Gary C. Moore With Dr. Allen Scult and Dr. Michael Elden

ATHEISM Part 9

Why Complaining about Iraq Produces Nothing (Das Nichts)

QUOTATIONS FROM HEIDEGGER’S ATHEISM: The Refusal of a Theological Voice by Laurence Paul Hemming, University of Notre Dame Press, 2002

Chapter Two: The Basis of Heidegger’s Atheism

52: The whole force of this explication of the structural analysis of Dasein is . . . a radical critique of any attempt to represent a transcendental structure of subjectivity—it is a critique of subjectivity as such, indeed . . . concerning any attempt to establish a universal theory of knowledge. It is simply not possible to deduce a universal knowledge which could then subsequently be passed on, perhaps pedagogically, without having been primarily or originally experienced by those who receive it. why this should be I will examine in full later. Heidegger says (Grundfragen der Philosophie [GA45] p. 87): “The knowledge of the essence, therefore, if it is to be shared, must itself be accomplished anew by the one who is to assume it. More precisely, it cannot be communicated in the sense of the passing on of a proposition, whose content is simply grasped without its foundation and its acquisition being accomplished again.” (“Die Wesenserkenntnis muss daher—soll sie zur Mit-teilung kommen—von dem, der sie aufnehmen soll, selbst wieder neu vollzogen werden. Genauer gesagt, sie kann nicht mitgeteilt werden im Sinne der Weittergabe eines Satzes, dessen Gehalt einfach erfasst wird, ohne dass die Grundung und Gewinnung nachvollzogen ist”) (trans. Rojcewicz & Schuwer: “The knowledge of the essence, therefore, if it is to be shared, must itself be accomplished anew by the one who is to assume it. More precisely, it cannot be communicated in the sense of the passing on of a proposition, whose content is simply grasped without its foundation and its acquisition being accomplished again. The knowledge of the essence must be accomplished anew by each one who is to share it; it must be genuinely co-accomplished.” Pg. 78)

52/53 “Dasein . . . is . . . not a subject or consciousness, which only incidentally provides itself with a world”.43 (Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs (GA20), § 32, p. 422. “Dasein . . . ist . . . nicht ein Subjekt oder Bewusstsein, das sich gelegentlich erst eine Welt zulegt” (author’s italics). (Kisiel same)

53: . . . the overcoming of subjectivity lies at the very origin of the whole project of Sein und Zeit . . .

World comes into view therefore, precisely by putting the ‘I’ into question.

. . . to be in the place of questioning is to bring before the self the there . . .

. . . Heidegger contrasts there-being with subjectivity . . .

Heidegger: “Descartes . . . begins philosophizing with doubt, and it seems everything is put into question. Yet it only seems so. Dasein, the I (the ego) never comes into question at all . . . all that is ever put into question . . . is knowledge, consciousness of things”.45 (Der Grunbegriff der Metaphysik (GA29/30), pg. 30. “Descartes . . . beginnt das Philosophieren mit dem Zweifel, und es sieht so aus, als werde alles in Frage gestellt. Aber es sieht nur so aus. Das Dasein, das Ich (das ego) wird gar nicht in frage gestellt. . . . .es wird in Frage gestellt . . . nur immer das Wissen, das Bewusstsein von den Dingen” (author’s italics). (trans. McNeill & Walker: “Here philosophizing begins with doubt, and it seems as though everything is put into question. Yet it only seems so. Dasein, the I (the ego) is not put into question at all. This illusion and ambiguity of a critical stance runs right through the whole of modern philosophy right up to the most recent present. It is, at most, a scientifically critical but not a philosophically critical stance. All that is ever put into question—or less still, remains open and is not followed up—is knowledge., consciousness of things, of objects or of subjects as well, and this only so as to reinforce the assuredness that has already been anticipated—yet Dasein itself is never put into question. A fundamental Cartesian stance in philosophy cannot in principle put the Dasein of man into question at all; for it would thereby destroy itself at the outset in its most proper intention.”, p. 20)