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Section Three: Recent German Philosophy B.
Kant. Critique of Pure Reason
1. In the first place, as to the theoretic
philosophy, Kant in the Critique of Pure
Reason sets to work in a psychological manner,
i. e. historically, inasmuch as he describes
the main stages in theoretic consciousness.
The first faculty is sensuousness generally,
the second understanding, the third reason.
All this he simply narrates; quite empirically,
without developing it from proceeding by
necessity.
a. The a priori fact of sensuous existence,
the forms of sensuous existence, constitute
the beginning of this transcendentalism.
Kant calls the judgment of the same the transcendental
æsthetic. Nowadays æsthetic signifies the
knowledge of the beautiful. But here the
doctrine of intuition or perception is taken
from the point of view of its universality,
i. e. from what in it pertains to the subject
as such. Perception, says Kant, is the knowledge
of an object given to us through the senses;
sensuousness, however, is the capacity of
being affected by conceptions as external.
Now, according to Kant, in perception there
are to be found all manner of contents, and
in dealing with this he first of all distinguishes
feeling as external, such as redness, colour,
hardness, &c., and then as internal,
such as justice, wrath, love, fear, pleasurable
and religious feelings, &c. He says content
such as this forms the one constituent and
pertains to feeling; all this is subjective
and merely subjective. In this sensuous element
there is, however, a universal sensuous element
likewise contained, which as such does not
belong to feeling in so far as it is immediately
determined; in such a content this ‘other’
consists in the categories of space and time,
which of themselves are void and empty. The
filling in is performed by the content, by
colour, softness, hardness, &c., as regards
space; while as regards time, the same content,
so soon as it is something transient, or
again some other content, and in particular
inward feelings are what causes the determination.
Space and time are consequently pure, i.
e. abstract perceptions in which we place
outside of us the content of individual sensations,
either in time as succeeding one another,
or in space as separate from one another.
Here we thus meet with the division between
subjectivity and objectivity, for if we isolate
the ‘alongside of’ and ‘after’ we have space
and time. It is the act of a priori sensuousness
to project the content; the forms of intuition
or perception constitute this pure perception.(8)
Now everything indeed is termed perception,
even thought and consciousness; God, who
certainly pertains to thought alone, is said
to be comprehended by perception or intuition,
the so-called immediate consciousness.
Kant further remarks in this regard, (1)
“Space is no empirical Notion which has been
derived from outward experiences.” But the
Notion is never really anything empiric:
it is in barbarous forms like this that Kant,
however, always expresses himself: “For in
order that I may relate my sensations to
something outside of me, I must presuppose
space.” Of time Kant speaks in similar terms:
“In order that something outside of me may
be represented in separate space or time,
the conception of space and time must come
first, or it cannot be derived from experience,
for experience first becomes possible through
this antecedent conception.” That is to say,
time and space which may appear as objective,
since their particular filling in certainly
belongs to subjective feeling, are not empirical;
for consciousness has time and space first
of all in itself.” (2) “Space is a necessary
conception which lies at the basis of all
external perceptions. Space and time are
conceptions a priori, because we cannot represent
things without space and time. Time is a
necessary basis for all phenomena.” As a
priori, space and time are universal and
necessary, that is to say we find this to
be the case; but it does not follow that
they must be previously present as conceptions.
They are fundamental indeed, but they are
likewise an external universal. Kant however
places the matter somewhat in this fashion:
there are things-in-themselves outside, but
devoid of time and space; consciousness now
comes, and it has time and space beforehand
present in it as the possibility of experience,
just as in order to eat it has mouth and
teeth, &c , as conditions necessary for
eating. The things which are eaten have not
the mouth and teeth, and as eating is brought
to bear on things, so space and time are
also brought to bear on them; just as things
are placed in the mouth and between the teeth,
so is it with space and time. (3) “Space
and time are not general Notions of the relations
of things, but pure intuitive perceptions.
For we can only represent to ourselves one
space; there are not different component
parts of space.” The same is the case with
time. The abstract conception tree, for example,
is in its actuality a number of individual
and separate trees, but spaces are not such
particulars, nor are they parts; for one
immediate continuity remains, and hence a
simple unity. Ordinary perception has always
something individual before it; space or
time are always however one only, and therefore
a priori. It might however be replied to
Kant: The nature of space and time undoubtedly
involves their being an abstract universal;
but there is in like manner only one blue.
(4) “Each Notion or conception certainly
comprises an infinite number of conceptions
under itself, but not within itself; nevertheless
this last is the case in space and time,
and they are therefore intuitive perceptions
and not Notions or conceptions.”(9) Space
and time, then, are certainly not thought-determinations,
if no thoughts are there present, but a Notion,
so soon as we have a Notion of them.
From the transcendental point of view it
is likewise maintained that this conception
of space and time contains synthetic propositions
a priori, connected with the consciousness
of its necessity. Examples of these synthetic
propositions are sought in statements such
as that of space having three dimensions,
or in the definition of a straight line,
that it is the shortest distance between
two points, and likewise in the statement
that 5 + 7=12.(10) All these propositions
are however very analytic. Kant nevertheless
in the first place holds that such propositions
do not take their rise from experience, or,
as we might better express it, are not an
individual contingent perception; this is
very true, the perception is universal and
necessary. In the second place he states
that we acquire them from pure sensuous perception,
and not through the understanding or Notion.
But Kant does not grasp the two together,
and yet this comprehension of them is involved
in such propositions being immediately certain
even in ordinary perception. When Kant then
expresses himself (Kritik der reinen Vernunft,
p. 49) to the effect that we have many sensations
which constitute “the real matter,” with
which we externally and inwardly “occupy
our minds,” and that the mind has in itself
in space and time “formal conditions of the
mode in which we place them” (those manifold
feelings) “in our mind,” the question of
how mind arrives at having just these special
forms now forces itself upon us. But what
the nature of time and space is, it does
not occur to the Kantian philosophy to inquire.
To it what space and time are in themselves
does not signify ‘What is their Notion,’
but ‘Are they external things or something
in the mind?’
b. The second faculty, the understanding,
is something very different from sensuousness;
the latter is Receptivity, while Kant calls
thought in general Spontaneity — an expression
which belongs to the philosophy of Leibnitz.
The understanding is active thought, I myself;
it “is the faculty of thinking the object
of sensuous perception.” Yet it has thoughts
merely without real content: “Thoughts without
content are void and empty, sensuous perceptions
without Notions are blind.” The understanding
thus obtains from the sensuous its matter,
both empirical and a priori, time and space;
and it thinks this matter, but its thoughts
are very different from this matter. Or it
is a faculty of a particular kind, and it
is only when both occur, when the sensuous
faculty has supplied material and the understanding
has united to this its thoughts, that knowledge
results.(11) The thoughts of the understanding
as such are thus limited thoughts, thoughts
of the finite only.
Now logic, as transcendental logic, likewise
sets forth the conceptions which the understanding
has a priori in itself and “whereby it thinks
objects completely a priori.” Thoughts have
a form which signifies their being the synthetic
function which brings the manifold into a
unity. I am this unity, the transcendental
apperception, the pure apperception of self-consciousness.
I=I; I must ‘accompany’ all our conceptions.(12)
This is a barbarous exposition of the matter.
As self-consciousness I am the completely
void, general I, completely indeterminate
and abstract; apperception is determination
generally, the activity whereby I transplant
an empirical content into my simple consciousness,
while perception rather signifies feeling
or conceiving. In order that a content may
enter this One, it must be infected by its
simplicity; it is thus that the content first
becomes my content. The comprehending medium
is ‘I’; whatever I have to do with must allow
itself to be forced into these forms of unity.
This is a great fact, an important item of
knowledge; what thought produces is unity;
thus it produces itself, for it is the One.
Yet the fact that I am the one and, as thinking,
the simplifier, is not by Kant satisfactorily
set forth. The unity may likewise be called
relation; for in so far as manifold is pre-supposed,
and as this on the one side remains a manifold
while on the other side it is set forth as
one, so far may it be said to be related.
Now as ‘I’ is the universal transcendental
unity of self-consciousness which binds together
the empirical matter of conception generally,
there are various modes in this relationship,
and here we have the transcendental nature
of the categories or universal thought-determinations.
But Kant (Kritik der reinen Vernunft, pp.
70, 77) approaches these modes of simplicity
by accepting them as they are classified
in ordinary logic. For he says that in common
logic particular kinds of judgment are brought
forward; and since judgment is a special
kind of relationship of the manifold, the
various functions of thought which 'I’ has
in it are shown therein. But the following
kinds of judgment have been noticed, viz.
Universal, Particular and Singular; Affirmative,
Negative, Infinite; Categorical, Hypothetical,
Disjunctive; Assertoric, Problematic and
Apodictic judgments. These particular modes
of relationship now brought forward are the
pure forms of the understanding. There are
thus, according to Kant (Kritik der reinen
Vernuuft, pp. 75, 76,
78-82), twelve fundamental categories, which
fall into four classes; and it is noteworthy,
and deserves to be recognized, that each
species of judgment again constitutes a triad.
(1) The first kind of categories are those
of Quantity, viz. Unity, Plurality and Totality.
Plurality is negation of the one, the assertion
of difference; and the third, the bringing
of the other two into one, plurality circumscribed,
the indeterminate plurality comprehended
as one, is the Totality. (2) In the second
series are the categories of Quality: Reality,
Negation, Limitation. Limitation is as real
or positive as negation. (3) The third series
comprises the categories of relation, of
connection; and first of all, indeed, the
relation of Substantiality, Substance and
Accident: then the relation of Causality,
the relation of Cause and Effect, and finally
Reciprocity. (4) The categories of Modality,
of the relation of the objective to our thought,
come fourth, viz. Possibility, Existence
(actuality) and Necessity. Possibility should
come second; in abstract thought, however,
the empty conception comes first. It betrays
a great instinct for the Notion when Kant
says that the first category is positive,
the second the negative of the first, the
third the synthesis of the two. The triplicity,
this ancient form of the Pythagoreans, Neo-Platonists
and of the Christian religion, although it
here reappears as a quite external schema
only, conceals within itself the absolute
form, the Notion. But since Kant says that
a conception can determine itself in me as
accidental, as cause, effect, unity, plurality,
&c., we thereby have the whole of the
metaphysics of the understanding. Kant does
not follow up further the derivation of these
categories, and he finds them imperfect,
but he says that the others are derived from
them. Kant thus accepts the categories in
an empiric way, without thinking of developing
of necessity these differences from unity.
Just as little did Kant attempt to deduce
time and space, for he accepted them likewise
from experience a quite unphilosophic and
unjustifiable procedure.
Thinking understanding is thus indeed the
source of the individual categories, but
because on their own account they are void
and empty, they only have significance through
their union with the given, manifold material
of perception, feeling, &c. Such connection
of sensuous material with categories now
constitutes the facts of experience, i. e.
the matter of sensation after it is brought
under the categories; and this is knowledge
generally.(13) The matter of perception which
pertains to the feelings or sensuous perception
is not left in the determination of individuality
and immediacy, but I am active in relation
to it, inasmuch as I bring it into connection
through the categories and elevate it into
universal species, natural laws, &c.
The question of whether a completed sensuousness
or the Notion is the higher may accordingly
be easily decided. For the laws of the heavens
are not immediately perceived, but merely
the change in position on the part of the
stars. It is only when this object of immediate
perception is laid hold of and brought under
universal thought-determinations that experience
arises therefrom, which has a claim to validity
for all time. The category which brings the
unity of thought into the content of feeling
is thus the objective element in experience,
which receives thereby universality and necessity,
while that which is perceived is rather the
subjective and contingent. Our finding both
these elements in experience demonstrates
indeed that a correct analysis has been made.
Kant (Kritik der reinen Vernunft, pp.
119, 120) however connects with this the
statement that experience grasps phenomena
only, and that by means of the knowledge
which we obtain through experience we do
not know things as they are in themselves,
but only as they are in the form of laws
of perception and sensuousness. For the first
component part of experience, sensation,
is doubtless subjective, since it is connected
with our organs. The matter of perception
is only what it is in my sensation. I know
of this sensation only and not of the thing.
But, in the second place, the objective,
which ought to constitute the opposite to
this subjective side, is itself subjective
likewise: it does not indeed pertain to my
feeling, but it remains shut up in the region
of my self-consciousness; the categories
are only determinations of our thinking understanding.
Neither the one nor the other is consequently
anything in itself, nor are both together,
knowledge, anything in itself, for it only
knows phenomena — a strange contradiction.
The transition of the category to the empiric
is made in the following way: “Pure conceptions
of the understanding are quite of a different
nature from empiric, indeed from any sensuous
perceptions;” we have thus “to show how pure
conceptions of the understanding can be applied
to Phenomena.” This is dealt with by the
transcendental faculty of judgment. For Kant
says that in the mind, in self-consciousness,
there are pure conceptions of the understanding
and pure sensuous perceptions; now it is
the schematism of the pure understanding,
the transcendental faculty of the imagination,
which determines the pure sensuous perception
in conformity with the category and thus
constitutes the transition to experience.(14)
The connection of these two is again one
of the most attractive sides of the Kantian
philosophy, whereby pure sensuousness and
pure understanding, which were formerly expressed
as absolute opposites, are now united. There
is thus here present a perceptive understanding
or an understanding perception; but Kant
does not see this, he does not bring these
thoughts together: he does not grasp the
fact that he has here brought both sides
of knowledge into one, and has thereby expressed
their implicitude. Knowledge itself is in
fact the unity and truth of both moments;
but with Kant the thinking understanding
and sensuousness are both something particular,
and they are only united in an external,
superficial way, just as a piece of wood
and a leg might be bound together by a cord.
Thus, for example, the conception of substance
in the schema becomes permanent in time,(15)
i. e. the pure conception of the understanding,
the pure category, is brought into unity
with the form of pure sensuous perception.
In as far as we have to deal with our own
determinations only and as we do not reach
the implicit, the true objective, the Kantian
philosophy called itself Idealism. But in
this connection Kant (Kritik der reinen Vernunft,
pp. 200, 201) brings forward a refutation
of empirical or material idealism, thus:
“I am conscious of my existence as determined
in time. But all time-determination presupposes
something permanent in perception. This permanence
cannot be” a sensuous perception “in me.”
For all the determining grounds of my existence
which are met with in me are conceptions,
and as such themselves require a constant
element different from them, and in relation
to which the change taking place in them
— consequently “my existence in time,” in
which they change, “maybe determined.” Or
I am conscious of my existence as of an empirical
consciousness which is only capable of being
determined in relation to something which
is outside of me; i. e. I am conscious of
something external to me. Conversely it may
be said: I am conscious of external things
as determined in time and as changing; these
hence presuppose something constant which
is not in them but outside of them. And this
is 'I,’ the transcendental ground of their
universality and necessity, of their implicitude,
the unity of self-consciousness. On another
occasion Kant regards it thus (Kritik der
reinen Vernunft, p. 101): These moments confuse
themselves, because the constant element
is itself a category. Idealism, when we regard
it as signifying that nothing exists outside
of my individual self-consciousness as individual,
as also the refutation of this, the assertion
that things exist outside of my self-consciousness
as individual, are the one as bad as the
other. The former is the idealism of Berkeley,
in which self-consciousness as individual
is alone in question, or the world of self-consciousness
appears as a number of limited, sensuous,
individual conceptions, which are as completely
devoid of truth as though they were called
things. The truth or untruth does not rest
in their being things or conceptions, but
in their limitation and contingency, whether
as conceptions or things. The refutation
of this idealism is nothing more than calling
attention to the fact that this empirical
consciousness does not exist in itself —
just as those empiric things do not exist
in themselves. But the knowing subject does
not with Kant really arrive at reason, for
it remains still the individual self-consciousness
as such, which is opposed to the universal.
As a matter of fact there is described in
what we have seen only the empirical finite
self-consciousness which requires a material
from outside, or which is limited. We do
not ask whether these facts of knowledge
are in and for themselves true or untrue;
the whole of knowledge remains within subjectivity,
and on the other side there is the thing-in-itself
as an external. This subjectivity is however
concrete in itself; even the determinate
categories of the thinking understanding
are concrete, and much more is experience
so — the synthesis of the sensation and the
category.(16)
c. The third faculty Kant finds in reason,
to which he advances from the understanding
after the same psychological method; that
is to say, he hunts through the soul’s sack
to see what faculties are still to be found
there; and thus by merest chance he lights
on Reason. It would make no difference if
there had been no Reason there, just as with
physicists it is a matter of perfect indifference
whether, for instance, there is such a thing
as magnetism or not. “All our knowledge begins
from the senses, thence proceeds to the understanding,
and finishes up with reason; nothing higher
than this is to be found in us, for it signifies
the working up of the material of perception,
and the reducing of it to the highest unity
of thought.” Reason is therefore, according
to Kant, the power of obtaining knowledge
from principles, that is, the power of knowing
the particular in the universal by means
of Notions; the understanding, on the contrary,
reaches its particular by means of perception.
But the categories are themselves particular.
The principle of reason, according to Kant,
is really the universal, inasmuch as it finds
the unconditioned involved in the conditioned
knowledge of the understanding. Understanding
is hence for him thought in finite relations;
reason, on the contrary, is thought which
makes the unconditioned its object. Since
Kant’s time it has become customary in the
language of philosophy to distinguish understanding
and reason, while by earlier philosophers
this distinction was not drawn. The product
of reason is, according to Kant, the Idea
— a Platonic expression — and he understands
by it the unconditioned, the infinite.(17)
It is a great stop forward to say that reason
brings forth Ideas; with Kant, however, the
Idea is merely the abstract universal, the
indeterminate.
This, the unconditioned, must now be grasped
as concrete, and therein lies the main difficulty.
For to know the unconditioned means to determine
it and to deduce its determinations. Much
has been written and said on the subject
of knowledge, without a definition of it
ever having been offered. But it is the business
of Philosophy to see that what is taken for
granted as known is really known. Now on
this point Kant says that reason has certainly
the desire to know the infinite, but has
not the power. And the reason which Kant
gives for this (Kritik der reinen Vernunft,
pp. 277, 278), is on the one hand that no
psychologically sensuous intuition or perception
corresponds with the infinite, that it is
not given in outward or inward experience;
to the Idea “no congruent or corresponding
object can be discovered in the sensuous
world.” It depends, however, on how the world
is looked at; but experience and observation
of the world mean nothing else for Kant than
a candlestick standing here, and a snuff-box
standing there. It is certainly correct to
say that the infinite is not given in the
world of sensuous perception; and supposing
that what we know is experience, a synthesis
of what is thought and what is felt, the
infinite can certainly not be known in the
sense that we have a sensuous perception
of it. But no one wishes to demand a sensuous
proof in verification of the infinite; spirit
is for spirit alone. The second reason for
considering that the infinite cannot be known,
lies in this, that Reason has no part in
it except as supplying the forms of thought
which we call categories; and these doubtless
afford what Kant calls objective determinations,
but in such a way that in themselves they
are still only subjective. If therefore for
the determination of the infinite we employ
these categories which are applicable only
to phenomena, we entangle ourselves in false
arguments (paralogisms) and in contradictions
(antinomies); and it is an important point
in the Kantian philosophy that the infinite,
so far as it is defined by means of categories,
loses itself in contradictions. Although
reason, says Kant, becomes transcendent by
the exhibition of these contradictions, it
still retains its claim to trace perception,
experience, and knowledge pertaining to the
understanding, back to the infinite. This
union of the infinite, the unconditioned,
with the finite and conditioned as existing
in the knowledge given by the understanding,
or even in perception, would signify that
the acme of concreteness had been reached.
Of this Unconditioned there are several kinds,
objects having special features of their
own and proceeding from reason, transcendental
Ideas; they are thus themselves particular
in their nature. The manner in which Kant
arrives at these Ideas is again derived from
experience, from formal logic, according
to which there are various forms of the syllogism.
Because, says Kant, there are three forms
of the syllogism, categorical, hypothetical,
and disjunctive, the Unconditioned is also
threefold in its nature: “Firstly, an Unconditioned
of the categorical synthesis in a subject.”
Synthesis is the concrete; but the expression
is ambiguous, since it indicates an external
association of independent elements. “In
the second place, an Unconditioned of the
hypothetical synthesis of the members of
a series will have to be looked for; and
in the third place, an Unconditioned of the
disjunctive synthesis of the parts in a system.”
We make the first connection, expressed as
object of Reason or transcendental Idea,
when we conceive “the thinking subject” the
second “is the sum total of all phenomena,
the world;” and the third is “the thing which
contains the supreme condition of the possibility
of all that can be thought, the Being of
all Beings,” i. e. God. When brought to an
ultimate point, the question which meets
us is whether Reason can bring these objects
to reality, or whether they remain confined
to subjective thought. Now, according to
Kant, Reason is not capable of procuring
reality for its Ideas — otherwise it would
be transcendent, its limits would be overstepped;
it produces only paralogisms, antinomies,
and an ideal without reality.(18)
“A paralogism is a syllogism false in its
form.” Since Reason credits with reality
that mode of the Unconditioned which constitutes
the categorical synthesis in a subject, and
therefore the thinking subject, it is termed
substance. Now is the thinking ego a substance,
a soul, a soul-thing? Further questions are
whether it is permanent, immaterial, incorruptible,
personal and immortal, and such as to have
a real community with the body. The falsity
of the syllogism consists in this, that the
idea of the unity of the transcendental subject
essential to Reason is expressed as a thing;
for it is only in this way that the permanency
of the same becomes substance. Otherwise
I find myself permanent in my thought, of
course, but only within perceiving consciousness,
not outside of that. The ego is therefore
the empty, transcendental subject of our
thoughts, that moreover becomes known only
through its thoughts; but of what it is in
itself we cannot gather the least idea. (A
horrible distinction! For thought is nothing
more or less than the “in-itself “ or implicit.)
We cannot assert of it any present Being,
because thought is an empty form, we have
a conception of what thinking Beings are
through no outward experience, but only by
means of self-consciousness, — i. e. because
we cannot take the “I” in our hands, nor
see it, nor smell it. We therefore know very
well that the ego is a subject, but if we
pass beyond self-consciousness, and say that
it is substance, we go farther than we are
entitled to do. I cannot therefore assign
any reality to the subject.(19)
We here see Kant fall into contradiction,
what with the barbarity of the conceptions
which he refutes, and the barbarity of his
own conceptions which remain behind when
the others are refuted. In the first place,
he is perfectly correct when he maintains
that the ego is not a soul-thing, a dead
permanency which has a sensuous present existence;
indeed, were it to be an ordinary thing,
it would be necessary that it should be capable
of being experienced. But, in the second
place, Kant does not assert the contrary
of this, namely that the ego, as this universal
or as self-thinking, has in itself the true
reality which he requires as an objective
mode. For he does not get clear of the conception
of reality in which reality consists in the
possession of a sensuous present existence;
accordingly, because the ego is given in
no outward experience, it is not real. For
self-consciousness, the ego as such, is not,
according to Kant, reality; it is only our
thought, or in other words he regards self-consciousness
as being itself simply and entirely sensuous.
The form which Kant accordingly bestows on
Being, thing, substance, would seem to indicate
that these categories of the understanding
were too high for the subject, too high to
be capable of being predicated of it. But
really such determinations are too poor and
too mean, for what possesses life is not
a thing, nor can the soul, the spirit, the
ego, be called a thing. Being is the least
or lowest quality that one can assign to
spirit, its abstract, immediate identity
with itself; Being thus no doubt pertains
to spirit, but it must be considered as a
determination scarcely worth applying to
it.
In the second place we have the antinomy,
i. e. the contradiction in Reason’s Idea
of the Unconditioned, an Idea applied to
the world in order to represent it as a complete
summing-up of conditions. That is to say,
in the given phenomena Reason demands the
absolute completeness of the conditions of
their possibility, so far as these constitute
a series, so that the unconditioned is contained
in the world, i. e. the totality of the series.
If now this completeness is expressed as
existing, an antinomy is alone presented,
and Reason is presented only as dialectic:
i. e. in this object there is on every side
a perfect contradiction found.(20) For phenomena
are a finite content, and the world is a
conjunction of the limited; if this content
is now thought by Reason, and therefore subsumed
under the unconditioned and the unlimited,
we have two determinations, finite and infinite,
which contradict each other. Reason demands
a perfectly complete synthesis, an absolute
beginning; but in phenomena we have, on the
contrary, a succession of causes and effects,
which never come to an end. Kant here points
out four contradictions (Kritik der reinen
Vernunft, p. 320), which, however, is not
enough; for in each Notion there are antinomies,
since it is not simple but concrete, and
therefore contains different determinations,
which are direct opposites.
These antinomies in the first place involve
our making the one determination, limitation,
just as valid as non-limitation. “Thesis:
The world has a beginning and an end in time,
and it is limited in regard to space. Antithesis:
It has no beginning and no end in time, and
also no limits in space.” The one, says Kant,
can be proved just as easily as the other;
and indeed he does prove each indirectly,
though his are not “advocate’s proofs.”(21)
The world, as the universe, is the whole;
it is thus a universal idea, and therefore
unlimited. The completion of the synthesis
in progression as regards time and space
is, however, a first beginning of time and
space. If therefore the categories of limited
and unlimited are applied to the world in
order to attain to a knowledge of it, we
fall into contradictions, because the categories
are not applicable to things-in-themselves.
The second antinomy is that atoms, from which
substance is composed, must necessarily be
admitted to exist, therefore simplicity can
be proved; but just as easy is it to prove
incompleteness, the endless process of division.
The thesis is accordingly stated thus: “Every
compound substance consists of simple parts,”
and the antithesis is as follows: “ There
exists nothing simple.”(22) The one is here
the limit, a material self-existence, the
point which is likewise the enclosing surface;
the other is divisibility ad infinitum.
The third antinomy is the opposition between
freedom and necessity. The first is the self-determining,
the point of view pertaining to infinity:
causality according to the laws of freedom
is the only causality. The other is: Determinism
alone is to be found: everything is determined
by means of an external ground or reason.(23)
The fourth antinomy rests on what follows:
On the one hand totality completes itself
in freedom as a first beginning of action,
or in an absolutely necessary Being, as the
cause of the world, so that the process is
interrupted: but there is opposed to that
freedom the necessity of a process according
to conditions of causes and effects, and
to the necessity of a Being is opposed the
consideration that everything is contingent.
The absolute necessity of the conditioned
world is therefore on the one hand maintained
thus: “To the world belongs an absolutely
necessary Being.” The opposite to this is,
“There exists no absolutely necessary Being,
either as part of the world or outside of
the world.”(24)
One of these opposites is just as necessary
as the other, and it is superfluous to carry
this further here. The necessity of these
contradictions is the interesting fact which
Kant (Kritik der reinen Vernunft, p. 324)
has brought to consciousness; in ordinary
metaphysics, however, it is imagined that
one of these contradictions must hold good,
and the other be disproved. The most important
point involved in this assertion of Kant’s
is, however, unintentional on his part. For
he indeed solves these antinomies (Kritik
der reinen Vernunft, pp. 385, 386), but only
in the particular sense of transcendental
idealism, which does not doubt or deny the
existence of external things (supra, p. 442),
but “allows that things are perceived in
space and time” (which is the case, whether
it allows it or not): for transcendental
idealism, however, “space and time in themselves
are not things at all," and therefore
“do not exist apart from our mind;” i. e.
all these determinations of a beginning in
time, and so on, do not really belong to
things, to the implicitude of the phenomenal
world, which has independent existence outside
of our subjective thought. If such determinations
belonged to the world, to God, to free agents,
there would be an objective contradiction;
but this contradiction is not found as absolute,
it pertains only to us. Or, in other words,
this transcendental idealism lets the contradiction
remain, only it is not Being in itself that
is thus contradictory, for the contradiction
has its source in our thought alone. Thus
the same antinomy remains in our mind; and
as it was formerly God who had to take upon
Himself all contradictions, so now it is
self-consciousness. But the Kantian philosophy
does not go on to grapple with the fact that
it is not things that are contradictory,
but self-consciousness itself. Experience
teaches that the ego does not melt away by
reason of these contradictions, but continues
to exist; we need not therefore trouble ourselves
about its contradictions, for it can bear
them. Nevertheless Kant shows here too much
tenderness for things: it would be a pity,
he thinks, if they contradicted themselves.
But that mind, which is far higher, should
be a contradiction — that is not a pity at
all. The contradiction is therefore by no
means solved by Kant; and since mind takes
it upon itself, and contradiction is self-destructive,
mind is in itself all derangement and disorder.
The true solution would be found in the statement
that the categories have no truth in themselves,
and the Unconditioned of Reason just as little,
but that it lies in the unity of both as
concrete, and in that alone.
Kant now goes on to the Idea of God; this
third idea is the Being of Beings, which
the other ideas presupposed. Kant says (Kritik
der reinen Vernunft, pp. 441-452), that according
to the definition of Wolff, God is the most
real of all Beings; the object then comes
to be to prove that God is not only Thought,
but that He is, that He has reality, Being.
This Kant calls the Ideal of Reason, to distinguish
it from the Idea, which is only the sum of
all possibility. The Ideal is thus the Idea
as existent; just as in art we give the name
of ideal to the Idea realized in a sensuous
manner. Here Kant takes into consideration
the proof of the existence of God, as he
asks whether reality can be assigned to this
Ideal.
The ontological proof proceeds from the absolute
Notion, in order from it to argue up to Being.
With Anselm, Descartes, and Spinoza the transition
to Being is thus made; and all of them assume
in so doing the unity of Being and thought.
But Kant says (Kritik der reinen Vernunft,
pp. 458-466): To this Ideal of Reason just
as little reality can be assigned: there
is no transition from the Notion to Being.
“Being is not a real predicate,” like any
other, “a Notion of something which might
be added to the Notion of a thing. A hundred
real dollars do not contain in the very least
more than a hundred possible dollars,” they
are the same content, i. e. the same Notion;
they are also a hundred exactly. The one
is the Notion, or rather the conception,
the other is the object; Being is no new
determination of the Notion, otherwise my
Notion of a hundred real dollars would contain
something different from a hundred real dollars.
But “the object, as real, is not contained
in my Notion alone; or to my Notion the real
hundred dollars are synthetically added.”
Being cannot therefore be derived from the
Notion, because it is not contained therein,
but must be added to it. “We must go out
of the Notion in order to arrive at existence.
With regard to objects of pure thought, there
are no means of coming to know of their existence,
because it had to be known a priori; but
our consciousness of all existence belongs
entirely to experience.” That is to say,
Kant does not attain to the comprehension
of that very synthesis of Notion and Being,
or in other words, he does not comprehend
existence, i. e. he does not attain to the
establishment of it as Notion; existence
remains for him something absolutely different
from a Notion. The content is no doubt the
same for him in what exists and in the Notion:
but since Being is not involved in the Notion,
the attempt to derive the one from the other
is unavailing.
Of course the determination of Being is not
found as positive and ready-made in the Notion;
the Notion is something different from reality
and objectivity. If we therefore abide by
the Notion, we abide by Being as something
different from the Notion, and adhere to
the separation of the two; we then have conception,
and not Being at all. That a hundred possible
dollars are something different from a hundred
actual ones is a reflection of a very popular
nature, so much so that no proposition has
been so well received as the assertion that
no transition can be made from the Notion
to Being; for though I imagine to myself
a hundred dollars, I do not possess them
for all that. But in a like popular fashion
it might be said that one must leave off
imagining, for that is mere conception: i.
e. what is merely imaginary is untrue, the
hundred imaginary dollars are and remain
imaginary. Therefore to believe in them is
a proof of an unsound understanding, and
is of no manner of use; and he is a foolish
fellow who indulges in such fancies and wishes.
One possesses a hundred dollars, when they
are real only; if a man has therefore so
great a desire to possess a hundred dollars,
he must put his hand to work in order to
obtain them: i. e. he must not come to a
standstill at the imagination of them, but
pass out beyond it. This subjective side
is not the ultimate or the absolute; the
true is that which is not merely subjective,
If I possess a hundred dollars, I have them
actually, and at the same time I form a conception
of them to myself. But according to Kant’s
representation we come to a deadlock at the
difference; dualism is ultimate, and each
side has independent validity as an absolute.
Against this false idea of what is to be
absolute and ultimate, the healthy human
understanding is directed; every ordinary
consciousness rises above it, every action
aims at setting aside a subjective conception
and making it into something objective. There
is no man so foolish as that philosophy;
when a man feels hungry, he does not call
up the imagination of food, but sets about
satisfying his hunger. All activity is a
conception which does not yet exist, but
whose subjectivity is abrogated. Moreover
the imaginary hundred dollars become real,
and the real ones imaginary: this is a frequent
experience, this is their fate; it depends
on circumstances entirely outward whether
a hundred dollars become my property or not.
Of course the mere conception is of no good,
if I obstinately hold by it: for I can imagine
what I will, but that does not make it exist.
The only important point is what I conceive
to myself, and then whether I think or comprehend
the subjective and Being; by means of this
each passes into the other. Thought, the
Notion, of necessity implies that the Notion
does not remain subjective; this subjective
is on the contrary abrogated and reveals
itself as objective. Now that unity is expressly
affirmed by Descartes solely in reference
to the Notion of God, for it is just that
which is God; he speaks of no hundred dollars,
as these are not an existence which has a
Notion in itself. That opposition does away
with itself absolutely and entirely, i. e.
the finite passes away; it holds good only
in the philosophy of finitude. If, therefore,
there is not a Notion of existence formed,
we have in it a notionless, sensuous object
of perception; and what is notionless is
certainly not a Notion, — therefore sensation,
handling, are not Notions. Such existence
has of course no Absolute, no real essence:
or such existence has no truth, it is only
a vanishing moment. This useless thrashing
of the empty grainless straw of the common
logic is termed philosophizing: it is like
Issachar the strong ass, which could not
be made to move from the spot where it was
(Gen. xlix. 14). People of this kind say:
We are good for nothing, and because we are
good for nothing, we are good for nothing,
and wish to be good for nothing. But it is
a very false idea of Christian humility and
modesty to desire through one’s abjectness
to attain to excellence; this confession
of one’s own nothingness is really inward
pride and great self-conceit. But for the
honour of true humility we must not remain
in our misery, but raise ourselves above
it by laying hold of the Divine.
The fact to which Kant clings most strongly
(Kritik der reinen Vernunft, p. 467) is this,
that Being cannot be extracted from the Notion.
The result of this is the proposition that
to have the thought of the Infinite is certainly
Reason; but that from the Idea of Reason
is separated determination in general, and
especially the determination which is known
as Being. The Ideas of Reason cannot be proved
from experience, or obtain from it their
verification: if they are defined by means
of categories, contradictions arise. If the
Idea in general is to be defined as existent
only, it is nothing more or less than the
Notion; and the Being of the existent is
still distinguished from it. This result,
however, so highly important with reference
to knowledge of the understanding, Kant does
not, with reference to Reason, carry further
than to say that Reason has on its own account
nothing but formal unity for the methodical
systematization of the knowledge of the understanding.
Abstract thinking is adhered to; it is said
that the understanding can only bring about
order in things; but order is nothing in
and for itself, it is only subjective. There
therefore remains nothing for Reason except
the form of its pure identity with itself,
and this extends no further than to the arranging
of the manifold laws and relations of the
understanding, the classes, kinds and species
which the understanding discovers.(25) I,
as Reason or conception, and the things external
to me, are both absolutely different from
one another; and that, according to Kant,
is the ultimate standpoint. The animal does
not stop at this standpoint, but practically
brings about unity. This is the critique
of theoretical Reason which Kant gives, and
in which he states the a priori and determinate
character of Reason in itself, without bringing
it to the determinateness of individuality.(26)
Mention should still be made of the positive
philosophy or metaphysics, which Kant sets
a priori above objective existence, the content
of the object of experience, nature; we have
here his natural philosophy, which is a demonstration
of the universal conceptions of Nature. But
this is on the one hand very scanty and restricted
in content, containing as it does sundry
general qualities and conceptions of matter
and motion, and with regard to the scientific
side or the a priori, as Kant calls it, it
is likewise altogether unsatisfactory. For
Kant assumes all such conceptions as that
matter has motion and also a power of attraction
and repulsion,(27) instead of demonstrating
their necessity. The “Principles of Natural
Philosophy” have nevertheless been of great
service, inasmuch as at the commencement
of a philosophy of nature, attention was
called to the fact that physical science
employs thought-determinations without further
investigation; and these determinations constitute
the real foundations of its objects. Density,
for instance, is looked on by physical science
as a variable quantity, as a mere quantum
in space: instead of this Kant asserted it
to be a certain degree of occupation of space,
i. e. energy, intensity of action. He demands
accordingly (Metaphysische Anfangsgründe
der Naturwissenschaft, pp. 65-68) a construction
of matter from powers and activities, not
from atoms; and Schelling still holds to
this without getting further. Kant’s work
is an attempt to think, i. e. to demonstrate
the determinations of thought, whose product
consists of such conceptions as matter; he
has attempted to determine the fundamental
Notions and principles of this science, and
has given the first impulse to a so-called
dynamic theory of Nature.
“Religion within pure Reason” is also a demonstration
of dogmas as aspects of Reason, just as in
Nature. Thus in the positive dogmas of religion,
which the Aufklärung (the clearing-up) —
or the Ausklärung (the clearing-out) — made
short work of, Kant called to remembrance
Ideas of Reason, asking what rational and,
first of all, what moral meaning lies in
that which men call dogmas of religion, e.
g. original sin.(28) He is much more reasonable
than the Ausklärung, which thinks it beneath
its dignity to speak of such matters. These
are the principal points in respect to the
theoretical part of Kant’s philosophy.
NOTES:
8. Kant: Kritik der reinen Vernunft,
pp.
25-27.
9. Kant: Kritik der reinen Vernunft,
pp.
29, 30; 34-36.
10. Kant: Kritik der reinen Vernunft,
pp.
30, 31, 41; 12, 13, 150.
11. Kant: Kritik der reinen Vernunft,
pp.
54, 55.
12. Ibidem, pp. 59, 97-104.
13. Kant: Kritik der reinen Vernunft,
pp.
105-110.
14. Kant: Kritik der reinen Vernunft,
pp.
129-132.
15. Ibidem, p. 134.
16. In the lectures of 1825-1826 the
philosophy
of Fichte on its theoretic side is
interpolated.
Here, while its practical side is only
shortly
mentioned after an account is given
of the
Critique of Practical Reason.
17. Kant: Kritik der reinen Vernunft,
pp.
257-259, 264, 267, 268, 273.
18. Kant: Kritik der reinen Vernunft,
pp.
261, 262, 274, 275, 284, 288, 289.
19. Kant: Kritik der reinen Vernunft,
pp.
289-299.
20. Kant: Kritik der reinen Vernunft,
pp.
312-314.
21. Kant: Kritik der reinen Vernunft,
pp.
317, 318, 328, 329, 332.
22. Ibidem, pp. 318, 336, 337.
23. Ibidem, pp. 319, 346, 347.
24. Kant: Kritik der reinen Vernunft,
pp.
319, 354, 355.
25. Kritik der reinen Vernunft, pp.
497,
498.
26. Here there is inserted in the lectures
of 1825-1826 an examination of what
the philosophy
of Jacobi has to say on this point.
27. Kant: Metaphysische Anfangsgründe
der
Naturwissenschaft (third edition, Leipzig,
1800), pp. 1, 27.
28. Kant: Die Religion innerhalb der
Grenzen
der bloosn Vernunft (second edition,
Königsberg,
1794), pp. 20-48.
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