On Hegel Notes on Dialectics:
PART II The Hegelian Logic
The Doctrine of Being
C L R James |
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L. R. James died in May 1989. His death coincided
with the explosion of popular forces across
China and eastern Europe which shook some
of the most oppressive political regimes
in human history. These momentous events,
calling into question the structure of the
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On Hegel Notes on Dialectics:
PART II The Hegelian Logic
The Doctrine of Being
C L R James
PRELIMINARY EXERCISES
You know, as I propose to myself to begin
the actual Logic, I feel a slight chill.
The Doctrine of Being. Harris, who ultimately
wrote a very fine work on the Hegelian Logic,
was a professor of philosophy and lecturer
on Hegel at second-hand. Brockmeyer, Governor
of Missouri, made a translation of the larger
Logic and someone gave it to Harris. Harris
says that he copied out the thing with his
own hand, the whole thing, and when he was
finished, he didn't understand a line, not
a line. I know exactly how he felt.
What I propose to do is to use the Doctrine
of Being as a means of getting practice in
the style and habit of Hegel. The larger
Logic is the most difficult book I know.
Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is child's
play compared to it. But we have to be able
to handle it. So while we shall get the main
points of the Doctrine of Being, look upon
this as a kind of basic training, before
we get down to it in the Doctrine of Essence.
I am not giving a summary of the Logic. I
am not expanding it as a doctrine. I am using
it and showing how to begin to know it and
use it.
Think of the world of human beings, nearly
two billions, more than that perhaps. What
is the simplest thing you can say about them?
They exist. Two billion people exist. So
what! To say that is to say - nothing. To
say something so broad, so complete, so abstract,
is to say nothing. Something must happen,
must come out of this abstraction. I say:
some men work. The previous abstraction has
now become something. Some men work. Let
us look at the men who work. They at once,
by being distinguished, create another category,
the people who do not work. You cannot separate
one category without creating another one.
To create a category is to "determine"
something. But every time you determine something,
you negate something. Every time. By determining
men who work, we negate them as men who merely
exist, but we also negate the men who do
not work. They are no longer men who merely
exist. That is over. They are men who do
not work. Whenever you do something, you
at the same time do not do something else.
A silver coin on a green table negated the
green cover on the particular spot where
it rests. It creates the spot where the coin
is and the spot where the coin is not.
Now we have men who work. That is the quality
which distinguishes them. When something
"becomes" out of the mass it has
a "quality". The quality we take
is work. But as you pile up the men who work,
you catalogue them, work is not enough. Some
are tailors, some shoemakers, some cowboys,
some engineers. The list is endless. Some
work well, some badly. Some work well but
stay at home every morning. We soon find
ourselves concerned with more than quality.
We find that we must look not at quality
but at quantity of work. Preoccupation with
quality has led us to quantity. But quantity
too is limited. The more you contemplate
it, deal with it, you find that it is impossible
to keep tab of the quantity of work of tailors,
cooks, deep-sea divers by measuring work
in the abstract. You have to get some common
measure. The three divisions of the Doctrine
of Being are Quality, Quantity, and Measure.
This is a crude, but in my opinion, quite
adequate, example of Hegel's method. That
is what I am after. Kant and the others would
know and use Quality, Quantity, and Measure.
What Hegel insisted upon is that these are
connected, that one developed out of the
other. Quantity came at a certain time because
quality upon quality does not go on being
quality but at a certain stage becomes something
new. Hegel takes Quality and Quantity as
abstractions to represent processes present
in all aspects of nature, society and thought.
Water is a quality, a small stream negates
the surrounding land. It is a stream because
it is no longer land. If it grows and grows,
it becomes a river, and a number of rivers
meeting in one place can become an inland
sea.
Hegel's own categories are much more profound,
of course. He says: think not of men, but
of everything that exists, that has some
"being". Think of the whole world
not as men, land, sky, horses, air, buildings.
Just think of it in its capacity of existing.
Pure absolute being. Good. But when you think
that, you are thinking - nothing. Pure being
- pure nothing. Something emerges, it "becomes"
and you have "being determinate".
It has a quality. But a coin on a table negates
some of the table. So that "Determinate
Being" is Being-for-self but always
being-for-another. Men who work are one being,
being-for-self, but they are also automatically
being-for-another, men-who-do-not-work. Quality
means that a limit is imposed, a barrier
between itself and its other.
If we take a closer look at what a limit
implies, we see it involving a contradiction
in itself, and thus evincing its dialectical
nature. On the one side limit makes the reality
of a thing; on the other it is its negation.
But, again, the limit, as the negation of
something, is not an abstract nothing but
a nothing which is - what we call an "other".
Given something, and up starts an other to
us: we know that there is not something only,
but an other as well. Nor, again, is the
other of such a nature that we can think
something apart from it; a something is implicitly
the other of itself, and the somewhat sees
its limit become objective to it in the other.
If we now ask for the difference between
something and another, it turns out that
they are the same: which sameness is expressed
in Latin by calling the pair aliad-aliud.
The other, as opposed to the something, is
itself a something, and hence we say some
other, or something else; and so on the other
hand the first something when opposed to
the other, also defined as something, is
itself an other. When we say "something
else" our first impression is that something
taken separately is only something, and that
the quality of being another attaches to
it only from outside considerations. Thus
we suppose that the moon, being something
else than the sun, might very well exist
without the sun. But really the moon, as
a something, has its other implicit in it.
Plato says: God made the world out of the
nature of the "one" and the "other":
having brought these together, he formed
from them a third, which is of the nature
of the "one" and the "other".
In these words we have in general terms a
statement of the nature of the finite, which,
as something, does not meet the nature of
the other as if it had no affinity to it,
but, being implicitly the other of itself,
thus undergoes alteration. Alteration thus
exhibits the inherent contradiction which
originally attaches to determinate being,
and which forces it out of its own bounds.
... But the fact is, mutability lies in the
notion of existence, and change is only the
manifestation of what it implicitly is. The
living die, simply because as living they
bear in themselves the germ of death.
That is the core of the Doctrine of Being.
Something immediately involves something
else. Continue with something like quality,
and its other, quantity, will take form.
A completely abstract something is the same
as nothing, that is its other. Something
"Becomes" out of nothing. It always
has its limit, its barrier. And this limit,
barrier, is burst through, at a certain stage,
to establish the other, its other. All this
takes place in the sphere of determinate
being, simple quality.
Let me take an example of what the method
of the Logic signifies. The proletariat politically
is an undistinguished body of proletarians.
Something "becomes". Some of them
form a party. At once the proletariat is
no longer party and proletarians. It is party
and non-party, or as we say, party and mass.
The party creates its other, the mass. But
you can have one, two, three, four parties.
One obvious way to distinguish is by size.
That is not sufficient, however. For political
purposes we can judge by "support",
a form of quantity. But support changes.
Out of support we can arrive at what in the
last analysis decided support - policy. That
is a form of Measure. Whenever you examine
any object, you can begin by looking for
its obvious distinguishing quality, the quantity
of this quality, and the measure of it.
Bit by bit we go a step further, like an
experienced man bringing along a virgin who
has willingly consented. Grace is probably
tearing her hair at the vulgarity of some
of my illustrations. They are better than
the perpetual water turning into steam which
everybody uses from Engels. But I don't want
to leave it there. For us Doctrine of Being
is a road to practise to get familiar with
the method, the concrete method, the method
of dealing with Hegel's matter and manner.
Do not be misled by the extract I have given
you from the smaller Logic. There he is being
friendly, considerate and kind. In the larger
Logic he is ruthless. He puts down the most
difficult, complicated idea in a clause of
three words. He creates terms, three, four,
five, and uses them as if they were letters
of the alphabet. So let us use this interlude
as training. Now for this quality into quantity
business. Hegel uses the One and the Many
as his illustration.
Common sense thinks one is one, and over
here, and many is some, and over there. In
other words. One has a special quality, and
they begin there and stay there. Hegel says
No. Philosophy tells us that One presupposes
Many. The moment I say One, I have thereby
created the category Many. In fact it is
the existence of the Many which makes the
One possible at all. If there were no Many,
One would be whatever you wish but it would
not be One meaning this one, in contrast
with many others. The One therefore is repellent.
To be, it repels the Many. It is exclusive,
but it is not quiescent. It is actively repelling
the Many, for otherwise its specific quality
as One would be lost. This is Repulsion.
But, all the other Ones who constitute the
Many have a connecting relation with it.
They thereby have a connective relation with
each other; the One, by holding them all
off, makes them all join together against
it. But each of these is a One, too. Thus
the One begins by Repulsion but creates in
every other single One an attraction. Thus,
the One when you begin with it is a Quality,
but by examining first and following what
is involved to the end, you turn up with
a new category, Quantity, with the original
pure and simple Quality suppressed and superseded.
Here is the complete extract:
The One, as already remarked, just is self-exclusion
and explicit putting itself as the Many.
Each of the Many however is itself a One,
and in virtue of its so behaving, this all
rounded repulsion is by one stroke converted
into its opposite - Attraction.
The thing that Hegel insists upon is not
to see the One as fixed, finite, limited,
isolated. It is One because there are Many,
and because of that the original category
of One begins to assume new facets and suddenly
they are the very opposite of what you began
with. As Hegel knows and says you can (if
you want to) make a lot of jokes about these
transitions. His fundamental answer is that
you have to go along with him and see where
you get and what you get. Anyone who has
had a class on Capital knows that there are
certain types who passionately contest every
sentence, every deduction. In the end they
always turn up in the bourgeois camp. It
is the revolution they are fighting. The
Hegelian categories offer infinite opportunity
for this. We, however, not only have our
past traditions. We have had a very substantial
introduction here, and can afford to follow
him. As a matter of fact, few people challenge
the broad divisions of the Doctrine of Being.
I have seen these basic premises challenged,
but the writer said that if you admitted
those, you could not seriously oppose him
after.
Now let Hegel himself speak. I give some
lengthy extracts from the smaller Logic.
The transition from Quality to Quantity,
indicated in the paragraph before us, is
not found in our ordinary way of thinking
which deems each of these categories to exist
independently beside the other. We are in
the habit of saying that things are not merely
qualitatively, but also quantitatively defined;
but whence these categories originate, and
how they are related to each other, are questions
not further examined. The fact is, quantity
just means quality superseded and absorbed:
and it is by the dialectic of quality here
examined that this supersession is effected.
First of all, we had being: as the truth
of Being, came Becoming: which formed the
passage to Being Determinate: and the truth
of that we found to be Alteration. And in
its result Alteration showed itself to be
Being-for-self, exempt from implication of
another and from passage into another; which
Being-for-self finally in the two sides of
its process, Repulsion and Attraction, was
clearly seen to annul itself, and thereby
to annul quality in the totality of its stages.
Still this superseded and absorbed quality
is neither an abstract nothing, nor an equally
abstract and featureless being: it is only
being as indifference to determinateness
or character. This aspect of being is also
what appears as quantity in our ordinary
conceptions. We observe things, first of
all, with an eye to their quality - which
we take to be the character identical with
the being of the thing. If we proceed to
consider their quantity, we get the conception
of an indifferent and external character
or mode, of such a kind that a thing remains
what it is though its quantity is altered,
and the thing becomes greater or less.
Then he works through Quantity and arrives
at Measure. These he sums up so far:
Thus quantity by means of the dialectical
movement so far studied through its several
stages, turns out to be a return to quality.
The first notion of quantity presented to
us was that of quality abrogated and absorbed.
That is to say, quantity seemed an external
character not identical with Being, to which
it is quite immaterial This notion, as we
have seen, underlies the mathematical definition
of magnitude as what can be increased or
diminished. At first sight this definition
may create the impression that quantity is
merely whatever can be altered - increase
and diminution alike implying determination
of magnitude otherwise - and may tend to
confuse it with determinate Being, the second
stage of quality, which in its notion is
similarly conceived as alterable. We can,
however, complete the definition by adding,
that in quantity we have an alterable, which
in spite of alterations still remains the
same. The notion of quantity, it thus turns
out, implies an inherent contradiction. This
contradiction is what forms the dialectic
of quantity. The result of the dialectic
however is not a mere return to quality,
as if that were the true and quantity the
false notion, but an advance to the unity
and truth of both, to qualitative quantity,
or Measure.
This is worth pondering over, it is not too
difficult. There Hegel says something which
he often repeats, as I have shown before.
Men it seems could be as stupid then as now.
He is talking about Nature where simple determinate
being, quality, abounds. Measure is a very
low stage of the dialectical logic. And Hegel
says:
It may be well therefore at this point to
observe that whenever in our study of the
objective world we are engaged in quantitative
determinations, it is in all cases Measure
which we have in view, as the goal of our
operations This is hinted at even in language,
when the ascertainment of quantitative features
and relations is called measuring.
Now come two splendid examples of the dialectical
relation between quality, quantity, and measure:
We measure, e. g. the length of different
chords that have been put into a state of
vibration, with an eye to the qualitative
difference of the tones caused by their vibration,
corresponding to this difference of length.
Similarly, in chemistry, we try to ascertain
the quantity of the matters brought into
combination, in order to find out the measures
or proportions conditioning such combination,
that is to say, those quantities which give
rise to definite qualities.
Then comes a really superb passage in which
you see what the Logic meant to him and how
he used it. It is very long. But this is
in its way an anthology and I would like
it in:
The identity between quantity and quality,
which is found in Measure, is at first only
implicit, and not yet explicitly realised.
In other words, these two categories, which
unite in Measure, each claim an independent
authority. On the one hand, the quantitative
features of existence may be altered, without
affecting its quality. On the other hand,
this increase and diminution, immaterial
though it be, has its limit, by exceeding
which the quality suffers change. Thus the
temperature of water is, in the first place,
a point of no consequence in respect of its
liquidity: still with the increase of diminution
of the temperature of the liquid water, there
comes a point where this state of cohesion
suffers a qualitative change, and the water
is converted into steam or ice. A quantitative
change takes place, apparently without any
further significance: but there is something
lurking behind, and a seemingly innocent
change of quantity acts as a kind of snare,
to catch hold of the quality. The antinomy
of Measure which this implies was exemplified
under more than one garb among the Greeks.
It was asked, for example, whether a single
grain makes a heap of wheat, or whether it
makes a bald-tail to tear out a single hair
from the horse's tail. At first, no doubt,
looking at the nature of quantity as an indifferent
and external character of being, we are disposed
to answer these questions in the negative.
And yet, as we must admit, this indifferent
increase and diminution has its limit: a
point is finally reached, where a single
additional grain makes a heap of wheat; and
the bald-tail is produced, if we continue
plucking out single hairs. These examples
find a parallel in the story of the peasant
who, as his ass trudged cheerfully along,
went on adding ounce after ounce to its load,
till at length it sunk under the unendurable
burden. It would be a mistake to treat these
examples as pedantic futility; they really
turn on thoughts, an acquaintance with which
is of great importance in practical life,
especially in ethics. Thus in the matter
of expenditure, there is a certain latitude
within which a more or less does not matter;
but when the Measure, imposed by the individual
circumstances of the special case, is exceeded
on the one side or the other, the qualitative
nature of Measure (as in the above examples
of the different temperature of water) makes
itself felt, and a course, which a moment
before was held good economy, turns into
avarice or prodigality. The same principles
may be applied in politics, when the constitution
of a state has to be looked at as independent
of, no less than as dependent on, the extent
of its territory, the number of its inhabitants,
and other quantitative points of the same
kind. If we look, e. g. at a state with a
territory of ten thousand square miles and
a population of four millions we should,
without hesitation, admit that a few square
miles of land or a few thousand inhabitants
more or less could exercise no essential
influence on the character of its constitution.
But on the other hand, we must not forget
that by the continual increase or diminishing
of a state, we finally get to a point where,
apart from all other circumstances, this
quantitative alteration alone necessarily
draws with it an alteration in the quality
of the constitution. The constitution of
a little Swiss canton does not suit a great
kingdom; and, similarly, the constitution
of the Roman republic was unsuitable when
transferred to the small imperial towns of
Germany.
That is about all we need.
Now for a little recapitulation and a jumping-off
place into Essence. Being means quality,
determinate being. It comes out of Nothing.
It deals with the categories of other determinate
beings that one determinate being automatically
creates. But Measure as the last stage of
such Being which creates other over there.
The dialectic of Measure leads it into Essence,
where being is no longer simply determinate.
It is reflected. We now begin to see an object
whose parts are separated by thought. One
part creates an other, true, but the other
is inherent in the object itself, not one
object here and another over there, but the
object splits into related categories that
are both contained within the object itself.
This has been very quiet, very easy. The
smaller Logic is worth reading on the Doctrine
of Being in particular. I have purposely
kept the pitch low. Just read and get acquainted.
For after this we are going to begin to go
places and it is going to be hectic.
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