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Chapter II. — Transition Period
C. French Philosophy
We pass onto the French philosophy; the relation
it bears to metaphysics is this, that while
man as a metaphysician stands to himself
in the attitude of a layman or outsider,
French philosophy does away with the lay
or outside position in regard alike to politics,
religion, and philosophy. Two forms have
to be mentioned which are of the greatest
importance in respect to culture — French
philosophy and the Aufklärung. With the English
we saw a certain idealism only: this was
either formal, as the mere general translation
of Being into Being-for-another, i. e., into
perceptibility, or else what is implicit
in this perceptibility, instincts, impulses,
habits, &c. — blind determinate forces;
a return into self-consciousness, which itself
appears as a physical thing. In that first
idealism the whole finitude and extension
of appearances, of sensations, and likewise
of thoughts and determinate fixed conceptions,
remain just what they are in the unphilosophic
consciousness. The scepticism of Hume makes
all that is universal sink into habits and
instincts, i. e., it consists in a more simple
synthesis of the phenomenal world; but these
simpler elements, these instincts, impulses,
and forces, are just as much a fixed present
existence in self-consciousness, unspiritual,
and without movement. The French philosophy
has more life, more movement, more spirit;
it would perhaps be more correct to describe
it as full of life and spirit. It is the
absolute Notion, which revolts against the
whole reigning system of prevalent conceptions
and established ideas, which overthrows all
that has settled into fixity, and acquires
the consciousness of perfect liberty. At
the root of this idealistic activity lies
the certainty that whatever is, whatever
counts for anything in itself, is all a matter
of self-consciousness; and as to Notions
(individual and isolated existences ruling
actual self-consciousness), such as the Notions
of good and evil, of power and riches, and
the fixed conceptions regarding faith in
God and His relation to the world, His mode
of government and, further, the duties of
self-consciousness towards Him — that all
these are not truths in themselves, having
validity beyond the bounds of self-consciousness.
All these forms, the real implicitude of
the actual world and also of the supersensuous
world, are therefore set aside in this spirit
conscious of itself. It does not trouble
itself seriously about those who admit the
validity of these conceptions just as they
are, and accept them as true, respecting
them as independent and free apart from self-consciousness,
but it speaks of such conceptions with intelligence
and spirit, that is to say, it asserts that
self-consciousness by its activity is the
first to make anything of them, and to make
that a something very different from what
they profess to be; for the self-conscious
spirit only intellectual relations, these
processes of formation and movement by means
of its self-consciousness, possess validity
and interest. This is the character of the
Notion in its actuality; what has reality
for this all-perceiving and all-comprehending
consciousness is held to be valid.
We must now consider what form existence
takes for this absolutely comprehending self-
consciousness. In the first place this Notion
is fixed as the negative movement of the
Notion only; the positive and simple, or
existence, falls outside of this movement.
There remains to the Notion no distinction,
no content; for all determinate content is
lost in that negativity. This empty existence
is for us pure thought generally, what the
French call être suprême, or if represented
objectively as existent, and as in opposition
to consciousness, it is matter. Absolute
Being is therefore determined as matter,
as empty objectivity, through a Notion which
destroys all content and determination, and
has as its object this universal alone. It
is a Notion which acts only destructively,
and does not again construct itself out of
this matter or pure thought or pure substantiality.
We here see so-called materialism and atheism
freely emerge, as the necessary result of
the pure comprehending self-consciousness.
From one point of view there perishes in
this negative movement all determination
which represents spirit as something beyond
self-consciousness, and more especially all
determinations within the spirit, and also
those which express it as spirit, indeed
all the conceptions formed of it by faith,
for which it has validity as an existent
self-consciousness beyond self-consciousness
— in short, all that is traditional or imposed
by authority. There remains only a present,
actual Being, for self-consciousness recognizes
implicit existence only in the form which
it has for self-consciousness, and in which
it is actually known to itself; in matter,
and matter as actively extending and realizing
itself in multiplicity, i. e., as nature.
In the present I am conscious to myself of
my reality, and consequently self-consciousness
finds itself as matter, finds the soul to
be material, and conceptions to be movements
and changes in the inner organ of the brain,
which result from external impressions on
the senses. Thought is therefore a mode of
the existence of matter. The One Substance
of Spinoza, to which French materialism as
naturalism is parallel, really finds its
accomplishment here in this object as in
all respects the ultimate; but while in Spinoza
this category is a possession which we find
ready to hand, here it appears as the result
of the abstraction of the understanding proceeding
from empiricism.
The other form of the Aufklärung is, on the
contrary, when absolute Being is set forth
as something beyond self-consciousness, so
that of itself, of its implicit Being, nothing
whatever can be known. It bears the empty
name of God. For though God may be determined
in any way whatever, all these determinations
fall away; He is, like x, the altogether
unknown quantity. This view is not therefore
to be termed atheism, in the first place
because it still employs the empty, meaningless
name, and in the second place because it
expresses the necessary relations of self-consciousness,
duties, &c., not as necessary in an absolute
sense, but as necessary through relation
to another, namely to the unknown — although
there can be no positive relation to an unknown
except by abrogating the self as particular.
Yet it is not matter, because this simple
and empty something is negatively defined
as non-existent for self-consciousness. This
all comes to the same thing, however, for
matter is the universal, and is Being-for-self
represented as abrogated. But the true reflection
on that unknown is this, that it exists for
self-consciousness simply as a negative of
the same, i. e., as matter, reality, the
present; it is this negative for me, this
is its Notion. The difference distinguishing
this from what appears to be in its entirety
something “other,” and in which any one side
is not permitted to say that what it thinks
is such is that particular thing, is the
difference which rests on this last abstraction.
Since then the Notion is present only in
its negative form, positive extension remains
without a Notion; it has the form of nature,
of an existent, both in the physical and
in the moral sphere. The knowledge of nature
remains the ordinary, scientifically unspeculative
knowledge, and as to its essence, in so far
as it claims to be philosophy, it is a general
way of speaking that plays with the words,
“forces, relations, manifold connections,”
but arrives at nothing definite. Similarly,
in the spiritual sphere, it is so far true
that the metaphysic of the spirit is of such
a nature that it is nothing more nor less
than a particular organization by means of
which the powers which are termed sensation,
perception, &c., come into existence;
but this is a wearisome way of talking, which
can make nothing intelligible, which accepts
appearances and perceptions and reasons about
them, but none the less reduces their implicit
existence to certain determinate forces,
of the inward nature of which we know nothing
further. The determination and knowledge
of the moral sphere has similarly for its
object to bring man back to his so-called
natural promptings; its essence has the form
of a natural impulse, and this natural impulse
is termed self-love, selfishness, or benevolence.
It is required that man should live in conformity
with nature; but this nature does not reach
further than general expressions and descriptions,
such as the state of nature we find depicted
by Rousseau. What is called the metaphysic
of ordinary conceptions is the empiricism
of Locke, which seeks to show their origin,
to be in consciousness, in as far as it is
individual consciousness; which, when born
into the world, emerges out of unconsciousness
in order to acquire knowledge as sensuous
consciousness. This external origin they
confound with the Becoming and Notion of
the matter in point. If one were to ask vaguely
what is the origin and genesis of water,
and the answer were to be given that it comes
from the mountains or from rain, this would
be a reply in the spirit of the above philosophy.
In short, it is only the negative aspect
that is interesting, and as for this positive
French philosophy, it is out of the question.
But even the negative side of it belongs
properly to culture mainly, with which we
have here nothing to do, and the Aufklärung
likewise belongs to the same. In the French
philosophic writings, which in this respect
are of importance, what is worthy of admiration
is the astonishing energy and force of the
Notion as directed against existence, against
faith, against all the power of authority
that had held sway for thousands of years.
On the one hand we cannot help remarking
the feeling of utter rebellion against the
whole state of affairs at present prevailing,
a state which is alien to self-consciousness,
which would fain dispense with it, and in
which self-consciousness does not find itself;
there is a certainty of the truth of reason,
which challenges the whole intellectual world
as it stands aloof, and is confident of destroying
it. French atheism, materialism, or naturalism
has overcome all prejudices, and has been
victorious over the senseless hypotheses
and assumptions of the positive element in
religion, which is associated with habits,
manners, opinions, determinations as to law
and morality and civil institutions. With
the healthy human understanding and earnestness
of spirit, and not with frivolous declamations,
it has rebelled against the condition of
the world as legally established, against
the constitution of the state, the administration
of justice, the mode of government, political
authority, and likewise against art.
Contrasting with this barren content there
is the other and fertile side. The positive
is in its turn constituted by so-called immediately
enlightening truths of the healthy human
understanding, which contains nothing except
this truth and the claim to find itself,
and beyond this form does not pass. But in
so doing there arises the endeavour to grasp
the absolute as something present, and at
the same time as an object of thought and
as absolute unity: an endeavour which, as
it implies denial of the conception of design
both in the natural and in the spiritual
sphere — the former involving the idea of
life, and the latter that of spirit and freedom
— only reaches to the abstraction of a nature
undetermined in itself, to sensation, mechanism,
self-seeking, and utility. It is this then
that we shall have to make evident in the
positive side of French philosophy. In their
political constitutions the French have,
it is true, started from abstractions, but
they have done so as from universal thoughts,
which are the negative of reality; the English,
on the other hand, proceed from concrete
reality, from the unwieldy structure of their
constitution; just as their writers even
have not attained to universal principles.
What Luther began in the heart only and in
the feelings — the freedom of spirit which,
unconscious of its simple root, does not
comprehend itself, and yet is the very universal
itself, for which all content disappears
in the thought, that fills itself with itself
— these universal determinations and thoughts
the French asserted and steadfastly adhered
to: they are universal principles, in the
form of the conviction of the individual
in himself. Freedom becomes the condition
of the world, connects itself with the world's
history and forms epochs in the same; it
is the concrete freedom of the spirit, a
concrete universality; fundamental principles
as regards the concrete now take the place
of the abstract metaphysic of Descartes.
Among the Germans we find mere chatter; they
would have liked to offer explanations also,
but all they have to give is in the form
of miserable phenomena and individualism.
The French, from their starting-point of
the thought of universality, and the German
liberty of conscience starting from the conscience
which teaches us to “Prove all things,” to
“hold fast that which is good,” have, however,
joined hands with one another, or they follow
the same path. Only the French, as though
they were without conscience, have made short
work of everything, and have systematically
adhered to a definite thought — the physiocratic
system; while the Germans wish to leave themselves
a free retreat, and examine from the standpoint
of conscience whether a certain course is
permissible. The French warred against the
speculative Notion with the spirit, the Germans
did so with the understanding. We find in
the French a deep all-embracing philosophic
need, different from anything in the English
and Scotch and even in the Germans, and full
of vitality: it is a universal concrete view
of all that exists, with entire independence
both of all authority and of all abstract
metaphysics. The method employed is that
of development from perception, from the
heart; it is a comprehensive view of the
entire matter, which keeps the whole ever
in sight, and seeks to uphold and attain
to it.
This healthy human understanding, this sound
reason, with its content taken from the human
breast, from natural feeling, has directed
itself against the religious side of things
in various moments: on the one hand and first
of all, as French philosophy, it did so against
the Catholic religion, the fetters of superstition
and of the hierarchy; on the other hand,
in less pronounced form, as the German “illumination,”
against the Protestant religion, in as far
as it has a content which it has derived
from revelation, from ecclesiastical authority
in general. On the one hand the form of authority
in general was challenged, and on the other
hand its matter. The content can be easily
enough disposed of by this form of thought,
which is not what we understand by reason,
but which must be termed understanding; it
is easy for the understanding to show objections
to the ultimate principles of what can be
comprehended only by means of speculation.
The understanding has thus tried the content
of religion by its standard, and has condemned
it; the understanding proceeds in the same
way against a concrete philosophy. What of
religion has in many theologies been very
commonly left remaining is what is termed
theism, faith in general; this is the same
content which is found also in Mohammedanism.
But along with this attack upon religion
on the part of the reasoning understanding
there has been also a movement towards materialism,
atheism and naturalism. It is true that we
should not make the charge of atheism lightly,
for it is a very common occurrence that an
individual whose ideas about God differ from
those of other people is charged with lack
of religion, or even with atheism. But here
it really is the case that this philosophy
has developed into atheism, and has defined
matter, nature, &c., as that which is
to be taken as the ultimate, the active,
and the efficient. Some Frenchmen, Rousseau
for instance, are not, however, to be included
with the rest; one of this author's works,
“The Confession of Faith of a Vicar,” (1)
contains the very same theism which is found
in German theologians. Thus French metaphysics
finds a parallel not only in Spinoza (supra,
p. 382) but also in the German metaphysics
of Wolff. Other Frenchmen have confessedly
gone over to naturalism; among them is specially
to be mentioned Mirabaud, to whom the Système
de la Nature is attributed.
In what has been termed French philosophy,
represented by Voltaire, Montesquieu, Rousseau,
d'Alembert, Diderot, and in what subsequently
appeared in Germany as the Aufklärung, and
has been also stigmatized as atheism, we
may now distinguish three aspects, first,
the negative side, to which most exception
has been taken; secondly, the positive side;
thirdly, the philosophical, metaphysical
side.
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1. THE NEGATIVE ASPECT. Justice must be done
even to this negative side, as to everything
else; what is substantial in it is the attack
of the reasoning instinct against a condition
of degeneracy, I may even say of utter and
universal falsehood; for instance, against
the positive side of a religion that has
become wooden and lifeless. What we call
religion is firm faith, conviction that there
is a God; if this is faith in the doctrines
of Christianity, it is more or less abstracted
from. But in this attack against religion
we have to think of something quite different
from the above; in what we find here, the
positive of religion is the negative of reason.
If we would understand the feeling of indignation
to which these writers give utterance, we
must keep before our eyes the state of religion
in those days, with its might and magnificence,
the corruption of its manners, its avarice,
its ambition, its luxury, for which nevertheless
reverence was claimed — a state of contradiction
present and existent. We perceive into what
a frightful condition of formalism and deadness
positive religion had sunk, as had the bonds
of society as well, the means employed for
the administration of justice, the power
of the state. This French philosophy also
attacked the state; it assailed prejudices
and superstition, especially the depravity
of civic life, of court manners and of Government
officials; it laid hold of and brought to
light the evil, the ridiculous, the base,
and exposed the whole tissue of hypocrisy
and unjust power to the derision, the contempt
and the hatred of the world at large, and
thus brought men's minds and hearts into
a state of indifference to the idols of the
world and indignation against them. Old institutions,
which in the sense of self-conscious freedom
and humanity that had developed, no longer
found a place, and which had formerly been
founded and upheld by mutual good feeling
and the obtuseness of a consciousness unconscious
of self, institutions which were no longer
in harmony with the spirit that had established
them, and now, in consequence of the advance
that had been made in scientific culture,
were bound to make good to reason their claim
to be sacred and just, — this was the formalism
that those philosophers overthrew. In making
their attacks, they wrote sometimes with
reasoned argument, sometimes satirically,
sometimes in the language of plain common-sense,
and they did not wage war on what we call
religion; that, was left quite unharmed,
and its claims were urged with words of choicest
eloquence. Those who enforced these views
were therefore agents of destruction against
that alone which was in itself already destroyed.
We place it to our credit when we reproach
the French for their attacks upon religion
and on the state. We must represent to ourselves
the horrible state of society, the misery
and degradation in France, in order to appreciate
the services that these writers rendered.
Hypocrisy and cant, imbecility of mind and
the tyranny which sees itself robbed of its
prey, may say that attacks were made on religion,
on the state, and on manners. But what a
religion! Not the religion that Luther purified,
but the most wretched superstition, priestly
domination, stupidity, degradation of mind,
and more especially the squandering of riches
and the revelling in temporal possessions
in the midst of public misery. And what a
state! The blindest tyranny of ministers
and their mistresses, wives and chamberlains
so that a vast army of petty tyrants and
idlers looked upon it as a right divinely
given them to plunder the revenues of the
state and lay hands upon the product of the
nation's sweat. The shamelessness, the dishonesty
were past belief, and morals were simply
in keeping with the corruptness of the institutions.
We see the law defied by individuals in respect
to civil and political life; we see it likewise
set at nought in respect to conscience and
thought.
In regard to practical politics, the writers
in question never even thought of a revolution,
but desired and demanded reforms alone, and
that these should be subjective mainly; they
called on the Government to sweep away abuses,
and appoint honourable men as ministers.
The positive recommendations made by them
as to the course to be pursued were, for
example, that the royal children should receive
a good upbringing, that princes should be
of frugal habits, &c. The French Revolution
was forced on by the stiff-necked obstinacy
of prejudices, by haughtiness, utter want
of thought, and avarice. The philosophers
of whom we are speaking were able to give
only a general idea of what ought to be done;
they could not indicate the mode in which
the reforms were to be carried out. It was
the Government's business to make arrangements
and carry out reforms in concrete shape;
but it did not perceive this. What the philosophers
brought forward and maintained as a remedy
for this horrible state of disorder was,
speaking generally, that men should no longer
be in the position of laymen, either with
regard to religion or to law; so that in
religious matters there should not be a hierarchy,
a limited and selected number of priests,
and in the same way that there should not
be in legal matters an exclusive caste and
society (not even a class of professional
lawyers), in whom should reside, and to whom
should be restricted, the knowledge of what
is eternal, divine, true, and right, and
by whom other men should be commanded and
directed; but that human reason should have
the right of giving its assent and its opinion.
To treat barbarians as laymen is quite as
it should be — barbarians are nothing but
laymen; but to treat thinking men as laymen
is very hard. This great claim made by man
to subjective freedom, perception and conviction,
the philosophers in question contended for
heroically and with splendid genius, with
warmth and fire, with spirit and courage,
maintaining that a man's own self, the human
spirit, is the source from which is derived
all that is to be respected by him. There
thus manifests itself in them the fanaticism
of abstract thought. We Germans were passive
at first with regard to the existing state
of affairs, we endured it; in the second
place, when that state of affairs was overthrown,
we were just as passive: it was overthrown
by the efforts of others, we let it be taken
away from us, we suffered it all to happen.
In Germany, Frederick II. allied himself
with this culture, a rare example in those
days. French court manners, operas, gardens,
dresses, were widely adopted in Germany,
but not French philosophy; yet in the form
of wit and jest much of it found its way
into this upper world, and much that was
evil and barbarous was driven away. Frederick
II., without having been brought up on melancholy
psalms, without having had to learn one or
two of them every day by heart, without the
barbarous metaphysics and logic of Wolff
(for what did he find to admire in Germany
except Gellert?), was well acquainted with
the great, although formal and abstract principles
of religion and the state, and governed in
accordance therewith, as far as circumstances
allowed. Nothing else was at that time required
in his nation; one cannot ask that he should
have reformed and revolutionised it, since
not a single person yet demanded representative
government and the publicity of courts of
justice. He introduced what there was need
of, religious tolerance, legislation, improvements
in the administration of justice, economy
in the revenues of state; of the wretched
German law there remained no longer in his
states even the merest phantom. He showed
what was the object and purpose of the state,
and at the same time cast down all privileges,
the private rights which pertained to Germans,
and arbitrary statute laws. It is foolish
when cant and German pseudo-patriotism pounce
down upon him now, and try to disparage the
greatness of a man whose influence was so
enormous, and would even detract from his
fame by a charge of vanity and wickedness.
What German patriotism aims at should be
reasonable.
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2. THE POSITIVE ASPECT. The affirmative content
of this philosophy certainly does not satisfy
the requirements of profundity. A leading
characteristic of its teaching, which is
found also with the Scottish philosophers
and with ourselves, is the assumption of
primitive feelings of justice which man has
in himself, as for example benevolence and
social instincts which should be cultivated.
The positive source of knowledge and of justice
is placed in human reason and the common
consciousness of mankind, in the healthy
human reason, and not in the form of the
Notion. It is certainly wonderful to find
truths expressed in the form of universal
thoughts, respecting which it is of infinite
importance that they should be assumptions
present in the human mind: that man has in
his heart the feeling of right, of love to
his fellow-creatures: that religion and faith
are not matters of compulsion; that merit,
talent, virtue are the true nobility, &c.
An important question, especially among the
Germans, was what is the end and character
of man, by which was meant the nature of
his mind and spirit, and certainly, as far
as the spiritual is concerned, it is to this
point that we must return. But in order to
find the nature of spirit, to discover what
this determination is, a return was made
to perception, observation, experience, to
the existence of certain impulses. These
are certainly determinations in ourselves,
but we have not known them in their necessity.
Such an impulse is besides taken as natural,
and thus it is here indeterminate in itself,
it has its limitation only as a moment of
the whole. In regard to knowledge, very abstract
thoughts are to be found — though of a truth
they are quite as good as ours, and more
ingenious — which according to their content
ought to be concrete, and also were so. But
so superficially were they comprehended that
they soon showed themselves far from sufficient
for what had to be derived from them. They
said, for instance, that Nature is a whole,
that all is determined by laws, through a
combination of different movements, through
a chain of causes and effects, and so on;
the various properties, materials, connections
of things bring everything to pass. Those
are general phrases, with which one can fill
whole books.
a. SYSTÈME DE LA NATURE.
To this philosophy belongs the Système de
la Nature, the leading work on the subject,
written in Paris by a German, Baron von Hollbach,
who was the central figure of all those philosophers.
Montesquieu, d'Alembert, Rousseau, were for
a time in his circle; however much these
men were moved to indignation at the existing
state of things, they were yet in other respects
very different from one another. The Système
de la Nature may very easily be found tiresome
to read, because it treats discursively of
general conceptions, which are often repeated;
it is not a French book, for vivacity is
lacking and the mode of presentation is dull.
The great Whole of Nature (le grand tout
de la nature) is the ultimate: “The universe
displays nothing but an immense collection
of matter and motion” (as with Descartes),
“an unbroken chain of causes and effects,
of which causes some directly affect our
senses, while others are unknown to us, because
their effects, which we perceive, are too
remote from their causes. The different qualities
of these materials, their manifold connections,
and the effects which result therefrom, constitute
essences for us. From the diversity of these
essences arise the different orders, species,
systems, under which things fall, and whose
sum total, the great whole, is what we call
Nature.”(2) It is like what Aristotle (vide
Vol. I. p. 241) says of Xenophanes, that
he gazed into the blue, i. e. into Being.
According to Hollbach all is movement, matter
moves itself: beer ferments, the soul is
moved by its passions.(3) “The manifold variety
of natural phenomena, and their incessant
rise and disappearance, have their sole ground
in the variety of motions and of their material.”
Through different combinations and modifications,
through a different arrangement, another
thing is originated. “Material substances
have either a tendency to combine with one
another, or else they are incapable of so
combining. Upon this are based by physical
scientists the forces of attraction and repulsion,
sympathy and antipathy, affinity and relation;
and the moralists base thereon hatred and
love, friendship and enmity.” Spirit, the
incorporeal, contradicts or opposes itself
to motion, to a change of the relations of
a body in space.(4)
b. ROBINET.
Another work of importance is the still more
“dangerous” treatise, De la Nature, by Robinet.
In it there reigns quite a different and
a deeper spirit; one is frequently struck
by the depth of earnestness which the writer
displays. He begins thus: “There is a God,
i. e., a cause of the phenomena of that Whole
which we call Nature. Who is God? We know
not, and we are so constituted that we can
never know in what order of things we have
been placed. We cannot know God perfectly,
because the means of doing so will always
be lacking to us. We too might write over
the doors of our temples the words which
were to be read upon the altar which the
Areopagite raised, 'To the unknown God.'”
The very same thing is said nowadays: there
can be no transition from the finite to the
infinite. “The order which reigns in the
universe is just as little the visible type
of His wisdom, as our weak mind is the image
of His intelligence.” But this First Cause,
God, is according to Robinet a creative God,
He has brought Nature into existence; so
that for him the only possible knowledge
is that of Nature. “There is only One Cause.
The eternal Cause, who so to speak had sown
(engrainé) events one in the other, in order
that they might without fail follow one upon
another as He chose, in the beginning set
in motion the endless chain of things. Through
this permanent impression the Universe goes
on living, moving and perpetuating itself.
From the unity of cause there follows the
unity of activity, for even it does not appear
as something to be more or less admitted.
By virtue of this single act all things come
to pass. Since man has made Nature his study,
he has found no isolated phenomenon, and
no independent truth, because there are not
and cannot be such. The whole sustains itself
through the mutual correspondence of its
parts.”(5) The activity of Nature is one,
as God is One.
This activity, more particularly regarded,
signifies that germs unfold themselves in
everything: everywhere there are organic
Beings which produce themselves; nothing
is isolated, everything is combined and connected
and in harmony. Robinet here goes through
the plants, the animals, and also the metals,
the elements, air, fire, water, &c.;
and seeks from them to demonstrate the existence
of the germ in whatever has life, and also
how metals are organised in themselves. “The
example of the polypus is convincing as to
the animal nature (animalité) of the smallest
portions of organised matter; for the polypus
is a group of associated polypi, each of
which is as much a true polypus as the first.
It stands proved that from the same point
of view the living consists only of the living,
the animals of minute animals, every animal
in particular of minute animals of the same
kind, a dog of dog-germs, man of human germs.”
In proof of this Robinet states in a “Recapitulation”
that “animal sperm swarms with spermatic
animalcules.” Since he then connects every
propagation properly so-called with the co-operation
of both sexes, he alleges that every individual
is inwardly or also in the external organs
a hermaphrodite. Of the minerals he says:
“Are we not compelled to regard as organic
bodies all those in which we meet with an
inward structure such as this? It presupposes
throughout a seed, seed-granules, germs,
of which they are the development.” In the
same way the air must have its germ, which
does not come to reality until it is nourished
by water, fire, &c. “The air, as principle,
is only the germ of the air; as it impregnates
or saturates itself in varying degrees with
water and fire, it will gradually pass through
different stages of growth: it will become
first embryo, then perfect air.”(6) Robinet
gives the name of germ to the simple form
in itself, the substantial form, the Notion.
Although he seeks to prove this too much
from the sensuous side, he yet proceeds from
principles in themselves concrete, from the
form in itself.
He speaks also of the evil and good in the
world. The result of his observation is that
good and evil balance each other; this equilibrium
constitutes the beauty of the world. In order
to refute the assertion that there is more
good than evil in the world, he says that
everything to which we reduce the good consists
only in an enjoyment, a pleasure, a satisfaction;
but this must be preceded by a want, a lack,
a pain, the removal of which constitutes
satisfaction.(7) This is not only a correct
thought empirically, but it also hints at
the deeper idea that there is no activity
except through contradiction.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. IDEA OF A CONCRETE UNIVERSAL UNITY. The
result of the French philosophy is that it
insisted on maintaining a general unity,
not abstract, but concrete. Thus Robinet
now propounded the theory of a universal
organic life, and a uniform mode of origination;
this concrete system he called Nature, over
which God was set, but as the unknowable;
all predicates which could be expressed of
Him contained something inapplicable. We
must admit that grand conceptions of concrete
unity are to be found here, as opposed to
the abstract metaphysical determinations
of the understanding, e. g., the fruitfulness
of Nature. But, on the other hand, the point
of most importance with these philosophers
is that what is to be accepted as valid must
have presence, and that man in all knowledge
must be himself the knower; for, as we may
see, those philosophers made war on all external
authority of state and church, and in particular
on abstract thought which has no present
meaning in us. Two determinations found in
all philosophy are the concretion of the
Idea and the presence of the spirit in the
same; my content must at the same time be
something concrete, present. This concrete
was termed Reason, and for it the more noble
of those men contended with the greatest
enthusiasm and warmth. Thought was raised
like a standard among the nations, liberty
of conviction and of conscience in me. They
said to mankind, “In this sign thou shalt
conquer,” for they had before their eyes
what had been done in the name of the cross
alone, what had been made a matter of faith
and law and religion — they saw how the sign
of the cross had been degraded. For in the
sign of the cross lying and deceit had been
victorious, under this seal institutions
had become fossilised, and had sunk into
all manner of degradation, so that this sign
came to be represented as the epitome and
root of all evil. Thus in another form they
completed the Reformation that Luther began.
This concrete had manifold forms; social
instincts in the practical sphere, laws of
nature in the theoretical. There is present
the absolute impulse to find a compass immanent
in themselves, i. e. in the human mind. For
the human mind it is imperative to have a
fixed point such as this, if, indeed, it
is to be within itself, if it is to be free
in its own world at least. But this striving
after really present vitality took forms
which as by-paths were themselves one-sided.
In this striving after unity, which was,
however, concrete unity, the further varieties
of the content likewise lie.
On the theoretic side of their philosophy,
therefore, the French proceeded to materialism
or naturalism, because the requirements of
the understanding, as abstract thought, which
from a firmly fixed principle allows the
most monstrous consequences to be drawn,
drove them to set up one principle as ultimate,
and that a principle which had at the same
time to be present and to lie quite close
to experience. Hence they accept sensation
and matter as the only truth, to which must
be reduced all thought, all morality, as
a mere modification of sensation. The unities
which the French propounded were in this
way one-sided.
a. OPPOSITION OF SENSATION AND THOUGHT.
To this one-sidedness belongs the opposition
between sentir and penser, or else, if you
like, their identity, making the latter only
a result of the former; there is not, however,
any speculative reconciliation of this opposition
in God, such as we find in Spinoza and Malebranche.
This reduction of all thought to sensation,
which in certain respects took place with
Locke, becomes a widely extended theory.
Robinet (De la Nature, T. I. P. IV. chap.
iii. pp. 257-259) lights also on this opposition,
beyond which he does not get, that mind and
body are not separate, but that the manner
in which they are united is inexplicable.
The Système de la Nature (T. I. chap. x.
p. 177) is marked by an especially plain
reduction of thought to sensation. The leading
thought is this: “Abstract thoughts are only
modes in which our inmost organ views its
own modifications. The words goodness, beauty,
order, intelligence, virtue, &c., have
no meaning for us if we do not refer and
apply them to objects which our senses have
shown to be capable of these qualities, or
to modes of being and acting which are known
to us.” Thus even psychology passed into
materialism, as for instance we may find
in La Mettrie's work L'homme Machine: All
thought and all conception have meaning only
if they are apprehended as material; matter
alone exists.
b. MONTESQUIEU.
Other great writers have opposed to the above
the feeling in the breast, the instinct of
self-preservation, benevolent dispositions
towards others, the impulse to fellowship,
which last Puffendorf also made the foundation
of his system of law (supra, p. 321). From
this point of view much that is excellent
has been said. Thus Montesquieu, in his charming
book, L'Esprit des Lois, of which Voltaire
said it was an esprit sur les lois, regarded
the nations from this important point of
view, that their constitution, their religion,
in short, everything that is to be found
in a state, constitutes a totality.
c. HELVETIUS.
This reduction of thought to feeling in the
case of Helvetius takes the form that if
in man as a moral being a single principle
is sought, this ought to be called self-love,
and he endeavoured to demonstrate by ingenious
analysis that whatever we term virtue, all
activity and law and right, has as its foundation
nothing but self-love or selfishness, and
is resolvable thereinto.(8) This principle
is one-sided, although the “I myself” is
an essential moment. What I will, the noblest,
the holiest, is my aim; I must take part
in it, I must agree to it, I must approve
of it. With all self-sacrifice there is always
conjoined some satisfaction, some finding
of self; this element of self, subjective
liberty, must always be present. If this
is taken in a one-sided sense, there may
be consequences drawn from it which overthrow
all that is sacred; but it is found in equal
degree in a morality as noble as any possibly
can be.
d. ROUSSEAU.
In connection with the practical side of
things this particular must also be noted,
that when the feeling of right, the concrete
practical mind, and, speaking generally,
humanity and happiness were made the principle,
this principle, universally conceived, had
certainly the form of thought; but in the
case of such concrete content derived from
our impulse or inward intuition, even though
that content were religious, the thought
itself was not the content. But now this
further phase appeared, that pure thought
was set up as the principle and content,
even if again there was lacking to this content
the true consciousness of its peculiar form
for it was not recognised that this principle
was thought. We see it emerge in the sphere
of will, of the practical, of the just, and
so apprehended that the inner-most principle
of man, his unity with himself, is set forth
as fundamental and brought into consciousness,
so that man in himself acquired an infinite
strength. It is this that Rousseau from one
point of view said about the state. He investigated
its absolute justification, and inquired
as to its foundation. The right of ruling
and associating, of the relation of order,
of governing and being governed, he apprehends
from his own point of view, so that it is
made to rest historically on power, compulsion,
conquest, private property, &c.(9)
Rousseau makes free-will the principle of
this justification, and without reference
to the positive right of states he made answer
to the above question (chap. iv. p. 12),
that man has free-will, because “liberty
is the distinguishing feature of man. To
renounce his liberty signifies to renounce
his manhood. Not to be free is therefore
a renunciation of a man's rights as a human
being, and even of his duties.” The slave
has neither rights nor duties. Rousseau therefore
says (chap. vi. p. 21): “The fundamental
task is to find a form of association which
will shield and protect with the power of
the whole commonwealth combined the person
and property of every one of its members,
and in which each individual, while joining
this association, obeys himself only, and
thus remains as free as before. The solution
is given by the Social Contract;” this is
the association of which each is a member
by his own will. These principles, thus abstractly
stated, we must allow to be correct, yet
the ambiguity in them soon begins to be felt.
Man is free, this is certainly the substantial
nature of man; and not only is this liberty
not relinquished in the state, but it is
actually in the state that it is first realised.
The freedom of nature, the gift of freedom,
is not anything real; for the state is the
first realisation of freedom.
The misunderstanding as to the universal
will proceeds from this, that the Notion
of freedom must not be taken in the sense
of the arbitrary caprice of an individual,
but in the sense of the rational will, of
the will in and for itself. The universal
will is not to be looked on as compounded
of definitively individual wills, so that
these remain absolute; otherwise the saying
would be correct: “Where the minority must
obey the majority, there is no freedom.”
The universal will must really be the rational
will, even if we are not conscious of the
fact; the state is therefore not an association
which is decreed by the arbitrary will of
individuals. The wrong apprehension of these
principles does not concern us. What does
concern us is this, that thereby there should
come into consciousness as content the sense
that man has liberty in his spirit as the
altogether absolute, that free-will is the
Notion of man. Freedom is just thought itself;
he who casts thought aside and speaks of
freedom knows not what he is talking of.
The unity of thought with itself is freedom,
the free will. Thought, as volition merely,
is the impulse to abrogate one's subjectivity,
the relation to present existence, the realising
of oneself, since in that I am endeavouring
to place myself as existent on an equality
with myself as thinking. It is only as having
the power of thinking that the will is free.
The principle of freedom emerged in Rousseau,
and gave to man, who apprehends himself as
infinite, this infinite strength. This furnishes
the transition to the Kantian philosophy,
which, theoretically considered, made this
principle its foundation; knowledge aimed
at freedom, and at a concrete content which
it possesses in consciousness.
NOTES:
1. Emile ou de l'éducation, T. II.
(Paris,
1813, él. stéréotype), Book IV., Profession
de foi du vicaire savoyard, p. 215
seq.
2. Buhle: Lehrbuch der Geschichte der
Philosophie,
Pt. VIII. pp. 62, 63: Système de la
Nature
par Mirabaud (Londres, 1770), T. I.
chap.
i. p. 10; chap. ii. p 28.
3. Buhle: Lehrbuch der Geschichte der
Philosophie,
Pt. VIII. pp. 63, 64. Système de la
Nature,
T. I. chap. ii. pp. 18, 16, 21, et
15.
4. Buhle, ibidem, pp. 64, 65, 70; Système
de la Nature, T. I. chap. ii, pp. 30,
31;
chap. iii, pp. 39, 40; chap. iv. pp.
45,
46; chap. vii, pp. 90, 91.
5. Robinet: De la Nature (Troisième
édition,
Amsterdam, 1766), T. I. P. I. chap.
iii.
iv. pp. 16, 17.
6. Robinet: De la Nature, T. I. P.
II. chap.
ii. pp. 156, 157; chap. vii. pp. 166,
168;
chap. ix.-xi.; chap. xv. pp. 202, 203;
chap.
xix. p. 217.
7. Robinet: De la Nature, T. I. P.
I. chap.
xxviii. p. 138; chap. xiii. p. 70.
8. Helvetius: De l'esprit (Oeuvres
complètes,
T. II. Deux-Ponts, 1784), T. I. Discours
II. chap. i. pp. 62-64; chap. ii. pp.
65,
68, 69; chap. iv. p. 90; chap. v. p.
91;
chap. viii. p. 114; chap. xxiv. pp.
256,
257.
9. Rousseau: Du contrat social (Lyon, 1790),
Book I. chap. iii. pp. 8, 9; chap. iv. pp.
10, 11, 13-16.
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