APPEARANCE AND ACTUALITY
On Hegel Notes on Dialectics:
PART II The Hegelian Logic
The Doctrine of Being
C L R James |
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L. R. James died in May 1989. His death coincided
with the explosion of popular forces across
China and eastern Europe which shook some
of the most oppressive political regimes
in human history. These momentous events,
calling into question the structure of the
modern world order, throw into sharp relief
the life and work of one of this century's
most outstanding figures. For James was pre-eminently
a man of the twentieth century. His legacy
reflects the scope and diversity of his life's
work, the unique conditions of particular
times and places; and yet at its core lies
a vision of humanity which is universal and
integrated, progressive and profound.
Anna Grimshaw - C. L. R. James: A Revolutionary
Vision for the 20th Century
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Willi
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On Hegel Notes on Dialectics:
PART II (CONTINUED)
The Hegelian Logic
The Doctrine of Being
C L R James
APPEARANCE AND ACTUALITY
Now, having leapt over Ground, and taken
a vacation with Lenin, we find ourselves
in Appearance. I want to take up Appearance
for a particular reason.
One of our most important pieces of work
is the exposure of the analysis of the Stalinist
parties as "tools of the Kremlin".
We say that it is true that they are "tools
of the Kremlin". But that, we say, is
only the appearance of things. We say that
in essence they are a product of labour and
capital at this stage, as Menshevism was
a product of labour and capital at that stage.
We clinch it by saying: if there had been
no Russian revolution, no Kremlin, but capitalism
had continued to degenerate without being
overthrown by socialism, then there would
have appeared such a party as Stalinism,
preaching revolution, ready to join up across
national boundaries with other workers, repudiating
private property and national defence, but
mortally afraid of the workers and rushing
for protection and refuge to a larger imperialism,
bureaucratic, corrupt, monolithic, reflecting
capitalism in its stage of state capitalism.
Our opponents continue with these "tools
of the Kremlin". It is disgusting. Yet,
curiously enough, they do not call the present
Mensheviks "tools of Washington".
They have Lenin to go by and they at least
try to relate these to labour and capital
- falsely, but at least they try.
The importance of our analysis is obvious.
It enables us to characterise Stalinism as
a stage of transition - we are not in the
ridiculous position of explaining why these
"tools of the Kremlin" for no God-damn
reason fasten themselves on the Kremlin.
We place the responsibility on capitalism.
We painhem objectively and not subjectively.
So much in general. In particular, we rid
ourselves of the Russian hangover. "Socialism
in a single country" originated from
Russia and has never held the slightest interest
for the world proletariat - never. I remember
the days when we nourished ourselves on the
illusion - I said it often - that when the
workers understood at lashahe communist parties
were merely agents of Stalin's foreign policy,
they would turn to us. Everybody knows this
truth now. They turn to the Stalinists more
than ever. The whole method of thinking was
wrong. Socialism in a single country did
not "produce" communist parties
that turned to their own bourgeoisie. That
socialism could not be built was as great
an abstraction as Trotsky's theory of the
permanent revolution. It was a continuation
of his old struggle with Bolshevism, by this
time corrupted under Stalin. All this, the
theory of the permanent revolution, the whole
debate about socialism in a single country,
the masses would turn to us when they understood,
etc., all this is the purest subjective thinking
with no objective contact with reality. "Tools
of the Kremlin" is Appearance, the specific
labour organisation of the epoch of state
capitalism is Essence. That is only in general.
Let us arm ourselves with some dialectical
logic.
Essence is a movement. This movement has
to appear. Its immediate appearance Hegel
calls Existence. Something exists, but it
is transitory, unimportant, mere Show, until
it persists and becomes Appearance. Appearance
is existence which has become "essential"
Essence accordingly is not something beyond
or behind appearance, but just because it
is the essence which exists - the existence
is Appearance (Forth-shining).
But you have to be careful with appearance.
You cannot dismiss it - this is only a mere
appearance. Hegel says:
Appearance is in every way a very important
grade of the logical idea. It may be said
to be the distinction of philosophy from
ordinary consciousness that it sees the merely
phenomenal character of what the latter supposes
to have a self-subsistent being. The significance
of appearance, however, must be properly
grasped, or mistakes will arise. To say that
anything is a mere appearance may be misinterpreted
to mean that, as compared with what is merely
phenomenal, there is greater truth in the
immediate, in that which is. Now in strict
fact, the case is precisely the reverse.
Appearance is higher than mere Being, a richer
category because it holds in combination
the two elements of reflection-into-self
and reflection-into another: whereas Being
(or immediacy) is still mere relationlessness,
and apparently rests upon itself alone. Still,
to say that anything is only an appearance
suggests a real flaw, which consists in this,
that Appearance is still divided against
itself and without intrinsic stability. Beyond
and above mere appearance comes in the first
place Actuality, the third grade of Essence,
of which we shall afterwards speak.
In the history of Modern Philosophy, Kant
has the merit of first rehabilitating this
distinction between the common and the philosophic
modes of thought. He stopped halfway however,
when he attached to Appearance a subjective
meaning only, and put the abstract essence
immovable outside it as the thing-in-itself
beyond the reach of our cognition. For it
is the very nature of the world of immediate
objects to be appearance only. Knowing it
to be so, we know at the same time the essence,
which, far from staying behind or beyond
the appearance, rather manifests its own
essentiality by deposing the world to a mere
appearance. One can hardly quarrel with the
plain man who, in his desire for totality,
cannot acquiesce in the doctrine of subjective
idealism, that we are solely concerned with
phenomena.
A good passage. Worth working over. But its
importance for us is both theoretical and
practical. Theoretical because we have just
been saying at some length that the real
is only a moment of the ideal. Good. But
that was in general. Now Hegel is saying
that the whole world is Appearance but that
Appearance is a manifestation of Essence.
And when he warned us that the real was real
"distinct", he now warns us that
appearance is no "mere" appearance.
It if were, it would be a show (one of the
cheap kinds of show, for Hegel, blast him,
has many "shows"). The warning
means: you must relate appearance to Essence.
A salutary warning! "Tools of the Kremlin"
is the only way in which Essence could appear
in the contemporary world. It was not this
appearance by chance. This is the truest
value of Hegel. He makes you wrestle with
the problems, probe into them, see deeper
and more complicated relations (which, however,
tend to a greater simplicity), and help you
to re-examine the object. A true appearance
is one that must be that way. Doubtful? Let's
see.
If a bureaucracy is convinced that capitalism
as it has known it is hopeless and helpless,
if it feels the pressure of the revolutionary
masses, if it lives in mortal terror of the
mass upheaval which seems to it to mean chaos
and the destruction of civilisation, then
with its own bourgeoisie offering no perspective,
it must turn to another. It must turn to
the revolutionary proletariat or to the bourgeoisie.
In fundamental crisis there is no other place
for it to go. therefore turns to the opposite
major imperialism. It creates an idealised
version of its patron, it fastens upon what
it thinks will make clear to its followers
the necessity of supporting it. It becomes
its advocate, it adopts its ideology; in
its own defence it becomes defender of its
patron.
The proof of this can be seen by observing
those who oppose the Russian regime. Stalinism
has one phrase for them: "tools of American
imperialism". In all the satellite countries
and in Russia no doubt the opposition which
is not able to turn to the revolutionary
masses but finds the Russian regime intolerable
has fundamentally the same attitude to American
"democracy" and "industrial
power" that the opposition, the Stalinists
in the Western world, have to Russian "planned
economy". Were it not for the merciless
totalitarian regime, we should find in all
probability the opposition leadership in
Russia and certainly in the satellite countries,
such as it may be, as bold, as fanatical,
for "democracy" as the Stalinists
are for "planned economy".
"Planned economy" seems to be something
new and is more in harmony with the present
stage of capitalism, but the opposition is
as fanatical as the Stalinists are, and given
the opportunity of time, American money,
and the freedom the Stalinists have in the
democracies, the leaders would create an
ideology and a practice which would enable
their enemies to call them "tools of
the White House" in the same way that
the Stalinists are called "tools of
the Kremlin". They could do this very
well without advocating the return to private
property of heavy industry. It is precisely
for this reason that Stalin allows nothing
in, not a peep of even a foreign newspaper.
Opposition to the regime which is not revolutionary
must seek the ideology of the opposing imperialism.
This is the logical movement. It is, however,
as a logical movement always is, modified
by all sorts of circumstances. An old, historically
powerful country like Britain, with its own
deeply-rooted traditions and a powerful and
united working class, cannot preach "Americanism"
as the Stalinists preach Stalinism. The labour
bureaucracy, however, acts in subservience
to American imperialism in all important
matters. De Gaulle, that powerful trumpeter
of French nationalism, has now become a genuine
American admirer. But in weaker countries
like Rumania, Hungary, etc., the opposition
to Stalinism is without this combination.
The socialists are for "American democracy",
and combine this with proposals for nationalisation
.
So that appearance is no mere appearance.
It is the only way in which in the present
complex of conditions Essence can shine forth.
And Hegel means precisely that. Otherwise
Appearance is not Appearance. It is show
or Existence or some damn thing. But when
its quality grows and grows until it settles
down into Appearance, then you have something.
And as you learn to read the larger Logic
and his pages upon pages of apparently abstruse
and mystifying jargon, you will find him
forcing you to see movement, pattern, connection,
order, inevitability where formerly you saw
nothing or mere chance.
The implications of all this are enormous
for thought in relation to the modern world.
The idea that the Russian revolution attracted
so many fades into the subjectivity that
it is. This relation of Appearance and Essence
teaches us to see that it is hopelessness
in capitalism and hopelessness in the revolution
which drove anti-capitalists to the Moscow
bureaucracy. They found an objective basis
and function and fought off their enemies.
That is why the defeat in Germany in 1933
and the coincident degradation of the masses
strengthened American imperialism. Each group
boasted its own "nationalisation"
or "democracy", some combining
both, but knowing where the emphasis lay.
These were the traps laid for the masses.
Trotsky's arguments on socialism in a single
country not only led to false conclusions.
It cut him off from any serious possibility
of examining what was taking place in Western
Europe.
It is impossible to stay here now and examine
all the implications. Let us go on with Hegel.
He says that after Appearance the next stage
is Actuality, and he tells us what Actuality
is. When Appearance is no longer the expression
of Essence but assumes an independent existence
of its own, and Essence too comes out in
its own name and right, then we have Actuality.
The veils are torn away, two totalities face
each other. Hegel writes: There is no transition.
In actuality this unity is explicitly put,
and the two sides of the relation identified.
Hence the actual is exempted from transition,
and its externality is its energising. In
that energising it is reflected into itself:
its existence is only the manifestation of
itself, not of another.
There is now no internal transition, no reflection.
Fundamental forces are in conflict in the
open. In Actuality, essence, the movement
to realisation, is seen plain. Appearance
that was, the way Essence used to shine forth,
is now something in its own right. In the
organism we have been following, the proletariat,
Actuality is as plain as day to a dialectician.
The movement of the proletariat, its seeking
after the realisation of its potentialities
is plain, even Shachtman can see it. But
the bureaucracies, the organisations, the
parties, these no longer express the movement.
They have now acquired an independent existence
of their own within the totality. The conflict
is at its most acute. There is no transition.
There is due now the total reorganisation
into something new. As Marcuse remarks in
Reason and Revolution, the category of Actuality
means merciless struggle.
I have to leave it to you to work out with
Hegel how a stage like Actuality expresses
itself in Substance, then in Causality where,
contrary to Understanding which perpetually
sees cause here and effechere, Hegel sees
cause as measurable only by effect. This
cause is that effect. But that effect is
another cause. Effect is incited into action
by cause. But cause too is incited by effect.
You cannot separate them. The opposing units
are jammed too tight. From causality, the
step is easy to action and reaction, what
Hegel calls Reciprocity. It is a more intensive
stage of Cause and Effect. Of Reciprocity
Engels writes: "What Hegel calls reciprocal
action is the organic body, which therefore
forms the transition to consciousness, i.
e. from necessity to freedom, to the idea:
see Logic II, Conclusion.''
And under the stress of this violent pressure
back and forth, for neither can give way,
the organism boils over into the Notion.
It knows itself for what it is. That stage
is not far off for the proletariat.
As you work through Substance, Possibility,
Necessity, Contingency, etc., do not handicap
yourself by trying to fit every paragraph
into some phase of the development of the
proletariao socialism. It is not necessary.
Hegel examined all the available material
of his own day, in all the major spheres
of nature and society to abstrachis essential
blueprint. What we should do is to note what
he says about Actuality and the Idea. He
wants you to keep them as close as you kept
Appearance and Essence. He warns against
making any great separation between Actuality
and Idea. They are close. We should remember
that today. His comment is easy, colloquial,
very different from that in the larger Logic.
It nevertheless says what he wants to say.
Note how the Idea hugs the Actuality - the
ideal and the real (you remember our interlude
with Lenin?) in the abstract generalities
of Being have now become more concentrated
in the more developed sphere of Essence.
Actuality and thought (or Idea) are often
absurdly opposed. How commonly we hear people
saying that, though no objection can be urged
against the truth and correctness of a certain
thought, there is nothing of the kind to
be seen in actuality, or it cannot be actually
carried out ! People who use such language
only prove that they have not properly apprehended
the nature either of thought or of actuality.
Thought in such a case is, on one hand, the
synonym for a subjective conception, plan,
intention or the like, just as actuality,
on the other, is made synonymous with external
and sensible existence. This is all very
well in common life, where great laxity is
allowed in the categories and the names given
to them: and it may of course happen that
e. g. the plan, or so-called idea, say of
a certain method of taxation, is good and
advisable in the abstract, but that nothing
of the sort is found in so-called actuality,
or could possibly be carried out under the
given conditions.
But when the abstract understanding gets
hold of these categories and exaggerates
the distinction they imply into a hard and
fast line of contrast, when it tells us that
in this actual world we must knock ideas
out of our heads, it is necessary energetically
to protest against these doctrines, alike
in the name of science and of sound reason.
For on the one hand Ideas are not confined
to our heads merely, nor is the Idea, upon
the whole, so feeble as to leave the question
of its actualisation or non-actualisation
dependent on our will. The Idea is rather
the absolutely active as well as actual.
And on the other hand actuality is not so
bad and irrational, as purblind or wrong-headed
and muddle-brained would-be reformers imagine.
So far is actuality, as distinguished from
mere appearance, and primarily presenting
a unity of inward and outward, from being
in contrariety with reason, that it is rather
thoroughly reasonable, and everything which
is not reasonable must on that very ground
cease to be held actual. The same view may
be traced in the usages of educated speech,
which declines to give the name of real poet
or real statesman to a poet or statesman
who can do nothing really meritorious or
reasonable.
Between us, it is very meritorious and reasonable
when Hegel discusses these things in that
way. The translators of the larger Logic
say that at times in that work he seemed
to be obscure and mysterious in his language
for sheer devilry. But here he is quiet and
easy.
This for us is the end of Essence. We have
seen it grow from Show, we dug into its Ground
(we didn't dig too deep), we skipped over
to Appearance. We saw in Actuality the different
elements come out into the open. Henceforth
no compromise is possible. War to the end.
Another time, you will see the philosophical
investigations and method which Hegel used
to get this. You will tackle perhaps the
fascinating problem of how this philosophical
developmenook place, and how it compares
to an intelligent man unphilosophically examining
an object and learning more and more experience.
You will see later how gifted individuals,
expressing their own psychosomatic idiosyncrasies
proved unable to go further than a certain
stage in thought, and how classes, or sections
of classes made them their spokesmen. All
this is for the future. But now we have,
in accordance with out practice, to use Essence,
lift ourselves a stage, just one more stage
further. I propose to do two things: (1)
examine Lenin's work, for until we go through
that and make it our own, we cannot go on;
(2) after doing that step forward a little,
in general, on our own, keeping well within
Essence. When you read Cause and Effect in
Essence, a very high stage of Essence, you
will remember that in the Logic Hegel had
also expounded on Cause and Effect, in general,
stage by stage, step by step. That I have
learnt.
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