The Trap of Analogical Thinking as Mere Tautology
QUOTATIONS FROM HEIDEGGER’S ATHEISM:
The Refusal of a Theological Voice
by Laurence Paul Hemming,
University of Notre Dame Press, 2002
Chapter One: Introduction
The Trap of Analogical Thinking
GARY.C.MOORE:
If one takes analogy away from theology,
then theology completely collapses
as having
never held anything but empty air.
Aquinas
in the Summa Theologica says, “Words
are
used of God and creatures in an analogical
way.” This in itself deflates all abstraction
to begin with and bodes ill for further
discussion,
especially of God. Aquinas says again,
“Even
if it be granted that everyone understands
this name ‘God’ to signify what is
said,
viz., ‘than that which a greater cannot
be
thought’, it does not follow that what
is
signified by the name exists in the
nature
of things, but only that it exists
in the
apprehension of the understanding.’
Aquinas also says, “Since we cannot
know
what God is, but only what he is not,
we
must consider the ways in which He
is not
rather than the ways which He is.”
But the logical question arises, If
you do
not know what something is, how can
you possibly
tell what it is not? The negative is
dependent
upon the positive. This has always
been so
in Aristotlean logic.
RICHARD SANSOM: Religious people do
not need
nor accurately use “logic.”
GARY.C. MOORE 2: I would disagree.
It is
exactly like any other human endeavor.
A
tiny few are very good, a greater number
fairly good but showing stress points,
one
might say, like Hemming who wants to
use
Heidegger to demonstrate how, in the
postmodernist
world, one can confront faith with
self.
He has actually greatly improved the
subject
by coming straight to the real point:
To
"believe" in anything, one
must
first believe in the self. Like God
used
to be and is still among the fundamentalists,
this is almost automatically answered
"Of
course there's a self! It is utterly
ridiculous
not to believe in the self. But the
self
has no more substance or logical identity
than God ever did. They are interlinked.
God is necessary or else how was the
universe
created? Self is necessary A) because
something
within you must initiate action, and,
more
to the point, B) something within you
MUST
yake responsibility for your acts.
Both of
these so called argument are totally
bogus
because they are arguments A) introduced
after political power has established
the
validity of a belief, B) they are not
real
logical arguments but are assertions
of force
because it is expected no one will
contradict
them, C) if they are contradicted,
it becomes
not a rational discussion ON EITHER
SIDE
since it necessarily must be a situation
of (emotional, but not necessarily so: you can
get your ass burned . . . as well as
everything
else . . . still) force against force,
and
D) it becomes an issue of "Might
makes
right". The Jehovah's Witnesses
stood
up to Hitler. They died.
The Baptists and Catholics stood up
to Stalin.
They died. The Buddhists stood up to
the
Catholics in Viet-nam. They died. Michael
Sevetus told John Calvin God was One.
He
died. The Lollards wanted to read the
BIBLE
in English. They died. All these confrontational
issues were resolved by greater force,
and
greater force so completely had its
way almost
anyone, now, knows of any of these
incidents.
No one but me knows of all these incidents,
and it tells me just one thing. Making
a
moral stand for self-respecting reasons
is
clearly and utterly stupid and is religious
in its fundamental motivation. One
can easily
be an atheist and still be completely
theological.
The CPSU certainly accomplished that
with
its epithany in Stalin. Hitler certainly
accomplished that after he got rid
of Rohm.
Just the ecstatic, joyful, grateful
faces
of the Germans lining the street as
Hitler
slowly drives past shows one that.
There
was no competitor. There was just one
object
of attention and everyone thought their
lives
depended upon paying all their attention
on the sacred object.
But Stalin's comrads learned differently.
The only thing that works for sure
is total,
constant fear, fear driven home by
factual
reality. Or, to actually and unfairly
twist
what Hemming said, "If Christianity
is to speak truly of human being .
. . what
it speaks of must have a basis in this
world.
Otherwise the contents of Christian
doctrine,
having no ontologic basis . . . would
simply
be an imaginative fancy." The
Parousia
of Kairological time demonstrated this
fully.
It combined both tremendous fear and
extreme
joy. One spied constantly on oneself
(for
once, since this was sincere, not on
others
so much) to keep oneself purified in
order
to receive the real possibility in
a short
while of divine bliss. David Hume tried
to
become a sincere Calvinist this way
. . .
and blew out all his belief . . . in
anything
. . . like an exploding tire.
Don't put down real use of reason in
religious
endeavor so readily. we have seen the
results
in 20th century Christianity. Evangelical
Protestantism is either an emotional
morass
that doesn't even read the BIBLE though
they
shake it is your face all the time.
This
certainly makes me appreciate A. E.
Housman's
acidic calm in dealing with poor textual
criticism. Essentially what he is saying
is, "So you're going to Cambridge
or
Oxford. Big deal. If you cannot analyze
a
text correctly, to put it bluntly but
rightly,
you simply can't read. Period. Without
the
use of rational, ent in reading, you
are
simply illiterate no matter how many
books
you think you have read." OR evangelical
protestantism is tepid and boring and
lifeless
and one wonders why they pretend. Simply
it has become a duty as our great American
hero Robert E. Lee said, "It is
the
most noble word in the English language."
Tepid, tepid. It is not better than
fanaticism
because they not only do nothing to
stop
it, they seem to either approve or
don't
think its worth thinking about. Now,
with
Roman Catholicism, you have a very
mixed,
treacherous, but different, more interesting,
and not tepid story . . . for a tiny
few.
Most Catholics don't even know how
they are
really different from Protestants.
But the
real point is-- Reason. Whether it
is used
properly or not, reason is given a
great
deal of respect, some of it grudging,
trying
to find any way around it they can,
others
enthusiastic but not quite sure what
it is
all about. And then you have Aquinas,
the
Dominicans, the Inquisition. People
do not
know the real reason the Inquisition
was
set up.
All they know are Protestant horror
stories,
many complete fabrications for propaganda
purposes. In other words if you believe
the
Inquisition was really evil, you have
converted
to the true faith . . . even if one
is an
atheist. The inquisition was set up
IN OPPOSITION
TO secular authority that was trying,
extremely
trying, anyone they wanted to call
a heretic
almost always--this is plausible since
what
other motive would secular authority
have
for 'purifying' the faith--for purely
personal
reasons or gain. It gave people a legal
trial
with a chance to speak their own words
in
court. Now, if you are accused of witchcraft,
this doesn't work too well. But if
you are
accused of being a Cathar, the Church
has
a strict definition of what a Cathar
is,
and--normally--it has absolutely nothng
to
do with how rich the individual is.
The Inquisition
may very possibly never had the great
auto
de fes they are accused of in Spain.
The
actual records during the height of
the Inquisition
there seem to indicate only about 50
people
were accused in a matter of years,
most of
whom were released because the charges
were
bogus, some were admonished to mend
their
ways and let go, repeat offenders--very
rare--were
given more persuasion to see the light
and,
it seems, only occassionally burned.
Now,
historical records are not things that
give
you the real facts right in your hands.
They
are just historical accounts. They
can both
misprepresent a story by accident or
intent
or by simple omission, silence. But
at least
the accounts exist. The Protestant
propagada
was essentially based on nothing OVERALL!
That is the real sticking point.
Jud may or may not be aware that the
Catholics
in England are minimalizing the heresy
trials
and burnings that ARE FULLY ACCOUNTED
FOR.
But accounts present specific names,
dates,
places, trials, all the things David
Hume
was such a pionneer in digging out
of history
systematically and CRITICALLY comparing
accounts
and telling his readers, if they want
to
read the footnotes, just how reliable
his
sources are. Hume is truly a role model,
a hero, an example to follow. Some
have said
(Grieg) that he is irrationally harsh
toward
believers. These are essentially Anglican
and Calvinist Christians that have
deliberately
tried to inflict real harm on him.
Of course
he was mad. I am mad now. He also condemns
the Catholics.
But . . . this situation is very different.
First, there is the Irish question,
dangerous
teriitory to speak one's real mind
about.
Second, one is EXPECTED to kick Catholic
butt because that is what a good Briton
does.
Kick and kick hard. It's all the stupid
Mick
bastards understand or they'll think
you're
getting soft and will treacherously
turn
on you in an instant. Listen to this
shit.
But it is real. Hume, though, had one
of
the most pleasant times in his life
arguing
with the Jesuits in the same seminary
that
educated Descartes. Also, when discussing
contractual law in the TREATISE, he
says
it is an imaginary legal act based
on faith
in material objects blessed by the
law just
as an image is blessed in a Catholic
Church.
Now, anyone who knows Hume knows how
important
he holds contractual law. In essence,
he
said that that is all that holds England--not
so much Scotland--they're something
of barbarians--but
England together. So . . . if he said
all
this about contractual law and compared
it
to the Catholic Church . . . Hume is
certainly
conscious of the ridiculousness of
miracles
that holds any faith together.
The Parousia was going to be a miracle.
And
he never hesitated to deride them theoretically
or specifically or in specific people
he
knew. But that is not all there is
to the
Roman Catholic Church. Thomas Aquinas
is
THE Doctor of the Church as pronounced
at
the Council of Trent that had Protestant
observers. He was a formidable presence
since
he has a profound understanding of
Aristotle.
And with Aristotle, everything goes
back
down to basic premises, axioms. These
are
things you HAVE to accept. But WHY
do you
have to accept them? These are things
each
person ON THEIR OWN have to confront.
You
cannot receive them from other people
or
it is those people that are then the
axioms.
David Hume is by far the nearest thinker
to achieve a nearly presuppositionless
philosophy.
His premisses are few, and APPEAL TO
MY FEELINGS
as sound. "My feelings" because
axioms come BEFORE reason! They are
utterly
irrational! They can be judged "reasonable"
ONLY AFTER ACCEPTING THEM! Each person
in
their uttermost lonliness has their
unique
set of axioms. They can only partially
be
shared in language, and that is probably
the least important part. A person
IS what
they are born as. Only a few later
in life
for whatever irrational eason achieve
critical
dustance and . . . sort of . . . make
their
own decisions. Sort of. That is, you
FEEL
that you will is free. I suppose a
great
many people 'feel' their will is NOT
free.
I would not like that. Anyway, the
point
is, Aquinas, being the sort of person
he
was and historically situated did a
great
job with what he had. HIS WRITINGS
CONTRIBUTED
GREATLY TO REAL LAW OVERCOMING IRRATIONAL,
PERSONALLY MOTIVATED FORCE!
RICHARD SANSOM:
They might claim something like the
following:
One cannot define love, pain or the
color
red, but one knows what they are when
they
encounter them – and (kind of “therefore”)
one can know God, though one cannot
define
him. (an analogy).
GARY.C. MOORE 2:
One has to try to define "love"
and "pain" because they strongly
motivate action, action that, without
any
understanding, then does become irrational
and disastrous. Even color can be defined
by comparison. You're right, this is
the
way many argue, but, just for that
reason,
they should be utterely ignored because
rational
discussion is impossible with them
AND they
want you to loose control and get emotional.
RICHARD SANSOM:
If the religious stray too far from
revelational
explanations, they get into trouble
and resort
to the kinds of strange logic that
Aquinas
used.
GARY.C.MOORE 2: I would not say his
logic
was strange, but that his axioms are
completely
strange to us now. Unfortunately, because
Aquinas is not taken as seriously as
he should
be (for, however, you view it, he is
a bedrock
of Western culture), many things are
accepted
unquestioningly in ordinary language
that
he openly and in great detail examined.
Even
if we disagree with his premises, TO
UNDERSTAND
OURSELVES we have to understand why
we think
the way we do, i. e., "There just
has
to be a self to take on moral responsibility."
But, yet, Aquinas has "revelation"
as his premise. But there is a problem
with
JUST saying that. Premises are always
a revelation
since they cannot be the product of
rational
argument. And EVERYONE examines critically
their axioms. Its just . . . for most
people
overall and with everyone in specific
matters,
this "examination" is never
completely
carried out in the open so that we
all to
some degree cannot help but operate
on "automatic".
If you knew the truth, you probably
would
not like it.
RICHARD SANSOM:
Aristotle also fell prey to challengeable
logic in his unmoved mover, since one
can
question WHY there must be an end to
causality,
or WHY the abstraction of “perfect”
need
be used at all.
GARY.C.MOORE 2: With Aristotle, it
was simply
a matter of the unchangeable is 'better'
than the changeable. We still the same
way.
We still admire the heavens and get
pissed
when the car breaks down.
The positive is dependent upon ‘empirical’
experience. I put ‘empirical’ experience
in scare quotes because experience
can never
be in any sense an abstraction. Also,
it
narrows down “experience”, then, to
exactly
what it is: Purely personal. You cannot
know
my experience. Words are only analogical,
just as we started above. There are
no back
doors permitted here for abstraction
to slip
in. And this is all confirmed again
by Aquinas
where he is quoted as saying at the
end of
his life, “All that I have written
seems
to me like straw compared to what has
now
been revealed to me,” quotedin J. A.
Weisheipl,
Friar Thomas d’Aquino, pg. 322. Now,
Aquinas
does not go on to state in words what
has
been revealed. The experience of whatever
is purely private.
We do not even know if what he experienced
was God which would at least for him
would
have validated, not negated, all that
he
had written . . . unless . . . but
we do
not KNOW! C. S. Lewis in The Four loves,
chapter 6, paragraph 20, pp. 174-175,
says
“The humblest of us in a state of Grace,
can have some ‘knowledge-by-acquaintance’
(con-naitre), some ‘tasting’, of Love
Himself;
but man even at his highest sanctity
and
intelligence has no direct ‘knowledge
about’
(savoir) the ultimate Being—only analogies.
We cannot see light, though by light
we can
see things. Statements about God are
extrapolations
from the knowledge of other things
which
the divine illumination enables us
to know.’
Now, not only does this support what
Aquinas
said at the end of his life as well
as what
I said of it, but it shows a circulus
vitiosis
because the special state of “grace”
validates
the knowledge of God and then that
so validated
God through “divine illumination enables
us to know” in the first place. Exactly
the
same thing has happened as Heidegger
says
happened with Descartes. First, you
say “I
am”, then and only then are you able
to say
“God created me so that I can say ‘I
am’.
And then you can see how drastic it
is for
theology when Heidegger says “You can
only
say ‘I am’ because you ‘always already’
exist
in a world that has ‘always already’
given
you the language by which you can say
‘I
am’. If the ‘I’ is put in doubt, then
“God”
no longer can even be something doubted
but
has become a completely meaningless
word.
No wonder modern theologians are resorting
to the denials of God’s existence to
say
there must be ‘something’ existent,
an object
of some sort, in order for it to be
denied,
and blasphemy which can only be blasphemy
if there is something sacred to be
sacrilegious
about. But all they have accomplished
is
to make the circulus vitiosis not vicious
at all but just meaningless gibberish.
RICHARD SANSOM:
I wonder if “metaphor” can substitute
for
“analogy” in much of what you have
said above.
GARY.C.MOORE 2: Yes, and I think we
need
to make up an uncompromising list of
terms
that have analogous functions, especially
keeping an eye out for those that do
not
seem to be so. But, first, you have
the problem
that language is wholly analogous.
At best,
can it only be a situation of "I
am
aware that I am aware that . . ."?
That
really would not accomplish much.
RICHARD SANSOM:
In the news lately there is the case
of a
woman who stoned her two children to
death,
having been told, by hallucination,
to do
so by God. She has been deemed to “legally
insane.” It seems that certain revelations
are OK and some are not. This fact
belies
the belief those religious folks who
depend
on revelation for the truth of their
Christian
faith. In our culture the community
is the
final legal and moral arbiter. She
will be
spared the death penalty and perhaps
will
spend much time in a psychiatric ward
purging
those Godly voices. If she does finally
do
this, and is eventually confronted
with the
reality of the horror of her deed,
I wonder
what she will feel?
GARY.C.MOORE 2: Why do we have to pay
for
this? Why does she have to endure all
this?
Nothing at all be be accomplished.
nothing
whatsoever. This is not mercy. Nothing
whatsoever
can be . . . 'corrected'. Kill her.
Why are
we so idiotic to look for "intent"?
If she will never commit the crime
again--and,
yes, this has at times been very successfully
determined--let her go. Her deamons,
then,
are her matter. But I don't think she
qualifies.
Very few times can real intent be determined
OR IS EVEN RELEVANT!!!! This usually
applies
to people who killed in a fit of rage
and
were horrified by what they did. Kill
them,
or let them go. No one desrves prison
. .
. or a psychiatric ward.
'Never trust the writer' Gary C. Moore
((FROM: THEISM Part 9)
Kairological Time and the Parousia”
QUOTATIONS FROM HEIDEGGER’S ATHEISM:
The Refusal of a Theological Voice
by Laurence Paul Hemming,
University of Notre Dame Press,
2002
SECTION A Chapter One: Introduction
38: “This reality of the will to power can
be expressed, with Nietzsche, in the proposition
‘God is dead . . . the supersensible world,
especially the world of the Christian God,
has lost its effective force in history .
. .”92 (Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen
Universitat, p. 25 “Diese Wirklichkeit des
Willens zur Macht lasst sich im Sinne Nietzsches
auch assagen durch den satz: ‘Gott ist todt’
. . . Die ubersinnliche Welt, insbesondere
die Welt des christlichen Gottes, hat seine
wirkende Kraft in der Geschichte verloren
. . .”) “What is essential is that we are
in the midst of the fulfillment of mihilism,
that God is ‘dead’ and every time-space for
godhead is buried”.94 (Das Rektorat, p. 39.
“Das Wesentliche isy, dass wir mitten in
der Vollendung des Nihilismus stehen, dass
Gott ‘todt’ ist und jeder Zeit-Raum fur die
Gottheit verschuttet.” What is a time-space?
It is the place of being human. God is dead,
and so the very place of godhead, being-human,
is buried too. That God is dead means that
the human being is in some sense also dead
to God. Chapter Two: The Basis of Heidegger’s
Atheism
43: . . . [T]he ‘kairological time’ of the
early Christian communities actually pointed
him in the direction of a description of
human being which enabled him to develop
a critique of Aristotlean ontology.
43/44: . . . [T]he originary Christian experience
of history—that history at any moment is
subject to its own end . . . enables the
earliest Christian communities to have a
unique access to the question concerning
the meaning of being. [Cardinal K.] Lehmann
compares this to the Aristotlean ontology
by saying; “The experience of the original
Christian understanding of history is . .
. the . . . possible . . . ‘standpoint’ from
which the limitation of the former ontology
in its understanding of the meaning of being
and . . . the persistence of this limitation
could stand out.” This makes the reference
to the forgetfulness of being more prescient—this
forgetfulness is not just a feature of time,
it is what the history of being is . . .
[I]t is a persistent concern with going back
into the roots of the Christian experience
which provides the basis for a philosophical
critique of the whole history of ontology.
44/45/46/47: Ott misses the point of what
Heidegger’s atheism is about. This atheism
is an address in the wake of Nietzsche’s
declaration of the death of God . . . with
regard for the whole of western philosophy
. . . his address springs from a strictly
philosophical motive. Philosophy has nothing
to say of the Christian God—which means that
heidegger’s discussion of the tradition of
western philosophy . . . takes on an interpretive
urgency . . . Heidegger’s atheism is a vibrant
pedagogy, indicating the extent to which
so much which claims to speak of God does
not do so . . . For Heidegger, the question
is , what is the ontological basis for these
ontic descriptions of matters of Christian
faith? This is a philosophical question that
concerns itself with theology . . . if Christianity
is to speak truly of human being . . . what
it speaks of must have a basis in the world.
Otherwise, the contents of Christian doctrine,
having no ontological basis . . . would simply
be an imaginative fancy . . . this concern
is most centrally located . . . in the working
out of the meaning of the ‘I’, the self.
(FROM; ATHEISM Part 1)
What Significance of Heidegger’s Quoting
SEPTUAGINT?
QUOTATIONS FROM HEIDEGGER’S ATHEISM: The
Refusal of a Theological Voice by Laurence
Paul Hemming, University of Notre Dame Press,
2002
Chapter Two: The Basis of Heidegger’s Atheism
47: What is the relationship between subjectivity
and the ens creatum? . . . Heidegegger always
reminds his reader that the Greeks understood
the human being uniquely as the zoon logon
exon, the being that has language . . . legein
which is the basis for human beings’ concern
with truth, aletheia. Aletheuein means “to
be disclosing, to remove the world from concealedness
and coveredness”.23 (Platon: Sophistes (GA19),
p. 17. “Aletheuein meint: aufdeckendsein,
die Welt aus der Verschlossenheit und Verdecktheit
herausnehmen” [author’s italics]) Speaking
is concerned with world.
Thgis understanding undergoes a transformation
. . . the translation of zoon logon exon
from greek thought into Latin mentality which
understands human being as antimal rationale
means that the original Greek sense is lost.
Humanity is now understood strictly in terms
of the ratio, reason, rather than speaking.
48: (Created Creature) Heidegger, ONTOLOGY—THE
HERMENEUTICS OF FACTICITY, trans. John
van
Buren, Indiana, 1999, page 23 : “The
position
which looked at man with the definition’animal
rationale’ as a guide saw him in the
sphere
of other beings-which-are-there with
him
in the mode of life . . . a being which
has
language which addresses and discusses
its
world—a world there for it in its dealings
it goes about in its praxis, concern
taken
in a broad sense. The later definition
“animal
rationale’ covered up the intuition
which
was the soil out of which this definition
of human being originally arose. Christian
Dasein became the now no longer discussed
foundation for the theological definition
of the idea of man out of which the
idea
of person developed (my italics) (rational=is
capable of knowing). This theological
definition
could be actualized only by being cut
to
the measure of its principleof knowledge,
i. e., only with reference to Revelation.
The guide taken for this was Ge nesis
1:26: “And God said, Let us make man in our
image, after our likeness” Ontologie (Hermeneutik
der Faktizitat) (GA63), p. 27. “Der hinaus
entnomene Leitfaden ist Genesis
1:26 – kai eipen o theos, “Poiesomen anthropon
kat’ eikona emeteran kai kath’omoioosin”.
Human being was, in a manner cut to
the measure
of faith, defined in advance as being-created
in the image of God. Apart from the
Greek
definition it externally adopted and
rendered
superficial, the Christian definition
of
the essence of human being is dependent
on
the idea of God which was added to
the Greek
definition and made normative for it.”
The effect of this is that the essence of
what it is to be human is made entirely dependent
on God as such, something which is added
to the Greek definition. The meaning of zoon
logon exon therefore undergoes a multiplicity
of changes while appearing to say the same
thing. The ratio of speaking, legein, becomes
the ratio Dei of medieval thought. From being
determined out of the condition of its being
with other beings (that is what speaking
is), human being is now determined out of
its foundation on God. Heidegger makes the
same point in Sein und Zeit, noting, however,
that ‘the Christian definition in modern
times becomes de-theologized”.26 ([GA2],
p. 48. with the same biblical reference [my
italics of Hemming’s comment] “Die christliche Definition wurde im Verlauf
der Neuzeit entheologisiert”.)
SECTION B
GARY.C.MOORE: Though I tend to slant Hemmings’
statements toward an almost purely philosophical
stance whereas he is wanting-- I think--
to create a time-space where an address of
faith of some sort can happen, I think it
is an honest supposition that the philosophical
structure of what he is saying has been truthfully
represented here on his own and, as he has
clearly shown, Heidegger’s terms.
“Kairological time”, “the originary Christian
experience of history” as the parousia did
bring something new upon the Greek philosophical
stage. When, in Part 8, I argued against
a definition of an experience as an experience
of God that could be communicated to others
and used, somehow, to ‘identify’ God, I did
not argue against the reality of the experience
itself—just of ‘what’. But, just as Hume
said, experience is just experience until
imagination puts words to it, words without
any guarantee of infallibility whatsoever.
That there is a powerful experience is undoubted.
But no one will let the experience “just
be’, stand by and as itself. It HAS to point
to something—because it is important. In
such a context, and thinking in such a way,
even an atheist would be thinking theologically.
If you feel a drop of water fall on you,
does that necessarily mean there is going
to be lightning and thunder and great winds,
devastation and destruction? Only in your
imagination. The o nly thing different between
a drop of water falling on you and supposedly
experiencing the “numinous” is the degree
of feeling, and, great though the difference
is, that is all there is and all there can
be.
Now, “kairological time”, the coming of the
“parousia”, gave an intensely, even
overwhelming
futural thrust to human consciousness.
Something
great and powerful and good was going
to
happen to cleanse the world of all
its evil
and injustice. Believing this made
life feel
absolutely wonderful. The whole, of
what
human being is, is taken away from
the dreadful,
meaningless, unchangeable now and thrust
so far into the future that one could
begin
to taste the coming of these great
changes.
One could even hope to change ones
self from
the horrible disappointment its had
become
into something completely washed clean,
changed,
and begun all over again as one has
wished
all of one’s life. It gave hope REALITY—it
was real because the future is the
most real
tense, the direction toward which,
even in
the depths of pagan and atheistic depravity,
all human effort is still always directed.
Hope therefore appropriated the whole
of
reality. It was unstoppable, unconquerable.
Except for one thing. It had a time
limit.
It had a certain region of time in
which
to occur. “Parousia” means “presence”
from
the participle of par-eimi, “to be
there”.
“Kairos” means “the proper moment”.
Parousia
was the ultimate statement about a
worth-while
reality of everlasting life instead
of dreary
death. “When longed for with love,
it effected
changes in Christian behavior,” Xavier
Leon-Dufour.
“For what is our hope, or joy, or crown
of
rejoicing? Are not even ye in the presence
of our lord Jesus Christ at his coming?”,
1 Thessalonians
2:19 [17] Hêmeis de, adelphoi, aporphanisthentes
aph' humôn pros kairon hôras, prosôpôi ou
kardiai, perissoterôs espoudasamen to prosôpon
humôn idein en pollêi epithumiai. [18] dioti
êthelêsamen elthein r<*s humas, egô men
Paulos kai hapax kai dis, [19] kai e<*ekopsen
hêmas ho Satanas, tis gar hêmôn elpis ê chara
ê stephanos kauchêseôs-- ê ouchi kai humeis--
emprosthen tou kuriou hêmôn Iêsou en têi
[20] autou parousiai; humeis gar este hê
doxa hêmôn kai hê chara. “For this we say
unto you by the word of the Lord, that we
which are alive and remain unto the coming
of the Lord shall not prevent them which
are asleep”, Ibid 4:15. [15] Touto gar humin
legomen en logôi kuriou, hoti hêmeis hoi
zôntes hoi perileipomenoi eis tên parousian
tou kuriou ou mê phthasômen tous koimêthentas:
hoti autos ho kurios en keleusmati, [16]
en phônêi archangelou kai en salpingi theou,
katabêsetai ap' ouranou, kai hoi nekroi en
Christôi anastêsontai prôton, [17] epeita
hêmeis hoi zôntes hoi perileipomenoi hama
sun autois harpagêsometha en nephelais eis
apantêsin tou kuriou eis aera: kai houtôs
pantote sun kuriôi esometha.
As Theodore Kisiel expresses it, “The facticity
of a Christian, the way she finds herself
and habitually comports herself, is
receptively
wrapped in dread and joy . . . With
this
reception, we enter into the operative
context
of God, in a working relation in His
presence.
To receive is to change before God’,
THE
GENESIS OF HEIDEGGER’S BEING AND TIME,
University
of California Press, 1993, page 183.
But
Kisiel begins immediately to philosophize
this into abstract “decision” before
an absent
God. John van Buren says, “The Coming
will
arrive only in the Kairos, the moment,
‘the
fullness of time”. The time and content
of
this arrival are not objectively available
in advance to be expected (erwartet
), represented,
and calculated, but rather are to be
determined
only out of the Kairos itself, which
will
happen with a ‘suddenness’ and in ‘the
twinkling
of an eye’ (1 Corinthians 15:52: “In
a moment,
in the twinkling of an eye, at the
last trump:
for the trumpet shall sound, and the
d ead
shall be raised incorruptible, and
we shall
be changed.’ [50] Touto de phêmi, adelphoi,
hoti sarx kai haima basileian theou
klêronomêsai
ou dunatai, oude hê phthora tên aphtharsian
klêronomei. [51] idou mustêrion humin
legô:
pantes ou koimêthêsometha pantes de
allagêsometha,
en atomôi, [52] en rhipêi ophthalmou,
en
têi eschatêi salpingi: salpisei gar,
kai
hoi nekroi egerthêsontai aphthartoi,
kai
hêmeis allagêsometha. [53] dei gar
to phtharton
touto endusasthai aphtharsian kai to
thnêton
touto endusasthai atha nasian. [54]
hotan
de to thnêton touto endusêtai [tên]
athanasian,
tote genêsetai ho logos ho gegrammenos
Katepothê
ho thanatos eis nikos. [55] pou xou,
thanate,
to nikos; pou sou, [56] thanate, to
kentron;
to de kentron tou thanatou hê hamartia,
hê
de dunamis tês hamartias ho [57] nomos:
tôi
de theôi charis tôi didonti hêmin to
nikos
dia tou kuriou hêmôn Iêsou Christou.
[58]
Hôste, adelphoi mou agapêtoi, hedraioi
ginesthe,
ametakinêtoi, perisseuontes en tôi
ergôi
tou k uriou pantote, eidotes hoti ho
kopos
humôn ouk estin kenos en kuriôi.) John
van
Buren continues, “The original Christians
live in “a constant, essential, and
necessary
insecurity . . . a context of enacting
one’s
life in uncertainty before the unseen
God,”
in “daily doing and suffering.” The
temporal
enactment of this fluid situation means
a
resolute and open wachsam sein, being
wakeful
for the incalculable Coming within
the moment”,
THE YOUNG HEIDEGGER, Indiana, 1994,
pages
190-191. This is closer to the mark
that
Paul’s language really evokes: a physical
tension, nothing at all abstract.
But it is Baron von Hugel writing to Norman
Kemp Smith that completely de-mystifies something
Even Heidegger is trying, in a limited way,
to appropriate for philosophy. Speaking of
20th century Christians von Hugel says, “It
was this proximateness, this suddenness of
the Parousia, of the New Heaven and the New
Earth, which these friends thought themselves
to be quite simply reaffirming. Yet this
their thinking is demonstrably mistaken—they
do not reproduce that primitive Christian
mentality at all. The Parousia was indeed,
between say A. D. 30 and A. D. 90, conceived
as proximate and sudden; and men were indeed
appealed to most strongly with regard to
it, in this its proximateness and suddenness.
But stronger again, was the conviction and
teaching, that the Parousia itself, that
this new order of things, was not the work
of men, whether slow or gradual, or quick
and hic et nunc; but that was the pure work,
the sheer gift, of God. Men could not produce
it, work they never so h ard; they could
not even hasten this work of God’s event.
Men could only prepare themselves to be awake
and not unworthy of it, whensoever it might
come. –Thus it is a profound travesty of
the Parousia doctrine and temper, to take
the element of proximity and suddenness,
and to use this element as part of a scheme
of human effort and human productivity, in
lieu of the original scheme of divine action
and human passivity. The original scheme
is profoundly pessimistic in its man-ward
side; this other scheme is enthusiastically
optimistic (i. e. shallow) in its man-ward
side. The original scheme is deeply religious;
the new scheme is a sort of fanatical moralism,”
THE LETTERS OF BARON FRIEDRICH VON HUGEL
AND PROFESSOR NORMAN KEMP SMITH, edited by
Lawrence F. Barmann, Fordham University Press,
1981, pages
24-25, 19th April 1919.
Von Hugel’s point is that these “primitive
Christians” were really expecting to experience
and know God within their lifetimes hic et
nunc. It was really going to happen as reality,
as much of a reality, and much more, as waking
up in the morning and going to work and wishing
you were already dead. This has nothing to
do with philosophy and has to do with factual
history as Paul wrote it down where the very
heart of Christianity lived intensely for
a while, and then utterly failed since it
was a real and literal expectation, not a
philosophical and abstract one, and from
whence could only pretend to believe, going
back to the duplicitous and hypocritical
behavior that was then the only way for a
Christian to act and which David Hume stated
was the outstanding feature of a ‘true believer’:
They said one thing and did the complete
opposite. The only time Christianity was
ever sincere was during kairological time
and the parousia.
EN PASSANT:
RICHARD SANSOM:
In the news lately there is the case of a
woman who stoned her two children to death,
having been told, by hallucination, to do
so by God. She has been deemed to “legally
insane.” It seems that certain revelations
are OK and some are not. This fact belies
the belief those religious folks who depend
on revelation for the truth of their Christian
faith. In our culture the community is the
final legal and moral arbiter. She will be
spared the death penalty and perhaps will
spend much time in a psychiatric ward purging
those Godly voices. If she does finally do
this, and is eventually confronted with the
reality of the horror of her deed, I wonder
what she will feel?
GARY.C. MOORE
Why do we have to pay for this? Why does
she have to endure all this? Nothing at all
be be accomplished. nothing whatso ever.
This is not mercy. Nothing whatsoever can
be . . . 'corrected'. Kill her. Why are we
so idiotic to look for "intent"?
If she will never commit the crime again--and,
yes, this has at times been very successfully
determined--let her go. Her deamons, then,
are her matter. But I don't think she qualifies.
This usually applies to people who killed
in a fit of rage and were horrified by what
they did. Kill them, or let them go. No one
desrves prison . . . or a psychiatric ward.
RICHARD SANSOM:
“Kill her.” Yes, sometimes I have the same
opinion regarding an especially horrific
crime, but the death penalty sticks violently
in my craw. As for “intent” being the determining
factor, what factor would you use in its
place? The foundation of capital law IS intent;
accidental killing, self defense, protection
of the home, killings of enemies during war,
killing when deranged, etc. are all in a
different moral category from many other
forms of killing. You say you don’t think
she qualifies, and this is your opinion,
but just maybe she does. In any case, my
solution to the death penalty for those convicted
of heinous crimes is to find an island, from
which escape is impossible and dump them
all, let them fend for themselves, commit
suicide or kill one another. For me, when
the state kills it is the most rank form
of premeditation, and there is no going back
if later evidence proves innocence. Of course
I must admit that if I was the father of
those children I might be more on your side.
It’s a tough issue.
Regards,
Richard
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