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Why are the objects of the phenomenal world
perceived as before us, outside of ourselves,
even though today everybody knows that they
depend upon processes inside of us, in the
central nervous system? A psychologist will
as a rule, immediately be able to give a
simple solution to this curious problem.
But that it is generally known may not be
assumed. It is not only a philosopher like
SCHOPENHAUER who uncritically accepts the
erroneous premises implicit in that question
and must then make the wildest assumptions
to answer it. Many of the greatest physiologists,
among them even Helmholtz, have failed to
achieve full clarity on this question. (1)
MACH and AVENARIUS attempted to lead the
scientific world away from the errors already
implicit in the formulation of the paradox.
But either their explanations remained little
known, or they did not sufficiently elucidate
the problem. (2)
For only a few years ago a well-known physician
raised the question anew: "How is it
that consciousness, which is bound to an
organism, relates the changes in its sense
organs to something located outside of itself?"
All attempts to explain this "compulsion
to project" appeared useless to him,
for he felt that here is one of the eternal
enigmas, related to the mind-body problem.
lt seems clear that this contemporary physician
is not alone; rather he represents the majority
of natural scientists. Students, at any rate
even those of the natural sciences, always
have to go through a sort of revolution in
their picture of the world as they try to
transform what appears so strange into a
simple, transparent matter. Under these circimstances,
it may indeed be worthwhile once more to
correct in somewhat more detail the error
inherent in this question.
We have here a typical case of a difficulty
which we create ourselves, in which we proceed
on a correct line of reasoning for a while,
but not consistently to the end. If new knowledge
is gained in one area, while in a neighboring
area an earlier stage of knowledge is inadvertently
retained, contradictions must result. The
path in the present case is directly determined
by the development of physics from GALILEO
and NEWTON on. Consequently, the way to discover
and to eliminate the core of the difficulty
that developed leads over this same road
of natural science. Little would be gained
if we tried to demonstrate by philosophical
speculation that here must be an error, while
science would find itself, just as before,
led on its way to the same old paradox.
.
We have here a typical case of a difficulty
which we create ourselves, in which we proceed
on a correct line of reasoning for a while,
but not consistently to the end. If new knowledge
is gained in one area, while in a neighboring
area an earlier stage of knowledge is inadvertently
retained, contradictions must result. The
path in the present case is directly determined
by the development of physics from GALILEO
and NEWTON on. Consequently, the way to discover
and to eliminate the core of the difficulty
that developed leads over this same road
of natural science. Little would be gained
if we tried to demonstrate by philosophical
speculation that here must be an error, while
science would find itself, just as before,
led on its way to the same old paradox.
The physics of the late baroque period destroyed
naive realism. The objects which exist independently
of the observer and are to be the subject
of scientific study could not possibly possess
all the variegated characteristics which
the phenomenal environment certainly shows.
Thus the physicist subtracts many socalled
sensory qualities if he wants to extract
what he considers the objective realities
from the phenomenal manifold. I do not venture
to judge whether the greatest minds of that
time were immediately aware that much more
is needed, namely a radical departure from
the identity of phenomenal object and physical
object. Sometimes it seems that for them
the phenomenal object was simply the physical
object itself, somewhat changed by all kinds
of subjective trimmings, thus both basically
still one and the same existence. Whatever
the historical truth, after the elimination
of the "secondary qualities," physics
developed so rapidly that soon its way of
thinking had to be applied to the relation
between physical events and the organism.
For example, whether a sound wave impinges
on a violin string or on the human eardrum
can, after all, make no difference in principle.
From this moment on, there seems to be no
escape from the paradox. Anatomy, physiology,
and pathology teach us that about one point
there can no longer be any possible doubt.
The physical processes between object and
sense organ are followed by further events
which are propagated through nerves and nerve
cells as far as certain regions of the brain.
Somewhere in these regions processes take
place which are tied to the occurrence of
perception in general and, therefore, also
to the existence of phenomenal objects. Thus
a physical object which reflects light differently
from its surroundings will be the source
of a long series of successive processes
of propagation and transformation through
rather different media, until finally a complex
of processes takes place which can be considered
the physiological carrier of the corresponding
phenomenal object.
Now it would obviously be meaningless to
identify with each other the starting point
and such a late or distant phase of this
sequence of events. Therefore this reasoning
might well allow for similarities of some
degree between the phenomenal object and
its partner in the physical world; but in
any case the two represent existences at
least as different as the physical object
and - in an entirely different spatial position
- the brain process on which the existence
of the phenomenal object directly depends.
If I shoot at a target, nobody will claim
that the hole in the target is the same thing
as the revolver from which the bullet came.
By the same reasoning, we may not identify
the phenomenal object with the physical object
from which the stimuli in question came.
Under no circumstances has the phenomenal
object anything to do with the place in physical
space where the "corresponding"
physical object is located. If it has to
be localized at all at some point in physical
space, then obviously it belongs most properly
to that place in the brain where the directly
corresponding physological process takes
place. It is immediately apparent that SCHOPENHAUER,
HELMHOLTZ, the above-mentioned physician,
and everybody for whom this paradox exists
would regard just such a localization of
phenomenal objects and phenomenal qualities
as the natural one. But instead, without
any doubt, we have the phenomenal objects
before us and outside of ourselves.
We might be tempted to say that parts of
the phenomenal world should not be thought
of as localized in any place in the physical
world as a matter of principle, since phenomenal
and physical localizations are incommensurable.
Therefore localization of a phenomenal object
within the brain is also ruled out. But we
should not make the answer to our question
easy. Such a purely negative statement certainly
does not solve the problem before us. For
the problem lies in the fact that phenomenal
objects are localized in a definite positionrelative
to our body, only not in it, but outside
of it. Thus the simplest experience seems
to contradict the epistemological argument
just considered. One finds, therefore, among
biologists and even philosophers, the assumption
that the phenomenal object is somehow again
withdrawn from the body into physical space
and, wherever possible, precisely to the
place of its physical counterpart ("compulsion
to project"). Fantastic as such an idea
may be, it is unfortunately not uncommon
to find all kinds of hypotheses in psychology
so confused that nobody would tolerate them
in the natural sciences proper. There are
surely also those who see in such an extraordinary
achievement an expression of the superiority
of mind over mere nature.
As to the epistemological argument of the
incommensurability of physic and phenomenal
localization there is, however, this to say.
Let us assume that it is absolutely correct
and that, therefore, the total phenomenal
world of a person is simply not definitely
localizable anywhere in the physical world,
because it is not possible even to conceive
of the relative localization of phenomenal
and physical facts. Then it follows that
we may arbitrarily think of theof a person
s phenomenal world. wherever in the physical
world it would help our thinking. Such a
procedure, if followed systematically, can
never lead to an inconsistency precisely
because, in fact, we are always dealing with
the relative localization either of physical
data or of phenomenal data among themselves,
but never with localization of the one relative
to the other. (3)
Now, according to our basic assumption, the
totality of a person s perceptual world is
strictly correlated with certain processes
in his central nervous system. lt will then
simplify our discussion and our terminology
if, in what follows, we do not consider spatial
relations of the phenomenal world as entirely
separate from. thos in physical space, but
think of the totality of the phenomenal world
and its subdivisions as being mapped on those
brain processes which certainly at least
correspond to them. After what has been said.
this procedure will prejudice nothing. Whoever
believes that he can cautiously avoid this
assumption and prefers to conceive of the
totality of the phenomenal world as permanently
set apart in an imommensurable space, must
reach exactly the same result, the same solution
to the paradox which we will reach. And besides,
I want to show that this solution succeeds
entirely even if one maintains, with HELMHOLTZ
and so many biologists, that phenomenal data
"belong only to our nervous system."
Footnotes:
(1) From the principles of his theory of
space, HELMHOLTZ proposes to derive "an
astonishing consequence": "the
objects present in space appear to us clothed
in the qualities of our sensations. They
appear to us red or green, cold or warm,
they have smell or taste, etc., while these
sensory qualities belong, after all, only
to our nervous system and do not at all extend
into outer space." (H. v. HELMHOLTZ,
Die Thatsachen in der Wahrnehmung. Berlin.
August Hirschwald, 1879.)
(2) A much clearer attempt, correct in its
essential points, to give a concrete, positive
soIution of the paradox was made by Ewald
HERING as early as 1862, at least for visual
perception. (E. HERING, Beitr? ge zur Physiologie.
Leipzig: W. Engelmann, 1861-1864. Heft 2,
1862, 164-166.) By the way, HERING himself
expressed great pessimism about the understanding
of his arguments that could be expected among
his contemporaries.
(3) Similarly, I am completely free to think
of the "pyramid of concepts" of
classical logic or of the color pyramid in
any arbitrary regions of space, precisely
because their quasi-spatial nature neither
excludes nor requires coincidence with a
definite region of "real" space.
PHENOMENAL SPACE
Phenomenal space everywhere offers examples
of the relationship "outside one another."
Next to my book, outside of it, is the pencil;
still farther from both is the phenomenal
object, the inkwell. This seems entirely
natural to us. The only consideration required
for the solution of our curious problem now
consists in the fact that "my body,"
before which and outside of which the phenomenal
objects are perceived, is itself such a phenomenal
object along with others, in the same phenomenal
space, and that under no circumstances may
it be identified with the organism as the
physical object which is investigated by
the natural sciences, anatomy and physiology.
Since at first, as long as this distinction
is not yet obvious so that the pseudoproblem
disappears, the situation is necessarily
somewhat confusing, I shall explain it step
by step. If I put my own hand next to the
pencil and the inkwell, the hand reflects
light and this stimulates my eye, exactly
as the other two objects do. In that brain
field which contains the physiological correlate
of our perception - and, according to our
assumption, also this perception itself -
there thus occur not only two total processes
corresponding to the external objects pencil
and inkwell, but also a third process of
generally exactly the same nature, connected
with the appearance of the phenomenal object
"hand." Nobody is surprised that
the phenomenal object "pencil"
is outside the phenomenal thing "inkwell."
But it is no more astonishing that the hand
as a third phenomenal object appears next
to the other two and that they, in turn,
appear outside of the hand. The processes
in that brain field undoubtedly possess some
properties on the basis of which perception
in general is spatial; but also, more particularly,
specific behavior of several brain processes
corresponds to the phenomenal relations next
to and outside of the respective phenomenal
objects. If this particular behavior exists
for the processes corresponding to pencil
and inkwell, then in the case just discussed,
it certainly does so in exactly the same
way for both of these in their relation to
the "hand process." Now, as I sit
at my desk, besides my hand there is also
visible in the more peripheral field a good
portion of both arms and the upper part of
my body. Obviously arms and body are phenomenal
objects just as the hand or the pencil and
inkwell. They arise, physically and physiologically,
in exactly the same way as the others, through
retinal images and the ensuing processes
in the nervous system; consequently they
are subject to the same rules of relative
localization as those objects. If there are
understandable reasons why, under the conditions
of our example, those other objects appear
external to each other, then exactly the
same reasons apply to their being external
to my body as a phenomenal object.
To enable us to see the situation still more
concretely, we shall introduce an assumption
which is certainly not entirely correct in
this form and will need later correction.
We shall assume that if two objects, such
as pencil and inkwell, exist phenomenally
side by side at a particular phenomenal distance,
the corresponding brain processes simply
exist next to each other at a particular
distance, in short that phenomenal space
and the spatial distribution of the directly
corresponding processes in the brain field
are, to some extent, geometrically similar
or even congruent. Then consideration of
the example just discussed shows that the
complex of processes for my body as a phenomenal
object is localized at a particular place
in the physical brain field, that the processes
for other phenomenal objects take place all
around it, and that, because of the relative
geometrical relationships of these processes,
phenomenal objects must be next to each other
everywhere in phenomenal space, and at the
same time they must all lie outside of one
(for me) especially important phenomenal
object which I call my body. This is the
first essential step to the solution of the
paradox.
If SCHOPENHAUER and many natural scientists
after him were astonished by the "external
localization" of phenomenal objects,
the reason was only that they failed to apply
to their own body an assumption which had
become natural to them in considering other
objects. For the body they retained the naive
identification or confusion of physical and
phenomenal object. But if we say some object
is in front of "us," then what
we mean by "us" is not the organism
in the physical, physiological sense, but
a phenomenal object among others which must
show the same kind of localization relative
to them as they have among themselves. And
both, the other phenomenal objects as well
as the "self" (in the everyday
phenomenal sense) depend functionally on
certain processes in one's own physical body;
and likewise all relative phenomenal localizations
depend on the distribution of these processes.
Nobody has ever seen a phenomenal object
localized relative to (outside of) his physical
body. (4) At this point the reader might
still be slightly uneasy because now, to
be sure, phenomenal objects are understandably
outside of the phenomenal self but still,
according to our assumption, both of them
exist inside our physical body. Later all
doubts in this respect should disappear.
But first an extension and a correction of
what has been said so far are needed.
An extension is necessary because our phenomenal
world contains very much more than just visual
facts. So far the discussion has been confined
to the visual content of phenomenal space
because we know, and are accustomed to this
knowledge, that visual processes occur in
orderly fashion in one connected physiological
field. Therefore the arrangement of the visual
phenomenal body next to other visual phenomenal
objects is immediately convincing once we
know that the phenomenal body may not be
identified with the physical organism. Sound
is also localized in phenomenal space but,
in general, less precisely so. Likewise I
feel the hardness of the table under my hands
(as phenomenal objects), thus again in phenomenal
space. An old controversy is concerned with
the relations to vision of such phenomenal
spatial data in other modalities. But in
any case one fact is phenomenologically certain:
Whether sharply or diffusely localized, sound
appears to us in places of the same phenomenal
space in which we see phenomenal objects
(in the same or in different places). It
is only because of this that I can say, for
instance, "Just now I heard a rustling
sound in the bushes over there," and
thus relate the place of a sound to the position
of a visually given phenomenal object. In
just the same way I feel the hardness of
the table for instance, somewhat to the left
of the place where the phenomenal object
pencil lies, and thus I localize a felt place
in relation to a seen one. Anyone who is
in the habit of letting his judgement about
the facts of perception be determined by
his knowledge of the peripheral sense organs
may not at once agree at this point, since
the organs of sight, hearing, and touch represent
separate receptor surfaces, and certainly
the primary regions of entrance of the respective
nerves into the cortex are also separate
from each other. But as to the first point,
the two eyes are also two separate peripheral
sense organs, the stimulation of which nevertheless
unquestionably results in one connected visual
phenomenal space. Furthermore, there is no
good evidence at all for the assumption that
the primary regions of entrance of the several
sensory nerves are also the last stations
of the sensory process.
The alternative hypothesis would correspond
much better with direct experience - that
all sensory processes finally enter a field
common to them all, and that here they interact
according to their respective relations;
this would be the basis for their localization
in a single phenomenal space. This is the
physiological version of a view which at
one time was considered almost obvious, and
which more recently has been advanced again
by William STERN. It would be a bad argument
if someone wished to object that not infrequently
discrepancies are observed between the localization
of a sound and the position of the visual
source of the sound, and that there are similar
inconsistencies between the felt object and
its seen form. The above assumption by no
means implies that this could not happen;
the observation of such a discrepancy indeed
presupposes that acoustic location and visual
location of the source of sound, that the
tactual and the visual image, have in principle
comparable characteristics since, in fact,
I do compare the two. Normally, of course,
not only does the localization of the phenomena
of different sensory modalities take place
in one and the same phenomenal space but
also, at least by and large, whatever belongs
together is perceived together; thus the
locus of the sound and the locus of the source
of the sound as a visual object coincide,
etc. It is not essential for our question
whether this approximate "fit"
of the relative phenomenal localization of
visual, auditory, and tactual objects is
partly based on anatomy (as the unitary spatial
order of seeing with the two eyes), or if
an almost inconceivable amount of learning
brings the locations of sounds, tactile objects,
etc., into an approximately fitting relation
to the unitary spatial order of the visual
world, or if, finally, still other possible
explanations might be considered.
At any rate, this coordination of localization
already exists very early in the life of
the human being. And thus the other phenomenal
data fit inte the one phenomenal context
which was described first in its visual extension
before the visually given body-self. Therefore
we may also conceive of the sensory processes
of nonvisual origin as taking place in the
same regions of the cerebral field where
the corresponding visual process complexes
take place (but see below). But a corresponding
extension must also be made in regard to
the phenomenal make-up of our bodily self.
For it and its changing states, sensory data
of nonvisual origin are undoubtedly even
more important than its visual appearance
which, for ourselves, always remains rather
incomplete. Just as our phenomenal world
is enriched by the sense of touch, but at
the same time preserves to a high degree
the correct correlation of visual phenomenal
objects and tactile data in one phenomenal
space, so what we perceive of ourselves through
the sense of touch incorporates itself in
and attaches itself, on the whole correctly,
to the visual object, "our body."
Into the same region of phenomenal space,
again in proper context, a great deal of
data are included which exist essentially
only for one's own phenomenal body and its
members, and about whose physiological foundations
in sense organs of the skin, muscles, joints,
etc., we are actually very poorly informed.
These are what we experience even without
looking: the phenomenal positions of our
limbs, the felt tension or relaxation of
extremities and parts of the body. In the
consideration of the immediate phenomenal
data, we need continually to guard against
slipping what is meant by these words into
the physical-physiological states and changes
in the corresponding regions of the physical
organism. Obviously one of the most important
groups of phenomenal data may not be forgotten,
the one that concerns the change and motion
of the phenomenal body and its limbs. It
is well known that stimulation of the vestibular
nerves gives rise, in a sense, to the purest
perception of spatial dynamics. And all these
states and events occur in and on the same
phenomenal structure for which we have -phenomenologically
quite properly - a single name, the self
(in the everyday sense) without concerning
ourselves with the enormous variety of different
sensory inputs which, physiologically, contribute
constantly to its make-up. This is again
possible only because all these data, whatever
their peripheral physiological source, may
be ordered, in general, so entirely adequately
in one structure of phenomenal space.
The tension, which I just now feel in my
right arm as I make a fist is localized in
the structure which I experience visually
as my right arm, etc. Again there is a conclusion
to be drawn for brain physiology: the data
from all these different sense organs contribute
to the determination of one single segregated
process complex, whose phenomenal correlate
is called "self." Neither from
considerations of brain physiology nor of
phenomenology, therefore, does the "sensory
heterogeneity" of the phenomenal self
and of the phenomenal environment change
anything of the fact that the one is surrounded
by the parts of the other. There is then
no reason whatever why the phenomenal environment
should appear within the phenomenal self.
This actually occurs only in special cases
where it is a consequence precisely of the
principle of normal appropriate organization
of all sensory data in one phenomenal context:
In taking food, I certainly perceive phenomenal
objects, just now objects of the phenomenal
environment, in the interior of the phenomenal
body self - that is to say, in the mouth
- for a few minutes.
But, of course, this has nothing to do with
the paradox from which we started. It only
means that in a unitary perceptual field
(and, correspondingly, in a brain field of
unitary structure) it is quite possible to
have continuous shifts of a phenomenal image
(and likewise of the underlying brain processes)
from a surrounding area to a surrounded one
(the complex of self processes). continue
(3rd part) back to 1st part
Footnotes:
(4) When we speak of the phenomenal self,
the personality in a deeper sense remains
entirely outside of our discussion. We speak
here of the self which is intended when we
say, "I lie down on the couch,"
"I sit down," "I go downstairs,"
etc.
SOLUTION TO THE PARADOX
In addition to the above generalization of
our considerations, from the visual facts
only to perception in general, the solution
of the paradox still requires the correction
of a simplifying assumption which is not
seriously tenable, but which has been made
up to now. It is impossible that the spatial
relationships in phenomenal space simply
corrrespond to the geometrical relationships
of their respective processes in the brain
field. G. E. MÜLLER pointed out a long
time ago that this is not conceivable because,
for example, visual space acts like a fairly
uniform continuum, while the corresponding
processes of the brain field are anatomically-geometrically
distributed over the two hemispheres; and
therefore, from purely geometrical considerations,
something, like a gap or at least a gross
disturbance of continuity would have to be
brought about by this inhomogeneity of the
geometrical distribution of the processes.
The same thing follows from the irregular
arrangement of blood vessels in the nervous
tissue (also emphasized by MÜLLER).
Quite aside from such considerations, phenomenal
space has a large number of characteristics
which would be alttogether incomprehensible
on the assumption that its structure and
its articulation in each concrete case were
determined by nothing but purely geometrical
relations of individual local processes.
The new psychology of perception has demonstrated
beyond any doubt that only the functional
distribution of processes, as well as gradations
and articulations in such a context, can
be regarded as the physiological basis of
the phenomenal spatial order.
Accordingly, the physiological theory of
phenomenal space must be dynamic, not geometrical.
The symmetry of a perceived circle, for example,
would not depend on the mere geometrical
relationships between the loci of independent
individual processes, but on the fact that,
in an extended whole process which underlies
the visual circle, a corresponding symmetry
of the functional context exists. A more
detailed discussion would lead us too far
from our topic. (5) It will suffice if we
show, by means of an analogy from elementary
physics, how this changed assumption permits
us also to solve those difficulties arising
from the anatomical peculiarities. Let a
three-dimensional network or lattice be formed
from filiform conductors, such that the conductors
may be considered the edges of many equal
small cubes. Consequently, at the corners
of each such cube six filaments are in electrical
contact, while they are otherwise encased
in insulating sheaths. If such a network
is connected to the poles of a battery in
a certain manner, then the distribution of
the stationary current may, of course, be
represented purely geometrically. But this
is a rather superfidal procedure, since purely
spatial data mean very little for what takes
place here, and since the distribution of
the current must essentially be related to
portions of the conductor. As far as geometry
is concerned, the stationary distribution
of current would be very different - it would
be distorted - if the network were "bent,"
if some filaments were curved, etc.
At the same time, however, in terms of length
of conductor or amount of resistance, the
distribution would be the same as before.
Indeed, in these terms the distribution could
still be considered the same even if some
of the filaments (between two junctions)
differed in length from the others but had
the same resistance. Under these conditions
there would certainly be considerable discrepancies
between a description of the current in purely
geometrical coordinates and one (the only
adequate one) in functional coordinates.
For instance, in the latter terms a certain
distribution of current would have to be
characterized as "homogeneous"
while its density per square centimeter would
vary considerably from place to place. Since
the distinction between functional and geometrical
coordinates may be applied to other events,
and thus must not be restricted to the case
of stationary electrical currents, it may
well be applied to the central nervous system
and especially to that part of it whose processes
underlie the spatial order of our perception.
It is clear, then, that only functional coordinates
may be used and that, therefore, the geometrical-anatomical
position of the individual conducting structures
and cells relative to each other becomes
meaningless (a position partly determined
by all kinds of secondary factors).
With this step, the difficulties discussed
by MÜLLER disappear. As a very rough
approximation we can, of course, still assume
a correspondence of geometrical-anatomical
and functional coordinates of the system.
For functionally neighboring parts of the
tissue are usually also geometrical-anatomical
neighbors, and functionally very distant
parts are also separated anatomically from
each other by a certain distance in space.
But this correspondance will not hold in
detail and will not apply strictly. lt will
be irrelevant for the understanding of the
ordering of events in such a field since
the functional distances are the only ones
that really matter. Without this principle
it is impossible to understand even the relation
between visual ordering of space and the
corresponding brain events. It is all the
more necessary if we want to make comprehensible
in physiological terms the fitting coordination
of the phenomena of the various sensory modalities
in one common space. (This needs to be considered
in relation to the simplifying formulation
above.
But perhaps this point of view is most important
for the understanding of the construction
of the phenomenal self from such different
sensory material. Again, it cannot seriously
be maintained that in the brain region in
question the corresponding process complex
represents a kind of geometrical copy of
the phenomenal body. For what matters are
precisely the functional coordinates, and
these may be "distorted" in a great
many ways. This correction of the relevant
coordinate system will not in the least change
the relative localization of phenomenal self
and phenomenal environment. "Being outside"
and the changing distance of phenomenal objects
relative to the phenomenal body are again
to be thought of as functionally determined
only, as a gradation in the extended context
of processes which the purely geometrical
distributions reflect only very roughly.
After this, nothing at all remains of the
paradox of the localization of our phenomenal
environment around us. Whatever relative
phenomenal localization may take place is
determined by functional proximities and
distances in the underlying nervous process
distributions. The fact that in their totality
these are contained within the meninges and
the skull in no way enters into these functional
connections.
Therefore they could not possibly appear
in our perception, whose spatial character,
indeed, depends only on those functional
connections. Only if, during the analysisis,
we shift from one kind of coordinate sytem
to an entirely different kind, can we possibly
still find difficulties here. If the phenomenal
self depends on one process complex, the
phenomenal environment on other such complexes,
and if the relative phenomenal localization
of the two corresponds to functional externality
(just as two different phenomenal objects
in the environment are outside of each other),
then there is no problem left. I do not wish
to give the impression that this discussion
leads to nothing more than to the disappearance
of the old paradox. So far the emphasis has
been on the fact that, in general, separate
localization of phenomenal environment and
self is natural and necessary for consistent
thinking. From a slightly different point
of view, however, these same considerations
lead, rather, to a functional equivalence
and kinship of the phenomenal self and phenomenal
objects, which again cannot be understood
as long as this self is not recognized as
a separate part of the phenomenal world.
Physiologically, the self and the objects
of the environment represent complexes of
processes in one and the same brain field.
It is by no means necessary, and not even
likely that these proccess complexes are
functionally entirely indifferent to each
other. The psychology of perception is full
of instances of mutual influences between
the objects nd occurrences of the phenomenal
environment. For example, forms, sizes, and
directions of seen objects may be strongly
influenced by a suitably chosen surrounding
visual environment. Because objectively and
physically these are nothing but independent
and mutually practically indifferent objects,
forms, or contours, because there is thus
no corresponding influence outside the organism,
these distortions are usually called "illusions."
But psychology is coming more and more to
realize that, physiologically in any case,
this is a matter of true influences on visual
process complexes by their neighbors in the
field. After what has been said, it is not
astonishing that among the processes which
underlie the phenomenal organization of space,
more intimate functional connections exist
than between the individual objects in physical
space, whose forms, sizes, etc., are independent
of each other under ordinary circumstances.
Particularly striking influences are often
observed in phenomenal space when there are
movements in the field. Everybody has noticed,
for example, that the moon clearly moves
in the opposite direction when clouds pass
in front of it. This is called "induced"
movement of a phenomenal object, and recently
DUNCKER has been able to offer a satisfactory
explanation of its remarkable properties.
(6)
If, now, the phenomenal self belongs to the
same interconnected field in which objects
of the phenomenal environment can exert such
an influence on one another, we may then
expect that the same influence which is exerted,
for instance, on the moon by the passing
clouds may, under suitable conditions, also
be exerted on the phenomenal self by vigorous
movements of the phenomenal surroundings.
Now, it is well known, and has even become
a favorite amusement at country fairs, that
obvious rotation of the visual environment
leads regularly to rotation of the phenomenal
self in the opposite direction, while the
physical organism remains at rest. This phenomenon
becomes, in principle, fully comprehensible
if we consider the organization of the process
complex which underlies the phenomenal self
as part of the whole field of connected processes
corresponding to everything phenomenal.
This simple example shows particularly impressively
that phenomenal space and the underlying
physiological field structure have qualities
which do not exist in the same way in physical
space. In particular, there are dynamic relations
between the process complex of the self and
the environment processes in the brain field
which have no correlate in any analogous
causal connections between the physical organism
and its physical environment. But if we have
gone this far, to be consistent, we must
go very much farther. For, considerations
of continuity demand that every kind of behavior
in which we are directed toward a part of
the environment will have to be understood
as the expression of a vectorial state or
event between the momentary process of the
self and the environmental process in question.
Depending on the actual characteristics of
the two which, of course, always determine
such a vectorial state, very different directions
may occur. Such psychological facts as "attending
to," "feeling attracted or repelled
by," "hesitating before something,"
etc., occur in experienced space as directed
from a phenomenal object to the self or vice
versa. If one wants to be consistent, these
will have to be incorporated in the schema
outlined here of a correspondence between
phenomenal order and functional connections
in the brain field. But a more concrete development
of this idea is hardly possible without also
treating the phenomena of memory; it would
therefore lead us too far from our problem.
Footnotes:
(5) But cf. M. WERTHEIMER, Experimentelle Studien über das Sehen
von Bewegung, Zeitschrift für Psychologie, 1912, 61, 161-265; and W. K? HLER, Die
physischen Gestalten in Ruhe und im station?
ren Zustand, Braunschweig: F. Vieweg &
Sohn, 1920.
(6) K. DUNCKER, Über induzierte Bewegung, Psychologische
Forschung, 1929, 12, 180-259.
First published in German as Ein altes Scheinproblem in the journal Die Naturwissenschaften, 1929, 17, pp. 395-401.
It was reprinted by permission of Springer-Verlag
and translated by Erich Goldmeier in Mary
Henle (Ed.), The Selected Papers of Wolfgang Köhler, New York: Liveright, 1971, pp. 125-141.
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