributes, al-Maturidi says that
the
problem is so complicated that no human
reason
can hope to solve it satisfactorily.
So we
should believe that God is one, has
attributes
which He ascribes to Himself, without
similitude,
comparison, and asking how. We should
not
go further than asserting that "the
attributes are not identical with nor
separated
from His essence" (la huwa wa
la ghairuhu).
[41]
Al-Maturidi also maintains that all
the attributes
of God whether belonging to His essence
or
action are eternal. The word takwin
has been
used to denote all the attributes pertaining
to action such as creating, sustaining,
etc.
Takwin, according to al-Maturidi, is
an eternal
attribute distinct from power (qudrah).
So
God is the creator before and after
the creation.
This does not indicate in any way the
eternity
of the world, because as knowledge
and power
are eternal attributes, though the
objects
of knowledge and power are created,
takwin
is an eternal attribute, though the
object
of takwin (mukawwan) is created. The
non-existence
of the world at the beginning does
not imply
God's inability, as He created it at
the
appropriate time in accordance with
His eternal
knowledge and will. [42]
Al-Ash'ari on this question is in agreement
with the Mu'tazilites and holds that
the
attributes of action are originated.
[43]
It seems to us that he agreed with
them in
order to evade the Aristotelian argument
which aims at proving the eternity
of the
world by the eternal, creative power
of God.
Al-Maturidi's main argument is that
the idea
of the createdness of any of the divine
attributes
is fundamentally opposed to the conception
of God as a perfect, self-subsistent,
eternal
Ultimate Reality and is, therefore,
in conflict
with the doctrine of tauhid.
As regards the Word of God (Kalam Allah),
al-Maturidi maintains that like all
other
attributes His attribute of speaking
as well
as His speech is eternal without similitude
and comparison. The exact nature of
this
eternal speech or the attribute of
speaking
is not known, but it is certain that
the
divine speech cannot be composed of
sounds
and letters like human speech, because
sounds
and letters are created. So, in reality,
he asserts, only the "meaning"
of which the words are an expression
can
be termed as the kalam of Allah. This
"meaning"
which existed with God from eternity
can
be heard and understood only through
the
medium of created sound. Accordingly,
Moses
did not hear the eternal speech, but
God
made him hear and understand the eternal
speech through created words and sounds.
Now, what is heard by or revealed to
the
prophets is called the kalam of Allah
figuratively
(majazan) for three reasons: (1) They
heard
(understood) the purport (al-ma'na)
of the
kalam, that is, divine command, prohibition,
forbidding, sanctioning, etc., which
belong
to God alone. (2) God Himself composed
it
(allafa wa nazama); hence it was inimitable
by any human being. (3) It explains
the eternal
speech and proves His attribute of
speech.
[44]
It is evident from the above account
that
al-Maturidi refutes the idea of the
orthodox
section who identified the revealed
Qur'an
with the eternal speech, and he agrees
in
principle with the Mu'tazilites who
held
it to be a creation of God. So the
subject
of contention between him and the Mu'tazilites
is not whether the recited Qur'an is
created,
but whether God has eternal speech
and the
attribute of speaking.
Al-Ash'ari, like al-Maturidi, maintains
that
God has eternal speech and the attribute
of speaking, [45] but it is not clear
from
his lengthy discourses in Kitab al-Luma
and
al-Ibanah what he exactly meant by
kalam
of Allah and what, according to him,
was
eternal in the Qur'an-words or meanings?
He maintained that the eternal speech
could
be heard directly without the medium
of created
sound. [46] This statement, together
with
general trends of his ideas and his
mode
of reasonings as reflected in his printed
books, corroborates a statement according
to which both words and meanings were
regarded
by him as eterna1. [47] But al-Shahrastani
asserts that, according to al-Ash'ari,
the
words are created and the "mental"
meaning (al-ma'na al-nafsi) is eternal;
[48]
this last is the view of all the eminent
Ash'arites. [49] If so, there is not
much
difference on this question between
the
Mu'tazilites and the Ash'arites.
Beatific Vision - It has been noticed
that
al-Maturidi, like the Mu'tazilites,
strongly
opposed the anthropomorphic idea of
God and
interpreted metaphorically those passages
of the Qur'an which appear to create
such
an impression. But on the question
of seeing
God in paradise by the believers, he
is wholly
in agreement with the orthodox, and
firmly
holds that the passages of the Qur'an
and
the traditions of the Prophet on this
subject
must be taken in their literal sense.
By
scholastic reasonings he shows that
the letter
and spirit of these verses and traditions
do not allow us to take them allegorically
and to interpret seeing God as "seeing
His signs and rewards or knowing Him
by the
heart." This latter type of seeing
is
common for believers and nonbelievers
in
the next world and may even happen
in this
world. The texts must always be taken
in
their literal and real sense, he argues,
except where that is impossible. The
vision
of God in the next world is not impossible
and it does not necessarily prove His
corporeality,
and hence if the literal sense were
rejected,
its consequences would be dangerous
and it
might ultimately lead to the denial
of the
existence of God. As God is knowing
and doing;
for example, without His being a body
or
accident or without His being limited
by
time and space, so will He be an object
of
vision in the next world. Some people
were
misled because, as they had no experience
of seeing what is not a body nor an
accident,
they compared the vision of God in
paradise
with the vision of a material object
in this
world. Thus, the Corporealists (Mujassimin)
erred in saying that God is a body,
because
He will be seen, and the Mu'tazilites
erred
in saying that He cannot be seen because
He is not a body. Conditions of vision,
al-Maturidi
says, differ from stage to stage, person
to person, and genus to genus. Many
things
exist, but we do not see them. Angels
who
are not corporeal beings see us, though
we
do not see them. Conditions of seeing:
rays
of light, darkness, and shadow, are
not the
same as those of seeing solid material
objects.
So it is quite unreasonable to apply
the
conditions of seeing a physical object
in
this world to the seeing of the Being
which
is not a body in the next world, where
conditions
will be totally different from those
in this
world. Seeing God, therefore, may be
impossible
in this world, but not in the next
world.
He also argues that vision may not
happen
sometimes for some reason or other,
although
the conditions of vision exist; in
the same
way, vision may happen in the absence
of
those conditions. Another argument
of his
is that, according to our sense-experience,
only the knowledge of matter and accidents
can be acquired by a man, yet we assert
the
possibility of acquiring knowledge
of the
realities beyond experience. This principle
is also applicable to beatific vision.
In short, al-Maturidi asserts that
the vision
of God in paradise is the highest spiritual
and intellectual delight and the most
coveted
reward of the believers; it is an article
of faith based on the Qur'an and the
Sunnah
and supported by reason. So we must
accept
this as such, without going into details.
[50]
Conclusion -The theological systems
of al-Maturidi
and al-Ash'ari have long since been
accepted
by the general populace of the Muslim
world.
Though ascribed to them, neither al-Maturidi
nor al-Ash`ari was, in fact, the author
of
his system, nor was either of them
a pioneer
in this field. Imam abu Hanifah (d.
150/767)
was the first renowned scholar among
the
ahl al-sunnah w-al jama'ah, who studied
theology for long before he had taken
up
the study of Fiqh, combated the heretical
sects of his time, and founded the
first
orthodox school in theology. [51] Al-Maturidi
followed his system, explained it in
the
light of the philosophy of his time,
tried
to defend it by argument and reason,
and
this provided for it a firm foundation.
Hence
this school is ascribed to its founder
as
well as to its interpreter who fixed
its
ultimate form and brought victory to
it.
The difference between the attitude
of al-Maturidi
and of al-Ash'ari may be judged from
this:
If al-Ash'ari's attempt during the
later
period was to strike a middle path
between
rationalism and traditionalism, al-Maturidi
certainly took a position between what
may
be called Ash'arism and Mu'tazilism.
The
important points of difference between
these
two leaders of orthodox Kalam, more
strictly,
between the two schools, have been
reckoned
by some writers as fifty in number.
[52]
(References have already been made
in the
foregoing pages to some of the most
important
of them and we need not enter here
into a
discussion of the rest.) As a result
of these
differences, there was once a tendency
of
bitter rivalry between the followers
of these
two schools but happily in course of
time
this tendency subsided and both the
schools
were regarded as orthodox. But how
profoundly
the educated Muslims of today are influenced
by the system of al-Maturidi may easily
be
realized from the fact that the `Aqa'id
of
al-Nasafi (d. 537/1142), which gives
the
substance of the former's Kitab al-Tauhid,
has been recognized as an authority
and prescribed
as a text-book on theology in many
educational
institutions of the Muslim world.
A comparative study of the arguments
employed
by al-Maturidi and by the great Ash'arite
scholars like `Abd al-Qahir al-Baghdadi
(d.
429/1031) and Imam al-Haramain al-Juwaini
(d. 478/1085) to prove the non-eternity
of
the world, the existence of God, His
unity
and attributes, the value of human
reason,
the necessity of the divine revelation,
and
the prophethood of Muhammad, will
show how
deep and enormous his influence was
on the
orthodox dialecticians who came after
him,
and what a lasting contribution he
made towards
the development of orthodox Kalam.
That Shaikh
Muhammad `Abduh (d. 1323/1905), one
of the
leaders of the modern reform movement
in
Islam, in his endeavour to reconstruct
Islamic
theology, closely followed the system
of
al-Maturidi, is evident from his Risalat
al-Tauhid and his observations on several
controversial questions in his note
on the
Sharh `Aqa'id al-`Adudiyyah.
Notes:
[1] The word is also pronounced as
Maturid
and Maturit. Cf, al-Sam'ani, al-Ansab,
fol.
498b; ibn al-Athir, al-Lubab, vol.
III, p.
76; Ahmad Amin, Zuhr al-Islam. vol.
I, p.
365. It was wrongly transcribed by
some writers
as Matarid.
[2] Al-Maturidi, Kitab al-Tauhid, MS.
Cambridge,
fol. 1, footnote al Sayyid Murtada,
Sharh
Ihya' of al-Ghazali, Cairo, 1893, V
ol. II,
p. 5.
[3] Imam abu Nasr al-'Ayadi, al-Samarqandi,
one of al-Maturidi's teachers, was
a descendant
of Sa'd b. `Ubadah, vide 'Abd al-Hay
Lakhnawi,
al-Fawa'id al Bahiyyah, Cairo, 1324/1906,
p. 23.
[4] Al-Sam'ani, op. cit., fol. 498.
[5] Abd al-Qadir al-Qarashi, al-Jawahir
al-Mud'iyyah,
MS. Cairo, p. 251 (it has been printed
at
Hyderabad); Mahmud al-Kufawi, Kata'ib
A'lam
al-Akhyar, MS. Cairo, pp.
129-30; Qasim b. Qutlubugha, Taj al-Tarajim,
Leipzig, 1862, p. 44; Tash Kubrazadah,
Miftah
al-Sa’adah, Hyderabad, 1928, vol. II,
p.
22; Sayyid Murtada, op. cit., vol.
II, pp.
5-14; `Abd al-Hayy Lakhnami, op. cit.,
p.
195.
[6] For Samanids see al-Maqdisi, Ahsan
al-Taqasim,
p. 294; Ahmad Amin, op. cit. vol. I,
pp.
261 et sqq.
[7] Kamal al-Din al-Biyadi, Zaharat
at-Maram,
Cairo, 1949, p. 23; Sharh Ihya' vol.
II,
p. 5, and books on Hanafi ,Tabaqat.
[8] Kata’ib A'lam al-Akhyar, p. 129.
[9] Three other works, viz., Sharh
Fiqh al-Akbar
of Imam abu Hanifah, 'Aqidah abi Mansur
and
Sharh al-Ibanah of Imam al-Ash'ari
are erroneously
ascribed to him.
[10] MSS. of this book are found at
the Cairo,
Istanbul, and Berlin Libraries. Sheikh
'Ala
al-Din abu Bakr Muhammad b. Ahmad al-Samarqandi
wrote a commentary on this book in
eight
volumes, an incomplete copy of which
can
be found at the Patna Library.
[11] Al-Jawahir al-Mud'iyyah, MS. Cairo,
p. 251.
[12] Kashf al-Zunan, Istanbul, 1943,
vol.
I, pp. 110-11.
[13] For al-Ka'bi, see al-Shahrastani,
Milal,
al-Azhar ed., vol. I, pp. 116-17; al-Baghdadi,
Kitab al-Fariq, Cairo, pp. 108-09.
[14] Al-Ash'ari was born in 260/873
or 2701883
and remained in the Mu'tazilites' camp
up
to the fortieth year of his age, so
he must
have begaan his movement after the
end of
the third century of Hijrah. Al-Maturidi
was born before 248/862, and supposing
that
he spent about thirty years in acquiring
knowledge, then his movement seems
to have
begun before the end. of the third
century
A. H.
[15] Al-Maturidi, op. cit., pp. 3,
13.
[16] Ibid., pp. 4-5, 68-69.
[17] Ibid., pp. 92-95; Tawilat, Surah
vii,
54.
[18] Ibid., pp- 91 et sqq.
[19] Ibid., pp- 2-4.
[20] Ibid., p. 116; Tawilat, MSS. Istanbul
& Hyderabad, Preface; 'Ali al-Qari,
Sharh
al-Fiqh al-Akbar, Cairo, 1323/1905,
p. 75.
[21] Zuhdi Hasan, al-Mu'tazilah, Cairo,
1947,
pp. 247-48; Ahmad Amm, Duha al-Ialam,
Cairo,
vol. III, p. 32.
[22] Kitab al-Tauhid pp. 48-49, 91-92;
Sharh
al-`Aqa'id al-`Adudiyyah with commentaries
of Sialkuti and Shaikh Muhammad `Abduh,
Cairo,
1322/1904, p. 180, Nazm al-Fara'id
Cairo,
1317/1899, pp. 32-37; al-Raudat al-Bahiyyah,
Cairo, 1322/1904, pp. 34-39.
[23] Qur'an, vii, 56.
[24] Kitab al-Tauhid, pp. 41-42, 48,
144-69,
178; Tawilat, Surah vii, 10.
[25] Kitab al-Tauhid, pp. 13, 21, 46.
[26] Ibid., p. 59; Tawilat, Surah xxxix,
62. [27] Tawilat, Surah vii, 54; v,
64; iv,
27; xi, 37; Kitab al-Tauhid, pp. 12,
32.
[28] Kitab al-Tauhid, pp. 46-47, 61-62.
[29] Ibid., pp. 134-35; Tawilat, Surah
ii,
286.
[30] Ibid., pp. 186 et sqq.
[31] For al-Ash'ari's views on these
questions,
see his Kitab al-Luma`, Cairo, 1955,
pp.
113 et sqq.; al-Ibanah, Hyderabad,
1948,
p. 59:
[32] Kitab al-Tauhid, pp. 48, 61, 112.
[33] Qur'an, ii, 77, 167; xxliii, 17;
xli,
40; xcix, 7, etc.
[34] Kitab al-Tauhid, pp. 115 et sqq.,
165.
[35] Ibid., pp. 117 et sqq.
[36] Ibid., p. 161.
[37] The evidence at our disposal does
not
clearly indicate when and by whom the
doctrine
of kasb was first formulated. But it
is quite
evident that neither al-Maturidi nor
al-Ash'ari
was the originator of this doctrine.
The
term kasb or iktisab had been used
long before
them by Imam abu Hanifah and his contemporaries:
Jahm b. Safwan (d.
128/745), Hafs, al-Fard, and Dirar
b. `Amar.
Cf. al-Ash'ari, al-Maqalat, Cairo,
vol. I,
pp. 110, 313; al-Baghdadi, op. cit.,
pp.
129 et sqq.; Muhammad b. al-Murtada
al-Yamani,
Ithar al-Haqq, pp. 312, 316.
[38] al-Ash'ari, Kitab al-Luma`, Cairo,
1955,
pp. 72 et sqq.
[39] Ibn al-Nadim, al-Fihrist, chapter
on
the Jabrites; al-Shahrastani, Milal,
vol.
I, p. 134.
[40] Al-Shahrastani, op. cit., vol.
I, pp.
157 et sqq.; Imam al-Haramain, al-`Aqidat
al-Nizamiyyah, p. 34; Shari’a al-`Aqa'id
al-`Adudiyyah, p. 88; al-Biyadi; Isharat
al-Maram, p.
255.
[41] Kitab al-Tauhid, pp. 12, 21, 31,
44,
51; al-Biyadi, op. cit., p. 118; al-Subki,
Sharh `Aqidah. MS. Madinah.
[42] Kitab al-Tauhid, pp. 23 et sqq.;
Tawilat,
Surahs i, 3; ii, 117.
[43] The three schools differ from
one another
in defining the attribute of an action.
Cf.
abi al-Qari, Sharh Fiqh al-Akbar, Cairo,
1323/1905, p. 19.
[44] Kitab al-Tauhid, pp. 26-28; Tawilat,
Surahs ix, 6; xlii, 51; vii, 143; iv,
164.
[45] Kitab al-Luma`, pp. 33 et sqq.;
al-Ibanah,
pp. 19 et aqq.
[46] Kitab al-Luma`, p. 63; also ibn
Humam
al-Musayarah, Cairo, 1347/1928, p.
11; `Abd
al-Rahim, Nazm al-Fara'id, Cairo, 1317/1899,
pp. 15-18; abu `Udhbah, al Raudat
al-Bahiyyah,
Hyderabad, pp. 44-45.
[47] Sharh al-`Aqa'id al-`Adudiyyah,
p. 188.
[48] Nihayat al-Iqdam, p. 320.
[49] Imam al-Haramain, al-Irshad, Cairo,
1950, pp. 102 et sqq.; al-Ghazali,
al Iqtisad,
Cairo, pp. 71-72.
[50] Kitab al-Tauhid, pp. 37-41; Tawilat,
Surahs vi. 103; vii, 143; x, 26; lxxv,
22-23.
[51] Al-Baghdadi, op. cit., p. 220;
Usul
al-Din, vol. I, p. 308; al-Makki and
Bazzaz,
al-Manaqib; al-Biyadi, op. cit., pp.
19-23.
There are five books on theology ascribed
to Imam abu Hanifah: al-Fiqh al-Akbar,
al-Fiqh
al-Absat, al-Risalah al-`Alim w-al-Muta'aalim
and al- Wasiyyah. These books, we are
convinced,
represent the correct views of the
Imam.
[52] Al-Biyadi, op. cit., pp. 53-56;
Shaikhzadah,
Nazm al-Fara’id, Cairo, 1317/1899;
Sayyid
Murtada, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 8 et
sqq.;
abu 'Udhbah, op. cit.; `Abd Allah b.
`Uthman,
Risalah fi al-Khilaf bain al Ash'ariyyah
wa-al-Maturidiyyah. MS. Cairo.
Al-Sam'ani, al-Ansab; ibn al Athir,
al-Lubab;
Ahmad Amin Zuhr al-Islam, vol. 1; al-Maturidi,
Kitab al-Tauhid, MS., Cambridge, fol.
1;
Sayyid Murtada, Sharh Ihya', vol. II;
`Abd
al-Qadir al-Qarashi, al-Jawahir al-Mud'iyyah,
MS., Cairo; Mahmud al-Kafawi, Kata'ib
A`lam
al-Akhyar, MS., Cairo; Qasim b. Qutlubugha,
Taj al-Tarajim, Leipzig, 1862; Tash
Kubrazadah,
Miftah al-Sa'adah, Hyderabad, 1928;
`Abd
al-Hayy Lakhnawi, al-Fawa'id al-Bahiyyah,
Cairo, 1324/1906; Kamal al-Din al-Biyadi,
Isharat al-Maram, Cairo,
1949; Hajji Khalifah, Kash al. Zunun,
Istanbul,
1943; 'Ali al-Qari, Sharh al-Fiqh al-Akbar,
Cairo, 1323/1905; Zuhdi Hasan, al-Mu'tazilah,
Cairo, 1947; al-Ash'ari, Kitab al-Luma';
Maqalat, Cairo; Imam, al-Haramain,
al-`Aqidat
al-Nizamiyyah; Sharh al-`Aqa'id al-`Adudiyyah;
al-Baghhdadi, al-Farq; Muhammad b.
al-Murtada
al-Yamani, Ithar al-Haqq; ibn al-Nadim,
al-Fihrist;
al- Shahrastani, Milal; `Abd al-Rahim,
Nazm
al-Fara'id, Cairo; al-Makki and Bazzaz,
al-Manaqib;
`Abd Allah b. `Uthman, Risalah fi al-Khilaf
bain al-Ash'ariyyah' w-al Maturidiyyah,
MS.,
Cairo; Goldziher, Vorlesungen uber
den Islam,
Heidelberg, 1910; Islamische Philosophie
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Evans Experientialism 
