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The Metaphysics of the Understanding
B 2. HUGO GROTIUS.
Hugo Grotius was studying the laws of nations
at the same time as Locke; and in him the
very same methods may be found as those already
mentioned, inasmuch as he also falls into
a quite empirical system of associating nations
with one another, combining with that an
empirical mode of reasoning. Hugo van Groot,
born 1583 at Delft, was a lawyer, fiscal
general, and council pensionary; in 1619,
however, he was implicated in the Barneveldt
trial, and was compelled to fly the country.
For a long time he remained in France, but
in 1634 he entered the service of Queen Christina
of Sweden. In 1635 he was made Swedish ambassador
in Paris, and in 1645 he died at Rostock,
while on a journey from Stockholm to Holland.(1)
His principal work, De jure belli et pacis,
he composed in 1625; now it is not read,
but at one time it exercised a very great
and important influence. In it Grotius presented
a comparative historical account, the material
of which was partly derived from the Old
Testament, of the manner in which nations
in the various relationships of war and peace
have acted towards one another, and what
usages they held to be binding. The following
may serve as an example of his empirical
method of reasoning: Prisoners ought not
to be killed; for the object is to disarm
the enemy, and if this end be attained nothing
further should be done.(2) This empirical
way of connecting facts had the effect of
bringing general comprehensible and rational
principles into consciousness, of making
them recognized, and of causing them to be
more or less acceptable. Thus we see principles
set forth, respecting the righteousness of
a king's power for instance; for thought
applied itself to everything. We are unsatisfied
by such proofs and deductions, but we must
not overlook what is thereby accomplished;
and this is the establishment of principles
which have their ultimate confirmation in
the objects themselves, in mind and thought.
B 3. THOMAS HOBBES. a. Hobbes, who was celebrated
and distinguished on account of the originality
of his views, was tutor to the Earl of Devonshire;
he was born in
1588 at Malmesbury, and died in 1679.(3)
As a contemporary of Cromwell, he found in
the events of that time, in the Revolution
which then took place in England, an occasion
for reflecting on the principles of state
and law, and in fact he succeeded in making
his way to quite original conceptions. He
wrote much, including a treatise on Philosophy,
entitled “The Elements of Philosophy.” The
first section (Sectio) of this work, De corpore,
appeared in London in 1655; in it he first
of all treats of Logic (Pars I.), and secondly
of philosophia prima (Pars III.); this last
is an ontology and metaphysic. The next subdivision
(Pars III.), “On the relation between motion
and magnitude,” is a system of mechanism,
a quite popular system of physics; and a
study of the human organs. The second section
was to treat of the nature of man (De homine),
and the third of the state (De cive), but
the intellectual sections of the work Hobbes
did not entirely finish. He says in his preface
that Copernicus first opened up astronomy,
and Galileo physics; before them there was
nothing certain in either science. Harvey
worked out the science of the human body,
and physics generally as well as astronomy
were perfected by Keppler. All this was termed
Philosophy, in accordance with the point
of view which has been already given (p.
313), since in it the reflective understanding
desires to know the universal. Hobbes further
says concerning the philosophy of the state
(philosophia civilis), that it only dates
from the publication of his book De cive.(4)
This work, which appeared at Paris in 1642,(5)
is, like his Leviathan, a much decried book;
the second mentioned writing was forbidden
to be circulated, and is hence very rare.
Both works contain sounder reflections on
the nature of society and government than
many now in circulation. Society, the state,
is to Hobbes absolutely preeminent, it is
the determining power without appeal as regards
law and positive religion and their external
relations; and because he placed these in
subjection to the state, his doctrines were
of course regarded with the utmost horror.
But there is nothing speculative or really
philosophic in them, and there is still less
in Hugo Grotius.
Before this ideals were set before us, or
Holy Scripture or positive law was quoted
as authoritative. Hobbes, on the contrary,
sought to derive the bond which holds the
state together, that which gives the state
its power, from principles which lie within
us, which we recognize as our own. In this
way two opposite principles arise. The first
is the passive obedience of subjects, the
divine authority of rulers, whose will is
absolute law, and is itself elevated above
all other law. All this is represented in
close connection with religion, and proved
by examples from the Old Testament, by such
stories as those of Saul and David. Criminal
and marriage laws, too, for long derived
their character from the Mosaic laws, or,
speaking generally, from those the provisions
of which possessed their value by the fact
of being established by express divine command.
On the other hand we have in the second place
the reasoning wherein we ourselves are the
determining agents, and which was called
sound reason. In the movement which Cromwell
made use of there was allied with this a
fanaticism, which from the written letter
drew opposite conclusions to the above, and
this we see exemplified in the equality of
property, for instance. Hobbes, it is true,
likewise maintained passive obedience, the
absolute freedom of the royal will and power;
but at the same time he sought to derive
the principles of monarchical power, etc.,
from universal determinations. The views
that he adopts are shallow and empirical,
but the reasons he gives for them, and the
propositions he makes respecting them, are
original in character, inasmuch as they are
derived from natural necessities and wants.
Hobbes maintained that “The origin of all
society is to be found in the mutual fear
of all its members;” it is hence a phenomenon
in consciousness. “Each association is thus
formed in its own interest or for its own
renown, that is, from selfish motives.” All
such matters as security of life, property,
and enjoyment, are not to be found outside
it. “But men have in all dissimilarity of
strength a natural similarity as well.” This
Hobbes proves by a characteristic reason,
viz. that “each individual can make away
with the other,” each is the ultimate power
over the others. “Each can be supreme.”(6)
Thus their similarity is not derived from
the greatest strength; it is not, as in modern
times, founded on the freedom of the spirit,
or on an equality of merit and independence,
but on the equal weakness of mankind; each
man is weak as regards others.
b. Hobbes further takes up the position that
this natural condition is of such a nature
that all possess the desire to rule over
one another. “All in their natural condition
are possessed of the will to injure others,”
to tyrannize over other men; each has thus
to fear the other. Hobbes looks at this condition
in its true light, and we find in him no
idle talk about a state of natural goodness;
the natural condition is really far more
like that of the animals — a condition in
which there is an unsubdued individual will.
All thus wish to “secure themselves against
the pretensions of others, to acquire for
themselves advantages and superior rights.
Opinions, religions, desires, arouse strife;
the stronger bears away the victory. The
natural condition is consequently a condition
of mistrust on the part of all toward all;
it is a war of all against all (bellum omnium
in omnes),” and the endeavour of one to overreach
another. The expression nature has a double
significance: In the first place the nature
of man signifies his spiritual and rational
Being; but his natural condition indicates
quite another condition, wherein man conducts
himself according to his natural impulses.
In this way he conducts himself in conformity
with his desires and inclinations, while
the rational, on the contrary, is the obtaining
supremacy over the immediately natural. “In
the condition of nature a certain irresistible
power grants the right to rule over those
who cannot resist; it is absurd to leave
those whom we have in our power to become
free and strong again.”
From this Hobbes draws the conclusion that
“man must go forth from the natural condition.”(7)
This is true; the natural condition is not
what it should be, and must hence be cast
off.
c. Hobbes finally passes to the laws of reason
which preserve tranquillity. This condition
of law is the subjection of the natural,
particular will of the individual to the
universal will, which, however, is not that
of all individuals, but is the will of the
ruler; this is consequently not responsible
to individuals, but is directed against this
private will, and to it all must be obedient.(8)
Thus the whole matter is now placed on quite
another footing. But because the universal
will is made to reside in the will of one
monarch, there nevertheless proceeds from
this point of view, which is really correct,
a condition of absolute rule, of perfect
despotism. The condition of law does not,
however, mean that the arbitrary will of
one man constitutes absolute law, for the
universal will is no despotism, being rational,
inasmuch as it is consistently expressed
and determined in laws.
Rixner (Handbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie,
Vol. III. p. 30) says: “Law to him is nothing
but the sum of the conditions of peace extorted
by iron necessity from the original wickedness
of mankind.” We might add that in Hobbes
we at least find this, that the nature and
organism of the State is established on the
principle of human nature, human desire,
&c. The English concerned themselves
greatly with that principle of passive obedience,
in accordance with which it is said that
kings receive their power from God. This,
in one aspect, is quite true, but in another
it is falsely taken to mean that they have
no responsibility, that their blind desires,
their merely subjective will, is what must
be obeyed.
B 4. CUDWORTH. CLARKE. WOLLASTON. Cudworth
wished to revive Plato in England, but to
do this after the manner of the demonstrations
which we met with in Descartes, and through
a trivial metaphysic of the understanding.
He wrote a celebrated work: “The true intellectual
System of the Universe,” but the Platonic
ideas expressed are often in a clumsy form
and mingled with the Christian conceptions
of God and angels — all regarded as particular
existent things. What in Plato is mythical,
is here taken as reality in the form of existence;
this is reasoned about just as we reason
respecting a matter of ordinary fact, such
as whether it is probable that the French
seek to effect a landing in England, and
if so, whether they will successfully accomplish
it. The Christian intellectual world is dragged
down to the form of ordinary actuality and
consequently it is ruined.
The name of Clarke is likewise famous in
connection with his proof of the existence
of God. There were quite a number of other
English philosophers, whom we do not, however,
require to notice; for Clarke, Wollaston,
and others carry on their speculations within
forms such as belong to a very commonplace
metaphysic of the understanding. The manifold
systems of moral philosophy which we find
taking their rise in England are drawn up
from this same mental standpoint; in them
the implicitude of mind appears in a form
of natural existence, namely, of desires
and feelings. Their principles are found
in moral sentiments, benevolent desires,
sympathy, &c. That form alone is worthy
of notice which, on the one hand, represents
duty as something which is not foreign, given,
commanded, but as clearly belonging to self-consciousness,
even while, on the other hand, it represents
this property as a natural, unconscious,
unspiritual, and irrational existence. Impulse
is blind, a solid existence which cannot
get beyond itself like thinking self-consciousness.
It is indeed true of impulse that its pure
activity or its process, and the content,
are, as in thought, immediately posited as
the same; it has its content in itself, and
this is not dead and passive, but self-acting
and impelling. But that unity has the form
of immediacy only as existent; in the first
place it is not a knowledge, it is not necessary,
for it is only taken from inward perception;
in the second place, it is a determinate
which does not abrogate itself, beyond which
we cannot get, and which thus is not a universal.
Impulse is no more an infinite than is the
fixed category of force. Such reasoning takes
the impulses in their determinate character
from experience, and expresses the appearance
of necessity in the same as an inward existence,
as a force. For instance, the social instinct
is a moment which is found in experience,
because man derives all manner of utility
from society. Wherein does the necessity
of the State, of society, find its basis?
In a social desire. This is cause, just as
in the physical world a formal interpretation
such as this is always to be found. The necessity
of any existent fact, such as what pertains
to electrical phenomena, finds its basis
in a force which brings it forth; it is merely
the form of returning from the external to
an inward, of passing from the existent to
what is thought, which is again in turn represented
as an existent. Force is necessitated by
reason of the manifestation, we must argue
from the latter to the former. On the other
hand, the manifestation takes place through
the force, for it is the cause of the manifestation;
we hence have force in one place as reason,
and in another as cause. But in all this
there is no realization of the fact that
in respect of form there is a transition
from the Notion into Being and the other
way, while in respect of content there is
a perfect contingency of manifestation; we
look at electricity in the same way as we
look at the fact that men have social instincts,
sympathetic inclinations, and so on.
B 5. PUFFENDORF. In the struggle to give
to just and equitable relations in the State
an independent basis of their own, and to
found a judicial system of government, reflective
thought put forth its efforts; and this became
to it a real interest and concern. And, as
in the case of Grotius, it was also true
of Puffendorf, that the instinct of mankind
— that is, the social instinct, &c. —
was made the principle. Samuel von Puffendorf
was born in 1632 in Saxony; he studied public
law, philosophy, and mathematics at Leipzig
and Jena; in 1661, as a professor at Heidelberg,
he made natural and civil law for the first
time academic studies; in 1668 he became
tutor in a Swedish family, which office he
later on exchanged for the service of the
House of Brandenburg, and in 1694 he died
at Berlin as a privy councillor. He wrote
several works on political law and history;
we must specially mention his work, De jure
naturæ et gentium, Libr. viii., Londin. Scan.
1672, 4; and also his compendium De officio
hominis, published at the same place in
1673) 8, and Elementa jurisprudentiæ, universalis.(9)
While the divine right of kings was here
still recognized — whereby they rendered
account to God alone, or, at all events,
were still bound to take counsel of the Church
— the impulses and necessities present in
mankind were now considered as well. These
were regarded as the inward principles for
private and political law, and from them
the duties both of the government and of
rulers were deduced, so that the freedom
of mankind might not be interfered with.
The basis of the state in Puffendorf's view
is the social instinct: the highest end of
the state is the peace and security of social
life through the transformation of inward
duties as prescribed by, conscience into
external duties as compelled by law.(10)
B 6. NEWTON. The other side is that thought
likewise applied itself to nature, and in
this connection Isaac Newton is famous by
reason of his mathematical discoveries and
his work in physics. He was born in 1642
at Cambridge, made a special study of mathematics,
and became professor of the same at Cambridge;
later on he was made president of the Royal
Society in London, and he died in 1727.(11)
Newton was indisputably the chief contributor
to the popularity of the philosophy of Locke,
or the English method of treating of Philosophy,
and more especially did he promote its application
to all the physical sciences. “Physics, beware
of metaphysics,” was his maxim,(12) which
signifies, Science, beware of thought; and
all the physical sciences, even to the present
day, have, following in his wake, faithfully
observed this precept, inasmuch as they have
not entered upon an investigation of their
conceptions, or thought about thoughts. Physics
can, however, effect nothing without thought;
it has its categories and laws through thought
alone, and without thought it does not effect
any progress. Newton was mainly instrumental
in introducing to physics the determinations
respecting forces, which pertain to reflection;
he raised science to the standpoint of reflection,
and set the laws of forces in the place of
the laws of phenomena. Regarding matters
as he did, Newton derived his conclusions
from his experiences; and in physics and
the theory of colour-vision, he made bad
observations and drew worse conclusions.
He passed from experiences to general points
of view, again made them fundamental, and
from them constructed the individual; this
is how his theories are constructed. The
observation of things, the discovery of the
law immanent therein, and the universal which
is found within them, has become the real
point of interest. In this way, Newton is
so complete a barbarian as regards his conceptions
that his case is like that of another of
his countrymen who was surprised and rejoiced
to learn that he had talked prose all his
life, not having had any idea that he was
so accomplished. This Newton, like all the
Physicists, indeed, never learned; he did
not know that he thought in, and had to deal
with Notions, while he imagined he was dealing
with physical facts: and he presented the
extremest contrast to Boehme, who handled
sensuous things as Notions, and, by sheer
force of mind, obtained entire possession
of their actuality and subjugated them. Instead
of this Newton treated Notions like sensuous
things, and dealt with them just as men deal
with wood and stone. And this is even now
the case. In the beginnings of physical science
we read of the power of inertia, for instance,
of the force of acceleration, of molecules,
of centripetal and centrifugal force, as
of facts which definitely exist; what are
really the final results of reflection are
represented as their first grounds. If we
ask for the cause of there being no advance
made in such sciences, we find that it is
because men do not understand that they should
apply themselves to Notions, but make up
their minds to adopt these determinations
without sense or understanding. Hence in
Newton's Optics, for instance, there are
conclusions derived from his experience which
are so untrue and devoid of understanding,
that while they are set forth as the finest
example of how men can learn to know nature
by means of experiments and conclusions derived
from experiments, they may also serve as
an example of how we should neither experiment
nor draw conclusions, of how nothing at all
can be learned. A miserable kind of experience
like this itself contradicts itself through
nature, for nature is more excellent than
it appears in this wretched experience: both
nature itself and experience, when carried
a little further, contradict it. Hence, of
all the splendid discoveries of Newton in
optics, none now remain excepting one — the
division of light into seven colours. This
is partly because the conception of whole
and part come into play, and partly from
an obdurate closing of the eyes to the opposite
side. From this empirical method in Philosophy,
we shall now pass on to Leibnitz.
Notes:
1. Brucker. Histor. critic. philos.
T. IV.
P. 2, pp. 731-736, 743-745.
2. Hug. Grot. De jure belli ac pacis,
B.
III. chap. xi. § 13-16 (Ed. Gronov.
Lipsiæ,
1758, 8vo), pp. 900-905; chap. iv.
§ 10,
pp. 792, 793.
3. Buhle: Geschichte der neuern Philosophie,
Vol. III. Sec. 1, pp. 223, 224, 227.
4. Hobbes. Epistola dedicatoria ante
Elementor.
philos. Sectionem primam (Thomæ Hobbesii
Opera philosophica, quæ latine scripsit
omnia,
Amstelod, 1668, 4to), pp. 1,
2.
5. Cf. Brucker. Histor. crit. philos.
T.
IV. P. II. p. 154.
6. Hobbes, De cive, chap. i. § 2, 3
(Oper.
phil. etc. Amstel. 1668), pp. 3, 4.
7. Hobbes, De cive, chap. i. § 4-6,
12-14,
pp. 4-8; Leviathan, chap. xiii. (Oper.),
pp. 63-66.
8. Ibidem, chap. v. § 6-12, pp. 37-38;
chap.
vi. § 12-14, pp. 44-46.
9. Buhle: Geschichte der neuern Philosophie,
Vol. IV. Sec. 2, pp. 519-523; Rixner:
Handbuch
der Geschichte der Philosophie, Vol.
III.
p. 29.
10. Rixner: Handbuch der Geschichte
der Philosophie,
Vol. III. p. 31; cf. Puttendorf: De
jure
naturæ et gent. II. 2, § 5-7 (Francof.
ad
Moenum, 1706, 4), pp. 157-161; VII.
1, §
3-7, pp. 900-909.
11. Buhle: Geschichte der neuern Philosophie,
Vol. IV. Sec. 1, pp. 107, 108.
12. Buhle: Geschichte der neuern Philosophie,
Vol. IV. p. 115; cf. Newtoni Optices, P.
III. (Londini, 1706, 4) p. 314.
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