|
The philosophy of Wolff is directly connected
with that of Leibnitz, for really it is a
pedantic systematization of the latter, for
which reason it is likewise called the Leibnitz-Wolffian
system of philosophy. Wolff attained to great
distinction in mathematics and made himself
famous by his philosophy as well; the latter
was for long predominant in Germany. In Wolff,
as a teacher dealing with the understanding,
we find a systematic exposition of the philosophic
element present in human conceptions as a
whole. As regards his connection with German
culture generally, great and immortal praise
is more especially due to him; before all
others he may be termed the teacher of the
Germans. We may indeed say that Wolff was
the first to naturalize philosophy in Germany.
Tschirnhausen and Thomasius likewise participated
in this honour, for the special reason that
they wrote upon Philosophy in the German
language. In regard to the matter of the
philosophy of Tschirnhausen and Thomasius
we have not much to say; it is so-called
healthy reason - there is in it the superficial
character and the empty universality always
to be found where a beginning is made with
thought. In this case the universality of
thought satisfies us because every thing
is present there, just as it is present in
a moral maxim which has, however, no determinate
content in its universality. Wolff, then,
was the first to make, not exactly Philosophy,
but thoughts in the form of thought, into
a general possession, and he substituted
this in Germany for mere talk originating
from feeling, from sensuous perception, and
from the ordinary conception.
This is most important from the point of
view of culture, and yet it does not really
concern us here, excepting in so far as the
content in this form of thought has caused
itself to be recognized as Philosophy. This
philosophy, as a philosophy of the understanding,
became the ordinary culture of the day; in
it, determinate, intelligent thought is the
fundamental principle, and it extends over
the whole circle of objects which fall within
the region of knowledge. Wolff defined the
world of consciousness for Germany, and for
the world in general, in the same wide sense
in which we may say that this was done by
Aristotle. What distinguishes him from Aristotle
is that in so doing the point of view that
he adopted was that of the understanding
merely, while Aristotle treated the subject
speculatively. The philosophy of Wolff is
hence no doubt built on foundations laid
by Leibnitz, but yet in such a manner that
the speculative interest is quite eliminated
from it. The spiritual philosophy, substantial
in a higher sense, which we found emerging
first in Boehme, though still in a peculiar
and barbarous form, has been quite lost sight
of, and has disappeared without leaving any
traces or effects in Germany; his very language
was forgotten.
The principal events in Christian Wolff's
life are these: He was the son of a baker,
and was born at Breslau in 1679. He first
studied Theology and then Philosophy, and
in
1707 he became Professor of Mathematics and
Philosophy at Halle. Here the pietistic theologians,
and more especially Lange, treated him in
the basest manner. Piety did not trust this
understanding; for piety, if it is true,
embodies a content which is speculative in
nature, and which passes beyond the understanding.
As his opponents could make no headway by
their writings, they resorted to intrigues.
They caused it to be conveyed to King Frederick
William I., the father of Frederick II.,
a rough man who took an interest in nothing
but soldiers, that according to the determinism
of Wolff, free will was impossible, and that
soldiers could not hence desert of their
own free will, but by a special disposition
of God (pre-established harmony) a doctrine
which, if disseminated amongst the military,
would be extremely dangerous. The king, much
enraged by this, immediately issued a decree
that within forty-eight hours Wolff should
leave Halle and the Prussian States, under
penalty of the halter. Wolff thus left Halle
on the 23rd of November, 1723. The theologians
added to all this the scandal of preaching
against Wolff and his philosophy, and the
pious Franke thanked God on his knees in
church for the removal of Wolff. But the
rejoicings did not last long. Wolff went
to Cassel, was there immediately installed
first professor in the philosophic faculty
at Marburg, and at the same time made a member
of the Academies of Science of London, Paris,
and Stockholm. By Peter the First of Russia
he was made Vice-President of the newly instituted
Academy in St. Petersburg. Wolff was also
summoned to Russia, but this invitation he
declined; he received, however, an honorary
post, he was made a Baron by the Elector
of Bavaria, and, in short, loaded with public
honours which, more especially at that time,
though even now it is the case, were very
much thought of by the general public, and
which were too great not to make a profound
sensation in Berlin. In Berlin a commission
was appointed to pass judgment on the Wolffian
philosophy - for this it had not been possible
to eradicate - and it declared the same to
be harmless, that is to say, free from all
danger to state and religion; it also forbade
the theologians to make it a subject of dispute,
and altogether put an end to their clamour.
Frederick William now issued a recall in
very respectful terms to Wolff, who, however,
hesitated to comply with it owing to his
lack of confidence in its sincerity. On the
accession of Frederick II. in 1740 he was
again recalled in terms of the highest honour
(Lange had meanwhile died), and only then
did be comply. Wolff became Vice-Chancellor
of the University, but he outlived his repute,
and his lectures at the end were very poorly
attended. He died in 1754.(1)
Like Tschirnhausen and Thomasius, Wolff wrote
a great part of his works in his mother tongue,
while Leibnitz for the most part wrote only
in Latin or French. This is an important
matter, for, as we have already noticed (pp.
114 and 150), it is only when a nation possesses
a science in its own language that it can
really be said to belong to it; and in Philosophy
most of all this is requisite. For thought
has in it this very moment of pertaining
to self-consciousness or of being absolutely
its own; when one's own language is the vehicle
of expression, as when we talk of "Bestimmtheit"
instead of "Determination," and
"Wesen" instead of "Essenz,"
it is immediately present to our consciousness
that the conceptions are absolutely its own;
it has to deal with these at all times, and
they are in no way foreign to it. The Latin
language has a phraseology, a definite sphere
and range of conception; it is at once taken
for granted that when men write in Latin
they are at liberty to be dull; it is impossible
to read or write what men permit themselves
to say in Latin. The titles of Wolff's philosophic
works are perpetually of this nature: "Rational
thoughts on the powers of the human understanding
and their right uses in the knowledge of
the truth," Halle, 1712, 8vo; "Rational
thoughts on God, the world, and the soul
of man, likewise on all things generally,"
Frankfort and Leipzig, 1719; "On the
action and conduct of men," Halle, 1720;
"On Social Life," Halle, 1720;
"On the operations of Nature,"
Halle, 1723, and so on. Wolff wrote German
and Latin quartos on every department of
Philosophy, even on economics - twenty-three
thick volumes of Latin, or about forty quartos
altogether. His mathematical works make a
good many more quartos. He brought into general
use the differential and integral calculus
of Leibnitz.
It is only in its general content and taken
as a whole that Wolff's philosophy is the
philosophy of Leibnitz, that is to say, only
in relation to the fundamental determinations
of monads and to the theodicy - to these
he remained faithful; any other content is
empiric, derived from our feelings and desires.
Wolff likewise accepted in their entirety
all the Cartesian and other definitions of
general ideas. Hence we find in him abstract
propositions and their proofs mingled with
experiences, on the indubitable truth of
which he builds a large part of his propositions;
and he must so build and derive his foundations
if a content is to result at all. With Spinoza,
on the contrary, no content is to be found
excepting absolute substance and a perpetual
return into the same. The greatness of Wolff's
services to the culture of Germany, which
now, appeared quite independently and without
any connection with an earlier and profounder
metaphysical standpoint (supra, p. 350),
are in proportion to the barrenness and inward
contentless condition into which Philosophy
had sunk. This he divided into its formal
disciplines, spinning it out, into determinations
of the understanding with a pedantic application
of geometric methods; and, contemporaneously
with the English philosophers, he made the
dogmatism of the metaphysics of the understanding
fashionable, that is a, philosophizing which
determines the absolute and rational by means
of self-exclusive thought-determinations
and relationships (such as one and many,
simple and compound, finite and infinite,
causal connection, &c.). Wolff entirely
displaced the Aristotelian philosophy of
the schools, and made Philosophy into an
ordinary science pertaining to the German
nation. But besides this he gave Philosophy
that systematic and requisite division into
sections which has down to the present day
served as a sort of standard.
In theoretic philosophy Wolff first treats
of Logic purified from scholastic interpretations
or deductions; it is the logic of the understanding
which he has systematized. The second stage
is Metaphysics, which contains four parts:
first there is Ontology, the treatment of
abstract and quite general philosophic categories,
such as Being and its being the One and Good;
in this abstract metaphysic there further
comes accident, substance, cause and effect,
the phenomenon, &c. Next in order is
Cosmology, a general doctrine of body, the
doctrine of the world; here we have abstract
metaphysical propositions respecting the
world, that there is no chance, no leaps
or bounds in nature - the law of continuity.
Wolff excludes natural science and natural
history. The third part of the metaphysic
is rational psychology or pneumatology, the
philosophy of the soul, which deals with
the simplicity, immortality, immateriality
of the soul. Finally, the fourth is natural
theology, which sets forth the proofs of
the existence of God.(2) Wolff also inserts
(chap. iii.) an empirical psychology. Practical
philosophy he divides into the Rights of
Nature, Morality, the Rights of Nations or
Politics, and Economics.
The whole is propounded in geometric forms
such as definitions, axioms, theorems, scholia,
corollaries, &c. In mathematics the understanding
is in its proper place, for the triangle
must remain the triangle. Wolff on the one
hand started upon a large range of investigation,
and one quite indefinite in character, and
on the other, held to a strictly methodical
manner with regard to propositions and their
proofs. The method is really similar to that
of Spinoza, only it is more wooden and lifeless
than his. Wolff applied the same methods
to every sort of content - even to that which
is altogether empirical, such as his so-called
applied mathematics, into which he introduces
many useful arts, bringing the most ordinary
reflections and directions into the geometric
form. In many cases this undoubtedly gives
his work a most pedantic aspect, especially
when the content directly justifies itself
to our conception without this form at all.
For Wolff proceeds by first laying down certain
definitions, which really rest upon our ordinary
conceptions, since these he translated into
the empty form of determinations of the understanding.
Hence the definitions are merely nominal
definitions, and we know whether they are
correct only by seeing whether they correspond
to conceptions which are referred to their
simple thoughts. The syllogism is the form
of real importance in this mode of reasoning,
and with Wolff it often attains to its extreme
of rigidity and formalism.
Under mathematics, which is the subject of
four small volumes, Wolff also treats of
architecture and military science. One of
the propositions in Architecture is this:
"Windows must be wide enough for two
persons." The making of a door is also
propounded as a task, and the solution thereof
given. The next best example comes from the
art of warfare. The "Fourth proposition.
The approach to the fortress must always
be harder for the enemy the nearer he comes
to it." Instead of saying because the
danger is greater, which would be trivial,
there follows the "Proof. The nearer
the enemy comes to the fortress, the greater
the danger. But the greater the danger the
greater the resistance that must be offered
in order to defy the attacks, and, so far
as may be, avert the danger. Hence the nearer
the enemy is to the fort the harder must
the approach be made for him. Q. E. D."(3)
Since the increase of the danger is given
as the reason, the whole is false, and the
contrary may be said with equal truth. For
if at the beginning all possible resistance
is offered to the enemy, he cannot get nearer
the fortress at all, and thus the danger
cannot become greater. The greater resistance
has a real cause, and not this foolish one
- namely, that because the garrison is now
at closer quarters, and consequently operates
in a narrow field, it can offer a greater
resistance. In this most trivial way Wolff
proceeds with every sort of content. This
barbarism of pedantry, or this pedantry of
barbarism, represented as it is in its whole
breadth and extent, necessarily brought itself
into disrepute; and without there being a
definite consciousness of the reason why
the geometric method is not the only and
ultimate method of knowledge, instinct and
an immediate consciousness of the foolishness
of its applications caused this method to
be set aside.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C 3. THE POPULAR PHILOSOPHY OF GERMANY. Popular
philosophy flatters our ordinary consciousness,
makes it the ultimate standard. Although
with Spinoza we begin with pre-supposed definitions,
the content is still profoundly speculative
in nature, and it is not derived from the
ordinary consciousness. In Spinoza thinking
is not merely the form, for the content belongs
to thinking itself; it is the content of
thought in itself. In the speculative content
the instinct of reason satisfies itself on
its own account, because this content, as
a totality which integrates itself within
itself, at once in itself justifies itself
to thought. The content in Spinoza is only
without ground in so far as it has no external
ground, but is a ground in itself. But if
the content is finite, a demand for an external
ground is indicated, since in such a case
we desire to have a ground other than this
finite. In its matter the philosophy of Wolff
is indeed a popular philosophy, even if in
form it still makes thought authoritative.
Until the time of Kant the philosophy of
Wolff was thus pre-eminent, Baumgarten, Crusius,
and Moses Mendelssohn worked each of them
independently on the same lines as Wolff;
the philosophy of the last-mentioned was
popular and graceful in form. The Wolffian
philosophy was thus carried on, although
it had cast off its pedantic methods: no
further progress was however made. The question
dealt with was how perfection could be attained
- what it is possible to think and what not;
metaphysic was reduced to its slightest consistency
and to its completest vacuity, so that in
its texture not a single thread remained
secure. Mendelssohn considered himself, and
was considered, the greatest of philosophers,
and was lauded as such by his friends. In
his "Morgenstunden" we really find
a dry Wolffian philosophy, however much these
gentlemen endeavoured to give their dull
abstractions a bright Platonic form.
The forms of Philosophy which we have considered
bear the character which pertains specially
to metaphysics, of proceeding from general
determinations of the understanding, but
of combining therewith experience and observation,
or the empiric method in general. One side
of this metaphysic is that the opposites
of thought are brought into consciousness,
and that attention is directed upon the solution
of this contradiction. Thought and Being
or extension, God and the world, good and
evil, the power and prescience of God on
the one side, and the evil in the world and
human freedom on the other: these contradictions,
the opposites of soul and spirit, things
conceived and things material, and their
mutual relation, have occupied all men's
attention. The solution of these opposites
and contradictions has still to be given,
and God is set forth as the One in whom all
these contradictions are solved. This is
what is common to all these philosophies
as far as their main elements are concerned.
Yet we must likewise remark that these contradictions
are not solved in themselves, i. e. that
the nullity of the supposition is not demonstrated
in itself, and thereby a true concrete solution
has not come to pass. Even if God is recognised
as solving all contradictions, God as the
solution of these contradictions is a matter
of words rather than something conceived
and comprehended. If God is comprehended
in His qualities, and prescience, omnipresence,
omniscience, power, wisdom, goodness, justice,
&c., are considered as qualities of God
Himself, they simply lead to contradictions;
and these contradictions, Leibnitz (supra,
p. 348) sought to remove by saying that the
qualities temper one another, i. e. that
they are combined in such a way that one
annuls the other. This, however, is no real
comprehension of such contradiction.
This metaphysic contrasts greatly with the
old philosophy of a Plato or an Aristotle.
To the old philosophy we can always turn
again and admit its truth; it is satisfying
in the stage of development it has reached
- a concrete centre-point which meets all
the problems set by thought as these are
comprehended. In this modern metaphysic,
however, the opposites are merely developed
into absolute contradictions. God is indeed
given as their absolute solution, but only
as an abstract solution, as a Beyond; on
this side all contradictions are, as regards
their content, unsolved and unexplained.
God is not comprehended as the One in whom
these contradictions are eternally resolved;
He is not comprehended as Spirit, as the
Trinity. It is in Him alone as Spirit, and
as Spirit which is Three in One, that this
opposition of Himself and His Other, the
Son, is contained, and with it the resolution
of the same; this concrete Idea of God as
reason, has not as yet found an entrance
into Philosophy.
In order that we may now cast a retrospective
glance over the philosophic efforts of other
nations, we shall apply ourselves to the
further progress of Philosophy. Once more
we see Scepticism making its way into this
and philosophy of the understanding. But
this time it is, properly speaking, in the
form of Idealism, or the determinations are
subjective determinations of self-consciousness.
In the place of thought we consequently find
the Notion now making its appearance. Just
as with the Stoics determinateness is held
to be an object of thought, we have in modern
times this same manifestation of thought
as the unmoved form of simplicity. Only here
the image or inner consciousness of totality
is present, the absolute spirit which the
world has before it as its truth and to whose
Notion it makes its way - this is another
inward principle, another implicitude of
mind which, it endeavours to bring forth
from itself and for itself, so that reason
is a comprehension of the same, or has the
certitude of being all reality. With the
ancients reason, as the implicit and explicit
Being of consciousness, had only an ethereal
and formal existence as language, but here
it has certainty as existent substance. Hence
with Descartes there is the unity of the
Notion and Being, and with Spinoza the universal
reality. The first commencement of the Notion
of the movement of fixed thoughts in themselves
is found in this, that the movement which,
as method, simply falls outside its object,
comes within it, or that self-consciousness
comes within thought. Thought is implicitude
without explicitude, an objective mode bearing
no resemblance to a sensuous thing; and yet
it is quite different from the actuality
of self-consciousness. This Notion which
we now find entering into thought, has the
three kinds of form which we still have to
consider; in the first place it has that
of individual self-consciousness or the formal
conception generally; secondly, that of universal
self-consciousness, which applies itself
to all objects whether they be objects of
thought, determinate conceptions, or have
the form of actuality - that is to say it
applies itself to what is established in
thought, to the intellectual world with the
riches of its determinations and looked on
as a Beyond, or to the intellectual world
in as far as it is its realisation, the world
here and around us. It is in those two ways,
and in those ways alone, that the actual
Notion is present in the succeeding chapter;
for not as yet is it in the third place to
be found as taken back into thought, or as
the self-thinking or thought of Notion. While
that universal self-consciousness is, on
the whole, a thought which grasps and comprehends,
this third kind of thought is the Notion
itself recognised as constituting reality
in its essence, that is to say as Idealism.
These three aspects again divide themselves
as before into the three nations which alone
count in the civilised world. The empirical
and perfectly finite form of Notion pertains
to the English; to the French belongs its
form as making an attempt at everything,
as establishing itself in its reality, abolishing
all determination, and therefore being universal,
unlimited, pure self-consciousness; and,
lastly, to the German pertains the entering
into itself of this implicitude, the thought
of the absolute Notion.
Notes:
Buhle: Geschichte der neuern Philosoph.,
Vol. IV. Sec. II., pp. 571-582; Tiedemann;
Geist der speculativen Philos., Vol.
VI.
pp. 511-518; Rixner: Handbuch der Geschichte
der Philosophie, Vol. III. § 79, pp.
195,
196.
2. Wolf's Vernünftige Gedanken von
Gott,
der Welt und der Seele des Menschen
(Halle,
1741), Pt. I. chap. ii. § 114, 120,
pp. 59,
60, 62, 63; chap. vi. § 575-581, 686,
pp.
352-359, 425; chap. v. § 742, p. 463;
§ 926,
p. 573; chap. vi. § 928, p. 574, seq.
3. Wolff's Anfangsgründe aller mathematischen
Wissenschaften, Pt. I.: Anfangsgründe der
Baukunst, Pt. II. Prop. 8, p. 414; Problem
22, pp. 452, 453; Pt. II.: Anfangsgründe
der Fortification, Pt. I. p. 570.
CLICK HEGEL ICON BELOW TO GO TO
NEXT PAGE
|
Evans Experientialism 
