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Continued from Page One.
XVII: An example of a subordinate regulation
in the law of nature which demonstrates that
God always preserves the same amount of force
but not the same quantity of motion:- against
the Cartesians and many others.
I have frequently spoken of subordinate regulations,
or of the laws of nature, and it seems that
it will be well to give an example. Our new
philosophers are unanimous in employing that
famous law that God always preserves the
same amount of motion in the universe. In
fact it is a very plausible law, and in times
past I held it for indubitable. But since
then I have learned in what its fault consists.
Monsieur Descartes and many other clever
mathematicians have thought that the quantity
of motion, that is to say the velocity multiplied
by the mass1 of the moving body, is exactly
equivalent to the moving force, or to speak
in mathematical terms that the force varies
as the velocity multiplied by the mass. Now
it is reasonable that the same force is always
preserved in the universe. So also, looking
to phenomena, it will be readily seen that
a mechanical perpetual motion is impossible,
because the force in such a machine, being
always diminished a little by friction and
so ultimately destined to be entirely spent,
would necessarily have to recoup its losses,
and consequently would keep on increasing
of itself without any new impulsion from
without; and we see furthermore that the
force of a body is diminished only in proportion
as it gives up force, either to a contiguous
body or to its own parts, in so far as they
have a separate movement. The mathematicians
to whom I have referred think that what can
be said of force can be said of the quantity
of motion. In order, however, to show the
difference I make two suppositions: in the
first place, that a body falling from a certain
height acquires a force enabling it to remount
to the same height, provided that its direction
is turned that way, or provided that there
are no hindrances. For instance, a pendulum
will rise exactly to the height from which
it has fallen, provided the resistance of
the air and of certain other small particles
do not diminish a little its acquired force.
I suppose in the second place that it will
take as much force to lift a body weighing
one pound to the height CD, four feet, as
to raise a body B weighing four pounds to
the height EF, one foot. (See Illustrations)
These two suppositions are granted by our
new philosophers. It is therefore manifest
that the body A falling from the height CD
acquires exactly as much force as the body
B falling from the height EF, for the body
B at F, having by the first supposition sufficient
force to return to E, has therefore the force
to carry a body of four pounds to the distance
of one foot, EF. And likewise the body A
at D, having the force to return to C, has
also the force required to carry a body weighing
one pound, its own weight, back to C, a distance
of four feet. Now by the second supposition
the force of these two bodies is equal. Let
us now see if the quantity of motion is the
same in each case. It is here that we will
be surprised to find a very great difference,
for it has been proved by Galileo that the
velocity acquired by the fall CD is double
the velocity acquired by the fall EF, although
the height is four times as great. Multiplying,
therefore, the body A, whose mass is I, by
its velocity, which is 2, the product or
the quantity of movement will be 2, and on
the other hand, if we multiply the body B,
whose mass is 4, by its velocity, which is
I, the product or quantity of motion will
be 4. Hence the quantity of the motion of
the body A at the point D is half the quantity
of motion of the body B at the point F, yet
their forces are equal, and there is therefore
a great difference between the quantity of
motion and the force. This is what we set
out to show. We can see therefore how the
force ought to be estimated by the quantity
of the effect which it is able to produce,
for example by the height to which a body
of certain weight can be raised. This is
a very different thing from the velocity
which can be imparted to it, and in order
to impart to it double the velocity we must
have double the force. Nothing is simpler
than this proof and Monsieur Descartes has
fallen into error here, only because he trusted
too much to his thoughts even when they had
not been ripened by reflection. But it astonishes
me that his disciples have not noticed this
error, and I am afraid that they are beginning
to imitate little by little certain Peripatetics
whom they ridicule, and that they are accustoming
themselves to consult rather the books of
their master, than reason or nature.
XVIII: The distinction between force and
the quantity of motion is, among other reasons,
important as showing that we must have recourse
to metaphysical considerations in addition
to discussions of extension if we wish to
explain the phenomena of matter.
This consideration of the force, distinguished
from the quantity of motion is of importance,
not only in physics and mechanics for finding
the real laws of nature and the principles
of motion, and even for correcting many practical
errors which have crept into the writings
of certain able mathematicians, but also
in metaphysics it is of importance for the
better understanding of principles. Because
motion, if we regard only its exact and formal
meaning, that is, change of place, is not
something entirely real, and when several
bodies change their places reciprocally,
it is not possible to determine by considering
the bodies alone to which among them movement
or repose is to be attributed, as I could
demonstrate geometrically, if I wished to
stop for it now. But the force, or the proximate
cause of these changes is something more
real, and there are sufficient grounds for
attributing it to one body rather than to
another, and it is only through this latter
investigation that we can determine to which
one the movement must appertain. Now this
force is something different from size, from
form or from motion, and it can be seen from
this consideration that the whole meaning
of a body is not exhausted in its extension
together with its modifications as our moderns
persuade themselves. We are therefore obliged
to restore certain beings or forms which
they have banished. It appears more and more
clear that although all the particular phenomena
of nature can be explained mathematically
or mechanically by those who understand them,
yet nevertheless, the general principles
of corporeal nature and even of mechanics
are metaphysical rather than geometric, and
belong rather to certain indivisible forms
or natures as the causes of the appearances,
than to the corporeal mass or to extension.
This reflection is able to reconcile the
mechanical philosophy of the moderns with
the circumspection of those intelligent and
well-meaning persons who, with a certain
justice, fear that we are becoming too far
removed from immaterial beings and that we
are thus prejudicing piety.
XIX: The utility of final causes in Physics.
As I do not wish to judge people in ill part
I bring no accusation against our new philosophers
who pretend to banish final causes from physics,
but I am nevertheless obliged to avow that
the consequences of such a banishment appear
to me dangerous, especially when joined to
that position which I refuted at the beginning
of this treatise. That position seemed to
go the length of discarding final causes
entirely as though God proposed no end and
no good in his activity, or as if good were
not to be the object of his will. I hold
on the contrary that it is just in this that
the principle of all existences and of the
laws of nature must be sought, hence God
always proposes the best and most perfect.
I am quite willing to grant that we are liable
to err when we wish to determine the purposes
or councils of God, but this is the case
only when we try to limit them to some particular
design, thinking that he has had in view
only a single, thing, while in fact he regards
everything at once. As for instance, if we
think that God has made the world only for
us, it is a great blunder, although it may
be quite true that he has made it entirely
for us, and that there is nothing in the
universe which does not touch us and which
does not accommodate itself to the regard
which he has for us according to the principle
laid down above. Therefore when we see some
good effect or some perfection which happens
or which follows from the works of God we
are able to say assuredly that God has purposed
it, for he does nothing by chance, and is
not like us who sometimes fail to do well.
Therefore, far from being able to fall into
error in this respect as do the extreme statesmen
who postulate too much foresight in the designs
of Princes, or as do commentators who seek
for too much erudition in their authors,
it will be impossible to attribute too much
reflection to God's infinite wisdom, and
there is no matter in which error is less
to be feared provided we confine ourselves
to affirmations and provided we avoid negative
statements which limit the designs of God.
All those who see the admirable structure
of animals find themselves led to recognize
the wisdom of the author of things and I
advise those who have any sentiment of piety
and indeed of true philosophy to hold aloof
from the expressions of certain pretentious
minds who instead of saying that eyes were
made for seeing, say that we see because
we find ourselves having eyes. When one seriously
holds such opinions which hand everything
over to material necessity or to a kind of
chance (although either alternative ought
to appear ridiculous to those who understand
what we have explained above) it is difficult
to recognize an intelligent author of nature.
The effect should correspond to its cause
and indeed it is best known through the recognition
of its cause, so that it is reasonable to
introduce a sovereign intelligence ordering
things, and in place of making use of the
wisdom of this sovereign being, to employ
only the properties of matter to explain
phenomena. As if in order to account for
the capture of an important place by a prince,
the historian should say it was because the
particles of powder in the cannon having
been touched by a spark of fire expanded
with a rapidity capable of pushing a hard
solid body against the walls of the place,
while the little particles which composed
the brass of the cannon were so well interlaced
that they did not separate under this impact,-
as if he should account for it in this way
instead of making us see how the foresight
of the conqueror brought him to choose the
time and the proper means and how his ability
surmounted all obstacles.
XX: A noteworthy disquisition in Plato's
Phaedo against the philosophers who were
too materialistic.
This reminds me of a fine disquisition by
Socrates in Plato's Phaedo, which agrees
perfectly with my opinion on this subject
and seems to have been uttered expressly
for our too materialistic philosophers. This
agreement has led me to a desire to translate
it although it is a little long. Perhaps
this example will give some of us an incentive
to share in many of the other beautiful and
well balanced thoughts which are found in
the writings of this famous author. 2
XXI: If the mechanical laws depended upon
Geometry alone without metaphysical influences,
the phenomena would be very different from
what they are.
Now since the wisdom of God has always been
recognized in the detail of the mechanical
structures of certain particular bodies,
it should also be shown in the general economy
of the world and in the constitution of the
laws of nature. This is so true that even
in the laws of motion in general, the plans
of this wisdom have been noticed. For if
bodies were only extended masses, and motion
were only a change of place, and if everything
ought to be and could be deduced by geometric
necessity from these two definitions alone,
it would follow, as I have shown elsewhere,
that the smallest body on contact with a
very large one at rest would impart to it
its own velocity, yet without losing any
of the velocity that it had. A quantity of
other rules wholly contrary to the formation
of a system would also have to be admitted.
But the decree of the divine wisdom in preserving
always the same force and the same total
direction has provided for a system. I find
indeed that many of the effects of nature
can be accounted for in a twofold way, that
is to say by a consideration of efficient
causes, and again independently by a consideration
of final causes. An example of the latter
is God's decree to always carry out his plan
by the easiest and most determined way. I
have shown this elsewhere in accounting for
the catoptric and dioptric laws, and I will
speak more at length about it in what follows.
XXII: Reconciliation of the two methods of
explanation, the one using final causes,
and the other efficient causes, thus satisfying
both those who explain nature mechanically
and those who have recourse to incorporeal
natures.
It is worth while to make the preceding remark
in order to reconcile those who hope to explain
mechanically the formation of the first tissue
of an animal and all the interrelation of
the parts, with those who account for the
same structure by referring to final causes.
Both explanations are good; both are useful
not only for the admiring of the work of
a great artificer, but also for the discovery
of useful facts in physics and medicine.
And writers who take these diverse routes
should not speak ill of each other. For I
see that those who attempt to explain beauty
by the divine anatomy ridicule those who
imagine that the apparently fortuitous flow
of certain liquids has been able to produce
such a beautiful variety and that they regard
them as overbold and irreverent. These others
on the contrary treat the former as simple
and superstitious, and compare them to those
ancients who regarded the physicists as impious
when they maintained that not Jupiter thundered
but some material which is found in the clouds.
The best plan would be to join the two ways
of thinking. To use a practical comparison,
we recognize and praise the ability of a
workman not only when we show what designs
he had in making the parts of his machine,
but also when we explain the instruments
which he employed in making each part, above
all if these instruments are simple and ingeniously
contrived. God is also a workman able enough
to produce a machine still a thousand times
more ingenious than is our body, by employing
only certain quite simple liquids purposely
composed in such a way that ordinary laws
of nature alone are required to develop them
so as to produce such a marvellous effect.
But it is also true that this development
would not take place if God were not the
author of nature. Yet I find that the method
of efficient causes, which goes much deeper
and is in a measure more immediate and a
priori, is also more difficult when we come
to details, and I think that our philosophers
are still very frequently far removed from
making the most of this method. The method
of final causes, however, is easier and can
be frequently employed to find out important
and useful truths which we should have to
seek for a long time, if we were confined
to that other more physical method of which
anatomy is able to furnish many examples.
It seems to me that Snellius, who was the
first discoverer of the laws of refraction
would have waited a long time before finding
them if he had wished to seek out first how
light was formed. But he apparently followed
that method which the ancients employed for
Catoptrics, that is, the method of final
causes. Because, while seeking for the easiest
way in which to conduct a ray of light from
one given point to another given point by
reflection from a given plane (supposing
that that was the design of nature) they
discovered the equality of the angles of
incidence and reflection, as can be seen
from a little treatise by Heliodorus of Larissa
and also elsewhere. This principle Mons.
Snellius, I believe, and afterwards independently
of him, M. Fermat, applied most ingeniously
to refraction. For since the rays while in
the same media always maintain the same proportion
of sines, which in turn corresponds to the
resistance of the media, it appears that
they follow the easiest way, or at least
that way which is the most determinate for
passing from a given point in one medium
to a given point in another medium. That
demonstration of this same theorem which
M. Descartes has given, using efficient causes,
is much less satisfactory. At least we have
grounds to think that he would never have
found the principle by that means if he had
not learned in Holland of the discovery of
Snellius.
XXIII: Returning to immaterial substances
we explain how God acts upon the understanding
of spirits and ask whether one always keeps
the idea of what he thinks about.
I have thought it well to insist a little
upon final causes, upon incorporeal natures
and upon an intelligent cause with respect
to bodies so as to show the use of these
conceptions in physics and in mathematics.
This for two reasons, first to purge from
mechanical philosophy the impiety that is
imputed to it, second, to elevate to nobler
lines of thought the thinking of our philosophers
who incline to materialistic considerations
alone. Now, however, it will be well to return
from corporeal substances to the consideration
of immaterial natures and particularly of
spirits, and to speak of the methods which
God uses to enlighten them and to act upon
them. Although we must not forget that there
are here at the same time certain laws of
nature in regard to which I can speak more
amply elsewhere. It will be enough for now
to touch upon ideas and to inquire if we
see everything in God and how God is our
light. First of all it will be in place to
remark that the wrong use of ideas occasions
many errors. For when one reasons in regard
to anything, he imagines that he has an idea
of it and this is the foundation upon which
certain philosophers, ancient and modern,
have constructed a demonstration of God that
is extremely imperfect. It must be, they
say, that I have an idea of God, or of a
perfect being, since I think of him and we
cannot think without having ideas; now the
idea of this being includes all perfections
and since existence is one of these perfections,
it follows that he exists. But I reply, inasmuch
as we often think of impossible chimeras,
for example of the highest degree of swiftness,
of the greatest number, of the meeting of
the conchoid with its base or determinant,
such reasoning is not sufficient. It is therefore
in this sense that we can say that there
are true and false ideas according as the
thing which is in question is possible or
not. And it is when he is assured of the
possibility of a thing, that one can boast
of having an idea of it. Therefore, the aforesaid
argument proves that God exists, if he is
possible. This is in fact an excellent privilege
of the divine nature, to have need only of
a possibility or an essence in order to actually
exist, and it is just this which is called
ens a se.
XXIV: What clear and obscure, distinct and
confused, adequate and inadequate, intuitive
and assumed knowledge is, and the definition
of nominal, real, causal and essential.
In order to understand better the nature
of ideas it is necessary to touch somewhat
upon the various kinds of knowledge. When
I am able to recognize a thing among others,
without being able to say in what its differences
or characteristics consist, the knowledge
is confused. Sometimes indeed we may know
clearly, that is without being in the slightest
doubt, that a poem or a picture is well or
badly done because there is in it an "I
know not what" which satisfies or shocks
us. Such knowledge is not yet distinct. It
is when I am able to explain the peculiarities
which a thing has, that the knowledge is
called distinct. Such is the knowledge of
an assayer who discerns the true gold from
the false by means of certain proofs or marks
which make up the definition of gold. But
distinct knowledge has degrees, because ordinarily
the conceptions which enter into the definitions
will themselves have need of definition,
and are only known confusedly. When at length
everything which enters into a definition
or into distinct knowledge is known distinctly,
even back to the primitive conception, I
call that knowledge adequate. When my mind
understands at once and distinctly all the
primitive ingredients of a conception, then
we have intuitive knowledge. This is extremely
rare as most human knowledge is only confused
or indeed assumed. It is well also to distinguish
nominal from real definition. I call a definition
nominal when there is doubt whether an exact
conception of it is possible; as for instance,
when I say that an endless screw is a line
in three dimensional space whose parts are
congruent or fall one upon another. Now although
this is one of the reciprocal properties
of an endless screw, he who did not know
from elsewhere what an endless screw was
could doubt if such a line were possible,
because the other lines whose ends are congruent
(there are only two: the circumference of
a circle and the straight line) are plane
figures, that is to say they can be described
in plano. This instance enables us to see
that any reciprocal property can serve as
a nominal definition, but when the property
brings us to see the possibility of a thing
it makes the definition real, and as long
as one has only a nominal definition he cannot
be sure of the consequences which he draws,
because if it conceals a contradiction or
an impossibility he would be able to draw
the opposite conclusions. That is why truths
do not depend upon names and are not arbitrary,
as some of our new philosophers think. There
is also a considerable difference among real
definitions, for when the possibility proves
itself only by experience, as in the definition
of quicksilver, whose possibility we know
because such a body, which is both an extremely
heavy fluid and quite volatile, actually
exists, the definition is merely real and
nothing more. If, however, the proof of the
possibility is a priori, the definition is
not only real but also causal as for instance
when it contains the possible generation
of a thing. Finally when the definition,
without assuming anything which requires
a proof a priori of its possibility, carries
the analysis clear to the primitive conception,
the definition is perfect or essential.
XXV: In what cases knowledge is added to
mere contemplation of the idea.
Now it is manifest that we have no idea of
a conception when it is impossible. And in
case the knowledge, where we have the idea
of it, is only assumed, we do not visualize
it because such a conception is known only
in like manner as conceptions internally
impossible. And if it be in fact possible,
it is not by this kind of knowledge that
we learn its possibility. For instance, when
I am thinking of a thousand or of a chiliagon,
I frequently do it without contemplating
the idea. Even if I say a thousand is ten
times a hundred, I frequently do not trouble
to think what ten and a hundred are, because
I assume that I know, and I do not consider
it necessary to stop just at present to conceive
of them. Therefore it may well happen, as
it in fact does happen often enough, that
I am mistaken in regard to a conception which
I assume that I understand, although it is
an impossible truth or at least is incompatible
with others with which I join it, and whether
I am mistaken or not, this way of assuming
our knowledge remains the same. It is, then,
only when our knowledge is clear in regard
to confused conceptions, and when it is intuitive
in regard to those which are distinct, that
we see its entire idea.
XXVI: Ideas are all stored up within us.
Plato's doctrine of reminiscence.
In order to see clearly what an idea is,
we must guard ourselves against a misunderstanding.
Many regard the idea as the form or the differentiation
of our thinking, and according to this opinion
we have the idea in our mind, in so far as
we are thinking of it, and each separate
time that we think of it anew we have another
idea although similar to the preceding one.
Some, however, take the idea as the immediate
object of thought, or as a permanent form
which remains even when we are no longer
contemplating it. As a matter of fact our
soul has the power of representing to itself
any form or nature whenever the occasion
comes for thinking about it, and I think
that this activity of our soul is, so far
as it expresses some nature, form or essence,
properly the idea of the thing. This is in
us, and is always in us, whether we are thinking
of it or no.
(Our soul expresses God and the universe
and all essences as well as all existences.)
This position is in accord with my principles
that naturally nothing enters into our minds
from outside.
It is a bad habit we have of thinking as
though our minds receive certain messengers,
as it were, or as if they had doors or windows.
We have in our minds all those forms for
all periods of time because the mind at every
moment expresses all its future thoughts
and already thinks confusedly of all that
of which it will ever think distinctly. Nothing
can be taught us of which we have not already
in our minds the idea. This idea is as it
were the material out of which the thought
will form itself. This is what Plato has
excellently brought out in his doctrine of
reminiscence, a doctrine which contains a
great deal of truth, provided that it is
properly understood and purged of the error
of pre-existence, and provided that one does
not conceive of the soul as having already
known and thought at some other time what
it learns and thinks now. Plato has also
confirmed his position by a beautiful experiment.
He introduces a small boy, whom he leads
by short steps, to extremely difficult truths
of geometry bearing on incommensurables,
all this without teaching the boy anything,
merely drawing out replies by a well arranged
series of questions. This shows that the
soul virtually knows those things, and needs
only to be reminded (animadverted) to recognize
the truths. Consequently it possesses at
least the idea upon which those truths depend.
We may say even that it already possesses
those truths, if we consider them as the
relations of the ideas.
XXVII: In what respect our souls can be compared
to blank tablets and how conceptions are
derived from the senses.
Aristotle preferred to compare our souls
to blank tablets prepared for writing, and
he maintained that nothing is in the understanding
which does not come through the senses. This
position is in accord with the popular conceptions
as Aristotle's positions usually are. Plato
thinks more profoundly. Such tenets or practicologies
are nevertheless allowable in ordinary use
somewhat in the same way as those who accept
the Copernican theory still continue to speak
of the rising and setting of the sun. I find
indeed that these usages can be given a real
meaning containing no error, quite in the
same way as I have already pointed out that
we may truly say particular substances act
upon one another. In this same sense we may
say that knowledge is received from without
through the medium of the senses because
certain exterior things contain or express
more particularly the causes which determine
us to certain thoughts. Because in the ordinary
uses of life we attribute to the soul only
that which belongs to it most manifestly
and particularly, and there is no advantage
in going further. When, however, we are dealing
with the exactness of metaphysical truths,
it is important to recognize the powers and
independence of the soul which extend infinitely
further than is commonly supposed. In order,
therefore, to avoid misunderstandings it
would be well to choose separate terms for
the two. These expressions which are in the
soul whether one is conceiving of them or
not may be called ideas, while those which
one conceives of or constructs may be called
conceptions, conceptus. But whatever terms
are used, it is always false to say that
all our conceptions come from the so-called
external senses, because those conceptions
which I have of myself and of my thoughts,
and consequently of being, of substance,
of action, of identity, and of many others
came from an inner experience.
XXVIII: The only immediate object of our
perceptions which exists outside of us is
God, and in him alone is our light.
In the strictly metaphysical sense no external
cause acts upon us excepting God alone, and
he is in immediate relation with us only
by virtue of our continual dependence upon
him. Whence it follows that there is absolutely
no other external object which comes into
contact with our souls and directly excites
perceptions in us. We have in our souls ideas
of everything, only because of the continual
action of God upon us, that is to say, because
every effect expresses its cause and therefore
the essences of our souls are certain expressions,
imitations or images of the divine essence,
divine thought and divine will, including
all the ideas which are there contained.
We may say, therefore, that God is for us
the only immediate external object, and that
we see things through him. For example, when
we see the sun or the stars, it is God who
gives to us and preserves in us the ideas
and whenever our senses are affected according
to his own laws in a certain manner, it is
he, who by his continual concurrence, determines
our thinking. God is the sun and the light
of souls, lumen illuminans omnem hominem
venientem in hunc mundum, although this is
not the current conception. I think I have
already remarked that during the scholastic
period many believed God to be the light
of the soul, intellectus agens animae rationalis,
following in this the Holy Scriptures and
the fathers who were always more Platonic
than Aristotelian in their mode of thinking.
The Averroists misused this conception, but
others, among whom were several mystic theologians,
and William of Saint Amour, also I think,
understood this conception in a manner which
assured the dignity of God and was able to
raise the soul to a knowledge of its welfare.
XXIX: Yet we think directly by means of our
own ideas and not through God's.
Nevertheless I cannot approve of the position
of certain able philosophers who seem to
hold that our ideas themselves are in God
and not at all in us. I think that in taking
this position they have neither sufficiently
considered the nature of substance, which
we have just explained, nor the entire extension
and independence of the soul which includes
all that happens to it, and expresses God,
and with him all possible and actual beings
in the same way that an effect expresses
its cause. It is indeed inconceivable that
the soul should think using the ideas of
something else. The soul when it thinks of
anything must be affected effectively in
a certain manner, and it must needs have
in itself in advance not only the passive
capacity of being thus affected, a capacity
already wholly determined, but it must have
besides an active power by virtue of which
it has always had in its nature the marks
of the future production of this thought,
and the disposition to produce it at its
proper time. All of this shows that the soul
already includes the idea which is comprised
in any particular thought.
XXX: How God inclines our souls without necessitating
them; that there are no grounds for complaint;
that we must not ask why Judas sinned because
this free act is contained in his concept,
the only question being why Judas the sinner
is admitted to existence, preferably to other
possible persons; concerning the original
imperfection or limitation before the fall
and concerning the different degrees of grace.
Regarding the action of God upon the human
will there are many quite different considerations
which it would take too long to investigate
here. Nevertheless the following is what
can be said in general. God in co-operating
with ordinary actions only follows the laws
which he has established, that is to say,
he continually preserves and produces our
being so that the ideas come to us spontaneously
or with freedom in that order which the concept
of our individual substance carries with
itself. In this concept they can be foreseen
for all eternity. Furthermore, by virtue
of the decree which God has made that the
will shall always seek the apparent good
in certain particular respects (in regard
to which this apparent good always has in
it something of reality expressing or imitating
God's will), he, without at all necessitating
our choice, determines it by that which appears
most desirable. For absolutely speaking,
our will as contrasted with necessity, is
in a state of indifference, being able to
act otherwise, or wholly to suspend its action,
either alternative being and remaining possible.
It therefore devolves upon the soul to be
on guard against appearances, by means of
a firm will, to reflect and to refuse to
act or decide in certain circumstances, except
after mature deliberation. It is, however,
true and has been assured from all eternity
that certain souls will not employ their
power upon certain occasions.
But who could do more than God has done,
and can such a soul complain of anything
except itself? All these complaints after
the deed are unjust, inasmuch as they would
have been unjust before the deed. Would this
soul a little before committing the sin have
had the right to complain of God as though
he had determined the sin. Since the determinations
of God in these matters cannot be foreseen,
how would the soul know that it was preordained
to sin unless it had already committed the
sin? It is merely a question of wishing to
or not wishing to, and God could not have
set an easier or juster condition. Therefore
all judges without asking the reasons which
have disposed a man to have an evil will,
consider only how far this will is wrong.
But, you object, perhaps it is ordained from
all eternity that I will sin. Find your own
answer. Perhaps it has not been. Now then,
without asking for what you are unable to
know and in regard to which you can have
no light, act according to your duty and
your knowledge. But, some one will object;
whence comes it then that this man will assuredly
do this sin? The reply is easy. It is that
otherwise he would not be a man. For God
foresees from all time that there will be
a certain Judas, and in the concept or idea
of him which God has, is contained this future
free act. The only question, therefore, which
remains is why this certain Judas, the betrayer
who is possible only because of the idea
of God, actually exists. To this question,
however, we can expect no answer here on
earth excepting to say in general that it
is because God has found it good that he
should exist notwithstanding that sin which
he foresaw. This evil will be more than overbalanced.
God will derive a greater good from it, and
it will finally turn out that this series
of events in which is included the existence
of this sinner, is the most perfect among
all the possible series of events. An explanation
in every case of the admirable economy of
this choice cannot be given while we are
sojourners on earth. It is enough to know
the excellence without understanding it.
It is here that must be recognized altitudinem
divitiarum, the unfathomable depth of the
divine wisdom, without hesitating at a detail
which involves an infinite number of considerations.
It is clear, however, that God is not the
cause of ill. For not only after the loss
of innocence by men, has original sin possessed
the soul, but even before that there was
an original limitation or imperfection in
the very nature of all creatures, which rendered
them open to sin and able to fall. There
is, therefore, no more difficulty in the
supralapsarian view than there is in the
other views of sin. To this also, it seems
to me can be reduced the opinion of Saint
Augustine and of other authors: that the
root of evil is in the negativity, that is
to say, in the lack or limitation of creatures
which God graciously remedies by whatever
degree of perfection it pleases him to give.
This grace of God, whether ordinary or extraordinary
has its degrees and its measures. It is always
efficacious in itself to produce a certain
proportionate effect and furthermore it is
always sufficient not only to keep one from
sin but even to effect his salvation, provided
that the man co-operates with that which
is in him. It has not always, however, sufficient
power to overcome the inclination, for, if
it did, it would no longer be limited in
any way, and this superiority to limitations
is reserved to that unique grace which is
absolutely efficacious. This grace is always
victorious whether through its own self or
through the congruity of circumstances.
XXXI: Concerning the motives of election;
concerning faith foreseen and the absolute
decree and that it all reduces to the question
why God has chosen and resolved to admit
to existence just such a possible person,
whose concept includes just such a sequence
of free acts and of free gifts of grace.
This at once puts an end to all difficulties.
Finally, the grace of God is wholly unprejudiced
and creatures have no claim upon it. Just
as it is not sufficient in accounting for
God's choice in his dispensations of grace
to refer to his absolute or conditional prevision
of men's future actions, so it is also wrong
to imagine his decrees as absolute with no
reasonable motive. As concerns foreseen faith
and good works, it is very true that God
has elected none but those whose faith and
charity he foresees, quos se fide donaturum
praescivit. The same question, however, arises
again as to why God gives to some rather
than to others the grace of faith or of good
works. As concerns God's ability to foresee
not only the faith and good deeds, but also
their material and predisposition, or that
which a man on his part contributes to them
(since there are as truly diversities on
the part of men as on the part of grace,
and a man although he needs to be aroused
to good and needs to become converted, yet
acts in accordance with his temperament),-
as regards his ability to foresee there are
many who say that God, knowing what a particular
man will do without grace, that is without
his extraordinary assistance, or knowing
at least what will be the human contribution,
resolves to give grace to those whose natural
dispositions are the best, or at any rate
are the least imperfect and evil. But if
this were the case then the natural dispositions
in so far as they were good would be like
gifts of grace, since God would have given
advantages to some over others; and therefore,
since he would well know that the natural
advantages which he had given would serve
as motives for his grace or for his extraordinary
assistance, would not everything be reduced
to his mercy? I think, therefore, that since
we do not know how much and in what way God
regards natural dispositions in the dispensations
of his grace, it would be safest and most
exact to say, in accordance with our principles
and as I have already remarked, that there
must needs be among possible beings the person
Peter or John whose concept or idea contains
all that particular sequence of ordinary
and extraordinary manifestations of grace
together with the rest of the accompanying
events and circumstances, and that it has
pleased God to choose him among an infinite
number of persons equally possible for actual
existence. When we have said this there seems
nothing left to ask, and all difficulties
vanish. For in regard to that great and ultimate
question why it has pleased God to choose
him among so great a number of possible persons,
it is surely unreasonable to demand more
than the general reasons which we have given.
The reasons in detail surpass our ken. Therefore,
instead of postulating an absolute decree,
which being without reason would be unreasonable,
and instead of postulating reasons which
do not succeed in solving the difficulties
and in turn have need themselves of reasons,
it will be best to say with St. Paul that
there are for God's choice certain great
reasons of wisdom and congruity which he
follows, which reasons, however, are unknown
to mortals and are founded upon the general
order, whose goal is the greatest perfection
of the world. This is what is meant when
the motives of God's glory and of the manifestation
of his justice are spoken of, as well as
when men speak of his mercy, and his perfection
in general; that immense vastness of wealth,
in fine, with which the soul of the same
St. Paul was to thrilled.
XXXII: Usefulness of these principles in
matters of piety and of religion.
In addition it seems that the thoughts which
we have just explained and particularly the
great principle of the perfection of God's
operations and the concept of substance which
includes all its changes with all its accompanying
circumstances, far from injuring, serve rather
to confirm religion, serve to dissipate great
difficulties, to inflame souls with a divine
love and to raise the mind to a knowledge
of incorporeal substances much more than
the present-day hypotheses. For it appears
clearly that all other substances depend
upon God just as our thoughts emanate from
our own substances; that God is all in all
and that he is intimately united to all created
things, in proportion however to their perfection;
that it is he alone who determines them from
without by his influence, and if to act is
to determine directly, it may be said in
metaphysical language that God alone acts
upon me and he alone causes me to do good
or ill, other substances contributing only
because of his determinations; because God,
who takes all things into consideration,
distributes his bounties and compels created
beings to accommodate themselves to one another.
Thus God alone constitutes the relation or
communication between substances. It is through
him that the phenomena of the one meet and
accord with the phenomena of the others,
so that there may be a reality in our perceptions.
In common parlance, however, an action is
attributed to particular causes in the sense
that I have explained above because it is
not necessary to make continual mention of
the universal cause when speaking of particular
cases. It can be seen also that every substance
has a perfect spontaneity (which becomes
liberty with intelligent substances). Everything
which happens to it is a consequence of its
idea or its being and nothing determines
it except God only. It is for this reason
that a person of exalted mind and revered
saintliness may say that the soul ought often
to think as if there were only God and itself
in the world. Nothing can make us hold to
immortality more firmly than this independence
and vastness of the soul which protects it
completely against exterior things, since
it alone constitutes our universe and together
with God is sufficient for itself. It is
as impossible for it to perish save through
annihilation as it is impossible for the
universe to destroy itself, the universe
whose animate and perpetual expression it
is. Furthermore, the changes in this extended
mass which is called our body cannot possibly
affect the soul nor can the dissipation of
the body destroy that which is indivisible.
XXXIII: Explanation of the relation between
the soul and the body, a matter which has
been regarded as inexplicable or else as
miraculous; concerning the origin of confused
perceptions.
We can also see the explanation of that great
mystery "the union of the soul and the
body," that is to say how it comes about
that the passions and actions of the one
are accompanied by the actions and passions
or else the appropriate phenomena of the
other. For it is not possible to conceive
how one can have an influence upon the other
and it is unreasonable to have recourse at
once to the extraordinary intervention of
the universal cause in an ordinary and particular
case. The following, however, is the true
explanation. We have said that everything
which happens to a soul or to any substance
is a consequence of its concept; hence the
idea itself or the essence of the soul brings
it about that all of its appearances or perceptions
should be born out of its nature and precisely
in such a way that they correspond of themselves
to that which happens in the universe at
large, but more particularly and more perfectly
to that which happens in the body associated
with it, because it is in a particular way
and only for a certain time according to
the relation of other bodies to its own body
that the soul expresses the state of the
universe. This last fact enables us to see
how our body belongs to us, without, however,
being attached to our essence. I believe
that those who are careful thinkers will
decide favorably for our principles because
of this single reason, viz., that they are
able to see in what consists the relation
between the soul and the body, a parallelism
which appears inexplicable in any other way.
We can also see that the perceptions of our
senses even when they are clear must necessarily
contain certain confused elements, for as
all the bodies in the universe are in sympathy,
ours receives the impressions of all the
others, and while our senses respond to everything,
our soul cannot pay attention to every particular.
That is why our confused sensations are the
result of a variety of perceptions. This
variety is infinite. It is almost like the
confused murmuring which is heard by those
who approach the shore of a sea. It comes
from the continual beatings of innumerable
waves. If now, out of many perceptions which
do not at all fit together to make one, no
particular one perception surpasses the others,
and if they make impressions about equally
strong or equally capable of holding the
attention of the soul, they can be perceived
only confusedly.
XXXIV: Concerning the difference between
spirits and other substances, souls or substantial
forms; that the immortality which men desire
includes memory.
Supposing that the bodies which constitute
a unum per se, as human bodies, are substances,
and have substantial forms, and supposing
that animals have souls, we are obliged to
grant that these souls and these substantial
forms cannot entirely perish, any more than
can the atoms or the ultimate elements of
matter, according to the position of other
philosophers; for no substance perishes,
although it may become very different. Such
substances also express the whole universe,
although more imperfectly than do spirits.
The principle difference, however, is that
they do not know that they are, nor what
they are. Consequently, not being able to
reason, they are unable to discover necessary
and universal truths. It is also because
they do not reflect regarding themselves
that they have no moral qualities, whence
it follows that undergoing a thousand transformations,
as we see a caterpillar change into a butterfly,
the result from a moral or practical standpoint
is the same as if we said that they perished
in each case, and we can indeed say it from
the physical standpoint in the same way that
we say bodies perish in their dissolution.
But the intelligent soul, knowing that it
is and having the ability to say that word
"I" so full of meaning, not only
continues and exists, metaphysically far
more certainly than do the others, but it
remains the same from the moral standpoint,
and constitutes the same personality, for
it is its memory or knowledge of this ego
which renders it open to punishment and reward.
Also the immortality which is required in
morals and in religion does not consist merely
in this perpetual existence, which pertains
to all substances, for if in addition there
were no remembrance of what one had been,
immortality would not be at all desirable.
Suppose that some individual could suddenly
become King of China on condition, however,
of forgetting what he had been, as though
being born again, would it not amount to
the same practically, or as far as the effects
could be perceived, as if the individual
were annihilated, and a king of China were
the same instant created in his place? The
individual would have no reason to desire
this.
XXXV: The excellence of spirits; that God
considers them preferable to other creatures;
that the spirits express God rather than
the world, while other simple substances
express the world rather than God.
In order, however, to prove by natural reasons
that God will preserve forever not only our
substance, but also our personality, that
is to say the recollection and knowledge
of what we are (although the distinct knowledge
is sometimes suspended during sleep and in
swoons) it is necessary to join to metaphysics
moral considerations. God must be considered
not only as the principle and the cause of
all substances and of all existing things,
but also as the chief of all persons or intelligent
substances, as the absolute monarch of the
most perfect city or republic, such as is
constituted by all the spirits together in
the universe, God being the most complete
of all spirits at the same time that he is
greatest of all beings. For assuredly the
spirits are the most perfect of substances
and best express the divinity. Since all
the nature, purpose, virtue and function
of substances is, as has been sufficiently
explained, to express God and the universe,
there is no room for doubting that those
substances which give the expression, knowing
what they are doing and which are able to
understand the great truths about God and
the universe, do express God and the universe
incomparably better than do those natures
which are either brutish and incapable of
recognizing truths, or are wholly destitute
of sensation and knowledge. The difference
between intelligent substances and those
which are not intelligent is quite as great
as between a mirror and one who sees. As
God is himself the greatest and wisest of
spirits it is easy to understand that the
spirits with which he can, so to speak, enter
into conversation and even into social relations
by communicating to them in particular ways
his feelings and his will so that they are
able to know and love their benefactor, must
be much nearer to him than the rest of created
things which may be regarded as the instruments
of spirits. In the same way we see that all
wise persons consider far more the condition
of a man than of anything else however precious
it may be; and it seems that the greatest
satisfaction which a soul, satisfied in other
respects, can have is to see itself loved
by others. However, with respect to God there
is this difference that his glory and our
worship can add nothing to his satisfaction,
the recognition of creatures being nothing
but a consequence of his sovereign and perfect
felicity and being far from contributing
to it or from causing it even in part. Nevertheless,
that which is reasonable in finite spirits
is found eminently in him and as we praise
a king who prefers to preserve the life of
a man before that of the most precious and
rare of his animals, we should not doubt
that the most enlightened and most just of
all monarchs has the same preference.
XXXVI: God is the monarch of the most perfect
republic composed of all the spirits, and
the happiness of this city of God is his
principal purpose.
Spirits are of all substances the most capable
of perfection and their perfections are different
in this that they interfere with one another
the least, or rather they aid one another
the most, for only the most virtuous can
be the most perfect friends. Hence it follows
that God who in all things has the greatest
perfection will have the greatest care for
spirits and will give not only to all of
them in general, but even to each one in
particular the highest perfection which the
universal harmony will permit. We can even
say that it is because he is a spirit that
God is the originator of existences, for
if he had lacked the power of will to choose
what is best, there would have been no reason
why one possible being should exist rather
than any other. Therefore God's being a spirit
himself dominates all the consideration which
he may have toward created things. Spirits
alone are made in his image, being as it
were of his blood or as children in the family,
since they alone are able to serve him of
free will, and to act consciously imitating
the divine nature. A single spirit is worth
a whole world, because it not only expresses
the whole world, but it also knows it and
governs itself as does God. In this way we
may say that though every substance expresses
the whole universe, yet the other substances
express the world rather than God, while
spirits express God rather than the world.
This nature of spirits, so noble that it
enables them to approach divinity as much
as is possible for created things, has as
a result that God derives infinitely more
glory from them than from the other beings,
or rather the other beings furnish to spirits
the material for glorifying him. This moral
quality of God which constitutes him Lord
and Monarch of spirits influences him so
to speak personally and in a unique way.
It is through this that he humanizes himself,
that he is willing to suffer anthropologies,
and that he enters into social relations
with us and this consideration is so dear
to him that the happy and prosperous condition
of his empire which consists in the greatest
possible felicity of its inhabitants, becomes
supreme among his laws. Happiness is to persons
what perfection is to beings. And if the
dominant principle in the existence of the
physical world is the decree to give it the
greatest possible perfection, the primary
purpose in the moral world or in the city
of God which constitutes the noblest part
of the universe ought to be to extend the
greatest happiness possible. We must not
therefore doubt that God has so ordained
everything that spirits not only shall live
forever, because this is unavoidable, but
that they shall also preserve forever their
moral quality, so that his city may never
lose a person, quite in the same way that
the world never loses a substance. Consequently
they will always be conscious of their being,
otherwise they would be open to neither reward
nor punishment, a condition which is the
essence of a republic, and above all of the
most perfect republic where nothing can be
neglected. In fine, God being at the same
time the most just and the most debonnaire
of monarchs, and requiring only a good will
on the part of men, provided that it be sincere
and intentional, his subjects cannot desire
a better condition. To render them perfectly
happy he desires only that they love him.
XXXVII: Jesus Christ has revealed to men
the mystery and the admirable laws of the
kingdom of heaven, and the greatness of the
supreme happiness which God has prepared
for those who love him.
The ancient philosophers knew very little
of these important truths. Jesus Christ alone
has expressed them divinely well, and in
a way so clear and simple that the dullest
minds have understood them. His gospel has
entirely changed the face of human affairs.
It has brought us to know the kingdom of
heaven, or that perfect republic of spirits
which deserves to be called the city of God.
He it is who has discovered to us its wonderful
laws. He alone has made us see how much God
loves us and with what care everything that
concerns us has been provided for; how God,
inasmuch as he cares for the sparrows, will
not neglect reasoning beings, who are infinitely
more dear to him; how all the hairs of our
heads are numbered; how heaven and earth
may pass away but the word of God and that
which belongs to the means of our salvation
will not pass away; how God has more regard
for the least one among intelligent souls
than for the whole machinery of the world;
how we ought not to fear those who are able
to destroy the body but are unable to destroy
the soul, since God alone can render the
soul happy or unhappy; and how the souls
of the righteous are protected by his hand
against all the upheavals of the universe,
since God alone is able to act upon them;
how none of our acts are forgotten; how everything
is to be accounted for; even careless words
and even a spoonful of water which is well
used; in fact how everything must result
in the greatest welfare of the good, for
then shall the righteous become like suns
and neither our sense nor our minds have
ever tasted of anything approaching the joys
which God has laid up for those that love
him.
THE END
Footnotes
*1 This term is employed here for the
sake
of clearness. Leibniz did not possess
the
concept "mass," which was
enunciated
by Newton in the same year in which
the present
treatise was written, 1686. Leibniz
uses
the terms "body," "magnitude
of body," etc. The technical expression
"mass" occurs once only in
the
writings of Leibniz (in a treatise
published
in 1695), and was there doubtless borrowed
from Newton. For the history of the
controversy
concerning the Cartesian and Leibnizian
measure
of force, see Mach's Science of Mechanics,
Chicago, 1893, pp. 272 et seq.- Trans.
*2 There is a gap here in the MS.,
intended
for the passage from Plato, the translation
of which Leibniz did not supply.- Trans.
* Note on the text: This document was
originally
downloaded from Leibniz Links. The
format
was subsequently modified, "Contents"
and bookmarks added, and minor corrections
made. The translation is by Dr. George
R.
Montgomery and was first published
in Leibniz
by the Open Court Publishing Company
in 1902.
This translation was subsequently revised
by Dr. Albert R. Chandler in 1924.
According
to the publishers' Preface to the Second
Edition, the "translation still
remains
substantially that of Dr. Montgomery."
I believe - but cannot be certain -
that
it is the revised translation that
is presented
here. The Reprint Edition of 1950 shows
only
the original 1902 copyright. Carl Mickelsen
- carlmick@moscow.com
|
Evans Experientialism 
