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C. Third Division
The third development of the philosophy of
the understanding is that represented by
Leibnitz and Wolff. If Wolff's metaphysics
is divested of its rigid form, we have as
a result the later popular philosophy.
Chapter I. — The Metaphysics of the Understanding
C 1. LEIBNITZ. As in other respects Leibnitz
represents the extreme antithesis to Newton,
so in respect of philosophy he presents a
striking contrast to Locke and his empiricism,
and also to Spinoza. He upholds thought as
against the perception of the English school,
and in lieu of sensuous Being he maintains
Being for thought to be the essence of truth,
just as Boehme at an earlier time upheld
implicit Being. While Spinoza asserted the
universality, the oneness of substance merely,
and while with Locke we saw infinite determinations
made the basis, Leibnitz, by means of his
fundamental principle of individuality, brings
out the essentiality of the opposite aspect
of Spinoza's philosophy, existence for self,
the monad, but the monad regarded as the
absolute Notion, though perhaps not yet as
the "I." The opposed principles,
which were forced asunder, find their completion
in each other, since Leibnitz's principle
of individuation completed Spinoza's system
as far as outward aspect goes.
Gottfried Wilhelm, Baron von Leibnitz, was
born in 1646 at Leipzig, where his father
was professor of Philosophy. The subject
that he studied in view of a profession was
jurisprudence, but first, in accordance with
the fashion of the day, he made a study of
Philosophy, and to it he devoted particular
attention. To begin with, he picked up in
Leipzig a large and miscellaneous stock of
knowledge, then he studied Philosophy and
mathematics at Jena under the mathematician
and theosophist Weigel, and took his degree
of Master of Philosophy in Leipzig. There
also, on the occasion of his graduation as
Doctor of Philosophy, he defended certain
philosophical theses, some of which discourses
are still contained in his works (ed. Dutens,
T. II. P. I. p. 400). His first dissertation,
and that for which he obtained the degree
of doctor of philosophy, was: De principio
individui, — a principle which remained the
abstract principle of his whole philosophy,
as opposed to that of Spinoza. After he had
acquired a thorough knowledge of the subject,
he wished to graduate also as Doctor of Laws.
But though he died an imperial councillor,
it was his ill fortune to receive from the
Faculty at Leipzig a refusal to confer the
doctorate upon him, his youth being the alleged
reason. Such a thing could scarcely happen
nowadays. It may be that it was done because
of his over-great philosophical attainments,
seeing that lawyers are wont to hold the
same in horror. He now quitted Leipzig, and
betook himself to Altdorf, where he graduated
with distinction. Shortly afterwards he became
acquainted in Nürnberg with a company of
alchemists, with whose ongoings he became
associated. Here he made extracts from alchemistic
writings, and studied the mysteries of this
occult science. His activity in the pursuit
of learning extended also to historical,
diplomatic, mathematical and philosophical
subjects. He subsequently entered the service
of the Elector of Mayence, becoming a member
of council, and, in 1672 he was appointed
tutor to a son of Von Boineburg, Chancellor
of State to the Elector. With this young
man he travelled to Paris, where he lived
for four years. He at this time made the
acquaintance of the great mathematician Huygens,
and was by him for the first time properly
introduced into the domain of mathematics.
When the education of his pupil was completed,
and the Baron Von Boineburg died, Leibnitz
went on his own account to London, where
he became acquainted with Newton and other
scholars, at whose head was Oldenburg, who
was also on friendly terms with Spinoza.
After the death of the Elector of Mayence,
the salary of Leibnitz ceased to be paid;
he therefore left England and returned to
France. The Duke of Brunswick-Lüneburg then
took him into his service, and gave him the
appointment of councillor and librarian at
Hanover, with permission to spend as much
time as he liked in foreign countries. He
therefore remained for some time longer in
France, England, and Holland. In the year
1677 he settled down in Hanover, where he
became busily engaged in affairs of state,
and was specially occupied with historical
matters. In the Harz Mountains he had works
constructed for carrying off the floods which
did damage to the mines there. Notwithstanding
these manifold occupations he invented the
differential calculus in 1677, on occasion
of which there arose a dispute between him
and Newton, which was carried on by the latter
and the Royal Society of London in a most
ungenerous manner. For it was asserted by
the English, who gave themselves the credit
of everything, and were very unfair to others,
that the discovery was really made by Newton.
But Newton's Principia only appeared later,
and in the first edition indeed Leibnitz
was mentioned with commendation in a note
which was afterwards omitted. From his headquarters
in Hanover, Leibnitz, commissioned by his
prince, made several journeys through Germany,
and also went to Italy in order to collect
historical evidence relative to the House
of Este, and for the purpose of proving more
clearly the relationship between this princely
family and that of Brunswick-Lüneburg. At
other times he was likewise much occupied
with historical questions. Owing to his acquaintance
with the consort of Frederick I. of Prussia,
Sophia Charlotte, a Hanoverian princess,
he was enabled to bring about the foundation
of an Academy of Science in Berlin, in which
city he lived for a considerable time. In
Vienna he also became acquainted with Prince
Eugène, which occasioned his being appointed
finally an Imperial Councillor. He published
several very important historical works as
the result of this journey. His death took
place at Hanover in 1716, when he was seventy
years of age.(1)
It was not only on Philosophy, but also on
the most varied branches of science that
Leibnitz expended toil and trouble and energy;
it was to mathematics, however, that he specially
devoted his attention, and he is the inventor
of the methods of the integral and differential
calculus. His great services in regard to
mathematics and physics we here leave out
of consideration, and pay attention to his
philosophy alone. None of his books can be
exactly looked on as giving a complete systematic
account of his philosophy. To the more important
among them belongs his work on the human
understanding (Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement
humain) in reply to Locke; but this is a
mere refutation. His philosophy is therefore
scattered through various little treatises
which were written in very various connections,
in letters, and replies to objections which
caused him to bring out one aspect of the
question more strongly than another; we consequently
find no elaborated systematic whole, superintended
or perfected by him. The work which has some
appearance of being such, his Théodicée,
better known to the public than any thing
else he wrote, is a popular treatise which
he drewup for Queen Sophia Charlotte in reply
to Bayle, and in which he took pains not
to present the matter in very speculative
form. A Würtemberg theologian, Pfaff by name,
and others who were correspondents of Leibnitz
and were themselves only too well versed
in philosophy, brought it as a charge against
Leibnitz — a charge which he never denied
— that his philosophy was written in popular
form.(2) They laughed very much afterwards
at Wolff, who had taken them to be quite
in earnest; his opinion was that if Leibnitz
were not perfectly serious in this sense
with his Théodicée, yet he had unconsciously
written his best therein. Leibnitz's Théodicée
is not what we can altogether appreciate;
it is a justification of God in regard to
the evil in the world. His really philosophic
thoughts are most connectedly expressed in
a treatise on the principles of Grace (Principes
de la Nature et de la Grace),(3) and especially
in the pamphlet addressed to Prince Eugéne
of Savoy.(4) .Buhle (Geschichte der neuern
Philosophie, vol. iv. section 1, p. 131)
says: “His philosophy is not so much the
product of free, independent, original speculation,
as the result of well-tested earlier” and
later “systems, an eclecticism whose defects
he tried to remedy in his own way. It is
a desultory treatment of Philosophy in letters.”
Leibnitz followed the same general plan in
his philosophy as the physicists adopt when
they advance a hypothesis to explain existing
data. He has it that general conceptions
of the Idea are to be found, from which the
particular may be derived; here, on account
of existing data, the general conception,
for example the determination of force or
matter furnished by reflection, must have
its determinations disposed in such a way
that it fits in with the data. Thus the philosophy
of Leibnitz seems to be not so much a philosophic
system as an hypothesis regarding the existence
of the world, namely how it is to be determined
in accordance with the metaphysical determinations
and the data and assumptions of the ordinary
conception, which are accepted as valid(5)
— thoughts which are moreover propounded
without the sequence pertaining to the Notion
and mainly in narrative style, and which
taken by themselves show no necessity in
their connection. Leibnitz's philosophy therefore
appears like a string of arbitrary assertions,
which follow one on another like a metaphysical
romance; it is only when we see what he wished
thereby to avoid that we learn to appreciate
its value. He really makes use of external
reasons mainly in order to establish relations:
“Because the validity of such relations cannot
be allowed, nothing remains but to establish
the matter in this way.” If we are not acquainted
with these reasons, this procedure strikes
us as arbitrary.
a. Leibnitz's philosophy is an idealism of
the intellectuality of the universe; and
although from one point of view he stands
opposed to Locke, as from another point of
view he is in opposition to the Substance
of Spinoza, he yet binds them both together
again. For, to go into the matter more particularly,
on the one hand he expresses in the many
monads the absolute nature of things distinguished
and of individuality; on the other hand,
in contrast to this and apart from it, he
expresses the ideality of Spinoza and the
non-absolute nature of all difference, as
the idealism of the popular conception. Leibnitz's
philosophy is a metaphysics, and in sharp
contrast to the simple universal Substance
of Spinoza, where all that is determined
is merely transitory, it makes fundamental
the absolute multiplicity of individual substances,
which after the example of the ancients he
named monads — an expression already used
by the Pythagoreans. These monads he then
proceeds to determine as follows.
Firstly: “Substance is a thing that is capable
of activity; it is compound or simple, the
compound cannot exist without the simple.
The monads are simple substances.” The proof
that they constitute the truth in all things
is very simple; it is a superficial reflection.
For instance, one of Leibnitz's maxims is:
“Because there are compound things, the principles
of the same must be simple; for the compound
consists of the simple.”(6) This proof is
poor enough; it is an example of the favourite
way of starting from something definite,
say the compound, and then drawing conclusions
therefrom as to the simple. It is quite right
in a way, but really it is tautology. Of
course, if the compound exists, so does the
simple; for the compound means something
in itself manifold whose connection or unity
is external. From the very trivial category
of the compound it is easy to deduce the
simple. It is a conclusion drawn from a certain
premiss, but the question is whether the
premiss is true. These monads are not, however,
something abstract and simple in itself,
like the empty Epicurean atoms, which, as
they were in themselves lacking in determination,
drew all their determination from their aggregation
alone. The monads are, on the contrary, substantial
forms, a good expression, borrowed from the
Scholastics (supra, p. 71), or the metaphysical
points of the Alexandrian School (Vol. II.
p. 439); they are the entelechies of Aristotle
taken as pure activity, which are forms in
themselves (Vol. II. pp. 138, 182, 183).
“These monads are not material or extended,
nor do they originate or decay in the natural
fashion, for they can begin only by a creative
act of God, and they can end only by annihilation.”(7)
Thereby they are distinguished from the atoms,
which are regarded simply as principles.
The expression creation we are familiar with
from religion, but it is a meaningless word
derived from the ordinary conception; in
order to be a thought and to have philosophic
significance, it must be much more closely
defined.
Secondly: “On account of their simplicity
the monads are not susceptible of alteration
by another monad in their inner essence;
there is no causal connection between them.”
Each of them is something indifferent and
independent as regards the rest, otherwise
it would not be an entelechy. Each of them
is so much for itself that all its determinations
and modifications go on in itself alone,
and no determination from without takes place.
Leibnitz says: “There are three ways in which
substances are connected: (1) Causality,
influence; (2) The relation of assistance;
(3) The relation of harmony. The relation
of influence is a relation pertaining to
a commonplace or popular philosophy. But
as it is impossible to understand how material
particles or immaterial qualities can pass
from one substance into another, such a conception
as this must be abandoned.” If we accept
the reality of the many, there can be no
transition at all; each is an ultimate and
absolutely independent entity. “The system
of assistance,” according to Descartes, “is
something quite superfluous, a Deus ex machina,
because continual miracles in the things
of nature are assumed.” If we, like Descartes,
assume independent substances, no causal
nexus is conceivable; for this presupposes
an influence, a bearing of the one upon the
other, and in this way the other is not a
substance. “Therefore there remains only
harmony, a unity which is in itself or implicit.
The monad is therefore simply shut up in
itself, and cannot be determined by another;
this other cannot be set into it. It can
neither get outside itself, nor can others
get inside it.”(8) That is also Spinoza's
way of regarding matters: each attribute
entirely represents the essence of God for
itself, extension and thought have no influence
on each other.
In the third place, “however, these monads
must at the same time have certain qualities
or determinations in themselves, inner actions,
through which they are distinguished from
others. There cannot be two things alike,
for otherwise they would not be two, they
would not be different but one and the same.”(9)
Here then Leibnitz's axiom of the undistinguishable
comes into words. What is not in itself distinguished
is not distinguished. This may be taken in
a trivial sense, as that there are not two
individuals which are alike. To such sensuous
things the maxim has no application, it is
prima facie indifferent whether there are
things which are alike or not; there may
also be always a difference of space. This
is the superficial sense, which does not
concern us. The more intimate sense is, however,
that each thing is in itself something determined,
distinguishing itself from others implicitly
or in itself. Whether two things are like
or unlike is only a comparison which we make,
which falls within our ken. But what we have
further to consider is the determined difference
in themselves. The difference must be a difference
in themselves, not for our comparison, for
the subject must have the difference as its
own peculiar characteristic or determination,
i. e., the determination must be immanent
in the individual. Not only do we distinguish
the animal by its claws, but it distinguishes
itself essentially thereby, it defends itself,
it preserves itself. If two things are different
only in being two, then each of them is one;
but the fact of their being two does not
constitute a distinction between them; the
determined difference in itself is the principal
point.
Fourthly: “The determinateness and the variation
thereby established is, however, an inward
implicit principle; it is a multiplicity
of modification, of relations to surrounding
existences, but a multiplicity which remains
locked up in simplicity. Determinateness
and variation such as this, which remains
and goes on in the existence itself, is a
perception;” and therefore Leibnitz says
all monads perceive or represent (for we
may translate perceptio by representation
[Vorstellung]). In other words, they are
in themselves universal, for universality
is just simplicity in multiplicity, and therefore
a simplicity which is at the same time change
and motion of multiplicity. This is a very
important determination; in substance itself
there is negativity, determinateness, without
its simplicity and its implicitude being
given up. Further, in it there is this idealism,
that the simple is something in itself distinguished,
and in spite of its variation, that it yet
remains one, and continues in its simplicity.
An instance of this is found in “I,” my spirit.
I have many conceptions, a wealth of thought
is in me, and yet I remain one, notwithstanding
this variety of state. This identity may
be found in the fact that what is different
is at the same time abrogated, and is determined
as one; the monads are therefore distinguished
by modifications in themselves, but not by
external determinations. These determinations
contained in the monads exist in them in
ideal fashion; this ideality in the monad
is in itself a whole, so that these differences
are only representations and ideas. This
absolute difference what is termed the Notion;
what falls asunder in the mere representation
is held together. This is what possesses
interest in Leibnitz's philosophy. Such ideality
in the same way pertains to the material,
which is also a multiplicity of monads; therefore
the system of Leibnitz is an intellectual
system, in accordance with which all that
is material has powers of representation
and perception. As thus representing, the
monad, says Leibnitz, possesses activity;
for activity is to be different, and yet
to be one, and this is the only true difference.
The monad not only represents, it also changes;
but in doing so, it yet remains in itself
absolutely what it is. This variation is
based on activity. “The activity of the inner
principle, by means of which it passes from
one perception to another, is desire
(appetitus).” Variation in representation
is desire, and that constitutes the spontaneity
of the monad; all is now complete in itself,
and the category of influence falls away.
Indeed, this intellectuality of all things
is a great thought on the part of Leibnitz:
“All multiplicity is included in unity;”(10)
determination is not a difference in respect
of something else, but reflected into itself,
and maintaining itself. This is one aspect
of things, but the matter is not therein
complete; it is equally the case that it
is different in respect of other things.
Fifthly: These representations and ideas
are not necessarily conscious representations
and ideas, any more than all monads as forming
representations are conscious. It is true
that consciousness is itself perception,
but a higher grade of the same; perceptions
of consciousness Leibnitz calls apperceptions.
The difference between the merely representing
and the self-conscious monads Leibnitz makes
one of degrees of clearness. The expression
representation has, however, certainly something
awkward about it, since we are accustomed
to associate it only with consciousness,
and with consciousness as such; but Leibnitz
admits also of unconscious representation.
When he then adduces examples of unconscious
representations, he appeals to the condition
of a swoon or of sleep, in which we are mere
monads: and that representations without
consciousness are present in such states
he shows from the fact of our having perceptions
immediately after awakening out of sleep,
which shows that others must have been there,
for one perception arises only out of others.(11)
That is a trivial and empirical demonstration.
Sixthly: These monads constitute the principle
that exists. Matter is nothing else than
their passive capability. This passive capability
it is which constitutes the obscurity of
the representations, or a confusion which
never arrives at distinction, or desire,
or activity.(12) That is a correct definition
of the conception; it is Being, matter, in
accordance with the moment of simplicity.
This is implicitly activity; “mere implicitness
without actualization” would therefore be
a better expression. The transition from
obscurity to distinctness Leibnitz exemplifies
by the state of swooning.
Seventhly: Bodies as bodies are aggregates
of monads: they are mere heaps which cannot
be termed substances, any more than a flock
of sheep can bear this name.(13) The continuity
of the same is an arrangement or extension,
but space is nothing in itself;(14) it is
only in another, or a unity which our understanding
gives to that aggregate.(15)
b. Leibnitz goes on to determine and distinguish
more clearly as the principal moments, inorganic,
organic, and conscious monads, and he does
it in the following way.
Such bodies as have no inner unity, whose
elements are connected merely by space, or
externally, are inorganic; they have not
an entelechy or one monad which rules over
the rest.(16) The continuity of space as
a merely external relation has not the Notion
in itself of the likeness of these monads
in themselves. Continuity is in fact to be
regarded in them as an arrangement, a similarity
in themselves. Leibnitz therefore defines
their movements as like one another, as a
harmony in themselves;(17) but again, this
is as much as saying that their similarity
is not in themselves. In fact continuity
forms the essential determination of the
inorganic; but it must at the same time not
be taken as something external or as likeness,
but as penetrating or penetrated unity, which
has dissolved individuality in itself like
a fluid. But to this point Leibnitz does
not attain, because for him monads are the
absolute principle, and individuality does
not annul itself.
A higher degree of Being is found in bodies
with life and soul, in which one monad has
dominion over the rest. The body which is
bound up with the monad, of which the one
monad is the entelechy or soul, is with this
soul named a living creature, an animal.
One such entelechy rules over the rest, yet
not really, but formally: the limbs of this
animal, however, are again themselves such
living things, each of which has in its turn
its ruling entelechy within it.(18) But ruling
is here an inappropriate expression. To rule
in this case is not to rule over others,
for all are independent; it is therefore
only a formal expression. If Leibnitz had
not helped himself out with the word rule,
and developed the idea further, this dominant
monad would have abrogated the others, and
put them in a negative position; the implicitness
of the other monads, or the principle of
the absolute Being of these points or individuals
would have disappeared. Yet we shall later
on come across this relation of the individuals
to one another.
The conscious monad distinguishes itself
from the naked (material) monads by the distinctness
of the representation. But this is of course
only an indefinite word, a formal distinction;
it indicates that consciousness is the very
thing that constitutes the distinction of
the undistinguished, and that distinction
constitutes the determination of consciousness.
Leibnitz more particularly defined the distinction
of man as that “he is capable of the knowledge
of necessary and eternal truths," —
or that he conceives the universal on the
one hand, and on the other what is connected
with it; the nature and essence of self-consciousness
lies in the universality of the Notions.
“These eternal truths rest on two maxims;
the one is that of contradiction, the other
is that of sufficient reason.” The former
of these is unity expressed in useless fashion
as a maxim, the distinction of the undistinguishable,
A=A; it is the definition of thinking, but
not a maxim which could contain a truth as
content, or it does not express the Notion
of distinction as such. The other important
principle was, on the other hand: What is
not distinguished in thought is not distinguished
(p. 333). “The maxim of the reason is that
everything has its reason,”(19) — the particular
has the universal as its essential reality.
Necessary truth must have its reason in itself
in such a manner that it is found by analysis,
i. e. through that very maxim of identity.
For analysis is the very favourite plan of
resolving into simple ideas and principles:
a resolution which annihilates their relation,
and which therefore in fact forms a transition
into the opposite, though it does not have
the consciousness of the same, and on that
account also excludes the Notion; for every
opposite it lays hold of only in its identity.
Sufficient reason seems to be a pleonasm;
but Leibnitz understood by this aims, final
causes (causæ finales), the difference between
which and the causal nexus or the efficient
cause he here brings under discussion.(20)
c. The universal itself, absolute essence,
which with Leibnitz is something quite different
from the monads, separates itself also into
two sides, namely universal Being and Being
as the unity of opposites.
That universal is God, as the cause of the
world, to the consciousness of whom the above
principle of sufficient reason certainly
forms the transition. The existence of God
is only an inference from eternal truths;
for these must as the laws of nature have
a universal sufficient reason which determines
itself as none other than God. Eternal truth
is therefore the consciousness of the universal
and absolute in and for itself; and this
universal and absolute is God, who, as one
with Himself, the monad of monads, is the
absolute Monad. Here we again have the wearisome
proof of His existence: He is the fountain
of eternal truths and Notions, and without
Him no potentiality would have actuality;
He has the prerogative of existing immediately
in His potentiality.(21) God is here also
the unity of potentiality and actuality,
but in an uncomprehending manner; what is
necessary, but not comprehended, is transferred
to Him. Thus God is at first comprehended
chiefly as universal, but already in the
aspect of the relation of opposites.
As regards this second aspect, the absolute
relation of opposites, it occurs in the first
place in the form of absolute opposites of
thought, the good and the evil. “God is the
Author of the world,” says Leibnitz; that
refers directly to evil. It is round this
relation that philosophy specially revolves,
but to the unity of which it did not then
attain; the evil in the world was not comprehended,
because no advance was made beyond the fixed
opposition. The result of Leibnitz's Théodicée
is an optimism supported on the lame and
wearisome thought that God, since a world
had to be brought into existence, chose out
of infinitely many possible worlds the best
possible — the most perfect, so far as it
could be perfect, considering the finite
element which it was to contain.(22) This
may very well be said in a general way, but
this perfection is no determined thought,
but a loose popular expression, a sort of
babble respecting an imaginary or fanciful
potentiality; Voltaire made merry over it.
Nor is the nature of the finite therein defined.
Because the world, it is said, has to be
the epitome of finite Beings, evil could
not be separated from it, since evil is negation,
finitude.(23) Reality and negation remain
standing in opposition to one another exactly
in the same way as before. That is the principal
conception in the Théodicée. But something
very like this can be said in every day life.
If I have some goods brought to me in the
market at some town, and say that they are
certainly not perfect, but the best that
are to be got, this is quite a good reason
why I should content myself with them. But
comprehension is a very different thing from
this. Leibnitz says nothing further than
that the world is good, but there is also
evil in it; the matter remains just the same
as it was before. “Because it had to be finite”
is then a mere arbitrary choice on the part
of God. The next question would be: Why and
how is there finitude in the Absolute and
His decrees? And only then should there be
deduced from the determination of finitude
the evil which no doubt exists therein.
It is true that Leibnitz has a reply to the
above question: "God does not will what
is evil; evil comes only indirectly into
the results” (blind), “because oftentimes
the greater good could not be achieved if
evils were not present. Therefore they are
means to a good end." But why does not
God employ other means? They are always external,
not in and for themselves. “A moral evil
may not be regarded as a means, nor must
we, as the apostle says, do evil that good
may come; yet it has often the relation of
a conditio sine qua non of the good. Evil
is in God only the object of a permissive
will (voluntatis permissivæ);” but everything
that is wrong would be such. “God has therefore
among the objects of His will the best possible
as the ultimate object, but the good as a
matter of choice (qualemcunque), also as
subordinate; and things indifferent and evils
often as means. Evil is, however, an object
of His will only as the condition of something
otherwise necessary (rei alioqui debitæ),
which without it could not exist; in which
sense Christ said it must needs be that offences
come.”(24)
In a general sense we are satisfied with
the answer: “In accordance with the wisdom
of God we must accept it as a fact that the
laws of nature are the best possible,” but
this answer does not suffice for a definite
question. What one wishes to know is the
goodness of this or that particular law;
and to that no answer is given. If, for example,
it is said that “The law of falling bodies,
in which the relation of time and space is
the square, is the best possible,” one might
employ, as far as mathematics are concerned,
any other power whatever. When Leibnitz answers:
“God made it so,” this is no answer at all.
We wish to know the definite reason of this
law; such general determinations sound pious,
but are not satisfying.
He goes on to say that the sufficient reason
has reference to the representation of the
monads. The principles of things are monads,
of which each is for itself, without having
influence on the others. If now the Monad
of monads, God, is the absolute substance,
and individual monads are created through
His will, their substantiality comes to an
end. There is therefore a contradiction present,
which remains unsolved in itself — that is
between the one substantial monad and the
many monads for which independence is claimed,
because their essence consists in their standing
in no relation to one another. Yet at the
same time, in order to show the harmony that
exists in the world, Leibnitz understands
the relation of monads to monads more generally
as the unity of contrasted existences, namely
of soul and body. This unity he represents
as a relation without difference, and notionless,
i. e. as a pre-established harmony.(25) Leibnitz
uses here the illustration of two clocks,
which are set to the same hour, and keep
the same time;(26) in the same way the movement
of the kingdom of thought goes on, determined
in accordance with ends, and the movement
onward of the corporeal kingdom which corresponds
with it, proceeds according to a general
casual connection.(27) The case is the same
as with Spinoza, that these two sides of
the universe have no connection with each
other, the one does not influence the other,
but both are entirely indifferent to one
another; it is really the differentiating
relation of the Notion that is lacking. In
abstract thought that is without Notion,
that determination now receives the form
of simplicity, of implicitude, of indifference
with regard to what is other, of a self-reflection
that has no movement: in this way red in
the abstract is in a position of indifference
as regards blue, &c. Here, as before,
Leibnitz forsakes his principle of individuation;
it has only the sense of being exclusively
one, and of not reaching to and including
what is other; or it is only a unity of the
popular conception, not the Notion of unity.
The soul has thus a series of conceptions
and ideas which are developed from within
it, and this series is from the very first
placed within the soul at its creation, i.
e., the soul is in all immediacy this implicit
determination; determination is, however,
not implicit, but the reflected unfolding
of this determination in the ordinary conception
is its outward existence. Parallel with this
series of differentiated conceptions, there
now runs a series of motions of the body,
or of what is external to the soul.(28) Both
are essential moments of reality; they are
mutually indifferent, but they have also
an essential relation of difference.
Since now every monad, as shut up within
itself, has no influence upon the body and
its movements, and yet the infinite multitude
of their atoms correspond with one another,
Leibnitz places this harmony in God; a better
definition of the relation and the activity
of the Monad of monads is therefore that
it is what pre-establishes harmony in the
changes of the monads.(29) God is the sufficient
reason, the cause of this correspondence;
He has so arranged the multitude of atoms
that the original changes which are developed
within one monad correspond with the changes
of the others. The pre-established harmony
is to be thought of somewhat in this style;
when a dog gets a beating, the pain develops
itself in him, in like fashion the beating
develops itself in itself, and so does the
person who administers the beating; their
determinations all correspond with one another,
and that not by means of their objective
connection, since each is independent.(30)
The principle of the harmony among the monads
does not consequently belong to them, but
it is in God, who for that very reason is
the Monad of monads, their absolute unity.
We saw from the beginning how Leibnitz arrived
at this conception. Each monad is really
possessed of the power of representation,
and is as such a representation of the universe,
therefore implicitly the totality of the
whole world. But at the same time this representation
is not in consciousness; the naked monad
is implicitly the universe, and difference
is the development of this totality in it.(31)
What develops itself therein is at the same
time in harmony with all other developments;
all is one harmony. “In the universe all
things are closely knit together, they are
in one piece, like an ocean: the slightest
movement transmits its influence far and
wide all around.”(32) From a single grain
of sand, Leibnitz holds, the whole universe
might be comprehended in its entire development
if we only knew the sand grain thoroughly.
There is not really much in all this, though
it sounds very fine; for the rest of the
universe is considerably more than a grain
of sand, well though we knew it, and considerably
different therefrom. To say that its essence
is the universe is mere empty talk: for the
fact is that the universe as essence is not
the universe. To the sand grain much must
be added which is not present; and since
thought adds more than all the grains of
sand that exist, the universe and its development
may in this way certainly be comprehended.
Thus according to Leibnitz every monad has
or is the representation of the entire universe,
which is the same as saying that it is really
representation in general; but at the same
time it is a determinate representation,
by means of which it comes to be this particular
monad, therefore it is representation according
to its particular situation and circumstances.(33)
The representations of the monad in itself,
which constitute its universe, develop themselves
from themselves, as the spiritual element
in it, according to the laws of their own
activity and desire, just as the movements
of their outer world do according to laws
of bodies; hence liberty is nothing other
than this spontaneity of immanent development,
but as in consciousness. The magnetic needle,
on the contrary, has only spontaneity without
consciousness, and consequently without freedom.
For, says Leibnitz, the nature of the magnetic
needle is to turn to the north; if it had
consciousness it would imagine that this
was its self-determination; it would thus
have the will to move round in accordance
with its nature.(34) But it is clear that
in the course of conscious representations
there is involved no necessary connection,
but contingency and want of sequence are
to be found, the reason of this according
to Leibnitz (Oper. T. II. P. I. p. 75) being
“because the nature of a created substance
implies that it changes incessantly according
to a certain order, which order guides it
spontaneously (spontanément) in all the circumstances
which befall it; so that one who sees all
things recognizes in the present condition
of substance the past also and the future.
The law of order, which determines the individuality
of the particular substance, has an exact
reference to what takes place in every other
substance and in the whole universe.” The
meaning of this is that the monad is not
a thing apart, or that there are two views
of it, the one making it out as spontaneously
generating its representations, so far as
form is concerned, and the other making it
out to be a moment of the whole of necessity;
Spinoza would call this regarding it from
both sides. An organic whole, a human being,
is thus for instance the assertion of his
aim from out of himself: at the same time
the being directed on something else is involved
in his Notion. He represents this and that
to himself, he wills this and that; his activity
employs itself and brings about changes.
His inward determination thus becomes corporeal
determination, and then change going beyond
himself; he appears as cause, influencing
other monads. But this Being-for-another
is only an appearance. For the other, i.
e., the actual, in so far as the monad determines
it or makes it negative, is the passive element
which the monad has in itself: all moments
are indeed contained therein, and for that
very reason it has no need of other monads,
but only of the laws of the monads in itself.
But if the Being-for-another is mere appearance,
the same may be said of Being-for-self; for
this has significance only in reference to
Being-for-another.
The important point in Leibnitz's philosophy
is this intellectuality of representation
which Leibnitz, however, did not succeed
in carrying out; and for the same reason
this intellectuality is at the same time
infinite multiplicity, which has remained
absolutely independent, because this intellectuality
has not been able to obtain mastery over
the One. The separation in the Notion, which
proceeds as far as release from itself, or
appearance in distinct independence, Leibnitz
did not succeed in bringing together into
unity. The harmony of these two moments,
the course of mental representations and
the course of things external, appearing
mutually as cause and effect, is not brought
by Leibnitz into relation in and for themselves;
he therefore lets them fall asunder, although
each is passive as regards the other. He
moreover considers both of them in one unity,
to be sure, but their activity is at the
same time not for themselves. Every forward
advance becomes therefore incomprehensible
when taken by itself, because the course
of the representation as through aims in
itself, requires this moment of Other-Being
or of passivity; and again the connection
of cause and effect requires the universal:
each however lacks this its other moment.
The unity which according to Leibnitz is
to be brought about by the pre-established
harmony, namely that the determination of
the will of man and the outward change harmonize,
is therefore brought about by means of another,
if not indeed from without, for this other
is God. Before God the monads are not to
be independent, but ideal and absorbed in
Him.
At this point the demand would come in that
in God Himself there should be comprehended
the required unity of that which before fell
asunder; and God has the special privilege
of having laid on Him the burden of what
cannot be comprehended. The word of God is
thus the makeshift which leads to a unity
which itself is only hypothetical; for the
process of the many out of this unity is
not demonstrated. God plays therefore in
the later philosophy a far greater part than
in the early, because now the comprehension
of the absolute opposition of thought and
Being is the chief demand. With Leibnitz
the extent to which thoughts advance is the
extent of the universe; where comprehension
ceases, the universe ceases, and God begins:
so that later it was even maintained that
to be comprehended was derogatory to God,
because he was thus degraded into finitude.
In that procedure a beginning is made from
the determinate, this and that are stated
to be necessary; but since in the next place
the unity of these moments is not comprehended,
it is transferred to God. God is therefore,
as it were, the waste channel into which
all contradictions flow: Leibnitz's Théodicée
is just a popular summing up such as this.
There are, nevertheless, all manner of evasions
to be searched out — in the opposition of
God's justice and mercy, that the one tempers
the other; how the fore-knowledge of God
and human freedom are compatible — all manner
of syntheses which never come to the root
of the matter nor show both sides to be moments.
These are the main moments of Leibnitz's
philosophy. It is a metaphysic which starts
from a narrow determination of the understanding,
namely, from absolute multiplicity, so that
connection can only be grasped as continuity.
Thereby absolute unity is certainly set aside,
but all the same it is presupposed; and the
association of individuals with one another
is to be explained only in this way, that
it is God who determines the harmony in the
changes of individuals. This is an artificial
system, which is founded on a category of
the understanding, that of the absoluteness
of abstract individuality. What is of importance
in Leibnitz lies in the maxims, in the principle
of individuality and the maxim of indistinguishability.
NOTES:
1. La vie de Mr. Leibnitz par Mr. le
Chevalier
de Jaucourt (Essais de Théodicée, par
Leibnitz,
Amsterdam, 1747, T. I.), pp. 1-28,
45, 59-62,
66-74, 77-80, 87-92, 110-116,
148-151; Brucker. Hist. crit. phil.,
T. IV.
P. II. pp. 335-368; Leibnitzii Opera
omnia
(ed. Dutens), T. II., P I. pp. 45,
46.
2. Vie de Mr. Leibnitz, pp. 134-143;
Brucker.
Hist. crit. philos. T. IV. P. II. pp.
385,
389; Tennemann, vol. xi. pp. 181, 182.
3. Leibnitzii Opera, T. II. P. I. pp.
32-39.
4. Ibidem, Principia philosophiæ, pp.
20-31.
5. cf. Leibnitz: Essais de Théodicée,
T.
I. P. I. § 10, p. 86.
6. Leibnitz: Principes de la nature
et la
grace, § 1, p. 32 (Recueil de diverses
pièces
par Des-Maiseaux, T. II. p. 485); Principia
philosophiæ, § 1, 2, p. 20.
7. Leibnitzii De ipsa natura sive de
vi insita
actionibusque creaturarum (Oper. T.
II. P.
II.), § 11, p. 55, Principia philosophiæ,
§ 3-6, 18, pp. 20-22; Principes de
la nature
et de la grace, § 2, p. 32.
8. Leibnitzii Principa philosophiæ,
§ 7,
p. 21; Troisième éclaircissement du
système
de la communication des substances
(Oper.
T. II. P. I.), p. 73 (Recueil, T. II,
p.
402).
9. Leibnitzii Principia philosophiæ,
§ 8,
9, p. 21; Oper. T. II. P. I. pp. 128,
129,
§ 4, 5: Il n'y a point deux individus
indiscrenables.
Un gentilhomme d'esprit de mes amis,
en parlant
avec moi en présence de Mad. l'Electrice
dans le jardin de Herrenhausen, crut
qu'il
trouverait bien deux feuilles entièrement
semblables. Mad. l'Electrice l'en défia,
et il court longtemps en vain pour
en chercher.
Deux gouttes d'eau ou de lait regardées
par
le microscope se trouveront discernables.
C'est un argument contre les Atomes
(Recueil,
T. I. p. 50).-Cf. Hegel's Werke, Vol.
IV.
p. 45.
10. Leibnitzii Principia philosophiæ,
§ 10-16,
pp. 21, 22; Principes de la nature
et de
la grace, § 2, p. 32.
11. Leibnitzii Principia philosophiæ,
§ 19-23,
pp. 22, 23; Principes de la nature
et de
la grace, § 4, pp. 33, 34; Nouveaux
essais
sur l'entendement humain (OEuvres philosophiques
de Leibnitz par Raspe), Bk. II. chap.
ix.
§ 4, p. 90.
12. Leibnitzii De amina brutorum (Op.
T.
II. P. I.), § 2-4, pp. 230, 231.
13. Leibnitzii Oper. T. II. P. I. pp.
214,
215, § 3; De ipsa natura sive de vi
insita,
§ 11, p. 55; Système nouveau de la
nature
et de la communication des substances
(Op.
T. II. P. I), pp. 50, 53.
14. Leibnitzii Oper. T. II. P. I. pp.
79,
121, 234-237, 280, 295; Nouveaux essais
sur
l'entendement humain, Bk. II. chap.
xiii.
§ 15, 17, pp. 106, 107.
15. Leibnitz: Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement
humain, Bk. II. chap. xii. § 7, pp.
102,
103; chap. xxi. § 72, p. 170; chap.
xxiv.
§ 1, p. 185.
16. Leibnitzii Oper. T. II. P. I. p.
39;
Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain,
Bk. III. chap. vi. § 24, p. 278; §
39, p.
290.
17. Leibnitzii Oper. T. II. P. II.
p. 60;
Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain,
Bk. II. chap. xxiii. § 23, p. 181.
18. Leibnitzii Principia philosophim,
§ 65-71,
p. 28; Principes de la nature et de
la grace,
§ 3, 4, pp. 32, 33.
19. Leibnitzii Principia philosophim,
§ 29-31,
p. 24; Principes de la nature et de
la grace,
§ 5, p. 34; Essais de Th6odic6e, T.
I. P.
1. § 44, p. 115.
20. Leibnitz : Priucipes de la nature
et
de la grace, § 7, p. 36.
21. Leibnitz: Principes de la nature
et de
la grace, § 8, p. 35; Principia philosophiæ,
§ 43-46, p. 25.
22. Leibnitz: Essais de Théodicée,
T. I.
P. I. § 6-8, pp. 83-85; Principes de
la nature
et de la grace, § 10, p. 36.
23. Leibnitz: Essais de Théodicée,
T. I.
P. I. § 20, pp. 96, 97; § 32, 33, pp.
106,
107; T. II. P. II. § 153, pp. 57, 58;
§ 378,
pp. 256, 257.
24. Leibnitzii Causa Dei asserta per
justitiam
ejus (Essais de Théodicée, T. II.),
§ 34-39,
pp. 385, 386.
25. Leibnitz: Principes de la nature
et de
la grace, § 3, p. 33; Premier éclaircissement
du système de la communication des
substances,
p. 70.
26. Leibnitz: Second et troisième éclaircissemens
du système de la communication des
substances,
pp. 71-73.
27. Leibnitzii Principia philosophiæ,
§ 82,
p. 30; Principes de la nature et de
la grace,
§ 11, p. 36.
28. Leibnitz: Système nouveau de la
nature
et de la communication des substances,
pp.
54, 55.
29. Leibnitzii Principia philosophiæ,
§ 90,
p. 31; Principes de la nature et de
la grace,
§ 12, 13, pp. 36, 37; § 15, pp. 37,
38.
30. Leibnitzii Oper. T. II. P. I. pp.
75,
76.
31. Leibnitzii Principia philosoph.,
§ 58-62,
p. 27; Oper. T. I. P. I. pp. 46, 47.
32. Leibnitz: Essais de Théodicée,
T. I.
P. I. § 9, pp. 85, 86.
33. Leibnitz: Principes de la nature
et de
la grace, § 12, 13, pp. 36, 37; Oper.
T.
II. P. I. p. 337.
34. Leibnitz: Essais de Théodicée, T. II.
P. III. § 291, pp. 184, 185; T. I. P. I.
§ 50, p. 119.
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