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B. Second Division
It was Locke who became the instrument of
setting forth this entire manner of thinking
in a systematic way, for he worked out Bacon's
position more fully. And if Bacon made sensuous
Being to be the truth, Locke demonstrated
the universal, Thought, to be present in
sensuous Being, or showed that we obtained
the universal, the true, from experience.
From Locke a wide culture proceeds, influencing
English philosophers more especially; the
forms adopted by this school were various,
but the principle was the same; it became
a general method of regarding things in a
popular way, and calls itself Philosophy,
although the object of Philosophy is not
to be met with here.
Section Two: Period of the Thinking Understanding
Chapter I. — The Metaphysics of the Understanding
B 1. LOCKE. When experience means that the
Notion has objective actuality for consciousness,
it is indeed a necessary element in the totality;
but as this reflection appears in Locke,
signifying as it does that we obtain truth
by abstraction from experience and sensuous
perception, it is utterly false, since, instead
of being a moment, it is made the essence
of the truth. It is no doubt true that against
the hypothesis of the inward immediacy of
the Idea, and against the method of setting
it forth in definitions and axioms, as also
against absolute substance, the demand that
ideas should be represented as results, and
the claims of individuality and self-consciousness,
assert their rights to recognition. In the
philosophy of Locke and Leibnitz, however,
these necessities make themselves known in
an imperfect manner only; the one fact which
is common to both philosophers is that they,
in opposition to Spinoza and Malebranche,
take for their principle the particular,
finite determinateness and the individual.
According to Spinoza and Malebranche substance
or the universal is the true, the sole existent,
the eternal, that which is in and for itself,
without origin, and of which particular things
are only modifications which are conceived
through substance. But hereby Spinoza has
done an injury to this negative; he hence
arrived at no immanent determination, for
all that is determined and individual is
merely annihilated in his system. Now, on
the contrary, the general inclination of
consciousness is to maintain the difference,
partly in order to, mark itself out as implicitly
free in opposition to its object - Being,
nature, and God, and partly in order to recognize
the unity in this opposition, and from the
opposition itself to make the unity emerge.
But those who were the instruments of this
tendency comprehended themselves but little,
they had still no clear consciousness of
their task, nor of the manner in which their
claims could be satisfied. With Locke, this
principle makes its first entrance into Philosophy
in a manner so completely at variance with
the inflexible undifferentiated identity
of the substance of Spinoza, that the sensuous
and limited, the immediate present and existent,
is the main and fundamental matter. Locke
does not get beyond the ordinary point of
view of consciousness, viz. that objects
outside of us are the real and the true.
The finite is thus not grasped by Locke as
absolute negativity, i. e., in its infinitude;
this we shall not find until we come to deal
in the third place with Leibnitz. It is in
a higher sense that Leibnitz asserts individuality,
the differentiated, to be self-existent and
indeed objectless, to be true Being. That
is to say, it is not according to him finite,
but is yet distinguished; thus, each monad
is itself the totality. Leibnitz and Locke
hence likewise stand in a position of mutual
independence and antagonism.
John Locke was born in 1632, at Wrington,
in England. He studied for himself the Cartesian
philosophy at Oxford, setting aside the scholastic
philosophy which was still in vogue. He devoted
himself to the study of medicine, which,
however, on account of his delicate health,
he never really practised. In 1664 he went
with an English ambassador for a year to
Berlin. After his return to England, he became
acquainted with the intellectual Earl of
Shaftesbury of that time, who availed himself
of his medical advice, and in whose house
he lived without requiring to give himself
up to practice. When Lord Shaftesbury became
Lord Chancellor of England, Locke received
an office from him, which, however, he soon
lost by a change of ministry. Owing to his
dread of falling a prey to consumption, he
betook himself in 1675 to Montpellier for
the benefit of his health. When his patron
came into power again he once more recovered
the place he had lost, only to be again deposed
on a fresh overthrow of this minister, and
he was now compelled to flee from England.
“The act by means of which Locke was driven
from Oxford” (what post he held there we
are not told) “was not an enactment of the
University, but of James II., by whose express
command, and by the peremptory authority
of a written warrant, the expulsion was carried
out. From the correspondence that took place,
it is evident that the college submitted
itself against its will to a measure which
it could not resist without compromising
the peace and quiet of its members.” Locke
went to Holland, which was at that time the
land wherein all who were obliged to effect
their escape from any oppression, whether
political or religious, found protection,
and in which the most famous and liberal-minded
men were to be met with. The Court party
persecuted him even here, and by royal warrant
he was ordered to be taken prisoner and sent
to England; consequently he had to remain
hidden with his friends. When William of
Orange ascended the English throne, after
the Revolution of
1688, Locke returned with him to England.
He was there made Commissioner of Trade and
Plantation, gave to the world his famous
treatise on the Human Understanding, and
finally, having withdrawn from public office
or account of the delicacy of his health,
he spent his remaining years in the country
houses of English nobles; he died on the
28th day of October, 1704, in the seventy-third
year of his life.(1)
The philosophy of Locke is much esteemed;
it is still, for the most part, the philosophy
of the English and the French, and likewise
in a certain sense of the Germans. To put
it in a few words, it asserts on the one
hand that truth and knowledge rest upon experience
and observation; and on the other the analysis
of and abstraction from general determinations
is prescribed as the method of knowledge;
it is, so to speak, a metaphysical empiricism,
and this is the ordinary method adopted in
the sciences. In respect of method, Locke
thus employs an exactly opposite system to
that of Spinoza. In the methods of Spinoza
and Descartes an account of the origin of
ideas may be dispensed with; they are accepted
at once as definitions, such as those of
substance, the infinite, mode, extension,
etc., all of which constitute a quite incoherent
list. But we require to show where these
thoughts come in, on what they are founded,
and how they are verified. Thus Locke has
striven to satisfy a true necessity. For
he has the merit of having deserted the system
of mere definitions, which were before this
made the starting point, and of having attempted
to make deduction of general conceptions,
inasmuch as he was, for example, at the pains
to show how substantiality arises subjectively
from objects. That is a further step than
any reached by Spinoza, who begins at once
with definitions and axioms which are unverified.
Now they are derived, and no longer oracularly
laid down, even if the method and manner
whereby this authentication is established
is not the right one. That is to say, here
the matter in question is merely subjective,
and somewhat psychological, since Locke merely
describes the methods of mind as it appears
to us to be. For in his philosophy we have
more especially to deal with the derivation
of the general conceptions, or ideas, as
he called them, that are present in our knowledge,
and with their origin as they proceed from
what is outwardly and inwardly perceptible.
Malebranche no doubt likewise asks how we
arrive at conceptions, and thus he apparently
has before him the same subject of investigation
as has Locke. But firstly, this psychological
element in Malebranche is merely the later
development, and then to him the universal
or God is plainly first, while Locke commences
at once with individual perceptions, and
only from them does he proceed to Notions,
to God. The universal to Locke is, therefore,
merely a later result, the work of our minds;
it is simply something pertaining to thought,
as subjective. Every man undoubtedly knows
that when his consciousness develops empirically,
he commences from feelings, from quite concrete
conditions, and that it is only later on
that general conceptions come in, which are
connected with the concrete of sensation
by being contained therein. Space, for example,
comes to consciousness later than the spacial,
the species later than the individual; and
it is only through the activity of my consciousness
that the universal is separated from the
particular of conception, feeling, etc. Feeling
undoubtedly comes lowest, it is the animal
mode of spirit; but in its capacity as thinking,
spirit endeavours to transform feeling into
its own form. Thus the course adopted by
Locke is quite a correct one, but all dialectic
considerations are utterly and entirely set
aside, since the universal is merely analyzed
from the empirical concrete. And in this
matter Kant reproaches Locke with reason,
the individual is not the source of universal
conceptions, but the understanding.
As to Locke's further reflections, they are
very simple. Locke considers how the understanding
is only consciousness, and in being so is
something in consciousness, and he only recognizes
the implicit in as far as it is in the same.
a. Locke's philosophy is more especially
directed against Descartes; who, like Plato,
had spoken of innate ideas. Locke likewise
makes special examination of the “inborn
impressions (notiones communes in foro interiori
descriptæ)” which Lord Herbert assumes in
his work De veritate. In the first book of
his work Locke combats the so-called innate
ideas, theoretic as well as practical, i.
e., the universal, absolutely existent ideas
which at the same time are represented as
pertaining to mind in a natural way. Locke
said that we arrive first at that which we
call idea. By this he understands not the
essential determinations of man, but conceptions
which we have and which are present and exist
in consciousness as such: in the same way
we all have arms and legs as parts of our
bodies, and the desire to eat exists in everyone.
In Locke we thus have the conception of the
soul as of a contentless tabula rasa which
is by-and-by filled with what we call experience.(2)
The expression “innate principles” was at
that time common, and these innate principles
have sometimes been foolishly spoken of.
But their true signification is that they
are implicit, that they are essential moments
in the nature of thought, qualities of a
germ, which do not yet exist: only in relation
to this last there is an element of truth
in Locke's conclusions. As diverse conceptions
essentially determined they are only legitimatized
by its being shown that they are implied
in the essential nature of thought; but as
propositions which hold good as axioms, and
conceptions which are immediately accepted
as laid down in definitions, they undoubtedly
possess the form of that which is present
and inborn. As they are regarded they are
bound to have value in and for themselves;
but this is a mere assertion. From the other
point of view the question of whence they
come is a futile one. Mind is undoubtedly
determined in itself, for it is the explicitly
existent Notion; its development signifies
the coming to consciousness. But the determinations
which it brings forth from itself cannot
be called innate, for this development must
be occasioned by an external, and only on
that does the activity of mind react, in
order that it may for the first time become
conscious of its reality.
The grounds on which Locke refutes innate
ideas are empirical. “There is nothing more
commonly taken for granted than that there
are certain principles, both speculative
and practical, universally agreed upon by
all mankind: which therefore, they argue,
must needs be constant impressions which
the souls of men receive in their first Beings.”
But this universal consent is not to be found.
We may instance the proposition, “Whatsoever
is, is; and It is impossible for the same
thing to be and not to be; which of all others
I think have the most allowed title to innate.”
But this proposition does not hold good for
the Notion; there is nothing either in heaven
or earth which does not contain Being and
non-Being. Many men, “All children and idiots,”
says Locke, “have not the least apprehension
of these propositions.” “No proposition can
be said to be in the mind which it never
yet knew, which it was never yet conscious
of. . . . 'Tis usually answered, That all
men know and assent to them” (the propositions)
“when they come to the use of reason. . .
. If it be meant that the use of reason assists
us in the knowledge of these maxims, it would
prove them not to be innate.” Reason is said
to be the deriving from principles already
known unknown truths. How then should the
application of reason be required to discover
supposed innate principles? This is a weak
objection, for it assumes that by innate
ideas we understand those which man possesses
in consciousness as immediately present.
But development, in consciousness is something
altogether different from any inherent determination
of reason, and therefore the expression innate
idea is undoubtedly quite wrong. Innate principles
must be found “clearest and most perspicuous
nearest the fountain, in children and illiterate
people, who have received least impression
from foreign opinion.” Locke gives further
reasons of a similar nature, more especially
employing those which are of a practical
kind - the diversity in moral judgments,
the case of those who are utterly wicked
and depraved, devoid of sense of right or
conscience.(3)
b. In the second book Locke goes on to the
next stage, to the origin of ideas, and seeks
to demonstrate this process from experience
- this is the main object of his efforts.
The reason that the positive point of view
which he opposes to any derivation from within,
is so false, is that he derives his conceptions
only from outside and thus maintains Being
for-another, while he quite neglects the
implicit. He says: “Every man being conscious
to himself, that he thinks; and that which
his mind is applied about, while thinking,
being the ideas that are there; 'tis past
doubt, that men have in their minds several
ideas, such as those expressed in the words,
whiteness, hardness, sweetness, thinking,
motion, man, elephant, army, drunkenness,
and others.” Idea here signifies both the
ordinary conception and thought; we understand
something quite different by the word idea.
“It is in the first place then to be inquired,
how he comes by them” (these ideas)? Innate
ideas have already been refuted. “Let us
then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white
paper, void of all characters, without any
ideas; how comes it to be furnished? . .
. To this I answer in a word, from Experience:
in that all our knowledge is founded.”(4)
As to the question in point we must in the
first place say that it is true that man
commences with experience if he desires to
arrive at thought. Everything is experienced,
not merely what is sensuous, but also what
excites and stimulates my mind. Consciousness
thus undoubtedly obtains all conceptions
and Notions from experience and in experience;
the only question is what we understand by
experience. In a usual way when this is spoken
of the idea of nothing particular is conveyed;
we speak of it as of something quite well
known. But experience is nothing more than
the form of objectivity; to say that it is
something which is in consciousness means
that it has objective form for consciousness
or that consciousness experiences it, it
sees it as an objective. Experience thus
signifies immediate knowledge, perception,
i. e., I myself must have and be something,
and the consciousness of what I have and
am is experience. Now there is no question
as to this, that whatever we know, of whatever
kind it may be, must be experienced, that
rests in the conception of the thing. It
is absurd to say that one knows anything
which is not in experience. I undoubtedly
know men, for instance, from experience,
without requiring to have seen them all,
for I have, as man, activity and will, a
consciousness respecting what I am and what
others are. The rational exists, i. e., it
is as an existent for consciousness, or this
last experiences it; it must be seen and
heard, it must be there or have been there
as a phenomenon in the world. This connection
of universal with objective is however in
the second place not the only form, that
of the implicit is likewise absolute and
essential - that is, the apprehension of
what is experienced or the abrogation of
this apparent other-being and the knowledge
of the necessity of the thing through itself.
It is now quite a matter of indifference
whether anything is accepted as something
experienced, as a succession of empirical
ideas, if one may so say, or conceptions;
or whether the succession is a succession
of thoughts, i. e., implicitly existent.
Locke treats of the various kinds of these
ideas imperfectly and empirically merely.
According to Locke simple ideas arise, partly
from outward, and partly from inward experience.
For experiences, he says, are in the first
place sensations; the other side is reflection,
the inward determinations of consciousness.(5)
From sensation, from the organs of sight
for instance, the conceptions of colour,
light, etc., arise; there further arises
from outward experience the idea of impenetrability,
of figure, rest, motion and such like. From
reflections come the ideas of faith, doubt,
judgment, reasoning, thinking, willing, etc.;
from both combined, pleasure, pain, etc.
This is a very commonplace account of the
matter.
After Locke has pre-supposed experience,
he goes on to say that it is the understanding
which now discovers and desires the universal
- the complex ideas. The Bishop of Worcester
made the objection that “If the idea of substance
be grounded upon plain and evident reason,
then we must allow an idea of substance which
comes not in by sensation or reflection.”
Locke replies: “General ideas come not into
the mind by sensation or reflection, but
are the creatures or inventions of the understanding.
The mind makes them from ideas which it has
got by sensation and reflection.” The work
of the mind now consists in bringing forth
from several simple so-called ideas a number
of new ones, by means of its working upon
this material through comparing, distinguishing
and contrasting it, and finally through separation
or abstraction, whereby the universal conceptions,
such as space, time, existence, unity and
diversity, capacity, cause and effect, freedom,
necessity, take their rise. “The mind in
respect of its simple ideas is wholly passive,
and receives them all from the existence
and operation of things, such as sensation
or reflection offers them, without being
able to make any one idea.” But “the mind
often exercises an active power in making
these several combinations. For it being
once furnished with simple ideas it can put
them together in several combinations.” According
to Locke therefore thought itself is not
the essence of the soul, but one of its powers
and manifestations. He maintains thought
to be existent in consciousness as conscious
thought, and thus brings it forward as a
fact in his experience, that we do not always
think. Experience demonstrates dreamless
sleep when the sleep is profound. Locke quotes
the example of a man who remembered no dream
until he had reached his twenty-fifth year.
It is as in the Xenien, - (6)
Oft schon war ich, und hab' wirklich an gar
nichts gedacht.
That is to say, my object is not a thought.
But sensuous perception and recollection
are thought, and thought is truth.(7) Locke,
however, places the reality of the understanding
only in the formal activity of constituting
new determinations from the simple conceptions
received by means of perception, through
their comparison and the combination of several
into one; it is the apprehension of the abstract
sensations which are contained in the objects.
Locke likewise distinguishes (Bk. 11. chap.
xi. § 15-17) between pure and mixed modes.
Pure modes are simple determinations such
as power, number, infinitude; in such expressions
as causality we reach, on the other hand,
a mixed mode.
Locke now explains in detail the manner in
which the mind, from the simple ideas of
experience, reaches more complex ideas; but
this derivation of general determinations
from concrete perception is most unmeaning,
trivial, tiresome and diffuse; it is entirely
formal, an empty tautology. For instance
we form the general conception of space from
the perception of the distance of bodies
by means of sight and feeling.(8) Or in other
words, we perceive a definite space, abstract
from it, and then we have the conception
of space generally; the perception of distances
gives us conceptions of space. This however
is no deduction, but only a setting aside
of other determinations; since distance itself
is really space, mind thus determines space
from space. Similarly we reach the notion
of time through the unbroken succession of
conceptions during our waking moments,(9)
i. e,. from determinate time we perceive
time in general. Conceptions follow one another
in a continual succession; if we set aside
the particular element that is present we
thereby receive the conception of time. Substance
(which Locke does not accept in so lofty
a sense as Spinoza), a complex idea, hence
arises from the fact that we often perceive
simple ideas such as blue, heavy, etc., in
association with one another. This association
we represent to ourselves as something which
so to speak supports these simple ideas,
or in which they exist.(10) Locke likewise
deduces the general conception of power.(11)
The determinations of freedom and necessity,
cause and effect, are then derived in a similar
way. “In the notice that our senses take
of the constant vicissitude of things, we
cannot but observe, that several particulars,
both qualities and substance, begin to exist;
and that they receive this their existence
from the due application and operation of
some other being. From this observation we
get our ideas of cause and effect,” for instance
when wax is melted by the fire.(12) Locke
goes on to say: “Every one, I think, finds
in himself a power to begin or forbear, continue
or put an end to several actions in himself.
From the consideration of the extent of this
power of the mind over the actions of the
man, which every one finds in himself, arise
the ideas of liberty and necessity.”(13)
We may say that nothing can be more superficial
than this derivation of ideas. The matter
itself, the essence, is not touched upon
at all. A determination is brought into notice
which is contained in a concrete relationship;
hence the understanding on the one hand abstracts
and on the other establishes conclusions.
The basis of this philosophy is merely to
be found in the transference of the determinate
to the form of universality, but it was just
this fundamental essence that we had to explain.
As to this Locke confesses of space, for
example, that he does not know what it really
is.(14) This so-called analysis by Locke
of complex conceptions, and his so-called
explanation of the same, has, on account
of its uncommon clearness and lucidity of
expression, found universal acceptance. For
what can be clearer than to say that we have
the notion of time because we perceive time,
if we do not actually see it, and that we
conceive of space because we see it? The
French have accepted this most readily and
they have carried it further still; their
Idéologie contains nothing more nor less.
When Locke starts by saying that everything
is experience and we abstract for ourselves
from this experience general conceptions
regarding objects and their qualities, he
makes a distinction in respect of external
qualities which was before this made by Aristotle
(De anima, II. 6), and which we likewise
met with in Descartes (supra, pp. 245,
246). That is to say, Locke distinguishes
between primary and secondary qualities;
the first pertain to the objects themselves
in truth, the others are not real qualities,
but are founded on the nature of the organs
of sensation. Primary qualities are mechanical,
like extension, solidity, figure, movement,
rest; these are qualities of the corporeal,
just as thought is the quality of the spiritual.
But the determinations of our individual
feelings such as colours, sounds, smells,
taste, etc., are not primary.”(15) In Descartes'
case this distinction has however another
form, for the second class of these determinations
is defined by him in such a way as that they
do not constitute the essence of body, while
Locke says that they exist for sensation,
or fall within existence as it is for consciousness.
Locke, however, no doubt reckons figure,
etc., as still pertaining to reality, but
by so doing nothing is ascertained as to
the nature of body. In Locke a difference
here appears between the implicit and being
'for another,' in which he declares the moment
of 'for another' to be unreal - and yet he
sees all truth in the relation of 'for another'
only.
c. Since the universal as such, the idea
of species, is, according, to Locke, merely
a product of our mind, which is not itself
objective, but relates merely to objects
which are germane to it, and from which the
particular of qualities, conditions, time,
place, etc., are separated, Locke distinguishes
essences into real essences and nominal essences;
the former of these express the true essence
of things, while species on the other hand
are mere nominal essences which no doubt
express something which is present in the
objects, but which do not exhaust these objects.
They serve to distinguish species for our
knowledge, but the real essence of nature
we do not know.(16) Locke gives good reasons
for species being nothing in themselves -
for their not being in nature, or absolutely
determined - instancing in exemplification
the production of monstrosities (Bk. III.
chap. iii. § 17): were species absolute no
monster would be born. But he overlooks the
fact that since it pertains to species to
exist, it thereby likewise enters into relationship
with other determinations; thus that is the
sphere in which individual things operate
upon one another, and may, hence be detrimental
to the existence of the species. Locke thus
argues just as one would who wished to prove
that the good does not exist in itself, because
there are likewise evil men, that the circle
does not exist absolutely in nature, because
the circumference of a tree, for example,
represents a very irregular circle, or because
I draw a circle badly. Nature just signifies
the lack of power to be perfectly adequate
to the Notion; it is only in spirit that
the Notion has its true existence. To say
that species are nothing in themselves, that
the universal is not the essential reality
of nature, that its implicit existence is
not the object of thought, is tantamount
to saying that we do not know real existence:
it is the same litany which has since been
so constantly repeated that we are tired
of listening to it:
Das Innere der Natur kennt kein erschaffener
Geist,
and which goes on until we have perceived
that Being-for-another, perception, is not
implicit; a point of view which has not made
its way to the positive position that the
implicit is the universal. Locke is far back
in the nature of knowledge, further back
than Plato, because of his insistence on
Being-for-another.
It is further noteworthy that from the sound
understanding Locke argues (Vol. 111. Bk.
IV. chap. vii. § 8-11) against universal
propositions or axioms such as that A=A,
i. e., if anything is A it cannot be B. He
says they are superfluous, of very little
use or of no use at all, for nobody yet has
built up a science on a proposition which
asserts a contradiction. From such the true
may be proved as easily as the false; they
are tautological. What Locke has further
achieved in respect of education, toleration,
natural rights or universal state-right,
does not concern us here, but has to do with
general culture.
This is the philosophy of Locke, in which
there is no trace of speculation. The great
end of Philosophy, which is to know the truth,
is in it sought to be attained in an empiric
way; it thus indeed serves to draw attention
to general determinations. But such a philosophy
not only represents the standpoint of ordinary
consciousness, to which all the determinations
of its thought appear as if given, humble
as it is in the oblivion of its activity,
but in this method of derivation and psychological
origination that which alone concerns Philosophy,
the question of whether those thoughts and
relationships have truth in and for themselves,
is not present at all, inasmuch as the only
object aimed at is to describe the manner
in which thought accepts what is given to
it. It may be held with Wolff that it is
arbitrary to begin with concrete conceptions,
as when our conception of identity is made
to take its origin from such things as blue
flowers and the blue heavens. One can better
begin directly from universal conceptions
and say that we find in our consciousness
the conceptions of time, cause and effect
these are the later facts of consciousness.
This method forms the basis of the Wolffian
system of reasoning, only here we must still
distinguish amongst the different conceptions
those that are to be regarded as most essential;
in Locke's philosophy, this distinction cannot
really be said to come under consideration.
From this time, according to Locke, or in
this particular aspect of Philosophy, there
is a complete and entire change in the point
of view adopted; the whole interest is limited
to the form in which the objective, or individual
sensations, pass into the form of conceptions.
In the case of Spinoza and Malebranche, we
undoubtedly likewise saw that it was made
a matter of importance to recognize this
relation of thought to what is sensuously
perceived, and thus to know it as falling
into relation, as passing into the relative;
the main question hence was: How are the
two related? But the question was answered
to the effect that it is only this relation
for itself that constitutes the point of
interest, and this relation itself as absolute
substance is thus identity, the true, God,
it is not the related parts. The interest
does not lie in the related parts; the related
parts as one-sided are not the existent,
presupposed and permanently established,
they are accidental merely. But here the
related sides, the things and the subject,
have their proper va1ue, and they are presupposed
as having this value. Locke's reasoning is
quite shallow; it keeps entirely to the phenomenal,
to that which is, and not to that which is
true.
There is another question however: Are these
general determinations absolutely true? And
whence come they not alone into my consciousness,
into my mind and understanding, but into
the things themselves? Space, cause, effect,
etc., are categories. How do these categories
come into the particular? How does universal
space arrive at determining itself? This
point of view, the question whether these
determinations of the infinite, of substance,
etc., are in and for themselves true, is
quite lost sight of. Plato investigated the
infinite and the finite, Being and the determinate,
etc., and pronounced that neither of these
opposites is of itself true; they are so
only as together constituting an identity,
wherever the truth of this content may come
from. But here the truth as it is in and
for itself is entirely set aside and the
nature of the content itself is made the
main point. It does not matter whether the
understanding or experience is its source,
for the question is whether this content
is in itself true. With Locke, the truth
merely signifies the harmony of our conceptions
with things; here relation is alone in question,
whether the content is an objective thing
or a content of the ordinary conception.
But it is quite another matter to investigate
the content itself, and to ask, “Is this
which is within us true? We must not dispute
about the sources, for the Whence, the only
important point to Locke, does not exhaust
the whole question. The interest of the content
in and for itself wholly disappears when
that position is taken up, and thereby the
whole of what is aimed at by Philosophy is
given up. On the other hand, when thought
is from the beginning concrete, when thought
and the universal are synonymous with what
is set before us, the question of the relation
of the two which have been separated by thought
is destitute of interest and incomprehensible.
How does thought overcome the difficulties
which itself has begotten? Here with Locke
none at all have been begotten and awakened.
Before the need for reconciliation can be
satisfied, the pain of disunion must be excited.
The philosophy of Locke is certainly very
comprehensible, but for that very reason
it is likewise a popular philosophy to which
the whole of the English philosophy as it
exists at this day is allied; it is the thinking
method of regarding things which is called
philosophy carried to its perfection, the
form which was introduced into the science
which then took its rise in Europe. This
is an important moment in culture; the sciences
in general and specially the empiric sciences
have to ascribe their origin to this movement.
To the English, Philosophy has ever signified
the deduction of experiences from observations;
this has in a one-sided way been applied
to physical and economic subjects. General
principles of political economy such as free-trade
in the present day, and all matters which
rest on thinking experience, the knowledge
of whatever reveals itself in this sphere
as necessary and useful, signifies philosophy
to the English (Vol. I. pp. 57, 58). The
scholastic method of starting from principles
and definitions has been rejected. The universal,
laws, forces, universal matter, etc., have
in natural science been derived from perceptions;
thus to the English, Newton is held to be
the philosopher par excellence. The other
side is that in practical philosophy regarding
society or the state, thought applies itself
to concrete objects such as the will of the
prince, subjects and their ends and personal
welfare. Inasmuch as we have an object such
as that before us, the indwelling and essential
universal is made evident; it must, however,
be made clear which conception is the one
to which the others must yield. It is in
this way that rational politics took their
rise in England, because the institutions
and government peculiar to the English led
them specially and in the first place to
reflection upon their inward political and
economic relationships. Hobbes must be mentioned
as an exemplification of this fact. This
manner of reasoning starts from the present
mind, from what is our own, whether it be
within or without us, since the feelings
which we have, the experiences which fall
directly within us, are the principles. This
philosophy of reasoning thought is that which
has now become universal, and through which
the whole revolution in the position taken
up by mind has come to pass.
Notes:
1. Buhle: Geschichte der neuern Philosophie,
Vol. IV. Sec. 1, pp. 238-241; Quarterly
Review,
April, 1817, pp. 70, 71; The Works
of John
Locke (London, 1812), Vol. I.: The
Life of
the Author, pp. xix-xxxix.
2. Locke: An Essay concerning human
Understanding
(The Works of John Locke, Vol. I.),
Book
I. chap. ii. § 1; chap. iii. § 15,
§ 22.
3. Locke: An Essay concerning human
Understanding
(Vol. I.) Book I. chap.. ii. § 2-9;
§ 27;
chap. iii. § 1-15.
4. Locke: An Essay concerning human
Understanding
(Vol. I.) Bk. II. chap. i. § 1, 2.
5. Locke: An Essay concerning human
Understanding
(Vol. I.), Bk. II. chap. i. § 2-5.
6. v. Schiller's Xenien.
7. Locke: An Essay concerning human
Understanding
(Vol. I.), Bk. II., chap. ii. § 2,
not.;
chap. xii. § 1; chap. xxii. § 2; chap.
i.
§ 10-14.
8. Locke: An Essay concerning human
Understanding
(Vol. I.), Bk. II. chap. xiii. § 2;
chap.
iv. § 2.
9. Ibidem (Vol. I.), Bk. II. chap.
xiv. §
3.
10. Locke: An Essay concerning human
Understanding
(Vol. II.), Bk. II. chap. xxiii. §
1, 2.
11. Ibidem (Vol. I.), Bk. II. chap.
xxi.
§ 1.
12. Ibidem (Vol. II.), Bk. II. chap.
xxvi.
§ 1.
13. Ibidem (Vol. I.), Bk. II. chap.
xxi.
§ 7.
14. Ibidem (Vol. I.), Bk. II. chap.
xiii.
§ 17, 18.
15. Locke: An Essay concerning human
Understanding
(Vol. I.), Bk. II. chap. viii. § 9-26.
16. Locke: An Essay concerning human Understanding
(Vol. II.), Bk. III. chap. iii. § 6; § 13,
15.
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