STUDIES IN THE HEGELIAN DIALECTIC
PREFACE
THE first four chapters of this book are
based on a dissertation submitted at the
Fellowship Examination of Trinity College,
Cambridge, in 1891. The fourth and fifth
chapters, nearly in their present form, were
published in Mind (New Series, Nos. 1, 2,
8, and 10). A part of the second chapter
appeared in the Revue de Métaphysique et
de Morale for November 1893. In quoting from
the Smaller Logic and the Philosophy of Spirit,
I have generally availed myself of Professor
Wallace's valuable translations. I am most
deeply indebted to Professor J. S. Mackenzie,
of University College, Cardiff, for his kindness
in reading the proof-sheets of these Studies,
and in assisting me with many most helpful
suggestions and corrections.
CHAPTER I: THE GENERAL NATURE OF THE DIALECTIC
1. HEGEL'S primary object in his dialectic
is to establish the existence of a logical
connection between the various categories
which are involved in the constitution of
experience. He teaches that this connection
is of such a kind that any category, if scrutinised
with sufficient care and attention, is found
to lead on to another, and to involve it,
in such a manner that an attempt to use the
first of any subject while we refuse to use
the second of the same subject results in
a contradiction. The category thus reached
leads on in a similar way to a third, and
the process continues until at last we reach
the goal of the dialectic in a category which
betrays no instability. If we examine the
process in more detail, we shall find that
it advances, not directly, but by moving
from side to side, like a ship tacking against
an unfavourable wind. The simplest and best
known form of this advance, as it is to be
found in the earlier transitions of the logic,
is as follows. The examination of a certain
category leads us to the conclusion that,
if we predicate it of any subject, we are
compelled by consistency to predicate of
the same subject the logical contrary of
that category. This brings us to an absurdity,
since the predication of two contrary attributes
of the same thing at the same time violates
the law of contradiction. On examining the
two contrary predicates further, they are
seen to be capable of reconciliation in a
higher category, which combines the contents
of both of them, not merely placed side by
side, but absorbed into a wider idea, as
moments or aspects of which they can exist
without contradiction. This idea of the synthesis
of opposites is perhaps the most characteristic
in the whole of Hegel's system. It is certainly
one of the most difficult to explain. Indeed
the only way of grasping what Hegel meant
by it is to observe in detail how he uses
it, and in what manner the lower categories
are partly altered and partly preserved in
the higher one, so that, while their opposition
vanishes, the significance of both is nevertheless
to be found in the unity which follows. Since
in this way, and in this way only so far
as we can see, two contrary categories can
be simultaneously true of a subject, and
since we must hold these two to be simultaneously
true, we arrive at the conclusion that whenever
we use the first category we shall be forced
on to use the third, since by it alone can
the contradictions be removed, in which we
should otherwise be involved. This third
category, however, when it in its turn is
viewed as a single unity, similarly discloses
that its predication involves that of its
contrary, and the Thesis and Antithesis thus
opposed have again to be resolved in a Synthesis.
Nor can we rest anywhere in this alternate
production and removal of contradictions
until we reach the end of the ladder of categories.
It begins with the category of Pure Being,
the simplest idea of the human mind. It ends
with the category which Hegel declares to
be the highest--the Idea which recognises
itself in all things.
2. It must be remarked that the type of transition,
which we have just sketched, is one which
is modified as the dialectic advances. It
is only natural, in a system in which matter
and form are so closely connected, that the
gradual changes of the matter, which forms
the content of the system, should react on
the nature of the movement by which the changes
take place. Even when we deal with physical
action and reaction we find this true. All
tools are affected, each time they are used,
so as to change, more or less, their manner
of working in the future. It is not surprising,
therefore, that so delicate a tool as that
which is used by thought should not remain
unchanged among changing materials. "The
abstract form of the continuation or advance"
says Hegel "is, in Being, an other (or
antithesis) and transition into another;
in the Essence, showing or reflection in
its opposite; in the Notion, the distinction
of the individual from the universality,
which continues itself as such into, and
is as an identity with, what is distinguished
from it."<Note: Encyclopaedia, Section
240. This indicates a gradual increase in
the directness of the advance, and a diminished
importance of the movement from contrary
to contrary. But this point, which Hegel
leaves undeveloped, will require further
consideration.<Note: Chap. IV.
3. The ground of the necessity which the
dialectic process claims cannot, it is evident,
lie merely in the category from which we
start. For in that case the conclusion of
the process could, if it were valid, have
no greater content than was contained in
the starting point. All that can be done
with a single premise is to analyse it, and
the mere analysis of an idea could never
lead us necessarily onwards to any other
idea incompatible with it, and therefore
could never lead us to its contrary. But
the dialectic claims to proceed from the
lower to the higher, and it claims to add
to our knowledge, and not merely to expound
it. At the same time it asserts that no premise
other than the validity of the lower category
is requisite to enable us to affirm the validity
of the higher. The solution of this difficulty,
which has been the ground of many attacks
on Hegel, lies in the fact that the dialectic
must be looked on as a process, not of construction
but of reconstruction. If the lower categories
lead on to the higher, and these to the highest,
the reason is that the lower categories have
no independent existence, but are only abstractions
from the highest. It is this alone which
is independent and real. In it all one-sidedness
has been destroyed by the successive reconciliation
of opposites. It is thus the completely concrete,
and for Hegel the real is always the concrete.
Moreover, according to Hegel, the real is
always the completely rational. ("The
consummation of the infinite aim . . . consists
merely in removing the illusion which makes
it seem as yet unaccomplished."<Note:
Enc. Section 212, lecture note.) Now no category
except the highest can be completely rational,
since every lower one involves its contrary.
The Absolute Idea is present to us in all
reality, in all the phenomena of experience,
and in our own selves. Everywhere it is the
soul of all reality. But although it is always
present to us, it is not always explicitly
present. In the content of consciousness
it is present implicitly. But we do not always
attempt to unravel that content, nor are
our attempts always successful. Very often
all that is explicitly before our minds is
some finite and incomplete category. When
this is so, the dialectic process can begin,
and indeed must begin, if we are sufficiently
acute and attentive,--because the ideal which
is latent in the nature of all experience,
and of the mind itself, forbids us to rest
content with the inadequate category. The
incomplete reality before the mind is inevitably
measured against the complete reality of
the mind itself, and it is in this process
that it betrays its incompleteness, and demands
its contrary to supplement its one-sidedness.
"Before the mind there is a single conception,
but the whole mind itself, which does not
appear, engages in the process, operates
on the datum, and produces the result."<Note:
Bradley's Logic, Book III. Part 1. Chap.
2, Section 20.
4. The dialectic process is not a mere addition
to the conception before us of one casually
selected moment after another, but obeys
a definite law. The reason of this is that
at any point the finite category explicitly
before us stands in a definite relation to
the complete and absolute idea which is implicit
in our consciousness. Any category, except
the most abstract of all, can be analysed,
according to Hegel, into two others, which
in the unity of the higher truth were reconciled,
but which, when separated, stand in opposition
to each other as contraries. If abstraction
consists in this separation, then, when we
are using the most abstract of the categories,
we fall short of the truth, because one side
of the completely concrete truth has been
taken in abstraction, and from that relatively
concrete truth again one side has been abstracted,
and so on, until the greatest abstraction
possible has been reached. It must therefore
cause unrest in the mind which implicitly
contains the concrete whole from which it
was abstracted. And through this unrest the
imperfection will be removed in the manner
described above, that is, by affirming, in
the first place, that contrary category,
the removal of which had been the last stage
of the abstraction, then by restoring the
whole in which those two opposites had been
reconciled, and so on. Thus the first and
deepest cause of the dialectic movement is
the instability of all finite categories,
due to their imperfect nature. The immediate
result of this instability is the production
of contradictions. For, as we have already
seen, since the imperfect category endeavours
to return to the more concrete unity of which
it is one side, it is found to involve the
other side of that unity, which is its own
contrary. And, again, to the existence of
the contradiction we owe the advance of the
dialectic. For it is the contradiction involved
in the impossibility of predicating a category
without predicating its opposite which causes
us to abandon that category as inadequate.
We are driven on first to its antithesis.
And when we find that this involves the predication
of the thesis, as much as this latter had
involved the predication of the antithesis,
the impossibility of escaping from contradictions
in either extreme drives us to remove them
by combining both extremes in a synthesis
which transcends them.
5. It has been asserted that Hegel sometimes
declares the contradictions to be the cause
of the dialectic movement, and sometimes
to be the effect of that movement. This is
maintained by Hartmann.<Note: Ueber die
dialektische Methode, B. II. 3. No doubt
the contradictions are considered as the
immediate cause of the movement. But the
only evidence which Hartmann gives for supposing
that they are also held to be the effect,
is a quotation from the second volume of
the Logic. In this, speaking of that finite
activity of thought which he calls Vorstellung,
Hegel says that it has the contradictions
as part of its content, but is not conscious
of this, because it does not contain "das
Uebergehen, welches das Wesentliche ist,
und den Widerspruch enthält."<Note:
Logic, Vol. II. p. 71. Now all that this
implies seems to be that the contradictions
first become manifest in the movement, which
is not at all identical with the assertion
that they are caused by it, and is quite
compatible with the counter-assertion that
it is caused by them. Moreover, Hartmann
also gives the same account of the origin
of the contradictions which I have suggested
above. He says "Der (im Hegel'schen
Geiste) tiefer liegende Grund der Erscheinung
ist aber die Flüssigkeit des Begriffes selbst."<Note:
Op. cit. B. II. 3. Flüssigkeit is certainly
not equivalent to movement, and may fairly
be translated instability. There is then
no inconsistency. It is quite possible that
the instability of the notion may be the
cause of the contradictions, and that the
contradictions again may be the cause of
the actual motion. Hartmann does not, apparently,
see that there is any change in his position
when he gives first instability and then
motion as the cause of the contradictions,
and it is this confusion on his own part
which causes him to accuse Hegel of inconsistency.
He endeavours to account for Hegel's supposed
error by saying that the contradictions were
given as the cause of the dialectic movement
when Hegel desired to show the subjective
action of the individual mind, while the
dialectic movement was given as the cause
of the contradictions when he wished to represent
the process as objective. If, as I have endeavoured
to show, there is no reason for supposing
that Hegel ever did hold the dialectic movement
to be the cause of the contradictions, there
will be no further necessity for this theory.
But it may be well to remark that it involves
a false conception of the meaning in which
it is possible to apply the term objective
to the dialectic at all.
6. There is a sense of the word objective
in which it may be correctly said that the
dependence of the contradictions on the instability
of the notion is more objective than the
dependence of the dialectic movement on the
contradictions. For the former is present
in all thought, which is not the case with
the latter. A contradiction can be said to
be present in thought, when it is implied
in it, even though it is not clearly seen.
But it can only cause the dialectic movement,
when it is clearly seen. Whenever a finite
category is used it is abstract, and consequently
unstable, and, implicitly at least, involves
its contrary, though this may not be perceived,
and, indeed, in ordinary thought is not perceived.
On the other hand, the actual dialectic movement
does not take place whenever a category is
used, for in that case finite thought would
not exist at all. It is only when the contradictions
are perceived, when they are recognised as
incompatible, in their unreconciled form,
with truth, and when the synthesis which
can reconcile them has been discovered, that
the dialectic process is before us. The contradiction
has therefore more objectivity, in one sense
of the word, because it is more inevitable
and less dependent on particular and contingent
circumstances. But we are not entitled to
draw the sort of distinction between them
which Hartmann makes, and to say that while
the one is only an action of the thinking
subject, the other is based on the nature
of things independently of the subject who
thinks them. Both relations are objective
in the sense that they are universal, and
have validity as a description of the nature
of reality. Neither is objective in the sense
that it takes place otherwise than in thought.
We shall have to consider this point in detail
later:<Note: Chap. V. at present we can
only say that, though the dialectic process
is a valid description of reality, reality
itself is not, in its truest nature, a process
but a stable and timeless state. Hegel says
indeed that reason is to be found in actual
existence, but it is reason in its complete
and concrete shape, under the highest and
absolute form of the notion, and not travelling
up from category to category. Till the highest
is reached, all the results are expressly
termed abstract, and do not, therefore, come
up to the level of reality. Moreover they
contain unsynthesised contradictions, and
that which is contradictory, though it may
have a certain relative truth, can never
exist independently, as would be the case
if it existed in the world of fact. The dialectic
movement is indeed a guide to that world,
since the highest category, under which alone
reality can be construed, contains all the
lower categories as moments, but the gradual
passage from one stage of the notion to another,
during which the highest yet reached is for
the moment regarded as independent and substantial,
is an inadequate expression of the truth.
7. This is not incompatible with the admission
that various isolated phenomena, considered
as phenomena and as isolated, are imperfect,
for in considering them in this way we do
not consider them as they really are. Hegel
speaks of the untruth of an external object
as consisting in the disagreement between
the objective notion, and the object.<Note:
Enc. Section
24, lecture note. From this it might be inferred
that even in the world of real objects there
existed imperfections and contradictions.
But, on looking more closely, we see that
the imperfection and contradiction are really,
according to Hegel, due only to our manner
of contemplating the object. A particular
thing may or may not correspond to the notion.
But the universe is not merely an aggregation
of particular things, but a system in which
they are connected, and a thing which in
itself is imperfect and irrational may be
a part of a perfect and rational universe.
Its imperfection was artificial, caused by
our regarding it, in an artificial and unreal
abstraction, as if it could exist apart from
other things. A diseased body, for example,
is in an untrue state, if we merely regard
it by itself, since it is obviously failing
to fulfil the ideal of a body. But if we
look at it in connection with the intellectual
and spiritual life of its occupant, the bodily
imperfection might in some cases be seen,
without going further, to be a part in a
rational whole. And, taking the universe
as a whole, Hegel declares "God alone
exhibits a real agreement of the notion and
the reality. All finite things involve an
untruth." God, however, is held by Hegel
to be the reality which underlies all finite
things. It is therefore only when looked
at as finite that they involve an untruth.
Looked at sub specie Dei they are true. The
untruth is therefore in our manner of apprehending
them only. It would indeed, as Hartmann remarks,
be senseless tautology for Hegel to talk
of the objective truth of the world. But
this Hegel does not do. It is in the nature
of the world as a whole that it must be objectively
true.<Note: Cp. Enc. Section 212, quoted
in section 3 above. But isolated fragments
of the world, just because they are isolated,
cannot fully agree with the notion, and may
or may not agree with a particular aspect
of it. According as they do or do not do
this Hegel calls them true or false. Hegel's
theory that the world as a whole must be
objectively true, so rational, and therefore,
as he would continue, perfect, comes no doubt
in rather rude contact with some of the facts
of life. The consideration of this must for
the present be deferred.<Note: Chap. V.
8. We have seen that the motive power of
the dialectic lies in the relation of the
abstract idea explicitly before the mind
to the concrete idea implicitly before it
in all experience and all consciousness.
This will enable us to determine the relation
in which the ideas of contradiction and negation
stand to the dialectic. It is sometimes supposed
that the Hegelian logic rests on a defiance
of the law of contradiction. That law says
that whatever is A can never at the same
time be not-A. But the dialectic asserts
that, when A is any category, except the
Absolute Idea, whatever is A may be, and
indeed must be, not-A also. Now if the law
of contradiction is rejected, argument becomes
impossible. It is impossible to refute any
proposition without the help of this law.
The refutation can only take place by the
establishment of another proposition incompatible
with the first. But if we are to regard the
simultaneous assertion of two contradictories,
not as a mark of error, but as an indication
of truth, we shall find it impossible to
disprove any proposition at all. Nothing,
however, can ever claim to be considered
as true, which could never be refuted, even
if it were false. And indeed it is impossible,
as Hegel himself has pointed out to us, even
to assert anything without involving the
law of contradiction, for every positive
assertion has meaning only in so far as it
is defined, and therefore negative. If the
statement All men are mortal, for example,
did not exclude the statement Some men are
immortal, it would be meaningless. And it
only excludes it by virtue of the law of
contradiction. If then the dialectic rejected
the law of contradiction, it would reduce
itself to an absurdity, by rendering all
argument, and even all assertion, unmeaning.
The dialectic, however, does not reject that
law. An unresolved contradiction is, for
Hegel as for every one else, a sign of error.
The relation of the thesis and antithesis
derives its whole meaning from the synthesis,
which follows them, and in which the contradiction
ceases to exist as such. "Contradiction
is not the end of the matter, but cancels
itself."<Note: Enc. Section 119,
lecture note. An unreconciled predication
of two contrary categories, for instance
Being and not-Being, of the same thing, would
lead in the dialectic, as it would lead elsewhere,
to scepticism, if it was not for the reconciliation
in Becoming. The synthesis alone has reality,
and its elements derive such importance as
they have from being, in so far as their
truth goes, members of a unity in which their
opposition is overcome. In fact, so far is
the dialectic from denying the law of contradiction,
that it is especially based on it. The contradictions
are the cause of the dialectic process. But
they can only be this if they are received
as marks of error. We are obliged to say
that we find the truth of Being and not-Being
in Becoming, and in Becoming only, because,
if we endeavour to take them in their independence,
and not as synthesised, we find an unreconciled
contradiction. But why should we not find
an unreconciled contradiction and acquiesce
in it without going further, except for the
law that two contradictory propositions about
the same subject are a sign of error? Truth
consists, not of contradictions, but of moments
which, if separated, would be contradictions,
but which in their synthesis are reconciled
and consistent.
9. It follows also from this view of the
paramount importance of the synthesis in
the dialectic process that the place of negation
in that process is only secondary. The really
fundamental aspect of the dialectic is not
the tendency of the finite category to negate
itself but to complete itself. Since the
various relatively perfect and concrete categories
are, according to Hegel, made up each of
two moments or aspects which stand to one
another in the relation of contrary ideas,
it follows that one characteristic of the
process will be the passage from an idea
to its contrary. But this is not due, as
has occasionally been supposed, to an inherent
tendency in all finite categories to affirm
their own negation as such. It is due to
their inherent tendency to affirm their own
complement. It is indeed, according to Hegel,
no empirical and contingent fact, but an
absolute and necessary law, that their complement
is in some degree their negation. But the
one category passes into the other, because
the second completes the meaning of the first,
not because it denies it. This, however,
is one of the points at which the difficulty,
always great, of distinguishing what Hegel
did say from that which he ought in consistency
to have said becomes almost insuperable.
It may safely be asserted that the motive
force of the dialectic was clearly held by
him to rest in the implicit presence in us
of its goal. This is admitted by his opponents
as well as his supporters. That he did to
some extent recognise the consequence of
this--the subordinate importance which it
assigned to the idea of negation--seems also
probable, especially when we consider the
passage quoted above,<Note: Enc. Section
240, quoted in section 2 above. in which
the element of negation appears to enter
into the dialectic process with very different
degrees of prominence in the three stages
of which that process consists. On the other
hand, the absence of any detailed exposition
of a principle so fundamental as that of
the gradually decreasing share taken by negation
in the dialectic, and the failure to follow
out all its consequences, seem to indicate
that he had either not clearly realised it,
or had not perceived its full importance.
But to this point it will be necessary to
return.
10. What relation, we must now enquire, exists
between thought as engaged in the dialectic
process, and thought as engaged in the ordinary
affairs of life? In these latter we continually
employ the more abstract categories, which,
according to Hegel, are the more imperfect,
as if they were satisfactory and ultimate
determinations of thought. So far as we do
this we must contrive to arrest for the time
the dialectic movement. While a category
is undergoing the changes and transformations
in which that movement consists, it is as
unfit to be used as an instrument of thought,
as an expanding rod would be for a yard measure.
We may observe, and even argue about, the
growth of the idea, as we may observe the
expansion of a rod under heat, but the argument
must be conducted with stable ideas, as the
observation must be made with measures of
unaltering size. For if, for example, a notion,
when employed as a middle term, is capable
of changing its meaning between the major
and the minor premises, it renders the whole
syllogism invalid. And all reasoning depends
on the assumption that a term can be trusted
to retain the same meaning on different occasions.
Otherwise, any inference would be impossible,
since all connection between propositions
would be destroyed. There are two ways in
which we may treat the categories. The first
is, in the language of Hegel, the function
of the Reason--to perform, namely, the dialectic
process, and when that culminates in the
highest category, which alone is without
contradiction, to construe the world by its
means. As this category has no contradictions
in it, it is stable and can be used without
any fear of its transforming itself under
our hands. The second function is that of
the Understanding, whose characteristic it
is to treat abstractions as if they were
independent realities. They are thus forced
into an artificial stability and permanence,
and can be used for the work of ordinary
thought. Of course the attempt to use an
imperfect and unbalanced category as if it
were perfect and self-subsistent leads to
errors and contradictions--it is just these
errors and contradictions which are the proof
that the category is imperfect. But for many
purposes the limit of error is so small,
that the work of the Understanding possesses
practical use and validity. If we take an
arc three feet long of the circumference
of a circle a mile in diameter, it will be
curved, and will show itself to be so, if
examined with sufficient accuracy. But in
practice it would often produce no inconvenience
to treat it as a straight line. So, if an
attempt is made to explain experience exclusively
by the category, for example, of causality,
it will be found, if the matter is considered
with enough care, that any explanation, in
which no higher category is employed, involves
a contradiction.<Note: Enc. Sections
153, 154. Nevertheless, for many of the everyday
occurrences on which we exercise our thoughts,
an explanation by the Understanding, by means
of the category of causality only, will be
found to rationalise the event sufficiently
for the needs of the moment.
11. To this explanation an objection has
been raised by Hartmann.<Note: Op. cit.
B. II. 6. He "emphatically denies"
our power to arrest the progress of the Notion
in this manner. It might, he admits, be possible
to do so, if the Notion were changed by us,
but it is represented as changing itself.
The human thinker is thus only "the
fifth wheel to the cart," and quite
unable to arrest a process which is entirely
independent of him. Now in one sense of the
words it is perfectly true, that, if the
Notion changes at all, the change is caused
by its own nature, and not by us. If the
arguments of the dialectic are true, they
must appeal with irresistible force to every
one who looks into the question with sufficient
ability and attention, and thus the process
may be said to be due to the Notion, and
not to the thinker. But this is no more than
may be said of every argument. If it is valid,
it is not in the power of any man who has
examined it, to deny its validity. But when
there is no logical alternative there may
be a psychological one. No intelligent man,
who carefully examines the proofs, can doubt
that the earth goes round the sun. But any
person who will not examine them, or cannot
understand them, may remain convinced all
his life that the sun goes round the earth.
And any one, however clearly he understands
the truth, can, by diverting his attention
from comparatively remote astronomical arguments,
and fixing it on the familiar and daily appearances,
speak of and picture the movement as that
of the sun, as most men, I suppose, generally
do. So with the dialectic. The arguments
are, if Hegel is right, such as to leave
the man who examines them no option. But
for those who have no time, inclination,
or ability to examine them, the categories
will continue to be quite separate and independent,
while the contradictions which this view
will produce in experience will either be
treated as ultimate, or, more probably, will
not be noticed at all. And even for the student
of philosophy, the arguments remain so comparatively
abstruse and unfamiliar that he finds no
difficulty, when practical life requires
it, in assuming for a time the point of view
of the Understanding, and regarding each
category as unchanging and self-supporting.
This he does merely by diverting his attention
from the arguments by which their instability
is proved. Although therefore the change
in the Notion is due to its nature, it does
not follow that it cannot be stopped by peculiarities
in the nature of the thinker, or by his arbitrary
choice. The positive element in the change
lies wholly in the Notion, but that it should
take place at all in any particular case
requires certain conditions in the individual
mind in question, and by changing these conditions
we can at will arrest the process of the
categories, and use any one of them as fixed
and unchanging. Any other view of the dialectic
process would require us to suppose that
the movement of the categories became obvious
to us, not as the result of much hard thinking,
but spontaneously and involuntarily. It can
scarcely be asserted that Hegel held such
a theory, which would lead to the conclusion
that everyone who ever used the category
of Being--that is everyone who ever thought
at all, whether he reflected on thought or
not,--had gone through all the stages of
the Hegelian logic, and arrived at all its
conclusions.
12. Another difficulty which Hartmann brings
forward in this connection arises from a
misapprehension of Hegel's meaning. He affirms<Note:
Op. cit. B. II. 6. that, so far from stopping
the dialectic process, we could not even
perceive it when it took place. For we can
only become aware of the change by comparing
stage A with stage B, and how is it possible
that we should do this, if A turns into B,
beyond our control, whenever it appears?
In the first place, we may answer, it is
possible, as we have seen, to arrest the
dialectic movement, in any given case, at
will, so that the development of the categories
is not beyond our control. In the second
place the thesis is not held by Hegel to
turn into the antithesis in the simple and
complete way which this objection supposes.
The one category leads up to and postulates
the other but does not become completely
the same as its successor. The thesis and
antithesis are said no doubt to be the same,
but the same with a difference. If we predicate
A, we are forced to predicate B, but there
remains nevertheless a distinction between
A and B. It is just the coexistence of this
distinction with the necessary implication
of the one category in the other, which renders
the synthesis necessary as a reconciliation.
If the thesis and antithesis were not different,
the simultaneous predication of both of them
would involve no difficulty.
13. Such is the general nature of the dialectic
as conceived by Hegel. How does he attempt
to prove its truth and necessity? The proof
must be based on something already understood
and granted by those to whom it is addressed.
And since the proof should be one which must
be accepted by all men, we must base it on
that which all men allow to be justifiable--the
ordinary procedure, that is, of thought in
common sense and science, which Hegel calls
the Understanding as opposed to the Reason.
We must show that if we grant, as we cannot
help granting, the validity of the ordinary
exercise of our thought, we must also grant
the validity of the dialectic. This necessity
Hegel recognises. He says, it is true, that,
since only the Reason possesses the complete
truth, up to which the merely partial truth
of the Understanding leads, the real explanation
must be of the Understanding by the Reason.<Note:
Logic, Vol. I. p. 198. But this is not inconsistent
with a recognition of the necessity of justifying
the Reason to the Understanding. The course
of real explanation must always run from
ground to consequent, and, according to Hegel,
from concrete to abstract. On the other hand,
the order of proof must run from whatever
is known to whatever is unknown. When, as
we have seen is the case with the dialectic,
we start from explicit knowledge of the abstract
only, and proceed to knowledge of the concrete,
which alone gives reality to that abstract,
the order of explanation and the order of
proof must clearly be exactly opposite to
one another. The justification of the Reason
at the bar of the Understanding, depends
upon two facts. The one is the search for
the Absolute which is involved in the Understanding,
the other is the existence in the Understanding
of contradictions which render it impossible
that it should succeed in the search. The
Understanding demands an answer to every
question it can ask. But every question which
it succeeds in answering suggests fresh questions.
Any explanation requires some reference to
surrounding phenomena, and these in their
turn must be explained by reference to others,
and nothing can therefore be fully explained
unless everything else which is in direct
or indirect connection with it, unless, that
is, the whole universe, be fully explained
also. And the explanation of a phenomenon
requires, besides this, the knowledge of
its causes and effects, while these again
require a knowledge of their causes and effects,
so that not only the whole present universe,
but the of the past and future must be known
before any single fact can be really understood.
Again, since the knowledge of a phenomenon
involves the knowledge of its parts, and
all phenomena, occurring as they do in space
and time, are infinitely divisible, our knowledge
must not only be infinitely extended over
space and time, but also infinitely minute.
The connection of the phenomenal universe
by the law of reciprocity has a double effect
on knowledge. It is true, as Tennyson tells
us, that we could not know a single flower
completely without also knowing God and man.
But it is also true that, till we know everything
about God and man, we cannot answer satisfactorily
a single question about the flower. In asking
any question whatever, the Understanding
implicitly asks for a complete account of
the whole Universe, throughout all space
and all time. It demands a solution which
shall really solve the question without raising
fresh ones--a complete and symmetrical system
of knowledge. This ideal it cannot, as Hegel
maintains, reach by its own exertions, because
it is the nature of the Understanding to
treat the various finite categories as self-subsistent
unities, and this attempt leads it into the
various contradictions pointed out throughout
the dialectic, owing to the inevitable connection
of every finite category with its contrary.
Since, then, it postulates in all its actions
an ideal which cannot be reached by itself,
it is obliged, unless it would deny its own
validity, to admit the validity of the Reason,
since by the Reason alone can the contradictions
be removed, and the ideal be realised. And,
when it has done this, it loses the false
independence which made it suppose itself
to be something different from the Reason.
14. One of the most difficult and important
points in determining the nature of the Hegelian
logic is to find its exact relation to experience.
Whatever theory we may adopt has to fall
within certain limits. On the one hand it
is asserted by Hegel's critics, and generally
admitted by his followers, that, rightly
or wrongly, there is some indispensable reference
to experience in the dialectic--so that,
without the aid of experience it would be
impossible for the cogency of the dialectic
process to display itself. On the other hand
it is impossible to deny that, in some sense,
Hegel believed that the dialectic process
takes place in pure thought, that, however
incomplete the Logic might be without the
Philosophy of Nature, and the Philosophy
of Spirit, however much the existence of
Nature and Spirit might be involved in the
existence of pure thought, yet nevertheless
within the sphere of logic we had arrived
at pure thought, unconditioned in respect
of its development as thought. And both these
characteristics of the dialectic are, independently
of Hegel's assertion, clearly necessary for
the validity of any possible dialectic. The
consideration of pure thought, without any
reference to experience, would be absolutely
sterile, or rather impossible. For we are
as unable to employ "empty" pure
thought (to borrow Kant's phrase) as to employ
"blind" intuition. Thought is a
process of mediation and relation, and implies
something immediate to be related, which
cannot be found in thought. Even if a stage
of thought could be conceived as existing,
in which it was self- subsistent, and in
which it had no reference to any data--and
it is impossible to imagine such a state,
or to give any reason for supposing thought
thus to change its essential nature--at any
rate this is not the ordinary thought of
common life. And as the dialectic process
professes to start from a basis common to
everyone, so as to enable it to claim universal
validity for its conclusions, it is certain
that it will be necessary for thought, in
the dialectic process, to have some relation
to data given immediately, and independent
of that thought itself. Even if the dialectic
should finally transcend this condition it
would have at starting to take thought as
we use it in every-day life--as merely mediating,
and not self-subsistent. And I shall try
to show later on that it never does transcend,
or try to transcend that limitation.<Note:
Chap. II. On the other hand it is no less
true that any argument would be incapable
of leading us to general conclusions relating
to pure thought, which was based on the nature
of any particular piece of experience in
its particularity, and that, whatever reference
to experience Hegel may or may not have admitted
into his system, his language is conclusive
against the possibility that he has admitted
any empirical or contingent basis to the
dialectic.
15. The two conditions can, however, be reconciled.
There is a sense in which conclusions relating
to pure thought may properly be based on
an observation of experience, and in this
sense, as I believe, we must take the Logic
in order to arrive at Hegel's true meaning.
According to this view, what is observed
is the spontaneous and unconditioned movement
of the pure notion, which does not in any
way depend on the matter of intuition for
its validity, which, on the contrary, is
derived from the character of the pure reason
itself. But the process, although independent
of the matter of intuition, can only be perceived
when the pure notion is taken in conjunction
with matter of intuition--that is to say
when it is taken in experience-- because
it is impossible for us to grasp thought
in absolute purity, or except as applied
to an immediate datum. Since we cannot observe
pure thought at all, except in experience,
it is clear that it is only in experience
that we can observe the change from the less
to the more adequate form which thought undergoes
in the dialectic process. But this change
of form is due to the nature of thought alone,
and not to the other element in experience--the
matter of intuition.<Note: Since I am
here dealing only with the question of epistemology,
it will be allowable, I think, to assume
that there is a matter of intuition, distinct
from thought, and not reducible to it, (though
incapable of existing apart from it,) since
this is the position taken up within Hegel's
Logic. Whether the dialectic process has
any relation to it or not, its existence
is, in the Logic, admitted, at least provisionally.
If Hegel did make any attempt to reduce the
whole universe to a manifestation of pure
thought, without any other element, he certainly
did not do so till the transition to the
world of Nature at the end of the Logic.
Even there I believe no such attempt is to
be found. The presence of this other element
in experience is thus a condition of our
perceiving the dialectical movement of pure
thought. We may go further. It does not follow,
from the fact that the movement is due to
the nature of pure thought alone, that pure
thought can ever exist, or ever be imagined
to exist by itself. We may regard pure thought
as a mere abstraction of one side of experience,
which is the only concrete reality, while
the matter of intuition is an abstraction
of the other side of the same reality--each,
when considered by itself, being false and
misleading. This, as we shall see, is the
position which Hegel does take up. Even so,
it will still remain true that, in experience,
the dialectic process was due exclusively
to that element of experience which we call
pure thought, the other element--that of
intuition-- being indeed an indispensable
condition of the dialectic movement, but
one which remains passive throughout, and
one by which the movement is not determined.
It is only necessary to the movement of the
idea because it is necessary to its existence.
It is not itself a principle of change, which
may as fairly be said to be independent,
as the changes in the pictures of a magic
lantern may be ascribed exclusively to the
camera, and not at all to the canvas on which
they are reflected, although without the
canvas, the pictures themselves, and therefore
the transition from one to another of them
would be impossible.
16. If this is the relation of the dialectic
process to the medium in which it works,
what postulate does it require to start from?
We must distinguish its postulate from its
basis. Its basis is the reality which it
requires to have presented to itself, in
order that it may develop itself. Its postulate
is the proposition which it requires to have
admitted, in order that from this premise
it may demonstrate its own logical validity
as a consequence. The basis of the dialectic
is to be found in the nature of pure thought
itself, since the reason of the process being
what it is, is due, as we have seen, to the
nature of the highest and most concrete form
of the notion, implicit in all experience.
Since pure thought, as we have seen, even
if it could exist at all in any other manner,
could only become evident to us in experience,
the basis which the dialectic method will
require to work on, may be called the nature
of experience in general. It is only the
general nature of experience--those characteristics
which are common to all of it--which forms
the basis of the process. For it is not the
only object of the dialectic to prove that
the lower and subordinate categories are
unable to explain all parts of experience
without resorting to the higher categories,
and finally to the Absolute Idea. It undertakes
also to show that the lower categories are
inadequate, when considered with sufficient
intelligence and persistence, to explain
any part of the world. What is required,
therefore, is not so much the collection
of a large mass of experience to work on,
but the close and careful scrutiny of some
part, however small. The whole chain of categories
is implied in any and every phenomenon. Particular
fragments of experience may no doubt place
the inadequacy of some finite category in
a specially clear light, or may render the
transition to the next stage of the idea
particularly obvious and easy, but it is
only greater convenience which is thus gained;
with sufficient power any part, however unpromising,
would yield the same result.
17. The basis of the dialectic process, then,
is the nature of experience, in so far as
the nature of pure thought is contained in
it. If the other element in experience has
really a primary and essential nature of
its own, it will not concern us here, for,
as it takes no part in the development of
the idea, its existence, and not its particular
qualities, is the only thing with which we
are at present concerned. The nature of experience
however, though it is the basis of the dialectic,
is not its logical postulate. For it is not
assumed but ascertained by the dialectic,
whose whole object is the gradual discovery
and demonstration of the Absolute Idea, which
is the fundamental principle which makes
the nature of experience. The general laws
governing experience are the causa essendi
of the logic, but not its causa cognoscendi.
The only logical postulate which the dialectic
requires is the admission that experience
really exists. The dialectic is derived from
the nature of experience, and therefore if
it is to have any validity of real existence,
if it is to have, that is to say, any importance
at all, we must be assured of the existence
of some experience--in other words, that
something is. The object of the dialectic
is to discover the forms and laws of all
possible thought. For this purpose it starts
from the idea of Being, in which all others
are shown to be involved. The application
of the results of the dialectic to experience
thus depends on the application to experience
of the idea of Being, and the logical postulate
of the dialectic is no more than that something
is, and that the category of Being is therefore
valid. It will be noticed that the basis
and the postulate of the dialectic correspond
to the two aspects of the idea which we mentioned
above as the fundamental cause of the process.
The basis--the nature of pure thought--is
the complete and concrete idea which is present
in our minds, though only implicitly, and
which renders it impossible that we should
stop short of it by permanently acquiescing
in any finite category. The postulate--the
abstract idea in its highest state of abstraction,
which is admitted to be valid--is that which
is explicitly before the mind, and from which
the start is made.
18. We are justified in assuming this postulate
because it is involved in every action and
every thought, and its denial is therefore
suicidal. All that is required is the assertion
that there is such a thing as reality--that
something is. Now the very denial of this
involves the reality of the denial, and so
contradicts itself and affirms our postulate.
And the denial also implies the reality of
the person who makes the denial. The same
dilemma meets us if we try to take refuge
from dogmatic denial in mere doubt. If we
really doubt, then the doubt is real, and
there is something of whose reality we do
not doubt; if on the other hand we do not
really doubt the proposition that there is
something real, we admit its truth. And doubt,
as well as denial, places beyond doubt the
existence of the doubter. This is, of course,
the Cartesian argument, which is never stated
by Hegel precisely in this form, but on which
the justification of his use of the category
of Being, as valid of reality, appears to
depend.
19. The dialectical process thus gains its
validity and importance by means of a transcendental
argument. The higher categories are connected
with the lower in such a manner that the
latter inevitably lead on to the former as
the only means by which they can be rescued
from the contradictions involved in their
abstractness. If the lower categories be
admitted, and, ultimately, if the lowest
of all, the category of Being, be admitted,
the rest follows. But we cannot by the most
extreme scepticism deny that something is,
and we are therefore enabled to conclude
that the dialectic process does apply to
something. And as whatever the category of
Being did not apply to would not exist, we
are also able to conclude that there is nothing
to which the dialectic process does not apply.
It will be seen that this argument is strictly
of a transcendental nature. A proposition
denied by the adversary--in this case the
validity of the higher categories--is shown
to be involved in the truth of some other
proposition, which he is not prepared to
attack--in this case the validity of the
category of Being. But the cogency of ordinary
transcendental arguments is limited, and
they apply only to people who are prepared
to yield the proposition which forms the
foundation of the argument, so that they
could be outflanked by a deeper scepticism.
Now this is not the case with the dialectic.
For the proposition on which it is based
is so fundamental, that it could be doubted
only at the expense of self-contradiction,
and the necessity of considering that proposition
true is therefore universal, and not only
valid in a specially limited argument, or
against a special opponent. It is doubtful
indeed whether a condition so essential as
this is correctly termed a postulate, which
seems to denote more properly a proposition
which it would be at least possible for an
adversary to challenge. At any rate the very
peculiar nature of the assumption should
be carefully remembered, as it affords a
clue for interpreting various expressions
of Hegel's, which might otherwise cause serious
difficulties.<Note: Cp. Chap. II. Section
46.
20. Having thus endeavoured to explain the
nature of the dialectic, we must ask ourselves
at what results we are entitled to arrive
by means of that process. These results will
be, to begin with, epistemological. For the
conditions of the dialectic are, first, the
concrete notion, which we are able to examine
because it is implicit in all our consciousness,
and, second, the category of Being, which
we are entitled to postulate, because it
is impossible to avoid employing it in judging
experience. Our conclusions will therefore
relate primarily to the general laws of experience,
and will so far be, like those of Kant's
Aesthetic and Analytic, concerned with the
general conditions of human knowledge. And
the result arrived at will be that no category
will satisfactorily explain the universe
except the Absolute Idea. Any attempt to
employ for that purpose a lower category
must either accept a gradual transformation
of the idea employed until the Absolute Idea
is reached, or acquiesce in unreconciled
contradictions--which involves the rejection
of a fundamental law of reason.
21. This position has two results. In the
first place it disproves the efforts which
are made from time to time to explain the
whole universe by means of the lower categories
only. Such an attempt lay at the bottom of
Hume's scepticism, when he endeavoured to
treat the notion of causality as derived
from that of sequence, and to consider all
that was added as false and illusive. For
absolute scepticism is impossible, and his
treatment of the higher category as an unwarranted
inference from the lower involves the assertion
of the validity of the latter. Such an attempt,
again, has been made by Mr Spencer, as well
as by the large number of writers who adopt
the provisional assumptions of physical science
as an ultimate position. They endeavour to
explain all phenomena in terms of matter
and motion, and to treat all special laws
by which they may be governed as merely particular
cases of fundamental principles taken from
physical science. But if we agree with Hegel
in thinking that the category of Being is
inadequate to explain the world which we
know without the successive introduction
of the categories, among others, of Cause,
Life, and Self- Consciousness, and that each
category inevitably requires its successor,
all such attempts must inevitably fail. Any
attempt, for example, to reduce causation
to an unjustifiable inference from succession,
to explain life merely in terms of matter
and motion, or knowledge merely in terms
of life, would involve a fatal confusion.
For it would be an attempt at explanation
by that which is, in itself, incomplete,
unreal, and contradictory, and which can
only be made rational by being viewed as
an aspect of those very higher categories,
which were asserted to have been explained
away by its means.
22. Even if this were all, the result of
the dialectic would be of great importance.
It would have refuted all attempts to establish
a complete and consistent materialism, and
would have demonstrated the claims of the
categories of spirit to a place in construing
part at least of the universe. But it has
done more than this. For it does not content
itself with showing that the lower categories
lead necessarily to the higher, when the
question relates to those portions of experience
in which the higher categories are naturally
applied by the uncritical consciousness.
It also demonstrates that the lower categories,
in themselves, and to whatever matter of
intuition they may be applied, involve the
higher categories also. Not only is Being
inadequate to explain, without the aid of
Becoming, those phenomena which we all recognise
in ordinary life as phenomena of change,
but it is also unable to explain those others
which are commonly considered as merely cases
of unchanging existence. Not only is the
idea of Substance inadequate to deal with
ordinary cases of scientific causation, but
without the idea of Cause it becomes involved
in contradictions, even when keeping to the
province which the uncritical consciousness
assigns to it. Not only is it impossible
to explain the phenomena of vegetable and
animal life by the idea of mechanism, but
that idea is inadequate even to explain the
phenomena of physics. Not only can consciousness
not be expressed merely in terms of life,
but life is an inadequate category even for
biological phenomena. With such a system
we are able to admit, without any danger
either to its consistency or to its practical
corollaries, all that science can possibly
claim as to the interrelation of all the
phenomena of the universe, and as to the
constant determination of mind by purely
physical causes. For not only have we justified
the categories of spirit, but we have subjected
the whole world of experience to their rule.
We are entitled to assert, not only that
spirit cannot be reduced to matter, but also
that matter must be reduced to spirit. It
is of no philosophical importance, therefore,
though all things should, from the scientific
standpoint, be determined by material causes.
For all material determination is now known
to be only spiritual determination in disguise.
23. The conclusion thus reached is one which
deals with pure thought, since the argument
has rested throughout on the nature of pure
thought, and on that only, and the conclusion
itself is a statement as to the only form
of pure thought which we can use with complete
correctness. But we have not found anything
which would enable us to discard sensation
from its position as an element of experience
as necessary and fundamental as pure thought
itself, and if Hegel did draw such a consequence
from it, we must hold that he has taken an
unjustifiable step forwards. All the thought
which we know is in its essential nature
mediate, and requires something immediate
to act on, if it is to act at all. And this
immediate element can be found--so far as
our present knowledge is concerned--only
in sensation, the necessary background and
accompaniment of the dialectic process, which
is equally essential at its end as at its
beginning. For an attempt to eliminate it
would require that Hegel should, in the first
place, explain how we could ever conceive
unmediated or self-mediated thought, and
that he should, in the second place, show
that the existence of this self-subsistent
thought was implied in the existence of the
mediating and independent thought of every-day
life. For since it is only the validity of
our every-day thought which we find it impossible
to deny, it is only that thought which we
can take as the basis of the dialectic process.
Even if, in the goal of the dialectic, thought
became self-subsistent in any intelligible
sense, it would be necessary to show that
this self-subsistence issued naturally from
the finite categories, in which thought is
unquestionably recognised as mediate only.
I shall endeavour to prove later on<Note:
Chap. II. Section 48. that Hegel made no
attempt to take up this position. The conclusion
of the Logic is simply the assertion that
the one category by which experience can
be judged with complete correctness is the
Absolute Idea. It makes no attempt to transcend
the law which we find in all experience by
which the categories cannot be used of reality,
nor indeed apprehended at all, without the
presence of immediate data to serve as materials
for them.
24. To sum up, the general outline of the
Hegelian Logic, from an epistemological point
of view, does not differ greatly, I believe,
from that of Kant. Both philosophers justify
the application of certain categories to
the matter of experience, by proving that
the validity of those categories is implied
in the validity of other ideas which the
sceptical opponent cannot or does not challenge.
The systems differ largely in many points,
particularly in the extent to which they
push their principles. And Hegel has secured
a firmer foundation for his theory than Kant
did, by pushing back his deduction till it
rests on a category--the category of Being,--the
validity of which with regard to experience
not only never had been denied, but could
not be denied without contradiction. It is
true also that Kant's work was clearly analytic,
while Hegel's had also a synthetic side,
and may even be said to have brought that
side into undue, or at any rate misleading,
prominence. But the general principle of
the two systems was the same, and the critic
who finds no fundamental fallacy in Kant's
criticism of knowledge, should have no difficulty
in admitting that the Hegelian Logic, if
it keeps itself free from errors of detail,
forms a valid theory of epistemology.
25. But the Logic claims to be more than
this, and we must now proceed to examine
what has been generally held to be at once
the most characteristic and the weakest part
of Hegel's philosophy. How far does he apply
the results of his analysis of knowledge
to actual reality, and how far is he justified
in doing so? It is beyond doubt that Hegel
regarded his Logic as possessing, in some
manner, ontological significance. But this
may mean one of two very different things.
It may mean only that the system rejects
the Kantian thing-in-itself, and denies the
existence of any reality except that which
enters into experience, so that the results
of a criticism of knowledge are valid of
reality also. But it may mean that it endeavours
to dispense with or transcend all data except
the nature of thought itself, and to deduce
from that nature the whole existing universe.
The difference between these two positions
is considerable. The first maintains that
nothing is real but the reasonable, the second
that reality is nothing but rationality.
The first maintains that we can explain the
world of sense, the second that we can explain
it away. The first merely confirms and carries
further the process of rationalisation, of
which all science and all finite knowledge
consist; the second differs entirely from
science and finite knowledge, substituting
a self- sufficient and absolute thought for
thought which is relative and complementary
to the data of sense. It is, I maintain,
in the first of these senses, and the first
only, that Hegel claims ontological validity
for the results of the Logic, and that he
should do as much as this is inevitable.
For to distinguish between conclusions epistemologically
valid and those which extend to ontology
implies a belief in the existence of something
which does not enter into the field of actual
or possible knowledge. Such a belief is totally
unwarranted. The thing-in-itself as conceived
by Kant, behind and apart from the phenomena
which alone enter into experience, is a contradiction.
We cannot, we are told, know what it is,
but only that it is. But this is itself an
important piece of knowledge relating to
the thing. It involves a judgment, and a
judgment involves categories, and we are
thus forced to surrender the idea that we
can be aware of the existence of anything
which is not subject to the laws governing
experience. Moreover, the only reason which
can be given for our belief in things-in-themselves
is that they are the ground or substratum
of our sensuous intuitions. But this is a
relation, and a relation involves a category.
Indeed every statement which can be made
about the thing-in-itself contradicts its
alleged isolation.
26. It cannot be denied, however, that Hegel
does more than is involved in the rejection
of a thing-in-itself outside the laws of
experience. Not only are his epistemological
conclusions declared to have also ontological
validity, but he certainly goes further and
holds that, from the consideration of the
existence of pure thought, we are able to
deduce the existence of the worlds of Nature
and Spirit. Is this equivalent to an admission
that the worlds of Nature and Spirit can
be reduced to, or explained away by, pure
thought? We shall see that this is not the
case when we reflect that the dialectic process
is no less analytic of a given material than
it is synthetic from a given premise, and
owes its impulse as much to the perfect and
concrete idea which is implicit in experience,
as to the imperfect and abstract idea which
is explicitly before the student. For if
the idea is, when met with in reality, always
perfect and concrete, it is no less true
that it is, when met with in reality, invariably,
and of necessity, found in connection with
sensuous intuition, without which even the
relatively concrete idea which ends the Logic
is itself an illegitimate abstraction. This
being the case it follows that, as each stage
of the Logic insists on going forward to
the next stage, so the completed logical
idea insists on going forward and asserting
the coexistence with itself of sensuous perception.
It does not postulate any particular sensuous
perception, for the idea is equally implicit
in all experience, and one fragment is as
good as another in which to perceive it.
We are thus unable to deduce any of the particulars
of the world of sense from the Logic. But
we are able to deduce that there must be
such a world, for without it the idea would
be still an abstraction and therefore still
contradictory. We are able to predicate of
that world whatever is necessary to make
it the complement of the world of pure thought.
It must be immediate, that thought may have
something to mediate, individual and isolated
piece from piece that thought may have something
to relate. It must be, in short, the abstract
individual, which, together with the abstract
universal of thought, forms the concrete
reality, alike individual and universal,
which alone is consistent and self-sustained.
27. If this is so, it follows that there
is nothing mysterious or intricate about
the deduction of the world of Nature from
the Logic, and of the world of Spirit from
the world of Nature. It is simply the final
step in the self- recovery of the spirit
from the illegitimate abstractions of the
understanding--the recovery which we have
seen to be the source of all movement in
the dialectic. Once granted a single category
of the Logic, and all the others follow,
since in the world of reality each lower
category only exists as a moment of the Absolute
Idea, and can therefore never by itself satisfy
the demands of the mind. And, in like manner,
the world of pure thought only exists as
an abstraction from concrete reality, so
that, granted pure thought, we are compelled
by the necessity of the dialectic to grant
the existence of some sensuous intuition
also. It is perhaps conceivable that, in
some future state of knowledge, the completion
of the dialectic process might be seen to
involve, not only the mere existence of Nature
and Spirit, but their existence with particular
characteristics, and that this might be carried
so far that it amounted to a complete determination,
in one way or another, of every question
which could be asked concerning them. If
this should be the case, we should be able
to deduce à priori from the character of
pure thought the whole contents of science
and history. Even then, however, we should
not have taken up the position that the immediate
element in Nature and Spirit could be reduced
to pure thought. For we should not be endeavouring
to deduce the immediate merely from the mediate,
but from the mediate compared with the concrete
reality of which they are both moments. The
true force of the proof would lie in the
existence of this synthesis. At present,
however, the world of sense appears to us
to contain a large number of particulars
which are quite indifferent to pure thought,
so that it might be as well embodied in one
arrangement of them as in another. This may
possibly be an inevitable law of knowledge.
It certainly expresses the state of our knowledge
at present. It follows that the Philosophy
of Nature and Spirit will consist only in
observing the progress of the pure idea as
it appears in the midst of phenomena to a
large extent contingent to it, and cannot
hope to account for all the particulars of
experience. But this is all that Hegel attempts
to do. He endeavours to find the idea in
everything, but not to reduce everything
to a manifestation of the idea. Thus he remarks
in the Philosophy of Spirit, "This development
of reality or objectivity brings forward
a row of forms which must certainly be given
empirically, but from an empirical point
of view should not be placed side by side
and outside each other, but must be known
as the expression which corresponds to a
necessary series of definite notions, and
only in so far as they express such a series
of notions have interest for philosophic
thought."<Note: Enc. Section 387,
lecture note, p. 42.
28. If this explanation be correct, it will
follow that Hegel never endeavoured to claim
ontological validity for his Logic in the
second sense mentioned above--by attempting,
that is, to deduce all the contents of experience
from the nature of pure thought only. The
deduction which does take place is not dependent
merely on the premise from which it starts,
which is certainly to be found in the nature
of pure thought, but also on the whole to
which it is working up, and which is implicit
in our thought. If we can proceed in this
way from Logic to Nature and Spirit, it proves
that Logic without the additional elements
which occur in Nature and Spirit is a mere
abstraction. And an abstraction cannot possibly
be the cause of the reality from which it
is an abstraction. There can be no place
here, therefore, for the attempt to construct
the world out of abstract thought, of which
Hegel's philosophy is sometimes supposed
to have consisted. The importance of the
ontological significance of the dialectic,
even in this limited extent, is, however,
very great. We are now enabled to assert,
not only that, within our experience, actual
or possible, everything can be explained
by the Absolute Idea, but also that all reality,
in any sense in which we can attach any intelligible
meaning to the word, can also be explained
by that idea. I cannot have the least reason
to believe in, or even to imagine possible,
anything which does not in the long run turn
out to contain and be constituted by the
highest category. And since that category,
as was pointed out above, expresses the deepest
nature of the human mind, we are entitled
to believe that the universe as a whole is
in fundamental agreement with our own nature,
and that whatever can rightly be called rational
may be safely declared to be also real.
29. From this account of the Hegelian system
it will appear that its main result is the
completion of the work which had been carried
on by German philosophy since the publication
of the Critique of Pure Reason--the establishment,
by means of the transcendental method, of
the rationality of the Universe. There was
much left for Hegel to do. For the Critique
of Pure Reason was a dualism, and had all
the qualities of a dualism. Man's aspirations
after complete rationality and complete justice
in life were checked by the consideration
of the phenomenal side of his own nature,
which delivered him over to the mercy of
a world in one of whose elements--the irrational
manifold--he saw only what was alien to himself.
And the defect of the Critique of Pure Reason
in this respect was not completely remedied
by the Critique of Practical Reason. The
reconciliation was only external: the alien
element was not to be absorbed or transcended
but conquered. It was declared the weaker,
but it kept its existence. And the whole
of this argument had a slighter basis than
the earlier one, since it rested, not on
the validity of knowledge, but on the validity
of the moral sense--the denial of which is
not as clearly a contradiction of itself.
Moreover, it is not by any means universally
admitted that the obligation to seek the
good is dependent on the possibility of realising
it in full. And if it is not so dependent
then the validity of the moral sense does
not necessarily imply the validity of the
Ideas of Reason. Even in the Critique of
Judgment the reconciliation of the two sides
was still external and incomplete. Nor had
spirit a much stronger position with Kant's
immediate successors. Fichte, indeed, reduced
the Non-Ego to a shadow, but just for that
reason, as Dr Caird remarks, rendered it
impossible to completely destroy it. And
the Absolute of Schelling, standing as it
did midway between matter and spirit, could
be but slight comfort to spirit, whose most
characteristic features and most important
interests had little chance of preservation
in a merely neutral basis. Hegel on the other
hand asserted the absolute supremacy of reason.
For him it is the key to the interpretation
of the whole universe; it finds nothing alien
to itself wherever it goes. And the reason
for which he thus claimed unrestricted power
was demonstrated to contain every category
up to the Absolute Idea. It is this demonstration--quite
as much as the rejection of the possibility
that anything in the universe should be alien
to reason--which gives his philosophy its
practical interest. For from the practical
point of view it is of little consequence
that the world should be proved to be the
embodiment of reason, if we are to see in
reason nothing higher than reciprocity, and
are compelled to regard the higher categories
as mere subjective delusions. Such a maimed
reason as this is one in which we can have
scarcely more pleasure or acquiescence than
in chaos. If the rational can be identified
with the good, it can only be in respect
of the later categories, such as End, Life,
and Cognition.
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Evans Experientialism 
