THE URGENCY OF THOUGHT:
THE ETHICAL DILEMMA OF A RESPECTFUL ENCOUNTER
WITH OTHERS:
A SPACE FOR DISCOURSE BETWEEN AFRICA AND
THE WEST. |
Dr.Mejame Ejede Charley
|
Philosophers from time immemorial, let alone
writers such as Heidegger, Levinas, Rousseau,
Freud, Sartre, Girard, Kant, Label, Edgar
Morin, Albert Camus, Luc Fery, Goethe, Vladimir
Jankelevitch, to name some of the better
known ones, have called attention to the
difficulties humans have in living together,
and have put forward multifarious explanations
to these difficulties. Yet, it is very baffling,
for the purpose of this paper, to account
for the position of each of them, but would
need to limit myself to those whose remedy
converge with the sapential function in African
thought, namely in its unexplorable linguistic
corpus. Notwithstanding, this paper would
also need to transcend this point of convergence.
It is noticeable that
in our contemporary world thought has created
an unspeakable fragmentation and has perpetuated
and engendered a mode of existing founded
on division. Hence a manifest duality in
fabricating conflict. It suffices to take
as an example Jean Paul Sartre, who appears,
in the 20th century, the theoretician of
the conflicting relations with others, describing
in ‘’Huis Clos”(No Exit) 1 the fundamentally conflicting nature of
human relations.
According to the existentialist
philosopher, "Hell is the others". As such everyone is the other's torturer,
whom he constantly antagonizes by endlessly
subjecting him to his judgment; by condemning
him as such to death by the sole fact that
he congeals him in his essence thus depriving
him of his existence. Now, as a response
to the agony reifying us, the only possible
response is nothing but reprisal. Hence the
inevitability of conflict between us.
By virtue of Sartre's conclusion
the essence of human relations is not community
but conflict. As far as Sartre is thus concerned
the fact that the other judges me and everyone
in such a way suggests he
hopes to exercise his power over the other,
conflict is imminent. He drew from this the
inference that conflict will in no circumstances
cease from existing among human beings.
"Homo homini lupus", Plautus' and Erasmus' formula, resumed
by Thomas Hobbes, marvellously illustrates
this hypothesis. If every being has as ambition
the domination of others, their appropriation
(to make an Anschluss out of them), it originally
holds, as Hobbes had observed, owing to the
equality of the potentialities of men. The
English Philosopher maintains that from this
equality of aptitudes ensues the hope of
attaining our ends. That is why if two men
desire the same thing whereas it is impossible
for both to appreciate, they become enemies;
In their pursuit of this end, they toil to
dominate or destroy each other. The similarity
of desire, therefore, seems to be a determinant
factor for conflict, engendering violence.
This tragic vision of human relations is
incontrovertibly in direct antithesis to
the optimistic vision of Philosophers like
Jean Jacque Rousseau,2 who looks at human
relations in the framework of sympathy.
His thesis: "man is theoretician of Sympathy" maintains that if sympathy is naturally
cultivated, would give birth to love and
friendship, considering that men are naturally
inclined to be good to one another. Thus
in his Discours sur L'origine et les fondements
de l'inegalite parmi les hommes (Discourse on the origin and foundations
of the inequality among men), he expresses his faith his rational faith
in the natural goodness of man, that would
incite him to do good with the less possible
evil to the other. The first dispositions
of men as such should be thus primitively
devoid of hostility, and if there is any
conflict, then it takes place owing to the
entry of men in society together. Clearly
speaking, sympathy appears a natural psychological
sentiment susceptible of uniting men together
without being in conflict against one another.
Behind Bergson's
thought
this vision of sympathy (the instinct
of
sympathy) is prevalent. It is therefore
admissible
that among our natural dispositions
with
regards to others, hostility or conflict
does not constitute the only envisageable
relation.
On the other hand another voice jars
against
this optimistic vision of human relations
going by the name of sympathy. If man
was
good as Rousseau, Bergson, among others,
claim, why should he necessarily be
asked
to love his neighbour?, argued the
Austrian
psychoanalyst, Sigmund Freud. Disapproving
thus of Rousseau's thesis, by showing
that
conflict is inevitable, man being,
as he
gives us to understand, naturally inclined
to harm his fellow human beings. The
carnage
and barbarism of the 20th century answering
to the names of war, genocide, as well
as
the conflict predominating up to date
seem
to confirm Freud's thesis. Accordingly,
the
ethics of our civilisation in total
peril.
We are thus summoned to ask ourselves
whether
other relations are envisionable and
whether
the conflict-relation predominating
up to
date does not constitute a major pathology.
It would be convenient to ask as to
which
attitude should be good and legitimate
to
adopt in our relations to others.
If, therefore the relation of sympathy
is
in the minority and systematic hostility
represents a great peril, what appropriate
attitude could be adopted to ameliorate
our
relations with others?
For us,
respect
seems to be the only suitable attitude
in
conformity with the need we all have.
Sympathy
and hostility are natural sentiments
of a
psychological nature. Respect is of
another
nature, being a moral sentiment of
an ethical
sort. It obliges us. Now the other
being
as me, a subject, endowed with a conscience
and self-awareness, I am held to treat
him
as such, without making out of him
an obstacle
in the satisfaction of interests foreign
to him. In all evidence, it is fundamentally
illegitimate in our wanting to subordinate
any of our fellows. The other not being
an
object, moral sentiment compels his
being
respected. Ethics, thus, requires a
profound
respect for the other.
Immanuel Kant,3 the great theoretician of
moral clearly recommends respect for the
other and this for two reasons: for he is
as me, free, conscious and worthy of respect
but equally, in the case of want of respect
for the other, I put my own identity of being
human in jeopardy. Works published by Kant
contain approximately 300 occurrences of
the term "Achtung" (respect), with approximately 40 occurrences
functioning with reference to a conceptual
network signified by the notions of "person",
"the dignity of humanity", "humanity",
"consideration for fellowman",
for "others". In addition to this
network are occurrences where there appears
the term "esteem" which we rightly
considers as being the equivalent of the
term "respect", in formulas such
as "man's esteem", "human
dignity". Also, Emmanuel Levinas' thought,4
(the contemporary philosopher, 1905-1995),
revolves around the mystery of the other.
For him relation is the alpha or the starting
point, to such a point that he writes: "in
the beginning was relation". This thought,
poetical though is profoundly philosophical.
In Emmanuel Levinas'
thought we find the occurrences of concepts
such as "respect", "relation",
"the other", "solidarity",
"and person"," encounter",
"love", "unity and diversity".
His thought therefore can be applied to contemporary
questions beyond the mystery of interpersonal
relation, such as the problem of racism,
the confrontation of cultures and of religions,
to name but these. Hence only ethics, according
to Emmanuel Levinas and Paul Ricoeur,5 is
the space for openness to the other. Concerning
the other, Levinas feels that ethics is a
necessary option. Thus the title of his work
"Totality and infinity" (Fr. Totalite and Infini, 1961) underlines the contradiction contained
in the understanding of the other within
a system. The sense of the other is that
he transcends my concepts and understanding,
whether it is a question of a vision of the
world, the movement of history or political
project. The other, according to Levinas,
is a "signification without context".
The other has his meaning by
himself, independently of the relations existing
between him and I and which makes us to fall
in the same context. We must not mistake
the other in a provisionary and relative
sense of which, in the final analysis, appropriable
by me and the other in the absolute sense
of that which has an unconditional meaning.
Levinas paradoxically finds in Descartes,
the appropriate notion: it is the idea of
infinity, this idea which only emanates from
me. Recognizing the other as other is not
to make out of him a concept but talk with
him, implying the acceptance of his right
on my discourse."To approach the other
in speech is to accommodate his expression
where at every moment the idea that would
carry a thought. It is therefore to welcome
the other beyond the capacity of the self;
which precisely signifies: to have the idea
of infinity. But that also means to be taught.
The rapport with the other or speech is a
non-allergic relation, an ethical relation,
but this welcome speech is a teaching. But
the teaching does not return to the maieutic
one. It comes from the exterior and brings
more to me than I contain. In its non-violent
transitivity there occurs the epiphany of
the face. Kant's and Levinas' approaches
join hands with the sapential function in
African thought; namely in its unexplorable
linguistic corpus. It is therefore worthwhile
to look closer, via linguistic analyses,
how we can define the sapential function
in African culture.
In Greek Philosophy, the (the sage) who has ended by becoming the
 (the philosopher) is the man who knows how
to utilize his intellectual faculties to
ask questions inherent in the presence of
man in the universe. The function of the
sophos is actually a function found in all
human societies. It is precisely what we
call here the sapential function. The originality
of ancient Greek society consists, among
other things, in the fact that this sapential
function, in the wake of sundry Sisyphean
labors including the political assassination
of Socrates, ended by imposing itself as
an autonomous intellectual discipline in
search of its own object and its own methodology
as Philosophy. Later on it succeeded to give
itself a name which became  but, even after two thousand years of history,
she has not succeeded to clearly define its
object nor succeeded to definitively define
her method. However, before the cultural
emergence of Greek antiquity, the sapential
function was in high esteem in Africa and
Egypt, raised to the cosmic throne under
the name of Maat or Tchaas.
Elsewhere in Africa it
carried different names. The Bantus called
it Bohlale. Hence the moral authority which every society
and human beings need in order to subsist
as read in the thought of Levinas and Kant
as we can also find in African culture is
what we call the sapential function in society.
Thus we find the African equivalence of "respect"
as we have just read in Kant and Levinas,
in the Kiluba language termed buleme, signifying: honour, veneration, respect,
esteem, deference, consideration, prestige,
celebrity, fame, dignity, influence. In Kiluba,
the verb Kulema first of all has the physical meaning of
: "to have weight, to carry weight,
to be weighty, heavy; to grow heavier, to
rely on as in expressions: -meso abalema: my eyes are heavy(from sleep); kiselwa kilema: the load is heavy; meza alema: the table is heavy. From this comes the
verbal substantive: bulemi meaning the heaviness or the weight of an
object: mwana kadi po na bulemi: the child
is not heavy; malemi abidi: two weights.
The verbal forms derived
from this are, among others: kulemena, meaning: to weigh on, to put charge on,
from whence expressions such as myanda imbi ilemena mu nda mwabo: bad actions weigh on the heart; kulemezya which signifies: to make something weigh
on, to make heavy, to overwhelm. Kulemenena which means: to grow stronger , to lean stronger
toward, to turn to, to go on one side: Muntu walemenea ku bulo: the man who leans entirely on his marriage.
The latter verbal form allows us to form
another norminal which is kilemenezi which has the same meaning as bulemi. In the figurative sense, the verb kulema (which can have kunema as regional variant) means: "to be
respectable, to be important, esteemed, considered,
influential; to merit respect" and which
expresses the opposite of kupela: to be careless, thoughtless; in the moral
sense: to count little, "to be disconsidered".
Hence we have the expression:
muntu nanshya ulemene namanyi: a man however respectable he may be. Avermaet relates thus the following saying: kyalemene kyapela: mushinzi kakupila ntambo:
mvungu le uba-kapula yo pi yo kolupila ntambo
mapi? What was esteemed can loss esteem: a squirrel
starts striking a lion, it is asked: you
squirrel from whence do you derive your strength
of striking a lion? The verbal form derivative
of kulemeka has a moral meaning: to respect, to honour,
to venerate, to have deference, to have consideration,
appreciate, to be polite, which makes the
nominal derived mulemeki signify a respectable man. We also have
the verbal substantive bulemeki meaning the act of honouring, the act of
respecting. Also, the verbal forms directly
derived from kulemeka all have a moral meaning such as the reflexive
kwilemeka meaning: to make oneself respected;-the
applicative kulemekela or kulemekena meaning: to venerate, to honour as in the
sentence: kamulemekele po: he has not respected him/her; the passive
kulemekwa: to be venerated, to be respected; that
does not provide us with another nominal: mulemekelo which means: the way of venerating, the
way of honouring.
There exists an adjective
of the same root: -leme which is used to mean "something of
value, something of weight, something worthy
of consideration, something considerable.
So it is said: muntu muleme: a respected person, a person venerated,
a respectable person.(Bantu) baleme ne bapele: the big and small (those worthy of consideration
and those who are not). Also, konakunya buleme bwa mukwenu, to ruin the honor of your neighbour or fellow
man, buleme bwa Iwimu: respectable salutations or greetings. The
Kiluba language always constructs a nominal
substantive on the same root: kalemo, meaning: respect, veneration, deference,
politeness, civility, affinity, manners,
propriety. Respectability, decorum, respectability
as in the sentence: muntu wa kalemo: a polite, distinguished person, full of
civility); dizina dya kalemo: the name give to through respect, decent term,
polite (to avoid or evade or coarse, offensive,
indecent expressions as Avermaet comments).
This substantive can also be used as an adjective
under the form of a kalemo: "respectful, courteous, polite"
or as an adverb in the form of: na kalemo: "with politeness, politely, respectfully".
The genius of the Kiluba language allows
the formation of the substantive in the germinate
form: kalemeleme, respectful manners in opposition to kapelepele referring to the contrary or the lack or
want of respect, the want of good manners.
The acme of the Kiluba conceptual
construction is thus found in the syntagm:
mulemantu which has a plural: balemantu, referring to a person who respects himself/herself,
thus in turn making himself or herself respected,
because he or she is a wise or virtuous person,
faults free, wise, prudent, pleasant, welcoming,
respected, venerated. Therefore there is
a sort of social ideology from the bulemantu bwabuntu, the true dignity of man, the true grandeur
of man, giving him the right to respect,
wisdom, kindness, affability, cordiality
etc., well expressed in Kiluba, which could
also be found in all African cultures, with
other words on condition that we labour to
look for it. It is this ideology which expresses
best what I term the sapential function in
African culture, and is also expressed in
the thought of the world's major thinkers.
Beyond the Bantuphone zone, we have one of
the languages situated in the Southern continent
of Africa, the Sesotho or the language of
the Basothos.
We notice that they have a
word called bohlale which linguists have first of all translated
as substantive: "wisdom, knowledge,
erudition, learning; discernment, judgment,
sagacity, prudence; light; cunning, sharpness"
and as an adjective: wise, clever, cunning.
Their language has constructed a series of
verbs and other substantives from such as
we can see from the following examples. The
Sesotho substantive: bohlale which has as plural mathale, meaning: wisdom, knowledge, erudition;
discernment, judgment, sagacity, prudence;
light, sharpness, cunning as we have just
observed. The root -hlale also serves to form something active and
substantive which respectively signifies:
prudent, intelligent, sharp and wise man,
the wise, magician, the same as nthale and kgwale referring to a smart, shrewd or cunning person
who succeeds to draw from a matter. Mahlale-hlele also seems to refer to a cunning, crafty,
sly, or wily person.
The verb ho hlalefa which seems be derivative from the substantive
bohlale, signifies: to become wise, to be cultured,
to be civilized, to be intelligent; to be
informed. Without any further ado, I would
like to hit on the substantives that is of
interest to this paper: ho hlalefelana: to be wise one another, to mutually understand
each other; hlalefisa: to render wise, to render intelligent,
to instruct; ho hlalefisana: to mutually render wise, to teach one another.
The verb ho hlalosa: explain, whose reflexive is ho itlhalosa: to make oneself clear; to explain who we
are. Also produces a series of nominals and
the following verbals: mohlalosi, he who explains; bohlalosi, the way of he who explains or makes remarks.
Mohlaloso, the way of explaining. Tlhaloso, hlaloso, explanation, commentary. Hlaloseha (ehile), to be clear. Hlalosetsa(ditse), to explain to. Mohlalotsetsi, he who explains to. Mohlaloseso, explanation, instruction, commentary. Hlalosetsana, to explain to each other. Tlhalosetsano, hlalosetsana, mutual explanation.Hlalosisa, explain well; to define. Hlalosiso, definition.
In front of such conceptual
richness, we only have a confusion of choice.
I do not know what the Bantu and Basotho
thinkers have done so far in rendering the
same ethical concepts as read in Kant's and
Emmanuel Levinas' ethics to take humanity
out of really difficult situations and also
out of the traps that men stupidly lay on
one another in their daily existence. On
the other hand, I find that kulemeka (respect, venerate, deference, consideration,
esteem, appreciation), Kalemo (respect, veneration, civility), ho hlalefelana (mutual understanding etc.), hlalosetsana (to explain to each other), ho hlalefisana (to teach one another), tlhalefisano, hlalefisano (mutual teaching) etc., are perfectly convenient
for the ethics of respect, especially on
the framework of communication giving way
to an exchange of point of views, implicitly
supposing dialogue and collective consultation
instead of resorting to violence. To acknowledge
the other as other, according to Emmanuel
Levinas', is not a matter of conceptualizing
him, but a matter of speaking with him, but
in speaking with him, one does not only have
an idea of infinity but one is also taught
in the process. In our contemporary world,
the other is regarded as being responsible
for economic difficulties, natural calamities,
and the enemy. Hence, Jews are only to be
parked for "final solution", there
is nothing else but track down Armenians
and Croatians; nothing else but to take out
knives and matchets to chase away the "Tutsis".
In technical terms is what we call the practice
leading to genocide.
Confrontations between
cultures escalate before us today in violent
conflicts. Since the attack on world trade
center of September 11, 2001, we are aware
that cultural rivalry can be utilized as
a justification for terrorism. Thus, duality
has necessitated the fabrication of conflict:
the big Satan of the western world/Moslem
people, a duality based on cultural identity.
If there is a painful question in our present
world, it is that of conflicts between cultures
and ethnic conflicts. Since the fall of the
Berlin wall and the demise of communism the
crux of conflicts have changed their nature,
turning out to be less ideological and have
become more of protest campaigns as to defending
the interests of different cultural communities.
At the root of these
conflicts, there is a claim of a cultural
identity. This identity appears as a watermark
in all the vocabulary we use today. Terms
such as:"the Kurdish people", "the
Palestinian people", "the Jewish
people", "the patriotic American
sentiment", to name but a few, supposing
the acknowledgment of a sort of identity.
The problem is, this identity is not perceived
as a natural component of diversity, yet
becoming a conflictual aggregation.
The problem resulting
only from the fragmentation where the mind
persists, from the fragmentation of my personality,
and from social fragmentation resulting from
division. From the moment in which I pose
my identity in an objective way in the form
of historical, political, religious, and
linguistic definitions, the problem already
poses itself as to know how to reconcile
this multiplicity in me.
At any rate, whether we want
it or not, humanity has entered a multicultural
era, the whole question is to know how we
will arrive at pacifying the relation between
different cultures. But thinkers including
philosophers, ethnologist, anthroplogists,
linguists, etc. have proposed different solutions
to human conflicts, which, thanks to limited
space, I cannot enumerate here. Levinas sees
the solution of this problem in ethics and
parole. He suggests to us that the relation
to the other or thinking is ethical. Suggesting
to us that we should never forsake or jilt
the thread of speech for the recognition
of the other as other. If speech is indeed
a discursive act aimed at intercomprehension,
necessarily involves an ethical recognition
of the other.
Philosophy of language
has developed much in the 20th century and,
in this development ("linguistic turn"),
the relational aspect of language was well
taken into consideration. On the one hand,
it was realised that speaking is not only
to express a content (semantic) but also
a speech act (performative) by which we engage
in such and such a way, according to such
and such rule of the game, vis a vis real
or potential partners (cf. American philosophers
C.S. Peirce and J.R.Searle and the British
philosophers L.Wittgenstein and J.L. Austin).
On the other hand, we realised that speaking
is using an instituted language and belonging
to a cultural community, that is to say,
participating in a pre-comprehension of the
world shared with others (cf. German Philosophers
M. Heidegger and G. Gadamer). But again there
is more in speech, as underlined, in the
wake of "linguistic turn", by recent
German Philosophers K.O Apel and J. Habermas.
The act of communication
itself contains the foundation of the ethical
recognition of speakers and, simultaneously,
a fundamental universal norm. Because, it
should be a real performative contradiction,
that is to say, a contradiction in the exercise
itself which we pose, rather than claiming
on the one hand to the validity of what we
are engaged in saying in a serious discussion
(claim to truth if it is a question of a
theoretical discussion, claim to justice
if it is a question of political or moral
discussion) and, on the other hand, to back
up one's words on intimidation, exclusion
and violence. Discussing really supposes,
at least in principle, renouncing such means
which not being arguments or polemics, can
no doubt influence but certainly not convincing.
There is a fortiori, strictly speaking, an ethics of discussion
(Diskursethik). Discussion presupposes the acceptance of
an absolute, categorical imperative: equality
of the rights of every speaker, present or
potential, and his equal co-responsibility
in the search for a solution about which
we are talking. This presupposition, as Apel
notably specifies, is pragmatic (otherwise
said related to the act of claiming to something
in a discussion) and transcendental (that
is a priori necessary condition of validity).
The obligation of respect of the speaker
is contained in speech as such whereas, in
facts, it happens to us to fail in this respect
when we talk in a strategic way, that is
by exerting pressures more or less acknowledged
in the simple aim of manipulating our speaker.
It remains, even in this case, necessary
for us at least to pretend from time to time,
to intend communicating really and not to
recourse to other means than the valuing
our arguments (this should be in a sort of
way if we go back to the word of La Rochefoucald,
of vice to virtue).
However, the solution
of ethical and linguistic philosophers to
our contemporary problem pregnant with conflict
is really a chimera for they themselves,
at least, misunderstand the nature of the
functioning of the ego, the innermost recess
and singularity of the speaker, the strategy
of the ego is that he is his own raison d'etre
alone, the raison d'etre of separation, the
raison d'etre of cultural conflicts, the
raison d'etre of the aversion for the other,
the raison d'etre of the incapacity to see
the other in oneself in an infinitely broader
consciousness. Other thinkers and writers
have suggested other solutions. Theoretical
intellect has produced the mental concept
of tolerance, without burrowing beneath the
surface of the problem. Francois- Marie Arouet,6
called Voltaire termed tolerance as
the privilege of humanity and that we are
all moulded with weaknesses and errors; that
we should reciprocally forgive our follies,
this being the first law of nature. Plus,
according to Wolfgang Goethe,7 tolerance
only ought to be a transitory state. It must
lead to respect. But it remains difficult
to bring down tolerance at the practical
level where the master ego rules with its
sense of division and separation.
Going beyond cultural
separations is not the fruit of a theory,
but a question of the openness of the heart,
the openness of consciousness, and above
all of a vision of unity. Hampate Ba, the
African writer, who has rethought for us
the tradition of his people, the Bambaras,
in an ideal way. In his symposium on the
notion of the person in black Africa in 1971
[8] and in his communication of 1972 [9]
during the symposium on African religions,
organized by C.N.R.S,, tells us the creator
of the universe, Maa Naala, according to the Bambara people, by intending
to perfect his work, created man as a spark,
emanating from himself. He named him maa as part of his own name while he confined
the secret of the universe to number two;
he kept his own name in number one, he confided
to maa (man) the secret of the universe of the
transformation of matter as well as the word
(Kuma) as a means of communication. Work and the
word are infallible signs of the presence
of the spirit. While work ensures the material
survival of the community, the word or parole
ensures its survival.
According to the writer, the
tradition considers the human body as a reproduction
in miniature of the earth, and by extension,
the entire universe. In this sense, the vision
of man is situated with unity. In the consciousness
of unity, the sense of the ego completely
disappears. There is no "me", "my"
as in the sense of "my culture",
etc.
The sense of mine is
extended to the dimensions of the universe,
in such a way that the self contemplates
the self. It is a vision of unity which,
accordingly, is evoked in the existence of
all things. According to the genuine thinker,
Luc Ferry,[10] speaking about openness to
singularities, it is a question of an invitation
for us to be opened to what is universal
in others. He gives us to understand his
suggestion by evoking the great works of
humanity, works belonging to all cultures,
to all singular epochs, but though singular,
have something universal in them, which render
them precious before us.
Tolerance is inexact,
for the word itself already supposes separation,
a fact we immediately feel in the presence
of difference which we must toil to accept
for better or for worse. That is why, according
Edgar Morin, we are in the prehistory of
the human mind, meaning that the human mental
capacities are still under-exploited, especially
at the level of our relations with others.
If the consciousness of unity prevails, where
is "difference"? Ergo, where is
the necessity for the mental rule of respect
called "tolerance"? The intimate
sense of One, of the presence of the self
is everywhere and diversity is an echo that
refracts one to infinity. We can only talk
about tolerance solely from the mental point
of view for which diversity is reified. From
the moment in which duality stays in the
mental, there is I/the other. There is I
(Black African, Jew, Arab, Christian, Moslem,
American, etc.) and the other (black African,
Christian, Jew, Arab, Moslem, American etc.).As
far as I situate myself in duality, as far
as I am difference- -intoxicated, I lose the entire view of unity. I think in division,
in fragmentation and it is from there that
the necessity for tolerance imposes itself.
Let us go farther than ordinary thinking;
farther than ordinary vigilance. That is
called lucidity. If you look at your wife,
your husband, your friend without any image,
an entirely different relation establishes
itself; then thought has nothing to do with
it and there is a possibility for love.
It is exactly the
same
problem concerning a stranger, the
other,
he who belongs to a different culture.
It
is a question of duality that thought
brings
about here: we/the others, my culture/their
culture, my national identity/their
national
identity etc. If I am intensely present,
passionately attentive, relation is
always
lively and new. And in this passion,
compassion
can be born and love takes its course.
For
there exist from now a communion, then
communication
becomes possible. Otherwise, communication
is only an illusion or a deception.
How do you intend to
communicate when everyone retains his own
image of the other? A Jew cannot communicate
with a Palestinian, A Serb cannot communicate
with a Croatian, an American cannot communicate
with an Arab etc. How could communication
take place when cleavages among men still
exist? Let the image fall, or better let
it not appear, for then communion exists.
And when communion is there, communication
is warm and spontaneous. No longer any barriers.
No more cleavage. It supposes a great humility.
This means throwing away every fictitious
identity laboriously constructed by the ego.
Accept the extreme denouement of being a
human being, close to a human being. Accept
being vulnerable, accept being sensitive,
accept knowing nothing, not intending to
impose anything, accept being there to listen.
Accept hearing the happening that is also
mine, but which I have never heard. Accept
welcoming and recognizing in me the whole
humanity and say yes to what it is. Never
to stick to verbal communication between
myself and the other. There exist a level
more profound where it is not a question
of a simple verbal communication, but of
a communion or with the same intensity, with
the same passion; then we only talk about
communion, a thing more important than a
simple verbal hearing.
Only love can see unity
in diversity, the intellect is incapable
of attaining it. The intellect will always
lay emphasis on diversity than unity. The
intellectual attempts to encourage tolerance
have a great value. It is necessary that
we teach the richness of cultural diversity
more and more. But it is not evident that
that will suffice to solve the problem at
its roots that is at the root of the human
mind.
Nowadays, the situation is critical, we see
the diversity of cultures, we continue to
sustain division and we are all taken aback
that it degenerates into conflict. The damages
are there and the ideal is yet to descend
on the real. Without man. Without you, without
me, there will be no differences. A fortiori, a plea not to incite differences.
Au bout du compte, a last poetic theorem: the future universal
democracy will have as its fundamental law:
unity in diversity and diversity in unity.
References.
1 Sartre, Huis Clos. (Sartre's play) The inner logic of human
relation is conflict not community. This
conflictual nature of human relation is also
implicit in Sartre's philosophical work, L'Etre et le Neant (translated in English as Being and Nothingness.)
2 Rousseau. Le Discours sur l'origine et les fondements
de l'inegalite parmis les hommes presente
par Rousseau au concours de l'Academie de
Dijon en 1755.
His thesis: “man is born good, society corrupts him". Based
on social inequality. The axial point
of
his reflection in the text: the man's
behaviour
in the state of nature. The question
treated
is: what is the spontaneous attitude
of man
in relation to his fellows? Is it wickedness?
His obvious answer is man repudiates
doing
evil in the presence of evil, he is
inclined
to pity. His arguments being, it is
pity
that leads us without reflection to
help
those we see suffering.
3 cf. Kant.Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, 1785; Kritik de Praktischen Vernunft, 1783; Kritik der Urteilskraft. 1790; Die Religion
innerhabl der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, 1793; Die Metaphysik der Sitten, 1797. In these works, Kant treats topics such
as respect for the law, respect for person;
respect as sentiment of the dignity of human
nature; law and duty; law, duty, respect.
4 Levinas. Totalité et infini, 1961, La Haye: Martin Nijhoff, p. 12; p. 22.
5 P. Ricoeur. Sympathie et respect, Phénoménonlogie et
éthique de la seconde personne, Revue de
la métaphysique et de morale, oct.-dec. 1954.
6 François-Marie Arouet, dit Voltaire, 1694-1778.
7 Wolfgang Goethe, 1749-1832.
8 Colloques Internationaux du C.N.R.S: la notion
de personne en Afrique noire, Paris 11-17 Edit. Du C.N.R.S, Paris 1971,
p. 181-192.
9 Colloques sur les religions traditionnelles
africaines comme sources de valeurs de civilisation,
1972. Ibid. la notion de personne en Afrique, p.187.
10 Luc Ferry. Qu’est-ce q’une vie réussie? Ch.V. The humanism of the man-God. Life as a life
in harmony with the human condition.Ch.11.A New approach to the question of happiness
pp. 471-482. Ibid. Openness to the other,
in what is unique and at the same time universal, pp. 474-476.
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