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Relativistic Dialectics            Relativistic Dialectics
Georges Metanomski
Linguistic Inversion

In one of the letters written to the Infeld group in Warsaw Einstein wrote:
"A new manner of thinking is essential if humankind is to survive."

Linguistic Inversion
------------------------

NOTE 1: By "Predicate Logic" will be understood the "Predicate Calculus of First Order", the current pretended foundation of the Set Theory and Mathematics). Note 2: Attribute and "Property" are considered below as synonyms. NOTE 3:"ref." will denote below: http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/metanomskiindex.htm

In "Linguistic Inversion" we distinguished between Noumenalistic and Phenomenalistic view. We shall discuss them in some detail in "Crisis of Noumenalism" and "RD'S Phenomenalistic Logic". The present chapter is restricted to the discussion of the basic linguistic structure "[Entity] is [Attribute]", eg. "My car is green" as seen by these two views.

Noumenalism being very vast and equally vague, we shall represent it with its pretended rigorous and scientific domain, that of Predicate Logic.

For the Predicate Logic Entity is some "thing in the world", "object" or "being", whatever it may mean, which may or not HAVE Attributes and exists independently of them. Attribute is a "being" as well, but of some different type, so that it cannot be an Entity. What's a "being" and what ("being"?) decides that two "beings" are different is left in the dark. The only hint we get is that Entity is a kind of "being" which may be subject of a proposition and Attribute is a different kind of "being" which may be a predicate, but never a subject.

Now, as to HAVING Attributes: Entity appears to the Predicate Logic as an Aggregate-Container containing several Parts-Attributes. "My car" HAS the Attribute "Green" among thousands of other ones. Whatever "being" may mean, Entity appears to the Predicate Logic as some more general "being" composed of some less general "beings"-Attributes.

On the face of it, it seems acceptable, if not obvious, because we are accustomed to express ourselves in terms of the natural language which has been created and refined during millennia to express our "common sense". The linguistic construct "My car is Green" is interpreted by the "common sense" as "My car has the Property of being Green".

But "common sense", when misused, is the worst guide in science. Let's have a closer look at the construct "[Entity] is [Attribute]".

It's enough to look at our example "My car is green" to see the inversion and its nonsense. "Green" is clearly more general than "My car". It encompasses "My car" among trillions of "green entities" such as all green leaves of all trees, all strands of grass of all fields and meadows.

Thus "Green" is Aggregate and "My car" is its Part. As Aggregate "Green" becomes Entity and, finally: [Entity] "Green" encompasses [Entity] "My car".

Predicate Logic will argue that "Green", being an "Attribute" is a different kind of "being" than Entity and cannot be raised to the status of Entity.

This appears to us as a necessary and sufficient reason to refute the noumenalistic Predicate Logic and to embrace the Phenomenalistic view, for which Entity is a collection of Attributes and nothing else, for which a single Attribute is already a legitimate full blown Entity, for which, if all Attributes vanish, the Entity, being nothing more than their collection, vanishes on the same occasion.

Consequently, RD refutes Noumenalism in general and the Predicate Logic in particular, embracing without restriction the Phenomenalistic view, for which Entity "Green" encompasses unnumerable green Entities, including "My car".

Foundations of RD's Logic, Construct Theory (RD's substitute of Set Theory) and Semantics will be discussed in chapters "RD's Phenomenalistic Logic", "Foundations of Construct Theory" and "Foundations of RD Semantics". The present chapter lays their cornerstone by interpreting "My car is Green" as "(Entity) My car is (encompassed by Entity) Green", in sharp contradiction with the noumenalistic inversion "My car has the Property of being green".

This cornerstone is illustrated by the Figure below, which copies Structure 2 of Fig. 2 of the chapter "Reflection Spiral".

Let's note in particular following Relations among Entities: "colour" encompasses "white" and "black"; "white" encompasses "moon" and "other bodies" encompassing in turn "stars" and "planets"; "black" and "surface" encompass "sky", which is the proper logical map of the natural language proposition "sky is a black surface".


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