|
Scientific knowledge of physical reality,
at least in the strict, traditional sense,
has to be based on necessary, universal generalizations.
Such generalizations, in turn, are impossible
without universal, substantial concepts of
extramental objects. For if none of our concepts
represents substantial characteristics of
extramental objects, then our concepts can
only represent contingent features of their
objects, and so they cannot provide us with
universal, necessary knowledge of these objects.
It is therefore crucial to any epistemology
upholding the possibility of scientific knowledge
in this sense to account for the human mind’s
ability to acquire substantial concepts of
things in extramental reality.[1]
Such an account, however, is particularly
problematic for empiricists, who, for the
purposes of this paper, will broadly be characterized
as philosophers holding that the human mind
begins its existence in this life without
any definite mental contents about extramental
reality, in short, without any categorematic
concepts,[2] but has to acquire its concepts
in a natural process from experience.
To be sure, this is a somewhat broad characterization,
which will turn out to comprise philosophers
whom we usually would not subsume under the
label ‘empiricist’ without reservation.[3]
Nevertheless, this characterization certainly
distinguishes a number of medieval Aristotelians
from Platonists, Augustinians, and Cartesians,
who would hold that the human mind begins
its existence in this life in possession
of at least some categorematic concepts,
which therefore it does not acquire in this
life from experience. Consequently, for these
philosophers the acquisition of these concepts
in this life is not a problem at all. They
rather have trouble with accounting for the
apparent lack of these concepts in children
and mentally impaired adults, as well as
the apparently mysterious match between these
prenatal or innate concepts and the objects
of empirical reality, and, in general, the
supernatural dependency of what appears to
be a natural operation of the human mind,
namely, understanding.[4]
By contrast, the acquisition of substantial
concepts in this life is a problem for empiricists,
for they have to be able to show that these
concepts can somehow be derived from the
natural input the mind receives in this life,
namely, sensory experience. However, sensory
experience apparently can only provide the
mind with information about sensible qualities
of objects of experience, which are all accidental,
non-substantial features of these objects.
To be sure, if substantial concepts can be
derived as some sorts of combinations of
the concepts of these sensible qualities,
then the problem may seem to be solved, in
the way proposed by the British empiricists,
Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. However, as John
Buridan’s argumentation in q. 4 of bk. 1
of his Questions on Aristotle’s Physics had
showed centuries before the British empiricist
approach emerged, such a derivation is impossible.
In this paper, I will first argue, rather
anachronistically, that Buridan’s discussion
in this question amounts to a principled
refutation of the British empiricists’ conception
of our substantial concepts as “collections
of simple ideas of sensible qualities”.[5]
After identifying the principles that allow
this refutation, I will show that on the
basis of two further Aristotelian principles
Buridan can successfully defend the possibility
of scientific knowledge of physical reality,
while staying within the bounds of the broadly
interpreted empiricism characterized above.
In conclusion, I will argue that it was precisely
Buridan’s insistence on these Aristotelian
principles that allowed him to be a thoroughgoing
empiricist without slipping into the sort
of “medieval Humeanism” from which he took
great pains to distinguish his own nominalism,
namely, the skepticism of Nicholas of Autrecourt
and his ilk, that is, whomever else Buridan
is opposing in this question.[6]
Buridan’s “Refutation of British Empiricism”
In his question-commentary on Aristotle’s
Physics, Buridan raises the question “whether
in every science the knowledge and understanding
of things arises from the preexisting cognition
of their causes, principles, and elements”.[7]
After advancing a number of arguments supporting
the negative reply, Buridan begins his discussion
by expounding an opinion on the issue, which
he is about to refute:
“This question and the arguments brought
up in connection with it raise several difficulties.
One such difficulty is whether from the cognition
(noticia) of one thing one can obtain the
cognition of another; for there are two sorts
of cognition, namely, complex and incomplex.
About the incomplex sort some people say
that no incomplex cognition can be obtained
from another, since no cognition can be obtained
from another, except by means of a consequence,
but a consequence can only lead from a complex
[cognition] to a complex one; therefore,
etc. In the second place, they infer as a
corollary that we have no cognition of any
substance in terms of incomplex cognition,
for we can arrive at the cognition of substances
only by means of the cognition of accidents;
and so by means of some consequence, which
can only obtain between complex [cognitions].
But I do not agree with this opinion, and
I posit two conclusions against it.”[8]
Buridan’s first conclusion directly attacks
the first claim of this opinion, namely,
that no simple cognition can be obtained
from a simple cognition. He points out that
the claim is self-defeating, insofar as the
simple intellectual cognitions it involves
had to come from some simple sensory cognitions,
in line with the common assumption of the
broadly understood empiricism described above;
and so, some simple intellectual cognition
had to come from some simple sensory cognition,
whence some simple cognition had to be obtained
from some simple cognition, contrary to the
original claim. As he writes:
“The first [conclusion] is that some incomplex
cognition can be obtained by means of another.
For there are incomplex intellectual cognitions,
and all intellectual cognitions are obtained
by means of another act of cognition; therefore,
some incomplex cognition is obtained by means
of another [act of cognition]. The major
premise has to be accepted, for if a caviler
were to deny it, then [by virtue of this
denial] he would have to concede at least
the existence of some complex intellectual
cognition; but the complex [cognition] would
have to be composed of simple ones, for it
is not divided to infinity as the continuum,
and an intellectual cognition is not composed
of sensory cognitions; therefore, it is composed
of incomplex intellectual ones. But the minor
of the principal argument is also clear,
for at least the first intellectual cognition
has to be obtained from a sensory one, and,
in general, every intellectual cognition
must be obtained from sensory cognition either
directly or indirectly, since one who understands
has to attend to [speculari] the phantasms,
as is stated in book 3 of On the Soul; and
for this reason it is also claimed in book
1 of the Posterior Analytics that if we lose
one of our senses, we also lose the knowledge
of the proper object of that sense.”[9]
So, simple intellectual cognition must somehow
come from simple sensory cognition. But how
is this possible? And even if we can provide
an explanation of the derivation of simple
intellectual cognition from simple sensory
cognition in general, how do we know that
we have such a simple cognition of substance
obtainable from sense experience? Indeed,
why would the intellectual cognition of substance
have to be simple? After all, if the British
empiricists are right, then the only way
we can make sense of our substantial terms
is to conceive of them as being associated
with relatively stable collections of sensory
ideas. The reason for this is that these
terms certainly cannot be associated with
anything over and above the sensory ideas
we can gain from experience, whence they
have to be associated with those relatively
stable bundles of these ideas that the mind
usually perceives together, and so associates
them with substantive names, for practical
reference.[10] Buridan’s second conclusion
addresses this issue as follows:
“The second conclusion is that we have simple
concepts of substances, for the concept of
man from which we take the substantial term
‘man’ is a concept of substance, if man is
a substance. And that concept supposits only
for a substance, for if it supposited for
an accident or for something composed from
substance and accident, then it would not
be true that man is a substance, for neither
an accident nor something composed from substance
and accident is a substance; but precisely
a substance is a substance, and that concept,
while it supposits for a substance, does
not even connote an accident other than that
substance, for then it would not belong to
the category of substance, but to that of
an accident, as do the terms ‘white’ or ‘big’
or ‘small’, etc. For these terms supposit
for substance and not for anything else,
just as the term ‘man’ does, but they leave
the category of substance because of their
connotation; therefore, a concept from which
a term in the category of substance is taken
is not a concept of any accident, or of something
composed from substance and accident, but
only of a substance or substances.
And if anyone were to say that they are complex,
then the complex ones are combined from simple
ones, for in the analysis of concepts one
cannot go to infinity; and then those simple
ones and the ones composed from them are
only of substances; therefore, there are
simple concepts of substances.”[11]
The first important thing to note about Buridan’s
argumentation here is his insistence on the
Aristotelian distinction between substance
and accident, and his combination of this
Aristotelian doctrine with his own semantic
analysis of the terms and the corresponding
concepts belonging to the Aristotelian categories.
The point of the argument is that even if
substances had complex concepts, those complex
concepts would have to be made of simple
concepts. But those simple concepts cannot
be concepts of accidents, so those simple
concepts would have to be simple substantial
concepts, so we would still have to have
some simple substantial concepts, which was
the point to be proved. On the other hand,
the claim that complex substantial concepts
cannot be made up from accidental concepts
(contrary to the British empiricists’ conception
of collections of sensory ideas) is proved
here with reference to Buridan’s doctrine
of the semantics of substantial vs. accidental
terms and concepts, as being absolute vs.
connotative terms and concepts.
For Buridan, concrete substantial terms are
distinguished from concrete accidental terms
by their different modes of signification
due to the different sorts of concepts to
which they are subordinated, yielding their
different modes of predication. Concrete
substantial terms are subordinated to absolute
concepts, whence they signify their significata
absolutely, without relating them to anything
else. Concrete accidental terms, on the other
hand, are subordinated to connotative concepts,[12]
whence they signify their significata in
relation to their connotata, which are also
called their appellata when they obliquely
refer to these connotata in the context of
a proposition. It is a consequence of this
difference that substantial terms are predicated
of their significata essentially or quidditatively,
whereas the accidental terms are predicated
of their significata non-essentially, or
denominatively.[13] Accordingly, absolute
terms, in particular substantial terms function
in Buridan’s semantics as what we nowadays
would call “rigid designators”. For these
terms are true of their significata in a
proposition as long as they supposit for
them. But since the supposita of an absolute
term are nothing but its significata that
exist at the time connoted by the copula
of the proposition in which the term is predicated,
absolute terms always and necessarily supposit
for their significata as long as these significata
exist at the time connoted by the copula
of the proposition in which they are predicated
of these significata. So, these terms may
never become false of these significata as
long as these significata exist. Therefore,
absolute terms are always predicated of their
significata essentially, or quidditatively,
and thus designate them “rigidly”. On the
other hand, concrete accidental terms supposit
for their significata only when their appellata
belong to their significata in the way they
are signified to belong to their significata.
So, if the appellata cease to exist or cease
to belong to the significata in the way demanded
by the signification of the term, then these
terms cease to supposit for their significata,
whence they become false of their significata,
even though these significata continue to
exist. Therefore, the essential vs. non-essential
predication of concrete substantial vs. accidental
terms is a direct consequence of their mode
of signification, which in turn, is determined
by the sorts of concepts to which they are
subordinated.
What Buridan’s argument shows is that the
assumption that substantial concepts are
collections of connotative concepts, which
is precisely the implication of the British
empiricist conception, would lead to the
absurd conclusion that a substantial term
would not be a substantial term, for then
it would be subordinated to a non-substantial
concept. As he writes further on:
“Again, if the substantial concept of man
were complex, then let us posit that it consists
of three simple ones, namely, a, b, and c.
Then, if no concept of substance is simple,
a can only be a concept of accident, and
the same goes for b and c; therefore, the
whole combined from them would also be only
a concept of accident, and not one of substance,
for a whole is nothing over and above its
parts. But this is absurd, namely, that the
substantial concept of man should be nothing
but a concept of accidents; therefore, etc.”[14]
To be sure, the British empiricists, who
provided precisely this sort of analysis
for substantial terms, happily embraced this
conclusion, and did not regard it as absurd
at all. But Buridan’s previous argument,
combined with his semantic considerations,
also shows that this conclusion directly
entails the impossibility of the essential
predication of these “phony” substantial
terms. This, however, entails further that
they cannot serve as the basis for valid
scientific generalizations: an implication
that was to be worked out in the fullest
detail by David Hume. But then, unless Humean
skepticism is the inevitable consequence
of empiricism in general, an empiricist who
wants to save the possibility of scientific
knowledge in the traditional sense has to
be able to find an alternative way to account
for the derivation of our substantial concepts
from experience, without turning the terms
associated with these concepts into non-essential
predicates of their significata.
This is precisely what Buridan offers in
his subsequent considerations, moderating
his “empiricist nominalism” with “Aristotelian
naturalism”, abandoned by his contemporary
opponents, especially, Nicholas of Autrecourt.
Buridan’s Balancing Act: Empiricist Nominalism
Combined with Aristotelian Naturalism
In response to the arguments supporting the
opinion he rejects, Buridan offers four different
ways in which one may account for obtaining
some simple cognition from another without
any inference. As he writes:
“Then, [I respond] to the arguments supporting
this opinion. To the first, we have to reply
that some cognition is obtained from another
without inferring one proposition from another
or others in four ways. First, objectively.
For if there is some cognition in an external
sense, then it is related to the cognition
of the common sense as its object, and also
any sensory cognition is related to intellective
cognition as its object.”[15]
In this way, the higher cognitive faculty
forms some act of cognition distinct from
the act of cognition of a lower cognitive
faculty, simply because it takes the act
of the lower faculty as its object. To be
sure, one has to make here the common distinction
between an immediate and ultimate object:
in the cognition of external objects (as
opposed to the soul’s reflecting on its own
acts) the act of the lower faculty is only
the immediate object of the act of the higher
faculty, insofar as the higher faculty cognizes
the object of the lower faculty by means
of cognizing the act of the lower faculty,
in the same way as when I see my face in
the mirror by means of its reflection. In
any case, this certainly is the most general
way in which one simple act of cognition
can give rise to another, or indeed, in general,
one stage of information processing can give
rise to another, as when a picture taken
by a digital camera is electromagnetically
stored on a computer’s hard drive possibly
for further processing. The important point
here is that information received by one
sort of encoder of that information can be
actively used and further processed by another
encoder, by reason of its own receptive and
processing ability. In fact, in this way,
the second encoder may even add information
not contained in the first, as when a computer
tags the picture files on its hard drive
with time and date stamps. This is precisely
the point Buridan makes concerning the second
way in which a simple act of cognition may
give rise to another:
“Second, [a simple act of cognition may give
rise to another] elicitively, as Avicenna
says that the estimative power from a sensed
intention, namely, of color, or shape, or
motion, elicits an intention not sensed,
namely, that of attraction or repulsion [amicitie
vel inimicitie]. This is why sheep fear and
flee the wolf, and follow the shepherd. And
this is not a miracle. Since the soul is
much nobler than fire, yet fire in generating
heat is able by that heat also to generate
lightness and rarity, so it is reasonable
that the soul, by means of one act of cognition
is able to generate another one, naturally
following upon the former.”[16]
This is indeed plausible; however, when he
specifically addresses the issue of how simple
substantial concepts may be derived from
sensory cognition, Buridan warns us that
this way of accounting for this specific
process of concept acquisition may contain
a false assumption. In his questions on Aristotle’s
On the Soul, he analyzes the issue in the
following way:
“… there is one way, in the first place,
in which the cognition of accidents leads
us to the cognition of substance. And this
assumes first that the intellect is moved
by phantasms, the imagination by the senses,
and the senses by external objects. It assumes
in the second place that the senses and the
imagination are only of accidents. It assumes
in the third place that the estimative power
is superior to and more excellent than the
external sensitive power; and so it is able
to elicit from the sensed intentions some
intentions not sensed. Thus also the intellect
is superior to any sensitive power, whether
external or internal; therefore, it is able
from the intentions of accidents which fell
into the imagination, to elicit intentions
of substances, which did not fall into the
imagination. And so, by means of the cognition
of accidents, we can arrive at the cognition
of substances.
Briefly, this way [of addressing the issue]
is defective in its second assumption, which
was that the senses are only of accidents.
For this goes against Aristotle, who in bk.
2 of this work [namely, On the Soul] asserts
that the son of Diarus is sensed; although
it is true that this is not per se, but per
accidens. Indeed, we do not perceive substances
under substantial concepts, but we do perceive
them under accidental and connotative ones,
and not under purely absolute ones.”[17]
So, even though the intellect may have the
power to elicit intentions not contained
in the senses, in the formation of substantial
concepts it is simply not true that these
would have to be “cooked up” by the intellect
alone, for the sensory data provided by the
senses about accidents does carry information
about the substances to which these accidents
belong. This is the idea that Buridan elaborates
in the continuation of this passage, listing
three further ways in which one can account
for the intellect’s ability to form substantial
concepts from sensory data, by extracting
the information this sensory data carries
about substances:
“The second way is that the senses first
perceive both substance and accident in a
confused manner, and afterwards the intellect,
which is a superior power, differentiates
between substance and accident. Therefore,
if I see someone now to be white and later
I see him to be black, and at the same time
I perceive that he remains the same, I arrive
at the cognition by which I notice that this
is other than whiteness and likewise other
than blackness. And thus, although at first
substance and accident are apprehended by
means of the senses in a confused manner,
the intellect, which is a superior power,
can arrive at the cognition of substance
itself.
The third way is possible because things
are cognized by means of their similitudes.
For it is stated in bk. 3 of this work that
“a stone is not in the soul, but the species
of the stone is”. Since, therefore, it is
the case that any effect bears the similitude
of its cause, and an accident is an effect
of a substance, it follows that an accident
also bears a similitude of a substance, and
consequently the intellect is able to arrive
at the cognition of substance by means of
the accident.
The fourth way can be this: prime matter,
before a substantial form is educed from
its potentiality, needs accidental dispositions
preparing it for receiving such a form; the
same can be imagined of the potential intellect,
namely, that before there would be the similitude
of substance in it, there have to be in it
the species and similitudes of accidents.
Once these are in the potential intellect,
the agent intellect is able to extract from
them the natural similitude of that substance
to which those accidents belonged whose similitudes
and intentions were in the potential intellect.”[18]
Basically the same point is made in the continuation
of the previously discussed passage from
the Physics-commentary.[19]
Conclusion In view of these passages, we
can summarize the Aristotelian principles
allowing Buridan to maintain his empiricist
nominalism without slipping into skepticism
in the following way.
The intellect is not just a passive receiver
of sensory information, but a cognitive faculty
actively processing this information, extracting
from it content that is not so extractible
from it by the senses. The sensory information
received by the senses, besides its primary,
per se content concerning the sensible qualities
of sensory objects, also carries some further
content about the substances bearing these
sensible qualities. Once these two principles,
which may be dubbed the principle of the
activity of the intellect, and the principle
of the substantial content of sensory information,
respectively, are acknowledged, any empiricist
should be able to provide a plausible account
of our ability to acquire genuine substantial
concepts from sensory information.[20] For
in view of the first principle, the intellect
is obviously able to extract content from
sensory information which the senses could
not so extract even though they may carry
it, in the way, for instance, light received
by a telescope carries not only visible information
about the stars, but also information about
their material constitution, which, however,
is extractible only by means of spectral
analysis. But in view of the second principle,
the information about sensible accidents
also carries such extractible information
about the substances to which these accidents
belong. Therefore, the intellect should be
able to form genuine substantial concepts
from this sensory information. But then,
these genuine substantial concepts will be
denoted by essential predicates of the things
conceived by means of these concepts, which
will always necessarily apply to these things
as long as these things exist. And so, these
predicates will be scientifically knowable
characteristics of these things.
All in all, even if, perhaps, Nicholas of
Autrecourt was “the medieval Hume”, it did
not take a “medieval Kant”[21] to refute
his skepticism. For Buridan’s version of
an essentialist nominalism was sufficient
to show that one can be a nominalist and
a thoroughgoing empiricist without having
to fall prey to any serious form of skepticism.
In this way, Buridan’s essentialist nominalism
could, in principle, have shown a way out
of the dilemma of empiricism vs. rationalism
of early modern philosophy. Indeed, the dilemma
may not even have emerged in its original
form, if the Aristotelian empiricism of the
scholastics, including Buridan’s, had not
been abandoned earlier, partly for extrinsic
reasons, by the new intelligentsia of a new
era.
Gyula Klima Fordham University
Bibliography
Primary Literature
Berkeley, G., A Treatise Concerning the Principles
of Human Knowledge (Principles), Hackett:
Indianapolis, 1982.
Matthew of Aquasparta, Quaestiones Disputatae,
in : Bonaventure, et al., De Humanae Cognitionis
Ratione: anecdota quaedam Seraphici Doctoris
Sancti Bonaventurae et nonnulorum eius discipulorum,
Ad Claras Aquas (Quaracchi): St. Bonaventure,
1883.
Buridan, J., Le traité de l’âme de Jean Buridan
(De Prima Lectura). Édition, Étude critique
et doctrinale par B. Patar, Éditions de l'Institut
Supérieur de Philosophie: Louvain-la-Neuve,
1991.
Buridan, J., Quaestiones in Aristotelis Metaphysicam:
Kommentar zur Aristotelischen Metaphysik.
Paris, 1518; reprint, Frankfurt am Main:
Minerva, 1964
Buridan, J., Questiones in De Anima lb. 3,
q. 8, in: John Buridan’s Philosophy of Mind:
An Edition and Translation of Book III of
his ‘Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima’ (Third
Redaction), edited by J. A. Zupko. Ph. D.
diss., Cornell University, 1989, 2 vols.
Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International,
1990
Buridan, J., Quaestiones in Porphyrii Isagogen,
in: R. Tatarzynski, "Jan Buridan, Kommentarz
do Isagogi Porfiriusza." Przeglad Tomistyczyny
2 (1986), pp. 111-95.
Buridan, J., Quaestiones super Octo Libros
Physicorum Aristotelis (QiP), Minerva: Frankfurt
A. M., 1964.
Buridan, J., Summulae de Dialectica (Summulae),
an annotated translation with a philosophical
introduction by Gyula Klima, New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2001.
Hume, D., A Treatise of Human Nature (Treatise),
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978.
Lock, J., An Essay Concerning Human Understanding
(Essay), New York: Dover Publications, 1959.
Secondary Literature
Haldane, J., “Reid, Scholasticism and Current
Philosophy of Mind”, in: M. Dalgarno and
E. Matthews (eds.): The Philosophy of Thomas
Reid, Kluwer Academic Publishers: Dordrecht,
1989, pp. 285-304.
King, P., “John Buridan’s Solution to the
Problem of Universals”, in: J. M. M. H. Thijssen
and J. Zupko (eds.): The Metaphysics and
Natural Philosophy of John Buridan, Brill
Publishers: Leiden, 2001, pp. 1-27.
Klima, G., “Contemporary ‘Essentialism’ vs.
Aristotelian Essentialism”, in: Haldane,
J. (ed.): Mind, Metaphysics, and Value in
the Thomistic and Analytic Traditions, University
of Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame, IN, 2002,
pp. 175-194.
Rashdall, H., “Nicholas de Ultricuria, a
Medieval Hume”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society 8(1907), pp. 1-27.
Scott, T. K., “Nicholas of Autrecourt, Buridan
and Ockhamism”, Journal of the History of
Philosophy 9(1971), pp. 15-41.
Thijssen, H., “John Buridan and Nicholas
of Autrecourt on Causality and Induction”,
in Traditio, 43(1987), pp. 237-255.
Zupko, J., “What Is the Science of the Soul?
A Case Study in the Evolution of Late Medieval
Natural Philosophy”, Synthese, 110(1997),
pp. 297-334.
Wordcount: 4366
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[1] To be sure, our ability to acquire such
concepts will still not guarantee that we
know which of our concepts are the essential
ones. That is the task of empirical research
to find out. But we can know a priori that
if we cannot have such concepts, then we
cannot have scientific knowledge in the specified
sense. For more on this issue see Klima,
G.: “Contemporary ‘Essentialism’ vs. Aristotelian
Essentialism”, in: Haldane, J. (ed.): Mind,
Metaphysics, and Value in the Thomistic and
Analytic Traditions, University of Notre
Dame Press: Notre Dame, IN, 2002, pp. 175-194.
[2] Obviously, syncategorematic concepts,
such as the concepts of the Boolean operations
of negation, conjunction, etc., may consistently
be treated even by empiricists as innate
operations of the mind, not carrying any
information about extramental reality, but
simply operating on categorematic concepts
which do carry such information.
[3] For a discussion of the issue of ‘empiricism’
in late medieval philosophy, see Zupko, J.:
“What Is the Science of the Soul? A Case
Study in the Evolution of Late Medieval Natural
Philosophy”, Synthese, 110(1997), pp. 297-334.
[4] As Matthew of Aquasparta remarks in connection
with the doctrine of divine illumination:
“…if that light were the entire and sole
reason for cognition, then the cognition
of things in the Word would not differ from
their cognition in their proper kind, neither
would the cognition of reason differ from
the cognition of revelation, nor philosophical
cognition from prophetic cognition, nor cognition
by nature from cognition by grace.” – “…
si lux illa esset ratio cognoscendi tota
et sola, non differret cognitio rerum in
Verbo a cognitione in proprio genere, nec
cognitio rationis a cognitione revelationis,
nec cognitio philosophica a cognitione prophetica,
nec cognitio per naturam a cognitione per
gratiam.” Matthew of Aquasparta, Quaestiones
Disputatae, in: Bonaventure, et al., De Humanae
Cognitionis Ratione: anecdota quaedam Seraphici
Doctoris Sancti Bonaventurae et nonnulorum
eius discipulorum, Ad Claras Aquas (Quaracchi):
St. Bonaventure, 1883, pp. 94-96.
[5] “I say, our specific ideas of substances
are nothing else but a collection of a certain
number of simple ideas, considered as united
in one thing. These ideas of substances,
though they are commonly simple apprehensions,
and the names of them simple terms, yet in
effect are complex and compounded. Thus the
idea which an Englishman signifies by the
name swan, is white colour, long neck, red
beak, black legs, and whole feet, and all
these of a certain size, with a power of
swimming in the water, and making a certain
kind of noise, and perhaps, to a man who
has long observed this kind of birds, some
other properties: which all terminate in
sensible simple ideas, all united in one
common subject.” John Locke: An Essay Concerning
Human Understanding (Essay), New York: Dover
Publications, 1959, bk. II, c. 23, para.
14.
[6] See Hastings Rashdall, “Nicholas de Ultricuria,
a Medieval Hume”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society 8(1907), pp. 1-27, and T. K. Scott,
“Nicholas of Autrecourt, Buridan and Ockhamism”,
Journal of the History of Philosophy 9(1971),
pp. 15-41. In his “John Buridan and Nicholas
of Autrecourt on Causality and Induction”,
in Traditio,
43(1987), pp. 237-255, Hans Thijssen has
plausibly argued that since some of the theses
and arguments Buridan opposes here do not
reflect Nicholas’ doctrine as we know it,
Buridan may well have had other opponents
in mind. On the other hand, since the theses
and arguments in question are at least not
incompatible with Autrecourt’s known doctrines,
it is still possible that Buridan had in
mind some further works or even just oral
presentations of Autrecourt’s that we simply
do not know of from other sources. Indeed,
this latter alternative has the advantage
of explaining the phenomena per pauciora.
In any case, my subsequent argument is not
dependent on the identity of Buridan’ actual
target of criticism in this question.
[7] Buridan: Quaestiones super Octo Libros
Physicorum Aristotelis (QiP), Minerva: Frankfurt
A. M., 1964, lb. 1, q. 4.
[8] “Ista quaestio et rationes ad eam adductae
implicant in se plures difficultates. Una
difficultas est utrum ex notitia unius potest
fieri notitia alterius, cum sit duplex notitia,
scilicet complexa et incomplexa. Quidam de
incimplexa dicunt quod nulla notitia incomplexa
fit per aliam, quia non fit una notitia per
alteram, nisi virtute consequentiae; sed
consequentia non est nisi complexi ad complexum,
igitur, etc. Secundo illi inferunt correlarie
quodnullam substantiam cognoscimus notitia
incomplexaquia non venimus in notitiam substantiarum,
nisi per notitiam accidentium, igitur in
virtute aliucuius consequentiae, quae non
est, nisi complexorum. Sed huic opinioni
non assentio; ideo pono contra eam duas conclusiones.”
Ibid.
[9] “Prima est quod aliqua notitia incomplexa
potest fireri per aliam. Quia aliqua est
notitia intellectiva incomplexa, et omnis
notitia intellectiva fit per aliam; igitur
aliqua notitia incomplexa fit per aliam.
Maior concedenda est, quia si cavillator
vellet eam negare, saltem ipse concederet
coticiam intellectivam complexam, et oportet
complexam esse compositam ex simplicibus,
non enim dividitur in infinitum, sicut divideretur
continuum. Et notitia intellectiva non est
composita ex sensitiva; igitur est composita
ex intellectivis simplicibus. Sed etiam minor
principalis rationis manifesta est, quia
saltem prima notitia intellectualis oportet
fieri ex sensitiva, et universaliter omnem
notitiam intellectualem ex sensitiva oportet
fieri vel mediate vel immediate, cum intelligentem
quemcumque necesse sit phantasmata speculari,
ut habetur tertio De Anima, propter quod
etiam dictum est primo Posteriorum quod deficiente
nobis aliquo sensu deficit nobis scientia
de obiecto illius sensus.” Ibid.
[10] See Locke, Essay, bk. II. cc. 22-23;
bk. III. cc. 5-6; George Berkeley, A Treatise
Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge
(Principles), Hackett: Indianapolis,
1982, nn. 1, 24, 54; David Hume, A Treatise
of Human Nature (Treatise), Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1978, Bk. I, sect. VI.
[11] “Secunda conclusio est ista quod de
substantia habemus conceptum simplicem, quia
conceptus hominis a quo sumitur iste terminus
substantialis ‘homo’ est conceptus substantiae,
si homo est substantia; et ille conceptus
non supponit, nisi pro substantia, quia si
supponeret pro accidente vel pro composito
ex substantia et accidente, tunc non esset
verum quod homo est substantia, quia nec
accidens est substantia, nec compositum ex
substantia et accidens est substantia, sed
praecise substantia est substantia. Et ille
conceptus etiam supponendo pro substantia
non connotat aliquod accidens aliud ab ipsa
substantia, qui tunc non esset de praedicamento
substantiae, sed accidentis, sicut ille terminus
‘albus’, vel ‘magnus’, vel ‘parvus’, etc.
Illi enim termini ita supponunt pro substantia
et non pro alio sicut iste terminus ‘homo’,
sed exeunt a praedicamento substantiae propter
connotationem; igitur talis conceptus substantialis
a quibus sumitur terminus de praedicamento
substantiae nec est conceptus aliquorum accidentium,
nec compositorum ex substantiis et accidentibus,
sed solum substantiae vel substantiarum.
Et si quis dicat quod sint complexi, tunc
complexi sunt compositi ex simplicibus, cum
in resolutione conceptuum non sit processus
in infinitum; et tunc illi simplices et compositi
ex eis non erunt, nisi substantiarum; igitur
substantiarum sunt conceptus simplices.”
QiP, lb. 1, q. 4.
[12] John Buridan: Summulae de Dialectica
(Summulae), New Haven: Yale University Press,
2001, pp. 147, 173, 639, 642, 644-646, 729,
735.
[13] Summulae, pp. 106, 123, 126-128, 131,
135, 138, 147-149, 147n9, 155, 155n20, 156-158,
163, 169, 169n38, 175, 183, 202, 629, 640,
653, 668, 732, 787, 885, 886.
[14] “Item si conceptus substantialis hominis
sit complexus, ponamus quod hoc sit ex tribus
conceptibus simplicibus, scilicet a, b, et
c. Tunc si nullus conceptus substantiae est
simplex, a non esset, nisi conceptus accidentis,
et similiter nec b, nec c. Igitur totum complexum
ex eis non esset conceptus, nisi accidentium
et non substantiae, cum totum nihil sit praeter
partes. Sed hoc est absurdum, scilicet quod
conceptus substantialis hominis non sit nisi
conceptus accidentium; igitur, etc.” QiP,
lb. 1, q. 4.
[15] “Tunc ad rationes illius opnionis. Ad
primam dicendum est quod fit una notitia
ex alia sine consequentia alicuius propositionis
ad aliam propositionem vel alias propositiones
quadrupliciter. Primo quidem obiective. Quia
si sit aliqua notitia in sensu exteriori,
se habet per modum obiecti respectu notitiae
sensus communis et etiam notitia sensitiva
se habet per modum obiecti ad notitiam intellectivam.”
QiP, lb. 1, q. 4.
[16] “Secundo etiam elicitive, sicut dicit
Avicenna quod virtus aestimativa ex intentione
sensata, scilicet coloris, aut figurae, aut
motus, elicit intentionem non sensatam, puta
amicitiae vel inimicitiae. Ideo ovis timet
et fugit a lupo, et sequitur pastorem. Et
hoc non est mirum; cum enim anima sit multo
nobilior virtus quam ignis, et tamen ignis
generando calorem potest consequenter mediante
illo calore generare levitatem et raritatem,
rationabile est quod anima mediante una notitia
potest consequenter generare aliam naturaliter
consequentem ad priorem.” Ibid.
[17] “Quantum ad tertium sciendum est quod
est unus modus primo quo cognitio accidentis
ducit nos in cognitionem substantiae. Et
supponit primo quod intellectus movetur a
phantasmate, phantasia vero a sensu, sensus
vero ab obiecto exteriore. Secundo supponit
quod sensus et phantasia non sunt nisi accident<ium.
Tertio supponit quod virtus aestimativa est
superior et excelsior quam sit virtus sensitiva
exterior; et ergo ex intentionibus sensatis
potest elicere intentiones non sensatas.
Sic etiam intellectus est virtus superior
quam quaecumque virtus sensitiva sive interior
sive exterior; et ergo potest ex intentionibus
accidentium quae cadebant in phantasia elicere
intentiones substantiarum quae non cadebant
in phantasia. Et sic mediante cognitione
accidentium possumus devenire in cognitionem
substantiarum. Breviter. Iste modus deficit
in secunda suppositione quae erat quod sensus
non est nisi accidentium. Hoc enim est contra
Aristotelem in IIo huius, ubi dicit quod
Diari filius sentitur; verum est tamen quod
hoc non est per se sed per accidens. Unde
substantias non percipimus mediante sensu
sub conceptibus substantialibus, sed bene
sub conceptibus accidentalibus et connotativis,
et non mere absolutis.” J. Buridan: Le traité
de l’âme de Jean Buridan (De Prima Lectura).
Édition, Étude critique et doctrinale par
B. Patar, Éditions de l'Institut Supérieur
de Philosophie: Louvain-la-Neuve, 1991, Quaestiones
in De Anima (QDA), lb. 1, q. 5. This passage
is in perfect agreement with the doctrine
of the corresponding passage of the commentary
on the Physics (and the other authentic passages
referred to in it; see n. 19 below). Because
of this doctrinal agreement, I take this
passage to be a reliable report of Buridan’s
ideas (whether by himself or someone else),
despite doubts concerning the text’s authenticity.
Cf. “Hence it is plain we do not see a man
- if by man is meant that which lives, moves,
perceives, and thinks as we do - but only
such a certain collection of ideas as directs
us to think there is a distinct principle
of thought and motion, like to ourselves,
accompanying and represented by it.” Berkeley,
Treatise, Part I, n. 148, p. 88.
[18] “Secundus modus est quod sensus primo
percipit simul confuse substantiam et accidens,
sed postea intellectus, qui est virtus superior,
ponit differentiam inter substantiam et accidens.
Unde, si video aliquem nunc esse album et
postea eundem video esse nigrum, et cum hoc
percipio quod ipse manet idem, ego venio
in cognitionem qua cognosco hoc esse aliud
ab albedine et similiter aliud a nigredine.
Et sic, quamvis primo apprehendantur rnediante
sensu substantia et accidens confuse, tamen
tali cognitione sensitiva praecedente, intellectus,
qui est virtus superior, potest venire in
cognitionem determinatam ipsius substantiae.
Tertius modus potest esse, nam res aliquae
cognoscuntur per suas similitudines. Dicitur
enim in IIIo huius: “lapis non est in anima,
sed species lapidis”; cum ergo ita sit quod
quilibet effectus gerit in se similitudinem
suae causae, et cum accidens sit effectus
substantiae, sequitur etiam ipsum accidens
gerere in se similitudinem substantiae, et
per consequens <per ipsum accidens intellectus
potest devenire in cognitionem substantiae.
Quartus modus potest esse iste: nam sicut
materia prima, antequam de eius potentia
educatur forma substantialis, indiget dispositionibus
accidentalibus disponentibus materiam ad
recipiendum talem formam, sic etiam potest
imaginari de intellectu possibili: antequam
in eo sit similitudo substantiae, oportet
quod primo in eo <sint species et similitudines
accidentium. Quibus existentibus in intellectu
possibili, intellectus agens potest extrahere
ex illis similitudinem illius substantiae
naturalem, cuius substantiae sunt illa accidentia
quorum similitudines et intentiones erant
in intellectu possibili.” QDA, lb. 1, q.
5. (prima lectura)
[19] “Tertio modo, abstractive; ut quia habeo
primo conceptum confuse et simul representantem
et substantiam et accidens, ut cum percipio
album – non enim solam albedinem video, sed
album. Et si postea percipio idem moveri
et mutari de albo in nigrum, iudico hoc esse
aliud ab albedine, et tunc intellectus naturaliter
habet virtutem dividendi illam confusionem,
et intelligendi substantiam abstractive ab
accidente, et accidens abstractive a substantia,
et potest utriusque formare simplicem conceptum,
et sic etiam abstrahendo fit conceptus universalis
ex conceptu singulari, sicut debet videri
in tertio De Anima, et septimo Metaphysicae.”
– “In the third way, abstractively; as when
I first have a concept that represents substance
and accident together in a confused manner,
for example, when I perceive something white,
for I see not only whiteness, but something
that is white, and then if I perceive the
same thing to move and change from white
to black, then I judge that this is something
distinct from whiteness, and then the intellect
naturally has the power to analyze that confusion,
and to understand substance abstractively
from accident, and accident abstractively
from substance, and it can form a simple
concept of each, and it is in the same way,
by abstraction, that a universal concept
is formed from a singular one, as one should
see in bk. 3 of On the Soul, and bk. 7 of
the Metaphysics.” QiP lb. 1, q. 4. Cf. QiP
lb. 1, q. 7, ff. 7vb-10ra; J. Buridan: Questiones
in De Anima lb. 3, q. 8, in: John Buridan's
Philosophy of Mind: An Edition and Translation
of Book III of his ‘Questions on Aristotle’s
De Anima’ (Third Redaction), edited by J.
A. Zupko. Ph. D. diss., Cornell University,
1989, 2 vols. Ann Arbor: University Microfilms
International, 1990, J. Buridan: Quaestiones
in Porphyrii Isagogen, in: R. Tatarzynski,
"Jan Buridan, Kommentarz do Isagogi
Porfiriusza." Przeglad Tomistyczyny
2 (1986), pp. 111-95, esp. pp. 172-173, and
J. Buridan: Quaestiones in Aristotelis Metaphysicam:
Kommentar zur Aristotelischen Metaphysik.
Paris, 1518; reprint, Frankfurt am Main:
Minerva, 1964, lb. 7, qq. 15-20, ff. 50rb-54va.
[20] To be sure, one might still raise the
question whether Buridan is “entitled” to
these Aristotelian principles in his solution,
given his semantic ideas concerning the natural
signification of absolute concepts. But this
question is beyond the scope of the present
paper. Cf. P. King: “John Buridan’s Solution
to the Problem of Universals”, in: J. M.
M. H. Thijssen and J. Zupko (eds.): The Metaphysics
and Natural Philosophy of John Buridan, Brill
Publishers: Leiden, 2001, pp. 1-27.
[21] It may be interesting to note here that
from a medieval perspective Kant’s solution
to “Hume’s problem” may be characterized
as simply shifting the categorical status
of some fundamental metaphysical concepts,
such as ‘substance’, ‘accident’, ‘cause’,
‘effect’, ‘existence’, etc. Instead of treating
them as (whether innate, infused, or empirically
acquired) categorematic concepts, he treats
them as “logical functions”, i. e., syncategorematic
concepts. But then it is no wonder that in
the conceptual framework of post-Kantian
positivist philosophy a number of traditional
metaphysical problems will turn out to be
not only radically undecidable, but even
meaningless, containing “category mistakes”.
At the meeting, Stephen Read also called
my attention to Thomas Reid’s very different,
“common sense” criticism of Hume’s philosophy,
as bearing some remarkable resemblances to
Buridan’s approach to the issue. In fact,
there may even be some actual historical
connection between their ideas, given the
lasting influence of Buridan’s thought in
Scotland through the circle of John Major.
Cf. J. Haldane, “Reid, Scholasticism and
Current Philosophy of Mind”, in: M. Dalgarno
and E. Matthews (eds.): The Philosophy of
Thomas Reid, Kluwer Academic Publishers:
Dordrecht, 1989, pp. 285-304.
|
