Dr. Gyula Klima
Comments on Peter King:
"THE FAILURE OF OCKHAM'S NOMINALISM"
Let me begin my comments on Peter King's
paper by declaring that I thoroughly agree
with its main claims, namely, that Ockham's
nominalism fails in some important respect,
and that we can learn a great deal from understanding
exactly what this failure consists in. I
am not entirely convinced, however, that
the paper manages to provide us with the
desired precise characterization of the nature
of Ockham's failure.
In order to understand the nature of Ockham's
failure, first we should clearly see the
problem that Ockham fails to solve. Based
on the initial considerations of the paper,
I take it that the problem can be characterized
by the following question. What is it that
accounts for the relation of natural signification
between simple universal concepts of the
mind and particular entities of extramental
reality, excluding the existence of extramental
universal entities?
The paper considers and rejects two solutions
proposed by Ockham: similarity and causality.
The paper's first objection to the proposed
solution in terms of similarity has to do
with the fact that when we judge things to
be similar, we compare them with respect
to some of their characteristics. Hence,
the similarity relation between two particulars
seems to have a third argument-place, reserved
for some common characteristic in respect
of which two particulars are deemed similar
or dissimilar. But then, since this third
argument-place apparently needs to be filled
in with some "abstract entity",
a universal, similarity so interpreted cannot
provide an acceptable solution for a nominalist.
This argument may seem effective, but it
may not be based on a correct interpretation
of Ockham's concerns in the passage quoted
in the relevant footnote (10). For Ockham's
main concern there seems to be simply to
establish that we need not posit some human
nature distinct from individual humans to
account for their specific unity, but he
does not appear to be addressing the general
issue of how many terms similarity requires.
But regardless of the interpretational problem
of identifying Ockham's true meaning there,
it is simply not true that a three-place
analysis of similarity entails commitment
to "abstract entities", that is,
to universals. For example, if Plato and
Socrates are similar in respect of whiteness,
then Plato has to have his own whiteness
and Socrates has to have his own whiteness,
yet there need not be a universal thing called
'whiteness', which somehow should belong
to both of them.
Indeed, the case of similarity in respect
of whiteness would be a special case for
Ockham, as he admits a real distinction between
a particular whiteness and its subject. However,
in the case of similarity with respect to
shape, for example, he would not be committed
to anything besides the particular things
thus and so shaped, since he would not regard
their shapes as distinct from the things
themselves. For example, two billiard balls
on this account may be similar with respect
to their shape, while dissimilar with respect
to their color. Yet, this does not require
either the existence of a separate shape-thing
which is one in itself and distinct from
each of these balls, or the existence of
two shape-things, which are inherent in,
but still distinct from, their respective
subjects. Each of the balls is round in virtue
of its own shape, but this shape is nothing
but the ball extended in such a manner that
all points of its surface are equidistant
from a given point. So the balls are similar
with respect to shape, each being its own
shape. In the same way, two humans may be
said to be similar with respect to humanity,
each being their own humanity, and two animals
may be similar with respect to animality,
each being its own animality, etc. Indeed,
it does not matter here whether we take 'similarity'
to be a generic term covering more specific
F-wise similarities in the way Marilyn Adams
suggested, or we take it to be a determinable
to be determined by the qualification 'with
respect to F-ness', as long as we provide
the same type of analysis in both cases.
The next move of the paper is to claim that
in view of the unacceptability of the three-place
analysis of similarity, Ockham will rather
use a notion of "global" similarity.
However, if the three-place analysis of similarity
does not necessarily involve commitment to
universal entities, Ockham need not be committed
to "global" similarity, to be interpreted
as similarity without any qualification or
specification. But then, the problems arising
from the unintelligibility of different scopes
and degrees of "global" or unqualified
similarity need not threaten his account.
What these arguments show is rather the fact
that similarity always has to be judged in
some respect, and that, accordingly, if concepts
are to be similar to the objects they represent,
and they represent them on account of this
similarity, then they should represent them
in some respect. (This is an important point
to which I will return later.) But since
admitting similarity in some respect need
not involve commitment to extramental universals,
these arguments in themselves need not pose
a threat to Ockham's account in terms of
similarity.
Perhaps, a more promising line of attack
concerning the similarity-account would be
to ask how Ockham could interpret similarity
between concepts and extramental material
substances at all-a question Ockham himself
raised against his own fictum-theory. For
at this point realists can still offer us
a story which is simply unavailable to Ockham'
mature theory. Being the staunch nominalist
he is, Ockham simply cannot afford the luxury
of talking about different instances of the
same nature. But realists can claim without
further ado that the reason why concepts
are similar in some respect to the objects
they represent is that the concepts of individual
human minds are just further instances of
the same nature that informs these objects.
To be sure, as far as moderate realists are
concerned, the nature informing the mind
and the distinct particulars can only be
formally, but not numerically the same nature.
Also, since the mind informed by this nature
does not become one of the particulars having
this nature, the nature has to have a different
mode of being in the mind than in the particulars.
As a consequence, the realist account will
have its own problems in explaining what
it means for numerically distinct entities
to be formally the same, and what it means
for the same nature that informs the particulars
to have a different mode of being in the
mind. Sill, the realist account is at least
clearly able to give an answer to the general
question of what makes a particular act of
a certain human mind related to a whole set
of individuals. Indeed, it can do so despite
the fact that a human mind typically cannot
get into a causal contact with all those
individuals. But this observation already
takes us to the second alternative considered
by the paper.
As the paper correctly argues, Ockham's causal
account should obviously work in the case
of individual concepts. If an object is the
cause of a concept, then there clearly is
a natural relationship between the object
and the concept, which can be utilized in
explaining why the concept is a natural representation
of the object in question. Certainly much
more would need to be said about exactly
how the causal mechanisms involved give rise
to a relation of natural representation.
But at least the general question of what
fixes the relation of natural signification
may plausibly be answered in this way.
However, when it comes to accounting for
universal concepts, even this general question
does not seem to be answered. For a universal
concept has to represent several particulars,
indeed, sometimes an infinity of particulars,
with which the mind having the concept has
never been in any causal relationship.
Naturally, one would wish to say here that
the causal relationship with a restricted
number of particulars establishes a relationship
of natural signification not only between
these particulars and the concept they give
rise to, but also between the concept and
all particulars of the same kind that have
an equal ability to produce the same concept.
But, as the paper points out, there is a
danger of circularity here in referring to
particulars of the same kind having an equal
ability to produce the same concept. For
then the question is whether Ockham is able
to specify the class of all particulars belonging
to the same kind without invoking the concept
produced by a restricted number of them.
If not, then grouping individuals into natural
kinds would have to be mind-dependent, and,
what is worse from the point of view of the
present task, the account of natural signification
in terms of causality will be circular. (Presumably,
the circularity would eventually amount to
something like the following: a particular
object o is represented by concept C if and
only if it belongs to kind K; but o belongs
to K if and only if o is represented by C.)
Now the very condensed argument of the paper
makes it appear as if the only way for Ockham
to specify the class of all particulars of
the same kind having an equal ability to
produce the same concept would be with reference
to their causal powers to produce the same
concept. But Ockham would emphatically deny
this claim. As even the paper points out,
for Ockham similarity is a real relation.
That two particulars do or do not belong
to the same species is a matter of their
nature. They either are or are not co-specific,
regardless of whether there is any human
mind to form a specific concept that does
or does not equally apply to both. Therefore,
if they are co-specific, then of course they
are apt to give rise to the same specific
concept in the same human mind. But that
they are co-specific is by no means dependent
on the having, let alone the exercise, of
this causal power; rather, it is the other
way around.
So, apparently, the burden of Ockham's account
of natural signification in terms of causality
will have to be carried by a nominalist account
of several particulars' belonging to the
same kind regardless of the consideration
of the intellect. But the possibility of
such an account is not ruled out by the objection
of circularity.
Indeed, it is not ruled out by the next objection
either. But then the rhetorical question
of the objection concerning Socrates and
a tomcat, namely, "Why should they produce
the concept of animal rather than the concept
of male?", need not spell trouble for
Ockham's account. For Ockham might simply
reply that Socrates and the tomcat have the
causal powers to give rise to both sorts
of concepts, since they belong both to the
kind of animals and to the kind of males.
And there is nothing problematic in the claim
that only one of these kinds is an essential
kind, giving rise to a generic concept, while
the other is not, and thus it gives rise
to a connotative concept. (For the sake of
simplicity we can assume here the otherwise
controversial claim that the concept "male"
is a simple connotative concept, signifying
males by simply connoting their vis generativa.
Of course, if it is a complex concept, then
its signification will depend on the signification
of its components, and not on some direct
causal contact with its objects.)
All in all, none of the objections of the
paper considered so far seems to have delivered
a fatal blow to Ockham's account of natural
signification. This does not mean, however,
that Ockham's account actually works. Indeed,
despite their ineffectiveness taken in themselves,
these arguments taken together are very helpful
in delineating the minimal requirements that
an acceptable answer to the original question
should meet.
Most importantly, one such requirement is
that our concepts should represent particulars
belonging to the same kind in that respect
in which these particulars should be similar
in order to belong to the same kind. Otherwise
a concept could not represent all individuals
of the same kind on the basis of acquaintance
only with a limited number of them, since
it has no direct causal contact with any
of the "new" particulars, and its
contact with the "old" ones cannot
serve as the basis for representing the "new"
ones, for it does not represent them in that
respect in which the old ones are naturally
connected to the "new" ones. But
if it does represent these particulars in
that respect in which they are similar insofar
as they are members of the given kind, then,
clearly, any "new" particular of
the same kind will be represented by this
concept in the same respect, so it will be
represented by this concept despite the lack
of a direct acquaintance with it, and so
the concept can serve as the basis of induction
over individuals of the kind in question.
But once this requirement is made explicit,
it is easy to see exactly why Ockham's account
cannot meet it. As we could see, talking
about similarity in certain respects need
not pose an immediate threat to Ockham's
nominalism, as it need not necessarily involve
commitment to "abstract entities",
that is, extramental universals. But Ockham
also claims that absolute terms signify or
represent their objects absolutely, that
is, not in respect of something, indeed,
not even in respect of something not really
distinct from themselves. So, regardless
of the fact that the notion of similarity
in some respect would still be available
to him, and thus he could allow that concepts
are similar to, and hence represent, their
particulars in some respect, his account
of absolute concepts is incompatible with
the above-described requirement.
Therefore, it is no mere coincidence that
the author of the Logica Realis contra Ockham
explicitly states that Ockham's division
of terms into absolute and connotative is
mistaken (c. 9), for even absolute terms
have to signify whatever they signify in
respect of something, despite what Ockham
says. A similar point is raised also by a
later realist, Domingo Soto (Summulae lb.
1, c. 7).
Indeed, Soto's case very clearly shows that
the most fundamental disagreement between
realists and nominalists is not ontological,
but semantical. For Soto retains the semantic
distinction between that which an absolute
term materially signifies, which he calls
its material significate, and that in respect
of which it signifies its material significate,
namely, that which it formally signifies,
and which, therefore, he calls its formal
significate. Still, Soto denies any ontological
distinction between the two (In Praedicamenta,
c. 5, q. 1), and so, despite his "realistic"
semantics, he ends up with the same ontology
as the nominalist Jean Buridan. In fact,
Soto's and Buridan's only ontological difference
from Ockham is their common refusal to identify
quantity with substance. But they still can
endorse the same ontology, despite their
radically different semantics. However, it
is precisely their semantical difference
that accounts for the fact that Soto's theory
is still compatible with the above-mentioned
requirement, whereas Buridan's, just like
Ockham's, is not.
Therefore, it seems that what is really at
the bottom of Ockham's failure to give an
acceptable answer to the original question
is not so much his nominalist ontology as
his nominalist semantics of absolute concepts.
Admitting some formal aspect under which
such a concept would represent its objects
may have appeared to him "dangerously"
close to admitting something like an "obscure"
formal distinction between the object and
its nature. So Ockham abandoned the very
idea that an absolute concept should represent
or signify its objects under some respect.
However, by this move he made himself incapable
of giving an answer to our original question.
In fact, he may have thought that that is
a small price to pay. After all, he would
not be the only, and certainly not the last
nominalist who, instead of trying to give
an answer to it, would challenge the legitimacy
of the question. But in view of the foregoing
considerations it seems that whoever finds
the question legitimate should seek an answer
not in the direction of a "more robust
nominalism", but rather in the direction
of an ontologically moderate, semantic realism.
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