INTRODUCTION TO THE LECTURE ON HEGEL
1. What Kojève presents as an explicationof Hegel’s abstract discussion of “Evil andits forgiveness” is, more accurately, a readingof this discussion in terms of Kojève’s understandingof Hegel’s politics. There is no referenceto Napoleon in Hegel’s discussion nor inany part of the Phänomenologie. However,Kojève’s reading is far from idiosyncratic.The asssessment of Hegel’s philosophicalwritings on the basis of his political beliefsgo back to his own life, largely becausehe was a German opposed to German nationalism.Moreover, Hegel’s admiration for Napoleonhad long been established by letters he wrotefrom Jena, when his completion of the Phänomenologiecoincided with Napoleon’s victory over thePrussian army. A good introduction to therelationship between the Phänomenologie andHegel’s politics is Chapter 4 of Shlomo Avineri’sHegel’s Theory of the Modern State:
The period of Hegel’s stay in Jena saw thefiercest battles between the French armyand the various coalitions of German statesranged against it. What characterized Hegel’spolitical attitude during this period, aswell as during his subsequent periods inBamberg (1807-8) and Nuremberg (1808-16),was his firm support for the French, hisrejoicing at the Prussian defeat at Jena,his opposition to the German nationalistanti-French upsurge in 1813 and, above allhis admiration for Napoleon, the great modernizerof Europe and of Germany. Much more thanmere infatuation with Napoleon, which wasquite common among intellectuals at the time,was involved here, and Hegel’s correspondenceof that period provides ample textual evidenceto support the contention that his politicalviews were related to a fundamental theoryabout the historical significance of whatwas happening in Germany. (63)
Averni also quotes from the letter that isthe source for Caillois’s reference to Hegel’ssymbol of “the man on horseback, who marksthe closure of History and of philosophy”:
This morning I saw the Emperor [Napoleon]—thisworld-soul (diese Weltseele)—ride throughtown . . . It is a marvelous feeling to seesuch a personality, concentrated in one point,dominating the entire world from horseback. . . It is impossible not to admire him.(Hegel to Niethammer, 13 Oct 1806).
Excerpt B (from pp. 151-52 of Kojève’s Introductionà la lecture de Hegel)
1. Die schöne Seele - “The beautiful soul.”This is a phrase from Hegel’s subheadingfor this final section of Chapter 7, whichKojève presents as “Das Gewissen, die schöneSeele, das Böse und seine Verzeihung” (“Conscience.The ‘beautiful soul,’ evil and its forgiveness”;notice the different punctuation in A. V.Miller’ translation).
What is Dialectic, according to Hegel?
We can give a first answer to this questionby recalling a passage from the Encyclopaedia— more exactly, the Introduction to the FirstPart of the Encyclopaedia, entitled Logic.
In § 79 (third edition) Hegel says this:
With regard to its form, logic has threeaspects (Seiten): (a) the abstract or understandable(versändige) aspect; (b) the dialecticalor Negatively rational (vernüntige) aspect,
(c) the speculative or positively rationalaspect.
This well-known text lends itself to twomisunderstandings. On the one hand, one mightbelieve that Dialectic reduces to the secondaspect of “Logic,” isolated from the othertwo. But in the explanatory Note, Hegel underlinesthat the three aspects are in reality inseparable.And we know from elsewhere that the simultaneouspresence of the three aspects in questionis what gives “Logic” its dialectical characterin the broad sense. But it must be notedright away that “Logic” is dialectical (inthe broad sense) only because it impliesa "negative” or negating aspect, whichis called “dialectical” in the narrow sense.Nevertheless, dialectical “logic” necessarilyimplies three complementary and inseparableaspects: the “abstract” aspect (revealedby Understanding, Verstand); the “negative,”properly “dialectical,” aspect — and thepositive” aspect (the last two aspects arerevealed by Reason, Vernunft).
On the other hand, one might suppose thatDialectic is the preserve of logical thought;or in other words, that this passage is concernedwith a philosophical method, a way of investigationor exposition. Now, in fact, this is notat all the case. For Hegel’s Logic is nota logic in the common sense of the word,nor a gnoseology, but an ontology or Scienceof Being, taken as Being. And “the Logic”(das Logische) of the passage we have citeddoes not mean logical thought consideredin itself, but Being (Sein) revealed
(correctly) in and by thought or speech (Logos).Therefore, the three “aspects” in questionare above all aspects of Being itself: theyare ontological, and not logical or gnoseological,categories; and they are certainly not simpleartifices of method of investigation or exposition.Hegel takes care, moreover, to underlinethis in the Note that follows the passagecited.
In this Note, he says the following: (VolumeV, page 104, lines 31-33):
These three aspects do not constitute threeparts of Logic, but are constituent-elements(Momente) of every logical-real-entity (Logisch-Reellen),that is, of every concept or of everythingthat is true (jedes Wahren) in general.
Everything that is true, the true entity,the True, das Wahre, is a real entity, orBeing itself, as revealed correctly and completelyby coherent discourse having a meaning
(Logos). And this is what Hegel also callsBegriff, concept; a term that means for him(except when, as in the writings of his youthand still occasionally in the Phenomenology,he says: nur Begriff) not an “abstract notion”detached from the real entity to which itis related, but “conceptually understoodreality.” The True and the Concept are, asHegel himself says, a Logisch-Reelles, somethinglogical and real at the same time, a realisedconcept or a conceived reality. Now, "logical”thought that is supposed to be true, theconcept that is supposed to be adequate,merely reveal or describe Being as it isor as it exists, without adding anythingto it, without taking anything away fromit, without modifying it in any way whatsoever.The structure of thought, therefore, is determinedby the structure of the Being that it reveals.If, then, “logical” thought has three aspects,if in other words it is dialectical (in thebroad sense), this is only because Beingitself is dialectical (in the broad sense),because of the fact that it implies a “constituent-element”or an “aspect” that is negative or negating(“dialectical” in the narrow and strong senseof the term). Thought is dialectical onlyto the extent that it correctly reveals thedialectic of Being that is and of the Realthat exists.
To be sure, pure and simple Being (Sein)does not have a threefold or dialecticalstructure; but the Logical — real, the Conceptor the True — i. e., Being revealed by Speechor Thought — does. Hence one might be inclinedto say that Being is dialectical only tothe extent that it is revealed by Thought,that Thought is what gives Being its dialecticalcharacter. But this formulation would beincorrect, or at least misleading. For insome sense the reverse is true for Hegel:Being can be revealed by Thought; there isa Thought in Being and of Being, only becauseBeing is dialectical; i. e., because Beingimplies a negative or negating constituentelement. The real dialectic of existing Beingis, among other things, the revelation ofthe Real and of Being by Speech or Thought.And Speech and Thought themselves are dialecticalonly because, and to the extent that, theyreveal or describe the dialectic of Beingand of the Real.
However that may be, philosophic thoughtor “scientific” thought in the Hegelian senseof the word — i. e., rigorously true thought— has the goal of revealing, through themeaning of a coherent discourse (Logos),Being (Sein) as it is and exists in the totalityof its objective-Reality (Wirklichkeit).The philosophic or “scientific” Method, therefore,must assure the adequation of Thought toBeing, since Thought must adapt itself toBeing and to the Real without modifying themin any way whatsoever. This is to say thatthe attitude of the philosopher or the "scientist”(= the Wise Man) with respect to Being andto the Real is one of purely passive contemplation,and that philosophic or “scientific” activityreduces to a pure and simple descriptionof the Real and of Being. The Hegelian method,therefore, is not at all “dialectical":it is purely contemplative and descriptive,or better, phenomenological in Husserl’ssense of the term. In the Preface and theIntroduction to the Phenomenology, Hegelinsists at length on the passive, contemplative,and descriptive character of the “scientific”method. He underlines that there is a dialecticof “scientific” thought only because thereis a dialectic of the Being which that thoughtreveals. As soon as the revealing descriptionis correct, it can be said that ordo et connexioidearum idem est ac ordo et connexio rerum;for the order and the connection of the realare, according to Hegel, dialectical.
Here is what Hegel says, for example, inthe Preface to the Phenomenology:
But scientific knowledge (Erkennen) demands,on the contrary, that one give himself (übergeben)to the life of the object (Gegenstandes)or, to say the same thing in different words,that one have before oneself and expressin speech (auszusprechen) the inner necessityof this object. By thus plunging (sich vertiefend)into its object, this knowledge forgets thatoverview (Übersicht) [thought to be possiblefrom the outside] which is [in reality] onlyknowledge’s (Wissens) own face reflectedback into itself from the content. But havingplunged into the matter and progressing (fortgehend)in the [dialectical] movement of this matter,scientific knowledge comes back into itself;but not before the filling (Erfüllung) orthe content [of the thought] gathers itselfback into itself, simplifies itself to specificdetermination (Bestimmtheit), lowers itselfto [being] an aspect (Seite) [merely] ofan empirical-existence (Daseins) [the otheraspect being thought], and transforms itself(übergeht) into its superior (höhere) truth[or revealed reality]. By that very process,the simple-or-undivided Whole (Ganze) whichhas an overview of itself (sich übersehende)itself emerges from the richness [of thediversity] in which its reflection [intoitself] seemed lost.
"Scientific knowledge” gives itselfor abandons itself without reserve, withoutpreconceived ideas or afterthoughts, to the“life” and the “dialectical movement” ofthe Real. Thus, this truly true knowledgehas nothing to do with the “Reflection” ofpseudo-philosophy (i. e., pre-Hegelian philosophy)and of pseudo-science (Newtonian science),which reflects on the Real while placingitself outside of the Real, without one’sbeing able to say precisely where; Reflectionwhich pretends to give an “overview” of theReal on the basis of a knowing Subject thatcalls itself autonomous or independent ofthe Object of knowledge; a Subject that,according to Hegel, is but an artificiallyisolated aspect of the known or revealedReal.
To be sure, in the end, “scientific knowledge”comes back toward itself and reveals itselfto itself: its final goal is to describeitself in its nature, in its genesis, andin its development. Just like ordinary philosophicknowledge, it is a self-knowledge. But itis a complete and adequate self-knowledge— that is, it is true in the strong senseof the word. And it is true because, evenin its return toward itself, it simply followspassively the dialectical movement of its“content” which is the “object” — that is,the Real and Being. The Real itself is whatorganises itself and makes itself concreteso as to become a determinate “species,”capable of being revealed by a general notion";the Real itself reveals itself through articulateknowledge and thereby becomes a known objectthat has the knowing subject as its necessarycomplement, so that "empirical existence”is divided into beings that speak and beingsthat are spoken of. For real Being existingas Nature is what produces Man who revealsthat Nature (and himself) by speaking ofit. Real Being thus transforms itself into“truth” or into reality revealed by speech,and becomes a “higher” and “higher” truthas its discursive revelation becomes evermore adequate and complete.
It is by following this “dialectical movement”of the Real that Knowledge is present atits own birth and contemplates its own evolution.And thus it finally attains its end, whichis the adequate and complete understandingof itself — i. e., of the progressive revelationof the Real and of Being by Speech — of theReal and Being which engender, in and bytheir “dialectical movement,” the Speechthat reveals them. And it is thus that atotal revelation of real Being or an entirelyrevealed Totality (an “undivided Whole”)is finally constituted: the coherent wholeof Being realised in the real Universe, completelyand perfectly described in the “overview”given by the one and unique "Science”or the “System” of the Wise Man, finallyemerges from Being which at first was onlya natural World formed of separate and disparateentities, an incoherent “richness' , in whichthere was no “reflection,)) no discursiveknowledge, no articulate self-consciousness.
Taken separately, the Subject and the Objectare abstractions that have neither “objectivereality” (Wirklichkeit) nor “empirical existence”(Dasein). What exists in reality, as soonas there is a Reality of which one speaks— and since we in fact speak of reality,there can be for us only Reality of whichone speaks what exists in reality, I say,is the Subject that knows the Object, or,what is the same thing, the Object knownby the Subject. This double Reality whichis nonetheless one because it is equallyreal in each aspect, taken in its whole oras Totality, is called in Hegel “Spirit”(Geist) or (in the Logic) “absolute Idea.”Hegel also says: "absoluter Begriff”(“absolute Concept”). But the term Begriffcan also be applied to a fragment of totalrevealed Being, to a “constituent-element”(Moment) of the Spirit or Idea (in whichcase the Idea can be defined as the integrationof all the Concepts — that is, of all theparticular “ideas”). Taken in this sense,Begriff signifies a particular real entityor a real aspect of being, revealed by themeaning of a word — i. e., by a “generalnotion"; or else, what is the same thing,Begriff is a “meaning” (“idea”) that existsempirically not only in the form of an actuallythought, spoken, or written word, but alsoas a “thing.” If the (universal or “absolute”)“Idea” is the “Truth” or the Reality revealedby speech of the one and unique totalityof what exists, a (particular) "Concept”is the “Truth” of a particular real entitytaken separately, but understood as an integralelement of the Totality. Or else, again,the “Concept” is a “true entity” (das Wahre)— that is, a real entity named or revealedby the meaning of a word, which meaning relatesit to all other real entities and thus insertsit in the "System” of the whole Realrevealed by the entirety of “scientific”Discourse. Or else, finally, the “Concept”is the “essential reality” or the essence(Wesen) of a concrete entity — that is, preciselythe reality which corresponds, in that concreteentity, to the meaning of the word that designatesor reveals it.
Like the Spirit or the Idea, each Conceptis hence double and single at the same time;it is both “subjective” and “objective,”both real thought of a real entity and areal entity really thought. The real aspectof the Concept is called “object” (Gegenstand),“given-Being” (Sein), “entity that existsas a given-Being” (Seiendes), “In-itself”(Ansich), and so on. The aspect thought iscalled “knowledge” (Wissen), “act of knowing”(Erkennen), “knowledge” (Erkenntniss), “actof thinking” (Denken), and so on; and occasionally“concept” (Begriff) in the common sense (whenHegel says: nur Begriff). But these two aspectsare inseparable and complementary, and itis of little importance to know which ofthe two must be called Wissen or Begriff(in the common sense), and which Gegenstand.What is of importance is that in the Truth-thereis perfect coincidence of the Begriff andthe Gegenstand, and that — in the Truth —Knowledge is purely passive adequation toessential-Reality. And that is why the trueScientist or the 'Wise Man must reduce hisexistence to simple contemplation (reinesZusehen) of the Real and of Being and oftheir “dialectical movement.” He looks ateverything that is and verbally describeseverything that he sees: therefore, he hasnothing to do, for he modifies nothing, —adds nothing, and takes nothing away.
This, at least, is what Hegel says in theIntroduction to the Phenomenology:
If by concept we mean knowledge (Wissen),and by the essential reality (Wesen) or thetrue-entity (Wahre) we mean entity existingas a given-being (Seiende) or object
(Gegenstand), it follows that verification(Prüfung) consists in seeing (zuzusehen)if the concept corresponds to the object.But if by concept we mean the essential realityof the In-itself (An-sich) of the object,and by object, on the other hand, we understandthe object [taken] as object, namely, asit is for another [i. e., for the knowingSubject], it follows that verification consistsin our seeing if the object corresponds toits concept. It is easily seen that both[expressions signify] the same thing. Butwhat is essential is to keep [in mind] forthe whole study (Untersuchung) that thesetwo constituent-elements (Momente), [namely]concept and object, Being for another andBeing in itself, are situated within thevery knowledge that we are studying, andthat consequently we do not need to bringin standards (Masssäbe) or to apply our [own]intuitions
(Einfälle) and ideas (Gedanken) during thestudy. By omitting these latter, we attain[the possibility] of viewing the thing asit is in and for itself.
Now, any addition (Zutat) [coming] from usbecomes superfluous not only in the sense(nach dieser Seite) that [the] concept and(the] object, the standard and what is tobe verified, are present (vorhanden) in theConsciousness (Bewusstsein) itself [whichwe, as philosophers, study in the Phenomenology];but we are also spared the effort of comparingthe two and of verifying in the strict sense,so that — since [studied] Consciousness verifiesitself — in this respect too, only pure contemplation(Zusehen) is left for us to do.
When all is said and done, the “method” ofthe Hegelian Scientist consists in havingno method or way of thinking peculiar tohis Science. The naive man, the vulgar scientist,even the pre-Hegelian philosopher — eachin his way opposes himself to the Real anddeforms it by opposing, his own means ofaction and methods of thought to it. TheWise Man, on the contrary, is fully and definitivelyreconciled with everything that is: he entrustshimself without reserve to Being and openshimself entirely to the Real without resistingit. His role is that of a perfectly flatand indefinitely extended mirror: he doesnot reflect on the Real; it is the Real thatreflects itself on him, is reflected in hisconsciousness, and is revealed in its owndialectical structure by the discourse ofthe Wise who describes it without deformingit.
If you please, the Hegelian “method” is purely“empirical” or “positivist": Hegel looksat the Real and describes what he sees, everythingthat he sees, and nothing but what he sees.In other words, he has the “experience” (Erfahrung)of dialectical Being), and the Real, andthus he makes their "movement” passinto his discourse which describes them.
And that is what Hegel says in the Introductionto the Phenomenology:
This dialectical movement which Consciousnesscarries out (altsübt) in (an) itself, bothin terms of its knowledge and its object,to the extent that the new. [and] true objectarises (entspringt) out of this movement[and appears] before Consciousness, is strictlyspeaking what is called experience (Erfahrung).
To be sure, this experience “strictly speaking”is something quite different from the experienceof vulgar science. The latter is carriedout by a Subject who pretends to be independentof the Object, and it is supposed to revealthe Object which exists independently ofthe Subject. Now in actual fact the experienceis had by a man who lives within Nature andis indissolubly bound to it, but is alsoopposed to it and wants to transform it:science is born from the desire to transformthe World in relation to Man; its final endis technical application. That is why scientificknowledge is never absolutely passive, norpurely contemplative and descriptive. Scientificexperience perturbs the Object because ofthe active intervention of the Subject, whoapplies to the Object a method of investigationthat is his own and to which nothing in theObject itself corresponds. What it reveals,therefore, is neither the Object taken independentlyof the Subject, nor the Subject taken independentlyof the Object, but only the result of theinteraction of the two or, if you that interactionitself. However, scientific experience andknowledge are concerned with the Object asindependent of and isolated from the Subject.Hence they do not find what they are lookingfor; they do not give what they promise,for they do not correctly reveal or describewhat the Real is for them. Generally speakingTruth ( = revealed Reality) is the coincidenceof thought or descriptive knowledge withthe concrete real. Now, for vulgar science,this real is supposed to be independent ofthe thought which describes it. But in factthis science never attains this autonomousreal, this “thing in itself” of Kant-Newton,because it incessantly perturbs it. Hencescientific thought does not attain its truth;there is no scientific truth in the strongand proper sense of the term. Scientificexperience is thus only a pseudo-experience.And it cannot be otherwise, for vulgar scienceis in fact concerned not with the concretereal, but with an abstraction. To the extentthat the scientist thinks or knows his object,what really and concretely exists is theentirety of the Object known by the Subjector of the Subject knowing the Object. Theisolated Object is but an abstraction, andthat is why it has no fixed and stable continuity(Bestehen) and is perpetually deformed orperturbed. Therefore it cannot serve as abasis for a Truth, which by definition isuniversally and eternally valid. And thesame goes for the “object” of vulgar psychology,gnoseology, and philosophy, which is theSubject artificially isolated from the Object— i. e., yet another abstraction.
Hegelian experience is a different story:it reveals concrete Reality, and revealsit without modifying or “perturbing” it.That is why, when this experience is describedverbally, it represents a Truth in the strongsense of the term. And that is why it hasno specific method of its own, as experience,thought, or verbal description, that is notat the same time an "objective” structureof the concrete Real itself which it revealsby describing it.
The concrete Real (of which we speak) isboth Real revealed by a discourse, and Discourserevealing a real. And the Hegelian experienceis related neither to the Real nor to Discoursetaken separately, but to their indissolubleunity. And since it is itself a revealingDiscourse, it is itself an aspect of theconcrete Real which it describes. It thereforebrings in nothing from outside, and the thoughtor the discourse which is born from it isnot a reflection on the Real: the Real itselfis what reflects itself or is reflected inthe discourse or as thought. In particular,if the thought and the discourse of the HegelianScientist or the Wise Man are dialectical,it is only because they faithfully reflectthe “dialectical movement” of the Real ofwhich they are a part and which they experienceadequately by giving themselves to it withoutany preconceived method.
Hegel's method, then, is not at all dialectical,and Dialectic for him is quite differentfrom a method of thought or exposition. Andwe can even say that, in a certain way, Hegelwas the first to abandon Dialectic as a philosophicmethod. He was, at least, the first to doso voluntarily and with full knowledge ofwhat he was doing.
The dialectical method was consciously andsystematically used for the first time bySocrates-Plato. But in fact it is as oldas philosophy itself. For the dialecticalmethod is nothing but the method of dialogue— that is, of discussion.
Everything seems to indicate that Sciencewas born in the form of Myth. A Myth is atheory — that is, a discursive revelationof the real. Of course, it is supposed tobe in agreement with the given real. Butin fact, it always goes beyond its givens,and once beyond them, it only has to be coherent— i. e., free of internal contradictions— in order to make a show of truth. The periodof Myth is a period of monologue, and inthis period one demonstrates nothing becauseone “discusses” nothing, since one is notyet faced with a contrary or simply differentopinion. And that is precisely why thereis true or false “myth” or “opinion” (doxa),but no “science” or “truth” properly so-called.
Then, by chance, the man who has an opinion,or who has created or adopted a myth, comesup against a different myth or a contraryopinion. This man will first try to get ridof it: either by plugging up his ears insome way, by an internal or external 94 censoring";or by overcoming (in the non-dialecticalsense of the term) the adverse myth or opinion,by putting to death or banishing its propagators,for example, or by acts of violence thatwill force the others to say the same thingas he (even if they do not think the samething).
But it can happen (and we know that thisactually did happen one day, somewhere) thatthe man begins to discuss with his adversary.By an act of freedom he can decide to wantto “convince” him, by “refuting” him andby "demonstrating” his own Point ofview. To this end he speaks with his adversary,he engages in a dialogue with him: he usesa dialectical method. And it is by becominga dialectician that the man of myth or opinionbecomes a scientist or a philosopher.
In Plato (and probably already in Socrates)all this became conscious. If Plato has Socratessay that not the trees, but only the menin the city can teach him something, it isbecause he understood that, starting from(false or true) myth and opinion, one canattain science and truth only by way of discussion— that is, by way of dialogue or dialectic.In fine, according to Socrates-Plato, itis from the collision of diverse and adverseopinions that the spark of the one and theonly truth is finally struck. A “thesis”is opposed to an “anti-thesis,” which, bythe way, the thesis generally provokes. Theyconfront each other, correct one anothermutually — that is, destroy each other —but also combine and finally engender a “synthetic”truth. But this latter is still just oneopinion among many others. It is a new thesisthat will find or arouse a new anti-thesis,in order to associate itself with it by negatingi. e., by modifying it — in a new synthesis,in which it will be different from what itwas at the start. And so on, until one achievesa “synthesis” that will no longer be thethesis of a discussion or a “thesis” thatcan be discussed; an indisputable “truth”that will no longer be a simple “opinion”or one of the possible opinions; or, speakingobjectively, the single One which is notin opposition to an Other because it is theWhole — the Idea of the ideas, or the Good.
In philosophy or science born from discussion— that is, in dialectical (or synthetic)truth which realises the Good in man by verballyrevealing the One — Whole — the intermediatetheses, antitheses, and syntheses are aufgehoben,as Hegel will later say. They are “overcome,”in the threefold sense of the German wordAufheben — that is, “overcome dialectically.”In the first place, they are overcome orannulled with respect to whatever is fragmentaryrelative, partial, or one-sided in them —that is, with respect to what makes themfalse when one of them is taken not for anopinion, but as the truth. Secondly, theyare also preserved or safeguarded with respectto whatever is essential or universal inthem — that is, with respect to what in eachof them reveals one of the manifold aspectsof the total and single reality. Finally,they are sublimated — that is, raised toa superior level of knowledge and of reality,and therefore of truth, for by completingone another, the thesis and the antithesisget rid of their one-sided and limited or,better, “subjective” character, and as synthesisthey reveal a more comprehensive and hencea more comprehensible aspect of the “objective”real.
But if dialectic finally attains the adequationof discursive thought to Reality and Being,nothing in Reality and Being correspondsto dialectic. The dialectical movement isa movement of human thought and discourse,but the reality itself which one thinks andof which one talks is in no way dialectical.Dialectic is but a method of philosophicresearch and exposition. And we see, by theway, that the method is dialectical onlybecause it implies a negative or negatingelement: namely, the antithesis which opposesthe thesis in a verbal fight and calls foran effort of demonstration, an effort, moreover,indistinguishable from a refutation. Thereis truth properly so-called — that is, scientificor philosophic truth, or better, dialecticalor synthetical truth — only where there hasbeen discussion or dialogue — that is, antithesisnegating a thesis.
In Plato, the dialectical method is stillquite close to its historical origins (thesophistic discussions). In his writings weare dealing with genuine dialogues, in whichthe thesis and the antithesis are presentedby different persons (Socrates generallyincarnates the antithesis of all theses assertedby his interlocutors or expressed successivelyby one of them). And as for the synthesis,it is generally the auditor who must makeit — the auditor who is the philosopher properlyso-called: Plato himself or that disciplewho is capable of understanding him. Thisauditor finally attains the absolute truthwhich results from the entirety of the dialecticor from the coordinated movement of all thedialogues, a truth that reveals the “total”or “synthetical” Good which is capable offully and definitively “satisfying” the onewho knows it and who is consequently beyonddiscussion or dialectic.
In Aristotle the dialectical method is lessapparent than in Plato. But it continuesto be applied. It becomes the aporetic method:the solution of the problem results froma discussion (and sometimes from a simplejuxtaposition) of all possible opinions —that is, of all opinions that are coherentand do not contradict themselves. And thedialectical method was preserved in this“scholastic” form until our time in boththe sciences and philosophy.
But along a parallel line there was somethingelse.
Like all opinion, the Myth arises spontaneouslyand is accepted (or rejected) in the sameway. Man creates it in and by his (“poetical”)imagination, content if he avoids contradictionswhen he develops his initial idea or “intuition.”But when the confrontation with a differentopinion or myth engenders the desire fora proof, which cannot as yet be satisfiedby a demonstration through discussion, onefeels the need to found one's opinion orthe myth that one is proposing (both beingsupposed to be unverifiable empirically —i. e., by an appeal to common sense experience)on something more than simple personal convictionor “subjective certainty” (Gewissheit) —which is visibly of the same type and weightas the adversary’s. A foundation of superioror “divine” value is sought and found: themyth is presented as having been “revealed”by a god, who is supposed to be the guaranteefor its truth — that is, for its universaland eternal validity.
just like dialectical truth, this “revealed”mythical truth could not have been foundby an isolated man confronted with Nature.Here too “trees teach man nothing.” But “themen in the city” do not teach him anythingeither. It is a God who reveals the truthto him in a “myth.” But in contrast to dialecticaltruth, this mythical truth is not the resultof a discussion or a dialogue: God alonespoke, while man was content to listen, tounderstand, and to transcribe (and to dothis far from the city, on the top of a mountain,and so on).
Even after having been a Platonic philosopher,man can still sometimes return to the “mythological”period. Such was the case of Saint Augustine.But this "return” is in reality a “synthesis":the myth-revealing God becomes a quasi-Socraticinterlocutor; man engages in dialogue withhis God, even if he does not go so far asto have a discussion with him (Abraham, however,discusses with Jehovah!). But this divine-human“dialogue” is but a hybrid and transitoryform of the dialectical method. Accordingly,it assumed an infinite variety of forms amongthe diverse “Mystics,” ranging from truedialogue in which “God” is but a title forthe human interlocutor with whom one discusses,to diverse “revelations” on the tops of mountainsin which the human partner is only a muteauditor, “convinced” beforehand.
In any case, the divine interlocutor is,in fact, fictitious. It all happens in thesoul itself of the “scientist.” And thatis why Saint Augustine had "dialogues”with his “soul.” And a distant disciple ofthat Platonic (or Plotinian) Christian, Descartes,deliberately dropped God and was contentto have dialogue and discussion with himself.Thus Dialectic became “Meditation.” It wasin the form of Cartesian meditation thatthe dialectical method was used by the authorsof the great philosophical “systems” of theseventeenth and eighteenth centuries: fromDescartes to Kant-Fichte-Schelling. At firstsight, this is a step backwards in relationto Socrates-Plato-Aristotle. The great modern“Systems” are like so many “Myths” whichare juxtaposed without being discussed, whichare created out of nothing by their authorswithout coming from an earlier dialogue.But in fact, this is not at all the case.On the one hand the author himself discusseshis “theses” and demonstrates their veracityby refuting possible objections or “antitheses":thus he applies a dialectical method. Onthe other hand, in fact, the Platonic Dialoguespreceded these Systems, which come from them“dialectically” through the intermediaryof the aporetic discussions of Aristotleand the scholastic Aristotelians. And justas in a Platonic Dialogue, the auditor (whoin this case is a historian-philosopher ofphilosophy) discovers the absolute truthas the result of the implicit or tacit “discussion”between the great Systems of history, hence,as the result of their “dialectic."
Hegel was the first of these auditor-historian-philosophers.In any case, he was the first to be so consciously.And that is why he was the first who couldknowingly abandon Dialectic conceived asa philosophical method. He is content toobserve and describe the dialectic whichwas effected throughout history, and he nolonger needs to make a dialectic himself.This dialectic, or the “dialogue” of thePhilosophies, took place before him. He onlyhas to have the “experience” of it and todescribe its synthetical final result ina coherent discourse: the expression of theabsolute truth is nothing but the adequateverbal description of the dialectic whichengendered it. Thus, Hegel's Science is “dialectical”only to the extent that the Philosophy whichprepared it throughout History has been (implicitlyor explicitly) dialectical.
At first sight, this attitude of Hegel isa simple return to Plato. If Plato lets Parmenides,Protagoras, Socrates, and still others havedialogues, while being content to recordthe result of their discussions, Hegel recordsthe result of the discussion which he organisesbetween Plato and Descartes, Spinoza andKant, Fichte and Schelling, and so on. Hence,here again we would seem to be dealing witha dialectical method in the search for truthor in its exposition, which in no way affectsthe Real which that truth reveals. And Hegeldoes actually say somewhere that he is onlyrediscovering the ancient or, rather, Platonic,dialectic. But a closer examination showsthat this is not at all the case, and thatwhen Hegel speaks of Dialectic, he is talkingabout something quite different from whatis found in his predecessors.'
One can say, if one pleases, that the eternallight of absolute Hegelian truth, too, comesfrom the collision of all the philosophicopinions which preceded it. However, thisideal dialectic, the dialogue of the Philosophies,took place, according to Hegel, only becauseit is a reflection of the real dialecticof Being. And only because it reflects thisreal dialectic does it finally achieve, inthe person of Hegel, the truth or the completeand adequate revelation of the Real. Eachphilosophy correctly reveals or describesa turning point or a stopping place — thetical,antithetical, or synthetical — of the realdialectic, of the Bewegung of existing Being.And that is why each philosophy is “true”in a certain sense. But it is true only relativelyor temporarily: it remains “true” as longas a new philosophy, also “true,” does notcome along to demonstrate its “error.” However,a philosophy does not by itself transformitself into another philosophy or engenderthat other philosophy in and by an autonomousdialectical movement. The Real correspondingto a given philosophy itself becomes reallyother (thetical, antithetical, or synthetical),and this other Real is what engenders anotheradequate philosophy, which, as “true,” replacesthe first philosophy which has become “false.”Thus, the dialectical movement of the historyof philosophy, which ends in the absoluteor definitive truth, is but a reflection,a “superstructure,” of the dialectical movementof the real history of the Real. And thatis why all philosophy that is “true” is alsoessentially “false": it is false inso far as it presents itself not as the reflectionor description of a constituent element ora dialectical “moment” of the real, but asthe revelation of the Real in its totality.Nonetheless, even while being or becoming“false,” all philosophy (worthy of the name)remains “true,” for the total Real impliesand will always imply the aspect (or the“moment”) which that philosophy revealed.The absolute truth or the Science of theWise Man, of Hegel that is, the adequateand complete revelation of the Real in itsTotality — is indeed, therefore, an integralsynthesis of all the philosophies presentedthroughout history. However, neither thesephilosophies through their discussions, northe historian-philosopher who observes them,effects the synthesis in question: real Historyis what does it, at the end of its own dialecticalmovement; and Hegel is content to recordit without having to do anything whatsoever,and consequently, without resorting to aspecific mode of operation or a method ofhis own.
“Weltgeschichte ist Weltgericht” (“WorldHistory is a tribunal that judges the World”).History is what judges men, their actionsand their opinions, and lastly their philosophicalopinions as well. To be sure, History is,if you please, a long “discussion” betweenmen. But this real historical “discussion”is something quite different from a philosophicdialogue or discussion. The “discussion”is carried out not with verbal arguments,but with clubs and swords or cannon on theone hand, and with sickles and hammers ormachines on the other. If one wants to speakof a "dialectical method” used by History,one must make clear that one is talking aboutmethods of war and of work. This real, orbetter, active, historical dialectic is whatis reflected in the history of philosophy.And if Hegelian Science is dialectical orsynthetical, it is only because it describesthat real dialectic in its totality, as wellas the series of consecutive philosophieswhich corresponds to that dialectical reality.Now, by the way, reality is dialectical onlybecause it implies a negative or negatingelement: namely, the active negation of thegiven, the negation which is at the foundationof every bloody fight and of all so-called“physical” work.
Hegel does not need a God who would revealthe truth to him. And to find the truth,he does not need to hold dialogues with “themen in the city,” or even to have a “discussion”with himself or to “meditate” a' la Descartes.(Besides, no purely verbal discussion, nosolitary meditation, can lead to the truth,of which Fighting and Work are the only “criteria.”)He can find it all alone, while sitting tranquillyin the shade of those “trees” which taughtSocrates nothing, but which teach Hegel manythings about themselves and about men. Butall this is possible only because there havebeen cities in which men had discussionsagainst a background of fighting and work,while they worked and fought for and becauseof their opinions (cities, moreover, whichwere surrounded by these same trees whosewood was used in their construction). Hegelno longer discusses because he benefits fromthe discussion of those who preceded him.And if, having nothing more to do, he hasno method of his own, it is because he profitsfrom all the actions effected throughouthistory. His thought simply reflects theReal. But he can do so only because the Realis dialectical — that is, imbued with thenegating action of fighting and work, whichengenders thought and discourse, causes themto move, and finally realises their perfectcoincidence with the Real which they aresupposed to reveal or to describe. In short,Hegel does not need a dialectical methodbecause the truth which he incarnates isthe final result of the real or active dialecticof universal History, which his thought iscontent to reproduce through his discourse.
From Socrates-Plato until Hegel, Dialecticwas only a philosophical method without acounterpart in the real. In Hegel there isa real Dialectic, but the philosophical methodis that of a pure and simple description,which is dialectical only in the sense thatit describes a dialectic of reality.
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