JOHN HENRY NEWMAN
ON MEMORY, COGNITION, IMAGINATION,
AND THE FICTIONS OF ESTABLISHING FIRST PRINCIPLES
IN GRAMMAR OF ASSENT
GARY C. MOORE
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HUME AND NEWMAN AND MODERN PHILOSOPHY
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It is crucial in a discussion like this to
absolutely define the 1) nature, 2) meaning,
and 3) value of the word "honesty"
before anything else. Actually, to be honest:
It is absolutely necessary for any act, at
some level of consciousness however much
deceit of others and self-deceit is involved,
and for anything like abstract knowledge
to be consistently formed. Even a totally
self-indulgent person realizes they have
conflicts at times with reality that are
unavoidable.
Now, it is a rational statement to say, "I
honestly know that I am lying." In fact,
to maintain the plausibility of an intentional
lie, the consciousness of what the reality
is, is even greater than it is for a person
"who simply wants to know and tell the
truth." If you operate upon the feeling
you are always telling the truth, then automatically
everything you say is true even when you
are caught in a contradiction. Such a person
is surprised and feels they do not deserve
a penalty for this. But in 'material reality'
(as purely the world of sense impression
with only its directly related ideas) there
is never a reward (or consideration) for
stupidity (remember Lenin's discussion of
"naïve materialism").
Such "knowing and telling the truth"
is equivalent to "thinking" on
all levels of personality. For a person that
is lying, honesty is an absolutely necessary
tool. A lie can only be built on a truth.
A lie has a second order existence and dependency
on the truth. It can have no form or direction
without the truth. It is very important to
put in here, maybe as equivalent or as a
subcategory, "compromise" whether
political, ethical or even philosophical,
whether secret or public. Because, again
fundamentally important, compromise can NEVER
be the "truth" except that it is
an artificial, fictional (as Hume says laws
and transfers of property are, and which
Father Robert Sokolowski so brilliantly analyses)
compromise, a combining of naturally disparate
and even nonexistent elements. "Thinking",
then, for the liar, would be defined as "knowing
with specific logic and experience the truth,
and being able but not willing to tell it."
One knows from experience, the average, beginning
liar is soon tripped up because he did not
adequately accord their lie with the truth.
If he persists without learning adequate
lying, and I have known such people, his
existence will cease even to be noted by
those around him, or his life expectancy
will be very short. So a liar soon learns
or soon dies.
A successful liar, then, will necessarily
be more intelligent than someone who 'thinks'
they always tell the truth. This can also
be deliberately compartmentalized: A liar
can tell part of a truth and part of a lie
to one exclusive group of people and tell
a different group a different equation of
truth and lie. If the more prestigious group
never finds out about the lie, no one will
listen to the less prestigious group if they
do find out about the lie. This is a difficult
thing to keep balanced, but if one's whole
way of life is involved with a system of
lies, it is the only way such a system will
work. However, it is prey to accident. And
then one must either have a very good lawyer
or know how to disappear. Disappearing is
the safer of the two choices. Confronting
others, even with a good lawyer, takes the
balancing essentially away from skill and
gives it primarily to chance. Far too many
factors are involved, and you are attached
to something that can drag you down.
But this is exclusively for lying to others,
and the competent liar must have a firm grip
on the truth of things. Lying to oneself,
however, is incredibly easy because one feels
everything one says to others and to self
is the truth. There is no standard of objective
rational judgment to interfere throughout
one's lifetime unless an accident happens
putting one up against the unavoidable situation
where what one believes to be true is at
variance with a experienced and testable
present at hand fact. But this way of life
puts your whole life in the hands of chance
because then you have no sound objective
judgment whatsoever. However, you will receive
great approval from all those around you
and thereby approve your self. But then,
like the liar and the criminal, that means
you can hold on to nothing as certain truth
and ultimate value. This is not a matter
of clear choice but just "flowing with
the current."
Honesty, to be a true consistent value, must
be 1) useful, and 2) satisfy the pleasure
of curiosity. It can be useful for the passionately
honest person the same way as it is for a
liar. Whether it satisfies any curiosity
in the liar, unless their life is considered
wholly a series of game values, where failure
might bring the ultimate consequence, is
questionable. However, this would be a weakness
in the non-gaming liar because then there
are things he wants to hold on to no matter
what. The gamester liar, however, knows there
is no property for the criminal, nothing,
including their lives, of ultimate, value
that cannot, when necessary, be released,
and know when to cut one's loses and run.
Or cut one's loses and die.
The reason I state it that way is everyone
has learned the consequences of being caught
in a lie. You decide between three possibilities:
1) One always tries to tell the truth consistently
and obey all the rules you have accepted
or at least acknowledged. This necessarily
includes trying to tell your self the truth
since paying strict attention to external
truth quickly shows up inconsistencies in
your internal thinking. Yet this trial obviates
the even greater effort needed to maintain
a consistent lie. In this case, one might
be more intelligent than a successful liar
theoretically. 2) You learn to tell lies
better using logical and experiential criteria,
keeping it as close to the real truth as
possible so that inconsistencies will seem
minor, trivial, so that others say "It
meant nothing." You learn from experience
not only quickly but with all its implications.
3) You make yourself emotionally agreeable
to yourself and others so the criteria for
"always telling the truth" is that
it always feels like the truth. It makes
you feel good. You are average. No one pays
attention to your blunders. But you are the
dodo in the survival of the fittest. Life
just happens to you, and death comes as a
great surprise.
This is an aspect a successful liar sometimes
takes, but only in special circumstances
and for short whiles. To be consistently
successful, a thorough going liar must know
what they are doing in all aspects all the
time including evident and authoritative
skills. If he is going to pretend he is a
diamond cutter, he must know almost enough
to be one. The "almost enough"
has to be minimal or it will kill you. For
as you rise in the skill of lying, the stakes
also rise. Or the value of gaming is lost
and you find yourself holding on to something
that will drag you down. Intense honesty
to self as well as evident and demonstrable
learning is absolutely necessary. And, here,
one sees the distance of distinction between
the strict truth teller and the competent
liar narrows consistently and considerably
more and more so that sometimes the distinction
seems lost. But compromises are fundamentally
necessary no matter what.
"Honesty" is one's intent to be
perfectly in accord with reality, even, or
especially, when people try to use force
or fraud upon you. From Hume's point of view
(he is very far from being a simple 'empiricist'),
the "human mind" (or "self"
or "soul" - Hume does use the last
word) and "reality" occupy polar
points with pure "sense impressions"
dominating the all-authoritative middle ground.
Hume describes both polar ideas as totally
composite ideas. The SOLE invariable determinant
is "sense impression" without any
kind of abstraction/word. So "self"
and "reality" are reverse (in intent)
but exact reflections of each other. But
this is actually an ethical choice. Norman
Kemp Smith made a very good case that Hume
essentially wrote the parts of A TREATISE
ON HUMAN NATURE concerning the passions (the
absolutely correct word, not just 'emotions')
and morals first, and THEN proceeded to write
the 'epistemological' first part with the
second and third parts determining its fundamental
form. So, if that proposition is accepted
(and, although Thomas Aquinas said that authority
is the weakest of arguments, one would be
going against a profound and time proven
authority), then the ethical choice is to
submit to the dictates of reality on the
part of the strictly honest person and the
competent liar. The "emotionally agreeable"
person essentially is totally disassociated
from reality unless forced.
So, even David Hume acknowledges external
authority. This is reflected as honestly
as he could possibly be in his analysis of
the word "God" which he finally
cuts down to almost meaningless, almost trivial
- and stops literally on his death bed there.
He does absolutely divorce religion from
the concept without compromise. But the concept
itself he does admit reluctantly as an irritating
(?) necessity. The whole discussion in Hume
is motivated as a political and legal compromise.
But, being strictly honest, he necessarily
goes were the thread of logic takes him.
His path has been vastly confusing to his
interpreters who have a predetermined pattern
in their mind he is going to fit no matter
what. But anyone, who has seriously read
Hume, must admit he left numerous loose threads
all over the place. And all the loose threads
come together at two poles, the "self"
and "God." Politics and the law
may have primarily initiated the discourse,
but, being strictly honest, he takes the
whole thread as far as it will go. Its primary
aspect, at its finish, is that not much is
left there. But my point, and Hume's, is
that this "not much" is the result
of a thoroughly exhaustive analysis from
every one of view (witness the form and literary
gendre of the DIALOGUES especially). Hume
ends partially in accord with the mystic
Demea (God is totally incomprehensible) and
partially with rationalist Cleanthes (one
can see an intelligent design in the universe).
The average person would conclude Hume essentially
tosses the concept of God in the trash heap.
But in the NATURAL HISTORY OF RELIGION in
the concluding paragraphs, Hume says:
The universal propensity to believe in invisible,
intelligent power, if not an original instinct,
being at least a general attendant of human
nature, may be considered as a kind of mark
or stamp, which the divine workman has set
upon his work; and nothing surely can more
dignify mankind, than to be thus selected
from all other parts of the creation, and
to bear the image or impression of the creator.
In both quotes I shall present, Hume immediately
proceeds to show how tawdry humankind has
made these ideals. His hatred of religion
remains uncompromising, but this is clearly
a better/worse distinction. His idea of God
is strictly and solely philosophical. But
to show it is not simply a political/legal
compromise simply to protect himself from
prosecution, Hume's language is extraordinarily
precise, far beyond what is needed to pacify
heresy hunters. Hume discounts believing
"in invisible, intelligent power"
as "not an original instinct" on
the level of BELIEF in an external world
or causation but as "being at least
a general attendant of human nature."
J. C. A. Gaskin makes this statement of demotion
fatal to a serious consideration of the idea
of God. But his argument is flawed because
A) he would be making Hume into a congenital
liar when he does not need to be for self
preservation, and B) he would, even more
decisive, be saying Hume began the sentence
with a precise logical distinction, then
halfway through started lying with loose
metaphors. Hume could very well have left
his sentence end at "a general attendant
of human nature," and that should have
sufficiently satisfied Anglican heresy hunters.
But he goes much, much further in the same
sentence than is politically necessary. Hume
says that the idea of a supreme creator is
"a general attendant of HUMAN NATURE."
This then narrows considerably this distance
between an "original instinct"
and "a general attendant." Gaskin
says being "a general attendant"
merely means most humankind believe in some
sort or other of divinity, but not all! But
that is a relative statement (Hume says the
same) and not an exclusion of the idea's
necessary part of "human nature"
as tendency and suggestiveness (which Gaskin
denies but Hume's own words here seem to
support). The next quote is:
What a noble privilege is it of human reason
to attain the knowledge of the supreme Being;
and, from the visible works of nature, be
enabled to infer so sublime a principle as
its Supreme Creator?
If we have 'faith' Hume is still being strictly
honest and not lying (and what can you have
in another person as what they are within
their 'selves' but 'faith'? -- this is the
immediately following paragraph), then we
have a philosophically interesting statement.
At first, "to be enabled to infer"
would mean to the ordinary reader that man
creates the idea of God. This is, at a slant,
true. But Hume says ALL ideas come from the
imagination. John Henry Cardinal Newman also
places the imagination at precisely such
a fundamental level precisely in regard to
sense impressions. Therefore logically "an
original instinct" and "a general
attendant to human nature" come from
the same place. If Hume is not using merely
metaphorical language but is continuing to
be philosophically precise, then "attaining
. . . knowledge" and especially being
"enabled to infer" come to human
being from the "PRINCIPLE" of a
supreme creator. An actual object as "supreme
creator" is not allowed, but the concept
is allowed as a "principle," which,
combined with the narrowing of concepts in
the first paragraph, approximately put it
on par with the necessary principles of belief
in an external world and causation. This
is what Donald W. Livingston calls "transcendence"
and names as the source of the idea in Kant.
It is technically limited and precise. It
is like "projection" or "being-there"
in phenomenology and Heidegger. One is always
'going out' and being wholly absorbed in
the world created in the image of the self
which also comes seemingly created by the
'self' as a 'real' whole, that most impossible
thing, a real abstraction. You might say
it is simply an interconnected system of
logical referents. But it is the ACT of reference,
a fact, a sense impression of some sort distinct
from the sense impression and idea it relates,
that then becomes problematic. The ability
derived from the sublime principle (therefore
also beautiful and aesthetic? as Newman definitely
considers, and Hans Georg Gadamer makes into
a philosophical system with its own attendant
logic), to "be enabled to infer,"
is precisely what Hume calls the imagination
whose source is wholly unknown and unknowable.
If Hume, as is commonly said, wants to deal
in human intelligence only with that which
is strictly knowable as in sense impression,
then with his concept of the "imagination"
he has gone way, way beyond that.
Both Hume and Newman state that fundamental
and necessary beliefs come from unknowable
sources, unknowable in their origins, not
their effects. And this remains necessarily
philosophically precise no matter how far
'psychology' as a so-called science can delve
(obviously I am showing my prejudices). Hume
would have been absolutely horrified by the
present-day quackery of psychology and especially
psychiatry. He might, however, have some
sympathy with R. D. Laing. Laing relies fundamentally
on empirical observation and attention to
custom and tradition within individual families.
He does not search for a fantastic, unproveable
physiological causes, and assume if he gets
some sort of result it explains everything.
Of course if you are going to tamper with
human physiology, of course you are going
to get results. But you must understand what
you really know of the whole of human nature,
and how little that it is understood as a
whole which is an empirically proven fact
how each human being works, however vast
the number of parliamentary voting parts
within oneself there are (an image from the
TREATISE). A human being as an animal, just
like an animal, makes a judgment, comes to
a decision, and acts. We know from private
experience of uncertainties that are always
elements within us voting against the act.
But the majority rules, and the act is done.
We understand very little even of this process,
a process it would seem absolutely necessary
to fully understand before you blunder into
completely unknown territory.
This, then, is the beginning of establishing
the primal existential point of decision.
Sartre and Heidegger say in this purely theoretical
situation highly simplified from the vast
complications of human physiology that cannot
be known, where one makes a decision as to
one's fundamental character. It is a decision
you can know nothing of - most of the time
(the exceptions are unpleasant in the extreme).
But you are theoretically purely free, with
no determination -theoretically, to be any
character you can be. Hume chooses to be
philosophically honest and acknowledges in
the real, social world you have to make compromise
after compromise. Hume becomes committed
to being "reasonable," not simply
rational, which entails the ideological necessity
of being polite in conversation and letting
others have an open field in which to speak.
Newman makes a choice to act according to
the situation he is born into and follow
rigidly the logical conclusions inherent
within that situation (this is true also
of Hume - the Calvinist rules of introspection
were crucial to his becoming a philosopher).
Newman becomes a Catholic but also holds
the ideal of being an English gentleman extremely
high and to be polite as Hume is - though
he can be a bit more sharp than Hume against
his antagonists. Even so, he like Hume bends
over backwards to like his opponents speak
their proper piece. Heidegger and Sartre
have the same fundamental situation, But
one, following a traditional customary way
of acting, becomes a committed, though egocentric,
Nazi. Sartre becomes a Communist but of a
purely egocentric and rebellious sort. These
two got along with extremely few people in
the world. Neither fit in well at all with
the groups attendant to their choices. Both
Newman and Hume had their difficulties but
worked through their problems with acceptable
compromises. Both had a highly prized sense
of conscience. Sartre did within thoroughly
egocentric limits. Heidegger is the almost
perfectly competent liar, and has a conscience,
maybe, only to himself, and made obscurity
into a high art. But Hume's conscience was
purely circumstantial, logical, and pragmatic,
whereas Newman's came from God. But, of course,
it is precisely here that we are dealing
with the undiscoverable sources of one's
personal, unique nature.
RICHARD SANSOM:
If there is any danger at all to those in
power (who are abject liars!) it is as usual
the danger of a discovered cover up -- or,
a lie to cover a lie to cover a lie, etc.
But surely, since Watergate, Iran-Contra
and the Clinton debacle, those in power KNOW
this and will surely cover their asses in
some way. It is appalling to me that the
American people cannot see through this whole
thing, all the lies, subterfuge and duplicity
that is going on. I am beginning to think
that it has become so common place that we
have become (most of us anyway) immune to
seeing the truth of what's happening. Added
to this is the fierce ideological fervor
that those in power possess -- they ACTUALLY
believe that they have the moral high ground
and that even if their lies are discovered,
that moral high ground will serve them well
in the long run. Look at the chronology of
Bush's reasons for going to war:
1) Iraq's defiance of the UN resolutions
2) Iraq's possession of WMD and ties to terrorism
3) Saddam's evil history
4) Lastly (since the first two didn't pan
out) to bring democracy to the world, beginning
with Iraq.
Now that religion has gotten into the political
mix in a big way, that moral high ground
has been given a big boost. Since the so-called
liberals/Democrats are all of different minds
on a variety of issues, the right wing ideologues
can wrap their arms around very simple, easy
to understand symbols: the flag and the bible,
and those are hard to de-fuse in terms of
things to run on. Even if 4) above turns
out to be the only raison d'être for the
Bushies, he can win with the flag and the
bible (and guns) on his side. Sad, sad situation.
GARY C MOORE:
Good points and interesting examples! Essentially
this comes overall under the heading of convincing
the most prestigious or most powerful group
of a proposition, so if less important groups
cry fowl, no one listens. Now, these politicians
are in the uneviable position of - possibly
- being called to account - especially if
things really go back.
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